G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004 JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO vs.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY FACTS:

Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. At the time of the companys incorporation, Dr. Ortaez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock. On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortaez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortaez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortaez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortaez).2 On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortaez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch (now Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortaez, docketed as SP Proc. Q-30884 (which petition to date remains pending at Branch 85 thereof). Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the petition for letters of administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a special administrator. On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Pao, then presiding judge of Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose Ortaez joint special administrators of their fathers estate. Hearings continued for the appointment of a regular administrator (up to now no regular administrator has been appointed). As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which included, among other properties, 2,0293 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife), representing 50.725% of the companys outstanding capital stock. On April 15, 1989, the decedents wife, Juliana S. Ortaez, claiming that she owned 1,0144 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortaez failed to repurchase the shares of stock within the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name. On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortaez, acting in his personal capacity and claiming that he owned the remaining 1,0115 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG, represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. After one year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose Ortaez failed to repurchase the same. It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of the intestate proceedings at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85), Juliana Ortaez and her two children, Special Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez, entered into a memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares separately sold by Juliana Ortaez on April 15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortaez on October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of herein petitioner FLAG. On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina OrtaezEnderes and her siblings (hereafter referred to as private respondents Enderes et al.) filed a motion for appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. This move was opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.

On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of private respondents Enderes et al. and appointed private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock. On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedents estate. These motions were opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez. On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which move was again opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez. On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the approval of the deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock and (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes as special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that there were no longer any shares of stock for her to administer. On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion of Special Administrator Jose Ortaez for the approval of the deeds of sale. ISSUE: Whether the memorandum of agreement, extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate of the deceased, is valid. RULING: Juliana Ortaez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortaez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortaez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortaez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void. An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent.20 However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares.21 This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case. Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is wellsettled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedents estate.

G.R. No. L-2277 December 29, 1950 MONICO CONCEPCION, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PACIENCIA STA. ANA, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
An action was instituted by Monico Concepcion vs. Paciencia Sta. Ana to annul the sale made by the late Perpetua Concepcion, sister of the plaintiff, of three parcels of land with the improvements thereon to the defendant. The complaint alleges, among others, that the plaintiff is the only surviving legitimate brother of Perpetua Concepcion, who died on or about January 28, 1948, without issue and without leaving any will; that in her life time or on about June 29, 1945, said Perpetua Concepcion, in connivance with the defendant and with intent to defraud the plaintiff, sold and conveyed three parcels of land for a false and fictitious consideration to the defendant, who secured transfer certificates of title of said lands issued under her name; and that the defendant has been in possession of the properties sold since the death of Perpetua Concepcion, thereby causing damages to the plaintiff in the amount of not less than two hundred (P200) pesos. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of action, because the deceased being the owner of the properties sold had the right to enjoy and dispose of them without further limitation than those established by law. The Court of First Instance of Manila granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint on the ground that "the plaintiff is not a party to the deed of sale executed by Perpetua Concepcion in favor of the defendant. ISSUE: Whether the plaintiff has any right ro bring an action to annul the sale.

RULING: The late Perpetua Concepcion has not transmitted to the plaintiff any right arising from the contract of conveyance or sale of her lands to the defendant, and therefore the plaintiff cannot file an action to annul such contract as representative of the deceased. According to the complaint, the deceased, in connivance with the defendant and with intent to defraud the plaintiff, (that is, in order not to leave the properties above mentioned upon her death to the plaintiff) sold and conveyed them to the latter, for a false and fictitious consideration. It is, therefore obvious, that the conveyance or sale of said properties to the defendant was voluntarily made by the deceased to said defendant. As the deceased had no forced heir, she was free to dispose of all her properties as absolute owner thereof, without further limitation than those established by law, and the right to dispose of a thing involves the right to give or to convey it to another without any consideration. The only limitation established by law on her right to convey said properties to the defendant without any consideration is, that she could not dispose of or transfer her property to another in fraud of her creditors.
A voluntary conveyance, without any consideration whatever, is prima facie good as between the parties, and such an instrument can not be declared fraudulent as against creditors in the absence of proof, that there was at the time of the execution of the conveyance a creditor who could be defrauded by the conveyance. Even a forced heir of the deceased Perpetua Concepcion would have no right to institute as representative of the decedent, an action of nullity of a contract made by the decedent to defraud his creditors, because such a contract being considered illicit under article 1306 of the Civil Code, Perpetua Concepcion herself had no right of action to annul it and recover the properties she had conveyed to the defendant. But the forced heir could in such case bring an action to rescind the contract under article 1291

(3) of the Civil Code. The reason why a forced heir has the right to institute an action of rescission is that the right to the legitime is similar to a credit of a creditor. Therefore, as the plaintiff in the present case, not being a forced heir of the late Perpetua Concepcion, can not institute an action to annul under article 1300 or to rescind under article 1291 (3) of the Civil Code the contract under consideration entered into by the deceased with the defendant.

G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992 MAURICIO SAYSON vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants. On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. The complainants asserted that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation. ISSUES: 1. Whether plaintiffs have a right to inherit from Teodoro; and 2. Whether respondents can represent Eleno for the inheritance from their grandparents. RULING: 1. NO. When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded. Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified. A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue. Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple. 2. There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by

the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006 MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and ELISA CRISTOBAL SIKAT, Petitioners,vs.EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, JOSE CRISTOBAL, HEIRS OF NORBERTO CRISTOBAL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. FACTS: Petitioners, the heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez. On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535 square meters. Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their names.Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them and private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. ISSUE: Whether petitioners sufficiently proved their filiation with the deceased. RULING: YES. Article 172 of the Family Code provides: Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. "Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist of the childs baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the childs name has been entered, common reputation respecting the childs pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they reside as being the children of Buevaventura Cristobal with his first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child. In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to present any proof to refute the petitioners claim and evidences of filiation to Buenaventura Cristobal. The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince the Court that petitioners are, indeed, children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981 BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner, vs.COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V) FACTS: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died and was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose. On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda. Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children. Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz. Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will. In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda. ISSUE: Whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree RULING: NO. Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor. As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from the prepositus, not from the reservor.Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979 FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS petitioners,vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa Florentina Rella, both of Ligao, Albay, together with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial, over the then present and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina enumerated in a prepared inventory. On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doa Florentina, also known as Doa Tinay separately executed their respective holographic wills, the provisions of which were in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of the other to his or her share in the conjugal properties, the other half of the conjugal assets having been partitioned to constitute their legitime among their four living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949. The wills also declared that in the event of future acquisitions of other properties by either of them, one-half thereof would belong to the other spouse, and the other half shall be divided equally among the four children. On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doa Tinay executed their mutual and reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their respective holographic wins. Again, the codicils similarly acknowledged and provided that one-half of all the properties of the spouses, conjugal and paraphernal, had been disposed of, conveyed to and partitioned among their legitimate heirs in the "Escritura de Particion" of November 25, 1949, but that they reserved for themselves the other half or those not disposed of to the said legitimate heirs under the above agreement of partition, and that they mutually and reciprocally bequeathed unto each other their participation therein as well as in all properties which might be acquired subsequently. Each spouse also declared that should she or he be the surviving spouse, whatever belongs to him or her or would pertain to him or her, would be divided equally among the four children. It was also declared in both codicils that upon the death of either of the spouses, the surviving spouse was designated mutually and reciprocally as the executor or administrator of all the properties reserved for themselves. Upon the death of Doa Tinay, Don Jesus was named executor. Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary,whom he instructed to make a list of all his remaining properties with their corresponding descriptions. His lawyer was then instructed to draft a new will which was duly signed by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses on November 14, 1959 at his home in Ligao, Albay. This notarial will and testament had three essential features: (a) it expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his four living children by virtue of the "Escritura de Particion Extra. judicial" of 1949, and that such properties be taken into account in the partition of his estate among the children; and (c) it instituted his children as legatees/devisees of certain specific properties, and as to the rest of the properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were to be given to Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to serve without a bond. ISSUE: Whether the questioned will and testament of November 14, 1959, was executed in accordance with Arts. 805-809 of the New Civil Code.

RULING: YES.About 2 weeks after said death of his wife, Don Jesus Alsua decided to make a new will, thereby revoking and cancelling his previous holographic will and also its codicil. In the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, he crossed out in ink each and every page of said page he wrote on each page the word "cancelado", and affixed his signature thereon. He then instructed him to make a list of all s properties with their corresponding descriptions. Meanwhile, Don Jesus Alsua sent for his lawyer. Don Jesus informed his lawyers that he wanted to make a new will, and accordingly gave more detailed instructions as to how he wanted to divide his properties among his four children. He handed to them a list and on the left he indicated the name of the child to whom the listed properties shall pertain. To Don Jesus, Spanish is his major language, as in fact his conversations with Don Gregorio are always in Spanish. A few days before November 14, 1959, Atty. Imperial showed to Don Jesus the semi-final draft of the will and after reading it Don Jesus said that it was as directed by him, and after making a few minor corrections, he instructed Atty. Jorge S. Imperial to put the win in final form. He further told Atty, Jorge Imperial that the signing of the will should be at his home in Ligao, in the morning of November 14, 1959, and that the witnesses should be Mr. Ramon Balana, the then Register of Deeds of Albay; Mr. Jose Madarieta who is a friend of the family; and Mr. Jose Gaya who is a sort of employee of Don Jesus. Thus in the morning of November 14, 1959, the witnesses arrived at the residence of Don Jesus at Ligao; Albay, and they were ushered in by Mr. Jose Gaya, and the latter requested them to be seated at the usual receiving room on the ground floor while he announced their arrival to Don Jesus who was on the second floor. Soon Don Jesus came down, carrying with him the will to be signed placed inside a cartolina folder. He greeted Don Gregorio, Mr. Balan, and Atty. Imperial and immediately joined them in conversation. Mr. Gaya called for Mr. Jose Madarieta, whose residence is just across the road from the house of Don Jesus. Mr. Madarieta was already informed by Don Jesus himself about the fact of signing the will that morning, and so, on being advised by Mr. Gaya that the Imperials had already arrived, Madarieta proceeded to the residence of Don Jesus, without much delay. With the coming of Madarieta and the coming back of Gaya, there were now six people gathered in the living room, namely: Don Jesus Alsua, Don Gregorio Imperial Atty. Jorge S. Imperial Mr. Ramon Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta, and Mr. Jose Gaya. All the witnesses who testified for the petitioner declared that Don Jesus was in bright and lively conversation which ran from problems of farming and the merits of French-made wines. At 1 1:00 o'clock, Don Gregorio made a remark that it is about time to do what they were there for, and this was followed by a more or less statement from Jesus, who said yes. On request of Don Jesus, all of them moved to the big round table on another part of the same sala for convenience in signing because there were chairs all around this table. The will which consisted of nine pages, with a duplicate, and triplicate was laid on the round table and the signing began, with Atty. assisting each person signing by indicating the proper place where the signature shall be written. Don Jesus, as testator, signed first. After signing the original and the two other sets, the three sets were then passed to Mr. Ramon Balana who signed as attesting witness. After Mr. Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta signed next as another attesting witness, and when Mr. Madarieta finished signing all the three sets, the same were passed to Mr. Jose Gaya who also signed as the third attesting witness. On each of the three sets, Don Jesus signed ten times. Each of the three attesting witnesses signed eleven times on each set. The original will, the duplicate, and the triplicate were Identified by Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta and Atty. (now Judge) imperial. It was also clearly established that when Don Jesus signed the will Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were present and witnessed said signing, and that when each of these three witnesses was signing, Don Jesus and the two other attesting witnesses were present and Witnessing said Signing. The signing by the testator and the attesting witnesses having been completed, Atty. Jorge S. Imperial as Notary Public with commission for the entire province of Albay, notarized the will and sealed it with his notarial seal which he brought along that morning. After all the three sets were notarized, they were all given back to Don Jesus who placed them inside the same folder.

G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926 In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir, appellee, vs.MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant. FACTS: On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament, in the second clause of which he declared: I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno. Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924, or only four days after the will above-mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924, thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death. Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will referred to, and after having been contested, has been admitted to probate by judicial determination. ISSUE: Whether the will of Tomas Rodriguez was valid, notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals named as heirs in the will was disqualified to take, and that as a consequence Margarita Lopez is entitled to inherit the share of said disqualified heir. RULING: As between articles 912 and 983, it is obvious that the former is the more general of the two, dealing, as it does, with the general topic of intestate succession while the latter is more specific, defining the particular conditions under which accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the provisions of the former article must be considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect to intestate succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion." It is true that the same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so understood, in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to, by which the more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this interpretation supplies the only possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to this, article 986 of the Civil Code affords independent proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible. Under paragraph 4 of article 912, intestate succession occurs when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed, while, under the last provision in paragraph 2 of article 982, accretion occurs when one of the persons called to inherit under the will is disqualified to receive the inheritance. A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed and incapacity to take, and it is contended that the disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to bring the case under article 912 rather than 982. We are of the opinion that the case cannot be made to turn upon so refined an interpretation of the language of the Code, and at any rate the disability to which Vicente F. Lopez was subject was not a general disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a consideration which makes a case for accretion rather than for intestate succession.

G.R. No. 2586 January 19, 1906 TOMAS GUISON,Petitioner-Appellant, vs. MARIA CONCEPCION,Respondent-Appellee. FACTS: Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo made her will in Manila, on January 3, 1904. The last part of the will is as follows: Asi lo otorgo ante los testigos Seores Ambrosio Reyes, Mariano de Leon y Felix Polintan, de Manila, Islas Filipinas, y por no yo poder firmar, firma a mi ruego el mismo Feliciano Maglaqui, en mi presencia y de los mencionados testigos, quienes tambien suscriben, cada uno de ellos en presencia de los otros y la mia. (Firmado) FELICIANO MAGLAQUI. (Firmado) AMBROSIO REYES. (Firmado) MARIANO DE LEON. (Firmado) FELIX POLINTAN. Nosotros Ambrosio Reyes, Mariano de Leon y Felix Polintan, atestiguamos que Feliciano Maglaqui, a ruego de la Sra. Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo y en presencia de la misma y la nuestra, firmo el testamento que antecede; y que cada uno de nosotros lo firmo en presencia de los otros y de dicha testadora.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Manila, tres de Enero de mil novecientos cuatro. (Firmado) AMBROSIO REYES. (Firmado) MARIANO DE LEON. (Firmado) FELIX POLINTAN. It will be seen that the witness Feliciano Maglaqui, instead of writing the name of the testatrix on the will, wrote his own. Probate of the will was refused in the court below on the ground that the name of the testatrix was not signed thereto, and the petitioner has appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not the signing made by Maglaqui was valid. RULING:

Section 618 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, which prescribes the form of the execution of wills, provides in part as follows: No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other.

As will be seen, the law does not prescribe the specific form in which the name of the testator should be affixed at the foot of the will when written at his request by another person. The only thing required by law is that the will shall be bear the name of the testator. In construing this legal provision this court has held and established in case No. 1708, Ex parte Pedro Arcenas et al. (4 Phil. Rep., 700), that "where a testator does not know how, or is unable for any reason, to sign the will himself, it shall be signed in the following manner: 'John Doe, by the testator, Richard Roe;' or in this form: 'By the testator, John Doe, Richard Roe.' "
chanrobles virtual law library

The question presented has been decided adversely to the appellant in the following cases: Ex parte Pedro Arcenas et al., No. 1708, August 24, 1905 ; Ex parte Nemesio Delfin Santiago, No. 2002, August 18, 1905.
chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant, and after the expiration of twenty days judgment should be entered in accordance herewith and the case remanded to the court below for execution.

G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964 IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE. CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee, vs.NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants. FACTS: The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the filing of the petition consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page. The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that the original of the will and its duplicate were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each and every page thereof by the testatrix herself and attested and subscribed by the three mentioned witnesses in the testatrix's presence and in that of one another as witnesses (except for the missing signature of attorney Natividad on page three (3) of the original); that pages of the original and duplicate of said will were duly numbered; that the attestation clause thereof contains all the facts required by law to be recited therein and is signed by the aforesaid attesting witnesses; that the will is written in the language known to and spoken by the testatrix that the attestation clause is in a language also known to and spoken by the witnesses; that the will was executed on one single occasion in duplicate copies; and that both the original and the duplicate copies were duly acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Oyengco of Manila on the same date June 2, 1956. Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his presence. Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents-appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as attorneys-in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositorsappellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal. ISSUE: Whether the will is valid. RULING: YES. The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate

deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause. That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.

G.R. No. L-40804 January 31, 1978 ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS vs.COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On June 2, 1966, Adelaida Nista who claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a petition for the probate of the alleged will and testament dated March 9, 1963 and codicil dated April 18, 1963 of the late Eugenia Danila who died on May 21, 1966. The petitioner prayed that after due notice and proper hearing, the alleged will and codicil be probates and allowed and that she or any other person be appointed as administrator of the testatrix's estate. She also prayed that in case no opposition thereto be interposed and the value of the estate be less than P10,000.00, said estate be summarily settled in accordance with the Rules. Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) both surnamed Guerra filed an opposition on and an amended opposition, to the petition alleging among others that they are the legally adopted son and daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila; that the purported will and codicil subject of the petition were procured through fraud and undue influence; that the formalities required by law for the execution of a will and codicil have not been complied with as the same were not properly attested to or executed and not expressing the free will and deed of the purported testatrix; that the late Eugenia Danila had already executed on November 5, 1951 her last will and testament which was duly probated and not revoked or annulled during the lifetime of the testatrix, and that the petitioner is not competent and qualified to act as administration of the estate. ISSUE: Whether or not the will was valid. RULING: YES. There is no showing that the lawyers had been remiss in their sworn duty. Consequently, respondent court failed to consider the presumption of regularity in the execution of the questioned documents. There were no incidents brought to the attention of the trial court to arouse suspicion of anomaly. While the opposition alleged fraud and undue influence, no evidence was presented to prove their occurrence. There is no question that each and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly, the attestation claim far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting witnesses. Neither is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the presence of each other and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was all the time present during the execution. Unlike other deeds, ordinary wills by necessity of law must contain an attestation clause which, significantly, is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding that the conduct of execution. Once signed by the attesting witnesses, it that compliance with the indispensable legal formalities had been observed. The attestation clause basically contracts the pretense of undue ex execution which later on may be made by the attesting witnesses. In the attestation clause, the witnesses do not merely attest to the signature of the testatrix but also to the proper execution of the will, and their signature following that of the testatrix show that they have in fact at not only to the genuineness of the testatrix's signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the attention clause. By signing the wilt the witnesses impliedly to the truth of the facts which admit to probate, including the sufficiency of execution, the capacity of the testatrix, the absence of undue influence, and the like.

G.R. Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, petitioners-appellants,vs.COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died, leaving behind a parcel of land and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will. On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a petition for the probate of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador. Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death, for the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio the lot. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos. Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968, the complaint for annulment, being premised on the fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious. ISSUE: Whether the holographic will was invalid as it was not dated. RULING: NO. The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article 810. It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will, viz: And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his estate.

G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927 Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased. FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant, vs.CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees. FACTS: On or about the 27th day of July, 1918, Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament. In the month of January, 1922, the said Francisco Gago presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union for the probation of that will. The probation of the same was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac. After hearing all of the parties the petition for the probation of said will was denied by the Honorable C. M. Villareal on the 2nd day of November, 1923, upon the ground that the deceased had on the 16th day of April, 1919, executed a new will and testament. On the 21st day of February, 1925, the present action was commenced. Its purpose was to secure the probation of the said will of the 16th day of April, 1919. To said petition Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac presented their oppositions, alleging (a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac; (b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and (c) that the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac. ISSUE: Whether or not the will presented for probate was revoked. RULING: YES. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it. In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator.

G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,vs. AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor. FACTS: On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds: (1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will; (3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect; and (4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law. The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case. Their motion was granted by the court in an order dated April 4, 1977. On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will. They argued that: (1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and (2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills. ISSUE: Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. RULING: YES. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

G.R. No. L-26545 December 16, 1927 Testate Estate of Florencia R. Mateo. PERFECTO GABRIEL, petitioner-appellee,vs.RITA R. MATEO, ET AL., opponents-appellants. FACTS: The judgment appealed from allowed the will of Florencia Mateo dated February 6, 1923, composed of two used sheets to probate. The will appears to be signed by the testatrix and three witnesses on the left margin of each of the sheets, by the testatrix alone at the bottom, and by the three witnesses after the attestation clause. The testatrix died on August 13, 1925. Opposition to such probate was filed by Rita Mateo, the testatrix's sister, and by other relatives.The three attesting witnesses to this will, testifying in this case, declared that the signature of the testatrix were written in their presence and that they signed their names in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. The testatrix from girlhood knew how to sign her name and did so with her right hand; but as the right side of her body later became paralyzed, she learned to sign with her left hand and for many years thereafter, up to the time of her death, she used to sign with that hand. Opponents allege that Florencia Mateo did not sign this will.There are three salient arguments among those adduced by the opponents in support of their opposition.The attesting witnesses testified that the testratrix signed before they did. The signatures of the testatrix on the left margin of the two sheets of the will are between the signatures of the two witnesses Vidal Raoa and Julio Gabriel, and below her surname is the signature of the other witness Felicisimo Gabriel. The signatures of Vidal Raoa and Julio Gabriel are on a level with each other, while that of Felicisimo Gabriel is found a little lower down. The testatrix's signatures start on the line with Felicisimo Gabriel's signature, but tend to rise and her surname reaches a level with Julio Gabriel's signature. It is said that this direction of the testatrix's signature was due to the fact that when it was written Felicisimo Gabriel's signature was already there, and so she had to write her surname upwards in order to avoid interfering with that Felicisimo Gabriel, which would have been the case had she continued on the horizontal line on which she had written her first name. From this detail it is pretended to draw the inference that the attesting witnesses signed before testatrix, contrary to their testimony that she singed before they did. Attention is also called to the apparently different kinds of ink used by the testatrix in her signature and by the attesting witnesses. ISSUE: Whether the will was valid. RULING: YES. At all events, even admitting that there is a certain question as to whether the attesting witnesses signed before or after the testatrix, or whether or not they signed with the same pen and ink, these are details of such trivial importance, considering that this will was signed two years before the date on which these witnesses gave their testimony, that it is not proper to set aside the will for this reason alone. The attesting witnesses to this will, who testified also as witnesses at the trial of this case, showed themselves to be intelligent and honest, one of them being a lawyer of twelve year's practice, and there is no reason to reject their testimony, and to suppose that they were untruthful in testifying, and that they falsified the will in question. Lastly, attention is called to the unreasonableness of the testatrix in not leaving anything to the principal opponent, her sister Rita Mateo, and to her nephews and nieces, to whom she had been so

affectionate during life. But as to the affectionate relations between the deceased and the opponents, only the opponent Rita Mateo testified, and she only stated that she was on good terms with her sister during the latter's lifetime; that the said sister used to give her a sack or some gantas of rice, and, a times, a little money; that she held all her nephews and nieces in equal regard. But even supposing that this were so, there is nothing strange in the testatrix having left nothing to the opponents, or in her having left all of her estate to the only heir instituted in her will, Tomas Mateo, who is also one of her nieces. And not only is it not strange, but it seems reasonable, since, according to the evidence of the testatrix when the former was but 3 years old, and from then on up to the time of her death had never been separated from her.

G.R. No. 168660 June 30, 2009 HILARION, JR. and ENRICO ORENDAIN, represented by FE D. ORENDAIN, Petitioners,1vs.TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ, Respondent. FACTS: On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doa Margarita Rodriguez, died in Manila, leaving a last will and testament. On September 23, 1960, the will was admitted to probate. On August 27, 1962, the CFI Manila approved the project of partition presented by the executor of Doa Margarita Rodriguezs will. At the time of her death, the decedent left no compulsory or forced heirs and, consequently, was completely free to dispose of her properties, without regard to legitimes, as provided in her will. Some of Doa Margarita Rodriguezs testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the income from her properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will. The last will and testament of the decedent is the creation of a perpetual trust for the administration of her properties and the income accruing therefrom, for specified beneficiaries. The decedent, in Clause 10 of her will, listed a number of properties to be placed under perpetual administration of the trust. The decedent unequivocally forbade the alienation or mortgage of these properties. In all, the decedent did not contemplate the disposition of these properties, but only sought to bequeath the income derived therefrom to various sets of beneficiaries. Almost four decades later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedents will, moved to dissolve the trust on the decedents estate, which they argued had been in existence for more than twenty years, in violation of Articles 8678 and 870 of the Civil Codes. ISSUE: Whether the trusteeship should be dissolved. RULING: YES. Apparent from the decedents last will and testament is the creation of a trust on a specific set of properties and the income accruing therefrom. Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the decedent intended any of the trusts designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties. The decedents will did not institute any heir thereto. The testatrix specifically prohibited the alienation or mortgage of her properties which were definitely more than the two (2) properties in the aforecited case. The herein testatrixs large landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust because the ownership thereof would then effectively remain with her even in the afterlife. The trust on the testatrixs properties must be dissolved and the case was remanded to the lower court to determine the following: 1. The properties listed in Clause 10 of the will, constituting the perpetual trust, which are still within reach and have not been disposed of as yet; and 2. The intestate heirs of the decedent, with the nearest relative of the deceased entitled to inherit the remaining properties.

G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010 AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner,vs. FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents. FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate, leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters1 Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration,", respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property), which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner. Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of the estate. Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it "may be considered as an advance legitime" to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation. ISSUE: Whether the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation. RULING: NO. The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

G.R. No. L-10111 August 31, 1960 Trusteeship of the Estate of BENIGNO DIAZ Y HEREDIA, deceased.BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, trustee.SOLEDAD ROBLES, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,vs.ISABEL MANAHAN DE SANTIAGO and NESTOR M. SANTIAGO, oppositors-appellants. FACTS: In the will of Benigno Diaz y Heredia, in his will dated July 5, 1944, , a trust estate was created out of the properties not otherwise disposed of, which the Bank of the Philippine Islands was designated as Trustee. After the death of his wife, Da. Rafaela Mercado y Beleti on August 8, 1944, Diaz, then still living, caused the preparation of a codicil (to his will), dated September 29, 1944. The testator died on November 7, 1944, and his will and the codicil were accordingly probated. On November 1, 1949, the Bank of the Philippine Islands was appointed Trustee of the trust created by the testator in his will and codicil, for the purpose of paying the monthly and yearly legacies of the legatees named therein, to which office it duly qualified. Pursuant to the terms of the codicil, and 10 years having already elapsed from the testator's death on November 7, 1944, the Trustee, on January 13, 1955, petitioned the court, with the consent of all the legatees, for authority to sell all the properties and liquidate the estate. This petition was granted. Accordingly, the property located at Rosario, Binondo, Manila, was sold to legatee Isabel Manahan de Santiago on March 18, 1955. Immediately thereafter, or on March 21 of the same year, legatees Soledad Robles and her children Pilar, Jose, Vicente and Angeles, all surnamed Legarda (her husband Domingo and daughter Paz died in 1945) filed a motion praying that the trustee be ordered to deliver to them, in accordance with the provisions of the will, 90 per cent of the rentals collected from the property in Rosario during the period of liquidation of the estate, that is, from January 13 to March 18, 1955, which the Trustee refused to deliver, the latter contending that upon the authorization of the court on January 19, 1955, of the sale of the properties, the trusteeship ceased already and the rentals collected thereafter not only from the Rosario property but also from all the other properties of the estate, constitute the mass of the residuary estate to be distributed among the legatees in accordance with the terms of the codicil, i.e., only 30 per cent and not 90 per cent to the heirs of Domingo Legarda. ISSUE: Whether the legatees may be subject to the payment only of real estate tax, necessary expenses for conservation of the property, and for estate and inheritance taxes. RULING: The will, it must be remembered, imposed on the legatees merely the payment of the real estate tax and expenses for the preservation of the Rosario property, and no other. It is evident therefrom that the testator intended the expenses incidental to the execution of his will to be defrayed and deductible from the residuary estate, excluding the rents from the Rosario property. On this point, the Rules of Court provide: SEC. 2. Part of estate from which debts paid where provision made by will. If the testator makes provision by his will, or designates the estate to be appropriated for the payment of his debts, the expenses of administration, or the family expenses, they shall be paid according to the provisions of the will; but if the provision made by the will or the estate appropriated, is not sufficient for that purpose, such part of the estate of the testator, real or personal, as is not disposed of by the will, if any, shall be appropriated for that purpose. (Rule 89.)

There is nothing on record to show that the provisions made by the testator in the will are inadequate to cover the expenses of administration. On the contrary, it appears that as of the date of the filing of the appellees' demand, there were still properties of the estate yet unsold. In the absence of valid and cogent reasons, the provision of the will as to how the expenses would be satisfied must be respected. In the belief that the court's order of January 19, 1955, allowing the sale of the properties of the estate, had the effect of terminating the trust and putting an end to the legatees' right to the fruits of the Rosario property, appellants contend that appellees' claim over rentals terminated on said date, hence, appellees are not entitled to the rentals from January 20 to March 18, 1955, date when the Rosario property was actually sold. This is equally without merit. The trust has been created to carry out the dispositions made in the will, principally the payment of the legacies. The codicil provides that after the lapse of ten or fifteen years from the date of the testator's death (November 7, 1944), the properties may be sold upon agreement of all the legatees and the proceeds of the sale, after deducting certain amounts, are to be distributed in the manner indicated therein. The approval of the petition to sell did not automatically terminate the trusteeship, nor did it constitute full accomplishment of the trust. It was only after the actual sale of the properties on March 18, 1955, and the distribution of the proceeds directed by the testator that the trust could be considered as accomplished and terminated. Consequently, the appellees are entitled to their share of the rentals during the liquidation of the trusteeship from January 20 to March 18, 1955.

G.R. No. L-30455 September 30, 1982 MARIA LANDAYAN, et al., petitioners,vs.HON. ANGEL BACANI, et al., respondents. FACTS: In his lifetime, Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and a house and lot in Manila. The said properties were all covered by Torrens Titles in his name. He died intestate in Urdaneta, on March 20, 1948. On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, the surviving spouse of Teodoro Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public document, entitled "Extra-Judicial Agreement of Partition" whereby they adjudicated between themselves the properties left by Teodoro Abenojar. Severino Abenojar represented himself in said document as "the only forced heir and descendant" of the late Teodoro Abenojar. On March 6, 1968, petitioners herein filed a complaint seeking a judicial declaration that they are legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar, and that private respondents be ordered to surrender the ownership and possession of some of the properties that they acquired under the deed of extra-judicial settlement corresponding to the shares of the petitioners and that the said deed of extra- judicial settlement and the subsequent deed of donation executed in favor of private respondents, spouses Liberata Abenojar and Jose Serrano, in consequence thereof be declared nun and void. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the legitimate children of Guillerma Abenojar, then already deceased, who was the only child of Teodoro Abenojar with his first wife named Florencia Bautista; and that while Teodoro Abenojar contracted a second marriage with Antera Mandap and a third with private respondent Maxima Andrada, he did not have any offspring in any of the said second and third marriages. They aver that private respondent Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar. They accordingly pray that they be declared as among the legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar entitled to share in his estate. Private respondents, on the other hand, have alleged in their pleadings that Teodoro Abenojar married only once, and that was with private respondent Maxima Andrada. They claimed that private respondent Severino Abenojar is an acknowledged natural child of Teodoro Abenojar with Florencia Bautista. They disclaimed the allegation of the petitioners that their mother Guillerma Abenojar was a legitimate daughter of Teodoro Abenojar and Florencia Bautista, the truth being allegedly that Guillerma Abenojar, the mother of the Landayans, was Teodoro Abenojar's spurious child with Antera Mandap who was then married to another man. ISSUE: Whether Severino Abenojar may be considered as a "legal heir" of Teodoro Abenojar and as such entitled to participate in an extra-judicial partition of the estate of said deceased. RULING: The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar depends on the truth of his allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of Guillerma Abenojar, but an acknowledged natural child of Teodoro Abenojar. On this assumption, his right to inherit from Teodoro Abenojar is recognized by law (Art. 998, Civil Code). He even claims that he is the sole legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar inasmuch as the petitioners Landayans, who are admittedly the children of the deceased Guillerma Abenojar, have no legal successional rights from Teodoro Abenojar, their mother being a spurious child of Teodoro Abenojar. Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar, he is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar. The right of

representation is denied by law to an illegitimate child who is disqualified to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of Ms father. (Art. 992, Civil Code). On this supposition, the subject deed of extra- judicial partition is one that included a person who is not an heir of the descendant whose estate is being partitioned. Such a deed is governed by Article 1105 of the Civil Code, reading as follows: Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person. It could be gathered from the pleadings filed by the petitioners that they do not seek the nullification of the entire deed of extra-judicial partition but only insofar as the same deprived them of their shares in the inheritance from the estate of Teodoro Abenojar; Should it be proved, therefore, that Severino Abenojar is, indeed, not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar, the portion of the deed of extrajudicial partition adjudicating certain properties of Teodoro Abenojar in his favor shall be deemed inexistent and void from the beginning in accordance with Articles 1409, par. (7) and 1105 of the Civil Code. By the express provision of Article 1410 of the Civil Code, the action to seek a declaration of the nullity of the same does not prescribe.

A.M. No. 190 October 18, 1977 RE: CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO, FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO, MARIO B. CHANLIONGCO II, MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA and MARIO C. CHANLIONGCO, JR., claimants. FACTS: At the time of his death on July 12, 1976, Atty. Chanliongco was more than 63 years of age, with more than 38 years of service in the government. He did not have any pending criminal administrative or not case against him, neither did he have any money or property accountability. The highest salary he received was P18,700.00 per annum. Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an only son Mario it appears that there are other illegitimate children of the deceased with one Angelina R Crespo, and duly recognized by the deceased. Except Mario, Jr., who is only 17 years of age, all the claimants are of legal age. According to law, the benefits accruing to the deceased consist of: (1) retirement benefits; (2) money value of terminal leave; (3) life insurance and (4) refund of retirement premium. It appears that the GSIS had already the release the life insurance proceeds; and the refund of rent to the claimants. The record also shows that the late Atty. Chanliongco died ab intestato and that he filed his application for membership with the GSIS the beneficiary or benefits of his retirement benefits, should he die before retirement. Hence, the retirement benefits shall accrue to his estate and will be distributed among his Legal heirs in with the benefits on intestate succession. ISSUE: Who are entitled to the intestate estate? RULING: There may be instances, like the instant case, where in legal succession the estate is distributed according to the rules on legitime without applying the rules on intestate ion. The reason is that sometimes the estate is not even sufficient to satisfy the legitimes. The legitimes of the primary compulsory heirs, like a child or descendant, should first be atisfied. In this case the decedent's legal heirs are his legitimate child, his widow and two intimate children. His estate is partitioned among those heirs by giving them their respective time. The legitimate child gets one-half of the estate as his legitime which is regarded as his share as a legal heir Art 888, Civil Code). The widow's legitime is one-fourth of the estate. That represents also her share as a legal heir (Art. 892, 1st sentence, Civil Code). The remaining one-fourth of the estate, which is the free portion, goes to the illegitimate children in equal shares, as their legitime, Pursuant to the provision that 'the legitimate of the illegitimate children shall be taken from the portion of the estate at the free disposal of the testator, provoked that in no case shall the total legitime of such illegitimate children exceed that free portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse must first be fully satisfied par., art. 895, Civil Code). The rule in Santillon vs. Miranda, L-19281, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 563, that when the surviving spouse concurs with only one legitimate child, the spouse is entitled to one-half of the estate and the gets the other half, t to article 996 of the Civil Code, does not apply to the case because here intimate children concur with the surviving spouse and the intimate child. In this case, to divide the estate between the surviving spouse and the ligitemate child that deprive the illegitimate children of their legitime. So, the decendent's estate is distributed in the proportion of 1/2 for the legitimate child, 1/4 for the widow and 1/8 each for the two illegitimate children. Also not of possible application to this case is the rule that the legal of an acknowledge natural child is 1/2 of the

legitime of the legitimate child of that the of the spurious child is 2/5 of that of the of the intimate child or 4/5 of that of that of the acknowledged natural child. The rule cannot be applied because the estate is not sufficient to cover legitimes of all compulsory heirs. That is one of the flaws of the law of succession. A situation as in the instant case may arise where the illegitimate children get less than their legitime. With respect to the decendant's unpaid salary and the money value of his leave, the same are conjugal properties because of the rule that property "obtained by the or work, or as salary of the spouses, or either of them", is conjugal in character (Art. 153[2], Civil Code).

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006 MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents. FACTS: On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration. Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate.In his Comment/Opposition, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,9 petitioner and his coheirs alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities. ISSUE: Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their successional rights. RULING: NO. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right. In this case,the Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim." Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides: ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.

Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.

G.R. No. 126996 February 15, 2000 HEIRS OF CESARIO VELASQUEZ, namely: ANASTACIA VELASQUEZ, SOFIA VELASQUEZ, ELISEO VELASQUEZ, JOSE VELASQUEZ, CORAZON VELASQUEZ, LEONORA VELASQUEZ, and NIEVES VELASQUEZ, petitioners,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF ANATALIA DE GUZMAN, namely: SANTIAGO MENESES, ANDRES MENESES, FELICIDAD MENESES, and APOLONIO MENESES, respondents. FACTS: Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in 1945 and 1947, respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs) and Tranquilina de Guzman (grandmother of the defendants). During the existence of their marriage, spouses Aquino were able to acquire real properties. Sometime in 1989, the heirs of Anatalia de Guzman filed a complaint for annulment, partition and damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez (son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the latters' refusal to partition the conjugal properties of the Spouses Aquino. The complaint alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a talk with the plaintiffs' mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago Meneses and Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez in attendance; that in the conference Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario Velaquez that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez together with his mother allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half (1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to 1/2 of each of all the properties in question being the children of Anatalia de Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman. Plaintiffs further claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all the properties and despite plaintiffs' repeated demands for partition, defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the properties in question since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land in question from the time defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected. Defendants alleged that during the lifetime of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman, they had already disposed of their properties in favor of petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and petitioners Anastacia and Jose Velasquez. Defendants denied that a conference took place, nor did the latter promise to divide the properties equally with the plaintiffs or to execute a deed of partition; that they did not forcibly take possession of the subject properties since their possession thereof has been peaceful, open, continuous and adverse in character to the exclusion of all others. ISSUE: Whether or not partition is the proper action in this case. RULING: NO. In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the

party filing the action to state in his complaint the "nature and the extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. Petitioners were able to adduce the uncontroverted and ancient documentary evidence showing that during the lifetime of the Aquino spouses they had already disposed of four of the six parcels of land subject of the complaint starting in the year 1919, and the latest was in 1939. The action of partition cannot be maintained. The properties sought to be partitioned by private respondents have already been delivered to petitioners and therefore no longer part of the hereditary estate which could be partitioned. After finding that no co-ownership exist between private respondents and petitioners, there is no reason to discuss the other arguments raised by the petitioners in support of their petition.

G.R. No. 80821 February 21, 1991 GREGORIO FAVOR, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRUDENCIO FAVOR HEIRS: EUFEMIO FAVOR and AGUSTIN FAVOR, respondents. FACTS: The deceased father in this case was Regino Favor, who left three sons and several parcels of land in his name. Before the property could be divided among the three brothers, one of them died with neither wife nor children. Only the surviving brothers, Gregorio and Prudencio (or Florencio), are involved in this litigation. The dispute arose in 1972 when Gregorio filed a complaint against his older brother Prudencio for partition of the properties they had inherited from their father. Florencio's reaction was to move to dismiss the complaint for lack of a cause of action. He contended that the properties mentioned in the complaint had already been partitioned under a Compromise Agreement concluded between Gregorio and him on October 4, 1948, and acknowledged before a justice of the peace. At the trial, Gregorio testified that the greater portion of his father's properties were in the possession of Prudencio, who was occupying 16,794 square meters as against the 3,789 square meters left to him. He also assailed the Compromise Agreement, claiming that he had signed it under the mistaken impression that it was a mortgage receipt for P150.00 and not a partition. He alleged that he could not read or speak English and that he was defrauded into signing the document by the defendant. For his part, Prudencio narrated under oath that after the death of their father and later of their brother Hilario, he and Gregorio verbally partitioned their inheritance, but in 1948 Gregorio asked for a new partition. He refused. Gregorio then filed a complaint against him which was, however, withdrawn after they signed the Compromise Agreement. He insisted that the agreement was a valid and binding document that justified the dismissal of the new complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not there was partition in this case. RULING: YES. Although denominated a Compromise Agreement, the document in question is deemed a deed of partition under Article 1082 of the Civil Code, which categorically provides as follows: Every act which is intended to put an end to in division among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. As for its validity, the Compromise Agreement must be upheld, the challenge to it not having been substantiated. A public instrument enjoys the presumption of validity that has not been overcome by the petitioner in this case with the full, clear and convincing evidence we have consistently required in similar cases. The document appears to have been duly notarized, and by the then justice of the peace, and ex officio notary public, of the town where it was executed. Although it was written in English and precisely because of this we can suppose that its contents were sufficiently explained to the parties thereto, who both claimed to be illeterate That claim is believable in Prudencio, who declared he was a farmer and merely affixed his thumbmark to the document, but it is not as credible with respect to Gregorio, who actually signed the agreement. Gregorio was in fact a businessman and even ran for the position of barangay captain, for which the ability to read and write is prescribed as an indispensable qualification. It is worth noting that he also

signed his complaint of February 15, 1972, and its verification as well, but in the petition he filed with this Court after the respondent court had found that he was literate he merely affixed his thumbmark to the verification. If his purpose was to convince us that he really could not write, he has not succeeded. To prove defect or lack of consent, the evidence must also be strong and not merely preponderant. Gregorio's claim that he was tricked by his brother into signing the Compromise Agreement, which he believed was only a mortgage receipt, is not convincing enough for us. If any one was more likely to be deceived, it was not Gregorio but the farmer Prudencio, who was less experienced than his brother in business matters and court litigations. It was Gregorio and not Prudencio who filed the first complaint that led to the execution of the Compromise Agreement and also the second complaint which is the subject of the present petition. But while upholding the Compromise Agreement, we must also find that the complaint for partition should not have been entirely dismissed by the respondent court. The reason is that there are still certain properties of Regino Favor that have not been distributed between the brothers, as a close examination of the Compromise Agreement will reveal. Thus the case is remanded to the trial court for the partition of the two remaining lots.