Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

The United States and Europe $.
Futureof Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Raymond 1. Barrett 3
15
23
34
41
MG Walter M. Hutton, British Army . . . . . . LTC Morris 1. Herbert, USA COL Robert G. Krebs, USA . . . Adolf Reinicke

The MilitaryHandgun

Beaufreand Total Strategy

CuerrillaWarfare in Central Europe An MR Special Feature

CivicAction in Thailand

. . . . . . Franklin Mark Osanka and LTG Saiyud Kerdphol, Royal Thai Army
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LTG Vinh Lot, ARVN . . , .lacWeHer Ashok Kapur

46

Searchfor ProfessionalExcellence Highway19: Then and Now . .

51
56
65
73

MilitarySituationin South Asia

NuclearPolicy and Military Strategy The DelicateBalance . . . . . . .

LTC Louis S, Hollier, USMC . .

Eughe Hinterhoff [ 78
Bb
93

TacticalCommunications

COL Emmett R. Arnold, USA LTG I. Kovalev, Soviet Army . . . . . . . . . . ...99

...108

Transportations Role in Modern War Military Notes Military Books . . . . . . . . . . . .

The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessarily those of the : US Armyor the Command and General Staff Collega.

Editor in Chief COL

DonaldJ.

Delaney

Associate Editor COL John B. .6. Trussell, Jr. Army War College Assistant Editor LTC A. Leroy Covey Features Editor LTC Robert G. Main Production Editor Helen M. Hall Spanish-American Editor MAJ Juan Horta.Merly Brazilian Editors LTC Samuel T. T. Primo LTC Romero Lepesqueur Publication Supervisor Amos W. Gallaway Art and Design Charles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW-Pubtished monthly by the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leav enworth, Kansas, in English, Spanish, and Portuguese. Use of funds for printing of this publication hss been approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 25 July 1968. Second.class postage paid at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Subscription rates: $4.oo (US currency)a year in the United States, United States military post oFRces,and those countries which are membersof the PamAmerican Postal Un~on fincludhrg Spain); $5.00 a year in all other countries single copy price 50 cents. Address subsr F1.hon mail to the Book Department, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

t
?3

Europe

Raymond J. Barfett

The views expressed in this arti cle are the aczthore and do not nec essarily reflect those of the Depart ment of Defense or ite agencfee. Editor.
NITED States policy in Europe ie a victim of its own success. This paradox probably accounts for much of the current perplexity about relations between tbe United States and Europe. Our success, as with any policy, brings us both risks and pros pects for greater achievement. It is important to acknowledge clearly where we now stand and to identify accurate] y the dangers and December 1968

possibilities that now confront ue. The confrontation with the Soviet Union has not been eliminated, but its qhar acter has changed. The fundamental interest of thp United States in Europe has been the protection of her own national eecu rity. The experience of two World Wars had taught the United States that her security would be in grave jeopardy if a hostile power controlled the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. The United States thus sought to fore stall that possibility by linking the se curity of Western Europe directly to that of the United States herself. Largely prostrated by World War II 3

EUROPE

, be obscured. For the plain fact is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza tion has been successful in ite primary purpose. A military equilibrium exiets in Eu rope. A sufficient balance of military strength existe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact so that neither side can rationally use military means to deal with the problems of central Eu rope. There is mutual deterrence over a wide range of poseible military ac tions. Nuclear striking forces on both sides are eo large or hardened that neither can expect to make a success ful surpriee nuclear attack on its op ponent. Timelag The timelag in the development and deployment of new weapone hae, in the past, given the other side time to respond, and there is no sign that this situation will change. In conven tional forces, the number and equip ment of NATO units deployed in Eu rope make it most unlikely that a Wareaw Pact commander might feel that he could launch a thrust swift enough to confront hie adversaries with a fait accompli before they could react. The rapid reinforcement capa bility of US and other NATO forces makes any euch thrust even more un likely. Thie state of affairs hae existed for several yeare now and seeme to provide a fairly etable military equi librium in Europe. The situation in Czechoslovakia has not basically changed this situation. The Soviet invasion was militarily effi cient and, in that sense, demonstrated that a clear military threat to West ern Europe is much in being. However, the buildup and positioning of Soviet forces took time and was clearly iden tified by Western sources. In other Militsry Review

and directly threatened by massive So viet military forces and Communist subversion, the countries of Western Europe found themselves vitally de pendent on the ~ted States for their security. I Dependence Increked The fundamental proposition that the security of the United States and that of Western Europe are inextri cably linked was formally recognized in the North Atlantic Treaty. Military developments over the past two dec ades have tended to strengthen rather than erode this proposition. The vast cost and complexity of modern Mili tary Establishments have put them be yond the means of the European coun tries. In the last analysis, therefore, the dependence of their security on the sophisticated and varied defense capabilities of the United States has grown. While the United States came under the immediate danger of attack in 1962, the threat would be far greater, and probably intolerable, if the east ern shores of the Atlant;c were in unfriendly hands. In acknowledging these fundamental truths, bowever, we should not let our vision of reality

Raymond J. Banett is Deputy Chief of the Program Staff, Ofice of Inter national Conferences, Department of State. A US Foreign Service oficer formerly assigned to the American Embassy in Madrid, Spain, he Ilas served at American Embassies in Mez ico City, Managua, Dzblin, and Cairo. He has also served with the Otlice of East and Southern African Affairs and was US Secretary of the Permanent Joint Board on DefenseUnited States and Canada, in Washington, D. C. His article, US-Canada Def ense Programs, smeared <,, tl~e September 1968 iseue of the MILITARY REVIEW.
4

$-..J,---

. ..

q EUROPE

words, the type of concentration of effort needed to launch a Soviet effort of similar strength against NATO ter ritory would provide warning for ap propriate NATO counterdeployment. The stationing of Soviet troops on the Czech-German border is not a net gain for the Soviets in the European

Cz&hoslovakia will be stationed among unfriendly hosts with attendant logis tics and morale problems. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was a sobering re miider of Soviet strength and brutal determination, but the Soviets may well have a tiger by the tail. Meanwhile, change has gone on

., --- Patrol boats of the Federal Republic of Germany Navy help guard NATOs northern tlank ! I power balance. They have lost in the process the considerable value of the Czech Army which had been reputed to be the best East European military force. They have also lost the Roma nian armed forces and whatever chances there were of Yugoslav sup port. The Soviets can hardly be free from suspicions regarding the loyalties of Polish,, Hungarian, and East German troops either. The Soviet units in December1968 apace in the relationships betwe~n the United States and Western Europe, within Western Europe, within the Communist bloc, and between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States and Western Eu rope in the postwar years have grown closer together in many ways. The volume of trade and investment be tweeethe two areas has grown enor mously. Tourist traffic has increased; transportation and communication ad 5

EUROPE vances have brought the peoples of the two areas far closer together than ever before. There is a vast and constant economic, cultural, and human inter change. While these ties are looser than those arising from military co operation in the face of danger, they more independent and self-assertilve tone of the German Government is another clear indication of changing attitudes. The Czechoslovakian situa tion has given Western Europeans pause and may result in some renewed attention to strengthening NATGs

us Amu!
East German troops operate a heavy mortar in Warsaw Pact exercises are likely to be more fundamental and enduring. The psychological ties that were basic to our involvement in West ern Europe have thus been. strongly reinforced. Relationships and attitudes within Western Europe also are changing. Diversity and self-confidence are on the increase. General Charles de Gaulle looms large because h. epitomizes the new mood of Western Europe. The 6 defenses. But the basic forces at work do not seem likely to be permanently diverted. A concern for military secu rity is no longer dominant among Western Europeans, and with it the sense of cooperation in the face of imminent danger has declined. Tbe im pulse toward closer political integra tion also seems to have passed. Meanwhile, having lost most of their colonies and many of their overseas Mllitsr) RMeW

,
EUROPE connections, Western Europeans are much less interested than they once were in other areas of the world, par ticularly in the developing countries which are likely to be the source of instability and future international crises. Economic and cultural ties among Western Europeans have been increased grestly by trade, invest ment, tourism, immigrant workers, and communication networks. Western European attitudes are clearly more concerned with economic and social well-being than with cooperation or common defense. Witlrin Eastern Europe The Communist countries of East ern Europe no longer constitute a mon olithic bloc. Even before Czechoslo vakia, there hae heen an undeniable process of fragmentation in the Com munist world. Distinct differences in internal arrangements, attitudes, and policies can be observed in the various East European countries. National as pirations and feelings have had a sig nificant impact on doctrinal formulas. Clearly, the Sine-Soviet dispute has also intensified the nationalistic trends in Eastern Europe and encouraged a greater degree of independence by many of these governments. The trends toward diversity also foster and are fostered by growing economic, tourist, and cultural con tacts with Western Europe. The developments in Czechoslovakia during 1968 have dramatized this trend. The Yugoelav and Romanian reactions to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia also underline the growth of diversity in Eastern Eu rope. Their dogged independence and the startling determination and re sourcefulness of the Czechoslovakians make clear how deep and pervasive are Decemberte68 the differences and national tion? in Eastern Europe. aspira

The Soviet occupation of Czechoslo vakia was, in itself, stark confirmation of this movement toward diversity, manifesting as it did how deeply worried the Soviets are about the growing independence among their one-time satellites. The Soviet move may well retfect feelings of vulnera bility rather than renewed aggressive intentions against Western Europe. At the very least, there are am biguity and movement in Eastern Eu rope that cannot be ignored. The So viet occupation of Czechoslovakia is likely to slow some of these changes, but can hardly deter them in the longer run. East Europeans will be cautious because of recent events, but evidence continues of their desires to develop relations with the West. Eaet European economic and technological needs and the underlying cultural as pirations seem likely to maintain and strengthen the desire for contacts with the West. United States and USSR The United States and the USSR have found a special dialogue between themselves well-nigh inevitable. If logic and rationality were to prevail, I the two superpowers had to recognize the mutuality of their interest in re ducing the likelihood of general war. In a more direct sense, each is the ~ only truly mortal threat to the other. A significant reduction in the uncer tainties and dangers that could lead to eithers destruction could only be negotiated with tbe other. The limited test ban treaty, the space treaty, the nonproliferation treaty, and tbe tacit restraints on each others activities in Vietnam and the Near East crisis are all pa~t of this pattern. 7

EUROPE This dialogue, of course, is not an uncomplicated matter. At best, it is a wary arrangement between capable and determined adversaries. The So viet aggression against Czechoslovakia has inhibited United States-USSR con tacts, but, significantly, neither side has sought to cut off discussions in areas of fundamental mutual concern, such as disarmament and arms con trol. Communist China and, to a lesser extent, De Gaullist France, add in creasing elements of uncertainty to the already complex equation. Allied Interests Negotiations between the two super powers also involve an often delicate weighing of allied interests. US mili tary power is the sine qua non of Western security, but the community of interests is the basic strength of the Western World. As the history of the nonproliferation treaty has shown, tbe United States must give careful and appropriate consideration to the interests of her allies. The Sine-Soviet dispute also clearly has placed con straints on the USSR in o;der to avoid compromising her position in tbe world Communist movement. While neither side is thus an entirely free agent, it is also clear that a special relationship has evolved. What are the implications of these new relationships for US policy to ward Europe ? Several points are: e The need to deal with Europe on its own terms. es An acceptance of NATOschang ing role. o A realistic assessment of West ern military requirements in Europe. e An effort to shape a more con structive relationship with Eastern Europe. e A positive ini: i.ive to further 8 the superpower dialogue between the United States and the USSR. There, undoubtedly, are other con siderations and many aspects of these points that will have to be examinsd carefully. However, these five points stand out as consequences of the emerging situation in Europe and as substantial departures in approach or emphasis from the previous pattern of US relations with Europe. Western Europes Terms The first requisite is that the Unitsd States deal with Western Europe on the latters terms. The emerging sit uation in Europe is a sign of success and not of failure in US policy. The United States set out in the postwar era to encourage the development of a free and strong Europe. Now, there is one. We are going to have to live with, and to learn to appreciate, dif ferences of opinion and policy. The very meaning of the word free is the right to disagree. Relations between the United States and Western Europe are going to he more fluid and unpredictable, and those countries are likely to resist be ing placed in molds favored by the United States. Dealing with Western Europe on its own terms will have certain advan tages, as well as disadvantages. West ern Europe and tbe United States are developing toward a common pattern. A community of industrial democra cies, dominated by egalitarian atti tudes and concern for economic and social well-being, is emerging. Many of their important problems and poli cies are similar. Full employment, eco nomic growth, broader educational op portunities, and improving rural and urban incomes are important to almost all of these countries. Military Rsview

On a broader international plane, the United States and the nations of Western Europe are bound together not by anticommunism, but by a common concern about the potential destructiveness of war, virulent na tionalism, and international anarchy. These positive, shared values and the ever-growing economic and cultural

sonably expect of NATO, namely the estab~ishment of a military equilib rium in Europe, has been achieved. Accordingly, we must anticipate that NATOs organizational concerns are going to be less central for its mem ber governments than they have been in the past. NATO can still provide a useful

NAfO NATo has achieved its primary purpose of establishing a mifitary equilibrium in Europe ties offer abundant room for construc tive common concerns that will tend to delimit, if not outweigh, the likely diversity in other areas of thought and policy. NATO is apt to play a substantially different role than it has up until now. A realistic approach to NATO is the second requisite of US policy toward Europe in the coming decades. The primary purpose that we could rea DECeinber1968 forum for the examination of political, politico-mihtary, technological, and re lated problems of clear interest to some or all of its members. We should turn our minds to constructi~ve initiatives that will utilize and develop NATOs still appreciable value in this regard. We also wilI have to accept that, even as a vehicle for political consul tation,, NATO is likely to have decided limitati?hs from the US point of view. 9 !

EUROPE Having shed most of their extra-Euro pean responsihilities, the members of NATO are clearly disinclined to re sume them. On Vietnam, for instance, Europeans are generally removed from the facts and issues and tend to judge the matter in terms of their own dom inant economic and social welfare as pirations. We, of course, should have a concern for European views regard ing Vietnam, but we gain little by un duly wringing our hands about them. Increased wealth and economic power are unlikely to lead our Euro pean allies to join us in our wider re sponsibilities elsewhere. As a consulta tive and collegial body, NATOs value to the United States as an instrument of action is going to be reduced. Ad hering to these limitations will be im portant to the United States in bene fiting from NATOs continued and con siderable value. Military Requirements Military matters will be more diffi cult for the United States to deal with in her relations with Europe. The third requirement for US policy is an accu rate identification of military prob. Iems combined with forethought and imagination in finding ways to meet these problems adequately within the realities of existing attitudes and pol icies. The Czechoslovakian crisis may produce some modest increase in the defense efforts of NATO members. But it has become increasingly fruit less, and probably counterproductive, to continue urging our European al lies to increase substantially their conventional military capabilities. We should view this question and the re lated one of allied troop levels as the military management problems that they are. The basic military requirement for 10 the Western alliance in EuroDe would .. seem to be to maintain mobile and flexible forces, with a wide range of conventional capabilities, sufficient to counter any Soviet pressure tactics and to reinforce the flanks of the al. liance if aggression or instability ace threatened in those areas. The prac. tical problems are more likely to m late to the composition of forces rather than their levels per se. Essential Element lhe maintenance, Of military strength will thus be an essential, rather than the central, element in Western policy. In the light of the more modest forces realistically needed, reductions in troop levels may be possible. This Likelihood will in crease as the reinforcement capabili ties rise sharply when the new large aircraft come into operation. The symbolic value of large US troop de. ployment on the Continent has de clined.

NATOs military concerns primar ily will be those related to the most efficient provision of the greatest mo bility and flexibility, particularly if the alliance is geographically split by the virtual withdrawal of France. Nu clear weapons will continue to be of concern, but increasingly as a political question rather than as a direct mili tary one. NATO has made a good start on institutionalizing consultative ar rangements regarding nuclear weap ens, and continuation of this trend provides one profitable avenue of al liance cooperation.
A military question that will be of increasing importance is the access through Europe to Africa and the Middle East. This aspect of US-Eur& pean military relations has receivd limited over-all study. All the indicS krimwyIreriefl

I EUROPE tions are that the major crisis areas in future decades are likely to origi. nate in the inherent instabilities of the development process in the nations of Afro-Asia. The Mediterranean is the entry way to much of this area. With out even going beyond the Mediter ranean littoral, grave problems can be bled areas in the Afro-Asian world. This ~capability is likely to continue to be of importance to the United States, and it is one that at least some of our European allies themselves may come to value and to join with us in developing. Changing military requirements are

The presence of substantial

US troop strength in Europe signifies our continued cuql mitment to mutual security a reflection of the altered nature of the conflict with the Soviet Union. Events of the past decades have shown that efforts to alter the military bal ance in favor of one side or the other are futile and often risky. The situa tion is not one of Europe for the Eu ropeans. Any such idea is obviously out of keeping with the realities of the military balance. While Soviet mil itary strength is no longer tbe main reason t or the Western alliance, it is 11

noted in the Near East, in Cyprus, and in the growing Soviet presence in this area. There clearly is a growing ~hreat to Western Europes southern flank; this is one good reason for a stepped-up emphasis on mobile reinforcement ca pabilities. In addition, the climate, communications, facilities, and re sources of southern Europe provide an advantageous base for expeditious deployment of Western forces to trou December1968

not, as the Czechoslovakian crisis viv idly demonstrated, a matter of uncon cern to it. The United States and the Soviet Union continue to be the major factors in the military balance in Eu rope and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. The mutual security interest be tween the United States and Western Europe is still great. Even less thah before can we contemplate accepting contrpl of Western Europe by a hos tile power. The increased intimacy of our relations would make our response to this prospect even more sensitive and rapid. Should the security situa tion change to one of heightened threat, the military aspect would, un doubtedly, again become the central feature of reIations between the United States and Europe. Constructive Relationship The fourth requisite of US policy in meeting the changes in Europe is an effort to shape a larger and more constructive relationship with the Communist states. Our Jeverage, of course, is limited in this area because changes in Eastern Europe will prob ably reflect developments within these countries more than anything that we can do. We can try to take advantage of the trends in Eastern Europe to en courage the kinds of changes that we would like to eee. The prospects for solution of the East-West confronta tion in Europe increase primarily as Eastern European attitude: change to ward openness and cooperation. We are going to have to proceed very gingerly in regard to Eastern Europe because of the Soviets strong sensitivities in this area. We are go ing to have to be ~nntent with SIOW change rather than dramatic liberali 12

zation in Eastern Europe. We will havs to abstain from forceful moves likely to be destabilizing by arousing Soviet counteractions. Instead, we should think in terms of those smaller steps not likely by themselves to provoke Soviet countermeasures, but that bit by bit do change the underlying sit. uation. Two-Way Street Trade is the principal avenue open to us. Many economic needs in East. ern Enrope can best be met by the West, and, in some cases, they can probably only be met from Western sour+cee. Eastern Europeans a[ready have a taste of the better life and they want more. Economic problems in the ares, are mounting and will not go away. If the Soviet Union cannot pro. vide the resources, technology, and mo tivation required to meet these prob lems, discontent will, undoubtedly, grow and so will Soviet difficulties in keeping the lid on. In Eastern Europe, the Soviets confront an almost insolu bIe economic dilemma, and trade thus seems the best avenue for the West to foster psychological and political cur rents toward change. Trade is not just commercial, but also political. It is a two-way street and a channel of communication. It a)so tends to stimulate ever-increasing interest in Western goods, techniques, and ideas in Eastern Europe. The ex port of militarily useful items to these countries is, of course, effectively pro hibited by allied agreement. Further restrictions on trade with these states do not, in tbe long run, deny the Com munists anything because they obtain most of the goods elsewhere. Our in tent is not to subvert the Eastern Eu ropean governments, but to draw them toward more responsiveness to domesMilitary Review

EUROPE tic needs and pressures, and toward more contact and cooperation with all the natiOns of Europe, the United States, and the USSR. Placing the German question in the context of improving relations with Eastern Europe may help to suggest a more fruitful approach to this key European questiOn. This iesue remains the major international political ques tion in Europe and an inherently dan gerous one because it directly involves the Soviet Union and the United States. The issue has been deadlocked hy Western insistence that proposals for settlement must begin with the ending of the East German regime and the not surprising refusal of the other side to proceed on such a basis. The dominant Western view thus hae been that movement toward a settle ment had to depend on a change in the Soviet position. However, East Germany grows stronger as time goes on. In Europes present mood, united Western support for a show of strength to maintain the status quo in future moments of stress will become more difficult to achieve. These considerations cIearly point to the conclusion that a German settle ment is far more likely to follow con tinued mutual acceptance of the mili tary balance and change in Eastern Europe than to come from some appli cation of Western pressure on the So viet union and her al]iea. Soviet fears of Germany are real and historically not unwarranted. In effect, the Soviets have worked consistently to maintain the statue quo, thwarting any attempt to unify Germany. We are unlikely to get dramatic changes in the German situation. Progress on the German problem seems possible only after the Dmember 1968 slow accumulation of change in East ern Eprope. When the situation there has basically altered, the Soviets may finally come to view continued ob duracy on Germany as counterproduc. tive on untenable. What appears to be the only feasi ble road toward settlement of the Ger man problem thus lies in patient and pragmatic exploration of change in relations between the two parts of Germany and between Western and Eastern Europe. The new German Government has started to move in this direction. That this is a promis ing approach is suggested by the nerv ous reaction in East Germany. The Czechoslovakian crisis and the Soviet threate againet Germany coun sel some prudence in this approach. But the change and movement in East ern Europe will continue to provide opportunities for judiciously pursuing this policy. The initiative should re main with the Federal Republic of Germany, but it behooves the United States to support, albeit discreetly, the German efforts and to encourage other members of tbe Western alliance to do likewise. Positive Initiative
Furtherance of the dialogue with
the USSR is the fifth requirement ~f US policy toward Europe. While mak ing clear the inhibiting effect of the Soviet aggression against Czechoslo vakia, we must quietly continue to ex amine the fundamental problems of mntual concern. The imperatives of power politics would not allow the United States to interrupt this dia logue even if she would. With all prudence, we must take positive and constructive initiatives. The rivalry between the United States ahd the USSR will not be ended. t3

EUROPE e, However, with time, it should be pos eible to stabilize and ease the military confrontation bet ween the two. A low ering of tensions, even though limited, provides gr&ter scope for construc tive change in East European coun tries and between the latter and West ern Europe and the United States. It also helps to make at least somewhat more manageable other crucial prob lems such as the emergence of the Chi nese nuclear threat. We should make it a central objective of our associa tion with Western Europe over the longer term to widen the area of co operative relations with the Soviet Union. We should, of course, keep firmly in is mind that only a limited ditente possible in the present period. The Czechoslovakian crisis has produced a salutary, sobering effect. Efforts to improve relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe involve a dilemma. Part of the problem is to develop a reasonably forthcoming and coopera tive climate. This requ,ires at least some emphasis on psychological intan gibles. At the same time, symbolic gestures with only limited substance may prove counterproductive because they can lead to self-deception and miscalcula tion. We do not want the Western al lies trampling each other on the roads east. There is no clear answer to this dilemma except to keep it carefully in mind and to weigh judiciously the psy chological pros and cons of any pro posed steps toward rapprochement. In a broader framework, what is happening in Europe is much in line with the type of world we want. The long view shows us that the force of identity is the fundamenti] our era. The deepest hope seems to be for a world where, within a framework of cooperation, each country can solve its own problems according to its own traditions and ideals. Pluralism is thus splitting both the Western alliance and the Communist bloc. Pluralism is incompatible with the Communist system. If there were any doubts on thk score, they were violently laid to rest by Soviet use of brute force against .Czechoslovakian efforts to pursue their own variety of communism. One great source of Communist ap peal had been the belief that it was a universal creed capable of answer. ing all needs. But the historic forces of diversity are bursting Communist discipline and shattering Communist ideology. Pluralism, on the other hand, is wholly compatible with our system. It is, indeed, its very basis. Diversity and independence, far from being op posed to the American concept of world order, express the very essence of our view of the future. The future for relations between the United States and Europe is likely to be more difficult than it has been in the past, but it is full of promise. To firmness and leadership we must add patience and tolerance. No rapid breakthroughs are in sight, and the risks and uncertainties continue to be great. The problems in Europe will be ended only through a long process of change. It is important that we move firmly in the right direction. We nesd to give zest and meaning to our com mitment to seek a new Europs in which a more durable settlement can eventually bs attained. national fact of

14

Militaty Review

A M:v+?w
From Jozuqd

of the RUSI

(Gre;t

Britain)

The Future of Armor

Major General Walter M. Hutton, British Armg

OR centuries, man has tried to produce a more mobile an,d power ful weapon system than the individual ~armed man. The chariots used at the Battle of Kadesh on the River Orontes in Syria in 1286 B. C., between the Egyptians and the Hittites, are an early example. The Egyptian chariots were manned by a driver and a bowman.- The Hittites, however, had a third manthe shield hearer-on their chariots to give some protection to the others and, perhaps, because of Oetemher 1966

this, were rather more successful. T~e weapons of the chariot were no more \ powerful than those of the foot soldier. Their sole advantage was superior speed which provided a means of strik ing a sudden blow from a flank before the opposition could deploy to meet it. Thus, they had the power and the flexibility to gain the initiative and produce dscisive results. Tbe Assyrians, who succeeded the Hittitee as the dominant power in Southwestern Asia, developed their 15

FUTURE

OF ARMOR

The British C/zieftwin (left) mounts a 120-millimeter gun. Latest Soviet tank, the T62 (right), mounts a 115-miHimeter main gun. chariots so that they became too heavy and cumbersome. They lost their mo bility without any marked improve ment in weapons or protection. The chariot then gave way to the horseman in the period of the first millenium. The weapons were still roughly the same for both mounted and dismounted men, but the vastly superior mobility of the cavalry en abled it to become the decisive arm. In medieval times, the horse began to lose some of its mobility because of the increasing weight of the knight in armor. He relied more on his ;rength and the protection of his armor than prise. on rapid maneuv& and sur.

Subsequently, the introduction of firearms further reduced the power of the cavalry. Horsemen could not use firearms accurately except dismounted as infantry, putting them on level terms at the point of engagement. On the other hand, firearms improved the defensive capability of the infantry against a cavalry charge. This is the background to the rigid ity of the battlefield in World War 1. The horse was too vulnerable to mod ern weapons and obstacles, and was no longer capable of carrying adequate weapon power to enable effective mo bile operations to be conducted. Land warfare was reduced to a slogging match as in earlier days, the main difference being that the slogging was with firepower rather than musclepower. Then came the internal combustion engine and its vastly greater horse power. The tank naturally followed as a mobile gun carrier. The foresight and imagination of the Germans in developing the new concept achieved the outstanding, but perhaps predict. able, reeults of 1940 with their panzer divisions. Military RwitW

This article was condenssd from the oreginal, published in the JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL
UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION

(Great Britain) May 1968. Copy righted @ 1968 by the JOURNAL

OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION. Ge?seral Hutton commanded the

5th Royal Tank Regiment at the Battle of Alamein and the .@th Regal Tank Regiment in the Ital ian campaign. He became Direc tor General of Fighting Vehicles in 1961 and has been responsible for coordinating the plans for the new range of fib.. Ling vehicles.
16

a .,:

FUTURE OF ARMOR

The French AlfX30 (left) has a 105-millimeter gun. The IffBT70 (right), joint United t3tates-Wee.t German development, has a 152-millimeter gun-launcher. This brief introduction is enough to remind us that land operations need a powerful, mobile element if they are not to stagnate into a rigid war of attrition. The main requirements for this mobile element have alao _been pretty clearly demonstrated in war. I suggest they are mob]lity, weapon power, control, some degree of pro tection, and commanders who really understand mobile operations. In the last war, this element was based on the tank which dominated all land operations wherever the ter rain permitted its free deployment. It provided an unprecedented combina tion of mobility, firepower, control, and protection. Deployment of forces by air was an r.ttempt to achieve even greater mobility, but the available airlift was unable to produce adequate firepower and mobility on arrival on the ground to match the enemy forces deployed against them by land. At the end of the last war, the tank was firmly established as the main element of the hard-hitting, mobile forces required to prevent rigidity in land operations and to achieve deci sive results. Nothing, including the air, had replaced it or made it re Oecemher1968 dundant in any way in spite of peated prognostications against value. re its

There were many who said in World War I that the artillery would anni hilate the tanksit did not. In be tween the wars, they said that the airplane would destroy the tanks from the airthey did not, not even in the open deserts of North Africa. In World War II, it was the bazooka cheap to produce and easily carried, concealed, and fired-but it had little real effect on tank operations except, perhaps, in very close country and ur ban areas. What had also been clearly substan tiated was the need for mobile forces, based on the tank or its equivalep, to be a balanced mixture of all arms and services. The theory, favored by some in the early 1930s, of independ ent action by tanks alone had been shown to be falae. Equally, the em ployment of mobile forces in uncoor dinated penny packets or in wild charges and without proper tire and logistic support too often produced dis aster to bear repetition. The outstanding new feature since World War H is, of course, the de velopm~t of nuclear weapons and 17

FUTURE

OF ARMOR present, they are relatively cheap and unsophisticated, but the need to im. prove their all-weather guidance and antijamming capabilities may change this. However, if they are kept fairly simple, they are easy to carry, conceal, and deploy and, being guided in flight, should be accurate. This all adds up to a formidable threat to the tank. But let us examine the other side of the coin. Tbe following limitations
,

their delivery systems. Whether they can ever be used, other than as a deterrent and, if they are, whether land operations of any sort would be feasible, ia not certain. They have not been used since World War II although several operations, which included large numbers of tanks, have been conducted in various parts of the world in this period. If military operations did take place

~.m

-:4

.:

.,

Hugh.. AircraftCmmmv US Marines test fire the YOB missile. Antitank guided missiles have not eliminated the tank role in modern armies.

under nuclear conditions, a tanks armor and mobility seem to give it the best chance of survival and effective use. This is also true of chemical and bacteriological warfare. The interior of the tank can be slightly pressurized to provide protection to its crew. Another area of change is in new weapon and technical development. New antitank guided weapons are in considerable coming into servi numbers 18 in all the main armies. At

to antitank guided weapons muet be remembered and carefully balanced against their advantages if tbe mis judgments of the past are not to be repeated: e They provide only a limited means of attack on armor-namely, hollow charge or squash head. If the designer of armor does not need to worry about the much more dangerous and flexible attack by kinetic energy projectile, his task is simplified. Military Review

FUTURE OF ARMOR
They have a relatively long time of flight. This opens UP opportunities of preventing the missile from reach ing its target, patilcularly those types which need clear visibility and careful control by the operator throughout their flight. Compare this with the high-velocity-gun projectile which,

it wjll be seen and be vulnerable. If it does not, it will have only limited use in the fast-moving operation of the future. Al] these arguments throw consid erable doubt on the rather extravagant claims advanced by some people on the effectiveness of antitank guided weap-

once fired, cannot be diverted from its predetermined course and needs no guidance. It reaches its target at nor mal battle ranges in a frac%on of the time taken by the missile, even if the latter is supersonic.
They seem to be rather more com plex and expensive than gun ammuni tion, and fewer rounds can be stowed in a given vehicle. Also, development in rangefindere and gun control equip ment provide similar chances of a first-round hit. There is, therefore, probably little caving in the number of rounds needed, and the use of guided weapons adds to stowage prob lems, costs, and complexity. The homing type of guided weapon can be two edged. If it homes on heat, it is nondiscriminating and could endanger friendly forces. If it uses radar or other electronic meane of homing, its use could be inhibited by the need for a source of power and by possibilities of countermeasures. Amw NeIo. Feat.%.

US Army Cobra armed helicopters provide a perfect partner for the tank, but do not replace it ons and on the wisdom ck doing with out tanks because of them. The need to have something to fulfill the tank role will still remain. [ The next logical step is to examine any alternative ways of meeting the\ requirement for a tank-type weapon system. Two apparently practical ideas which seem to merit study are the mechanized fighting vehicle and the helicopter. Colonel Robert P. Zeigler suggested the mechanized fighting vehicle in an atilcle in the Military Review in July 1966.* It is simply a combination of
COIOW1 RobertP. Zeiule?,United States ArmY, WechmlzeclFighting Vehicle,,)Militar# Reuieto, JIY 1966, PP S-12.

o They are, in some cases, less ef fective at night or in condition of poor visibility than a high-velocity gun. . The tank ie an integral part of the modern combat team which in cludes infantry, artillery, mortars, ma chineguns, and airborne weapons. The antitank guided weapon will be sub jected to attack by the whole team if necessary, just aa any other weapon which ia threatening the success of the team. If it is to have mobility, December1968

19

I
FUTURE OF ARMOR there are some. seem to be:
ti The most important
the tank and the armored personnel carrier (APC) in one vehicle. In his article, he says:
A

We need a light mechanized fight- ing vehicle (MFV) that is an armored personnel carrier, antimechanized weapon, direct fire wpport vehicle, amf an assault or fighting vehicle.
He suggests that this dual-purpose vehicle might lead to the elimination of the present tank ae a separate weapon syetem. His whole thesis, of course, rests on the ability to mount adequate weapon power on a light tracked vehicle and also provide space for 10 men. Thie solution has the same appeal as the idea that APCS should mount an effective weapon to enable infantry to fight with tanks on the move. How ever, there seems little chance of it producing anything other than a poor, second-best tank for the obvious rea son that the design would need to cater for too many requirements. Use of Helicopters Helicopters, on the oth& hand, of fer more interesting possibilities, par ticularly hecauee, as carriers of weap ons, men, and supplies, they provide an unparalleled degree of mobility and flexible deployment for land forces. Terrain obstacles can be exploited much more effectively. Indeed, artifi cial obstacles can be created wherever operational plans favor their use, well before any battle and in areas behind, as well ae in front of, forward troops because they would not ~mpede the movement of helicopters. Thus, in mo bility and flexibility, they represent a vast improvement over the tank or any other land vehicle. But what of the rlisadvantages in using helicopters as the main vehicle for mechanized divisions ? Inevitably, 20

o The limits on sustained orrera. s by day and night in all weather, % The difficulties of supplying ade. quate petroleum, oile, and lubricants mines, and other supplies to insure full use of the superb mobility pro. vialed. e The still unknown vulnerability of helicopters against sophisticated enemy land and air forces. @ The problems of command and control in large-scale mobile opera tions. A study of the desert operations in the last war shows how dim. cult this problem is on land, even in flat, open country at relatively slow epeeds. It would be much more difficult in the air at high speeds. e The limitations imposed by the relatively small payload available for weapons, ammunition, and protective armor. The average payload is meas ured in pounds rather than tons and poses the greatest single disadvantage in comparison with the land vehicle. Partner There is an established need for eomething like a tank to meet the main weapon requirement for mech anized forces. Nothing produced so far has made it possible or advisable to do without the tank, nor is there any better way of meeting the require ment at present. A glance at the Se viet and other major armies of the world endorees this view. This does not detract from the obvious need to exploit the helicopter to the maximum extent possible, both by forming air mobile divisions and by their greater use with conventional formations. On the contrary, they provide a perfect partner for the tank, particularly the advanced tank of the future. kiiliterjRedeW

PerfectTank

FUTURE The next generation tank should, of course, go ae far as possible to remedy the known weaknesses in tank design which have etill not been adequately resolved. If the tank is to fulfill the requirement for a powerful, highly mobile weapon system, capable of ef fective, eustained day-night opera tions against strong and sophisticated enemy forces, come of the present weaknesses in tank design nmet be remedied. Theee include:
Weight should be under 40 tons and preferably within a practical airportable weight of about 30 tons or less. Power of about 20 horsepower per ton of vehicle ie necessary. Mobility is presently restricted by ground pressures. A reduction to well under 10 pounds per square inch is highly desirable. Also needed are better solutions to the problems of water and other obstacles. Range and self-containment of todaye tanks are too restrictive on mobile operations. . Reliability of tanks can be im proved by designing for only essential needs, thus reducing the repair and maintenance loads. Logistic support has been re stricted in the past by the limited fuel afid ammunition carried in a tank and the lack of bad carriers designed to operate across country with mobile forces. . Communications have never quite caught up with requirement, particu larly for workbrg with aircraft. Navigation still presents a prob lem across country under difficult con ditions and at night. Weapon power has been the ma jor weakness of British tanks, but the

OF ARMOR

mill meter and now 120-mill~meter, tan I! guns have corrected it. Prospects are encouraging for meet ing requirements with the next gen eration tank. The weight of a tank stems from the weapon to be mounted; the crew, fuel, and ammunition to be carried; the size of the powerpack; and the extant to which they all need to be protected by armor. If a guided weapon could meet the weapon re quirement, a considerable saving in weight might result. \ Hi.git-Velocity Gun For reasone I have already given, I would still recommend a high-vehc ity-gun solution. The next genera~lon gun could be smaller and lighter with an even better chance of a first-round hit. A crew of four may still be re quired in order to keep the design simple, improve reliability, and allow for reliefs. But it might be possible to reduce the crew to three men by duplicating facilities for driving, fir ing tbe gun, and operating the com munications, and by using automatic loading. Developments in engines and their reliability should permit a significant reduction in size in spite of the extra power-to-weight ratio required. The auxiliary engine requirement should be dropped. The main engine could easily do the job of charging batteriek. as is done on the German Leopard tank. This leaves the armor, fuel, and ammunition. I feel sure a lighter gun, combined with modem techniques for armor, could achieve startling results. All tbeee improvements would, I believe, produce a tank weighing less than 35 tons and capable of operating by day and Sight for about seven days with out any resupply other than ammuni 21

specially

designed

20-pounder,

105

December 19S8

FUTURE

OF ARMOR

/=.

) vide mechanized forces of startling mobility, power, range of action, and endurance, provided tbe organization, communications, commanders, and training can match the challenge. With tbe helicopter, we at last have some. thing which will enable the tank to develop its full potential. These two combined could produce the same leap forward in mobile warfare as the Ger. man panzers in 1940.

tion. The increased power and reduced weight would provide a major advance in mobility. Improved versions of already existing navigation devices should be available at least on a basis of one per troop. Greatly improved lo gistic support could stem from tbe use of helicopters, air-dropped supplies, and special logistic vehicles. The tank should be well equipped to operate closely with helicopters to pro

. . . we

are all interested

in one ultimate goal, a just and honorable peace

in the world. To have an adequate military posture, we must apply the most advanced technology to our weapons and equipment. To stay abreast of ad varrces in technology, the military must be intimately involved in the support of research.

Lieutenant

General Austin

W. Betts

22

frlilifary Revisu

Milifary
Lieutenant

I=latklgun

Colonel Morris J. Herbert, United States Armu

The views expressed in this arti cle are the authors and do not nec essarily rejlect those of the Depart ment of Defense or its agencies. Editor.
F YOU find yourself dispatched to a combat zone in the foreseeable future, and the Government decides to arm you with a handgun, the odds are overwhelming that it will be tbe Automatic Colt Pistol (ACP), caliber .45, Model 1911A1. It is not exactly a new weaponthe last major modi fications were made in 1921but it hae been the standard sidearm for tlecernber 1963

the US Army since it won the Govern ment competition in 1911. For the paat several years, ~any voices within the Army and without have been raised against the Colt .45; recommending it be junked in f aver of a better weapon. Complaint take various tacks: the .45 is inaccurate; it is too oldin fact, it is the oldest weapon we have in length of contin uous service; and it is an odd caliber since all standard foreign handguns are nine millimeter (caliber .357). Some of these comments are true, and @me are only partly true. Huw ever, whether complaints against the 23

HANDGUN Armys present handgun are valid or not is really beside the point. Before the .45 automatic can be judged, we must first define the form and sub stance of the handgun problem. This can best be done by asking three questions: e What is the purpose of a mili tary handgunin other words, what is the job that the handgun must tackle ? o Is tbe purpose the same for all personnel who will be armed with a handgun-or is it so diverse that more than one type of handgun will be re quired? e Does the caliber .45 ACP accom plish this purpose ? And, as a corollary to the last ques tion, if the .45 will not do the job, is a handgun available that will meet our requirements ? Individual Defense To begin with, i~ilitary handgun fense. No modern manning a larger offensive weapon. His primary miesion never entails fir. ing his sidearm. The handgun, then, is a personal weapon, with limited of. fensive potential, designed to give its user optimum protection under all con. ditions and extremes of service. Man Is Target The target will be mana singlearmed, aggressive enemy moving rap idly and with malice. His armament will probably be a service ritle. At worst, the target for an engagemsut might consist of two oi three individ uals. If the target is a squad or a platoon, the handgun ie not the sn swer. The larger target means a dif ferent problem with a totally different weaponperhaps a submachinegun as the solution. The handguns task is to hit and disable a single target at close range, and, if properly aimed, to do it every time the trigger is pulled. The range for the handgun engage ment will be 25 yards or less. Because of the target and the range, the en vironment will be one of surprise, excitement, fear, and tension. Thus, the probability is high that the first and most important round fired from the handgun will be poorly aimed and will achieve only a marginal hit, if it hits at all. Evaluation of a military handgun can be determined only by gauging its characteristics and performance against a set of definitive criteris. In order to fulfill its mission as sn individual defensive weapon, the hand gun must achieve a satisfactory mark when tested against each of these factors: o ReUabWt~-When the trigger is pulled, the gun fires. e DurabilityRugged; continues Military Rsview

the purpose of a is individual de handgun ever won

a war or even influenced ~he decision in a tactical battle. The handgun is carried because the bearer has other matters on his mind. He must plan, or command, or serve as part of a team

Lieutenant Colonel Morms J. Her bert is Commander of the 6th BattaL ion, 61st Artillery, Fort Bliss, Texas. A graduate of the US Military Acad emg, West Point, New York, he re ceived a Masters degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Southerw California, Los Angeles, and is a gradruate of the US AmmI Com mand and General Sta# College. ffe served with the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, and, from 1964 to 1968, was Assistant Professor, Ballistics, and later Associate Professor, Department :I US Military of Ordnunce, at Academy.
24

,.,>

-m

HANDGUN to operate under adverse field condi tions of dust, temperature, and humid ity; is easy to clean, disassemble, and maintain. Deetmctiva Efiect-The bullet, impacting at a range of 25 yards or less, transfers enough linear kinetic energy to the target, an armed indi vidual, to render him incapable of fur ther offensive action.
Acczwao&-From a fixed rest, all ~Foundsfrom one magazine land in a three-inch diameter circle at 25 yarde. ~ ComfortMust weigh no more than 32 ounces; barrel length must be no more than five inches; weapon must be double action self-loading; barrel-to-stock angle must be 110 to . 120 degrees; and recoil must be less thsn five f-+-pounds.

be $isastrous since the sight picture is lost and considerable time is used. Among US-made autoloading hand gunst the eingle exception is the Smith

Model 99 & Weeeon, nine-millimeter, which is a doubie-action gun. Despite its disadvantage, with am munition that today is almost 100 per cent reliable, the caliber .45 automatic stands alone among all handguns in reliability and ruggedness. Not a com plicated weapon, it is easy to keep n firing condition. For over 50 years, 1n every conceivable field and combat sit uation, the .45 has proved that it will fire when called upon.

Destructive Effect
Measuring the destructive effect of a bullet, or, literally, its stopping power and shock action, is usually done by recording the bullets linear kinetic energy ( % M v) before and after paseing through the target. The dif ference, or the kinetic energy absorbed by the target, should be a measure of the damage done to the target. I say ehould because the numerical answers. are subject to interpretation. The shape and mass of the bulletits bal listic coefficient, the bullete stability in flight, the impact velocity of the bullet, and the nature of the tarket materially affect the amount of dam \ age inflicted. data obtained From empirical through controlled experimentation in the Ballistics Laboratory at West Point, it appears that, within the range of impact velocities encountered with handguns, tranefer of kinetic energy to the target material is the best measure of the projectiles de structive effect. At impact velocities over 1,s00 feet per second, compara tive stopping power of a bullet seems to be governed by a factor involving 25

Relialdlityand Ruggedness It is not poseible to differentiate clearly between reliability and dura bility of a weapon. The two categories are closely interrelated since the rug gedness and etrength of a handgun contribute to its reliability. In the field, under all extremes of service, the revolver cannot compare to the auto]oading pistol. Becauee of its de sign, the revolver clogs more rapidly and needs cleaning more often. It has more openings to accumulate dirt and foreign matter, and its rotating cyl inder detracte from the strength of the gun. Generally speaking, however, the revolver ie considered to be a more reliable weapon than an automatic pis tol. If a double-action revolver mis fires, the trigger can be pulled again, rotsting another round into firing po sition and firing it all on one motion. If the automatic misfires, both hands must bq tieed to eject the cartridge and chamber a new round. This could Oeeernber 1966

HANI16UN a higher power of the velocity than v. For this discussion, kinetic energy will be the criteria for measuring the capability of a bullet to do damage. The target material ueed in all experimentation was gelatin, of a consistency that closely resembles human tissue in its response to projectile ima caliber .25, fifty-grain bullet that transfers only 16 foot-pounds of energy to the gelatin target is an effec tive killer if it strikes the target be. tween the eyes. The 160 foot-pound value is designed to provide. adequate stopping power even when the shooter is able to achieve a marginal hit only.

TRANSFER 6Ql

OF KINETIC

ENERSY TO

TARGET

MEASURED

IN FOOT-POUNDS ,ga

4m

e
rol us # .f e Q ----

MINIMUM TRAN3fER OF KINETIC [NERGY ROIUIRED FOREFFECTIVE STOPPING POWER

------ ---------- e @ ------

.s5
AUTOMAWC

.s2
AUTOMATIC

,%

.45

9 Mlullmm
AUTOMATIC

MILITARY AuTOMATIC ANO POLICE COLTPISTDL

.357 MAGNUM

.44 MAGNUM

wEAPON-RANGE, 10 WROS AGAINST SIMULATEO THIGH OF AOULTMALE

AILPROJECTILES JACKEIEO.
MAGNUM WEAPONSAND .3$ ARE REVOLVERS

Figure 1. pact. The tbicknees of the gelatin used simulates a torso or upper leg hit. Figure 1 illustrates the kinetic energy transfer measured in foot-pounds of work done on the target by seven representative handguns. The range is 10 yards. As a result of hundreds of rounds fired with each weapon, it appears that a projectile must do a minimum of 160 foot-pounds of work on the target in order to have acceptable shock action and stopping power. The figure of 160 foot-pounds can be argued. There is no question that 26 Considering the environment of the engagement, and the marksmanship ability of the average individual armed with a handgun, thie is the type of hit most likely to occur. When the handgun bullet strikes the gelatin block, its velocity may be anywhere between Mach .7 and Mach 1.2. Thus, it may or may not have a shock wave associated with it at im pact. The velocity of sound is consid erably greater in tissue than in air; the bullet will be subsonic as it passes through the target iteelf. At the pro tdilitafy ~e~les

HANDGUN jectile velocities in question, the shock wave in air will have little damaging effect on the target. It may cause a preeeure wave to pass through the target at conic velocity ahead of the bullet. However, the bulletas it moves through the target material at several, hundred feet per secondforcibly dis places the tissue and fluids that it hits in passage, and these particles move out at high velocity. This phenomenon caus& cavitation within the tissuethe temporary forwation of a cavity much greater in volume than the tract of the projectile itself. is tfiarginal, impacting at 1,210 feet per second versue about 800 feet per second for the .45 ACP, and trans. ferring 140 foot-pounds of energy. The impact momentum of the bullet, which is measured by taking the prod uct of the bullet mass and velocity, also contribute to the destructive ca-

Permanent Cavity
After passage of the bullet, a per manent cavity of damaged and de stroyed tissue and blood vessels with a greater over-all volume than the bul let tract itself may he formed. Whether or not permanent cavitation occurs de. pends on the mass and impact velocity of the bullet, its stability, and the na ture of the target. These are basically the same factors associated with trans fer of energy. Physical examination of gelatin blocks after firing clearly indicates that a bullet muet transfer at least 160 foot-pounds of energy to the target in order to form a significant perma nent cavity. By significant is meant a cavity with at least twice the diame ter (or four times the volume) of the bullet tract itself. Figure 1 shows the permanent cavities created in gelatin by a caliber .45 ACP bullet, and by a nine-millimeter round fired from a -hwsr pistol. ~ From the viewpoint of destructive effect, the caliber .45 round is ineffec tive, transferring approximately 105 foot-pounds of energy to the target. The nine-millimeter, 115-grain bullet December 1968

Cowtenu of author Path of crdiber .45 ACP bullet through gelatin (top), and nine-millimeter, 115 grain, parabellum bullet thrqugb gelatin (bottom) I pacity of the round. Momentum is real] y impetus, or the force with which{ the projectile moves againat resist ance. As such, it is a good yardstick of the bullets ability to carry through a thick, dense, or protected target. Often referred to as the freight train effect, it is most noticeable in a stable bullet euch ae the old M-2 ball ammunition for the caliber .30 Ml rifle of World War II fame. For a han~gun, the momentum at impact should be at Ieaet .50 pound-eeconde to give the bullet satisfactory carry

21

HANDGUN ing uower as it moves through bone, muscle, and tendons. Impact momentums for ~e handgun bullets shown in Figure , measured in pound-seconds, are: .25 Automatic .166 .32 Automatic .265 .33 Revolver .596 .45 Automatic .867 9-millimeter Automatic .626 .910 .357 Magnum 1.620 .44 Magnum The caliber .45 ACP has good im pact, momenttirn, but transfers little energy to the target. Unless tbe .45 round hits bone-which would nor mally strip the jacket and mushroom the bulletit bores a neat caliber .45 hole through tbe target, and inflicts little real damage to tissue more than one-half inch outside of the bullet track. enough to accomplish its mission. The .45 automatic, or any of the available handguns that we will compare with the .45, can place a magazine of seven or eight rounds in a three-inch target at 25 yards. Misses occur because of lack of practice, excitement, and ten sion. Every major pistol championship is won by an autoloading gunpro fessional shooters always prefer auto matics to revolvers. Nevertheless, the time for practice is not always avail-. able, and the caliber .45 ACP loses many points in the category of com fort--and comfoii affects the acctiracy of the man-gun team, Weight A better term for comfort might h; feelthe feel of the gun in your hand while>u are shooting it. Ever since the War Department bought #,000 smoothbore, flintlock pistols, caliber .69, weighing 52 ounces and with an 8 %-inch barrel from North and Chew in 1800, it has been traditional for the Army to have large, heavy sidearms. With the high strength steels used in todays guns, the military sidearm need not weigh two and one-half pounds. @inioh is divided as to where the line should be drawn on handgun weight. Certainly, the .44 Magnum, at 46 ounces, is uncomfortably heavy. It takes both hands and a tripod to hold it on target unless you are an experienced ehooter with well-devel oped band and forearm muscles. In addition, there are not many handgunners who can put up with its ex cessive recoil for long. The .25 autc matic, at less than a pound, feels equally uncomfortable to many men. Its lightness is a disadvantage in pointing. The best heft among modern Military ReYiw

Accuracy
The biggest complaint against the .45 is ita accuracy or lack of it. Ad mittedly, it is not the most accurate handgun on the market. Worse yet, it points badly. Difficulty in lining up the gun on the target and holding it there-pointing-is due primarily to a poor barrel-to-stock angle (107 de grees) and, to a lesser extent, to its weight of 39 ounces. But we are now discussing the mangun combination, not the gun itself. In a combat situation, it is the mangun team that does the job. Tbe man who carries this defensive weapon will probably be a poor marksman, or, at best, he will not have had much prac tice. The .45 ACP, as part of the man-gun team, is guilty as charged. It is a difficult weapon to shoot accu rately, and it takes instruction and hours of practice to master. The gun itself is more than accurate 28

HANDGUN handguna comes with Smith & Wes sons Model 39 automatic which weighe 26% ounces, and the nine-milli meter Luger at 30 ounces. Bearing in mind that the great majority of those armed with a handgun will not be experienced shots, there is a strong ~argument that the handgun should weigh between one an_d7two pounds. A heavier gun will be harder to aim, and the accuracy of the man-gun team will suffer accordingly. Mu@ Velocity Modern powder and primers have increased muzzle velocity to the point where a long-barrelled weapon is not a necessity. Again, a compromise must be struck. As barrel length is short ened below three inches, pointahility ia affected and accuracy suffers. Ade. quate muzzle velocity can b obtained with barrels five inches 10 g, and this should be the maximum al { wed, with a minimum length of four jnches for aiming accuracy. From tests in bench rests, it is generally concluded that barrel length does not affect the basic, built-in accuracy of the gun as long as the barrel is long enough to impart sufficient spin to the projectile. A three-inch barrel can do this for a handgun. Long neglected in selection of hand. gum has been the barrel-to.-stock an gle. For a gun to feel right in the hand, for it to point correctly, the angle between barrel and etock must be at least 110 degrees. Of the repre sentative automatics shown in Figure 2, only the World War II German Luger has this minimum angle. The uPPer fimit is more flexible. The Lugsr points well at 124 degrees, but a more reasonable value would he closer to 120 degrees. Recoil, usually meaeured in foot Oecember 1968 po~nds of energy absorbed by the shooters hand, should be less than five foot-pounds for comfortable fir ing. The most powerful handgun on the, market, the .44 Magnum sixshooter, kicks with a force of over 18 foot-pounds. The nine-millimeter au tomatics vary between three and 3.5 foot-pounds, and the Armys .45 holds at 4.5 foot-pounds. Like the upper. limit on the barrel-stock angle, the maximum energy level of five footpounds is an arbitrary figure. M ch more than that, and the ave ) age shooter will tend to flinch, or lose his sight picture, or find himself dread ing to pull the trigger. The result, of course, will be decreased accuracy. Stopping Power Againat the criteria of comfort, the .45 automatic is certainly too heavy, by half a pound. The size is right, but the single-action feature is unaccept able in a modern handgun. The recoil is within limits, but marginally so, and the barrel-to-stock angle is too small for accurate pointing. In the nice-to-have category, the magazine capacity of seven rounde should be in creaeed. At the present time, only the Belgium-made Browning automatic holds more than 10 rounds; no we~pon in its caliber range hae a smaller mag azine than the .45. ! Measured against the performance criteria that we have established, the .45 automatic is not an effective hand gun. It rates high in reliability and strength, and satisfactory in accuracy, but it does not have efficient stopping power. It does not meet requirements in the arbitrary area of comfortthat nebulous quality that contributes so markedly to the efficiency of the mangun te2m. The list of possible replacements for 29

COMPARISON

OF HAND6UNS

g ~
~-4 g% ~~ BrA
.&

As

Weapon

~s .3 ,% I&s
50 71 130 115 115 115 115 230

al =

ii

j! g%
s%
750 840 1,280 1,220 1,230 1,220 1,230 825 54 101 400 344 350 344 350 307 225 510 1,075
SO! :$

~G

Autoloadera Beretta (Italy)

Star S-1 (Spain) Colt Super .38

10
22 39 26~2 32 30 34 39

2% 3% ii 4 4 21/32 4 4?4 5

.25 .32 .38 9 millimeters 9 millimeters 9 millimeters 9 millimeters .45

6 8 9 8 13 8 8 7

No

No No
Yee

107 106 107 109 103 124 106 107

Smith & We.won, Model 99 Browning, Standard

Luger, (World 1942) War II,

No No Yes
No

Walther, P-88 (Germany) Colt, (US Army) Revolvere Smith & We8eon, Model 10 Smith & We8eon,
Combat Magnum Magnum

34 36 47

4 4 61Yz

.38 .357 .44

F,gure 2.

6 6 6

Yes

111 106 108

158 158 240

850 1,285 1,520

Yes Yee

Smith & Weeson,

-,

the .45 narrows quickly when com pared to these five criteria. A quick comparison of 10 modern handguns is shown in Figure 2. Among the auto loaders, only the Smith & Wessorz, nine-millimeter,Model 39 meets all the requirementsunder cOmfOrt.TOgether. with every automatic on the list, how ever, it has marginal destructive ef fect. Only two of the automatics are double action, and the reliability and durability of every candidate is an un known quantity when gauged againet the Model 1911AI Colt .45. This, perhaps, is the key to the prob lem. The stopping Power of a gun is important, hut its reliability must be urichallenged.Exhaustive field testkg would be neceseary hefore any auto loadercould be considered equal to the Armys .45. NewIdeal Weapon Since no single handgun meets all the requirements for an individual de fensiveweapon, let us buildup an ideal military handgun, keeping well within the pres~nt state of the art in ballis tics. Th gun must be an autoloader, and,in o 1 der to avoid cocking the ham mer bef re firing the first round, it / muet be a double-action model. To keep within the. limits on eize and weight, and to develop sufficient im pact velocity, the gun ehould he nine millimeter in caliber. The .32 simply does not pack enough wallop, and any thing over nine millimeters Iimite the magazine capacity and requires a larger, heavier gun for sufficient muz zle velOcity. The over-all weight of the gun will be no more than 32 ounces, including a barrel length of five inches. With this length of barrel and a redesigned 130 grain, nine-millimeter cartridge, a muzzle velocity of 1,275 feet per secOecember le68

ond can easily he achieved. The pro pellant charge would be between five and five and one-half grains of powder. A velocity of 1,275 feet per second is not in the Magnum range, but it is high enough, demonstrated by empir ical work in the laboratory, to ineure a step increase in destructive effect on the target. Impact Momentum At our maximum anticipated lethal range-25 yardsthe bullet velo ity will have dropped to 1,200 feet !per second, and th]z is the impact velocity. Thus, a satisfactory impact momen tum of .69 pound-seconds can be at tained. The kinetic energy of the round at impact will be 416 foot pounde, and at an impact velocity of 1,200 feet per second, the bullet! will tranefer about 182 foot-pound$ of linear kinetic energy to the gelatin target. Minimum barrel-to-stock angle is a comfortable 110 degrees. The probable appearance and the statistics of an improved handgun are shown in Figure 3. Is it time, then, to replace the .45? The automatic described here would be an improvement over any military handgun in use today, but how much of an improvement, and at what Icost in time, manpower, development, and production funds ? The conclusion ib inescapable that this improved hand gun does not represent the results of extensive, advanced research. It is not a leapfrogging step forward in the design of individual defensive weap ons. It is simply an evolutionary gun that could have been produced any time in the past 20 years. Should it be produced right now? Th: answer has to be no. Marginal improvement of a 50-year-old weapon system is not worth the time and ex .i. . 31

HAND6UN pense involved. There are definite lim itations on the advances that can be made in conventional projectiles, propellants, and handguns. Even the im 1 proved nine-millimeter automatic just discuseed will be less than optimum. The probability of a sure kill and instant incapacitation of the target be as revolutionary as the develop. ment of the guided missile was to antiaircraft gunnery. The conven tional pistol should be shouldered aside as quickly as tbe 90-millimeter gun gave way to the Nike family of missiles. In order to take a giant step for

IMPROWEO

HANDGUN

\
Transfer of Linear Kinetic Esergy (to7.inJi g~atin block) 182 foot.pounds

Pigure 3. is nowhere near 100 percent unless the shot is well aimed. There is really not a great deal that we can do with the conventional handgun that will improve the chances of a poor marksman who is highly excited and undergoing the stress of the combat arena. The Army does not need a better, two-pound, nine-millimeter autoloading weapon, but, rather, it neede a radical approach L the problem of individual defense. The approach must 32 ward in individual defensive weapons, the state of the art must be advanced considerably beyond its present level. Obviously, a major development program, costly both in money and in scientific resources, will be necessary before a completely new, optimum weapon can be furnished to tbe serv ices. The timeframe is a minimum of 15 years. This gun; the IDW150, would weigh 32 ounces fully loaded, with an Mifitary neviav

HANDLWN over-all length Of not more than nine inchee. Projectiles would coneist of 10-grain, arrow-shapqd f%chettes, one inch in length each. Magazine capacity would be 150 rounds, with a selector switch to permit firing f16chettes sin gle or in fixed bursts of five with one trigger pull. F16chette rounds for the Ifl WI 50 will be too small to be guided in flight, but the weapon itself should have a passive heat-seeking guidance system mounted in the barrel. At a maximum range of 100 feet, the infrared cell would detect warm bodies, and a emall light would glow red when the target is properly tracked, giving the firer an instant check on his sight picture under any lighting conditions. Today, weight and size of these guid ance components would present a se rious design problem, and detection range would be equally difficult to achieve. The propellant for the ID W150 must be a low-molecular-weight gas under high pressure, rather than conven tional powder, providing a muzzle ve locity of 4,000 feet per second. At ranges of 100 feet or less, no guid ance system is needed. The firer need never lead the targethe aims at tar get center, gets his red light witbin milliseconds, and fires. A target mov ing at a speed of 15 miles per hour across his front at a range of 100 feet travele only six inches in the 25 milli seconds between trigger squeeze and tk%hette impact. The high-muzzle velocity insures a lkill~~even with a marginal hit. The fl&hette, stable in air, loses its sta bility and tumbles on impact, emerg ing from the target material with a velocity of 1,000 feet per second or less. This transfers some 334 foot p$unds of kinetic energy to the target. Even at a reduced muzzle velocity of 3,000 feet per eecond, 180 foot-pounds of kinetic energy would be absorbed. The lDW150 will not need to be cocked before firing the first round. It will combine light weight, large magazine capacity, high rate of fire, great destructive effect, infraredaided sighting, and excellent accuracy. These characteristics all add up to a man-gun syetem kill probability of near unity. Thie is the gun that should replace the Colt .45. Protection of the individual against an armed assailant is being accom plished todayas it has been in the pastby the caliber .45 ACP. Its com plete reliability is the one overriding reason for retaining it as the service standard until a marked increase in handgun effectiveness can be achieved. If there were a question of reliability or ruggedness, the .45 would have to be replacedand it would have been, years ago. Although its heavy, slow bullet does not insure instant disabil ity of the target, tbe probability is still quite high that a man struck with a 230-grain, jacketed bullet traveling at 800 feet per second will be put out of action. Tbe probability of a basic de~elop ment program in the bandgun field being initiated in the near future is open to donbt. It is reasonable to sup pose, therefore, that the .45 will be a mainetay for some time to come. Interest and effort are needed hefore this barely adequate weapon can be retired. It is not time to replace the .45 yet because no strong replacement exiets, but it is time to start the pickand-shovel research and development workv that will lead to a totally new individual defensive weapon.

Oecember1968

33

..

..

--

BEAUFRE
and ,Total ... ..

strate

Colonel Robert G. Krebs, United States Armu

ENERAL Andr6 Beaufre has laid out a main design for strategytotal etrategythat we in the United States, as well as our counterparts in other countries of the West, can well afford to etudy. G6n6ral dArm6e Beaufre is the director of the Institut Fran@s dEtudes analyst, an accomplished Strat4giwtes in Parie. He is a literate politico-military author, and a keen student of military history and strategy. Before hie retire ment as G6n6ra1 d Arm6e in 1961, he was the French representative on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standing Group in Washington, D. C. Be fore that, he was Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics and Administration, Supreme 34 Witary Revim

BEAUFRE Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe. Earlier, he commanded French forces in the SueZcrisis Of 1956, participated in the Algerian and Indochina cam paigns, and saw service with French resistance and regular forces through out World War II. Codification of Eventa Strategic thinking and concepts as enunciated by General Beaufre merit consideration if only because of his scholarly effort at a codification of strategies. Of transcending impor tance, however, is his overview of to days world where neither peace nor war, but cold war and counterinsur gency obtain, and where the possibil ity of nuclear holocaust is held to be virtually nil because of the deterrent aspecte of the very weapons of anni hilation. In his book, An Introduction to Strategy, General Beaufre states that: on a definition of etrategy ~s, The a~ of applying force so that it makes the most effective contribution to wards achieving the ends set by polit ical policy, Thue, Beaufre establishes thk point that the force being applied may likely be of an economic or psy chological nature, or other nonmilitary pressure. Strategic Modes General Beaufre considere two stra tegic modesthe direct and the in direct. Within the direct mode are tra. ditional military force, including nu clear force, and the threat thereof. Under indirect are incorporated di plomacy, political and economic means, cold war threats, and guerrilla opera tions.

Strategg cannot be a eimple defined doctrine; it ie a method of thought, the object of which is to codtfg events, set them in order of priomtg, and then choose the meet effective coewse of ac
tion, He concurs with B. H. Liddell Hart

Five typical strategic patterns cited by Beaufre are: Direct threatthe strategic ob jective is of moderate importance, whereas military and other resources are large. This falls into the direct mode.
Indirect pressure+the objective is of moderate importance; resources are inadequate. This comes under the indirect mode. Series of successive actionethe objective is of major importance, and resourcee are limited. Freedom pf ac tion is restricted. This pattern may be ~ placed under either mode. Protracted struggle at a low level of military intensityfreedom of ac tion is large; resources are inadequate. This falle under the indirect mode. Violent conflict aimed at military victorymilitary resources are effic ient. This falls under the direct mode.

Colonel Robert G. Krebs ie on the staff and faculty of the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn sylvania. A graduate of the US ArmsI Mititar~ Academy, West Point, New York, he rece<ved his M.A. in Geog raphy from the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, and the US Army War College. His service itwludee duty with the .%jth Infantrg Division in Korea; with O@e, Chief of Civil Aflaire, De partment of the Army, Washington; Ofice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington; a~d with Headquarters, 7th US Army and the 24th Infantry Diviston in Germang.
December 1968

Theee patterns are general in na ture and actually constitute courses of action stemming logically from Beau fre~ over-all base of strategy. These a5

BEAUFRE five patterns, together with the two cited modes, help to provide a basis for understandirig his- various break outs of strategy. General Beaufre has placed total strategy at the pinnacle of strategy, assigning it the overriding task of con ducting general war. For components or fields of total strategy, Beaufre has designated political, economic, diplo matic, military, and. psychological measures. AR are blended into a single, coordinated, and coordinating mech anism or agency designed to receive long-range goals and policy, and then produce a finished producttotal strategy. This is not new; we in Amer ica have sometimes referred to it as national strategy. Unfortunately, the function seems to have been left un fulfilled completely at national or aRi ance levels. Over-All Strategy The next tier under total strategy is over-all strategy. Here, General Beaufre indicates that, in each of the fields-political, economic, diplomatic, military, and psychologicala sepa rate over-all strategy should be molded so that all tasks within a particular field are fully coordinated. He points out that this coordination is a com mon practice within the military pro fession, but not so in other fields where it may be just as important. General Beaufres is a fully reason able contention here. Certainly, it would be begging the issue to suggest that, for instance, in the economics field in the United States, there is complete coordination of production, financial policy, overseas trade, bal ante of-payments, economic warfare, and the many other branches of eco nomics in and bet~~pen governments. To meet the requirements of the 36 individual branches of each functional field within over-all strategy, General Beaufre puts forth operational strat egy. Examples of operational strategy within the Defense Establishment of the United States would be the strate gies employed by the individual uni fied and specified commands and, in the instance of administrative and logis tic support, by the individual military services. Logistics Strategy One of the operational strategies especially cited by Beaufre is that of the peacetime strategy concerned prin cipally with technology and, specifi cally, how to produce modern equip ment that will outdate the materiel of an opponent. For this special opera tional strategy, General Beaufre se lected the term logistics strategy. Re garding it, he cites two salient fea tures: that nuclear weapons have enhanced the importance of this strat egy, and that full attention should be paid to the management aspects of this complicated process. This would be an effort to insure that the budget ary allocation is in balance, production priorities are coordinated, and yet, tecL LCSIsuperiority is retained. General Beaufre feels that this par ticular strategy is far from fully de veloped. This may be true of many parts of the world, and certainly in Communist China. In the case of the United States, however, there are many in the Department of Defense who would disagree sharply, especially when the relatively recent managerial improvements, as well as the signifi cant changes which occurred in the organization of function, are taken into full consideration. In the United States, it is not known as logistics strategy, but it is there.
Military ReYieW

BEAUFRE Returning to the top of his strategy pyramid, Gene~al Beaufre feels that searching consideration should be given to nuclear strategy. He accords it total strategy status, and utilizes it for the development of his key theme of deterrence. In the opinion of General Beaufre, . Defensiv+physical protection against nuclear effects. Indirect offensiv+threat of nucIear retaliation. Beaufre considers the first three nuclear forms not feasible. He cites the first as the form previously employed by the United States until the

US A!, F.,..

With the destruction

of Wlroshima, nuclear strategy total strategy

became the principal element to !

the nuclear weapon cannot be considered only as a more powerful, longer ranging weapon. Beaufre sets out the following forms of nuclear strategy: . Direct offensive-preventive destruction of enemy nuclear weapons and production, Defensiveinterception of enemy nuclear weapons in transit.
December

USSR developed deliverable strategic nuclear weapons of her own. The sec ond form, in bis opinion, represents a technological race in progress, while he feels the third is not feaeible be cause of cost and insufficient protec tion. Thus, only the final form, the retaliatory threat, is left. It seems that the form on preven tive destruction stands the test of fea37

1968

sibility against any possible enemy other than the USSR, and so should be kept on the shelf, at least in lim ited form. Also, the second, or anti ballistic missile (ABM), form may be with or against us sooner than has been indicated. Perhaps it merits more investigation by Beaufre. Thus, it is believed that the following modified version of Beaufres nuclear forms is more applicable to the United States: e Preventive destruction. e ABM and civil defense. e Retaliatory threat. Although reliance should focus prin cipally on the retaliatory threat form the producer of deterrenc+it is considered that all forms should be tagged feasible. Decisive Factor General Beaufre believes the deci sive factor today in total strategy is incontestably deterrence. When the United States was the sole possessor of the nuclear weapon, deterrence did not apply as it does now. But with the advent of deliverable strategic nuclear weapons in the hands of a second power, both winner and loser could be expected to pay an exorbitant price in any nuclear interchange. This is the essence of Beaufres theme on strategy of deterrence and the vital outgrowth of his nuclear strategy. The overriding aspect is not the conduct of war, but, instead, the deterrence of war with tbe prime de terrent being the threat of nuclear destruction and the prime character istic being stability. In this concept, there can be no mistaking General Beaufres deep belief nor the validity of his thesis. He still leaves the door slightly ajar to the possibilities of ir rational national decision or danger ous miscalculation.

Beaufre propounds that deterrence is actually increased in effectiveness when a third nation-such as France or Britainallied to one of the prin cipals attains a nuclear strike force status. Beaufre contends that, if, say, France had the capability to retaliate by inflicting 10 to 15-percent damage on an enemys resources, after having herself taken a first strike, then France would enter into a deterrent situation vis-a-vis that enemy. His contention is interesting, and quite probably valid. However, his assess ment of Frances nuclear capability is, to say the least, optimistic and fu turistic. Theory Is Weakened He weakens an otherwise well-con trived theory when he fails at that moment to include the impact of Chi nese Communist nuclear capability. Nevertheless, he does make the point that the stability created by nuclear weapons can be attained only between reasonable powers. He also comments that the USSR will be faced by China, and that people are wondering how reasonable is Chinas political philos ophy. His inference that, perhaps, only thh USSR will face China seems some what narrow. The general has carefully aligned himself against proliferation of nu clear weapons, but proliferation in the sense that he deplores democratiza tion of nuclear weapons. He feels that a limited proliferation, provided the holding powere are responsible ones, is desirable, but that rampant prolifer ation is not. He concludes that it will fall ultimately to the responsible nu clear powers to institute firm controls against further proliferation. Another of his points is thst nu clear disarmament is simply not feaMilitary ReYicM


BEAUFRE sible. The nuclear weapon is seemingly vital to superpower standoff. It does uot, then, 10gically follow that a weapon which provides parity, pres tige, and possibly peace is to become a serious candidate for being done away with altogether. Nuclear weapons can and should be subjected to controls, although this will be difficult, but the weapons must not be abolished. Beau fres analysis of nuclear disarmament and arms control seems particularly well considered. ConventionalForces Shifting from world political con sequences of deterrence to the effects of deterrence on military establish ments, what is the status of conven tional force structures ? At first glance, it would seem that there should have occurred a sharp upsurge in conven tional forces. To the contrary, there has, in fact, been a decline. Further more, Beaufre feele that there will be a new emphasis on small-nnit mobile forces with tactical nuclear weapons and hacked up by a well-trained mi litia. Why the decrease rather than an upswing in conventional forces? It is General Beaufres opinion that the answer lies in the deterrent effect of tactical iiuclear weapons which with their use, or threat thereof, immedi ately raise the threat of escalation to the strategic nuclear level. This sit uation quite definitely affects the United States and the USSR, tending to militate eharply against the out break of conventional war in areas vital to either nation. Where suhdeterrence may well fail to take hold is in areas of secondary influence or interest not contiguous to either superpower. In such instances, it is Beaufres contention that con
December 19a8

ve tional war may occur as a pro 10 11 ged war of attrition at a baeically low level of intensity. What is the effect of nuclear deterrence with re gard to cold war situations? To Beau fr~, deterrence does not neutralize cold war, but all forms of pressure are pos sible, and peace is no longer peace. His thesisthat there is no peace, only cold warwould seem to add credence to his contention that deter rence leaves cold war undeterred. This ~ may be only partially true. There will be implicit in many cold war c~ises a threat of employment of conven tional and higher levels of force. When this occurs, these other levels will most surely cast their effect upon cold war attitudes and hot spots even though they may fail to produce any complete neutralization. In cold war, freedom of action remains large-so does in stability. Indirect Approach The second portion of General Beau fres theme of total strategyindirect strategylooms large, after the strat egy of deterrence, as the greatest sin gle strategic determinant operating in the world today. The real essence of his indirect strategy is that this strategy attempts to employ all means other than military to attain (objec tives. Indirect strategy is basically political, economic, and, perhaps, abdve all, psychological. Under indirect strategy, General Beaufre visualizes a two-phase ma neuver concept:
Exterior maneuveraction is primarily psychological, although po litical, economic, diplomatic, or even military measures may be taken. The two requirements for its success are th~t the military deterrent must be sufficient to prevent any sizable reac

39

BEAUFRE tion by the enemy, and tbe policy pur sued must appear logical. e Interior maneuveraction takes place in the actual geographical area of interest and involves material or moral force which may be employed in a rapid fait accompli-type opera tion or via protracted conflict over a prolonged period. Most of todays world operations oc cur under the aegis of indirect strat egy, and it goes without saying that, for every interior maneuver, there will be many more exterior maneuvers. Rare will be the instance where man will employ force if he feels he can accomplish his ends without it. In the indirect strategy arena, the contest is on a world scale and goes under cold war rules, with freedom of action unlimited and instability looming large. Initiative is a prime factor. For these reasons, formulation of a carefully coordinated total strat egy on both a national and an inter national level is an absolute must. With this, the vying for developing nation influence and favor should end with the West overmatching develop ing nations as they emerge intact, hopefully as viable independent na tions rather than as underlings to the colonialism of communism. Thus, large-scale war and true peace may he buried side by side. Beaufre may prove to be correct, especially concerning the latter and hopefully tbe former as well. Even then, a dramatic counterforce technological breakthrough or an irrational inter national act might cut short severely this existing timeout on general wak. Total strategy must be applied both from a national, as well as an alliance, standpoint. Political, diplomatic, eco nomic, and psychological factors must be interwoven and coordinated along with the military factor. This total strategy will reflect both a direct mode, as in the instance of the strat egy of deterrence, and an indirect one, with indirect strategy being no less a frontrunner than its direct counter part, in fact, perhaps, more so. For even though deterrence operates to in. hibit general and large-scale conven tional wars, actual low-scale military operations can be expected within the purview of indirect strategy. codification of General Beaufres strategy, his algebra of modern-day war, and, above all, his contribution to strategic thought are significant. Hiq glances into the mirror of the pas~, -ths change of the present, and the telescope of the future are search ing and sound.

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40

Militafy Review

W:DK Militaire Gdmfrale

~(France)

From Revue

Guerrilla Warfare in Central Europe

J
HROUGH the centuries, the nature of the settlement of conflicts between menwars and revolutionshas undergone many changes. Since 1945, methods of fighting have de veioped which are quite different from those of the European wars of material waged with masses of artillery, tanks, and aircraft. During the civil war in China, Mao Tse tung improvised tactics which were a dras tic departure from classical doctrine and enabled the Chinese Communists to defeat the better equipped forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

lbcsmhert988

41

..... .

CENTRAL EUROPE The question of whether Communist , Chinas doctrine of guerrilla warfare signifies a new period in military his tory is a recurring topic of discussion. The gretat powers have different con cepts on the conduct of war. Their image of a future war is based on the strategy and tactics of nuclear and conventional wwapons with a heavy concentration of firepower. Mao Tse tungs method of wagjng war is con sidered to be a special type of warfare not applicable in Europe. But is this a mistaken belief? Is it conceivable that Maos type of warfare might oc cur in Europe? Nuclear Threat Oeclines It becomes ever more improbable that the type of war envisioned by tbe majm- powers will occur. Perhaps the era of nuclear war, described with so much imagination, has already passed and consisted of the two nu clear bombs dropped in 1945 and the subsequent policy of demonstrations and protests, the threat, the intimida tion, and the counterthreat. To date, this policy has been effective. It has prevented world war 111 and com pelled the two giantsthe United States and the USSRto come to terms. It has been said that nuclear weap ons are political weapons and not military weapons. This is a self-decep tion. In reality, any military weapon is a political weapon. If in this case Tki.s article was translated antf condensed from tke original, pub tisked in the REVUE MILITAIRE GENItRALE (France) December 196T, under the title, Die Krieg staktik von Mad Tse-tung Un ter Europaiscken VerAa[tnissen. Translation by Mrs. Gevda L. i Freeman, Mundelein, Illinois. 42 the special label is to mean that these weapons are being used only as a threat, they lose their politic?l value. After the long break from a big war and getting used to the long pe riod of peace brotight about by the fear of nuclear weapons, one might come to believe that the will to live together without the use or threat of force will come to predominate in all gov ernments. This is an attractive con cept, but its realization is doubtful. However, it. is probable that tbe day will come when the threat of the use of nuclear weapons will lose its pOjit ical strength. There is every reason to believe ~hat the antagonism between the political systems in the East and in the West will not be neutralized by the time th~ effect of the threat of nuclear weapons has waned. The greater the demands now madp on tbe USSR at her eastern border m Asia and the fewer troops that are maintained in Western Eu rope by the North Atlantic Treaty Or ganization, the ,greater the certainty that, when the storm in the Far East has passed, the USSR will be stronger than the West which is appeased by the dc!tmcte. Space and Time Factors As the nuclear threat declines, a po litico-military aggression patterned on Mao Tse-tungs principles becomes in creasingly possible. There are two factorsspace and timewhich suP ported Maos tactics in China that are not present everywhere in the world, least of all in Eur6pe. Yet it is conceivable that, in a mod ified form, the Red Chinese guerrilla tactics could be applied in central Eu rope. An aggressor might believe that the infiltration tactic dressed up as revolutionary uprisings and SUP<
Military Review

.
CENTRAL EUROPE ported by air drops as in a partisan war could be full of promise for avoid ing an open and costly battle with tanks and aircraft. Actions taken for of the people the self-liberation could effectively cloak the nature of , the aggressive war. Even though armed bands could not operate for long in the densely popu lated regions of West Germany, hide? erations are possible only for a short time. Therefore, in Europe, this method of fighti~g is more promising when it is combined with the infiltration of large groups of regular forces to en gage and hold the troops of the de fender. For example, troops could be infiltrated through wooded regions along the bocder, landed at the coast

-e41

- ...

\
Soviet partisans bebind German lines in 1942 serving as bases for attacks against transport columns, military snpply installations, industrial tar gets, and administrative establish ments could be sustained for a period of time in the large wooded and moor land areas. Such bases could also be established and supplied by air, pro viding there was prior reconnaissance and study as to suitability. These activities of tbe covert strug gle could be combined with propa gandathe planned use of depressing news and rumors disseminated by leaf lets and radio broadcasts. However, if tbe defender makes determined efforts to enlighten the people of the country and takes countermeasures, such op
outs

.. \.

\.

? under the cover of d rkness or foggy weather, or air drop ed in industrial regions near the frontier. This covert struggle would be most successful if it served as the launching of far-reaching operations of regular ground forces. By presentday conceptions, such operations would be overripe for an intervention with nuclear weapons. But in view of the uncertainty concerning the targets, fighting an infiltrated and air-landed enemy with nuclear weapons in ones own country would seem to be unac ceptable. The defense against this method of fighting requires an extensive secu rity system for all of the border ter.

Llecember 1968

43

CENTRAL

EUROPE Of course, this heavy materiel is necessary and serves its purpose wher ever the enemy would attack with mechanized and armored units. But in. asmuch as the opponent knows that the defenders in the West are strong in fighting power and might inflict

rain which does not lend itself to successful tank battles. Under Maos concepts, the anticipated big tank battle in the open terrain involving larger penetrated enemy units would not take place, at least initially. More likely to occur would be penetrations of numer-

D, fcnse M(,tiatru d th, GeTma>, Fcd.,vl Rcwb!k

West German troops of the Ist Mountain Infantry Dhision during an exercise in the Zugspitze area
ous medium-size bodies of combat troops into the wooded and mountainous regions where tanks and armored personnel carriers are hampered in their movement. It must be questioned whether the present armament and equipment of NATO unitsprimarily heavy, armored materieln?+ the conditions for the Mao Tse-tung style of warfare.

upon him substantial losses, it is doubtful whether he would throw his armored units into battle in the first days of a conflict. It is possible that he would not employ this tactic until he is holding large forces of tbe defender with infiltrated troops at many points along the long frontier. To be sure, at this time, one cannot impute a definite plan of attack Ml@ry Review
d

44

CENTRAL EUROPE

+
to the opponent. With a suitable sit uation, he might be tempted to push through the north German area with massed armored units in his first thrust and simultaneously infiltrate many lighter units along the border between the Harz Mountains and the Danube. In any event, operations in wooded and mountainous regions must be ex pected. There will be a need for light combat troops. They should be mo torized and transportable by helicopter so that they can be rapidly moved to distant areas of operation. These forces must be designed for close com bat in difficult terrain or densely set tled regions. Vast regions of West Germany along tbe eastern border are covered with mountainous forests, and behind them, in several places, are industrial cities. Here, the enemy cannot be dis kidged by armored brigades. In the rear of these frontier zones, there are, also in greater depth, areas difficult to control. They offer opportunities for the establishment of guerrilla bases from which the defending forces could be effectively harassed. Territorial infantry units might have to engage in serious mopping-up operations that could become so ex tensive that stronger Tortes than now planned must be employed. Maybe it will be necessary to change these ter ritorial units into rifle brigades or light divisions through a reorgani zation and an improvement in arma ment. They could also then he assigned missions as described for diilicult ter rain within the framework of the na tional defense. Strong, conventionally trained reserves must be available for such military tactics. At present, the West German Army has only one mountain division, and West European armies have no light rifle brigades. In NATOs defense policy, there is an increasing tendency to withdraw conventional troops from Europe and to reduce, their, number on the whole. However, in the course of the next decade, it may become necessary to rely again upon strong land forces armed with modern, but not nuclear, weapons.

.
45

December 1968

AJmi+&&d%aibze Civic Action

Lieutenant

Franklin Mark Osanka

General Saiyud Kerdphol, Rowd T18aiArmu

action. Mitrapab is a Thai word mean ing friendship, and the foundation is more commonly known as Mitrapab-ThaiAmerican. The organization is composed of Thai and United States military and civilian personnel dedicated to the ta1 of building a four-room school in every province in 46

HE Mitrapab Education Foundation in Thailand provides an example of a nongovernmental program of civic

Thailand. The foundations motto is Rais ing Funds for Raising Schools. It has successfully acquired the funds to build a four-room school building in 49 of the 71 provinces in Thailand. The Mitrapab Education Foundation was begun in May 1961 when a Thai Army officer and a US Army advisor observed classes being conducted in a badly rundown and inadequate school building in a village in Military Review

CIVIC ACTION the Province of Prachin Buri. A rainstorm during the visit vividly demonstrated that the roof was more of a sieve than a shelter. After discussion with their senior officers and further investigation into the possibil ities of providing more adequate facilities, ,the two men were instrumental in forming a committee named Operation Mitrapab. Then, the fundraising campaign began. Most otthe money came from donations received at skydiving and parachuting demonstrations conducted by both Thai and United States military personnel. Additional funds weie donated by businesses and private individuals. By August 1961, suf ficient funds were on hand to build a new school at Prachin Buri. In September 1961, it was decided to make Operation Mitrapab a permanent proj ect and to call it Mitrapab Education Foundation. Since that time, the organiza tion has raised funds through sky diving and parachuting demonstrations, sports events, television productions, and through donations from individuals and businesses. Civic Action The Mitrapab schools do not represent a one-way contribution. Local province of. ficials and ordinary citizens become actively involved and share equally in the success. The foundation is a marriage of education, military civic action, and community selfhelp. A school is built with the funds reaped from 15 and 50.cent tickets purchased by spectators to a combination- parachute sports exhibition. Thus, the people them selves actually pay for their own school. This is an excellent example of the military civic action principle of the military help ing the populace to help itself. Finally, after the money is collected, the people must donate labor and land before a four-room school can result from this joint venture of the Mltrapab Education Founda tion and the local populace. There are three phases to a successful foundation operation. Phase I is the initial visit to the selected province to establish a face-to.face relationship with the gover nor and his st;ff, informing them of founda 41

Franklin Mark Osanka is a Research Sociologist with the Stanford Re search Institute, Menlo Park, Calif or nia. He holds B.S. and M.A. degreas in Sociology from Northern Illinois University in De Kalb and is presently studying toward a Ph. D. in SociologU at Northwestern University, Evans ton, Illinois. He is the author of Guer rilla Warfare which appeam in the
International Encyclopedia of the So cial Sciences and the book, Modern Guerrilla Warfare. During 1964-68, he

performed research tasks with the Stanford Research Institute in Thai land under the sponsorship of the Ad v%nced Research Projects Agency. He was a Committee Member and then Vice Chairman of the Mitrapab Edu cation Foundation. Lieutenant General Saiyu (t Kerdphol graduated from the Royal Thai Army Cadet School in 1940, the US Avmy Infantry School in 1954, the Royal Thai Army Command and General Staff College in 1951, the Australian Staff College in 1958, and the National Defense College of Thailand in 1968. He served with the United Nations forces in Korea. He is currently the Assietant Chief of Staff for Personnel of the Rorral Thai Army and Co-Chair man of the Mitrapab Education Foun dation. He is also Director of the Operations and Coordination Center, Combined Suppression Operations Command, the civilian police-military headquarters whose main function is in de counterinsurgency operation fense of Thailand.
Oecember 196e

officers to start the Mltrapab Uaucano?. r ounuanon

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Parachutist

performs at frrnrhising bition

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Supplies

are distributed at a Mltrapah school defecation MilitaryReview

48

CIVIC ACTION >

Thai

schoolchildren raise flag over newly dedicated Mitrapab school

Local populace watch United States and Thai sky-divers jump demonstration

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December1968

CIVIC ACTION tion procedures and capa~lities, identify ing and plotting a suitable drop zone, and determining how far the drop zone is from an acceptable airfield. Phase II is the presentation of the jump show which consists of static-line and freefall skydiving performances. Each exhibition begins with opening remarks by the province governor and the senior Mitrapab Founda tion Executive Committee member present. The first jumpers out of the Royal Thai Air Force C-123 are one Thai and one United States officer, each carrying the others national flag. Upon landing, the Thai of ficer presents the US flag to a US represent ative (usually a Peace Corps, US Operations Mission, or US Information Service repre sentative), and the US officer presents the Thai flag to the Thai representative (usually a local schoolteacher). The national anthems of Thailand and the United States are played as both flags are raised. The next jumpers are soccer players from the Royal Thai Army Special Warfare Center who are dressed in their soccer uniforms. After landing, they go to a nearby field to play the local champions. The third group of jumpers is composed of female skydivers who jump from 7,000 to 10,000 feet. Last, come the male acre. batic sky-divers who jump at 10,000 to 15,000 feet and delay opening their para chutes, performing a variety of maneuvers while falling. There are closing remarks by United States and Thai Mitrapab Foundation Committee members and the governor. Finally, both flags are lowered to the strains of the national anthems of each country. Phase Ill is, perhaps, the most rewarding for foundation members, for it marks reach ing the long-term objectivethe completion of a four-room schoolhouse. The school, up until this phase, has belonged to the founda tion. In an atmosphere of pagentry, the school is dedicated to the peoples of the province while senior committee members sign the school over to the province. The final act in the presentation is the raising of the Thai national flag over the school. While the foundation is not an official agency of the Royal Thai Government, many of the spectators assume that it is. And, although not planned, Mitrapab Foundation ceremonies often manifest many of the characteristics of good psychological op erations. Events that are most Ionglasting in peoples minds are those which are emoti~ma~ stirring and those in which people have themselves participated. Phases II and Ill give many opportunities for the people to be involved actively. For example, educators, priests, military, police, civil officials, Boy Scouts, soccer players, and ordinary citizens very often play an active role. The raising and lowering of both flags is emotionally stirring. In addition, demonstrations of daring and strength of character always leave a deep impression on the Thai people. The members of the Mitrapab Education Foundation believe their civic action con cept can be applied in other developing areas of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.

50

Military Review

+ SEARCH for Professional Excellence

Lieutenant General Wmh Lo., Armu Rembt!c of Vietnm

INE Vietnamese graduates of the US Army Command and General Staff College are key partici pants in a pioneering nation-building effort of potentially great significance to the Republic of Vietnam. Those nine officers, representing Leaven worth classes from 1956 through 1966, are members of the newly established National Defense College in Saigon. In d sense, they have generated a corollary to their alma maters admo nition, of Ad Betlwn Pace %rati-that
December 1968

is, in time of war, the Vietnamese Na tional Defense College seeks to edu cate outstanding high-ranking mili tary officers and career government civilians to become better qualified to perform important functions relevant tn national security. The decision to establish a senior service college in the course of a war, which, incidentally, brought small arms skirmishes within a few blocks of the colle~ge and enemy rockets to the residential areas inhabited by 51

PROFESSIONAL

EXCELLENCE The missions prescribed by the na tional decree pointed to one clear oh. jective: establish an operational col lege. At the same time, there were stimulating challenges related to that objective. Somehow, the college had to be created without undue impact on day-by-day tactical operations. Ironi cally; the fundamental needs of Viet nam for broadly educated officers of considerable potential also presented understandable temptations to give the project less than top priority. The faculty and advisorsmany of whom were busily engaged with the shoot ing war or, in the case of American advisors, not even in Vietnam in April 1967were directed to open the aca demic building doors to class number 1 by February 1968. Formal Opening Through the strong support of such leadw~ --as President Nguyen Van Thieu; Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky; General Cao Van Vien, Chief, Joint General Staff; General William C. Westmoreland; and exceptional per formance of duty by the faculty and US advisors, National Defense College class number 1 embarked on formal curricular activities on 6 May 1968. The Tet offensive bad required a re vision of plans to open the college in February. The college is under the direct com mand of the Chief, Joint General Staff. The Central Training Command of the Joint General Staff is responsible for coordinating support and supervising instruction. The commandant is ad vised by a board of consultants com posed of representatives of all Minis tries in the governmental Cabinet. When the college faculty is fully manned, the commandant and his dep uty will have three key assistants
Military Review

members of the college during the opening days, reflects serious study by the Republic of Vietnam Joint Gen eral Staff, as well as Headquarters, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The Chief, Joint General Staff, ap

..
us
A,mg,

US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, es corted by Commandant, Lieutenant Gen eral Vinh Lot, leaves the Republic of Vietnam National Defense College after delivering a Iecture to class number 1 proved the concept of the college in April 1967. A campus was selected in Saigon and, on 22 August 1967, the National Defense College was formally established by national decree. The de cree charged the college with studying, planning, and developing national de fense policy and educating top officers and government civilians for functions of national security. 52

PROFESSIONAL the college secretary, the director of instruction, and the chief, administra tive and support division. Itiis possible that, as the college pursues its mis sion related to development of na tional defense policy, the doctrine evaluation division will become a ma jor element under the direct command , of the commandant. Class Composition As the highest level military educa tional institution in the Republic of Vietnam, the National Defense CO1. lege ia attended by selected senior mil itary officers and career government civilians who are particularly qualified for rapid promotion to positions of great responsibility. Officers of the armed forces in the class are normally in the grade of colonel or lieutenant colonel, or the equivalent, and should be graduates of a command and staff college. General officers also may be selected for attendance. Of the 15 military members of the first class, 10 are graduates of a com + mand and staff college. Civilian class members are of comparable stature. All but three of the 21 members have attended college. Military members of the class have held such responsible

EXCELLENCE

positions as regimental commander, divisiop chief of staff, and province chief. Civilian members include in their backgrofinds service as chief of Cabinet and Ministry inspector. The average age of the members is about 38with the military officers tending

Us

A,mIJ

Lieutenant General Vink Loc is Commanding General of tke Central Training Commwcd, Army Republic of Vietnam, and Commandant of tke Na. ttonal Defense College, Saigon. The jirst Vietnamese graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff Col lege, ?LS bus served as Commander of the 9tli Infantry Division in the Delta, and was Crmzmanding General of tke 2d Army Corps in the Highlands. He kas written numerous books about the Vietnam war and militant operations, including Wby Plei me? His article, Road-Clearing Operation, appeared in tk e April 1966 issue of tke MILITARY
REVIEW. Llecernber 1968 t

General Alfred M. Gruenther, US Army, Retired, shown with Commandant, Lieu tenant General Vinh Lot, was a May 1968 Iecturer at the National Defense College to be about 40 while the civilians are about 32. The National Defense College cnr riculurn was designed specifically for Vietnam and it focuses upon topics directly related to Southeast Asia. Many topics covered in US senior serv ice colleges were eliminated during serious academic board numerous, meetings devoted to curriculum devel opment. Political, economic, sOciOpey chological, and military topics focus . 53

NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE CURRICULUM

PHASSCOSSFISE lSNE
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PROFESSIONAL on Vietnamese needs. The curriculum, which provides a balance hetween mil itary and nonmilitary topice, includes an investigation of Vietnams natiOnal potential, the elements of nationhuild ing in Southeast Asia, and the eseen. tials of national defense planning for an Asian nation. Scheduled activities center upon a comprehensive guest speaker program which relies heavily on the participa- \ tiOn of government officials from Free World countries. Those officials, who are often in top-level and sensitive posts, have given outstanding support to the college. Interest and understand ing of the various topics presented during courses are achieved through lectures and by group discussions, oral and written presentations, and a re search program. There are no written examinations or college solutions. The over-all curriculum of the Na tional Defense College consists of an orientation, 10 numbered courses, a regular seminar program, and an indi vidual research program. In addition, the college offers an elective English program and conducts a unique senior seminar. Even though all members of the class have at least fair comprehen sion and speaking ability in English, tbe entire class has enrolled in an elec tive English-language program. The weekly senior seminar begins on Saturday morning when key gen eral officers and distinguished career government officials are invited to hear guest speakers as they lecture and dis cuss significant topics with the regu lar class. Time and facilities are made available each Saturday afternoom for those generals and distinguished ca reer officials to meet in seminar ses sion on subjects related to tbe lecture. This procedure promotes understand-

EXCELLENCE

ing at $he highest governmental level not only of the vital topics under dis cussion, but also of the role of the college and how it contributes to achievement of national goals. Simultaneously, members of the reg ular class benefit by listening to the questions, comments, and observations of members of the senior seminar. At the same time, they are afforded op portunities for direct and frank ex change of ideas with some of the na tions most influential leaders. The regular seminar and the 10 numbered courses, which together con stitute the bulk of the curriculum, are scheduled concurrently. They cover three broad phases or areas of study. These and the 10 numbered courses and their duration are depicted in the chart. The curriculum takes about 10 monthe to complete. Present Plans call for one class each 12 months. Much has been accomplished since the concept for the National Defense College was approved. Now, with the first class in, session, the college is providing the best possible education while planning for the future. The commandant and his senior ad visor have agreed upon a set of 14 goals, encompassing approximately 70 projects or undertakings, for the pe riod June 1968 through May 1969. The fundamental pnrpose in establishing these goals, and the design of the re lated projects or undertakings, is to provide a set of programs which will build upon the foundation established since April 1967. Through such pro grams, it is hoped that the National Defense College can become a model of professional excellence to produce Vietnamese leadership equal to what ever national security challenges may face this nation in the future. u
55

December 1968

A wider, hard-surfaced roadway, patrolled by forti fied vehicles, a 650-gard-wide cleared area to prevent anz bushes, and superior potential for combat on the ground are major factors which have changed the Nangyang Pass from a 1954 graveyard of French hopes to a valuable pas sageway for trow~~ and supplies in 1968

56

Military Reviaw

I rode/and walked recently all over the area escorted by only three US soldiers in an armored jeep. The new Highway 19, now a broad, hard-sur- faced road with clearings along both sides, could be seen far below. Con voys of US trucks were moving along it at a rate of more than 500 per day from the port of Qui Nhon all the way to Pleiku. A single US armored cavalry squadron has primary respon sibility for keeping the Nangyang Pass sectiona total of more than 40 milesof this highway secure. Why and how has the United States suc ceeded where the French failed ? The first answer that probably comee to mind is manpower, but that is not correct. The United States ac tually has fewer men directly involved now than the French had in 1954. GM 100 had more heavy weapons initially than the 2d Squadron, Ist Cavalry, has now, although tanks, armored per sonnel carriers (APCS ), and 105 millimeter, eelf-propelled howitzers are conspicuous. Another possible answer is that the enemy is weaker, but this is probably not correct either. Some of the Com munist units in the 2d Corps area are identical with those which defeated GM 100, but are now associated with the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) rather than the Vietminh. A full and correct answer surely includes the superior potential for combat on the ground tbi-ough uee of air mobility, strategic and tactical airpower, and Free World reserves of men and materiel which can be brought into action if an emergency should occur near Nangyang today. The real difference lies in how High way 19 waS held then and is held now. 57

Jac Weller

ROUPMENT Mobile 100 (GM 100 ) may have been the finest French nnit that fought in Indochina. It was finally destroyed by the Viet minh on 24 June 1954 near Nangyang Pass on Highway 19 between Pleiku and An Khe. This place is second only to Dien Bien Phu as a graveyard of French hope in Vietnam. There are 10,000 men said to be buried there.
December 19S8

HIGHWAY

19

A US armored jeep near the marker which denotes the ambush area of GM 10I3 The Vietminh cut this vital road into the Central Highlands repeatedly in 1954. When the Viet Cong did the same early in 1965, a decision was made to introduce US combat troops. Restoring secure ground communica. tions from the coast to Pleiku is a notable US achievement, especially since this is now maintained with a minimum of force. Early in 1951, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny developed a plan for beating the Communists in Indo Jac Wetler, a ~rearms consultant china ,by holding the Hanoi and Hai phong areas in strength and control ling other portions of the country with mobile task forces of infantry, armor, and artillery. GM 100 was one of these and included two French infantry bat. talions which had fought in Korea. GM 100 also included a battalion of French Colonials, a squadron of ar mored cavalry, a battalion of 105 millimeter, self-propelled howitzers, and some light units including Mon. tagnards under French officers. Ini tially, total strength was 3,500 men. The morale, discipline, and combat ef fectiveness of this unit was second to none, perhaps, in the entire world at the time of its creation on 15 Novem ber 1953. It was also well armed, mainly with US weapons. After a short but intensive train ing period, it was committed in the Central Highlands around Pleiku. It fought numerous small actions and Military Review

wit;t ofiices in Princeton, New Jersey, attended Georgia Military Academy and was graduated from Princeton contribu University. He is a frequent tor to numerous US and foreign jour nals and is the author of several books, including Fire and Movement. His most recent article for the MILITARY REVIEW, Good and Bad Weapons for Vietnam , appeared in the Octobe7 1968 issue. 58

HIGHWAY 19 took casualties in men and materiel, as well as in physical stamina and health. BY mid-March 1954, the strain of Dien Bien Phu began to tell on French strength throughout Indo china. Units were withdrawn from the Central Highlands; GM 100 became the main defender of Highway 19 ,from Pleiku to An Khe. Other units held several fortified bases both along this vital road and north and south of it, but GM 100 was the cement that held them together in a single struc ture. The enemy gradually whittled away at them all. Finally, GM 100 was or dered to abandon An Kbe and retreat west along the main road to Pleiku. It began to move at dawn on 24 June 1954, more than a month after the fall of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954. The French held a strongly defended post slightly east of Nangyang Pass known as PK 22, but GM 100 never reached it. This elite force and some poor units included ~n its long, narrow column fell into a powerful ambush and were destroyed as an effective military forte. A few, vehicles and some individ uals did manage to escape to PK 22 early in the ambush. Some squads and platoons went south into the jungle after nightfall and hacked their way around to temporary safety. Meet of these shattered remnants eventually arrived at Pleiku along with the de fenders of PK 22, but the French lost as conclusively in the highlands as they did in Dien Bien Phu. When one looks for reasons why the French did not succeed in spite of excellent personnel and materiel, one is forced to consider the word mobile in the title of GM 100. Their mobility was good in the area around Pleiku, but Highway 19 was then only one lane wide and bordered by thick

HIGliwAY

19 the French made some minor mis takes. The Vietminh were lucky in killing, wounding, or putting out of action the entire headquarters section of GM 100, including its commander, within 10minutes. These appear, how ever, to be of secondary importance. The Communists won essentially be cause they took advantage of the jun gle to mass superior force in a battle area favorable to them. They surprised their enemies in regard to time and place and carried through a well-coor dinated ground action in which they used recoilless weapons and mortars in larger numbers and with more ammu nition than the French believed pos sible. The big change over the past 14 years is in Highway 19 itself. The road is now two lanes wide, solidly constructed, and covered with hard

jungle. Tanks, APCS, and self-pro pelled howitzers could move for long stretches only along this narrow road; even tanks could not leave it. When the Communists sprang their last ambush, they partialIy blocked the highway with boulders and placed some of their weapons within 15 feet of the road itself. Mortars were posi tioned farther back, but with observ. ers looking down on the entire am bush area. The Vietminh commander, rather than the French force com mander, had tactical control of his units, in part, by radio. The French possessed the advantage of tactical air support in Indochina to a greater de gree than is often realized today, but it did them little good here. The Com munists were protected by thick jun gle and the proximity of GM 100. During theactionon24 June 1954,

A truck-mounted quad 50 defending a working party along the road 60 Military Review

HIGHWAY 19

A fortified truck with M60 machineguns and riflemen on the hard surface of High. way 19 blacktop. Strips of 325 to 550 yards wide have been cleared along each side of the new highway. The road for merly ran through jungle from An Xhe Pass to the east and past Nang yang Pass to the west, but not any more. American engineers and their equipment have built the new road and removed the jungle. An ambush 325 yards back from a road is not really an ambush at all. The enemy cannot place one closer now without risking disaster. So far, the enemy has been unable to hide a mine under neath the new road and not have its presence detected by the thunder run of a tank and two APCS that passes along alertly in the morning before convoys are allowed to start. Another obvious change is a new type of convoy security. The trucks themselves are nearly defenseless, but tanks and APCS are not idealnot even goodf or protecting them. At least three local modifications of thin .. Llecemher 1968 skinned vehicles now provide convoy protection that is cheap, effective, and has the same characteristics as the trucks themselves. Homemade, ar mored vehicles regularly accompany all convoys and do independent patrolling. Military police jeeps often have one fourth-inch armor and sandbags on the floor and mount one or two M60 machineguns behind. These changes have increased total weight between 1,400 and 1,800 pounds. This cuts down life expectancy drastically and prac tically eliminates cross-country mobil ity. However, the considerable pro tection given by this light armor, especially against the Communist 7.62 millimeter bullets, can be of extreme value. A jeep which survives the ini tial blast of an ambush may be tbe difference between trifling losses and the annihilation of a small convoy. Trucks have also been fortified with armor and machineguns and ac company larger groups of vehicles. . 61

HIGHWAY

19

They can carry several riflemen and adequate ammunition more comfort ably than a tank or APC in the Viet namese climate. Vehicles of this type cannot move off roads, but they can take punishment and reply with a heavy volume of fire. Other trucks have heen modified by mounting a quad 50-four, caliber .50 heavy machineguns which fire to getherin back. Since these trucks are not usually heavily armored, they can move off the road and aid tanks and ACPS in protecting working par ties who maintain the cleared strip and do other jobs. These special purpose fighting ve hicles do not damage the road and can go anywhere that a loaded truck can move and at the same speed. Even more important, their use allows the true armored units deployed along Highway 19 to remain at full strength and available for other missions,
62

Thq French tried to control High way is by means of fortifications along it and the mobile power of GM 100. Essentially, this is what the United States is doing today. There are a few more perimeters since every one of the nine bridges is defended by one. However, the total force is smaller. The real deterrents today are quick reactions in the air by artillery, and especially by armor and mecha nized infantry. Many of the tanks and APCS of the 2d Squadron, Ist Cav alry, as well as the self-propelled, 105 millimeter howitzers of the supporting artillery are dug in at these positions. These vehicles, along with some sand bagged trenches and revetments, have a considerable defensive capability, but each one could be destroyed by the enemy in time and for a price. The key to the security of this vital stretch of Highway 19 lies in the words time and price. The Military Review

. ...
H16HWAY 19 NVA and Viet Cong know how GM 100 met its fate and would like to win in the same way again. The Viet minh attacked parts of this elite French force in a dozen minor actions. Sometimes they won, sometimes they lost, but the Communists suffered less in aggregate than the French. Today, the enemy does not have the time to make a small attack e k ective because of quick reaction up to any appropriate level. Highway 19 is open because the armored cavalry units presently deployed along it can fight where they are, or move along it, or beside it, in spite of anything the en emy can do. The enemy could, of course, mount a much larger offensive in this area, something of Khe Sanh size and in tensity. They are unlikely, however, to want to do this so far from their logistic eupport, especially where we have a eequre, two-lane highway Iead ing from deepwater ports to the point of attack. An enemy offensive of this type would precipitate a really big battle in , an area favorable to our forces. So far, all enemy efforts have been small and unsuccessful because they have not solved the problem of our quick reactions. There were some am bushes during the Tet offensive, but Highway 19 was not closed for a sin gle day. Mines were buried beneath the shoulders of the road, not under the paving and blacktop, in places where trucks often stopped. These were exploded by electricity on com mand from concealed observation posts in the cutover area. However, when the enemy tried to camouflage larger numbers of men and weapons in these side strips, they knocked out a few trucks, but were beaten badly. The I

HIGHWAY

19 gathering facilities are sometimes suc cessful in spotting these positions be forehand, but not always. With good observation, the enemy can adjust his fire on the target quickly. In this situation, an armored cav alry reaction does no good. The Com munist mortar, mortar crew, and ob servation post are all far back from the road, but they do not often get off free. The 105-millimeter howitzers fire back quickly. Available helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft are directed to the approximate mortar position. The cost paid by the Communists even for an attack of this small size is best ascer tained by the fact that they do not occur often. As long as tbe Free World main tains a general, over-all superiority in conventional weapons, along with the ability to move quickly as required day or nighi, -the present rather unusual defense system seems to be sound. A strip of country only 650 yards wide would be difficult to hold in any other way. Overconfidence which leads to disastrous surprise is the chief danger. Americans have succeeded !vhere the French failed because of greater ma teriel resources and because of a bet ter plan. Given a reasonable break on intelligence, US forces which react as required to any enemy offensive ap pear to have the situation well in hand. Highway 19 is an unprofitable objec tive for an enemy effort of any size at all. We are spread thinner than the French were in this same area, but we have a resiliency and flexibility that they lacked.

convoys which were attacked not only

fought back, but summoned help. More powerful US elements arrived quickly. The Communists could neither hide in the cleared areas nor cope with US firepower. The armed helicopter gunships which patrol Highway 19 from dawn to darkand sometimes longer--concentrated like vultures and attacked. Artillery fire usually came in quickly since it is registered through out the Nangyang section. Each time the NVA ambushed, US armor moved out with heavy fire. The key to the US effort is mobile reaction rather than static defense. Each perimeter is capable of pri mary defense. Tanks and APCS are dug in to make them more secure, and they are coordinated with other sand bagged structures. If attacked directly, they would be tough. Every fighting vehicle can also move out quickly if an adjacent post needs help. The idea is to be ready to fight efficiently where you are if You are hit, but to move out quickly if your partner up the road is being assaulted. Highway 19 and the cleared strips on either side as they are now constituted give the US armored cavalry the mobility which GM 100 did not have. The individual posts are too small to be easily hit by rockets. but they are vulnerable to mortar fire. Surprise attacks of this type are difficult to pre vent because US installations are along the road in the bottom of the valley. The enemy controls the mountaintops in many areas and can bring in a mortar and ammunition at night. US and Army Republic of Vietnam re connaissance and other intelligence-

64

Military Review

,!.

The Military~tuation in + SouthAsia

Ashok Kapur

ENERALLY, the term South Asia comprises kdia, Pakistan, Burma, C6y Ion, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and the Indian Ocean area. Although there may be some dif ferences over the definition of this area, there is no doubt about its strategic location and strategic importance. On the north, the Soviet Union and tbet Chi nese Peoples Republic border and overlook the entire region. The Pamirs which horder the Sotiiet Union, China, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan have been an area of great power rivalries. Several geostrategic factors explain this. The Wakhari corridor, a narrow strip of Afghan territory which separates Pakistan from tbe Soviet Union, is only a few miles wide. Pakistans territory also ends in a moun tainous watershed about 50 miles from the common frontier between the Soviet Union and the Sinkiang Province of China. Similarly, tbe Kashmir region, which is strategically located along the Pamirs, has long been a center of great power ambitions and Indo-Pakistan ri valry. It is not surprising that tbe Soviet Union has sought to develop a presence in Afghani stan, following the traditional aspirations of Imperial Russia for a foothold in this area. Likewise, it is noteworthy that the Soviet Union bas already served notice, as sbe did during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, that con flict causes concern especially when the mili tary action is taking place in a region which is close to tbe borders of tbe Soviet Union. Another aspect of significance is that Cornmunist China has been able to consolidate her military presence in Tibet, an area of tradL tional Russian aspirations. It is also note worthy that the Cultural Revolution has not reached at all into the western Tibetan region. In central and eastern Tibet, there is no sign that the Cultural Revolution has affected Chi nese military posture toward India. In fact, following the experience of the 1967 border skirmishes between India and China in the ~ikkim area, one may hypothesize that tbe lo ,
Cowrirht 0 1!168 by &hok Kmmr. AH Sights Reserved.

, ,

December 1968

65

SOUTH ASIA cal Chinese military commanders in Tibet may continue to resort to bor der skirmishes to otTset political pres sures from Peking. British Indian forward defense policy before 1947 was based on the assumptions that the Soviet Union posed the main threat to the Indian subcontinent via Afghanistan and Ti bet, and, to offset such a threat, there was need to maintain a forward pos ture in Tibet and Afghanistan. Mili tary planning was hased on the idea that the enemy would have the initia tive in escalating tensions or starting hostilities, and the military campaign on the Indian side was to be limited, decisive, and punitive. Nonalignment Policy Indian national policy after 1947, however, was based on the idea of nonalignment. In military terms, this meant a renunciation of military alli ances. Prior to tbe 1962 Chinese at tack, the preoccupation of the Indian military planner had largely focused on Kashmir. The strategic significance of the Chinese attack rested in the fact that with one stroke, the Chinese military intervention of 1962 escalated the~threat potential, according to the Indian perception, from the concern over Pakistans threat to Kashmir, to the reality of a protracted confronta tion with China over 2,500 miles of difficult Himalayan terrain. The Chinese forces were impressive. The construction of a main road run ning parallel to the Indo-Tibetan bor der with arterial roads extending to the main passes and pressure points along tbe border allowed the Chinese to achieve tactical and local superiority at a time and place of their choosing. hWitary Capabilities Since the Chinese threat to India at present continues to be a conven tional military one, the question of Chinese military capabilities in Tibet is important. Chinese forces in Tibet are estimated to be between 60,000 and 100,000 infantry troops supported by light and medium tanks and artil lery. The Tibetan military sector may be divided @o three parts: the western Tibet&i region covering the strategic Ladakh and Aksai Chin sector, the central sector including the area known as the Chumbi Valley, and the eastern sector opposite the Indian North-East Frontier Agency territory. The Chinese military threat pres ently is focused mainly on the Chumbi valley since this region controls the approaches to Sikkim and Bhutan. China regards both as her legitimate area of intTuence and included within her traditional boundaries. The impor tance of this area is testified to by such border skirmishes as the Novem ber 1967 Chinese horder provocations. Politically, a formidable Chinese pos ture in this area connects with the overt Chinese provoc~tion and subver sion of political elements in the key border areas, as was to be seen during the 1967 Naxalbari disturbances. Whether Chinese strategy in the
Military Rstiew

Ashok Kapar is a Ressarch Fellow at the Institute for Sino-SOviet Stud ies, George Washington University, Washington, D. C. Born in Pakistan, ke was graduated from. Punjab Uni versity, and holds a Masters degree in International Affairs from George Washington University. He 2uas se lected as a United Nations intern and was assigned to tlze Ojice of Political a~d Security Council Affairs at UN Head~uarters at New York in 1962, and l$as traveled extensively in Europe and the Far East.
66

SOUTH ASIA border areas is to achieve tactical mil itary superiority by overwhelming the Indian forward positions at Natu La or Jelep-la Passes or by instigating subversive elements in the border re gions on the Naxalbari model is an open question. What is crucial, however, is that the geographical terrain where the defense. c% breakthrough at the point of the watershed could conceivably be decisive both from the Indian and the Chinese side. Contrat-y to the view commonly held that the Peking leaders are irrational and that they would not mind a nu clear war, Chinese nuclear policy has so far reflected a strong caution. This

forward Indian positions are located is such that it lacks depth for an area defense. Undoubtedly, this considera tion armlies both to the Indian and the Chine~~ forward positions. Thus, the military significance of this area rests in the fact that the forward positions, both for Indian and the Chinese forces, constitute the first and the last line of Llecember 1968

caution is a product of the inherent caution in Chinese military olicy and Mao Tse-tungs view that ( military force is to be used mainly for the achievement of political objectives. Contrary to the publicly held United States and Soviet view regarding the fear ~of small wars escalating into bigger and possible nuclear wars, 67

SOUTH ASIA and the danger of an irrational power igniting an accidental nuclear holo caust, the Chinese military thinkers have rejected the idea of an accidental attack. It is thus fair to assume that, according to current Chinese military doctrine, the use of force, conventional or nuclear, involves a deliberate choice. Implications for India At least three variables affect the nature of the Chinese nuclear threat to India: e The Chinese have the technical and industrial capabilities required for the deployment of b;llistic missiles and, according to US estimates, the Chinese are making intensive efforts to develop a medium-range missile. China should have a modest opera tional force of missiles by the mid 1970s. Likewise, the Chinese intercon tinental ballistic missile program is being pursued with high priority. However, judging by the performance of the December 1967 test which has been described as a partial failure, the Chinese may continue to have trouble in perfecting the circular error prob able, the weight, and the guidance system of their missiles. first-generation Chinese e The medium-range missiles will be liquid fueled with a range of 1,000 to 1,500 miles. It is possible that, given tbe geographic and other related consid erations peculiar to Tibet, the Chinese will have some difficulty in deploying such missiles in Tibet. e Hard intelligence regarding the deployment and target of Chinese mid range ballistic missiles in Tibet may be difficult to obtain. Since first-gen eration Chinese missiles will be liquid fueled, their deployment will not go unnoticed, but Indian defense planners must face tbe question of .1 wing ra 6B dar along the 2,500-mile Himalayan border to police the missiles. There is also the question of whether a landbased radar system in this terrain would be adequate for this purpose. The question of Indian security visa-vis the Chinese threat has assumed considerable importance. This ques tion requires close examination in terms of Indo-American relations, both politically speaking and from the viewpoint of contingency planning. Such an analysis needs to be under taken in terms of the military require ments of deterrence and defense of Indian borders; the implications of such requirements in terms of cur rent Indian military capabilities; and implications for US policy in terms of current US military sales policy. Political Goals Military policy is the outgrowth of the ptdi+ical goals of a country. Polit ical goals, in turn, are affected by the strategic balance of forces in a given region. For instance, until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Euro pean military theater was in a rela tively quiescent state. As a European power, the Soviet Union appeared sat isfied to maintain the status quo as far as the European theater was con cerned. This situation was confirmed following the failure of the Soviet threat in Berlin and the Cuban mis sile crisis of 1962. By contrast, in the Middle East and the Far East, the military and tbe political situation is in a fluid state. From the experience of the Vietnam war, one can surmise that the thrust of Soviet, Chinese, and United States policies revolves around the question of the Asian balance of power. For the United States, the objective has been to maintain the status quo.
Military Raview

SOUTH ASIA The Soviet poIicy objective has been to keep the war on, its present course, to weaken US mili my power, to prevent the United St tes from affecting 1 the basic viability [of North Vietnam, and to keep US military power on the Chinese periphery. For the Peking reUS miIit~ry sales policy is governed by the 12 April 1967 State Department announcement which outlines two basic objectives: to prevent an arms race in t~e subcontinent, and to prevent diversion of funds into unnecessary and sophisticated military equip-

Many technical ditliculties remain to be sol 4 ed before US assistance of nuclear threat, could be timely and effective gime, the Vietnam war in its present form appears to be tolerable as long as the buffer of North Vietnam is not threatened and as long as mainland China is not threatened by US military power. Apart from the Kashmir issue, a significant indicator of US attitudes toward India is to be found in her military policy vis-a-vis the subcontinent. If 1955 may be taken as the low point of Indo-American relations, and the 1962-64 period as the high point, current relations may be classified as somewhere in between. Current
December 1968

to India, in event

ment instead of using such funds for

developmental purposes.
Under this policy, the United States
will allow India sale of suares
against cash on a case-by-case basis
for equipment previously supplied. The
operative element of this policy is to maintain a military balance between India and Pakistan. Since this policy to India is most restrictive, tbe effect has been to slow down procurement of essential mili tary supplies such as submarines, fighter-interceptor jets, and radar from US sources for strengthening 69

SOUTH ASIA Indian defense posture vis-a-vis Red China. A good example is the case of radar which India requires for polic ing the Himalayan frontiers. Follow ing the 1962 Chinese attack, the US Air Force, in cooperation with Indian Air Force and British Air FCIreeunits, had conducted an air exercise called Shiksha. AS a result of these exercises, stan a possible third fzont. Also, in spite of impressive improvements in the Indian defense posture following the 1962 military campaign against China, given the reality of the con frontation with Pakktan and China, Indian defense forces have the capa bility only of conducting a defensive holding operation in case of military hostilities. India does not have the military capability of fighting a sus tained offensive military campaign against either Pakistan or China. Theaters Lack Oepth Another factor in planning is that the Indian military theater, like the European military theater, lacks depth particula~ly because, following i tbe British withdrawal in 1947, Endia gave up the forward policy which bad been the main feature of the British Inditi d@nse policy. In view of this, it is significant that a breakthrough by the Chinese forces at Natu La Pass couId conceivably enable the Chinese forces to cut off the North-East Fron tier Agency and the Assam area from the rest of India. Similarly, on the Indo-Pakistan border, as the 1965 war showed, a Pakistani breaktbrou gh in the Kashmir or the Punjab sectors could have cut the lines of communi cations between these areas and the rest of India. Since the Indo-Pakistan border is about 1,500 miles long and the IndoTibetan border is about 2,500 miles long, it is apparent that, in spite of considerable improvements in the In dian military posture, the task of guarding the foreward areas is a for midable one. A final factor to consider is tbe question of the Indian capability to deter and defend against a nucleararmed China. Whether Indian conven Military Review

>.

---
TIume,ulnmi,

An Indian patrol in the H,malayas a detailed plan was drawn up and fi nalized for providing an integrated early warning radar system in the Himalayas. In terms of this plan, some supplies were made available by the United States, but, folIowing the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, the entire supply program was first suspended and, fi nally, entirely terminated. In formulating contingency plans, several factors in the post-1965 mili tary situation in the subcontinent have to he considered. One of these is that the current threat potential for Indian defense forces consists essentially of a two-f rent confrontation am inst Pak istan and China and with East Paki 70 \ I 1.

SOUTH ASIA tional tirepower per man is better than the Chinese firepower is debatable. In any case, it is clear that, with the present force in being, India could not possibly contain a nuclear-armed China. At best, as of now, Indian forces have the capability of conduct ing a defensive holding operation against the Chinese forces. Time Factor However, in discussing contingency planning, the question is not whether India has the capability to contain military pressures, but Chinese whether India, five years in the future, would have the capability to contain a deliberate Chinese thrust, conven tional or nuclear, at a time and place of her own choosing. Since policies are normally geared to a timeframe of at least five years, and eince military planning and production must aleo have a similar Ieadtime, the time fac tor is important in visualizing future contingencies in the Himalayan areae. Implicit in the US case for the nu klear nonproliferation treaty is the argument that, were India to face nu clear blackmail or threat of invaeion from China, US military power would be available both for deterrence and the defense of India. But many com plicated political and technical ques tions are involved in the US assump tion that, were India to face such a threat, the B-52s in Thailand and the US 7th Fleet would be available to counter the Chinese threat. The nonproliferation treaty provides that, should any state commit nuclear aggressi~n or threaten such aggres sion against a nonnuclear state, the nuclear signatories will take effective measures to suppress the aggression or remove its threat. In practical terms, what is the meanDecembir 1968

ing of these assurances? Aseuming that the Chineee were to co-locate their missilee /in the airfields at Kashgar, Khotan, Gartok, Tanghsiung, and Linghih, which are on the periphery of Indias northern bordera, and as suming that such miesiles were to have an operational range of 1,000 to 1,500 miles, what are the hard choices avail able to India and the United States to counter the Chinese threat? What is the state of contingency planning in thie reepect between tbe two coun triee ? Available Alternatives Basically, there appear to he only two major presently available alterna tives, barring an independent Indian nuclear program: Seek the joint protection by the United Statee and the Soviet Union against China. Seek the protection of US mili tary power aseuming that any joint aeeurances by the United States and the USSR through the instrumentality of the United Nations are not likely to be practical. Whatever the psychological signifi cance of joint United States-Soviet assurances through the United Na tions might be, it is quite obvious that, given the nature of United States and Soviet relationsboth global and in Indiait will be very difficult, if not entirely impossible, for the.USSR to cooperate with the United Statee in India in any phyeical military form against China. This problem would also affect US willingness to collaborate with the USSR in such an overt military form. If it ever became necessary to set up an antiballistic missile system in In dia, it would be impossible, politically and for fear of technological leaks, for . 71

SOUTH ASIA the United States and the USSR to collaborate jointly in either setting up such a system or in participating at the command and staff level for main taining control over the system. On the other hand, if the joint United States-USSR assurances must be routed through the Security Coun cil, where the veto is in effect, such assurances would be meaningless un less the United States and the Soviet Union could, in fact, actively coRabo rate against a Chinese threat. Also, since the nonproliferation treaty spe cifically stipulates against transfer, receipt, and production of nuclear weapons by a nonnuclear weapon power, how could the United States and the USSR, without violating tbe treaty, ever establish a missile defense system in India even though control remains in United States or Soviet hands ? Such being the case, one might say that, not only would India he giv ing up her strategic option if she signed the treaty, but even the United States might be losing her option to participate in Indias defense if a fu ture contingency so required. Similar problems can be seen with the second alternative if India were to rely solely upon the protection of US military power through the 7th Fleet and the B-52s hased in Thai land. Given the absence of an inte grated early warning radar system in the Himalayan regions, there is the question of a reliable early warning. Also, given the nature of the moun tain features in the Himalayas, there is the additional question whether a land-based radar system would be ef fective against low-flying missiles. Even if land-based radar systems could be effective, it would be neces sary to have numerous radar stations stretched along the Himalayan fron tiers. Because of logistic problems in the forward areas, it would also be necessary to protect each radar tinit with self-sufficient military units. However, even assuming that the problem of early warning could be surmounted, the sheer mechanics of having an adequate defense system in the Himalayas appear formidable. As suming that the United States were willing to come to Indias defense, would forward Indian border positions have to provide information regard ing targeting of Chinese positions, and would the US 7th Fleet move up to the Bay of Bengal to counter tbe Chinese threat ? If so, would not the use of B-52s and the 7th Fleet be tantarhount to a strategic strike? If so, would this not also be a reversal of the flexible response doctrine? Recent developments such as the Vietnarn_,war, the nonproliferation treaty, the power vacuum in the In dian Ocean area, the Soviet naval pen etration into the Mediterranean, the belligerence in the Middle East along with the hardening of the Soviet gen eral inte;hational line, and the increas ing impact of Communist China in Asian affairs bear many implications for the future. It is clear that the focus of politico-military relationships in recent times has shifted to the Asian and the Pacific theaters. Both the Soviet Union and tbe Peking re gime have tended to act as continental powers, as well as world powers. It is in the Asian theater that US posture and policy will be tested. Fu ture conflict situations can pose fur ther strains on US military power and posture in Asia as long as the Soviet Union and Red China continue to threaten in the area.

72

Military Review

Lieutenant

Colonel Louis S. HoIlier, United States

Marine Corps

The views expressed in this arti cle are the authors and are not nec essavilv those. of the Department of the Navy, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US Army Command and General Staff College.Editor.
INCE 1947, it hae been the pol icy of the United States to con tain the spread of communism. To this end, our Government bas made com mitments to defend, by military force if necessary, most free nations in the world.
December 1968

An assessment of this vasti commit ment and tbe military resources re quired to support it led to a decision to develop and, if necessary, use nu clear weapons. The effect of our nuclear weaponry on military strategy is a clouded issue. The use of our strategic deterrent forces implies a conflict of general war proportions with the immediate issue of the survival of our Nation at stake. No rational military thinker is ready to concede that general war is the only option available if the use of nuclear weapons is involved. D 73

POLICY ANO STRATEGY But the tactical use of nuclear weap. ons in a limited war involves serious problems of judgment, Neither the terms limited war nor tthe uw of tactical nuclear weapons can be pre cisely defined. A nuclear projectile fired from a medium-caliber artillery weapon can be distinguished from a nuclear-armed Minuteman missile by any reasonable system of comparison. This, however, compares the smallest of the tactical weapons with the prin cipal deterrent weapon. To an enemy, a nuclear mine, a short-range missile, a medium-range missile, or a nuclear bo~b dropped from an attack aircraft may not be distinguishable in any de gree from the same nuclear-armed about his airfielde, his lines of com munications, his armament industry ? Where is the crossover point to stra tegic targets and general war ? The assumption that we can use tac tical nuclear weapons in a limited war is dangerous because the ultimate de. termination as to whether or not they are, in fact, tactical rests with the enemy. This enemy may be directly or indirectly the Soviet Union. We can. not be absolutely sure that any cir cumstance exists wherein this Nation can employ tactical nuclear weapons witbout provoking a nuclear response from the Soviet Union. IN Dilemma The United States faces a dilemma. Using conventional forces alone, we confront the proepect of becoming a nation in arme involved in small, but kmg and costly, peripheral conflicts. If wk=e~ploy tactical nuclear weap ons, we can apply vastly more pOwer ful and effective forces at far less cost in manpower and time. However, by doing so, we overstep the single uni versally accepted factor which can to day serve to limit warthat is the uee of conventional force alone. It is a tan. talizing but dangerous situation which calls for a firm policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons. The situation offere us options, yet ie clearly under stood by ourselvee and by our poten tial enemies. One might logically assume that, on a matter of such importance, a nuclear p$icy would be stated in explicit terms specifying precise conditions under which nuclear weapons would be em ployed. This is not the case and has not been since President Dwight D. Eisenhowers term of office. Under present circumstances, we cannot af ford to announce either publicly or
Military Review

Minuteman.
Problem of Definition A number of open-ended questions illustrate the problem of definition. When does the use of a nuclear weapon, cease to be tactical? Does it depend upon depth of the battlefield? If so, how deep is the battlefield? Is depth baeed upon tbe range of the weapon to be employed, or is it based upon the depth of the enemy combat poten tial ? What is combat potential? Does it consist of the enemys combat troops, or does it include his rear area service and logistic components as well? What

Lieutenant Colonel Louis S.,.Hollier, United States Marine Corps, is with the 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. He is a graduate of the US Naval Academy, Anrwpolis, Maryland: US Marine Corps Comncand and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia; and the US Army War College, Car lisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. His serw ice has included duty mit!z the Ist Marine Division in Korea; the .?d Mavine Division in Okinawa: and on the faculty of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Qwant
74

POLICY AND STRATEGY privately that we will, or will not, uee nuclear weapons. To do so would lessen the cred]$ Aty of our intention to respond to Communist aggression, en courage further Communist aggres sion, and, perhaps, most dangerous of all, invite a preemptive nuclear attack upon the United States and her allies. Flexible Response What the Nation does have is a firm, caref u]]y calculated policy of uncer tainty backed hy a certain capability to exercise any response it deems nec essary to repel aggression. This is the policy of flexible response which is the defense policy of the United States. First stated by President John F. Kennedy, the policy of flexible re sponse embodies three major aspects: . Our forces must be adequate to deter aggression. . The President must have free dom of choice to select and apply the amount of force appropriate to the threat. . The use of force must be con trolled. It is significant to note that nuclear weapons are not specifically men tioned. Apparently, this policy was in tended to assure the world at large that the United States would not au tomatically rely on the use of nuclear weapons to counter Communist ag gression or threats of aggression. If this was the intent, the policy fell short of the mark because it is sub ject to any interpretation one wants to put to it. Significant from both a political and a military point of view was the priority given to political considerations in the application of military force, at least at the begin ning of conflict. President Lyndo~ B. Johnson has been somewhat more explicit in stat . 75

Tdt,dw,,

Week

The ultimate determination of whether nuclear weapons are tactical or strategic rests with the enemy
December 1968

POLICY ANO STRATEGY ing the policy of flexible response and has removed some of the doubts that have existed concerning its implemen tation. He has announced his inten tion to apply a deliberate, measured, and controlled response to aggression. Thus, it is apparent that political con siderations will remain preeminent during a conflict and that the use of nuclear weapons is not a foregone conclusion. There is no uncertainty regarding the spectrum of our tactical nuclear capability. The uncertainty exists as to how, when, where, to what extent, and why the President may decide to employ tactical nuclear weapons. Profound Implications The policy of controlled flexible re sponse has some profound implications on military strategy. First, is the fact that, in the event of conflict, political considerations will transcend military strategy. Recognition of this impor tant aspect of conflict has been long overdue on the part of our political leaders and the public as a whole. Too much has been expected of our mili tary leaders in the past. They were expected to redeem political failure by military means in such a manner as to create conditions for a durable and lasting peace. They were by default supposed to be superpoliticians. A second implication of our defense policy concerns the selection of polit ical objectives which can be attained by the military means employed. If political leaders are to determine the military response to aggression, then they have a requirement to weigh that response against the political objec tives they must attain. This requires consultation with military leaders. Political strategy must assume a character similar to military strategy 76 wherein the over-all objective to be achieved is the result of the attain ment of subobjectives which are de. fined both in terms of the military force required to attain them and the manner in which they support the main or over-all objective. When mil itary force is involved, it is to attain those limited political objectives by military means. Only if limited political objectives ( subobjectives ) are carefully and properly selected can the over-all polit. ical objective be attained. Over-all po litical objectives, as we tend to state them, are not attainable by the lowscale political tactics and the limita tions on the application of military force which have characterized our re. cent attempts. Oefensive Tactics The trend is to react to aggression by attempting to counter it. This in volveserrtry into the conflict arena in a defensive frame of mind, with de fensive political tactics, and a defen sive military strategy. The initiative remains with the forces of aggression and results in alternating escalation. This has been well demonstrated in the Vienam war. Neither low-scale en try into that conflict nor measured es calation which raises the intensity of the conflict rung by rung on the es calation ladder has accomplished its purpose. The enemy has had time to adapt, become more intractable, and escalate in turn. An alternative, perhaps the only al ternative, by which we can counter aggression today is to enter the arena with a well-considered political strat egy and the military force required to augment that strategy in a quick crmnteroff ensive. and overpowering This would, of course, require a realMilitary Review

POLICY AND STRATEGY istic assessment of the aggression to be overcome and a sufficiently high level of initial conflict to insure a quick success. Under such conditions, the necessity for escalation may not exist because the aggressor will lack the time necessary to adapt to the level of conflict or to develop a resistance. ,If escalation is necessary, it should represent a considerable jump on the escalation ladder. The responsihilities of military lead ers have also increased under the pol icy of flexible response. Military lead ers must provide advice, recommenda tions, and alternatives regarding the military strategy to be employed to attain military objectives which sup port and lead to the attainment of political objectives. This may involve military actions likely to create unfa vorable political resultsresults which are neither desired nor intended. There is a profound responsibility on the part of the military leader to as sess the political implications of a par ticular military strategy. The use of tactical nuclear weap ons involves strong political and moral issues. Therefore, a final decision re garding a political strategy involving a military response must await the full implications of a supporting military strategy. Circumstances may be such that the only feasible military strat egy involves the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Political leaders must be advised of the military options and the relative osts in terms of manpower, F. materiel, and time. There may or may not he political alternatives. It may be in the critical national interest $0 avoid tbe use of tactical nuclear weapons. This may necessitate the scaling down of political objectives to fit the resulting military strategy. The decisions and the responsibilities for the ultimate course of action are political, but a favorable outcome can result only from sound military advice. This process means that we can en ter a conflict with well-considered and compatible political and military strat egies calculated to succeed. The va garies of conflict demand that the proces he a continuing one until the politic 1 objective has been attained. Th s, the military leader may find himsel t n the position of recommend ing a military strategy involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons, but responsible for executing a strategy in which their use is prohibited. The nature of war bas changed. Never again will military strategy be come the paramount aspect of conflict. With limited war, political dominance has arrived. War is deliberate, meas ured, and controlled. The military pro fession must provide sound military advice that serves national interest and make the most effective use of the weapons which are provided.

.
December 1968

I
.

Recent changes in deterrent

power threaten to upset

Eug&ne Hinterhoff

in Germany in 1945, the event marked not only the end of World War II, but the beginning of a phenomenon called confrontation. Similar situations arose in Kashmir, Korea, and Indochina. In each case, the demarcation line which was drawn was intended to be tem porary, pending a final political solu tion. In each case, the line remained permanent, resulting in the partition of the respective country and becom ing a source of khronic conflict. Confrontation has shaped the polit 78

HEN

the

advancing

armies

from the east and west met

ical and military strategy of both the Communist countries and the Free World. As far as tbe Communists are concerned, the situation created by confrontation has become the starting point for achieving the ultimate goal the establishment of a worldwide Communist. system. For the Free World, the maintenance of the status of its quo has become the foundation political and military strategy. For the United States, this policy has been termed containment. Its ef fect was to stop the Soviet military forces from advancing beyond the limMilitary Itsvievf

DELICATE BALANCE its which thev reached in the earlv postwar peri~d. TMe policy did not provide for stopping a Communist ad vance that proceeds by political rather than by military strategy, and it ex cluded offensive moves on the part of the United States which would carry across the borders of the Communist ,world. Nuclear Stalemate The military strategy of the West was built around this concept of con tainment, and, with the passage of time, the entire strategy of the West has become based upon the idea of nu clear stalemate. There was conviction that US nuclear potential would al ways be able, after absorbing a Com munist first strike, to retaliate and inflict unacceptable damage upon the enemy thus making the risk of aggres sion suicidal. This defensive strategy leaves to the Communists the choice of time. It. is not surprising that the com bination of passive foreign policy and the strategy of deterrence, conveying initiative to the other side, has re sulted in a paralysis of will and imag ination in Western leaders who may believe that the status quo based upon nuclear stalemate can last indefinitely. While it has been generally accepted that strategic nuclear weapons are the main foundation of the deterrent, ac tually, it might be said that the de terrent consists of three elements: US nuclear potential.
A closely coordinated and inte grated <defense potential in Europe, both conventional and nuclear. A psychological element which includes the solidarity of the Western alliance, plus the will and determina tion to use all available resourcee to resist.

No single factor ie effective without the other two. Lack of Courage The late 1980s provide examples of the failure of deterrent becauee of the lack of courage to use it. Had the ~ Austrian leader, Kurt von Scbusch nigg, had the courage to organize the defense of his country, he could, per haps, have deterred Adolf Hitler from aggression. Hitler wouId have realized that Austrias armed resistance could have triggered off a general war, or, at least, the intervention of the great powers for which Germany was not prepared. A few months later, President Ed uard Ben& had at his disposal the powerful Czechoslovak armed forces to Oppose Hitter. Many observers believe that, had he resisted Hitlers invasion, French and British assistance would have been forthcoming. At the time, the Germans were in no position to fight the three Western Powers. On the other hand, a perfect exam-1 pIe of the working of the deterrent may be found in the Cuban crisis when President John F. Kennedy made full uee of all three elements of the deterrent and prevented Nikita S. Khrushchev from taking any precipi tous action. Kennedy succeeded be cause the Western deterrent had full credibility. The Soviets have not forgotten the lessons of the Cuban crisis, and their entire effort has been directed toward v 79

Eugt%e Hinterhofl, a former Polish Army oficev and member of the Polish Supreme Military Council, resides in London. Founder and Secretary of the Military Commentators Circle, Lon don, Mr. Hinterhoff is the author of British Defense Review which ap peared in the June 1966 issue of the
MILITARY REVIEW.
December 1960

DELICATE BALANCE the erosion of the elements of the Western deterrent. In view of the par amount importance of nuclear weap ons, it is only natural that the Soviet main effort is directed toward obtain ing not only nuclear parity with tbe United States, but also actual superi ority. Shortly after World War United States had complete II, the nuclear bility of from 25,000 to 50,000 mega tons. The USSR had a capability of 6,000 to 12,000 megatons. With the Soviet buildup, it is estimated that, by 1971, the USSR will be able to de liver 30,000 to 60,000 megatons. At the same time, the US delivery capa bility is expected to decline to about 15,000 megatons. The Soviets are estimated to have

Air Fome

a,,d SD...

Dig..t

The Minuteman

III is scheduled for deployment in the early 1970s

about one-third the strength of the

supremacy and, for many years, an overwhelming superiority. But the United States, bound to the futile pol icy of containment, had no intention of using her power as an argument for negotiation from a position of strength. The era of Western military superi ority and of a real position of strength in negotiations with the Communists has gone. Today, in view of the sys tematic buildup of Soviet nuclear po tential and of a corresponding US de crease, the present delicate balance basad upon nuclear stalemate is in danger of coming to an end. In 1962, tbe United States report edly bad a total nuclear deliwry capa 80

US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, hut they are credited with a production rate of about 400 missiles a year. This means that, not only will they wipe out the US nu merical superiority in ICBMS, but the higher yields of their warheads will provide them with a considerably higher megatonnage superiority. The high yield of ICBM warheads brings into question the invulnerabil ity of US ICBM hardened sites. The threat to these sites may be aggra vated also by Soviet orbital bombs. The fractional orbital bombardment system can outflank the US early warning system, reducing the 15-min M6itary Review

DEllCATE ute warning time calculated for a So viet attack to four minutes or less. The Soviets have at least 750 inter mediate and medium-range missiles with warheads of one megaton within reach of larger North Atlantic Treaty Organization installations in Europe. On the other hand, after the Cuban crisis, US medium-range missiles were removed from Britain, Italy, and Tur key because they were said to be too vulnerable to Soviet attack and their tasks could be better performed hy Polaris submarines and NATO fighter bombers. In spite of these arguments, tbe withdrawal of the Thor and Juw ter missiles caused disappointment in Europe and contributed to the erosion of credibility. Submarine-launched Missiles In the field of submarine-launched missiles, the United States enjoys, at least for the present, botb numerical and technological superiority. But the Soviets have not been idle in develop + ing their own capability in this field. More than 75 submarines have heen adapted to carry missiles, mostly with ranges between 300 and 500 miles. Some 30 more missile-firing subma rines are under construction. The rel atively ehort range of Soviet subma rine-launched missiles does not mini mize the danger because of the number of major targets located close to the US coastline. The spectacular growth of Soviet naval power must be regarded with concern. The trends in the construc tion program show that the Soviet Navy is making itself capable of ful filling the dual mission of defeating an enemy fleet and disrupting its naval and sea communications. Western na tions are stronger in aircraft carriers and in a wide range of surface ships,
Dscsmber leaa

BALANCE

but the Soviets have heen concentrat ing theJr efforts on building subma rines and fact patrol boats armed with guided missiles which appear to be es pecially suitable for combating air craft carriers. On both NATO flanks, Soviet naval action can be supported by land-based naval power. Strategic Bombers In the air, the United States had an overwhelming superiority in stra tegic bombers. This is no longer true. Today, the Soviet Union has the larg est strategic bombing force. This is because she has retained about 900 of her medium-range bombers, whereas the United States has scrapped 1,000 B-47s. Today, the Soviets have over 1,000 strategic bombers while the United States has less than 700. While the Soviets have been build ing their offensive capabilities, they have also been working to counter the US second-strike capability. For the past two years, they have been install ing an antiballistic missile (ABM) system around their larger cities, such as Moscow and Leningrad. The effect of the installation of the Soviet ABM system is more far reaching than ap pears on first sight. Apart from the possible adverse effect on the US sec ond-strike capability, it has greatly disturbed the European allies. They 1 now face a growing Soviet nuclear. strength enhanced by the ABM system which makes European nuclear forces seem almost useless. ~ At the came time, the United States has been reluctant to install her own ABM system in the hope that the So viets might agree to a moratorium or even cancellation of defensive systems. This hope has proved without foun dation. The Soviets, in short, are gradually . m

threatening to undermine the US sec ond-strike strategic concept. The United States is not sitting idle, however. Polaris is being replaced by Poseidon, and Minuteman III is being equipped with tbe most advanced de vices to enable it to penerate the So. - viet ABM system. Work is also going forward on the concept of multiplewarhead missiles. These Multiple In dependent Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) will each carry from five to 10 war heads which can he separated in flight to strike a number of widely dispersed preselected targets. Unfortunately, the Soviets, too, are working on the MIRV. The main dan ger from the development of the MIRV system by both sides is that, because of its truly devastating effect, the temptation to strike first will he in creased. As the MIRV system becomes more reliable, there may be greater instability in the world, for each side will worry that its missile force might be knocked out in a single blow. Erosion has occurred also in the sec ond element of deterrent which con 82

sists of the system of defense alliances along the perimeter of the Communist bloc. NATO strength has been seri ously degraded by the withdrawal of France from the integrated command, the Soviek move into Czechoslovakia placing Soviet troops on the Czecho slovak border of Western Germany, and the Soviet penetration into the Mediterranean. The denial to NATO of French landspace is a serious blow to NATOs de fense potential. French territory, in the event of the failure of NATO for ward strategy, can insure room for maneuver. Without it, NATO has much less flexibility. The denial of French airspace presents even more serious problems. NATOS ability to disperse squadrons from the airfields of central. Europe is reduced, and So viet weapons become more effective. The loss, even temporarily, of the 450 modern aircraft of the French air forces could be much more serious to NATO than the withdrawal of Frances land forces, and withdrawal has, undoubtedly, left a serious gap Milita~ Rwiw

DELICATE BALANCE in the air defense system of Western Europe. NATO has also suffered from the drawdown of personnel in other NATO units in Western Europe. US forces have heen reduced to satisfy the re quirements of the war in Vietnam, and the British cuts announced in the De fenee Estimates for 1968 result in the withdrawal of an infantry bri gade and a Royal Air Force squadron from Germany to the United Kingdom. US spokesmen say that, in view of improved airlift capabilities, it will be possible to bring substantial reinforce ments from the United States to E!u rope in the event of emergency. Yet if such operations were undertaken during a period of acute tension, it would most certainly not contribute to diplomatic efforts to prevent the crisis from escalating into a ehooting war. From the European point of view, one US battalion in Germany might be of greater value than a brigade stationed in the United States, but earmarked for emergency deployment. The process of thinning out the mil itary forces casts doubt on the feasi bility of NATO etrategy in its present form. Act@dly, there are three stra tegic concepts: the strategy of deter rence; the strategy of tlexihle re sponse; and the forward defense strat egy. The strategy of deterrence, being part of an over-all deterrence strategy, assumes that a sufficiently strong de fensive posture will deter the enemy from an attempted aggression. Obvi ously, the process of thinning out the NATO shield weakens this posture and erodes its deterrent value. The strategy of flexible response en visions the defense of Europe with conventional forces, avoiding or delay ing as long as possible the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The vital precondition for the success of this strategy is the presence in Europe of strong conventional forces. The weaker they become, the greater will be tbe urge to use tactical nuclear weapons. The same conditions apply to the forward defense strategy by which an enemy must be etopped at or near the frontier. This capability will aleo be brought into jeopardy as the result of withdrawals of NATO contingents.

US Air F.,..

The United States has scrapped over 1,000 fl-!~f Stratojets December 1968 83

DELICATE BALANCE This situation has some obvious po litical implications. It appears that the main responsibility for the ground de fense of Europe will rest on German shoulders. The thinning out process may make the use of tactical nuclear weapons by NATO imperative from 1 the start. Therefore, the increasing importance of German forces to the defense of Europe might make their insistence on having nuclear weapons more difficult to resist. Such demands, however justifiable they may be, will contribute to political tension which tbe West would prefer to avoid. One mnst include in tbe over-all Su viet buildup the massive increase in Soviet naval power in the Mediterra nean. Its most serious implication is the obvious intent to establish a chain of naval facilities and airbases, stretching from Cairo to Hodeida and Aden, which could become a spring board for further expansion in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Snviet activities in the Middle East are aimed at developing a powerful left pincer which can threaten not only NATOs southern flank, but insure the cutting off of Middle East oil in event of war. Psychological Factor Soviet efforts shonld also be viewed in relation to the third element of de terrentthe psychological factor. A main Sovie~ aim is the destruction of the Atlantic alliance, and the So viets have attempted to exploit exist ing differences within NATO wher ever possible. Unfortunately, NATO countries have failed to convert their alliance into a political and economic community and have refused all sug gestions to expand the geographical scope of the alliance. They have de clined to take an active interest in the 84 problems of North Africa and the Mid dle East even though developments in these areas have a strong impact on the situation in Western Europe. It is with the same indifference that NATO countries have viewed Britians losing battle in Aden and the Persian Gulf. refusing to understand that Britain was trying not o secure the continuity of her impe f Ial past, but an uninterrupted flow of 0}1 indispen sable for all of Western Europe. As a result of the lack of solidarity and the withdrawal by France and Britain from their traditional positions in Af rica and the Middle East, the Soviets and their Arab friends are now filling the vacuum created hy the West. Contingency Aim The Soviet role in Southeast Asia has, at least, the weakening of NATO as a contingency aim. There is no doubt th~at~he massive Soviet aid to North Vietnam has significantly pro longed the war. The result has been relatively less US attention to Eu ropean developments. This has also tended to isolate the United States politically. US allies watch these de velopments closely. If no satisfactory solution is reached in Vietnam, or if the Saigon Government is sacrificed in the process of negotiations, US pres tige and tbe credibility of her guar antees will be seriously eroded not only in the Far East, but also in Europe. At the same time that the Western deterrent has been eroding, the War saw Iact has been shaken. It is clear now that the Soviets would be unable to rely upon several of their allies. The Soviet Union, recognizing the unreli ability of some of her satellites, has now stationed her own forces on the Czechoslovak-German border. In the short run, this development may be
Military Review

DELICATE BALANCE

.
more ominous than a Czechoslovakia firmly supporting the Warsaw Pact. The one favorable outcome of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia may be the realization in the West that no further erosion of NATO strength may be tolerated. It is yet too soon to know whether this lesson has been taken to heart. If, on the other hand, the Soviets continue to build up their nuclear st;ength and are s~cessful in secur ing disunity within the Atlantic alli ance and a distrust of the US nuclear umbrella, they may create a situation in which they could blackmail some countries o Western Europe. It is in r-f. such a situation that the credibility ,, of the US deterrent and the moral fiber of the leaders of Western Europe will be put to t$e test. They will be justi fied in asking for assurances that the United States will not only be willing, but able, to provide a sufficient nuclear umbrella which will not be crippled or destroyed by a Soviet first strike. History is a great teacher, but there will he little parallel in the outcome between the Cuban missile crisis and a situation in which the West may find itself facing not an imaginary, but a real, strategic superiority.

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The Allied

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U. S. Army Com Kansas 66027 with

.
December 1966

65

-!

Colonel Emmett 1{. Arnold, United States

Army

HILE great strides have been made in the employment of communications since the Korean War ended, the advances have been evolutionary and generally lag behind technological ad vancements. The technical advances have not and cannot be trans lated immediately into communications hardware and tecfiniques. Even at that, current advances are such that the commander and his signal staff are fully taxed to meet the challenges presented by the rapid introduction of new communications systems, devices, and techniques. Tactical communications equipment and systems are integral to each element of the field army and a major portion of the signal organizations serving tbp theater army. No commander can afford to take his commune, - tions for granted; he must be as knowledgeable 86
Military Review

TACOMM in employment of communications re sources as he is for firepower and mobility. Trends Trends in new equipment reflect the need for greater capacity and in creaeed reliability. The continuing em phasis being placed on centralization of command and control from the seat of Government to combat elements in the field, the demands for more rapid response time of tactical units, and tbe greater dispersion and mobility of maneuver elements establish a need for vast central information banks. These factors, when combined, create a corresponding increase in the need for a more flexible, relia ble, secure communications capability greatly reduced in size and weight over its predecessors. Tactical multichannel radio and ca ble systems were first introduced dur ing WoAd War II. This new capability permitted several voice circuits over one radio or cable link. Doring the
Colonel Emmett R. Arnold is with the Ofice of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Communication.s-Electnmics, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, wI!eye he heads the Tactical Comrnurricatians Systems Division. He holds Masters degrees in Business Administration and Interna tional Affairs from George Washing ton University, Washington, D. C., and is a graduate of the US Arm II Cont marrd and General Staff College and the US Armg War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penns@ania. He hae served with the 3d US Army in World War II, witk the 8th Army i% Korea, and with the let Signal Brigade, US Army Stra te.qie Cornmrsnicatirm8 Command, in Vietnam. Colonel Arnold is the author of Signal Com m unicatione in Viet nam which appeared in the March 1967 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW. December 1966

early yeare, these tactical carrier sys tems wer~ limited to four channels and were not employed below division headquarters level. Now, these systems havebeen extended to the brigade level with three 12-channel communications systems. There have been correspond ing increases at echelons above bri gadean upward trend in require ments. Radio has long been used extensively at the lower echelons and within highly mobile units, and wire has been used at all echelons where time permitted installation. The trend now is almost exclusively toward use of radio be tween echelons while use of wire is being greatly reduced and essentially limited to distribution within the com mand post. The requirement for phys ical security and mobility often re stricts the use of long wire links. Aerial P16tforms Another trend is the increasing use of aerial platforms to enable a major commander to control his forces through the use of airborne command consoles and by relay communications to extend the operating range of the ground radios. The greater require ment for communications has fostered the trends toward greater security of circuits and systems and increased cir cuit-switching capacity and efficiency at every echelon. Still another trend in tactical wm munications is the use of digital data for transmission of large volumes of logistic and administrative traffic such as supply requisitions and personnel actions, including the pay, of troops. All the new capabilities cdrnbine to provide the means to the c mmander at each echelon for effectivq command f and control of his firepowe~ and ma neuver capabilities. e7

TACOMM The communications capability in the field today is a good one, but it is not good enough for tomorrow and for tbe distant future. Fortunately, improvements are on tbe way. Solid-State Oesign The current family of frequency modulated (FM ) radios is a significant step forward in comparison to the equipment used throughout the 1950s. The new family is of solid-state design more compact, more reliable, and easier to maintainhas a wider fre quency range, and, hence, more chan nel capacity. The radios are lighter in weight, and provide better perform ance and longer range with more ver satility in application. Recently, a small, helmet band-held radio has been pruvided the squad. This new radio ( PRC-88 ) weighs just urider two pounds and replaces the six-pound PRC-6. Also, the manpack PRC-25 with a five-mile range and the vehicular VRC-12 series with the as sociated airborrie sets are now in use worldwide. A new and better radio set with tele type and voice capability using single side band (SSB ) techniques is also entering the inventory of all the ac tive army. This set, a more powerful one than the FM radio, is used at bat talion and bigher echelons. Already available to airborne and airmobile units is a small, fOur channel, telephone multiplex terminal which operates over the AN/GRC-l Otype radio. A newer version of this multichannel system is now being pro vided to add flexibility not before pos sible in the airborne and airmohile units. Also available to division and higher commands is 12-channel, tele phone multiplex equipment which op erates over radio or field cnble. These multichannel systems are the backbone of the communications networks to the brigade level. At field army and thea ter army level, there is a need for 50 to 100 circuits to designated nodal points thus requiring several of tbe radio links to be provided in parallel to attain the needed channel capacity. The next generation multichannel equipment will provide for greatly in creased channel capacity for larger formation. Switching Function The tactical switching capability with troops today ranges in capacity from six to 600 line terminations. The manually operated switching centrals are a major bottleneck in our present multichannel systems and cannot be considered satisfactory for meeting to days requirements or those of the fu ture. Plans are underway to automate the switching functionthe nerve cen ter of a~mmunications system. Ground-to-air and air-to-ground ra dio communications are excellent as are the relay and retransmission capa bilities where aircraft are available for such use. Security of individual teletype cir cuits has been widely available throughout the Army for many years. Now entering the inventory of some units is a secure voice capability over FM tactical radio systems. Eventually, the secure voice capability will be built in as part of the basic radio equipment. Within the next five years, the frontIine troops will have an improved ver sion of the AN/PRC-2.5. This new set ( AN/PRC-77 ) is completely solid state, more reliable, capable of secure voice operation, and of using an am plifier if required to extend the range. A new, manpack, FM-SSB radio (AN,PRC-70) is planned for special
Militsry Review

88

TACOMM purposes. This radio will be similar in size and weight to the FRC-25, but with the SSB capability, as well as a continuous-wave ( CW) burst mode, and will have a greatly extended range. Also, a new vehicular SSB assemblage (the AN/GRC-108) with voice and teletype capability up to several hunA new, mobile, tactical tropospheric sca:ter ~ultichannel system will be for use between command avadable echelons of army, corps, division, or other places as required. This new system w)II not depend on line of sight operation, but will be capable of 100 mile hopi without relay. This capabil-

The .4A/Pi?C-25 is a compact, FM radio transceiver designed for platoon and company use dred miles range will be available corps and higher echelons. to ity will greatly enhance the mobility of the communications system of higher headquarters and improve the commanders capability to control his forces. The Army, Air Force, and Marines are planning a triservice effort to de velop tactical automatic analog voice switches for use at division and higher echelons of the Army and comparable echelons of the other services. The switches will vary in size from 100 to 600 line terminations. A semiauto matic switch will be used at brigade and battalion levels. Prior to fielding . 89

Dramatic impi.ovement will be made in multichannel systems serving head quarters from brigade through the field army communications zone. A new pulsing technique (pulse code modulation-PCM) will contribute to improved reception, stability of signal, and security of the entire link between terminal facilities and on individual circuits. The new multichannel systems will provide capacities of six, 12, 24, 48, and 96 channels for use from front to rear as the need dictates.
December 1968 I

TACOMM these
new automatic switches, it is

planned

to procure

a limited quantity

for operational evaluation ducted in Europe.

to be con

Tactical communications satellite terminals in limited quantities will become available, during this period thus permitting rapid and dependable

for some systems fmm the front line to army rear. Tbe single-channel, FM, tactical radio family will have security as a built-in feature for many radios. The multichannel systems will be secured on a link basis between relay points. Link security does not automatically provide subscriber to subable

TACllCAlCOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS (POST-1975 FIELDARMY)

. ~ \ , \, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,. ~ \\\\\
.$~.

TACTICAL SATELUTE

w
!,

from any point in tbe combat zone to any other by manpack and small, tactical vehicular-mounted radio terminals. This, too, is a joint service undertaking. The Army is de veloping the ground terminals, the Navy the shipborne terminals, and tbe Air Force, tbe airborne terminals and the satellite relay. communications

scriber security, however. To provide this, each circuit must still be equipped with terminal security devices. The next five years will see a significant improvement in communications secu rity. It is tbe logical step toward a more completely secure system. Looking further ahead, the commu nications systems known by the code words or acronyms as Ma[[ard, RADA, and TACSA TCOM are planned for troop use in the post-1975 era (see chart ). These systems are still in the objective stage in the Combat Devel opments Objective Guide.
hlilita~ Review

Data terminals and data-switching centrals will also join the tactical com munications family to help provide a variety of automatic data processing capabilities. Secure communications will 1.Pzvail 90

TACOMM For combat nets, the exact configu. ration of the next generation of small, portable, tactical radios has not yet been determined. It will be smaller, lighter, almost lifetime failure-free, secure with solid-state integrated cir cuitry, modular to permit different configurations at various echelons, and capable of FM, SSB, CW, and burst or other modulations offering advan tages. The several configurations will have ranges from three to 30 miles in accordance with the requirements of the employing unit, Special purpose models will be capable of extended ranges from 500 to 2,500 miles. The power source will be high energy, long life, lightweight, and silent. This fam ily of ra~diosshould, indeed, lighten the load for the radio operator and provide the commander completely reliable command control facilities. RADA System At division and brigade level, the RADA (Random Access Discrete Ad 71ress) system will provide the equiva lent of automatic dial telephone serv ice for stationary and mobile sub scribers. RADA will be secure from sub scriber to subscriber; capable of trans mitting voice, teletype, data, and fac @mile; and will permit free movement by its user while giving him constant, dependable communications. The basic subscriber unit of the first-generation RADA will consist of a, radio unit with touch-tone-type sig naling capability built into the hand set. It will weigh approximately 35 pounds. Retransmission units mounted in small tactical vehicles positioned tu provide area coverage will automat ically relay calls to stations beyond direct-calling range. Other features of RADA will be an December 196a override capability for selected users, conferem?e ~alls, warning broadcast, and 10-second call placement time. RADA Will be capable of working with other contemporary communications systems to permit combat net radio and bigher echelon s\vitched circuits to interoperate with the RADA sys tem. The full extent to which the RADA concept will be applied is now under study and will not be determined for several years. The system is in the advanced development phase. Mallard System At field army, the system planned for the future is Mallard. This is the project name adopted for a tactical communications system for the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. The objective of the project is to provide the services of the par ticipating nations with a secure, dig ital, automatically switched tactical comnkpnications system. It will interoperate with any other tactical or stra tegic system of the military forces. The composition of the Mallard sys tem will not be completely identified until 1969, but will contain the next generation multichannel equipment, voice and data switching, and tele phone, teletype, data, and facsimile terminal equipment. It will cover the field army area to the brigade level the present echelon to which multi channel communications is provided. This joint and international under taking in communications development is unprecedented. Each nation partic ipates in the research and develop ment and shares the cost on a pm centage basis. The project has its headquarters at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and works closely with other communications-electronics agencies also stationed at that post. . 91 ~

TACOMM

TACSA TCOM (Tactical Satellite Communications) may enter the pie. ture sometime ahead of RADA and Mallard programs, but in a rather austere way. During the mid or latter 1970s, an extensive operational capa
bility will be available to commanders

tional systems

of the field army. This relatively new capability in tactical operations will permit instan taneous communications for any con tingency with small, man portable and vehicular-mounted terminals. The new dimerision in communications will jus tify a corresponding-decrease in quan tity of other type commuicaticms systems. Th,e present schedule calls for about two years of research and develop ment followed by about two years of operational use and evaluation. After this period, purely operational sys tems will be employed at designated points about the Free World. Lincoln Experimental Satellites (L.ES-5 and LXS-6) and TACSAT COM 1 are research and development satellites, but will have an interim op erational capability and serve a valu. able role in further development of concepts and doctrine after completion of the research, development, test, and evaluation phase. The follow-on opera.
of tactical units

will be capable of illu minating relatively small areas of the earths surface, and will have up to 1,000 accesses or, perhaps, a switching capability. In the management of new commu nications systems, the US Army Com bat Developments Command and the US Army Materiel Command estab lish the requirements of tbe field com mander and develop and field the equipment to meet the needs. Each major tactical communication system is under project management. US Army Materiel Command has estab lished an office for coordination of aIl tactical communications systems. This office, Deputy Commanding General, US Army Electronics Command, Tac tical Communications Systems, also insures proper coordination with proj ect managers for strategic and nontactical communications systems. A combina%ie-xr_Communications Systems Agency of US Army Materiel Com mand and US Army Strategic Com munications Command has also been established at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, tomanage the development of nontactical communications systems. This organization insures that mmtac. tical systems and those developed for the tactical forces are compatible.

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92
Milita~Review

A Ul:aqed
From Communist of the Armed

Fopces

(USSR)

TRANSPORTATIONS

ROLE

IN MODERN

WAR

Lieutenant General I. Kovalev, Souiet Armu

ODERN war will be character ized by dynamic and highly mobile operations carried on over enormous expanses of territory. Its progress and outcome will, on the whole, be determined by the relationship of the military, economic, moral, and poand capabilities which litical forces December1963

the

adversaries posal.

will have at their dis

One of the most important require ments for a high degree of Soviet defense capability is an all-around development of transportation. It bas been said that, without serious, pro longed ecQnomic preparation and the 93

TRANSPORTATION
organization war of railway lines, modern

is but an empty

expression.

In the past 50 years, the transpor

of the USSR has grown from 110,000 miles to 700,000 miles. This includes the railway network with an expansion of 37,000 miles
tation network

Laying the Central AsiaCenter gas pipe line almost double its previous size; the river waterways with a growth of 48,. 000 miles, to 2.2 times; and the motor routes with an increase of 245,000 miles to 12 times their former length. Modernization of the railways has been emphasized. Diesel and electric locomotives now haul 92 percent of all rail freight as against two percent in 1940. This ratio continues to change in favor of the modern type of hauling. Great progress is also being made in the development of tbe oceangoing fleet. Diesel-electric and diesel-pro-

pelled units make up the greater part of the fleet. In the ports, modern gan try cranes, electric loaders, floating reloaders, and pumps have been in stalled. As a result, cargo has in creased by more than 10 times and passengers hy nine times since 1928. A considerable percentage of freight is carried by river transportation. In 1964, with the opening of the VolgaBaltic water route, adeepwatertrans portation system was established con necting the seas of the European por tion of the USSR. River transportation has been supplemented by a large num ber of high-performance diesel mo diesel-electric vessels, tor vessels, and high-speed hydrofoil boats. The freight carried by river transporta tion has increased almost five times over 1913. The network of hard-surfaced high ways in 19 6 amounted to 250,000 miles, de freight carried by mo tor transportation in 1967 exceeded 100 billion ton-miles. Economic Value There is also great economic? impor tance attached to pipeline transporta tion. The cost of pumping oil products through pipelines is only one-half to one-third that of railway transporta tion. The network of main oil pipe lines was 18,600 miles at the begin ning of 1967, and approximately 85 percent of all oil is transported by pipeline. Transportation of gas by pipeline was begun after the end of the war, and, by 1966, there were more than 30,000 miles of gaslines in the country. There is now a network of high =pacity main gaslines to serve the industrial and population centers of Stavropol, Moscow, Minsk, and Lenin grad with a branch running to Riga Military Revisw

TAis a?ticle was translated and condensed from the original, pub lished in the COMMUNISTOF THE
ARMED FORCES (USSR) Decem
Tlle

ber
Role

1967, of

under

the

title,

Transportation

in Modern

War. Translation by Mr. LaVergne Dale, Leavenworth, Kan 1 sas.

94

--7 TRANSPORTATION and Vilnyus in Saratov, and, since Oc tober 1967, the new ~uper gasline from central Asia to Moscow. Air transportation bas been estab lished throughout the country. By 1967, the length of airlines was 300, difficulties and the exorbitantly high cost of~air transportation. Today, the cost of air transport is approximately 60 times as great as rail. Transportation is an important fac tor in t?he economy and an instrument

A modern train passes a more traditional transportation means in the Siberian Steppes. By 1972, the Soviets wiIl have diesel or electric power for 98 percent of riiI traffic. 000 miles with a load turnover, includ ing mail, of 900,000 ton-miles. There is a particular significance to the development of air transportation with its rapid delivery of passengers and freight. In nuclear warfare, the time factor !s of special importance. Both the national economy and the . armed ftmces have great need for the rapid delivery of goods and equip ment. As yet, however, the share of freight carried by air is not very great. This is due both to technical December1968 of war
cannot without be which modern armies

military

delivered to the theaters of action. I

At the outbreak of World War I, Russia was not as well prepared as Germany. Possessing considerable su pe~iority in transportation means, Germany carried out the strategic con centration of her armed forces against Russia in between 14 and 16 days. The transportation of the Russian Army was conducted with great diffi cult y. Lack of roads and a shortage of rail ~quipment severely hampered 95

military operations. At the same

time,

German forces constantly received reenforcements of troops and materiel by rail from other military theaters. Although Russia possessed considerably greater human potential, she was not able to exploit it due to tbe back-

fied network of interior waterways in the European portion of the USSR, although of great significance from the standpoint of defense, was only partly carried out. Ocean transportationin its size, cargo-carrying capacity, and port fa-

A 27-ton Soviet

truck.

The Soviets are expanding their hard-surfaced at the rate of 8,000 miles each year. sys-

road network

wardness tem.

of her transportation

The situation was considerably dif ferent by 1940. The traffic-handling capacity of strategic railways was more than twice that of the adjoining western countries. The number of four-axle flatcars capable of carrying tanks and self-propelled guns had greatly increased. New railway junctions, unloading areas, and marshaling yards had been constructed. The capacity of the river fleet and its freight turnover had also increased. However, a decision to creat ~ uni96

cilitieswas considerably behind that of many of the western countries. The number and the quality of the motor highways were also considerably lower than in the western countries. On the whole, transportation, espe cially railway transportation, was basically shaped for handling the movements and strategic deployment of the Soviet armed forces. During the course of the war, more than 30 strategic operations were conducted, in each of which from 100 to 200 divisions participated. In the conduct of the operations for the liberation of Romania, Military Rsview

- -q
..
Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, seven fronts comprising 377 infantry divisions, 34 tank corps, up to 73,OOO guns, more than 10,500 tanks, and up to 11,000 planes had to be concen trated. The enormous task of trans porting these forces was accomplished in the planned length of time. In the first months after the GerTRANSPORTATION

a tremendous transportation of troops. There ~ere, of course, many imperfec tions in the functioning of transpor tation, but they could not lessen the achievements and the importance of the role of transportation in the war. In a future war, it is unlikely that the volume of troop carrying will in crease as compared with that of the

Sheep flown to their summer pasture. Aircraft are an important portation in remote areas. man attack, more than 1,360 heavy industries and 10 million persons were evacuated to the east out of the threat ened regions. In spite of the ceaseless bombardment of the railway junctions, bridges, and other installations, the Germans did not succeed in preventing the stra tegic deployment of the Soviet armed forces in their counterattacks at Mos cow, Stalingrad, at the Kursk bend, and in other operations which required Oecembsr1968

method of trans

I past war, hut it will call for a wide and all-inclusive employment of transportation. The most important place in the So viet transportation system is occupied by the railways. It continues to be irreplaceable for the delivery of loads from the remote portions of the coun try, for the grouping of large masses of armed forces, and for their rapid transfer over great distances. Each year, more than 600 miles of . 91

TRANSPORTATION new railway lines are constructed, and over 1,200 miles of the existing main lines are being converted to electric traction. Much of this important con struction work is performed by army railway forces as a method of special training. Despite the increased development of railway transportation, its relative importance is decreasing due to the growth of other types of transporta tion, especially motor and pipeline transportation. Their lesser vulnera bility to nuclear attack is more respon sive to the conduct of nuclear warfare. The importance of transportation to the Soviet economy, as well as military operations, is reflected in the govern ments emphasis on its development. In rate of increaee in freight trans portation, for example, the USSR by far leads the United States. Since 1951, the mean annual rates have been almost three times as great. In total tonnage of freight movement, the gap between the USSR and the United States is lessening at a rapid rate. In 1966, the total quantity of freight turnover for all types ~of transporta tion in the USSR amounted to about 80 percent of the level of that of the United States; in 1950, it was 34 per cent. The freight turnover is expected to increase in the next five-year period by 34 percent. During the same time, the load turnover of pipeline transpor. tation will increase by 87 percent, ocean transportation by 77 percent, and motor transportation hy 48 per cent. The principal burden, however, will still be borne by the railroads. During the next five years, 2,650 electric loco motives, 6,150 diesel units, and more than 250,000 freight cars will be added, Construction plans call for more than 8,000 miles of hard-surfaced highway to be built in 1968 and 42, 000 miles in the next five years. Both the river and the oceangoing fleets will be increased. Seaport cargohandling capacity will be increased by 40 percent during the next five years. More modern planes and helicopters will be added to the air routes. By 1970, it is expected that 35 to 40 ad ditional air$orts will have been con. structe~ri the main lines of national importance, and 200 on local lines. Approximately 7,500 miles of pipe line will be added to the existing net work, and, by 1970, the amounts of petroleum and petroleum products car ried by pipelines will double. In all of the development of the So viet transportation systems, military doctrine influences the proportions of the different types of transportation and the characteristics of the equip ment developed.

98

Military Raview

..,., >. ... , + MILITARY ,... !. NOTES

UNITED STATES
firing conventional ammunition or the Shillelagh guided missile. The first phase of the testing ex aminea the battalion in conventional, nonnuclear warfare. The simulated eituation at Fort Riley portrays US forces engaged in a war with a mech anized threat similar to that found in Western Europe. During the second phase, one com pany of the unit is air transported to Fort Stewart, Georgia in a situa tion simulating US forces deployed by air to a newly developing nation re questing assistance in combating ag gressor insurgency. The Fort Stewart environment provides a setting sire. ilar to Southeast Asia. The final phase concentrates on the platoon while evaluating the firepower and maintainability of the new assault vehicle. Platoon firing exercises at Fort Riley are being ueed to gather information on the weapons, ammuni tion, fire control system, maintaina bility, and techniques of employment of the platoon. The results of the test will be used to finalize the organization and doc trine of employment of an armored unit equipped with the new reconnais sance vehicle.US Army release.
The MILITARY REVIEW sd the U. S.
Arnw Cmnum.d and General Staff CeUeEe as for accuracyof lnfor 8nme no responsibility
in.tion contained in the MILITARY NOTES
section of this mblicnfion. Itinm r.re printed
as a scrviw to the readers. No official m d.msement of the views, opinions, m faetvnt
statements is intended.Tbe Editor.

Ligltt Armor

Battalion and Its M551 The newly organized light armor battalion and its M551 armored recon naissance airborne assault veMcle are undergoing an extensive, thrfie-phase, troop-testing program.

The six-week trials, which began in November at Fort Riley, Kansas, have been designed to determine the feasi

..
,-

,., .. .. ..
-..
. . . . . ,.-. .. .

-.. . .

. . y.-,.

.-.
.

US Arnw

M551 during

early test firing Knox, Kentucky

at Fort

bility of the proposed organization and to test doctrine and techniques for employment of the unit. Included in tbe program are move ment testing, air deployment, and fir ing and armament evaluations. The logistic and maintenance requirements of the M551 are also being evaluated. The
be

16-ton
and

M551
highly

is

lightweight, air dropped.

amphibious,

mobile. It can

air transported

and

The vehicle mounts a combination gunlauncher with the dual capability of

December 196a

99

MILITARY NOTES Long-Range Radar Prototype

Hugh..

Aircraft

Conwaw

Artists concept of a new long-range radar system planned for split-second defense of cities against attack shows proposed subterranean installation near a metropolitan center A prototype of a long-range radar system planned for ~plit-second de fense of cities against attack is being built for the Alr Force by a US man ufacturer. The full-scale version of the system (called ADAR for Advanced Design Array Radar) would be the worlds most powerful radar should it become operational. This could occur in the early 1970s. than a speeding bullet miles away. The system will be comprised of two antennas, a power source, and a data processing center. The transmitting phased-array planar (billboard-type) antenna is the smaller of the two an tennas. It will emit a beam that can be electronically directed in elevation and azimuth. The larger receiving an tenna is hemispherical in shape. The data processing center will com pute the information received from a target and, when necessary, auto matically speed instructions to the con trol center.lfews release. Military Review

ADAR has been designed to pinpoint and identify targets accurately as well as quickly. The system will have the capability of detecting and analyzing a target travelint? faster
100

,. ~

----%
MILITARY NOTES

Communications Satellites Approved The Department of Defense haa an nounced its decision to proceed with a program to develop and acquire new, synchronous communications satellites and new terrestrial terminals as the next phase of its Defense Satellite Communications System. It is expected that some of the new satellites will be placed in synchronous, equatorial orbit by late 1970 or early 1971. The new satellites are to be equipped with both earth coverage and narrow beam antennae. The earth coverage antenna will direct most of tbe satellite-radiated power toward tbe earth, providing relatively uniform coverage of that portion of the earth visible to the satellite. The narrow beam antennae will fo cus their radiated energy into a very narrow beam which illuminates an area of the earths surface 1,000 to 2,000 miles in diameter. The narrow + beam antennae will be steerable so that the beams may be directed toward any selected area of the earth visible to the satellite. The concentration of radiated power provided by the narrow heame will permit communication us ing transportable terminals having small antennae. Establishment of the advanced sys tem will be under the management of tbe Defense Communications Agency which will also exercise operational cent rol over the system when it is es tablished. The Army will be respon sible for development and acquisition of land terminals; the Navy will be in charge of development and acquisition of shipboard terminals; and the Air Force will have cognizance over the development, acquisition, launching, and on-orbit control of the satellite system.DOD release.
Decembsr 1968

Persbin~ 1A Completes Tests The Pershing 1A missile system has successfully passed its first troop eerv. ice firing tests. Three 10,000-pound missiles,, launched from improved ground support equipment, were fired from Gilaon Butte, near Green River, Utah, and impacted on target at White Sands Miesile Range, New Mexico, some 400 miles away. Under the Pershing 1A concept, the basic 34-foot missile remains un changed, but is now supported by an entirelY new family of ground equip.

Mwti?!

M.n.etta C.rp.mti.n+ Oda.dn Di.isi.n

ment

items. Included

is a highly

mo. [

bile, fast-reacting erector-launcher which carries the complete two-stage missile on a single carrier towed by an eight-wheeled prime mover. Other improvements center on the programer test station and new communications links to higher headquarters. The Pershing 1A system is sched uled to replace the current Pershing equipment which has been deployed in Europe with United States and West German units since 1964.Army News Fe!atures. 101

MILITARY NOTES Army Engineers Activate New Command The Army has consolidated several geodetic data, and other related topo engineer elements into a single agency graphic information to meet Depart the US Army Topographic Comment of the Army and Department of mand. Defense requirements. The Army Map Serviee, the EngiThe command will also collect, proc neer Topographic Laboratories, the ess, and store topographic data on a mapping and geodetic staff elements worldwide basis. This data consolida of the Office, Chief of Engineers, and tion procedure will provide a quickthe 30tb and 64th Engineer Battalions reaction capability to support overseas (Base ToPo) were combined into one topographic erements and to meet the agency. tactical needs of the Army and deThe new command is responsible for fense agencies.Army News Fea production and distribution of maps, tures. New Stinger for Chinooks Tail

US A,mu

Ckinook taiI gunnsr Troops in Vietnam have received initial quantities of a new armament for tbe rear ramp of the CH-47 Ckinook helicopter. Designated the XM41, the new weapon system includes an M60D mach]negun, link and brass retainer, ammu nition box, and safety harness for the gunner. Mechanical stops limit the ele vation, depression, and azimuth of the machinegun to prevent accidental damage to the aircraft.US Army reinlle. 102

Military Review

%
MILITARY NOTES UH-lC HueyTug . A powerful new version of the Army UH-lC Hwey helicopter capable of lifting a three-ton external payload has been successfully flown by the manufacturer. The aircraft, named the Huey2ug, utilizes the UH-IB or UH-lC air frame, hut incorporates an engine presently used in larger helicopters. The Hue@lg is ideally suited as an

as the 6 H-1, making, pilot and main tenance crew transition minimal. During recent demonstrations for the military services, the UH-lC lifted a 105-rnillimeter howitzer plus 10 rounds of ammunition and pallet, and three cannoneers for an over-all pay load excesding 6,000 pounds. A flight of nine HueyTugs in sup. port of a 105-millimeter artillery bat tery could move six cannon, two radio jeeps and a standard jeep, 36 can noneers, and 195 rounds of ammunition on a 60-mile radius mission in 35 minutes.News releaae. Twin Version of UH-1 Ordered by Air Force A twin-engine vereion of the UH-I Iroquois series helicopter has been or dered by the Air Force. Purchase of 76 of the aircraft was authorized with deliveries to begin in November 1969. The twin-engine helicopter will be a configuration of the UH-lH model which the company is producing for the US Army.News item. Communications Satellites for NATO The Air Force Systems Command has awarded a contract for the devel opment, production, and launch of two COnUUUniCCttbIIs satellites for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Tbe contract calls for the firet satel- ~ lite to be{launched during the latter part of 1969. The satellite will be placed in a synchronous, equatorial or bit approximately 20,000 miles above the earth. The second satellite will be held asa backup. Designed for use by the North At lantic Council and NATO military au thorities for top-level communications, the satellites will have station-keeping capability to maintain specific posi tions in relation to the earth.US Air Force release. 103

Bell HC1<CWW

T.zt.o,! ,. Cmvmw

A HuegTug lifts a heavy 105-millimeter howitzer during a Slight demonstration aerial artillery prime combat operations. mover in field

Field tests have ehown the helicop ter also can serve as an important medium-lift resupply aircraft, ship-to struction shore transport, enginee tool, high-speed command , med. % p ical evacuator, and retriever of 90 per cent of Army aircraft.

Hue~Tug retains the basic UH-1 size and operational suitability. All dynamic parts will function the same
December 1968

MILITARY NOTES

AUSTRALIA
First F-lllc Aircraft Oelivered The first of 24 F-11 IC aircraft for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) was recently delivered in

Oefense Science Orgaoizatiorr Planned The Australian Defense Department is to set up a Defense Science Organi zation. The organization will coordinate the research and development work neces sary to support the services directly. It will also, in cooperation with the Department of Supply and the serv ices, assist in the formulation of equiP ment requirements and procedures by which they can be met. According to the Australian Defense Minister, an important function of the organimtion will be to consider pro curement of local equipment and to give Australian manufacturers more time in preparing to meet these re qu irements.Austral ian news release.

.A,,trall.,? w,?)itkr

for I)(fcw..

Itoyal Australian Air Force F-IIIC ceremonies in Fort Worth, Texas. The remaining aircraft are scheduled to be delivered to the RAAF by the end of the year.News release. Bloodhound Missile B&sg Phased Out The Blaadh aranrl surface-to-air mis sile will soon be phased out of Aus tralias defenses. The missiles role will be temporarily taken over by the Mirage jet fighter. The Blaadh ound was scheduled to he phased out by 1970, but since the Miraqe squadron has been brougbt up to strength, it is better able to fulfill the fl~oodhounds role. Consideration for a full replacement of the Blood }~azandwill be part of the normal de fense review.-News release. Record Oefense Budget Planned The Australian Government has dis closed its defense spending will rise 11.8-percent to 1.4 billio< dollars, in cluding 450 million dollars in overseas procurement, this fiscal year. The additional money will be used to buy major equipment for all three armed services and for recruitment of an extra 3,000 men into the regular forces.Australian news reh .L.e. 104

BELGIUM

Pakistan May Buy Belgian M4T Tanks

The ,Belgjan Army is planning to sell its W27combat tanks to Pakistan ,as they are replaced by the German Lcapard main battle tanks. There is some concern, however, over the In. dian political reaction to snch a deal which, if strong ennugh, might pre vent the sale.Am~ ed Farces Man aqemewf, @ 1968.

THE NETHERLANDS

Maritime Patrol Aircraft

The Netherlands will have no air craft carriers in the future. Since the fire onboard their one carrier, the Kare/ fhxnwan has been out of action, and a decision has now been made not to repair it. Instead, the Netherlands Navy is tu buy from France nine At/antirs ]Ong-range, twin-engined maritime pa trol aircraft. The first four aircraft will be delivered in July 1969, and de livery of all nine is expected to he com pleted by March 1971.News item. Military Review

MILITARY NOTES Reorganization in Dutch, Army The Netherlands Defense Minister has announced that a considerable re organization of the Dutch Army is planned. Details were not released, but it is planned to recruit some 10,. 000 volunteer technical specialists to
replace a considerable number of
draftees.
Consideration is being given to the creation of a military emergency bri gade to come into action in the event of disasters within the country and also in and outside Europe. Military units held at the disposal of the United Nations for peacetime missions will be augmented by a 30 man military police detachment. The decision on a new tank to re place the aging Cereturion will also be made this year. The United StatesGerman M70 main battle tank is a likely successor. The Netherlands will also partici pate in a European fighter project. +Replacements are needed for 20 F-lO.@ Starjigltte~s being sold to the West German Air Force.A rmed Forces >Management, @ 1!)68.

Other reports indicate that Israel will soon m~ufacture the Turbomeca en gines used to power the trainer at the new aircraft engine factory being erected in Israel as a joint FrancoIsraeli venture. Paris sources state

I>tt.m

Israeli Magisfer that, except for the new Mirage V and except during a short period of timeFrance has never discontinued her supply of parts and equipment to Israel.Armed Forces Management, @ 1968.

SINGAPORE
Oefense Buildup Starts The newly formed air force of Sin gapore has signed an order for 20 Hunter jet fighters from the United Kingdom. Ten of the aircraft are trainers; the other 10 are interceptors and close air eupport fighters. The first aircraft are due for delivery in Au gust 1970. The Air Defense Command also or- [ dered 16 BAC 167 jet tra,iner-strike aircraft from the United Kingdom. Delivery will begin in 1969, and the BAC 167s will be brought into im mediate use, operating initially from one of the airfields in Singapore that was originally a Royul Air Force base. The BAC 167 is based on the Jet Pro zwst aircraft, They will be used for pilot training and for ground support

A 1

ISRAEL

has ap

Fouga Magister Spare Parts

The French Government

prOved an Israeli request fOr. delivery of spare parts for 25 twin-jet Fouga Magister trainers. The spare parts will enable Israel to repair Ma@sters dam aged ~uring the fighting last year. Israel has been producing these train ing aircraft since 1960, and they were used with great success for close air , support missions, according to Tel Aviv sources. French sources have claimed that West Germany has agreed to sell Is rael between 20 and !30 second-hand Magisters as replacement aircraft. December1968

missions.A rmed n?e7tf,@ 1?:68.

Forces

Manage-

105

INDIA
Defense Cost Rises Slightly The Indian budget for 1968-69 pro vides 1.353 billion dollars for defense, representing an increase of 60 million dollars over the 1967-68 defense budget. The marginal increase of 4.5 percent is well below the increase in the average level of prices in 1967-68 and also below the rate of increase es timated in other current expenditures in 1968-69 over the previous year. The following is a breakdown of the 1968-69 defense estimates: $ 922 million Army 50 million Navy 220 million Air Force 161 million Capital Expenditure Totnl $1.353 billion

Frizates ;he first Indian frigate was launched in October this year. The In dian Government also announced an order for two more frigates expected to be commissioned by October 1972 and October 1973.India News.

CANADA
Four New Destroyers Ordered The Canadian Department of De fense Production has awarded con tracts for the construction and out fitting of four helicopter-carrying de stroyers for the Maritime Command of the Canadian armed forces. These awards follow other purchases of the gas turbine propulsion machinery, other machinery, weapon systems, and communications equipment. These ships, the DDH-Z80 class, are fitted with a missile system for de fense against air attack and a 5-inch gun for surface action. Designed pri mar]ly + m- an antisubmarine role, they have additional fighting capabilities. Two other significant features are the all gas turbine propulsion plant and a computerized command and con trol system. The propulsion plant is designed for remote operation from either the bridge or from the engine control room. Tne computerized com mand and control system will give the ships maximum effectiveness in the performance of their tactical roles. The Canadian Military Jorwnal.

The principal items accounting for the increase of GOmillion dollars are: Pay and allowances: 23 million dollars. Three cost-of-living incr-ases were granted in 1967-68, and their full effect will be felt in 1968-69. Supplies: 21 million dollars. This includes food and ration expenditures and generally reflects an increase in prices. Included also are funds with which to replace overaged and obsolete equipment. Construction of naval vessels: eight million dollars. Maintenance of buildings: seven million dollars. Indian defense expenditures as a proportion of the countrys gross na tional product have shown a declining trend in the last four years: 3.97 percent 1!)65-66 3.57 percent 1966-67 1967-68 (revised estimate) 3.15 percent 1968-69 (estimate ) below 3 percent AMHPd Forres Management, 106 @ 1968.

BRAZIL

Contract Awarded for Aircraft

The Brazilian Air Force has awarded a construction contract to a Brazilian aircraft manufacturer. It calls for 45 Regente aircraft for liai son and reconnaissance, and 150 Urti versals for basic pilot training.News item. Military Review

~b

MILITARY NOTES

USSR
Gainful Missile System

.%lda t u>,d T<,ch>,ik

Soviet

low-aItitude air defense

missile

The Soviet Army has augmented its low-altitude air defense capability with
the introduction of a track-mounted missile system (NATO name, Gainfzd). The
Gainful was developed on the same body as the Z.SU-23-4. It carries three radar *guided missiles believed to have a range of about 18 miles. A mobile radar is part of the system. The missiles are mounted on a revolving turret and are elevated and fired from a 45-degree angle.So[dat und 1ecknik, @ 1968. Automatic Waterway Navigation An automatic inland waterway navigation system has been developed by the Soviets. An aluminum cable tbe thickness of a pencil is laid underwater along the channel and an alternating current passed through it. The electromagnetic field thus generated is registered by a ships antennae. Amplified pulses are transmitted to the steering gear which is operated automatically. The system has been tested with ships operating without a crew, the Soviets report. Over a nine-mile course, the deviation from the cable was less than 20 feet.Souz%t Military Review. Intersputnik Communications System The. Soviet Union and seven other Communist countries are pressing for establishment of a new global satellite communications network, to be called Intewputnik. While their motives are I as yet unclear, it seems this proposal may be designed as an alternative to
joining the presently functioning In ternational Telecommunications Satel lite Consortium ( INTELSAT).
The United States bas made it clear
since the establishment of INTELSAT
in 1964 that participation by the So viet Union and Eastern European
countries would be welcome.State
Department release.

December 1968

107

MILITARY BOOKS
RELI SJhES IN WASHINtiTllN. By George Car pozi, A! 252 Pages. TritJetztPress, New York, 1968.$4.95. BY LUIS A. MONSERRATE In a fascinating compilation of 13 factual cases, the author presents n sample of Soviet and other satellite countries espionage activities within and against the United ,%ates. - The principal agents involved were Embassy otficials and military attach~ personnel from Soviet or satellite countries who entrapped some of our peOplelike Army Sergeant Robert L. Johnson and Army G2 Lieutenant Colonel William H. Whalenand at tempted to lure others into collaborat ing with them as spies. Each case has its own bizurre set ting and is presented ns a separate chapter of the book. In most instances, for their betray als, the spies were paid paltry sums or nothing at all, except, perhaps, a few dinners and drinks, by the for eign operatives. However, there were other unsung patriots who promptly reported to their superiors and the Federal Bu reuu of Investigation ( FBI) the at tempts to recruit them for espionage. Under the guidance of the FBI, these intended victims voluntmily played the risky role of counterspies and helped to foil and expose the Red agents schemes. In the last chapter, the author arzaIyzes public reactions to espionage in the United States. In this respect, he 10B summarizes that the United States has gone through severai stages-f rom the Age of Innocence to the Age of Suspicion to the Age of Confusion in reacting, as a Nation, to intelligence work and spying. He concludes that: . . . espionage & nota game be tween the good guys and tlge bad guys. . . . It is a vital activity cfrn dueted by uhnost every natia?k against almost every other nation-merely ta keep alive in tile morid cm?lwunity. . . . He ends with the plea that the Na tion should Muturity. enter now the Age of

AME ICAS STAKE IN ASIA. By Drew Mid dleton. 40 Pages. J. B. Lippincott Co., bPhiladelphia, Pa., 1968.$5.95. BY MAJ JOSEPH A. SHEA, USA This book covers t\vo areas of in. ternational relations related to Com munist Chinas political conduct in Asia, The first concerns the struggle of the small states of South Vietnam, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singa pore to remain independent frnm Com munist China. The second appraises the threat which Communist Chinas political policy along the Tibetan fron tier poses to the delicate peace between Pakistan and India. Dre\\, Middleton has been a corre spondent for TIIe New York Times since 1938. In 1967, in order to evolve his own answers to the controversial questions which have arisen over the United States undeclared war in Asia, he journeyed to 13 Asian countries to Military Iteview

I
MILITAiY visit old. friends and news sources. This book will he a source of pleas ure to those who favor current US in volvement in Asia. Mr. Middleton states that be began the trip devoid of prejudice on the war, seeking only factual political information, and with , out the intent of writing a book. Half way through his trip, he states that he felt compelled to write what his findings and impressions were about the US stake in Asia. First, he did not find that US in. tervention in South Vietnam was re sented. To the contrary, it was re garded, except by! Communists and their clients, as a shield. Second, Asians are willing to accept all forms of foreign aid, and there was far less anti-Americanism, far more gratitude for American help, than h:) had antic ipated. Third, as a result of the de feat of Indonesian communism, Com munists can be defeated. Fourth, as stated by Narcisu Ramos, the Philip pine Foreign Secretary: BOOKS THE VIOL~NT PEACE. A Report on Wars in the Postwar World. By Carl Mydans and Shelley Mydans. 478 Pages. Afheneum Pub. Iishers, Naw York, 1888.$12.50. 13Y LT~ FRANCIS A. IANNI, USA This handsome book is a compilation of eyewitness reports of 44 Time-.Life correspondents covering 25 major con flict situations which have occurred since the end of World War IL One hy one, from Chinas Civil War to thethlrd Arab-Israeli conflict, theep iso es of violence are paraded by. Tbe !. collection of articles is tied together by brief discussions on the nature uf war and of peace. The husband and wife authorphotographer team, both combat cor respondents, have drawn on the tiles of Time-Life for memorable photo graphs to heighten the impact of the narration. FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS TO THE ASTRONAUTS. The Memoirs of Major Gen. eral Benjamin O. Foulois. By Major General Benjamin O. Foulois. With Colonel C. V. Gli nes, United States Air Force. 306 Pages. Mc6raw-Nill Book Co., New York, Toronto, Can., London, Eng., and Sydney, Aus., 1968. $8.95. BY MAJ JAMES E. DRUMiItOND,USA The exciting early days of military , avfiation in the United States are re counted in this autobiography of one of the Legendary and controversial pio neers of flying. General Foulois, as a lieutenant, flew with Orville Wright during the acceptance tests of the first aircraft purchased by the US Army in 1909, and became the first military aviator to pilot a military aircraft. The first practical tactical applica tion of heavier-than-air aircraft came under Foulois command during the M~xican Expedition. During World f Ioa

We [Asians] want to maka our mm future, but we zuarzt uou on the s<delines to make sure we maks it our selves without interrreption friends up north.
And fifth:

from our

The btwtal conclusion, then, is that if Asia, specifically Southeast Asia, is to be protected from Communist pres sure, militar~ or political, to be as sisted in building econowtic and gov ernmental defenses against subver sion, to be helped to feed itself now and in the future, extensive United States involvement is necessary.
This excellent summary of the sta tus of rimland Asian nations political objectives with respect to the United States gives a concise view, of Asian trends which may affect US policy. Decenrber 1968

MILITARY BOOKS War I, Foulois commanded the air service of the American Expeditionary Forces. It was here that his associa tion with General Billy Mitchell devel oped into a well-known animosity that Foulois explains in some detail. Also discussed in later chapters is.the Air Mail Fiasco during which army avi. ators piloted the US mails and which contributed to a congressional com mittees recommendation for Foulois early retirement. This is interesting reading on the evolution of US military aviation. ROMAN MILITARY - LAW. By C. E. Brand. Preface by Charles L. Decker. 226 Pages. Tbe University of Texas Press, Austin, Tex., and London, Eng., 1966.$6.50. BY LTC MILTON B. HALSEY, JR., USA Colonel Brand, a retired member of the Judge Advocate Generals Corps, in conducting research on the study of comparative military law, deter mined that substantially nothing had been written on Roman military law, and wrote this book to attempt to fill this void. Rome, as the lawgiver for much of the modern world and a great mili tary power, was instrumental in the development of much of the military law used today. Colonel Brand out lines, in this book, a thousand years of Roman rule emphasizing the mil itary organization, disciplinary Pro cedures, offenses, and punishments peculiar to Roman armies. He con siders the changes in military law brought about by the evolution of Rome as a republic, principate, and empire. In the final appendixes, he lists the Latin text and the English translation of the only known code of Roman military law which has sur vived to the present day. 110 I THE MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY IN THE SECONO WORLD WAR. By Michael Howard. B3 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1966.$4.00. Recent events in Czechoslovakia give special significance to this exami nation of the World War II strategy pursued by the Allies in the Mediter ranean theater. The origins and out lines of the proposal to invade Eu rope through its soft? underbelly, the Balkans, are covered by the author, a member of the Council of the Institute for Strategic Studies of Great Britain. Mr. Howard does not choose sides in the debate river whether the pro posal was right or wrong. He concludes that the British failed to present their Allies with a coherent strategy hased either on their historical experience or on their prophetic insights into the problems of the postwar world. The book is a concise, crisply written re telli~ a subject that will be long debated. THE PHILBY CONSPIRACY. By Bruce Page, David f.eiteb, and Phillip Knigirtley. 360 Pages. Doubleday & Co., fnc., Garden City, N. Y., 196B. $5.95.
13Y LTC BENJAMIN G. SPIVEY, USA

how can individuals with known Communist beliefs and backgrounds penetrate the British Secret Service ? The entire story will probably never be known, but the authors have pieced together an incredible story of not only Kim Philby, but also GUY Burgess and Donald McClean and how they did, in fact, lead dual lives.
The book begins with Philbys early life in India and ends with his flight to the Soviet Union in 1963. The de tails of how, or to whom, information was passed are not included, but the consequences are evident. Military Review

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CUBA: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966. By Andr6s Su5rez. Trans lated by Joel Carmichael and Ernst Halperin From the Spanish. With a Foreword by Ernst Haiperin. 266 Pages. The M. I. T. Press, Massachu setts Institute of Technology, Cam bridge, Mass., and London, Eng., 1967. $7.50. COMMUNISM IN VIETNAM. A Doc umentary Study. By Rodger Swear ingen and Hammond Rolph. 195 Pages. American Bp,r Association, Chicago, 111., 1967. $1~00 paperbound. VIETNAM. By Mary McCarthy. 106 Pages. Harcourt, Bruce & World, Inc., .New York, 1967.$1.95 paperbound. AFRIKA KORPS. By Major K. J. Macksey. 159 Pages. Ballantine Books, Inc., New York, 1968. $1.00 paperhound. + D-DAY: Spearhead of Invasion. By R. W. Thompson. 158 Pages. Ballan tine Books, Inc., New York, 196S. $1.00 paperbound. ~ THEIR FINEST HOUR. The Story of the Battle of Britain, 1940. By Edward Bishop. 160 Pages. BaRentine Books, Inc., New .York, 1968. $1.00 paper . bound. U-BOAT: The Secret Menace. By David Mason. 160 Pages. Ballantine Books, Inc., New York, 1968. $1.00 paperbound. . . . ON THE COURSE OF THE STARS. The Roger B. Chaffee Story as Told to C. Donald Chrysler. By Don L. Chaffee and Family. 155 Pages. Kregel Publications, Grand Rapids, Micb., 1968.$3.95. December 1968

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