Religion Compass 4 7 (2010): 436442, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2010.00214.

Zaydism: A Theological and Political Survey

Najam Haider*
Barnard College, Columbia University

Abstract

Zaydism, one of the three major branches of Sh ism, emerged in the early 2nd 8th century in the southern Iraqi city of Ku fa around the claims of the Alid rebel, Zayd b. Al  (d. 122 740). The sect initially consisted of a range of Sh   groups that shared a common political agenda but differed in their opinions of the rst two caliphs. The next three centuries witnessed the development of a cohesive Zayd  theology constructed primarily on the Mutazil  belief in a just and rational God. Specically, the Zayd s afrmed free will and a theory of the im amate that required armed uprising against tyrants under the leadership of a learned descendant of Al  and F atima. Zayd  Im ams established a number of long-standing political states, the most important of which was centered in northern Yemen around the city of Sada. Intellectually, Yemen  Zaydism was challenged by a gradual Sunnication that began in _ the 9th 15th century (as epitomized by Muhammad al-Shawk an  in the 19th century) and the intensication of Wahh ab  missionary activities_ in the 14th 20th century (epitomized by Muqbil al-Wadi ). These tensions persist into the _ activism reected in (a) the armed modern period and have given rise to a new wave of political resistance of the Youthful Believers led by the al-Hu th  family and (b) the emergence of a new generation of Zayd  scholars such as Muhammad _Yahy a S alim Izz an who do not trace their _ _ descent to Al  and F atima. _

Historical Background Sh ism rst crystallized in the late 1st 7th century around the belief that Muhammad _ appointed Al  b. Ab  T alib, his cousin and son-in-law, successor (either implicitly or _ explicitly) only to have this decision reversed with Abu  Bakrs proclamation as caliph in 11 632. In subsequent years, the Sh a placed their hopes in descendants of Al  (Alids) who were revered as the legitimate leaders of the Muslim community despite their lack of actual political power. In time, the vast majority of Sh a came to narrow the acceptable lineal requirement for the Im amate from all Alids to those descended from Al  through his rst wife, and daughter of the Prophet, F atima (subsequently: Sayyids). Disagreements over the identity of the Im am fractured the_ Sh   community into rivals groupings thatin timeacquired a theological dimension. The Zayd s materialized in the aftermath of the failed revolt of Zayd b. Al  b. alHusayn b. Al  b. Ab  T alib outside Ku fa in 122 740. According to the heresiographical _ literature, the rebellion_ brought together two currents of Ku fan Sh ism (the Batr s and the J aru d s) to create a new movement. While both of these constituent groups restricted legitimate religious and political authority to Sayyids, they subscribed to radically different interpretations of early Muslim history. Specically, they disagreed regarding the status of those Companions who had rejected Al s right to the succession. According to the heresiographical literature (largely reproduced in modern tracts on Zaydism), the Batr s believed that the Prophets designation of Al  consisted of subtle statements and implicit gestures that required careful research and investigation. As the
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issue was not self-evident, Companions who sided against Al although mistakenhad not committed an act of disbelief or apostasy. The Batr s further upheld the legitimacy of Abu  Bakr and Umar based on Al s apparent refusal to lead an armed uprising against their rule. In the legal arena, the Batr s accepted legal opinions and had ths (traditions) _ related by all the Companions, irrespective of their support of or opposition to Al , placing them at the core of a legal movement subsequently known as Ku fan traditionism. The J aru d s argued that the Prophet had chosen Al  as his successor on a number of public occasions including (most famously) the sermon at Ghad r Khumm during his nal pilgrimage. This evidence was so clear and unambiguous that a denial of Al s rights was tantamount to disbelief (kufr). Consequently, the J aru d s excommunicated a majority of the Companions, judging them unreliable as legal authorities or transmitters of religious knowledge. This view was representative of most early Ku fan Sh   groups including both the nascent Im am -Twelvers and the Kays an s. In time, the J aru d  position eclipsed that of the Batr s as the dominant view of a majority of Zayd s. Recent scholarship suggests that the origins of Zaydism are considerably more complicated than their portrayal in heresiographical works. The earliest layers of Zayd  literature are almost exclusively Batr ; J aru d  texts only emerge in the middle of the 2nd 8th and early 3rd 9th century. This raises the possibility that Zaydism was initially Batr  in orientation and only became J aru d  as a result of outside political pressures (e.g. a series of failed revolts) or internal theological developments (e.g. a slow move towards Im am Twelver attitudes of the Companions). If this is the case, the use of the terms Batr  and J aru d  by heresiographers may simply be an attempt at explaining a transformation within Zaydism. This issue, however, remains highly contentious. The rst Zayd  state was established in 250 864 in the mountainous regions of the southern Caspian and continued as an independent political entity through 559 1164. The broader Zayd  community in the area survived into the 10th 16th century when they were forcibly converted to Im am -Twelver Sh ism by the Safawids. Northern _ restricted) ruled Yemen was the main center of Zaydism where Im ams (both full and continuously from 279 893 to 1382 1962. A substantial Zayd  community continues to exist in the Yemeni highlands, particularly concentrated around the city of Sada. _ Theological Doctrines Zayd s were initially distinguished by a series of beliefs regarding the political leadership of the Muslim community. These included (a) an afrmation of Al s appointment as the successor to Muhammad, (b) the theoretical right of any Sayyid to the im amate, and _ b. Al (c) support for Zayd s revolt against the Umayyads in 122 740. Beginning in the late 3rd early 10th century, Zayd  scholars adopted a set of Mutazil  theological doctrines that precipitated a fundamental intellectual transformation within the sect. Although the time frame for this process remains controversial, there is a general scholarly consensus that the rst Zayd  gure unambiguously tied to Mutazilism was al-H ad  il a-l-Haqq Yahy a b. al-Husayn (d. 298 911), the eponymous founder of one of _ _ schools. _ This differs from the contemporary Zayd the sects primary legal  view which anachronistically depicts Zayd b. Al  as a disciple of the famous early Ba sran Mutazil  _ W a sil b. At a (d. 130 748). _ steps_ involved in the convergence of Mutazilism and Zaydism lie outside the The scope of an introductory essay. Those interested should refer to the bibliography, especially the works of Wilferd Madelung. It sufces to say that over time the
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historical political tenets of Zaydism detailed previously were integrated into a Mutazil  theological edice that could (a) be defended against outside attack and (b) be used as a platform for the criticism of opposing groups, primarily the Im am -Twelver Sh a. The remainder of this section details the core beliefs that came to characterize a mature Zaydism and continue to play a central role in the modern period.
 D TAW h

_ The Zayd s contend (in agreement with the Mutazila) that Gods primary attribute is oneness (tawh d) with all other attributes serving as derivative manifestations of that oneness. For _ Qur anic descriptions of God that include anthropomorphic and corporeal elements, the Zayd s forward allegorical interpretations and reject any potential similarities parallels between God and humans based on Q42:11 (There is nothing like him). Similarly to the Mutazila, the Zayd s afrm the createdness of the Qur an, arguing that an uncreated text would be co-eternal with God and constitute a violation of tawh d. _ ADL

The Zayd s adhere to the Mutazil  principle that God is just in a manner that humans can rationally comprehend. In other words, his actions accord with a human understanding of justice (adl ). This belief is in radical opposition to the Ashar  (and modern Sunn ) assertion that Gods actions are just by denition with any conuence between those actions and human notions of justice strictly coincidental. The Mutazil  Zayd  view of justice has a number of important theological consequences including the belief that God (a) is not the cause of evil actions and (b) always acts in the best interests of human beings (a notion known as lutf ). The Zayd s also afrm free will (albeit in a modied form), _ punished individuals for the very actions he had compelled them arguing that a God who to perform would be a tyrant (and therefore unjust). The Zayd  notion of judgment on the nal day follows directly from their position on divine justice. Specically, the Zayd s believe that God will fulll both his promise to reward upright believers and his threat to send sinners to the eternal hellre as specied in the Qur anic text. They also conrm the physical reality of heaven and hell, explicitly rejecting any attempts at allegorical interpretation. Intercession (shaf aa) from the Prophet, the Im ams, or any other revered gures (e.g., saints), is unconditionally rejected as a blatant violation of justice. Individuals, as free agents, are exclusively responsible for their actions and will enjoy the reward or suffer the penalty for their behavior in this world. A second consequence of divine justice is the necessity of prophethood. Drawing on the fact that God desires only the best for his creatures and acts in a manner that benets them (lutf ), the Zayd s afrm the necessity of guidance through messengers and revealed texts. It _ is possible for humans to ascertain right and wrong through rational thought but important acts of ritual law that embody divine wisdom are exclusively established through revelation brought by messengers sent from God. A similar logic leads to a proof for im amate albeit linked with a political (as opposed to a religious) purpose that rejects the need for an infallible and or divinely guided Im am.
aMATE IM

The Zayd  doctrine of the im amate is built on the view that legitimate authority is the exclusive right of Sayyids. This is in marked contrast to other Sh   groups (i.e., the
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Im am -Twelvers and Isma l s) who further restrict the Im amate to the descendants of alHusayn. As the Im am is expected to serve both as the religious and political head of the _ Muslim state, he must demonstrate the characteristics necessary for effective administration of each aspect of his ofce. In terms of religion, the Im am must be a jurist qualied to perform ijtih ad (rational interpretation of revealed texts) as well as a neutral arbiter and judge, vigorously enforcing Islamic legal rulings with a rm and just hand. Zayd  legal theory permits the perpetual reinterpretation of the divine texts by scholars for the creation of a exible legal code (shar a). The Im am serves as the nal judge between competing scholarly rulings and is empowered to implement his own legal decisions as the decisive law of the land. This allows each Im am the latitude to exercise an independent ijtih ad and thereby create his own set of legal interpretations. By contrast, the Im am -Twelvers and Isma l s characterize the Im am as possessing i sma (inerrancy) through which God grants him perfect _ knowledge of the law and protects him from making interpretive mistakes. In actuality, the interpretive freedom enjoyed by early Im ams (e.g. al-H ad ) was increasingly constricted so thatby the 11th 17th centurythe Zayd s were accused of the uncritical imitation (taql d) of past Im ams. The political qualities mentioned in the Zayd  literature include (amongst a litany of others) military prowess, courage, tactical intelligence, political acumen, scal responsibility, and a commitment to justice. In addition to Sayyid descent, religious knowledge, and political skill, a candidate for the im amate must lead a military uprising (khur uj) against an unjust ruler preceded by a period of missionary work (dawa). In fact, classical Zayd  political theory considered armed insurrection against a tyrant a fundamental religious duty logically resulting from a belief in divine justice. Specically, given (a) a God who wants the establishment of a justice, (b) a ruler who oppresses his subjects, and (c) free will, it is incumbent on every Muslim to overthrow the tyrant and establish a just political order. The Im am is the enlightened leader of this movement with a legitimacy predicated on consensus as evidenced by his ability to rally popular support. It should be noted that the technical aspects of this process (i.e. the establishment of an Im ams legitimacy through consensus) remain contentious amongst modern Zayd  scholars. The Im ams position as the nal arbiter of law has resulted in serious tensions both within and outside the Zayd  community. Specically, the Im ams mandate to rule with absolute authority on religious doctrine and establish a just order by commanding the good and enjoining the forbidden has led to the wholesale oppression of religious minorities in Zayd  territory (e.g. the Isma l  Sh a in southwest Yemen or the Sha  Sunn s in southern Yemen). The most egregious of these episodes targeted the Mutarrif  Zayd s _ who segregated themselves in secluded enclaves in northern Yemen before being systematically destroyed by Im am al-Muayyad Yahy a b. Hamza in the 8th 14th century. _ The belief in an activist Im am was also_ employed by Zayd s in polemics against the Im am -Twelvers with repeated references to politically passive Im ams sitting quietly at home in occultation. This was in reference to the Im am -Twelver belief that an Im am could function primarily as a learned religious authority and may (in the manner of the 12th Im am) disappear or go into hiding for fear of his life. Although the Isma l s were initially inclined toward the activist Zayd  view (as embodied in the establishment of the F atimid dynasty in North Africa and Egypt), they currently follow an Im am (the Aga _ Khan) who no longer pursues actual political power. The strident Zayd  requirements for the Im amate meant that many political leaders were not strictly qualied for the ofce. In most cases, these candidates exercised rule as
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restricted (muhtasib) Im ams, having achieved political power through military victory or _ from the previous ruler. Lacking the necessary religious credentials, they by inheriting it relied on Zayd  scholars for guidance in ritual practice and other legal matters. Evolution As discussed earlier, the Zayd s grant each Im am (and even particularly distinguished scholars) the right to practice independent ijtih ad in the determination of religious law. In practice, this has fostered the development of multiple legal schools named for their eponymous founders including (most prominently) the Hadaw s (followers of al-H ad ) in Yemen and the N a sir s (followers of al-N a sir al-Utru sh Hasan b. Al  [d. 304 917]) in the _ _ _ southern Caspian. _ As early as the 9th 15th century, Sunn  traditionism began to exert a strong inuence on Yemen Zaydism, especially in the arena of legal methodology. Ibn Waz r (d. 840 1436), one of the earliest representatives of this trend, criticized Zayd  had th col_ reliable lections as falsied and advocated the use of Sunn  works as fundamentally more and trustworthy. The 10th 16th and 11th 17th century saw an acceleration in Sunnication with revisionist scholars such as Bahr an al-S ad  (d. 957 1550), Muhammad b. alHasan b. al-Q asim (d. 1079 1668), and Maqbal _ (d. 1108 1696) utilizing_ Sunn  sources _ and acknowledging their superiority to foundational Zayd  works. As the inuence of Wahhabism grew in the 12th 18th and 13th 19th centuries, Zayd  scholars increasingly rejected both the theological doctrines and political activism at the core of traditional Zaydism. The process culminated in the career of al-Shawk an  (d. 1250 1834) who claimed complete interpretative freedom (mujtahid mutlaq) and devoted signicant efforts _ at systematically attacking the entire edice of Zayd  scholarship. The emergence of a dynasty (the Q asim s) in northern Yemen that lacked proper religious qualicationsbut refused to settle for the title of restricted Im amcreated a signicant opening for Sunnied scholars. Whereas traditional Zaydism allowed (and even endorsed) the rebellion of a qualied Sayyid candidate against the Q asim s, the Sunnied scholars supported the rulers unconditionally and (in line with Sunn  political theory) rejected any armed insurrection as overtly illegitimate. Given the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that al-Shawk an  wielded signicant authority during the im amates of Ahmad al-Mutawakkil (180916) and Abd All ah al-Mahd  (181635), spearheading an _ offensive against representatives of traditional Zaydism. This campaign led to the imprisonment and execution of a signicant number of Zayd  scholars, most notably Muham_ mad b. S alihal-Samaw  (d. 1825) who authored a powerful critique of Sunnication _ directly primarily at al-Shawk an  himself. The consequences of this conict between a Sunnied Zaydism resembling Sh aism and a traditional Zaydism rooted in the traditional theological tenets and political activism of the communitys early history continue to reverberate in contemporary Yemen. These are discussed in greater detail below. Zaydism Today Northern Yemen was ruled by a line of Zayd  Im ams until 1962 when the last effective ruler of the H am d al-D n family, Ahmad b. Yahy a, was replaced by a nationalist leader_ _ a military coup deposed the republiship backed _by the Egyptian government. In 1974, can government, precipitating a process that led to Al  Abd All ah S alihs seizure of _ _ power in 1979. He has remained the president for over thirty years through the 1990
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unication of northern and southern Yemen as well as the 1994 civil war. S alih won a _ _ new seven year turn in ofce in September 2006. Zaydism in Yemen today is in crisis along two mutually-reinforcing fault lines, the one religious and the other lineal. The rst fault line is a consequence of Sunnication (see previous section) with government policies favoring an educational curriculum (in both secular and religious schools) that strongly resembles Sh a  Sunnism. In recent years, S alihs government has _ _ who preach the systematically closed madrasas (religious schools) run by Zayd  scholars political activism characteristic of traditional Zaydism. They have also restricted the activities of cultural foundations and social organizations run by advocates of traditional Zaydism, resulting in a severe decline in their number and impact in major urban centers outside of the northern highlands. The second fault line centers on the conict between Sayyid and non-Sayyid Zayd s. As mentioned previously, Zaydism accords Sayyids considerably more authority in religious matters and an exclusive monopoly on political power (e.g. an Im am must be Sayyid). Over time, this has translated into a palpable sense of disempowerment amongst non-Sayyids who have felt the effects of systematic social discrimination. Beginning in the 1980s, Wahhab  scholars such as Muqbil b. H adi (d. 2001) exploited this rift with great effectiveness by directing their missionary efforts at non-Sayyid Zayd  communities in northern Yemen. This had the secondary effect of aggravating a long-standing historical struggle for inuence between Zayd  scholars (largely Sayyid) and tribal leaders (largely non-Sayyid), with the latter increasingly unwilling to submit to the authority of the former. A number of grassroots movements have emerged in north Yemen as a response to these challenges, particularly in the regions surrounding the classical Zayd  stronghold of Sada. _ One such group, the Believing Youth (al-shab ab al-mumin n) began in the mid 1990s as an avenue for young men to study the religious sciences in a traditional non-Sunnied form. By the early 2000s, the Believing Youth were in open revolt under the leadership of Husayn al-Hu th , a former representative in the Yemen  parliament and a junior mem_ the most prominent Zayd ber_ of one of  clerical families. The rebellion prompted a strong (but largely ineffective) military response from the Yemen  government. Al-Husayn al-Hu th s death in September 2004 did little to mitigate the uprising which is _ headed by _ his father, Badr al-D now n al-Hu th . There remains a real possibility that _ al-Hu th a scholar of some repute and a Sayyidmay declare himself Im am, but this _ unlikely given the current political landscape. seems Recent developments have also witnessed the growth of non-Sayyid Zayd  scholars who adhere to traditional Zaydism and defend its tenets against Wahhab  attacks. The most prominent representative of this tendency is Muhammad Yahy a S alim Izzan who _ scholars in_ Sada. He has edited studied under a number of the most prominent Zayd  _ numerous works authored by Zayd  Im ams and published detailed rebuttals of al-Shawk an  and other Sunnied scholars. Izzans importance lies not only in the quality of his scholarship but in his non-Sayyid background that serves as a bulwark against Wahhab  missionary efforts. An overwhelming majority of Zayd s live in the northern regions of Yemen with population estimates ranging from 810 million (2540% of the total population). Pockets of Zayd s may also still exist in Iran near the Caspian Sea, in parts of Saudi Arabia, and isolated regions in north Africa.

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Short Biography Najam Haider is an Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Barnard College of Columbia University. He obtained his doctorate from Princeton University in 2007 and also holds a dual BA in Physics Government from Dartmouth College and an Mphil in Islamic Historiography from Oxford. He has taught classes at a variety of institutions including New York University Georgetown University, and Franklin and Marshall College. His current research focuses on early Sh ism with a particular emphasis on the gradual demarcation of a Sh   identity in 2nd 8th century Ku fa. Past publications include a range of articles dealing with the impact of polemical or theological factors on Muslim historical writing. At the present, he is working on a book manuscript based on his doctoral dissertation tentatively entitled Becoming Sh a. Note
* Correspondence address: Najam Haider, Barnard College, Columbia University. Email: nhaider74@gmail.com.

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2010 The Author Journal Compilation 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Religion Compass 4 7 (2010): 436442, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2010.00214.x