A Propos of the "Critique of the Subject" and
of the Critique of this Critique
Until recently, French philosophy had given the impres-
sion of having invested the best part of its energy in the
enterprise of the "critique of the subject". It was neces-
sary to put to an end what we call the "philosophy of the
subject" or the "metaphysics of subjectivity". This
conviction was shared by the two rival schools: authors
of "structuralist" inspiration (known in the United States
under the label of "post-structuralism') and authors of
Heideggerian inspiration. Lately, several philosophers
have recommended a return to one or another version
of the philosophy of the subject (a return, of course,
illuminated and informed by the results of the critique).
Some return to phenomenology. Others to Kant and to
Fichte. 1
I should begin by confessing a first embarrassment. I
find it difficult to get used to this locution, so frequent in
contemporary French authors, of the "critique of the
subject" or the "death of the subject". I find it no less
difficult to get used to the closely related locution of a
critique or destruction "of subjectivity". What is, then, a
critique of the subject? When we speak of the "critique
of power", we well understand by this a critique of
persons in power, a critique of the way in which power
is exercised, or else again a more general denunciation
of the wrongs we are subjected to, perhaps because
of an ineradicable power. Similarly, the "critique of
money" is, it seems, the critique of the exaggerated or
pernicious role that money plays within our lives. In the
same way, the critique of the subject ought to be the
critique of persons who take themselves for subjects.
And the critique of subjectivity ought to be the critique
of those persons who give proof of subjectivity. How-
ever, if we consider the developments presented under
the heading of a Critique of the subject, we find not so
Topoi 7 (1988), 123--131.
9 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers'.
Vincent Descombes
much a censure of persons as the denunciation of an
illusion. What we call the critique of the subject is in fact
the critique of the concept of subject (or of the concept
of subjectivity). This critique bears upon the content of
the concept, upon its possible applications, upon its
validity. According to this critique, it is an illusion -- an
illusion ascribable to a "metaphysics of subjectivity" --
to believe that a lover is the subject of his desires, that a
thinker is the subject of his thoughts, that a writer is the
subject of his writing, that an agent is the subject of his
action, and so on.
There is a strange hesitation here between two kinds
of critique. On the one hand, we reproach the spirit of
our times as much as the "metaphysics of subjectivity"
for strongly encouraging persons to think of themselves
as subjects. Each person would be more or less under
the injunction of having to say to himself: I am the
subject of my thoughts, of my desires, of my actions, etc.
But we could never reproach persons for succumbing to
this appeal if they were not able, with some success, to
figure themselves as "subjects". On the other hand, we
claim that the concept of subject is chimerical: it is an
illusion to believe in the thinking subject, in the desiring
subject, in the writing subject, in the militant subject, etc.
Upon reflection, the hesitation that marks the sum-
mary phrase critique of the subject is instructive. It
would be mere intellectual confusion to found in a single
critical discourse the critique of morals and the critique
of the concept if this concept was not destined to play a
role in our lives. In other words, this "philosophy of the
subject" implies both a theoretical element and a pract-
ical element. As theory of the subject, it assigns to the
concept of the subject a fundamental role in the expla-
nation of a host of other concepts. (What other
concepts? "Structuralists," on account of their interests,
think more of the concepts used in the human sciences.
"Heideggerians", better read in metaphysics, claim that
it is instead a question of all our concepts, those of the