1. Pe et. al. vs. Pe G.R. No. L-17396. 30 May 1962. Bautista Angelo J.

: Appeal from a decision of the CFI Mla. Facts: Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolitas house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brothers house where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolitas aparador The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the action and plaintiffs appealed. Issue: W/N the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code. Held: The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolitas affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed and injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code. 2. VALENZUELA FACTS: HARDWOOD V CA

of the policy but the latter denied liability under the policy. Plaintiff likewise filed a formal claim with defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation for the value of the lost logs but the latter denied the claim. Court of Appeals affirmed in part the RTC judgment by sustaining the liability of South Sea Surety and Insurance Company (South Sea), but modified it by holding that Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation (Seven Brothers) was not liable for the lost cargo. ISSUE: Whether defendants shipping corporation and the surety company are liable to the plaintiff for the latters lost logs. HELD: The charter party between the petitioner and private respondent stipulated that the (o)wners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo VALID There is no dispute between the parties that the proximate cause of the sinking of M/V Seven Ambassadors resulting in the loss of its cargo was the snapping of the iron chains and the subsequent rolling of the logs to the portside due to the negligence of the captain in stowing and securing the logs on board the vessel and not due to fortuitous event. Likewise undisputed is the status of Private Respondent Seven Brothers as a private carrier when it contracted to transport the cargo of Petitioner Valenzuela. Even the latter admits this in its petition. Private respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioners lauan logs. Thus, Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by petitioner may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter party. In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their

Plaintiff shipped at Maconcon Port, Isabela 940 round logs on board M/V Seven Ambassador, a vessel owned by defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation. Plaintiff insured the logs against loss and/or damage with defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. for P2M and the latter issued its Marine Cargo Insurance Policy on said date. In the meantime, the M/V Seven Ambassador sank resulting in the loss of the plaintiffs insured logs. Plaintiff demanded from defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. the payment of the proceeds

duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in contracts involving common carriers. The provisions of our Civil Code on common carriers were taken from Anglo-American law. Under American jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is not against public policy and is deemed valid. Such doctrine We find reasonable. The Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would be void only if the strict public policy governing common carriers is applied. Such policy has no force where the public at large is not involved as in this case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party. (Home Insurance Co. vs. American Steamship Agencies Inc., 23 SCRA 24, April 4, 1968) 3. GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS 176 SCRA 778 August 25, 1989 Facts: 10 November 1972, hereisn private respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a crook and a swindler, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator.

Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscals Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed. Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent. Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be trusted.) as well as against Tobias (crook, and swindler); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED 4. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. JADER

GR No. 132344 February 17, 2000 FACTS: Respondent Romeo Jader was enrolled in the University of the East (UE) College of Law from 1984 to 1988. In the first semester of SY 1987-1988, he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled the following semester, and filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade on February 1, 1988, given by Prof. Ortega which was approved by Dean Tiongzon. Thereafter, he took the removal examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Prof. Ortega submitted his grade of five (5). Respondents name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for Graduation, with the annotation that he had an incomplete grade in PC1. His name appeared in the invitation for the Investiture and Commencement Exercises on April 16, 1988, with footnote that the list was tentative. Naturally, the respondent jubilantly attended the graduation and threw a party thereafter. He took a leave from work for five (5) months to attend a review class in preparation for the Bar examination. Upon learning of his deficiency, he dropped the review class and was not able to take the Bar examination. Respondent then filed with the RTC for damages against petitioner. The petitioner denied liability arguing that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for an LlB degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students. The RTC ruled in respondents favor. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed RTCs decision. ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution may be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. HELD: The petition lacks merit.

When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is entered into between said institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the schools commitment under the contract. Petitioner, in belatedly informing the respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the Bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes and honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. It is the school that has access to the information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in discliplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the schools rules and orders. 5. TANJANCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS L-18630 December 17, 1966

FACTS: Petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted respondent Araulli Santoshe expressed and professed his undying love and affection towards her which she eventually reciprocated. For one year from Dec. 1953-Dec. 1954, petitioner succeeded in having carnal access to her, because of his protestation of love and promise of marriage. She got pregnant, for which she resigned from her work as IBM secretary to avoid embarrassment. He refused to marry her nor give support. Thus, she filed for an action before the trial court to compel him to recognize the unborn child

and provide support. The complaint was dismissed for failure to state the cause of action. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that cause of action existed for damages as premised on Art. 21. ISSUE: Whether or not breach of a promise to marry is an actionable wrong. HELD: The case under Art. 21, cited as an example by the Code Commission, refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than sexual intercourse, or a breach or promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer, to which the woman has yielded. Where for one whole year, a woman of adult age maintained intimate sexual intercourse, such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion. Hence, no case is made under Art. 21, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by CFI in dismissing the complaint. In US v. Bustamante, 27 Phil 121: To constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. Decision of CA reversed; that of CFI affirmed. 6. MANILA GAS CORPORATION V CA (ONGSIP) FACTS - On May 20, 1964, respondent Ongsip applied for gas service connection with petitioner Manila Gas Corporation.- A burner gas was installed by petitioner's employees in respondent's kitchen at his residence.- On July 27, 1965, respondent Ongsip requested petitioner to install additional appliances as well as additional gas service connections in his 46-door Reyno Apartment: petitioner installed two 20gallon capacity water storage heaters and two heavyduty gas burners and replaced the original gas meter with a bigger 50-light capacity gas meter.- The installations and connections were all done solelyby petitioner's employees.- There was no significant change in the meter reading despite additional installations, and on May and June1966, no gas

consumption was registered in the meter,prompting petitioner to issue a 'meter order' with instructions to change the gas meter in respondent's residence.- On August 17, 1966, petitioner's employees went to Ongsip's place.- Without notifying or informing respondent Ongsip, they changed the gas meter and installed new tube connections. Private respondent was then taking a nap,but he was informed afterwards of what had taken place by his houseboy.On that same afternoon, petitioner's employees returned with a photographer who took pictures of the premises. Ongsip inquired from Coronel why they were taking pictures but the latter simply gave him a calling card with instructions to go to his office. There, he was informed about the existence of a bypass valve or"jumper" in the gas connection and that unless he gave P3,000.00, he would be deported.Respondent Ongsip refused to give the money- By the end of August, a reading was made on the new meter and expectedly, it registered a sudden increase in gas consumption. -Thereafter, in October, 1966, a complaint for qualified theft was filed by petitioner against respondent Ongsip - On February, 1967, pending investigation of the criminal complaint, petitioner disconnected respondent's gas service for alleged failure and/or refusal to pay his gas consumptions from July, 1965 to January, 1967. - Subsequently, the complaint was dismissed - On July 14, 1967, following the dismissal by the investigating fiscal of the complaint for qualified theft and the disconnection by petitioner of hisgas service, respondent Ongsip filed a complaint for moral and exemplary damages against petitioner Manila Gas Corporation based on two causes of action, firstly: the malicious, oppressive and malevolent filing of the criminal complaint; and, secondly: the illegal closure of respondent Ongsip's gas service connection without court order and without notice of warning.

HELD A significant fact brought about by the testimony of Coronel himself is the total absence of immediate accusation against Plaintiff right at the very moment when the by-pass valve was allegedly discovered. Right then and there Coronel should have told Plaintiff that he was using a by-pass valve and in effect stealing gas from Defendant. The circumstance was familiar to that of catching a thief in flagrante delicto. But the truth is that when Coronel and his men entered Plaintiff's compound and made

changes therein, Plaintiff was sleeping. When Plaintiff woke up at four o'clock in the afternoon, Coronel and his men had already made the changes and had already gone. They returned however at five o'clock, this time with a photographer. This was the time when Plaintiff met Coronel. Here was then the opportunity for Coronel to confront Plaintiff with the allegedly discovered 'by-pass valve' and bluntly, even brutally, tell him that there was thievery of gas. This ,Coronel did not do. .. .. Evidently, petitioner Manila Gas Corporation, in failing to recover its lost revenue caused by the gas meter's incorrect recording, sought to vindicate its financial loss by filing the complaint for qualified theft against respondent Ongsip knowing it to be false. It was actually intended to vex and humiliate private respondent and to blacken his reputation not only as a businessman but also as a person. Qualified theft is a serious offense indicating moral depravity in an individual. To be accused of such crime without basis is shocking and libelous. It stigmatized private respondent causing him emotional depression and social degradation. The fact that the complaint for qualified theft was dismissed by the Pasay City fiscal is no consolation. The damage had been done. Necessarily, indemnification had to be made. .- Petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.- The award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article2220 which provides that "willful injury to property maybe a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith" 7. PATRICIO v LEVISTE Petitioner was a Catholic priest appointed Director General of 1976 Religious and Municipal Town Fiesta of Pilar, Capiz. On 16 May 1976 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, while a benefit dance was on-going in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta, petitioner together with two (2) policemen were posted near the gate of the public auditorium. Private respondent Bienvenido Bacalocos, President of the Association of Barangay

Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, who was in a state of drunkenness, struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on his hand which started to bleed. He approached petitioner in a hostile manner and asked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand, and before petitioner could respond, private respondent, without provocation, hit petitioner's face with his bloodied hand. As a consequence, a commotion ensued. A criminal complaint for "Slander by Deed was flied by petitioner but was dismissed. Subsequently, a complaint for damages was filed by petitioner with the court a quo. The court awarded moral and exemplary damages in favor of petitioner as well as attorneys fees. Petitioner moved for execution of judgment but this was denied owing to the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, the court dismissed the complaint, prompting the filing of the subject petition on 2 grounds: (1) lack of service of copy of MR, and (2) admission of private respondent of slapping petitioner entitles petitioner to award of damages.
W/N petitioner is entitled to damages originally awarded by TC.

Yes. Moral and exemplary damages should be given. Petitioner is also entitled to attorneys fees. There is no question that moral damages may be recovered in cases where a defendant's wrongful act or omission has caused the complainant physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. o Private respondent's contention that there was no bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face and that the incident was merely accidental is not tenable. It was established before the court a quo that there was an existing feud between the families of both petitioner and private respondent and that private respondent slapped the petitioner without provocation in the presence of several persons. The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish, moral

shock, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Private respondent has to take full responsibility for his act and his claim that he was unaware of what he had done to petitioner because of drunkenness is definitely no excuse and does not relieve him of his liability to the latter. o The fact that no actual or compensatory damage was proven before the trial court, does not adversely affect petitioner's right to recover moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded in appropriate cases referred to in the chapter on human relations of the Civil Code (Articles 19 to 36), without need of proof that the wrongful act complained of had caused any physical injury upon the complainant Exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed upon herein private respondent by way of example or correction for the public good. Exemplary damages are required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the offender. They are an antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through the body politic. The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to either moral, temperate or compensatory damages, as the case may be, although such award cannot be recovered as a matter of right. In cases where exemplary damages are awarded to the injured party, attorney's fees are also recoverable. 8. AMERICAN EXPRESS V CORDERO Sometime in 1988, Nilda Cordero, wife of respondent Noel Cordero, applied for and was issued an American Express charge card with No. 3769895901-010020. The issuance of the charge card was covered by an Amex Cardmember Agreement. As cardholder, Nilda, upon signing the back portion of the card, manifested her acceptance of the terms of the Agreement. An extension charge card, with No. 3769-89590101010, was likewise issued to respondent Noel Cordero which he also signed.[2]

at about 7:00 oclock, the group went to the Watsons Chemist Shop located at 277C Ocean Gallery, Kowloon, Hong Kong. Noel picked up some chocolate candies and handed to the sales clerk his American Express extension charge card to pay for his purchases. The sales clerk verified the card by making a telephone call to the American Express Office in Hong Kong. Moments later, Susan Chong, the store manager, emerged from behind the counter and informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondents American Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation considering that it was done in front of his family and the other customers lined up at the check-out counter. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her own American Express charge card.[3] Nilda called up petitioners Office in Hong Kong. She was able to talk to Senior Authorizer Johnny Chen, who informed her that on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card with the same number as respondents card. The Hong Kong American Express Office called up respondent and after determining that he was in Manila and not in Hong Kong, placed his card in the Inspect Airwarn Support System. the trial court found that the inexcusable failure of defendant (petitioner herein) to inform plaintiff (respondent herein) of the November 1, 1991 incident despite sufficient time was the proximate cause of the confiscation and cutting of plaintiffs extension card which exposed the latter to public humiliation for which defendant should be held liable. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision affirming the trial courts Decision with modification in the sense that the amounts of damages awarded were reduced HELD: to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff. As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the authorized cardholder. This could have been accomplished had respondent talked to petitioners representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent is indeed the true holder of the card.

On November 29, 1991, respondent, together with his wife, Nilda, daughter, sisters-in-law and uncle-in-law, went on a three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. In the early evening of November 30, 1991,

When Watson Company called AEII for authorization, AEII representative requested that he talk to Mr. Cordero but he refused to talk to any representative of AEII. AEII could not prove then that he is really the real card holder. Clearly, no negligence which breaches the contract can be attributed to petitioner. If at all, the cause of respondents humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioners representative. 9. SOCORRO RAMIREZ v CA Facts of the case: Soccoro Ramirez was scolded by Ester Garcia inside Garcias office. Ramirez taped the conversation and later filed charges against Garcia for insulting and humiliating her, using as evidence the transcript of the conversation, based on the tape recording. Garcia filed criminal charges against Ramirez for violating the anti-wire tapping act, because it was done without her knowledge and consent. Ramirez claimed that what the law forbids is for other parties, who are not part of the conversation, to record it using the instruments enumerated in the law (there was an earlier case that was dismissed because the instrument used was not mentioned in the law). The trial court ruled in favor of Ramirez, granting a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, but the Court of Appeals reversed it. Ratio: First, the court noted that the provision makes it clear that it is illegal for any person to secretly record a conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The congressional records also showed that the intent was that permission must be sought from all parties in the conversation. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties, Sen. Tanada said during the deliberations. The provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Decision: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed. Costs against Ramirez.

In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American. In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaos. ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar HELD: Yes. On the part of Tenchavez: His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents. On the part of Escaos parents: It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and

10. TENCHAVEZ V ESCANO

has been correctly established in the decision of the lower court, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only 11. LAGON V CA

2005 Keywords: Sultan Kudarat property; Oblicon case on tortuous interference Nature: Petition for review on certiorari FACTS:

certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court confirming that no record of any lease contract had been entered into their files. Petitioner added that he only learned of the alleged lease contract when he was informed that private respondent was collecting rent from the tenants of the buildings. Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be unwarranted, Lagon filed his counterclaim for actual and moral damages. Lower Court: ruled in favor of unnamed private respondent, holding the lease contract authentic and genuine. Court of Apeals: affirmed Lower Courts decision with modifications. ISSUE:

Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi two parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, which covers commercial buildings. Said commercial buildings were constructed by the unnamed respondent pursuant to a contract of lease between the respondent and the late Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guibar wherein it was stipulated that the private respondent would put up a commercial building which would be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. It was alleged by the unnamed respondent that the lease contract ended in 1974, but it was renewed since the construction of the commercial buildings had yet to be completed. When Bai Tonina Sepi died, respondent started remitting his rent to the administrator of the deceaseds estate until he was advised to stop collecting rentals from the tenants because the property had been sold to Jose Lagon, and Jose Lagon had been collecting the same. Respondent thus filed a complaint against Lagon, accusing Lagon of inducing the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it. Lagon denied that he induced the heirs to sell him the property, contending that the heirs were in dire need of money to pay off the obligations of the deceased and this was what led the heirs to sell him the property. Lagon also maintained that he didnt interfere with private respondents leasehold rights as there was no lease contract covering the property when he purchased it; that his personal investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject lots. Lagon further alleged that before he bought the property, he went to Atty. Fajardo who allegedly notarized the renewed lease contract but the contract shown to him was unsigned. To refute the existence of a lease contract, petitioner presented in court a

WON the purchase by Lagon of the subject property, during the supposed existence of the private respondents lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which Lagon should be held liable for damages. HELD: No, the interference of Lagon was with a legal justification (in furtherance of a personal financial interest) and without bad faith. RATIO: Elements of Tortuous Interference with contractual relations (So Ping Bun v. CA): 1. Existence of a valid contract 2. Knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract 3. Interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse 1. Existence of a valid contract: The Court declared that absent a clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document continues to be a prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its execution and delivery. This brought the Court to rule that the notarized copy of lease contract presented in court appeared to be an incontestable proof that Bai Tonin Sepi and private respondent renewed their contract. 2. Knowledge on the part of the interfere that the contract exists: The Court ruled that Lagon had no knowledge of the lease contract as he even conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property; that an examination of the entire property title bore

no indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent and that even the registry of property had no record of the same. 3. Interference without legal justification or excuse: According to So Ping Bun v. CA, petitioner may be held liable only when there was no legal justification or excuse for his action or when his conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. Even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never established. The disquisition in So Ping Bun applies squarely in this case. Lagons purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of his financial or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives. In the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the Court declared that a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled by a proper business interest. In other words, a financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a person an officious interferer liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved. This case is one of damnum absque injuria or damage without injury. Injury- legal invasion of a legal right Damage- the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury BPI Card Corp vs CA: There can be damage without injury where the loss or harm is not the result of a violation of a legal duty. Attorneys Fees, Actual and Moral Damages cannot be awarded. 12. VILLARAMA v NLRC and GOLDEN DONUTS On July 15, 1989, petitioner Villarama was charged with sexual harassment by Divina Gonzaga, a clerktypist assigned in his department. The humiliating experience compelled her to resign from work. Her letter-resignation, dated July 15, 1989, reads We went to a restaurant along Makati Avenue where we ate our dinner. Mr. Villarama, Mr. Olaybar and Mr. Jess de Jesus were drinking while we were eating and (they) even offered me a few drinks and when we were finished, they decided to bring me home. While on my way, I found out that Mr. Villarama was not driving the way to my house. I was wondering

why we were taking the wrong way until I found out that we were entering a motel. I was really shock(ed). I did not expect that a somewhat reputable person like Mr. Villarama could do such a thing to any of his subordinates. I should have left the company without any word but I feel that I would be unfair to those who might be similarly situated. For his failure to tender his resignation, petitioner was dismissed by private respondent on August 23, 1989. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case 2 against private respondent. In a decision dated January 23, 1991, Labor Arbiter Salimar V. Nambi held that due process was not observed in the dismissal of petitioner and there was no valid cause for dismissal. Private respondent GOLDEN DONUTS, INC. was ordered to: (1) reinstate petitiner DELFIN G. VILLARAMA to his former position, without loss of seniority rights, and pay his backwages, etc. HELD: termination was proper The records show that petitioner was confronted with the charge against him. Initially, he voluntarily agreed to be separated from the company. He took a leave of absence preparatory to this separation. This agreement was confirmed by the letter to him by Mr. Prieto dated August 7, 1989. A few days after, petitioner reneged on the agreement. He refused to be terminated on the ground that the seriousness of his offense would not warrant his separation from service As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more exacting work ethics. He failed to live up to this higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect its employees from over sexed superiors. To be sure, employers are given wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of managerial employees on the ground of lack of trust and confidence. 13. LIWAYWAY CHATO v FORTUNE TOBACCO Liwayway Vizons-Chato vs. Fortune Corpation| YNARESSANTIAGO, J.: G.R. No. 141309 | June 19, 2007 Tobacco

FACTS Petitioner, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 37-93 which subjected cigarette brands "Champion," "Hope," and "More," to 55% ad valorem tax. Respondent company filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals, which ultimately ruled that RMC 37-93 as defective, invalid and unenforceable. Such pronouncement was affirmed by the CA and the SC, for being an invalid administrative issuance. Thereafter, respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in her private capacity, under Article 32, considering that the issuance of the RMC violated the constitutional right of the respondent against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. Petitioner's motion to dismiss was denied by the RTC, and eventually the case got to the SC, wherein it is contended that it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. ISSUES Is petitioner liable in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office? Does Article 32 of the NCC, or Sec 38, Book I of the Admin Code should govern in determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Petitioner in the case at bar is liable for damages. Although the general rule provides that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks, there are exceptions to such, (1) where said public officer acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff. The second exception is clearly applicable in the instant case. Article 32 is the governing provision in determining whether or not respondents' complaint had a valid cause of action.

Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent. The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional rights. The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff. Petition denied. 14. SILAHIS HOTEL V SOLUTA SILAHIS VS SOLUTAFACTS: Petitioner Panlilio was the Vice President for Finance of his co-petitioner Silahis International Hotel, Inc.(hotel), while respondents Soluta, Santos, Edna, Vicenta,and Matilla were employees of the hotel and officers of the Glowhrain-Silahis Union Chapter, the hotel employees union. Petitioners version: 1.The General Manager of the security agency of Silahis Hotel allegedly received information of illegal activities including sale of marijuana, dollars smuggling, and prostitution going on in the Unio

nOffice at the hotel.2.GM with other security personnel allegedly entered the Union Office with the permission of the uniono fficers and found marijuana. Respondents version: 1.Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office.2.In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.3.Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed illanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops. As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13union officers was filed before the Fiscals Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that they are not liable for damages under Article 32 and that their search of the union office in the instant case was entirely reasonable under the circumstances. ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights. HELD: YES. Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and(10) of the Civil Code, allows so. ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one. The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners violation of individual respondents constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the

award of damages under Article32 of the Civil Code. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure. Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person" directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10). Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others,(6) Illegal search and(10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28,29, 30, 32, 34 and 35. Doctrines: The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff. While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a PERSONAL right which may be waived expressly or impliedly a waiver by implication CANNOT be presumed To constitute avalid waiver of the right there must be proof that (1)the right exists; (2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The waiver must be voluntary, knowingly, and intelligently made. A violation of one's constistution rights against illegalsearch and seizure can be the Basis for the recovery of damages under CC Art. 32 in reln to CC Art. 2219(6)and (10) on MORAL DAMAGES, since the complaint filed was for damages due to

Malicious Prosecution AND violation of constitution right . DISPOSTION: PETITION DENIED! 15. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, et al (2003) FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion RULING: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the

standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the perceived danger against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption. The petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.