PUBLICATION

What does Law mean? Law includes rules and regulations issued pursuant to a valid delegation and designed to enforce or implement an existing law. Such rules and regulations must be publish in order to be effective.1 When law take effect Art. 2. Section 2 provided the rules on publication that Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
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However, this was impliedly repealed by Sec. 18 of

Book I of the 1987 administrative Code which states that Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.3 Otherwise provided means that shorter or longer period may be fixed by law from publication, when the law will take effect.4 Illustrative Case: Tanada vs. Tuvera 146 SCRA 1986 Facts: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Issue: Whether or not publication is necessary in order for the law to take effect

Phil. Assn. of Service Expoerters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298 (1992) Art. 2, New Civil Code 3 Sec. 18 of Book I of the 1987 administrative Code 4 Ruben E. Agpalo (2005) Administrative Law, Law on Public officers and Election Law, Rex Book Store.
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Held: Yes, Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity.Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Rule in Publication General Rule: The law should be publish in order to be effective. Exception to the rule: Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. Summary of the Tanada vs. Tuvera Case. What needs to be publish? 1. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. a. presidential decrees and executive orders b. administrative rules and regulations 2. Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. 3. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board No need to be Publish Internal in nature 1. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature 2. letters of instructions 3. Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the

assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. 4. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code. Other Publication Requirements as mandated by law: Executive no. 292 Book VII Chapter 2: Rules and Regulations SECTION 3. Filing.(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. SECTION 4. Effectivity.In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. SECTION 5. Publication and Recording.The University of the Philippines Law Center shall: (1) Publish a quarterly bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and (2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables. SECTION 6. Omission of Some Rules.(1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained. (2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law is

punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. SECTION 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules.The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. SECTION 8. Judicial Notice.The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules. SECTION 9. Public Participation.(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. Illustrative Cases: People vs. Que Po Lay Facts: The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay. Issue: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties. Held: Yes, Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its

violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties. Philippine Blooming Mills vs. SSS Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) has been employed 6 Japanese technicians under a pre-arranged contract of employment, the minimum period of which employment is 6 months and the maximum is 24 months. First Deputy Administrator of the SSS, citing: Aliens who are employed in the Philippines shall also be compulsorily covered. But aliens who are employed temporarily shall, upon their departure from the Philippines, be entitled to a rebate of a proportionate amount of their contributions; their employers shall be entitled to the same proportionate rebate of their contributions in behalf of said aliens employed by them. (Rule I, Sec. 3[d]) The Assistant General Manager of the corporation, filed a claim with the SSS for the refund of the premiums paid to the System, on the ground of termination of the members' employment. As this claim was denied, they filed a petition with the Social Security Commission for a refund of P2,520. Commission denied the petition for the reason that, the original provision of Section 3 (d) of Rule I of the Rules and Regulations of the SSS was amended by eliminating that portion granting a return of the premium contributions. This amendment became effective on: January 14, 1958, or before the employment of the subject aliens were terminated. Issue: Whether or not the SSS is correct in denying the aliens refund

Held: Yes, in the present case, the original Rules and Regulations of the SSS specifically provide that any amendment thereto subsequently adopted by the

Commission, shall take effect on the date of its approval by the President. (The date of publication of laws in the Official Gazette is material for the purpose of determining their effectivity, only if the statutes themselves do not so provide.) the amendment thereto, although approved by the President on January 14, 1958, was published in the Official Gazette in November, 1958. Consequently, the delayed publication of the amended rules in the Official Gazette did not affect the date of their effectivity, which is January 14, 1958, when they were approved by the President. It follows that when the Japanese technicians were separated from employment in October, 1958, the rule governing refund of premiums is Rule IX of the amended Rules and Regulations, which requires membership for 2 years before such refund of premiums may be allowed. PASEI v Torres Facts: As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE issued DO No. 16-91, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino agencies of domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. DOLE, through the POEA, took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. Thus, pursuant to the DOLE order, POEA issued Memorandum Circular 30-91 providing guidelines for the deployment of Filipino domestic workers to Hong Kong. The petitioner therefore assailed the constitutionality of the aforementioned circulars for being contrary to the Constitution, and for lacking the requirements of publication. Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned circulars need publication prior effectivity and implementation

Held: Yes. Though they may be valid exercise of police power, nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and

filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. And pursuant to the ruling in Tanada v Tuvera, administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. De Jesus v COA Facts: RA 6758 was enacted which provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates, with certain exemptions. To implement this law, the DBM issued DBM-CCC No. 10, which discontinues without qualification all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary. Aggrieved by the aforesaid circular, the petitioners, who were receiving honoraria from a government corporation prior effectivity of the RA 6758, questioned the constitutionality of the circular for supplanting the law which it seeks to implement and for lacking the required publication prior its promulgation. Issue: Whether or not the questioned circular requires publication prior its effectivity Held: Yes. DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. Before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out NASECORE v ERC Facts: Pursuant to RA 9136, which created the Energy Regulatory Commission, the whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter.

latter issued an Order setting for public consultation its proposed Implementing Rules for the Recovery of Deferred Fuel and Independent Power Producers Costs (DCOR) and Deferred Incremental Currency Exchange Recovery (DICER). A notice of public consultation was caused to be published in the newspaper of general circulations directing parties to submit their comments on the proposed implementing rules. Several parties filed their respective comments and manifested their strong objections over the proposal. Thus, the ERC instead adopted the Implementing Rules for the Recovery of Fuel and Independent Power Producer costs: Generation Rate Adjustment Mechanism (GRAM) and the Implementing Rules for the Recovery of the Incremental Currency Exchange Rate Adjustment (ICERA). These two IRs were not published. Pursuant to this IR of GRAM, MERALCO filed their amended application for the increase of generation charged, which was subsequently approved by the ERC and is effective immediately. Thus, the petitioners filed this case questioning the lack of publication of the amended publication as required by RA 9136. On the other hand, the respondents contend that the amended publication need not require any prior publication because it is not RA 9136 but the IR of GRAM rather that governs it, which does not require any publication of the application at all. Also, they argued that the distribution utilities and consumers groups were duly notified of the public consultation on the proposed IR and that they even submitted their comments thereon, therefore, the petitioners should have known of it. Issue: (1) Whether or not the amended application of MERALCO to be valid must first be published (2) Whether or not public consultation and submission of comments on the proposed IR may substitute for its required publication

Held: (1) Yes. It is not the IR of GRAM which governs the amended application, rather it is RA 9136. And pursuant there, the application must first be published.

(2) The IR of GRAM from which the respondent argues that the amended application need not be published pursuant to thereto, is invalid due to lack of publication. The fact that the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their respective comments is not compliance with the fundamental rule that the GRAM Implementing Rules, or any administrative rules whose purpose is to enforce or implement existing law, must be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The requirement of publication of implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may not be dispensed with altogether even if, as in this case, there was public consultation and submission by the parties of their comments. The public consultation and submission by the parties of their comments were procedures prior to the adoption of the GRAM Implementing Rules. These procedural steps (public consultation and submission of comments) are entirely different from the publication of statutes mandated by law, which occurs after their promulgation or adoption. The obvious purpose of the preliminary procedures of public consultation and submission of comments is to give the parties the opportunity to air their views and express their concerns on particular subject matters before legislative measures or implementing rules and regulations addressing these matters are promulgated. On the other hand, the avowed rationale for the requirement of publication of statutes is to apprise the public of the contents of the laws or rules and regulations that have already been promulgated or adopted. Republic v Shell Facts: The Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under PD 1956, as amended by EO 137, the purpose of which is to minimize the frequent price changes in the world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. This OPSF requires petroleum and gas distribution companies to contribute to the fund.

The Office of Energy affairs, now the DOE, informed the respondent that the respondents contributions to the OPSF were insufficient, and that pursuant to MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended by Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 2-94, aside from the payment of the principal amount, a surcharge must also be paid. Thus, the respondent paid the principal amount of their underpayment, but not the surcharge. As the OEA persisted for the payment of the surcharge, the respondent contended the constitutionality of the said circular before the CA, which the CA held as unconstitutional and ineffective due to lack of prior publication. Thus, this petition brought before the Court by the petitioner contending that the circular is valid the respondent knew of its existence despite its lack of publication with the Office of the National Administer Register. Issue: Whether or not the aforesaid circular despite its lack of publication, is valid since the respondent knew of its existence Held: No. Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera, the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those issuances which should be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said circular should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 filing with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center for rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code of 1987 became effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance. Also, strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules concerned, as held in NASECORE v ERC.

Penal Rules and Regulations

Administrative rules and regulations which are penal in nature refer to those which carry with it penal or criminal sanctions for violation of the same. Administrative bodies have the authority to issue administrative regulations which are penal in nature where the delegating statute itself makes the violation of the administrative regulations punishable and provides for its penalty.5 The power to define and punish crime is exclusively legislative and may not be delegated to the administrative authorities. While administrative regulations may have the force and effect of law, their violation cannot give rise to criminal prosecution unless the legislature makes such violation punishable and imposes the corresponding sanctions.6 Requisites for validity: (a) The law which authorizes the promulgation of rules and regulations must itself provide for the imposition of a penalty for their violation; (b) It must fix or define such penalty; (c) The violation for which the rules and regulations impose a penalty must be punishable or made a crime under the law itself; and (d) The rules and regulations must be published in the Official Gazette. Nature of power to prescribe penalties: The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an administrative agency or official, the power to declare what acts shall constitute a criminal offense and how it shall be punished. Prescribing of penalties is a legislative function. However, Congress may validly provide in the law itself for the imposition of the penalty for violation of rules and regulations which it has empowered administrative authorities to enact.

Illustrative Cases: PEOPLE VS. MACEREN7 Facts:

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De Leon, H. (2010) Administrative Law: Text and Cases. Rex Publishing. Id. 7 People v. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450 [1977].

The old Fisheries Law punishes: (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deep sea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine mollusks; (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught; and (6) other violations, and provides fine and imprisonment for its violation. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending Section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84 by restricting the ban against electrofishing to fresh water fisheries. The defendants were charged with violation of Order No. 84-1. Issue: Is the order in question valid? Held: No. Power to declare what acts should constitute a criminal offense cannot be delegated. "Nowhere in that law is electro-fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro-fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls within the category of 'other violations' because the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances is fixed in Section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for 'other violations' of the law and regulations fixed in Section 83 of the Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute a criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro-fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against electro-fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the impression that electro-fishing is not condemnable per se, it could be tolerated in marine waters. The circumstance strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro-fishing." Administrative agencies are without power to enact a criminal statute: "A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, the power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An

administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. US VS. PANLILIO8 Facts: The defendant was charged with violation of Act No. 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases. The Act provides a penalty for violation of any of its provisions. It appears, all the carabaos of the accused had been exposed to the disease commonly known as rinderpest, and that said carabaos were accordingly declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral until released by order of the Director of Agriculture. However, inspite of defendant's knowledge of the order, he took the carabaos from the corral, drove them from place to place in his hacienda, and used them as work animals thereon in a manner as if they had not been quarantined. Nowhere in the Act is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Issue: May the accused be convicted for violation of the quarantine order issued by the Director of Agriculture? Held: No. "The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are not statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it." "Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein... What the act penalizes is the violation of any of its provisions, and NOT the violation of any of the rules or regulations that may be issued thereunder." PEOPLE VS. QUE PO LAY9
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U.S. v. Panlilio, 28 Phil. 608 [1914] People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 [1954]

Facts: Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said Circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Act No. 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says the Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Act No. 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have Issue: Is Que Po Lay liable for violation of Circular No. 20? Held: No. Publication of statutes in the Official Gazette is required for the effectivity of Circular No. 20. [T]he laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be published shall be published in the Official Gazette but said two laws do not say that unless so published they will be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing the same, and of the Bureau of Printing. Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of force and effect.

the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the New Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386.) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. Rights of the people to be informed of contents of penal statutes. "Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties."

Fixing of Rates, Wages, and Rates

The specific provision from the Administrative Code governing this subject matter is Sec. 9, Book VII of the said Code. The whole provision reads: SECTION 9. Public Participation.(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. Background: Normally, it is the Legislature that handles the subject matter. However, due to complexities society face, Legislature deemed it would be in the Publics interest if the administrative agencies who are experts in their field make the determination. These powers are delegated to the administrative agencies through statutes. The determination of these rates are subject to certain standards, rules, and requirements such as public hearings, guidelines, and other that will be discussed in a while. These standards are essential because absent any issuance by the legislative, the delegation may not be sustained. A good case to illustrate this would be the case of PHILCOMSAT v Alcuaz where: By virtue of RA5514, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, (now NTC) EO 196 issued in 1987

placed it under the jurisdiction of NTC. As a result, PHILCOMSAT was required to apply for a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Pending the application for the certificate, they were given a provisional authority to operate valid for 6 months and was extended for another 6 months but this time, they were directed a reduction of 15% on its authorized rates. Contends that enabling act of NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications does not provide the necessary standards, hence an undue delegation of legislative power. Also, PHILCOMSAT contends it is violative of due process since it was issued without notice and hearing. The issue presented was whether or not necessary standards were provided in the enabling act? The Supreme Court ruled in the Affirmative. Delegation is valid when: a. some standards for exercise are provided; b. the manner of its exercise is prescribed. Sec. 15g of EO 546 provides NTC in its exercise of rate-fixing power is limited to the requirements of: a. public safety; b. public interest; c. reasonable feasibility; d. reasonable rates. Section 6d thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates. All of these satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power to fix rates. Required contents of a statute to make a delegation of power valid: In order to make the delegation of such power valid, the following must be present: a. The manner of exercise of the delegated power must be present; b. It must be complete and must fix a sufficient standard; and c. It must be reasonable and just. It must be noted for the third requirement that even absent any express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. However, the absence of a fixed standard, the whole delegation may be declared unconstitutional. In addition, it must be non-confiscatory. Imposition of charges: Administrative agencies impose charges in 2 ways. First, by issuing rules and regulations which affect the public; and second, by issuing orders affecting only a certain person. The foregoing can be distinguished by presenting it in table form. Issuance of Rules and Regulations. (public) exercise of QuasiLegislative power Issuing of orders affecting a certain person. exercise of Quasi-Judicial power

grant of prior notice and hearing not a requirement applies to all enterprises of a given kind

prior notice and hearing essential apply exclusively to a particular party

For issuance of rules and regulations, there is no or little issue pertaining to it since it affects the public as a whole. However, when it comes the exercise of Quasi-judicial powers, prior notice and hearing is usually the issue. Most of the time, it concerns with due process. Illustrations of these would be the case of Vigan Electric v PSC, where Vigan Electrics revenue was reduced without prior notice and hearing; and again, the important case of PHILCOMSAT v Alcuaz, which also concerns reduction with regards to their rates; and lastly, the case of MIAA v Airspan Corp, where MIAA sought to increase the rent of their leased spaces. The different between the 1 st 2 cases (Vigan Electric and PHILCOMSAT) and the last one, MIAA is that in the case of MIAA, it was MIAA who wanted an increase. These cases concern only a particular party, prior notice and hearing is absolutely essential. Illustrative cases: Vigan Electric v PSC GR No. L-19850 (1954) Vigan Electric received a letter petition from Congressman Crisologo and Vigan residents, saying that Vigan Electric is importing electricity from Japan and are making money out of a privilege which belongs to the people; excessive charges and more than actual consumption. Vigan Electric denied importation; meters have been inspected checked, tested and sealed by PSC. An audit was conducted by General Auditing Office. Latter found out that the companys revenue can still be reduced by about 18%; and that it violated the 12% allowable return. PSC ordered for its reduction. Vigan instituted an action for certiorari to annul the order contending that the reduction issue was resolved without hearing PSC alleged that it was their delegated legislative authority and that no notice and hearing required in exercising such authority. The Issue presented was whether or not a hearing was necessary in reducing the prices set? The Court ruled for Vigan Electric. Since the reduction of rates apply only to Vigan Electric it was an exercise of a quasi-Judicial power thus, notice and hearing is required. Modification of such rates cannot be made, over Vigan Electrics objection, without such notice and hearing. Preliminary injunction on the reduction of the rates made permanent. PHILCOMSAT v Alcuaz GR No. 84818 (1989) PHILCOMSAT contends it is violative of due process since the reduction of its rates by 15% was issued without notice and hearing. The

Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. NTC failed to rationalize its order to decrease rates, no opportunity was given to PHILCOMSAT to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which NTC based its order. Notice and hearing is essential in this case. NTC is in the performance of its quasi-judicial function because it pertains exclusively to PHILCOMSAT and to no other; and it is premised on the finding of fact (whether there is merit in the reduction of the rates.) Furthermore the Public Service Act provides that the commission shall have the power upon proper notice and hearing to fix and determine rates. The order to increase rates is set aside. MIAA v Airspan Corp GR No. 157581 (2004) MIAA issued Resolution No. 97-51 announcing an increase in rentals of its buildings, VIP lounge, and business concessions. Thereafter it passed Resolution 98-30 adopting 20% increase in rentals. Issued another resolution; 99-11 which further increased other airport fees and charges. The lessees filed with the RTC a petition for injunction and a TRO. The lessees contend the resolution will cause damage to their properties as it will impede their business. RTC ruled in favor of the lessees. The RTC enjoined further collection and ordered the refund of amounts already paid. MIAA contends its charter authorizes it to increase its fees, charges, and rates without need of public hearing. Fees involved are contractual in nature. If lessees are not amenable, they are free to terminate the lease. The charter which created it is a special law. Therefore, the requirement of notice and hearing (as stated in the Public Service Act and the Administrative Code) is not applicable. Lessees contend MIAAs accountant erroneously based its recommendation on the price levels of other countries. The issue in this case was whether or not petitioner MIAA validly raised without prior notice and public hearing the fees, charges, and rates subject of its Resolutions Nos. 98-30 and 99-11? The Court ruled in the Negative. MIAAs old charter (EO 778) allowed it to adjust fees and rates. However, EO903 limited such authority to a mere recommendatory power. MIAAs charter established it as an attached agency of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (now DOTC). Hence, it is the head of the DOTC who has the power to determine the revisions of fees and rates. As an attached agency, MIAA is governed by the Administrative code which specifically requires notice and public hearing. Even if the increases are contractual in nature, MIAAs properties, facilities and services are imbued with paramount public interest, as it is the countrys principal airport EO903 requires that MIAAs charges should reflect the costs and increases in price levels. Delegation: The power delegated to an administrative agency cannot be delegated to another unless there is a law authorizing such. The underlying principle is that a delegated

power constitutes a right and a duty to be performed by the delegate through instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. It is presumed that the one to whom the power was delegated to is the one who is competent, and by delegating it to another, the purpose is defeated. This is in keeping with the latin maxim, PROTESTAS DELEGATA NON DELEGARI PROTEST. Illustrative cases: Panay Autobus Co. v Phil Railway Co. GR No. L-37869 (1933) Hancock, the VP and GM of Phil. Railway filed with the Public Service Commission a petition requesting the authority to alter the rates of PRC on the Cebu and Panay Divisions whenever in their judgement they find it necessary. Petition was set for hearing, and the operators were notified. Panay Autobus opposed and contends it will promote unnecessary competition between the operators; and, the petition for flexible rates could not be granted as it is against the fundamental principles of public utility regulation because the said law authorized Phil. Service Commission to fix the rates and no other. The issue was whether or not the petition of the PRC, if granted, would be an undue delegation of the power to fix rates? Yes. Sec16 of the Public Service Commission prohibits any unjustly discriminatory rate. PRCs proposal to alter its rates whenever it may be necessary and whenever it would be to its advantage would be discriminatory. If the unlawful competition really exists, it is up to PSC to correct them, not by delegating such authority. KMU v Garcia GR No. 115381 (1994) The DOTC issued MO Circ. allowing provincial bus operators to adjust their rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the official rate of LTFRB; it was valid for 1 year. Through another MO Circular, it was later increase to 20% above and 25% below limit. Private respondent PBOAP availed of this issuance and increased its rate by 20% without first having filed a petition for the purpose of public hearing. KMU filed a petition opposing the adjustment. It contends it was a derogation of the LTFRBs duty to determine if the adjustment is just and reasonable by delegating its function to bus operators. The issue presented in this case was whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to fix rates? Yes. Authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. It is LTFRB that is authorized under EO202 to determine such fares or rates, not the holders of a certificate of public convenience. Rates should not be confiscatory as would place the operator to continue to operate at a loss. This should be determined by the LTFRB alone.