Guy Yedwab

Professor Levine

9/18/06

The Whole Truth?

In Book X of Plato's Republic, the character of Socrates makes many attacks on the field of art.

At times, however, his argument seems to become steeped in contradiction. On the one hand, one

passage argues that imitators can only represent a small part of the truth: “Imitative art is a long way

from truth, and, as it seems, that is why it reproduces everything, because it touches only a little part of

each, and even that an image.” (397). On the other hand, another passage argues that art sometimes

shows too much: “Then is this praise right and proper... to watch such a man as one would not like to

be oneself...and then to praise him instead of being disgusted?” (406). The questions this contradiction

raises are whether or not Socrates would prefer the whole truth or the idealized truth, and why Socrates

holds art to these two separate standards.

The passage which says “imitative art is a long way from truth...because it touches only a little

part of each...” (397), implies that true art would strive to represent the whole truth, and this is

supported elsewhere throughout the book. The passage which says that “all such [imitative art] are the

ruin of the hearers' minds, unless they possess the antidote, knowledge of what such things really are.”

(394) argues that only knowledge can defend one against the ignorance bred by the incomplete

imitations of art. In arguing that way, the passage is implying that the incompleteness of art erodes the

mind, which can only follow from the assumption that art is incomplete. He also includes a reason for

why this is bad: it erodes the mind. The passage that reads “if anyone should announce to us that he had

met a man who knows all the arts and crafts as well as each particular man knows them, knows

everything about them better than all the world—we ought to retort to such a man that he must be a

simple soul, and he must have met a magician and an imitator...” (398) argues that art is flawed because

it cannot know everything, but needs to if it is to attempt to imitate the world accurately. This passage,
in essence, says that art can never be successful due to its aim (which is assumed again to be complete

portrayal of truth) and the impossibility which is required. Again, this is based on the premise that it

needs a complete portrayal of truth to be effective. This is reiterated in the passage reading “the good

poet must know what he brings into his poetry, if he is to compose fine poems.” (398). This argues that

if the poet does not have full knowledge, he cannot fully portray the subject; and this implies that his

goal is to portray the subject fully. Using the passage “You call [the artist] the imitator of a thing of

which others were craftsman,” (397), Socrates' passage “if he really knew the truth in the things which

he imitates, he would make the real things his business far more than he would imitations.” (398). The

passages taken together argue that a creator is attempting to come as close to the whole (Godly) truth as

possible; and that, if possible, crafting is closer than imitating. Taken as a whole, these passages lend

credence to the idea that Socrates would advocate art only if it completely portrayed the truth.

On the other hand, another passage doubts the validity of showing certain elements of the

human psyche is shown in his question, “Then is this praise right and proper... to watch such a man as

one would not like to be oneself...and then to praise him instead of being disgusted?” (406). The

criticism of this passage is that art portrays heroes who act in imperfect ways. Socrates would prefer to

see characters who know “the right way...to behave in face of the fortunes of life.” (403). Yet at the

same time, another passage argues that “our soul is laden with thousands of such contradictions which

exist all at once.” (404). If so, then a truly full representation of art would include the thousand of such

contradictions—but this is not what many passages seem to argue. The opening passage of Book X

argues that we should “not to let in the imitative part of [art].” (394). In distinguishing between

imitative and non-imitative art, the passage advocates selecting the positive aspects of art: namely, the

non-imitative parts. Another passage asks “My dear Homer... what city was ever governed better

because of you...?” (399) implies that Homer should be working to improve the world. If Homer's

work is a passive reflection of the whole truth, then it would be improbable that Homer's work would

create massive positive change. On the other hand, the opposing quotation which calls for Homer to
influence toward good by providing a positive example is more congruent with this passage. The attack

on the imitative artist enshrined in the passage “He does not know how his work is good or bad...”

(402) is raised the point that the artist cannot distinguish between good or bad. The implication is that

the artist should distinguish between good and bad, in order to highlight “virtue and beauty and

rightness in each article or animal or action” (401).

As the contradiction deepens, I find myself wondering which position Socrates actually held.

Would Socrates prefer an art which came as close as possible to recreating the 'ideal forms' he

envisioned as existing in nature? Or would he rather that artists choose the most idealized of possible

appearances? From the textual evidence, it seems to me more likely that Socrates was holding imitative

art to the high standard of replicating full truth. When I examine the strains of his argument on a broad

scale, I found that two of three major arguments support a 'full' truth version of art. Firstly, his

ontological argument, which posits that art is flawed because it is three times removed from reality,

makes a very strong demand for art to be a full recreation of truth, at least implicitly. His

epistemological argument, which posits that art is flawed because the artist is not omnipotent and thus

cannot depict everything, is also balanced on the necessity of art as a full recreation of truth. Neither of

those arguments would have any meaning without the implied assumption that full recreation of truth is

art's goal. Nearly all of the evidence which opposes this view is from the moral argument, which warns

against the 'corruption of the soul' that the spectator gets from art.

Of course, another explanation for the contradiction rests with a passage early in the text: when

the passage indicates that we should “not to let in the imitative part of [art].” (394), there is obviously

implied a non-imitative part of art. However, this 'non-imitative part' of art is never defined, and the

reader is left to wonder what it is. One possible interpretation distinguishes 'imitative art' from the

works of Homer and similarly 'great' art; the argument which attacks art as 'immoral' tends to coincide

with the passages discussing the impact of Homer. If this is what Socrates was intending, then all of the

'original' artists, who are considered to be great, are held to the high standard of improving society and
putting forward what truths best benefit society, and all of the 'imitators' who would be Homer but do

not create original art on their own, rather reacting to what they see, are held to the standard of at least

fully recreating the truth of what they see. The lines between these two arguments are not sufficiently

well-defined to support this theory, but at the same time the passages could be consistent with that

view. If so, Socrates had best do a better job explaining the two (or more) separate classes of art, and

what each's standards are.