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(February 2011)
Swedish iron ore was an important economic factor in the European Theatre of World War II. Both the Allies and the Third Reich were keen on the control of the mining district in northernmost Sweden, surrounding the mining towns of Gllivare and Kiruna. The importance of this issue increased after other sources were cut off from Germany by the British sea blockade during the Battle of the Atlantic. Both the planned Anglo-French support of Finland in the Winter War, and the following German occupation of Denmark and Norway (Operation Weserbung) were to a large extent motivated by the wish to deny their respective enemies iron critical for wartime production of steel. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty was particularly concerned about Swedish exports of iron ore to Germany, and pushed for the British government to take military action to end the trade. From the beginning of the war Churchill tried to persuade his cabinet colleagues to send a British fleet into the Baltic Sea to stop shipping reaching Germany from the two Swedish iron ore ports, Lule and Oxelsund. The project was called Project Catherine and was planned by Admiral of the Fleet William Boyle, 12th Earl of Cork. However, events overtook this project and it was canceled.[1] Later, when the Baltic ports froze over and the Germans began shipping the iron ore from the Norwegian port of Narvik, Churchill pushed for the Royal Navy to mine the west coast of Norway to prevent the Germans travelling inside neutral territorial waters to escape Allied Contraband Control measures.
Contents
1 Background 2 Iron ore routes o 2.1 The Eastern Route o 2.2 The Western Route ("Norwegian Corridor", Western Leads or Skjaergaard) 3 British attempts to disrupt German-Swedish trade 4 After the invasion of Norway 5 The Swedish position 6 Later Allied pressure on Sweden 7 See also 8 References
Background
Iron ore is extracted in Kiruna and Malmberget, and brought by rail to the harbours of Lule and Narvik. (Borders as of 19201940.) Upon the beginning of hostilities on 3 September 1939, Britain and France enacted a repeat of the blockade of Germany system used to great effect throughout the previous war. They were able to do this because they had vastly more powerful naval forces at their disposal than Germany, a country lacking in natural resources and heavily reliant on large scale imports of a wide range of goods. Perhaps the material Germany needed above all others was iron ore, a steady supply of which was imperative in the creation of steel to sustain her war effort and general economy. Prewar iron ore supplies to Germany tons Source (millions) 10 Germany 9 Sweden 3 Other 22 Total In the year before the war, Germany received 22 million tons of iron ore from various foreign sources. Although she was able to produce around 10m tons of her own iron ore each year, it was of low grade quality and needed to be mixed with high grade material from other countries such as Sweden, which annually supplied her with 9 million tons: 7 million from Kiruna and Gllivare in Lapland and 2 million from the central Swedish ore fields north-west of Stockholm. With the declaration of war and the start of the blockade, many of these foreign supplies were lost to Germany, and although she retained access to 3 million tons per annum from neutral Norway and Luxembourg, together with the 10 million tons from Lorraine in France[citation needed], the supplies from Morocco and Spain were lost to her, and so the remaining supplies from neutral Scandinavia became of crucial importance. Grand Admiral Raeder, head of the German navy, declared that it would be "utterly impossible to make war should the navy not be able to secure the supplies of iron-ore from Sweden". Britain, who itself imported large quantities of iron ore, was fully aware of the Swedish exports to Germany and through its system of Contraband Control was routinely stopping ships of all nations to ensure they were not delivering important supplies to the enemy. Germany considered the allied
blockade illegal, and to counter it embarked upon a system of unrestricted submarine warfare whereby enemy and neutral ships could be attacked without warning. As a result, during the first nine months of the war a large number of neutral ships were sunk with considerable loss of life. While the allies were keen to maintain the moral high ground and stressed at every opportunity the difference in impact between their approach compared to their enemys, they were mindful that many neutral mariners relied upon the Germany trade for their livelihoods, and so during the opening stages of the war they were careful not to be too strict with non-combatant vessels for fear the blockade would alienate neutral nations into joining the war on the side of Germany. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement (AGNA) of 1935, concluded between Britain and Germany, seriously challenged the independence of Sweden and its long-standing policy of peaceful neutrality. Despite provisions in the Treaty of Versailles, the AGNA allowed Germany to increase the size of its Kriegsmarine to one-third the size of the Royal Navy, which when completed in 1942 would have allowed Germany to dominate the Baltic.
The Germans made great use of the Norwegian Corridor to avoid the attention of the vigilant Royal Navy and RAF. In the winter of 19391940 a steady stream of their specially-constructed iron ore vessels made the long trip south from Narvik, sometimes within the three mile curtilage of neutral Norwegian territorial waters, sometimes just outside if the way appeared hazardous or the sea particularly turbulent. At the southernmost point the iron ore captains had to make a choice: 1. Follow the Skjaergaard around the coasts of Norway and Sweden, down through the Kattgat and finally into the north German N Baltic ports of Lubeck and Stettin. This route was safer because it brought them much closer to the protection of the German naval patrols and Luftwaffe air cover but involved hauling the very bulky and heavy iron ore the long way overland to the industrial centres on the overburdened German railway system 2. Leave the safety of the Skjaergaard and make a dash south across the Skagerrak, (the sea channel north of the Danish Jutland peninsula) and hurry down the west coast of Denmark to Hamburg and Bremen. This was the preferred route because it allowed the ore to be taken straight along the efficient inland waterways to the industrial heartlands of the Ruhr and the Rhineland where it could be processed. It was much more hazardous, putting the ships and their cargo at the mercy of allied submarines and patrolling destroyers of the Contraband Control. A number of German ships were sunk in this area.
out in February 1940 between the respective governments of Britain, Norway and Germany following the Altmark Incident. A German tanker, attempting to return home via the cover of the Norwegian Corridor carrying British prisoners of war was spotted by British aircraft and pursued by destroyers, eventually being forced onto rocks. On the evening of 21 March 1940 the British submarine HMS Ursula, (which had damaged the German cruiser Leipzig in Heligoland Bight the previous December) intercepted the German iron ore ship Hedderheim, en route from Narvik, and sank her eight miles off the coast of Denmark, although the crew were all saved. At the time it was seen as an early indication that Britain was at last taking steps to end the iron trade and over the next few days several other German ships were sunk at the entrance to the Baltic. Following reports that strong British destroyer and submarine forces were stationed in the Skagerrak, Berlin ordered all her ships along the iron ore route to port immediately. By now it was clear to all concerned that the Phoney War was about to end. Antagonised by the German mining of their own waters with deadly new magnetic mines and a general concern that Germany was managing to overcome the worst effects of the blockade, the Supreme War Council met in London on 28 March 1940 to discuss an intensification of the economic warfare strategy. Finally, on 3 April the War Cabinet gave authorisation for the mining of the Skjaergaard. On the morning of Monday 8 April 1940 the British informed the Norwegian authorities of its intentions, and despite Norwegian protests and demands for their immediate removal, carried out Operation Wilfred. However, by the time it took place German preparations for the German invasion of Norway were well under way and because of this only one minefield was actually laid, in the mouth of Vestfjord leading directly to Narvik.
war, in combination with the Swedish people's spirit to resist an invasion, and perhaps also some diplomatic skillfulness.[3] But according to contemporary German sources, Hitler considered Swedish neutrality as beneficial to Germany, as he did not want to use troops necessary for occupation and was afraid that Norwegian partisans and Allied special forces would cross into Sweden and attack mines and railroads. Another reason given was that the Swedish people were part of the Aryan race, but it seems likely that the Germans would have invaded Sweden from Norway if they had decided to withhold supplies of iron ore, and Sweden continued to make political and economic compromises with Germany in order to maintain its neutrality. Sweden also sought to maintain its traditional ties with the Western democracies. The Allied blockade of Europe and the German counter blockade of the Baltic prevented all but the bare minimum of commodities such as oil reaching Sweden from the West, but despite the Allies sympathy with Swedens position, there was a general belief among the American and British economic warfare agencies that Sweden went too far in accommodating the Nazi regime.[4] The Allies believed that without the Swedish iron ore, the German war effort would grind to a halt because not only was the ore being sent in large quantities but it was also of very high quality, making German steel manufacture extremely efficient. The US military was also appalled at Sweden for escorting German ships, allowing use of its own ships to transport the ore and for its failure to stop the transit of German soldiers and war materials across its territory. After America joined the blockade against the Axis forces and assisted in the Economic Warfare measures already being implemented by the British in early 1942, efforts were made to stop the Swedish iron ore trade and to reduce the practical help she was giving to Germany, although these attempts initially did nothing to reduce the German war effort.
position gradually persuaded Sweden to reduce and ultimately end its trade with Germany by November 1944.
See also
FrancoBritish plans for intervention in the Winter War Malmbanan Swedish overseas trade during World War II
References
Jump up ^ The Twilight War. Winston Churchill 1948 Jump up ^ The Rise & Fall of the Third Reich. William L. Shirer. 1959 Jump up ^ Boheman, Erik Carlsson (1964). P vakt: Kabinettssekreterare under andra vrldskriget (in Swedish). Norstedt. Retrieved 2012-10-10. 4. Jump up ^ State Dept. report on holocaust assets and the fate of the wartime Utasha Treasury. 1998 Categories:
1. 2. 3.
Sweden in World War II Baltic Sea operations of World War II Economic history of Sweden