The Marines of Athens Author(s): John F. Charles Source: The Classical Journal, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Dec.

, 1948), pp. 181-188 Published by: The Classical Association of the Middle West and South Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3292569 . Accessed: 15/08/2013 12:36
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"The Epibataehavelanded

and have the situation well in hand."

The

Marines

of

Athens

John F. Charles
F A MARINE be definedas a fighteron ship- guished from the sailorswho make up the is contemporary crew, as any Americanmarineor sailor will board,the originof marines with that of warships, before the dawn of very quickly inform you. At the same time, history; for the first Stone Age man who put they are not merely infantry who happen to himself and his axe in a dug-out canoe with find themselves on a ship; they are part of malice prepense against his neighbor was a the total naval establishmentof the nation. We would expect such specializationto demarine. fleet and in a A narrower definition would confine the velop first in a highly organized itself nation which term to regularlyorganizedfoot-soldiersservprimarily as a regarded marines under modern The first for war. on board sea-power. ing shipsespeciallydesigned Such were the soldiers who sailed on the this definitionappearedin the British Navy warshipsof Thutmose III in his Syrian cam- in 1664, in the midst of England'snaval wars paigns,' or those representedin combatwith with the Dutch. The AmericanMarineCorps "peoples of the sea" in the murals of was formed at the very inception of the RamesesIII at Medinet Habu.2 Such also Navy in I775. would be the hosts who sailed against Troy Among the ancients the highest degree in the armadaof Agamemnon, kindred,no of naval specializationwould be expected doubt, of those very peoples of the sea. And fromthe Athenians, who were the sea-power of Athens we would similarly classify the Vikings in parexcellence;and the sea-soldiers their dragonships who terrorizedthe coastal are the main subject of this paper, although and river towns of Europein the ninth and marinesin our sense of the term must have as early as the naval battle between tenth centuries of our era. But even such appeared warriorsare not what we usually meanwhen Corinth and Corcyra in 704.4 The regular we speak of marines. The Homeric heroes word for marine was epibates, which the define as one who sails in a and the Norsemen were land-fighters who lexicographers used ships to get to the scene of fighting,and triremenot to row but to fight.5 There are three ways to use a warship:as usually rowed, themselves, the ships they a meansof locomotionto get to the fight; as sailed.3 The marines of modern times arerather a platform to fight on; and as a weapon to soldiers especially trained to serve on ship- fight with. The first theory is representedby board,intended to fight on or fromthe decks the Vikings and the Homeric warriors; in of ships, or to makeup landing parties oper- modern times by the troop-carrying deating out of ships. They are clearly distin- stroyers that played so prominenta role in 18I

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i82

JOHN F. CHARLES The per ship, 14 hoplites and four archers.10

Persian ships still had 30.1

the Pacific campaigns,notably the "Tokyo Express"of the Solomons' "Slot," and the host of LC's and LS's of the United States Navy. As between the two other uses, no final decision was reached until after the Napoleonic Wars when the developmentof longrange guns made boardingoperationsa practical impossibility.Even so, as late as 1941, a boarders'battle took place in a Norwegian fjord between HM destroyer Cossack and the Germanprison ship Altmarck.6On the whole, the more skillful sea-faringpeoples have tended to use the ship as a weapon, the less skillful as a platform.This was certainly reached true in antiquity. Fleet maneuvering its highest development among the fifthcenturyAthenians;whereasthe landlubberly Romansin their one real naval contest relied on the corvus(a combinationgrappling-iron and drawbridge)and the legionary soldier.

In the Athenian fleet of the fifth and fourth centuries, io seems to have been the standardnumber,as we see from an inscription,'2 and from several passages where we can divide the numberof infantryin a landing by the number of ships involved.l3 On the expedition to Sicily in 415, however, for 60 which fighting ships, we have 700 marines,14
would mean II or 12 per ship.

Of course a warship might carry more troops than its regular complement of marines. The Athenian fleet which operated around the Peloponnesusin 431 carried, in addition, 400 archers,presumablyfour to a ship.15These we may classify as marines, although they were not regularly assigned. Quite frequently greater numbers sailed with the fleet. In the expedition to Orneae
in 416 there were 600 men on 30 ships.16

Development of Marine Tactics

and their employment depends largely on the philosophyof navaltactics of the belligerents. In his descriptionof the battle between CorinthandCorcyra atSybotain433,Thucydides tells how both sides crowded their decks with hoplites, bowmen and javelin men. He adds rather patronizingly that "they were organized in the old manner, rather unskillfully. . . it was more like a land than a sea battle."7 Again before the battle in the GreatHarborof Syracusein 413, the Athenians, realizingthat fighting in so narrowa space would give little opportunity for maneuver, embarked large numbers of infantry.8 Thoughancientauthorsarenot lavishwith data on the number of marines at various times, it does appearthat it was greaterbefore the rise of Athenian sea,powerand the perfection of fleet maneuveringthan it was later. At the battle of Lade in 494, between the Persians and the revolting lonians, we read that the Chian ships each carried 40 Fourteen years chosen infantry as marines.9 later at Salamis,however, the new and modernized Athenian squadroncarried only 18
OBvIoUSLY the number of marines required

When the fleet sailed against Melos in 428,

there were 2,ooo on 60 ships.17Twelve years
1,520 troops.18 The expedition against Syra-

later againstthe sameisland, 30 ships carried

cusein 415 had 5,Ioo soldierson a total of 134 In cases like these, of course, the triremes.19 were not servingas marines,but were troops merely being transportedto the battlefield. Sometimes,no doubt, the fighting men were disposed through the whole fleet, and the ships thus became temporarily transports. At other times, the troops are carried in notably in the specialtransports,stratiotides, Sicilianexpedition,where we are told that of the Ioo Athenian ships, 40 were transports.

SocialStatus of Marines
IT ISA TRUISM that the class that fights the

battles of the state is likely to have socialand to its military political status corresponding importance.There is certainly a connection between the chariotwarriorsof the Homeric poems and the aristocraticmonarchyof the of the heroic age; between the pre-eminence phalanxin the classicalperiodand the hoplite franchisewe meet with so frequently in the fifth century; and between the Athenian fleets rowed by the proletariat,and the exof that city. It is only to be treme democracy

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THE MARINES OF ATHENS expectedthat the status of the marinewould vary accordingto the military and political system of the individual city. Generallywe find that the marinehas the same status as the infantryman, which is appreciably higher than that of the commonsailor. In the Persianfleet at the beginningof the fifth century the crews are madeup fromthe subject maritimestates which furnishedthe ships: lonians, Cilicians, Phoenicians and Egyptians. But the marinesare the elite inthe Persiansthemselves, fantryof the Empire, the Medes, the Sacae,and the warriorcastes of Egypt.20 Roughly the same situation obtained in the Spartan fleet. At least an Athenian speakerin 369 says that in a Spartanfleet the captainsand probablythe marineswould be but the sailorseither helots Lacedaemonians, or mercenaries.21 And if Spartacould furnish when her total populationhad citizenmarines fallento about I,Soo,22 she undoubtedlydid so in the precedingcentury. There is other evidence that generallythe marines rated as more important than the sailors.Aristotle tells us that sailorsneed not be freemen, but that marines will be, and that they controlthe ship.23 In many passages the marinesare bracketedwith the captains and officersas the elite of the ship.24 This is not at all surprisingin a state like Sparta whose social and economic system would permitno full citizento be a seaman.But even in democratic Athens the marinesseem to be in some ways a privileged group, although the distinction is not so clear-cut. Before Salamisit is to the marines,not the sailors that Themistoclesmakeshis rallyingspeech.25 When the orator Lysias is accusing an opponent of never having served the state, he says that he was neither horsemannor hopWhen the lite, neither captain nor marine.26 Sicilianexpedition is about to leave Athens, the libationsare made by the commandersand the marines.27 Someof these remarks, e.g. those referring to the eve of Salamisand the departurefor Sicily, are to be explained by the fact that every sailorhad a specificpost and a job to do, whereasthe marines,being merelypassengers

I83

until the ship was in action, would be free to hearspeechesandmakelibations.

Sailorsand Marines
BUT
WAS THERE

any real distinction in

economicclass between sailorsand marines? Specifically, we know that the sailors of Athens were fromthe lowest propertyclass, the thetes.Were the marinesthetes, or were they from the class above, the zeugitae,i.e. regularhoplites drawn from the catalog, or muster-roll? Two passagesseem to make it clear that the marines were thetes. In describingthe musterof the Athenian forces at Corcyrain 4I5, Thucydides distinguishes clearly the from I,500 hoplites from the muster-rolls28 the 700 thetes epibatae of the 60 fighting But in the summer of 412, when Atheships.29 nian naval fortunes were at their lowest ebb before Aegospotamoi, Leon and Diomedon sailedwith an Athenian fleetto Chios having on board marinesdrafted compulsorilyfrom the muster-rolls.30 It seems obvious that the procedure in 415 before Athens had suffered any naval lossesand when she was preparing the mightiest armadain her history would be more normalthan that of 412 after the tremendous loss in ships and seafaringmen at Syracuse. In 412, when half her empire was in revolt (and Athens thus cut off from her usual recruiting grounds for sailors) every available thete was needed for the rowing bench; whereasthe hoplite class, which had suffered less severely and was not needed for other service at present, might well be draftedfor shipboardduty.31 The theory that marines were usually drawn from the hoplite class,32 and that the use of thetes in 415 was unique33 or at least the first occasion,34 can scarcelybe based on these two passages. Sometimes an argument has been drawn fromThucydides'statementthat the marines who died in Aetolia in 426 were "the best men who fell in this war."35The word for best is ji8XrLOTro, which can refer to social class, of course. "This war" obviously means the ArchidamianWar. If we take "best" in

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184

J1OHNF. CHARLES

is by a sort of armorbelt.46When a grappling the sense of social status, the statement36 an enemy vessel for no matter what class iron was used.to immobilize incomprehensible, these men belongedto, it would not be supe- in order to board, it was, of course, the marior to that of the regularhopliteswho fell at rines who operatedit.47 In many accountsof naval expeditionswe Potidaeaor Delium or Amphilpolis. But it is if we interpretit as are told that extra hoplites went along, and, perfectlyunderstandable referringto military virtue,37for they may once landed, no distinction would be made well have been a special group picked from between the two forces. Even moreoften no mention is made of the size of the land force the whole corps of marines.38 We can only conjecture what the exact andwe arethus unableto tell whetherregular of the MarineCorps hoplites were included or not. Nevertheless andmakeup organization in which we are was. The epibataewere probablya group of there are enough campaigns alone that marines the told about ,500oo-2,ooo thetes, equipped by participated,or may state and trained in shipboardfighting, and reasonablyconjecturethat this was the case, perhapsorganizedin tribes like the hoplites. to give us some idea of the role of the seaWhen.a ship was to sail, its trierarchwould soldiers in the building and defense of the draft his quota of marines, like his citizen Athenian empire. We aretold nothing aboutthe composition sailors, from the tribal rolls. I would con. of the force that landed from ships and destatus somewhat the that privileged jecture of the Athenian marinesmay have been in feated the Persians at Mycale in 479. It is part due to their being Athenian citizens in clearhowever that:at the very time when the greater measurethan the seamen, who had Plataea campaignwas going on, no hoplites the reputationof being largelymercenaries.39 could have been spared to serve with the fleet, and that the fighting must have been Sailors Non-Combatants done by the marinesand such Ionian and isand oarsmennormallydid not land Greeksas hadjoined their countrymen.48 THESAILORS participatein the fighting, but occasionally To the marines must also be assigned the and not infrequentlywere siege and captureof Sestos on the Hellespont they carriedarms40 of the in the following winter, since it was conarms with by the commander provided as and light-armed ducted by the Athenian contingent from the employed expedition A few years later Cimon won a as or even Herodotus, samefleet.49 hoplites.42 troops41 like Mycale at the mouth of the much describesthe crews of victory possibly exaggerating, in Pamphylia.The main River national in their armed fleet as all the Persian Eurymedon on land by troops disemwas action make manot did of fashion.43 fought This, course, rines of such seamen,since their employment barkedfromthe 2oo Athenian triremeswhen as soldiers was incidental and exceptional. the Persiansdeclined a sea battle. The bulk The same custom exists in modern navies, of these menwere of coursemarines,although are occasionally Plutarchtells us that the ships had been eswhere partiesof blue-jackets to carrymoresoldiers.50 used as landingparties.44 peciallyreconstructed The tactics and armament of marines Landing Parties when used as landing parties calls for no conflict with the PelIN ATHENS'FIRST special comment, for they fought like any in the middleof the fifth century other land troops, with whom, of course, oponnesians they were often brigaded.The same is true the marineswere prominent.The descent on of boarders'battles, which Thucydides tells Halieis in 459 was a landing from ships, unThe siege of Aegina In the melee doubtedly by marines.51 us were muchlike land battles.45 use made marines the of maneuveringships, (458-7) requiredregularhoplites, of course; of arrows,javelins, and long-thrustingspears but the originallandingand investing of the againstenemy marinesand even the oarsmen town seems to have been made by marines. in so far as the latter were not sheltered For Thucydides tells us that immediately

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THE MARINES OF ATHENS after their naval victory off the island, the Athenians landed and besieged Aegina. It is improbablethat extra hoplites would have been carriedon ships which expected a naval engagementwith a fleet as efficient as the Aeginetan and largeenoughto lose 70 ships.52 The Athenians probablyhad 1oo ships, giving a marine force of about iooo, strong enough to start preliminarysiege operations city. againsta demoralized The expeditionof 2oo ships sent by Athens in 459 to assist the Egyptian revolt against Persiacarriedno troops but marines;and to them is due the credit of capturingMemphis and holdingit for nearlyfive years.53 Pericles' expedition to the Corinthian Gulf in 453 in which he attackedSicyon and joined the Achaeans in a campaignagainst Oeniadaewas a marinecampaignif the iooo troops54really sailed on ioo triremes, as Plutarchtells us.55 Throughout the PeloponnesianWar the Athenian marineswere constantly employed. This is particularlytrue of the Archidamian
War, from 431 to 421; for during that time

the Athenian fleet had almost undisputed controlof the sea, and full-dressnaval battles were few. Athenian strategy called for constant nuisanceraidson exposed points of the enemy coast, and occasionalseizureof fortified posts and beachheadsfrom which more extensive campaignsinland could be organized. Such operationswere the naturaltask of marinesthen as now. Marines Alone
THERE ARE SOME cases in which figures

given make it clear that only marineswere involved. These include a sweep of ioo triremes around the Peloponnese in 431;56 an 429/8 by Phormio and 400 marines from the

expedition into Acarnania in the winter of squadron at Naupactus on the Corinthian Gulf;57the voyage of Demosthenes in 424 throughthe CorinthianGulf, when he failed to get his 400 marinesand an army of allies to Boeotiain time for the Deliumcampaign.58 In some other campaignsno forces other than marinesare mentioned or implied, and they very probablyshould be assignedto the

marines.In the summerof 431 a fleet of 30 operated off Locris, landing marines who seized Thronium and Atalante and defeated in pitched battle the field force of the LoThe first expedition sent to block crians.59 the revolt of Mitylene in 428 consisted of 40 ships, and apparentlyno troops but marines, although reinforcementswere soon brought In 428 Asopus in fromLemnosand Imbros.60 raided aroundLaconiato Oeniadaeand Leucas, where he finally lost his life and part of his marine contingent.61At the time of Brasidas' seizureof Amphipolisin 424 it was the timely arrivalof Thucydides' eight ships and their marinesthat prevented the fall of Eion.62 Ominously indicative of a common employment of marines in the fourth century were two small expeditions to Caria, in 430/29 and 428, partly to put down piracy, but chiefly for what the Athenians quaintly referredto as "silvercollecting."Both ended disastrously.63 During the first Athenian expedition to Sicily in 427-23, Athenian participationin the land fightingwas confinedto the marines who won a number of successes in landing operations:at Mylae and Locrisin 426, and Messinain 425.64 The battle of Cyzicus in 410, where the Spartanslost the best part of a fleet of 60 and their admiralMindaros, was chiefly a land battle between the marinesof Alcibiadesand those of Mindaros.65 Perhapsthe most elaboratemarineexpedition of the war was that conducted by Demosthenesin a squadronof 30 ships in 426.66 With his 300marinesas a nucleus,and gatherand other allies,he ing a force of Acarnanians and Leucas finally Aetolia, operated against where he met disaster,losing nearly half his The shipsand survivingmarines contingent.67 were sent home. The following winter Demosthenes, commandinga force of western allies, inflicted a catastrophicdefeat on the Ambraciotsand their Peloponnesianallies.68 The only Athenian force specificallymenBut the tioned was a group of 60 archers.69 "few Athenians"70 later mentioned as reand as departing ceiving a third of the spoil,71

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I86

JOHN F. CHARLES The activities of the marinesin the Corinthian War of 395-86 can also be traced. In 394 after their victory over the Peloponnesians off Cnidus, Pharnabazusand Conon sailed among the islands expelling Spartan harmostsand garrisons,a job that must have been done by marines,though probablyfew were from Athens.82In the next springthey sailed to Greece with a large fleet "having hired in addition a large mercenaryforce."83 Since this was not for a land campaignbut merelyto raidthe enemyshore,the mercenaries were undoubtedly Greeks hired as marines to stiffen a fleet made up largely of oriental seamen;just as Cyrus a few years earlierhad hired Greekmercenaries to stiffen the armywith which he had warredupon his brother.These samemarinesseized Cythera, a grievousblow to Sparta.84 The expedition of Thrasybulusin 390/89 which restored Athenian control in the Hellespontand Lesboswas madewith a force of 400 marinesfrom 40 ships, and included a signalvictory over a groupof Spartanmarines under Therimachus.But it ended with the deathof Thrasybulus and a partof his forcein a landingat Aspendus.85 It would be exaggerated, of course to claim as a marinecampaignevery Athenian expedition which made a landing in enemy territory. The most striking Athenian successes of the ArchidamianWar, the capture of Sphacteria,Cythera and Methone, and the raids on Thyrea and other places, were madewith largeforces;that againstCythera, for example,had a few cavalryand 2,ooo hoplites, of which only 600 could have been marines.86 The force that raided the Corinthiad and took Methone was madeup of 200 horsemen and 2,000 soldiers, 800 of them marines.87 But it is obvious that in any camin marinesmadeup roughlyonewhich paign third of the force, and which consisted of on a hostile shore, the winning a beach-head marines, especially trained for this type of warfare,must have played a very important role.And it is worthy of note that the actions which really hurt Spartaand gave the Athenians the upper hand in this war were just suchcampaigns.

seem to play a more imwith Demosthenes72 portant role in the story than we would exarchers.It seems very pect of 60 light-armed that Demosthenes also had under probable his commandthe 200 marines from the 20 ships of Aristoteles which were operatingin the sameregionat the time.73

Marines at Pylos
eventually involved all branches of the Athenianforcesin largenumbers,but it seems likely that the originalseizureand defenseof Pylos was made largely by marines, again We aretold that 40 ships underDemosthenes. were despatched to Sicily under command of Sophoclesand Eurymedon.74 No force of hoplites is mentioned, and as the earlier squadronto Sicily had carriednothing but marinesand seamen,it is likely that this one did too,75especiallyas Thucydides makesit clear that it was ships that were needed in After Pylos hadbeenhastilyfortified, Sicily.76 the generals sailed off leaving Demosthenes with five ships to hold the place.77Demosthis numberby sending theneslaterdecreased two ships with a call for help to the fleet at At the time when the PeloponCorcyra.78 nesiansmade their first attack, Demosthenes had armedhis sailors as best he could, and had received a reinforcementof 40 MesseIn making his niansfroma passingprivateer.79 for defensehe picked60 hoplites preparations to preventa landingat the one placewhere it could be expected; the rest, and the light armed, guarded the stockade.80Probably Demostheneshad go hoplites under his command:the 40 Messeniansand the 5o marines from the ships, provided that he had held backthe marinesfrom the two ships sent to In additionhe had somethingbet, Corcyra.81 ter than Soosailorsarmedas skirmishers. It is quite reasonablethat when the attack came he employedtwo thirds of his shock troops to beat off the landing.Sinceno other soldiers arementioned,and the figuresagreewith the assumptionthat only marineswere present, it seems legitimateto credit that corps with the initial captureof Pylos.
THE PYLOS-SPHACTERIA campaign in 425

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THE MARINES OF ATHENS

NOTES (References are to Thucydides unless otherwise speci, fied.)
2. 454, 460, 468, 472 and n. a. 2 Breasted,
I23. 3 I. 10. 4. 4 I. 3. 4. 42 8. 43 7.

187

1 Breasted,Ancient Recordsof Egypt(Chicago, I906) History of Egypt (New York, 1912) fig.

17. I; 7. I. 3; XenophonHellenicaS. I; i. I. 24. 89-95. 44 Cf. the British naval detachment at Antwerp in 1914: W. Churchill, The World Crisis (New York, I93I) pp. I96 ff.
46 I. 49. I-2.

46 7. 70. 5. On protection for oarsmen,cf. C. Torr, Ancient Ships (Cambridge, I895) p. 5S. Plato Laches I83 D-i84 A mentions a long spear with a sickle on the end as unusual.It mayhave been intended to cut enemy 5 E.g. Hesychius, Harpocration,Suidas, s.v. bria3rTaL. rigging.Cf. CaesarBell. Gall. 3. I4. 6 Cf. 474. 25. 4; 7. 62. 3; 7. 65. 2. G. Cant, The War at Sea (New York, I942) 48No figures are given for the Greek forces. The 57-68. 7 fleet is numberedas iio by Herod. 8. 131; as 25o by I. 49. I-2. 8 7. 67. 2. Diodorus ii. 34. 2, a discrepancythat Glotz (Histoire 9 Herodotus 6. 5. grecque2 [Paris, I938] 93) explains by the addition of 10Plutarch ThemistoclesI4. the Athenian contingent between the musterat Aegina 11Herodotus 184. and the departurefrom Samos. Glotz (apparentlyfol7. 12 CIA II. 959. lowing How and Wells Commentary on Herodotus 13 3. 91. I and 95. 2; 2. 69. I and 92. 7 and Io2. I; [Oxford, 1912] 2. 395-396) speaks of 6000 Greeks at 4. 3I. I, 32. 2 and 76.I and ioI. 3; Xenophon Hellenica Mycale; Beloch (op. cit. 2. X. 59 n. 2), using Diodorus' Beloch's figures would give i84. 8. 25 and 28. figures, of 2000ooo-3000. 14 6. 43. 27 marinesper ship; Glotz' an averageof 24. The num, 15 2. ber on the Athenian ships at Salamiswas i8 according 23. 2. 16 6. to Plutarch Themistocles14. It is certainly unlikely 7. 2. 17 that morehoplites would have been with the fleetduring 3. 91. I 18 5. the Plataea campaign. 84. I.

21 XenophonHellenica7. I. I2. 22K. J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 3 (Berlin,i922)

282. 23 Politics I327 b.

19 6. 43. 20 Herodotus 7. 96, I84; 8. I30;

49 Herodotus 9. 114, 117--18.

9. 32.

50Plutarch Cimon 12; Diodorus II. 60-62; Beloch

op. cit. 2. 2. i6o.

24Xenophon Hellenicai. i. 28; Herodotus 8. 83; Plu, tarch Pericles28. 25Herodotus 8. 83. 26Lysias 6. 46.
29

51Whether an Athenian defeat as in i. I05. I, or a victory, Diodorus II. 78. 2. 52 I. 105. 2. The Aeginetans had won the prize of valor at Salamisonly i8 years before: Herodotus 8. 93.
53 I. 04, 109.
2. 54 I. III.

27 6. 32. I. 28 6. 43: (K KaraXoyov.

raxeat.

308. 24. 2: iKKaraX6'yova va'YKoarovs. 31So G. Busolt, GriechischeGeschichte 3 (Gotha, I88I) 236; and R. Sargentin CP 22 (1927) 274. 33P. Paris in Daremberg-Saglio s.v. epibatae. 34E. Meyer, Forschungen zur alten Geschichte (Halle,
1899) 2. I59-60.
1904) 872. 32 A. Cartault, La triereathenienne (Paris,

65PericlesI9. Diodorus II. 8s. I gives the numberas 50. Busolt (3. 334 n. 3) rejects both figures on the groundsthat no such numberof ships could have been stationed at Pagae. But Thucydides' concise narrative does not say that they were a permanent squadron there. A cruiseof Ioo triremeswas not unusual,andthey may simply have been at Pagaeon their way somewhere when the decision was madeto send them to the Corinthian Gulf. 562. 23, 25, 30, 31; Diodorus 12. 42. 7-8; 43.
57 2. 102.

353. 98. 4: cf. 3. 95. 2. 36 Poppo-Stahledition (Leipzig,i875) ad loc. Crawley (Modern Library edition) translates "by far the best men"; J. B. Bury, History of Greece (London, 1927) p. 424: "the very finest men," which does nothing to clear up the question of class. 37J. Classen's edition (Berlin, I875) ad loc.: "tapfersten"; Busolt op. cit. 3. 1069: "tiichtigsten." 38Jowett in his commentary(Oxford, I80o) refers to "chosenbattalions."
39 I. I21. 3. 40 7. I. 3: ^croi U7! eLxov 5rXa. 41 4. 32. 2; Xenophon Hellenica

4. 77. I-2; IxI. 3-4. 59 2. 26, 32; Diodorus I2. 44. I-2.

603 3.2; 3. 5. - 2. 3. 7 62 4. io6. 3-4.

61 63
65 66

4 3. 90. 3; 3. 99 and 103. 3;

67 3.
68

apyvpo)oyit.

2. 69; 3. I9.

4. 25. I. Xenophon Hellenica i. I. 17-I8.

3. 9 . I.

94-98.

3. I5-II4.

69 Ibid., 107. 1. 70 1. 2. 1.

Ibid., 4. 71 Ibid., 1 63. 6.

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I88

W. C. s.
76 3. IIS. 3-4. 77 4. . 2. 78 4. 8. 3.
79 80

72Ibid., 114. .73Ibid., Io5. 3; 112. 7. 744. 2. 2. 75 The mention of taxiarchshere might give the ima pressionthat regularinfantry were involved, as officers of this name regularlycommandedthe tribal regiments. But if the regularinfantry commanderswere with the fleet, the implication would be that the bulk of the Athenian field force was with them, several thousand at least, obviously impossible on so small a number of ships as 40. These taxiarchs must have been naval officers of some kind, as suggested by Lammert(PW s.v. raoilapxos)on the evidence of XenophonHellenica i. 6. 29, 35; I. 7. 30, 3I. Similar suggestion by Arn, apud Poppo.Stahledition of Thucydides, ad loc.

. 4 9. 4. 9. 2.

81As Classen suggests; though why he says the marines were "in der Regel 20 auf die Triere" is not clear. 82 Xenophon Hellenica4. 8. i-2. Though some may be included in the vbrrpecrias mentioned in Hellenica 2. i. Oxyrhynchia 83Xenophon Hellenica4. 8. 7. 84Ibid., 4. 8. 8.
85
87

Ibid., 4. 8. 25-30. 53. I.

I. 4. 42.

864

We See by the Papers.

0

We urge all our readers to appoint themselves special clipping bureaus for this department, and to forward material to us suitably marked with the name of the periodical and the date of issue. If an item appears in a magazine that you do not wish to clip, send us the gist of the material on a penny postcard!---TheEditors.

the wordsof Tiresias to quotesa speechrecalling Odysseus(Od. II.I2I-I32): "Not me, brother! I'm gonnafinishup the businesso' Bullwinkle an' that loggin' company;then I'll take me savin's,such as they is, an' stick a oar over me shoulder an'startwalkin' an'when someinland, bodyaxesme what the oaris, thereI'll settle!"
AND NOW A VERGILIAN parallel, submitted by

Professor E. AdelaideHahnof HunterCollege.

The New York HERALD TRIBUNE of October I7

ULYSSES WAS the first draft dodger, declared an officer of Selective Service Headquarters in an interview published by UP September 30, and Moses held the first draft registration.He related how Ulysses feigned insanity but dropped the pretense when his infant son was placed in the path of his plow, and then was required to join with other Greeksin the Trojan War. The officer made it clear that the draft bill of Moses was divinely ordered; and he did his best to make a case against the crafty son of Laertes:"If Ulysses tried to pull a stunt like that nowadays, it would constitute willful violation of the selective service act. Under such a violation, Ulysses would be liable to five years imprisonment, or a fine of $io,ooo, or both."

that volumesof carbon dioxideemitted reported over Mammoth Hot Springsin Yellowstone NationalParkwere killingbirdsflyingover the springs.Dr. Hahncites Vergil. Aen. 6.239-241, on LakeAvernus: quam super haud ullae poterant impune volantes tendere iter pinnis;talissesehalitusatris effundens ferebat. faucibus superad convexa of the placein Sherefersalso to the description Lucretius, 6.738-768.
REFLECTING ON the dearth of news from Ruare no mania,where "foreigncorrespondents longerwelcome,"the writer of "Topicsof the of October30, Times"in the New YorkTIMES slyly suggeststhat there may be a revival of corinterestin the reportsof a formerBalkan wereaptly someof whosedispatches respondent, of titled Tristia.He describes the circumstances Ovid's relegatioand touches on some of the strangethings that he foundto report.Tomis "hadbeenvisitedby Medea,the samecruellady in the New Yorktheatre who was appearing just PLEASE TURN TOPAGE194

ANOTHER HOMERIC ECHO was detected in the SATURDAY EVENING POST of September 18 by

ProfessorVirginia Moscrip of the University of Rochester. From the story "Tugboat Annie Races the Tide" by Norman Reilly Raine, she

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