[G.R. No. 148311.

March 31, 2005] IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case. The facts are undisputed. On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition[1] to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname. On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus: After a careful consideration of the eviden ce presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603. WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes. SO ORDERED.[4] On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.

On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father. Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons: First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained. Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows. Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.[7] We find merit in the petition. Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.[8] It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from

parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[9] Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surname[10] of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus: Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. xxx Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the father. Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs. Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees otherwise, or (2) She or the former husband is married again to another person. Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370. Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion. Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either: (1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on. x x x Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176[11] of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle name a child may use. The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mothers surname shall be added. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus: "(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; x x x However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of t he surname and that of the child because the fathers surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother. Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother. Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article 364, which reads: Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David but they all call him Justice David. Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name . Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter. xxx Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name. xxx Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied) In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters.[13] Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.[14] The Underlying Intent of Adoption Is In Favor of the Adopted Child Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.[15] It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.[16] The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation , but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.[17] This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.[18] Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,[19] secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.[20]

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189[21] of the Family Code and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23] Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future. Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy. Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.[25] The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.[27] Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This provision, according to the Code Commission, is nec essary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.[28] Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname GARCIA as her middle name. Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption. SO ORDERED. Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo at 34-36. [2] Annex C, id. at 33. [3] Annex F, id. at 41-43. [4] Rollo at 42-43. [5] Annex G, id. at 44-48. [6] Annex H, id. at 49. [7] Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, August 10, 1985, p. 8. [8] Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 189, citing 38 Am Jur, Name 594-595. [9] Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al ., G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 509, citing Tolentino, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1993 ed., 672. [10] Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra. [11] Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. [12] Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family law Committees, August 10, 1985, pp. 16-18.

[13] Article 365 of the New Civil Code. [14] Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al ., supra; Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra. [15] Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, Fifteenth Edition, 2002, p. 685. [16] Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1989 Edition, p. 272-273, citing 4 Valverde, 473. [17] Paras, supra, citing Prasnick vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 665. [18] Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, 406 SCRA 135, citing United Nation General Assembly/44/49 (1989). [19] Sec. 17. Legitimacy. The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance and support in keeping with the means of the family. [20] Id. [21] Art. 189. (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; [22] Supra. [23] Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. [24] Sec. 18. Succession. In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern. [25] Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, citing 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 865. [26] Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., id., citing 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 910. [27] Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., id., citing Bobanovic, et al. vs. Montes, etc., et al., 142 SCRA 485 (1986). [28] Paras, supra, p. 91.

[G.R. No. 143989. July 14, 2003] ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM), respondent. DECISION VITUG, J.: The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred 7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke respondents adoption, but was prevented by petitioners supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future. x x x x x x xxx

10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo. x x x x x x xxx

13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year. 14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son.

15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioners nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner. 16. That in view of respondents insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondents only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation.1[1] Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads: SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations. Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code. (emphasis supplied) Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 3482[2] of the Civil Code and Article 1923[3] of the Family Code.

1[1]

Rollo, pp. 25-26.

Art. 348. The adopter may petition the court for revocation of the adoption in any of these cases:
2[2]

(1) If the adopted person has attempted against the life of the adopter; (2) When the adopted minor has abandoned the home of the adopter for more than three years; (3) When by other acts the adopted person has definitely repudiated the adoption. (n)

In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly: On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 9911-07 SC. On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365). Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lack of cause of action. Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the provisions of the Family Code should be respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court) WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered dismissed. 4[4] Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner raises the following questions; viz: 1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552? 2. In the affirmative, has the adopters action prescribed?

A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the family.5[5] The continuity of the adopters family was the primary purpose of adoption and all matters

Art. 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission of the adoption in any of the following cases:
3[3]

(1) If the adopted has committed any act constituting a ground for disinheriting a descendant; or (2) When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters during minority for at least one year, or, by some other acts, has definitely repudiated the adoption. (41a, P.D. No. 603)
4[4]

Rollo, pp. 33-34. The Law of Adoption, Morton L. Leavy & Rey Weinbey, 4 th Edition (1979).

5[5]

relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted.6[6] Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recognized adoption.7[7] It was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law and still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount concern.8[8] Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an overriding consideration.9[9] In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,10[10] followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the Child,11[11] were written instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines12[12] of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code13[13] and then by the Family Code of the Philippines,14[14] gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.

6[6]

The Law on Adoption and Surrogate Parenting, Irving J. Sloan (1988). Ibid., p.7.

7[7]

Id. The earliest adoption statute was reported in Mississippi in 1846. In 1850, Texas and Vermont, USA passed their general adoption statutes, followed by Massachusetts and New York in 1851.
8[8]

A Comparative Study of the Adoption Law under the Spanish Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, 4 Phil. L.J. 313-323 (1918).
9[9] 10[10]

United Nation General Assembly, Resolution dated 10 December 1948. United Nation General Assembly/ 44/ 49 (1989). Presidential Decree No. 386.

11[11]

12[12]

Presidential Decree No. 603 (10 June 1975), as amended by P.D. No. 1175 (15 August 1977).
13[13] 14[14]

Executive Order 209 (03 August 1988).

Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force. The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process15[15] that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action;16[16] it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested.17[17] Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,18[18] absolute, unconditional, and perfect19[19] or fixed and irrefutable. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20[20] a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its decision and while the case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by the husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined by her husband, according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller,21[21] spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize Michaels adoption having theretofore been taken into their care. At the time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed.

15[15]

16 CJS citing City of Los Angeles vs. Oliver, 283 P. 298, 102 Cal. App. 299. Ayog vs. Cusi, Jr. G.R. No. L-46729, 19 November 1982 (118 SCRA 492). 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, p.651.

16[16]

17[17]

Benquet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, No. L-7231, 28 March 1956 (98 Phil. 711) quoting Pearsall vs. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U.S. 646.
18[18]

Reyes vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129, 29 March 1999 (305 SCRA 512) as cited in Bernabe vs. Alejo, G.R. No. 140500, 21 January 2002 (374 SCRA 180).
19[19] 20[20]

G.R. No. 92326, 24 January 1992 (205 SCRA 356). G.R. No. 125932, 21 April 1999 (306 SCRA 183).

21[21]

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,22[22] had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued. Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveyear bar rule under Rule 10023[23] of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges.24[24] While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute.25[25] It is a privilege that is governed by the states determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child.26[26] Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.27[27] Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.28[28]

Section 26. Repealing Clause. Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to, or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, or modified, or amended accordingly.
22[22]

SEC. 5. Time within which to file petition.- A minor or other incapacitated person must file the petition for rescission or revocation of adoption within the five years following his majority, or if he was incompetent at the time of the adoption, within the five (5) years following the recovery from such incompetency.
23[23]

The adopter must also file the petition to set aside the adoption within five (5) years from the time the cause or causes giving rise to the rescission or revocation of the same took place. (emphasis supplied) Id. at 24, citing Brearly School vs. Ward, 210 NY 358, 40 LRA NS. 1215; also, Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed. p. 546.
24[24]

Martin vs. Putman (Miss) 427 So 2d 1373; There is no right of adoption. It is the extension of a privilege. Eggleston vs. Landrum 210 Miss 645, 50 So 2d 364, 23 ALR2d 696.
25[25] 26[26]

Browder vs. Harmeyer (Ind App) as cited in AmJur, 2d, Vol. 2.

Adoption has also been characterized as a status created by the state acting as parens patriae, the sovereign parent. Douglas vs. Harrelson (Ala App) 454 So 2d 984.
27[27] 28[28]

16 CJS citing Robinsons vs. Mchugh, 291 P. 330, 158 Wash. 157.

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate. WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.