6. G.R. No.

L-4170

January 31, 1952

Intestate of the late AGUSTIN MONTILLA, SR.; PEDRO LITONJUA, a movant-appellant, vs. AGUSTIN B. MONTILLA, JR., administrator-appellee; CLAUDIO MONTILLA, oppositor-appellee.
Carlos Hilado and Jose V. Corua for the administrator. Jose M. Estacion for movant. Gaudencio Occeo and Jose Ur. Carbonell for oppositor. PARAS, C.J.:

In Civil Case No. 868 of the court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Pedro L. Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of the sum of P4,000 with legal interest, plus costs amounting to P39.00 In due time, a writ of execution was issued, but no property of Claudio Montilla was found which could be levied upon. On June 12, 1950 Pedro L. Litonjua filed in special Proceeding No 32 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Intestate Estate of Agustin Montilla, Sr., deceased, a motion praying that the interest, property and participation of Claudio Montilla, one of the heirs of Agustin Montilla, Sr., in the latter's intestate estate be sold and out of the proceed the judgment debt of Claudio Montilla in favor of Pedro L. Litonjua be paid. This motion was opposed by Claudio Montilla and by Agustin Montilla, Jr., administrator of the intestate estate. On August 7, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental issued an order denying the motion. From this order Pedro L. Litonjua appealed. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it was held that the creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of the testate or intestate succession have been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the debts of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. It was therein also held that a person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene either in the proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession. We quote hereunder pertinent passages of the decision.

A person who, having claim against a deceased person which should be considered by the committee does not, after publication of the required notice, exhibit his claim to the committee as provided by law, shall be barred from recovering such demand or from pleading the same as an offset to any action, under the provisions of section 695 of the Code of Civil Procedure, excepting the case referred to in section 701 of the same; with still less reason can one who is not a creditor of the said deceased intervene in the proceedings relative to the latter's intestate estate and to the settlement of his succession (article 1034 of the Civil Code), because such creditor has no right or interest that call for the protection of the law and the courts, except in any remainder which may be found due the heir. It is true that Yap Tico, as the creditor of the widow and heirs of the deceased Ildefonso, is entitled to collect what is due him out of the property left by the latter and which was inherited by such widow and heirs, but it is no less that only after all the debts of the said estate have been paid can it be known what net remainder will be left for division among the heirs, because the debts of the deceased must be paid before his heirs can inherit. (Arts. 659 et seq. 1026, 1027, and 1032 of the civil Code, and secs. 734 et seq., Code of Civil Code Procedure.) An execution cannot legally be levied upon the property of an intestate succession to pay the debts of the widow and heirs of the deceased, until the credits held against the latter at the time of his death shall have been paid can the remaining property that pertains to the said debtors heirs can be attached (Art. 1034, aforecited, Civil Code.) (pp. 350-251) The foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the case at bar, because the appellant is not a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his claim out of the inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir, before the net assets of the intestate estate have been determined. Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, and it is so ordered with costs against the appellant.

17. G.R. No. L-33924

March 18, 1988

MARIA BALAIS and PETRONILO ERAYA as successors in interest of JUAN BALAIS and JUANCHO BALAIS, petitioners, vs. BUENAVENTURA, ADELA, ROSITA, and TERESITA, all surnamed BALAIS, respondents. Ledesma, Guytingco & Associates for petitioners. Sergio F. Apostol for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.: Pursuant to its Resolution of June 30, 1971, 1 the Court of Appeals 2 certified this case to the Court. The Appellate Court declined to render a ruling, it being of the opinion that the case "involve[s] purely questions of law over which [it] [has] nojuriscliction." 3 Specifically, the questions put to the Court are two-fold: (1) does the court have jurisdiction to decree a partition in an action for reconveyance? (2) may it apply the provisions of the new Civil Code in determining the successionary rights of heirs where the decedent died during the effectivity of the old Code? 4 questions undoubtedly legal in character. In forwarding the appeal to this Court, the Court of Appeals invokes, specifically, the provisions of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. 5 We quote pertinent parts thereof: SEC. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in xxx (3) xxx xxx

All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;

(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided however, That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of the latter may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; xxx xxx xxx xxx

Under the Constitution then in force: 6

SEC. 2. ... [T]he Supreme Court [shall have] jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue. xxx xxx xxx

All cases in which an error or question of law is involved.

an exclusive jurisdiction of the Court since aimed under our subsequent Constitutions: Section 5. xxx xxx The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx

(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

All in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue. xxx xxx xxx

All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

Under, finally, the Judiciary Reorganization Act, 8 the Court of Appeals exercises: (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. We turn to the facts. We quote: From the decision of the Court of First Instance of L- qqqeyte the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders judgment:

(1)

Dismissing the complaint with cost against the plaintiffs:

(2) Maintaining its decision in toto in Civil Case No. C811 entitled Juan Balais et al. versus Petronilo Eraya including the dispositive portion granting to the illegitimate children, namely Buenaventura, Adela, Rosita and Teresa, all surnamed Balais successional rights and adjudicating to them one-fourth (1/4) of the share of their deceased father Escolastico Balais which consists of one- half (1/2) of the conjugal partnership property; and (3) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendants the amount of P400.00 for attorney's fees and P100.00 for expenses of litigation. plaintiffs Maria Balais and Petronilo Eraya have taken an appeal to this Court. Giving rise to the present case are in their chronological sequence as follows: April 22, 1964 Juan, Maria, Buenaventura, Adela, Rosita and Teresa all surnamed Balais filed a complaint against Petronilo Eraya in the CFI of Leyte docketed therein as Civil Case No. 811 for recovery of real property and damages (p. 13, folder of Exhibits). August 5, 1965 The lower court, rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: 1. Declaring the sale of one-half (1/2) of the parcel of land more particularly described in paragraph 4 of the complaint by the widow Eutelia Masalig to the defendant Petronilo Eraya null and void and ordering the latter to execute within thirty (30) days after the judgment becomes final a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs of one-half (1/2) of the said parcel of land minus one-fourth (1/4) thereof which is hereby declared validly sold to him by the widow and, if he fails to do so within the specified period, let judgment be entered divesting the title of said Petronilo Eraya to the property and vesting it in the plaintiffs and such judgment shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law; 2. Ordering that the hereditary estate of the deceased Escolastico Balais consisting of one-half (1/2) of the whole parcel of land described in paragraph 4 of the complaint be divided into two-halves, one-half (1/2) of which is hereby adjudicated to bis two legitimate children Juan Balais and Maria Balais (Article 888, new Civil Code); the share of each of the plaintiffs Buenaventura, Adela, Rosita and Teresa, all surnamed Balais shall be equal to two-fifths (,2/5) of the share of either Juan Balais or Maria Balais provided that their total shares in this particular case shall not exceed one-half (1/2) of the free portion after the share of Eutelia Masalig is fully satisfied (Article 895, paragraph 3, new Civil Code) which share of the widow shall be equal to the share of each of the legitimate children (Article 999 Civil Code); otherwise stated, the hereditary estate of the deceased which consist of one-half (1/2) of the whole parcel of land described in the complaint shall be divided into four (4) parts, two (2) parts of which shall belong to the two (2) legitimate children Juan Balais and Maria Balais one (1) part to the widow Eutelia Masalig which is hereby deemed included in the sale of the property to the defendant Petronilo Eraya and the remaining one (1) part to the illegitimate children Buenaventura, Adela, Rosita and Teresa, all surnamed Balais.

3. Ordering the defendant to render an accounting of the value of the products of the shares of the plaintiffs as above indicated from the time of the filing of the complaint, and to deliver the share to the plaintiffs together with their shares; and 4. To pay the costs of the suit.

March 28, 1966 The lower court issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution of the aforesaid decision. May 12, 1966 Defendant Eraya filed a motion to set aside the order of execution for the reasons therein stated (pp. 16-19, folder of Exhibits),. June 27, 1966 The aforesaid motion to set aside order for the issuance of writ was denied (p. 10, RA.). It will be noted that the plaintiffs' cause in Civil, Case No. 811 was for the recovery of property-and not for partition of an estate. Despite this, however, the lower court proceeded to distribute the estate of the late Escolastico Balais. February 23, 1967 Maria and Juan Balais and Petronilo Eraya filed a complaint in the CFI of Leyte, Civil Case No. C-893 against defendants for the annulment of that portion of the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 811 awarding to the latter who are illegitimate children of the late Escolastico Balais (1/4) of the hereditary estate of their deceased father. March 10, 1967 Buenaventura Balais and his co-defendants filed through counsel an answer with counterclaim whereby they sought for the dismissal of the aforesaid complaint. When the case was called for trial, the parties agreed to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings inasmuch as the defendants have admitted the material allegations of plaintiffs' complaint, as well as the latter's documentary evidence. July 29, 1967 The lower court rendered a decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint (pp. 13-26, RA.) 9 xxx xxx xxx

As we have indicated, the jurisdiction of the trial court 10 to order the partition and distribution of the estate in the course of an action for recovery of real property is contested. Apart from such a jurisdictional challenge, the trial court is held to be in error for applying the provisions of the new Civil Code, in particular, Articles 887 and 895 thereof, granting to so-called spurious children the right to a share in the estate of the deceased who perished in 1946 and consequently, prior to the effectivity of the new Code. 11 Jurisdiction, in general, is either one over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants (not incidentally, put to question here), or over the issues framed in the pleadings. There is no doubt that as far as the instant case is concerned, the Court of First Instance is vested with the jurisdiction to try either case, whether for reconveyance or partition. Under the judiciary law then in force, the Judiciary Act of 1948, the Court of First Instance exercises original jurisdiction:

(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into and detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act upon city and municipal Courts; 12 What is asailed however is the competency of the lower court to distribute the estate on a simple complaint for reconveyance. In other words, what is disputed is the jurisdiction of the court to pass upon issues not raised in the pleadings. There are instances, and upon the acquiescence of the parties, when issues not in fact alleged may be heard by the court. Section 5, of Rule 10, of the Rules of Court, provides, in part, as follows: ... When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. ... 13 In such a case, amendments may be had on the pleadings: ... as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment: ... 14 But failure to amend, the Rule further tells us, "does not affect the result of the trial of these issues." 15 The court, in that event, acquires jurisdiction over such issues. It may likewise be that although the court lacks the jurisdiction, it acquires one subsequently as when the defendant invokes it, say, by asking for affirmative relief 16 In that case, jurisdiction by estoppel arises. 17 Noteworthy is the fact that in the case at bar, in spite of the broad challenge the appellants present against the jurisdiction of the trial court to order the distribution of the property, they, in reality, question only that part of the decision awarding a one-fourth part of the property to the illegitimate children of the deceased, upon the ground that under the old Civil Code the statute in effect at the time of the death of the deceased in 1946 illegitimate children other than natural enjoyed no successionary rights. Otherwise, they do not contest the delivery of the estate to the deceased's widow or to themselves in the proportions decreed by the court. In that respect, they do not deny the court's jurisdiction to order partition. In their complaint, 18 they therefore prayed: WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiff;, thru their undersigned counsel to this Honorable Court respectfully pray: (a) That the plaintiffs be declared the absolute owner of the portion of 1/4 of the intestate estate of Escolastisco Balais now possessed under claim of ownership by herein defendants; That the part of the decision in Civil Case No. C-811, adjudicating one-fourth (1/4) of the intestate estate of the illegitimate children of Escolastico Balais be declared null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction and being contrary to law, particularly Art. 2263 of the New Civil Code; (c) That defendants be sentenced to pay the amount of P200.00 for every year they remain in possession of the property subject of this suit; P 500.00 as attorney's fees and P300.00 for expenses of litigation and costs; and (d) That the plaintiffs be granted whatever remedy they may be entitled in equity and justice. 19

The appellants must therefore be considered to have accepted the lower court's jurisdiction. To reject that jurisdiction with respect to the part of the decision unfavorable to them and to accept it as regards those portions favorable to them is to assume inconsistent stances. Either the court has jurisdiction or it does not. Estoppel is a bar against any claims of lack of jurisdiction. This is not to say, however, that the trial court in both suits, the original action for reconveyance and the suit for annulment of judgment did not err in granting in favor of the appellees a share in the estate pursuant to Article 895 of the Civil Code, 20 the decedent having passed away during the regime of the Civil Code of 1889 under which bastards, in bulgar parlance, were entitled to no share in the state. In Uson v. Del Rosario, 21 we said that the rights given to the adulterous children under the new Civcil Code have no retroactive application. Thus: xxx xxx xxx

There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vestedor acquired of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first timein this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act and the event which give rights thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the date her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the right to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Aricle 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the inpairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands dispute. 22 xxx xxx xxx

But as we stated, the error of the court notwithstanding, the case is a closed chapter, the decision having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. And, as noted by the trial court itself, it is the case that has become final and executory, and in fact, in the process of execution. 23 A decision, no matter how erroneous, becomes the law of the case between the parties upon attaining finality. 24 WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-13781

January 30, 1960

Testate Estate of JOSE J. JAVELLANA, Deceased. CRISTETA JIMENEA VDA. DE JAVELLANA, and BENJAMIN JAVELLANA, petitioners-appellees, vs. JOSE JAVELLANA y AZAOLA and JOSE JAVELLANA, JR., oppositors-appellants.

Vicente Hilado for appellees. Delgado, Flores and Macapagal and Arturo E. Balbastro for appellants. BARRERA, J.: On June 29, 1957, a petition to probate the alleged last will and testament of Jose J. Javellana, who died on May 24 of the same year, was presented in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Crsiteta Jimenea Vda. de Javellana and Benjamin Javellana, widow and brother respectively of the deceased, alleging that the aforesaid Jose J. Javellana, at the time of his death, a resident of Ssan Juan Rizal, left porperties with an approximate value of P400,000.00; that he also left a will which was delivered to the clerk of court pursuant to the Rules of Court; that Oscar Ledesma, therein named executor, had agreed to act as such; that the decedent's next of kin were; the wido., Criteta J. Vda. de Javellana, his children Erlinda Javellana, Jose Javellana y Azaola, and Jose Javellana, Jr. (Pepito), his sister Juanito J. de Ledesma, and brother Benjamin Javellana, whose respective addresses wre given in the petition. To this petition, Jose Javellana y Azaola and Jose Javellana, Jr. (Pepito) filed separate opposiytions, both claiming that the alleged will of Jose J. Javellana deposited by peittioners with the clerk of court was null and void, the same not having been executed "in accordance with the formalities required by law" and that "the legal requirements necessary for its validit" had not been complied with. At the hearing, petitioners introduced as evidence in support of the petition, a copy of the will; certification of the date and cause of death of the testator; proof of publication of the petition, once a week for 3 consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation, and thre testimonies of Jose G. Guevarra, Eloisa Villanueva and Jose Yulo, Jr., the 3 instrumental witnesses to the will, whi, in sustancer, testified that sometime in April, 1956, they were asked to witness the execution of the will of the late Jose. J. Javellana; that on the said occasion, Jose J. Javellana signed the 4 pages of the will in their presence, and they, in turn, also signed each and evey page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another; and that these acts wetre acknowledge before notary public Fernando Grey, Jr. on the same occasion. For their part, the oppositor limited their evidence to the presentation of two letters in the Visayan dialect allegedly written by the deceased, the signatures appearing thereon being identified by Jose Javellana, Jr. (Pepito) and Manuel Azaola, as those of the deceased, for the sole purpose of comparing said signatures woth those appearing in the will. On December 10, 1957, the court a quo issued an order allowing the probate of the will and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to Oscar Ledesma as executor thereoif, upon the latter's filing a bond in the sum of P10,000.00. From this order, oppositors appealed to this Court charging the lower court of committing error in allowing oprobate of the will, Exhibit C, on 2 grounds: (1) that the 3 sttesting witnesses failed to clearly and convincingly estabish the due execution of the will; and (2) that petitioners failed to prove that the will was written in a language known to the testator.

The first basis of oppositor's appeal has no merit. It is true that witnesses, particularly Miss Eloisa Villanueva, apparently found difficulty recalling who arrived first at the appointed place, or the order of the witnesses' signing the will, or failed to mention by name the persons present at the time of the witnesses was signing the document. These details, however, are minor and significant and do not enervate their positive testimony that at the execution of the will the testator, the 3 witnesses, the notary public and Atty. Vicente Hilado were all together in the private office of the latter; that Jose Guevarra, Eloisa Villanueva and Jose Yulo, Jr., the instrumental witnesses, were unanimous in declaring that they actually saw the testator sign the will as well as each and every page thereof, and they, in turen, affixed their signatures to all of its 4 pages. For the purpose of determining tjhe due execution of a will, it is not necessary that the instrumental witnesses should give an accurate and detailed account of the proceeding, such as recalling the order of the signing of the document by the dsaid wirtneese. It is sufficient that they have seen or at least were so situated at the moment that they could have seen each other sign, had they wnated to do so.1 In fact, in the instant case, at least two witnesses, Yulo and Guevarra, both testified hat the testator and the 3 witnesses signed in the presence of each and every one of them. With respect to the second ground, there is some merit in appellant's contention that the language requirement of the law on wills has not been satisfactorily complied with in this case. Admittedly, there is want of expression in the body of the will itself or in its attestation clause that the testator knew Spanish, the language in which it is written. It is true that there is no statutory provision requiring this and that proof thereof may be established by evidence aliunde.2 But here, there is absolutely no such evidence presented by the petitioners-appellees. Not even the petition for probate contains any allegation to this effect. No reference to it whatsoever is made in the appealed order. In some cases, it is true, this lack of evidence was considered cured by presumptioin of knowledge of the language or dialect used in the will, as where the will is executed in a certain province or locality, in the dialect currently used in such provimnce or locality in which the testator is a native or resident, the presumption arises that the testator knew the dialect so used, in the absence of evidence to the contrary; 3 or where the will is in Spanish, the fact that the testratrix was a "mestiza espaola", was married to a Spaniard, made several trips to Spain, and some of her letters in her own handwriting submitted as evidence by the oppositor, are in Spanish, give rise to the presumption that she knew the language in which the will was written, in the absence of proof to the contrary.4 In the case before us, no such or similar circumstances exist. On the contrary, there is evidence that the testator is a Visayan although residing in San Juan, Rizal at the time of his death. The will was executed in the City of Manila. Undoubtedly, it cannot be said, and there is no evidence, that Spaniards is the language currently used either in San Juan, Rizal, or Manila. It follows, therefore, that no presumption can rise that the testator knew the Spanish Language. But petitioner-appellees insist in their brief that the burden is on the oppositors to allege and prove that the testator did not know the Spanish language in the face of the legal presumption that "the law has been obeyed", "that a will executed in the Philippines must be presumed to have been executed in conformity with the laws of the Philippines".5 and "that things have happened

in accordance with the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life", concluding that it woiuld certainly be contrary to the ordinary habits of life for a person to execute his will in a language unknown to him. This, we believe, is, to use a colloquial term, being the question. If the argument of counsel is correct, then every unopposed will may be probated upon its mere presentation in court, without need of producing evidence regarding its execution. Counsel's statement is its own refutation. We find, in the record stone indicia, although insufficient to give rise to the presumption, that the testator might, in fact, have known the Spanish language. In oppositor's own Exhibit 3 (a letter admittedly written by the testator) appear the salutation "Querido Primo" and the complimentary ending "Su primo" which are Spanish terms. Having found that al the formal requisites for the validity of the will have been satisfactorily establishment, except the language requirement, we deem it in the interest of justice to afford the parties a opportunity to present evidence, if they so desire, on this controverted issue. Wherefore, let the records of this case be remanded to the court of origin for furhter proceedings as above indicated, without costs. It is so ordered. Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.