John R. Fisher - Royalist Regime in The Viceroyalty of Peru, 1820-1824

The Royalist Regime in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1820-1824 Author(s): John R.
Fisher Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, Andean Issue (Feb., 2000), pp. 55-84 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/157780 . Accessed: 19/08/2013 20:49
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Latin American Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 129.15.14.53 on Mon, 19 Aug 2013 20:49:16 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
].
Lat. Amer. Stud. 32, j 5--84
Printed in the United Kingdom
2000
Cambridge University Press
55
The Royalist Regime in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1820-1824 *

JOHN R. FISHER
Abstract.
This article provides an analysis of royalist strategy in the viceroyalty
of Peru during the four years between the arrival of Jose de San Martin's invasion force in September
18 20
and the battle of Ayacucho of December

I
particular attention to royalist policy from July who declared independence there on
8 2 I,
18 24.
It pays
when viceroy JOSe de la
Serna evacuated Lima, the viceregal capital, leaving the city open to San Martin,
28
July. Its focus differs, therefore, from
that of most previous commentators on Peru's transition to independence, who have tended to neglect royalist policy and activity during these crucial final years in favour of a concentration upon the activities of San Martin, Antonio Jose de Sucre, Simon Bolivar and their Peruvian allies. The article begins with a brief contextual discussion of the historiography of Peruvian independence and subsequently analyses the main features of historical developments in the viceroyalty in the period
1810-20.
Following substantive discussion of the period
18 20-4,
it concludes with observations on the historical legacy in Peru of the
royalists' elevation of the city of Cusco to the status of viceregal capital in
18 2 2-4.
1 . The historiographical context If fortune favours the brave, as Terence had Pliny the Elder suggest in Phormio, historiography tends to concentrate upon the achievements of the victorious . This tendency is particularly marked when the outcome of a civil war, such as the conflict fought in Peru between patriots and royalists in 1 8 20-4, becomes inextricably associated in establishment ideology - and gradually in popular consciousness too - with the ar ticulation of national identity. In late colonial Peru, the related phenomena of insurgency and proto-nationalism, such as they were prior to the arrival of San Martin in 1 8 20, manifested themselves primarily in the ' Indian ' highlands - symbolically represented by the city of Cusco - rather than in aristocratic, creole Lima and its hinterland . Notwithstanding a certain tendency to exalt Peru's Inca past, the leaders of the coastal elite (and, in large measure, the creoles of the interior, too) had looked askance at the rebellion of Ttipac Amaru of 1 7 8 0-3 , and three decades later they actively supported the suppression of the Cusco rebellion of 1 8 1 4- 1 5. This was more for what they seemed to symbolise, feebly in the first case but very
J ohn F ish er is Professor of Latin A meri can History and Di rector o f the Institute of Latin A merican Studies at the Un iversity o f L iverpool.
*
Research for this article i n Spain ( 1 99 5 ) and Peru ( 1 99 8 ) was made poss ible b y grants from the British Academy.
56
John R. Fisher
clearly in the second - the possibility of an independent Peru controlled from the Indian interior - rather than for what they actually threatened to creole hegemony, for both movements were conservative in terms of their social and economic goals. Similarly, as Cecilia Mendez has recently demonstrated, the limeno aristocracy would fight, with pen and sword, in 1 8 3 6-9 against the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation, using blatantly racist rhetoric to undermine the legitimacy of its president, Andres de Santa Cruz, who was condemned as not only an invader from Bolivia but also as an upstart Indian. 1 Ever since 1 8 2 1 , the identity of republican Peru has been associated in formal manifestations of nationalist ideology - what Mendez describes as ' officialist historiography ' - with San Martin's declaration of indepen dence in Lima on 2 8 J uly 1 8 2 1 , and the perceived need to celebrate that event as the crucial moment in Peru's fiestas patrias. 2 By contrast, the anniversary of the battle of Ayacucho of 9 December 1 8 24, following which the numerically superior royalist army surrendered to Sucre, is regarded more as a tidying-up operation than as the decisive moment in the establishment of Peruvian independence from Spain. This tendency to see Peru's identity through the myopic eyes of the metropolitan elite, looking outwards to Europe and the United States rather than towards the country's interior, intensified, of course, rather than diminished from the mid-nineteenth century, as export-led economic growth provided the material legitimisation for a deep-rooted cultural antipathy towards the increasingly marginalised southern highlands and their inhabitants, the vast maj ority of whom were excluded by their illiteracy from formal participation in political life. 3 In the Hispanic world the celebration of significant historical anniversaries occasionally brings in its train a degree of historical revisionism. In Peru, the urge to mark the onset of the first centenary of independence from Spain made a small contribution to this process, with the publication of several studies of pre-revolutionary activity beyond
1
2 3
In fact, Santa C ruz was of mixed descent, the La Paz- b orn son of a m inor colonial official and a wealthy cacica. A lthough he serve d b riefly as pres id ent o f Peru in 1 8 27, fo llowing distinguished military service fo r the patriot cause under S ucre from 1 8 20, like Juan Velasco A lvarado 1 40 years later, he was never a b le to shake off the disdain displayed b y the Lima elite fo r a provincial officer whose racial origins were perceived to be dubious. See C ecilia Mendez G. , ' Incas Si, Indio s No: Notes on Peruvian C reole f Latin American Studies, vol. 2 8 Nationalis m and its C ontemporary C risis ' , Journal o ( 1 996) , pp. 1 9 7-2 2 5 . C onversely, some scholars have sough t t o exalt his Indian identity ; see, fo r example, A lfredo Crespo, Santa Cruz: el condor indio (Mexico, 1 944) . Mendez, ' Incas Si, Indios No ' , p. 202. Th e background to the marginalisation of the sierra from national life in the 1 9th century is discussed in Maria I sa b el Remy, ' La sociedad local al inicio de la repti b lica. C usco, 1 8 24- 1 8 5 0 ', Revista Andina, vol. 6 ( 1 9 8 8) , pp. 4 5 1 -84.
Royalist Regime in the Viceroyalty of Peru
57
Lima itself, mainly in Hufouco, Huamanga and Cusco.4 This process complemented the early twentieth-century attempts of several prominent writers of the Cusco school to revive the indigenismo promoted in the immediate post-independence period by cusquefio writers such as Narciso Arestegui, Pio Benigno Mesa and Clorinda Matto de Turner, and later at the national level by Manuel Gonzalez Prada. 5 Despite their activities and the parallel efforts in the 1 9 20s of J ose Carlos Mariategui to promote the discussion of national as opposed to purely metropolitan reality, the oligarchic control of political life - and, hence, an oligarchic view of Peru's historical development - remained largely intact throughout the second quarter of the twentieth century, even if occasional compromises had to be made by co-opting potential dissidents into establishment structures. The collapse of oligarchic politics in Peru in the third quarter of the twentieth century brought with it a consequential shift in historiographical focus away from the traditional preoccupation with the metropolis and its elite groups towards a much clearer awareness of the need to examine the history of the country's interior in general and that of the Indian and the rural population in particular. To some extent this trend was imposed from above during the most radical period ( 1 96 8-7 5 ) of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, when the Comision Nacional del Sesquicentenario de la Independencia sought to promote a reinterpretation of the late colonial history of Peru that harmonised with the military's new insistence upon social justice, racial harmony and nationalism in reconstructing Peru in the wake of the October 1 96 8 revolution. 6 The scholarly shift also reflected the emergence of a new generation of Peruvian historians, many of whom had undertaken their doctoral research outside Peru before returning to publish penetrating analyses of Peru's past that were often thinly-disguised critiques of the country's old historical and political establishments. 7 To a small extent this process involved, perhaps almost unconsciously, a reconsideration of the preeminence or otherwise of 1 8 2 1 in securing national independence: for example, one volume of the vast Coleccion documental published by the Comision Nacional del Sesquicentenario reproduced documents relating to the functioning of viceregal government in Cusco during the 1 8 2 2-4
4 5 6
S ee, fo r example, Luis A. Eguiguren, Guerra separatista def Peru. La rebefion de Leon de Huanuco (Lima, 1 9 1 2) and La revolucion de 1 8 1 4 (Lima, 1 9 1 4) . Th is theme i s discussed i n J ose Tamayo H errera, Historia def indigenismo cuzqueiio, siglos XVI-XX (Lima, 1 9 80).
'
J ohn R . Fisher, ' Royalism, Regionalism and Rebellion in C olonial Peru, 1 8 0 8 - 1 8 1 5 , Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 5 9 ( 1 979), pp. 2 3 2-7. 7 A classic example is provide d b y the iconoclastic work o f H eraclio Bonilla et al. , La independencia en el Peru (Lima, 1 972) .
58
john R. Fisher
period.8 However, chronologically the commission's principal thrust was in the opposite direction, with the exaltation of Ttipac Amaru as both the first of South America's precursors of independence - thereby enabling Peru to trump the reputations of Bolfvar and San Martin - and as a prophet of the agrarian reform and nationalisation programmes of Velasco . 9 Curiously, this trend (which revealed little about the historical reality of the late colonial period but much about the superficiality of pseudo-historical scholarship in Peru in the 1 9 70s) survived the 1 9 7 5 shift to the right i n military politics, partly because of the vigour with which a further official body, the Comision Nacional de! Bicentenario de la Rebelion Emancipadora de Ttipac Amaru, organised the bicentennial celebrations of the 1 7 8 0 uprising. 10 During the 1 9 8 os, the return to the presidency of Fernando Belatinde Terry and, subsequently, the election of Peru's first Aprista president, Alan Garcia, brought in their train, at least at the rhetorical level, renewed interest in the need to devolve political power from Lima towards the highlands, and specifically in the possibility of creating a federal republic with Cusco as its capital. 1 1 The more sober political environment created i n Peru i n the 1 990s by Alberto Fujimori has restored a degree of reality to debates about the potential for the restructuring of the country's political organisation. Visitors to Peru now encounter apparently contradictory symbols . Real power is entrenched ever more firmly in Lima, but the (imagined) flag of Tawantisuyu flies freely in Cusco. 1 2 Popular participation at least at the superficial levels of political activity, is here to stay. In this context, the modern media (notably television) are capable of proj ecting a distorted image of Peru's present and past, and, in the annual build-up to the celebration of the fiestas patrias, specifically of how (and when) the country secured independence from Spain . 1 3 With these observations in mind, the following section will discuss political and military events in Peru during the decade prior to the disembarkation of San Martin's army in 1 8 20, before moving to a more detailed analysis of royalist strategy in the subsequent four years .
8 9
10 12 13
Coleccion documental de la independencia def Peru, 8 7 vols. in 3 0 tomos (Lima, 1 9 7 1 -74) ; tomo 2 2 , vol. 3 , ' Go bierno virreynal de! C uzco ' H oracio Villanueva Urteaga (e d . ) . This theme is developed in J ohn F ish er, ' Imperi al ism, C entralism and Regionalism i n Peru, 1 776- 1 8 4 5 ' , i n Region and Class i n Modern Peruvian History, Rory Miller (ed.) (Liverpool, 1 9 8 7), pp. 2 1- 3 4 . An example of its work is Actas def Coloquio Internacional' Ttipac Amaru y su tiempo ' I I Fisher, ' Imperialism ' , p. 2 3 . (Lima, 1 9 8 2) . The traditional ( Spanish) name of the city - C uzco - is now rarely seen; in some circles t he new-style C usco has already given way to Qosqo. Visiting Ayacucho on 3 1 July 1 99 8 I h eard a speech in the main square, nominally a bout events in 1 8 2 1 , from the city's military commander which elevated o bv ious pride in Peru ' s national identity into a threat of war agai nst Ecuador.
Royalis t Regime in the Viceroyalty of Peru
59
2 . The historical context: Peru
1810-20
The viceroyalty of Peru was, of course, the only major administrative unit in Spanish America that did not experience a sustained attempt by disaffected creoles in 1810-1 1 to seize political power, following the French takeover of peninsular Spain in 1 8 0 8 -10. 14 One of the fruits of revisionism since the 1970s, however, is that it is also now widely acknowledged that behind the facade of Peruvian royalism in the post1 8 0 8 period - when viceroy J ose Fernandez de Abascal (18 06-16) was able to despatch royalist armies, led by creole officers, to repress insurrections in Upper Peru, Chile and Ecuador - there was considerable local unrest, merging into attempted armed rebellion in the south of the viceroyalty (Tacna in 1811 and 181 3 ; Arequipa in 181 3 ) and the centre (Huamanga and Huanuco in 1812). Crucially, however, proto-nationalist activity in Lima never got beyond the stage of half-hearted conspiracies primarily because the conservative elite was intensely afraid of upsetting social and racial stability. As future president J ose de la Riva Aguero observed in 182 1 : 'Es sabido que los que van a ganar en toda revolucion son las gentes perdidas, y no las acomodadas '.15 In Cusco, the viceroyalty's second city, and the seat (since 1788) of its second audiencia, a much more uneasy peace prevailed until August 1 814, when a major insurrection was provoked by the failure of the viceregal authorities to implement fully the provisions of the Constitution of Cadiz of 18 1 2 (ironically, the restored Ferdinand VII had decreed its abolition in May, but news did not reach Peru until September).16 The movement's creole leaders - small landowners, lawyers, clergy and municipal officials - immediately made clear their demand for Peruvian independence, as they despatched hastily-recruited expeditions, manned largely by in digenous recruits, throughout southern Peru. By the end of 1814 they controlled the cities of Puno, La Paz, Huamanga (modern Ayacucho) and Arequipa, before falling back to Cusco, following the arrival of a royalist force of 1, 200 cusqueiio officers and men hitherto fighting insurgency in Upper Peru. By March 181 5 this force, led by General J uan Ramirez, deputy-commander of the army in Upper Peru, had retaken Cusco, where the leaders of the rebellion were promptly executed. They included the cacique of Chincheros, Mateo Garcia Pumacahua, whose participation
14
15 16
A restatement of the reasons for the po litical conservatism of Peruvian creo l es is embraced in Brian R. Hamnett, 'Process and Pattern: a Re-examination o f the f Latin American I bero-American Independence Movements, 1 8 0 8-18 2 6 , Journal o Studies, vol. 29 ( 1 997) , pp. 2 79- 3 2 8 . Quoted in Fisher, ' R oyalism , p. 244. ystem 1784-1814 J. R. Fisher, Government and Society in Colonial Peru: the Intendant S (London, 1970 ), p. 2 3 3 .
' '
60
John R. Fisher
legitimised the interpretation of the movement as a racial upnsmg of Indians against whites, as well as a bid to make Cusco the capital of an independent Peru . Similarities between the Ttipac Amaru rising (initially an attempt at a broad-based revolution, drawing some support from poor creoles and mestizos in southern Peru) and the r 814-1 5 rebellion (started by non Indians but rapidly taking on the character of a caste war against all whites) are obvious . The connecting thread, revealed most recently by David Cahill, is that the three decades separating the two movements had seen a sustained assault on traditional indigenous rights in the region, the most common features of which were the entry of creoles and mestizos into the cacicazgos, and the usurpation of community lands and other resources.1 7 The audiencia of Cusco grappled with these issues throughout the r 79 o s, but, in the face of political opposition (locally and in Lima) reconciled itself gradually to the inevitable abuses inherent in allowing outsiders access to community resources. In the event the tribunal capitulated to the subdelegates, the local political authorities who replaced the corregidores in r 7 8 4, under whose aegis entry of the ' new ' caciques had been permitted. The audiencia's failure to control the exploitation of communities stemmed largely from its awareness that the new community officials were more efficient than their indigenous predecessors in collecting tribute revenues. It also helps explain why the weakening of crown authority in southern Peru in r 8 r 4 provided an opportunity for not only the expression of creole political protest but also for the revival of widespread indigenous insurgency.18 The suppression of the rising by Ramirez in r 8 r 5 meant that the process of inserting outsiders as caciques continued unabated throughout - and beyond - the final transition to independence, with communities that resisted running the risk of being accused of sedition by the subdelegates.1 9 Although experience of the unpredictability of socio-racial alliances made the creoles of Cusco wary of the region's indigenous population, elements of both the white middle class and the elite were attracted from
17 18
19
David P. Cahill, ' Repartos ilicitos y familias principales en el sur an dino, 1 7 8 0- 1 8 2 4 ' , Revis ta de Indias, vol. 48 ( 1 9 8 8), pp. 449-7 3. David P. Cahill and Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy, ' Forging their own History : Indian f Latin American Insurgency in t h e southern Peruv ian Si erra, 1 8 1 4- 1 8 1 7 ' , Bulletin o Research, vol. 1 1 ( 1 99 2 ) , pp. 1 2 5 -6 7 . In 1 8 2 2 , fo r example, the subdelegate of A bancay accused the a/ca/de of the pue b lo of Huanipa (Francisco Xavier Negron) of insurrection b ecause of his resistance to the appointment as cacique of the subdelegate's nominee (Mariano Alzamorra); Negron attrib uted the appointment to the payment of a b ribe whereas the subdelegate accused Negron of having encouraged the i nha bitants not to pay their contribucion: Archivo D epartamental del C usco (hereafter cited as ADC ) , lntendencia, Go bi erno, leg. 1 5 7.
Royalist Regime in the Viceroya!ty of Peru
61
time to time to the idea of identifying an Inca to lead a separatist movement. This sentiment surfaced not only in 1 7 8 0 and l 8 1 4 but also in the 1 80 5 Aguilar-Ubalde conspiracy, when creole plotters tried to persuade the Cusco regidor Manuel Valverde Ampuero, who claimed descent from Huayna Capac, to recruit support from the noble Indian electors of the alferazgo real - they represented the pre-Conquest panacas, or lineage groups into which the nobility of Inca Cusco had been organised - for the proclamation of Gabriel Aguilar, a miner from Huanuco, as Inca. 20 At first sight it is difficult to reconcile such sentiments with the increasing tendency of local landowners, merchants, and officials to exploit community resources, but it is worth remembering that some prominent creole families could claim kinship links with the indigenous nobility. Moreover, indigenista - or incanista - rhetoric would continue into the republican period, its principal exponent being Cusco's first prefect after independence, Agustin Gamarra, at least until he realised in the l 8 30s that he had more to gain by identifying with metropolitan interests rather than with the regionally-based Peruvian-Bolivian Con federation. 21 The savage reprisals undertaken in the aftermath of the l 8 l 4 rebellion in and around Cusco by the royalist forces - many of them local creoles who saw an enhanced opportunity to seize Indian community lands ensured relative political tranquillity in southern Peru for the remainder of the second decade of the nineteenth century. Within the old viceroyalty as a whole (i.e. excluding Upper Peru), what insurrectionary activity there was from mid- l 8 l 5 until the end of l 8 l 9 manifested itself primarily in guerrilla activity in the Mantaro Valley ; it remains to be determined definitively whether this represented banditry, social protest, patriotism, or a combination of all three. 22 However, recent scholarship suggests that support for the montoneras came mainly from rootless groups particularly susceptible to economic fluctuations - ' arrieros, vagabundos y jornaleros de las minas ', to quote one source - rather than community Indians with greater resources upon which to fall back in times of recession. 23 In Lima
20 21
22
23
J R Fisher, ' Regionalism and Rebellion in Late C olon ial Peru : The Aguilar-Ub alde C onsp i racy o f 1 8 0 5 , Bibliotecha Americana, vol. 1 ( 1 9 8 2), pp. 44- 5 9 . Recent treatments of incanismo i nclude Manuel Burga, Nacimiento de una utopia: muerte y resurreccion de los Incas (Lima, 1 9 8 8) an d Al berto Flores Galindo, Buscando un Inca: identidad y utopia en los Andes (Lima, 1 9 8 7) . Peter Guardino, ' Las guerri llas y la i n d epen d enc i a peruana : un ensa yo de interpretacion , Pasadoy Presente, vol. 2 ( 1 9 8 9) , pp. 1 0 1 - 1 7 . See, too, Raul Rivera Serna, Los guerrilleros de/ centro en la emancipacion peruana (L i ma, 1 9 5 8 ) , Gustavo Vergara Arias, Montonerasy guerrillas en la etapa de la emancipacion de/ Perti (1820-I325) (L i ma, 1 9 74), and Ezequ iel Beltran Gallardo, Las guerrillas de Yaos en la emancipacion de/ Perti, 1S20-I324 (Lima, 1 9 77). Al b erto Flores Galindo, quoted in Remy, ' La sociedad , p. 4 8 2 .
' ' '
62
John R. Fisher
itself economic and fiscal difficulties rather than overt revolutionary activity were the principal concerns, at least until 1 8 20, of the new viceroy, Joaquin de La Pezuela who succeeded Abascal in mid-18 16, following service from 1 8 1 3 as commander-in-chief of the royalist army in Upper Peru. Pezuela's crowning moment in this role had occurred in November 1 8 1 5 , with his decisive victory at Viluma over Jose Rondeau, following earlier successes at Vilcapugio and Ayohuma against the expeditionary force brought from Buenos Aires by Manuel Belgrano.24 Thereafter, the new viceroy' s preoccupation with maintaining a strong military presence in Upper Peru - where overall command of the royalist army was transferred in 1 8 1 6 to the newly-arrived La Serna, a veteran of the peninsular war - is usually cited as a decisive factor in his failure to commit adequate forces to the defence of Chile against San Martin's 1817 trans-Andean expedition. 25 A point of relative detail, which would become a maj or bone of contention in due course between the respective apologists of Pezuela and La Serna, was that, following his landing at Arica in September 1 8 16, the latter travelled directly to Upper Peru, rather than going first to Lima to confer with the viceroy, thereby allegedly undermining the authority of his superior.26 In the event, Upper Peru remained relatively secure in royalist hands until well after San Martin' s landing. Similarly, the kingdom of Quito was mostly tranquil, following the eventual Peruvian repression by 1812 of its early efforts to rej ect Spanish rule, and would remain so until invaded by Colombian forces in 1 8 2 2.27 As Field Marshal Jeronimo Valdes wrote in 1 8 2 7, following his return to Spain after Ayacucho, when Pezuela became viceroy in 1 8 1 6 ' la situacion de aquel Reino era la mas lisonjera ... el nuevo mundo era todo espaiiol, a excepcion de parte de! Virreinato de Buenos Aires ' .28 Although continuous warfare in Upper Peru from 1809 had imposed a heavy drain on the human and material resources of the southern Peruvian provinces of Arequipa, Cusco and Puno - from which the aptly-named royalist ' army of Peru ' was largely recruited - the full costs of the determination of most Peruvians to fight for the royalist cause did not
24
A detailed account of the viceroy's military career is provided by Joaquin de la Pezuela,
Memoria militar def general Pezuela (1813-181J) (Li ma, 1955) Felix D enegri Luna (e d.). See, too, Joaquin d e la Pezuela, Memoria de gobierno ( S evilla, 1947) Vicente Rod riguez
25 26 27
28
Casado an d Guillermo Lohmann Villena (eds.). John Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions 1808-1826 (Lon don, 1973), pp. 125-6. Jeronimo Valdes, Documentos para la historia de la guerra separatista def Perri, 4 vols., (Madrid, 1894-98) Fernando Valdes y H ector [C onde de Torata) (ed.), vol. 1, p. 2 1. Guayaqu i l - o ffi cially part of Peru s i nce 1803 - revolted in October 1 8 20, however, providing Bolivar with an early opportunity to despatch Colombian troops (under Sucre) to help its defence against royalist counter-attack . Valdes, Documentos, vol. 1, p . 20.
63
become evident to fimeiios until 18 18, with the loss of Chile. The patriot victory at Maipti in April over the royalist army commanded by Mariano Osorio - Pezuela's son-in-law - caused heavy casualties among the 3,000strong expeditionary force - half of them Peruvians, and the remainder peninsufares recently-arrived from Panama - despatched to Chile from Peru at the end of 1817.29 The southern port of Valdivia would remain in royalist hands until its capture by Thomas Cochrane in January 18 20 (and the island of Chiloe until January 18 26), but Peruvian dreams of mounting yet another reconquest of Chile were rapidly dissipated after Maipti. A decisive blow was the capture in October 18 1 8 in Talcahuano - the naval base near Concepcion abandoned by Osorio - by the fledgling Chilean navy of the Callao-bound naval frigate Maria Isabel and several transports carrying troops and arms from Cadiz.30 This single incident not only deprived Peru of 2 ,000 reinforcements but also provided the Chileans with the flagship (renamed the O'Higgins) of the seven warships that escorted the 4, 5 oo troops of the liberating expedition from Valparaiso to Peru in August 18 20.31 The following section of the article begins with a consideration of the royalist reaction to the landing of this force south of Lima on 8-10 September 18 20. 3. Rqyafist reaclions : Peru
IS20-4
Despite the fact that official statistics of troop strengths in late-colonial Peru, as elsewhere in Spanish America in this period, are notoriously unreliable, particularly with respect to the real numbers of men in militia regiments able and willing to go on active service, on the face of it Pezuela had substantial forces at his disposal in 18 20 for the defence of the viceroyalty against both internal insurgency and external attack.32 The largest elements in his total forces of 2 3 ,ooo were the ' army of Upper Peru ' (10,000 ) , commanded by Ramirez - who had returned to Upper
29
30 31
32
Exhaustive coverage o f Peruvian participation i n m ili tary activity throughout the vi ceroyal ty an d i n Chil e, Quito and Upper Peru du ring the independ ence peri o d as a who l e i s provide d b y El ejircito en la independencia de/ Peru, tomo 4, 3 vo l s . (Lima, 1 9 84). For a more succinct coverage, see J u li o Al b i, Banderas olvidadas: el ejircito realista en America (Madrid, 1 990 ). A so lid account o f the period is Ruben Vargas Ugarte, Historia de/ Peru: emancipacitin (!309-1821) (Buenos Aires, 1 9 5 8 ) . The fa il ure to maintain a m ili tary presence a t Tal cahuano after Maipu became another o f the maj or comp laints against Pezue l a: Valdes, Documentos, vo l . 2, p . 43. For details of the ships in the Chil ean s quadron, see Vargas Ugarte, Historia, pp. 1 5 6-7. An overview of the ro l es o f regu lar and m iliti a troops in the roya li st armies is provided b y J uan Marchena Fernandez, Ejircito y mi/icias en el mundo colonial americano (Ma drid , 1 99 2 ) . S ee, too, J uan Marc h ena Fernandez, ' T h e Social World of the M ili tary i n Peru an d New Granada : the C o l onia l Oli garchies in C onflict, 17 5 0- 1 8 1 0 ' , in Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru (Baton R ouge, 1 990), e ds . J ohn R. Fisher, Allan J. Kuethe, and Anthony McFar lane, pp. 60-6 1 , 69 .
64
John R. Fisher
Peru in succession to La Serna, following an interim period as president of Quito - and the 6,ooo-strong ' army of Lima ' , under the direct command of the viceroy. 33 The garrison of Callao ( 1 ,ooo) and other detachments north and south of Lima increased immediately-available royalist strength to almost 9,000.34 Within hours of receiving confirmation that San Martin had begun to disembark his troops at Paracas, Pezuela withdrew the small force he had posted at Pisco, ordered Ramirez to move his headquarters from Tupiza to La Paz (i. e. nearer to Lower Peru) , and repeated his instructions to hacendados south of Lima to move slaves, cattle and horses to the interior. 35 The viceroy's general strategy of concentrating his forces in and around Lima reflected his apprehension about the vulnerability of Callao to attack by the superior naval squadron of the Chileans, whose control of the sea grew even more marked with the capture of the royalist flagship, the Esmeralda, by Cochrane on 5 November.36 The following month the semi-phoney war was further punctuated by the occupation of Peru's principal mining town, Cerro de Pasco, by a column despatched by San Martin to the interior of central Peru under the command of the Spanish born Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales. Although Arenales (as he is commonly called) soon returned to the coast - leaving the montoneras and the citizens of Tarma and Huanuco who had declared for independence at the mercy of the royalist reinforcements under V aides and Brigadier Mariano Ricafort - he did lasting damage to the viceregal economy by seizing large stocks of silver and sabotaging recently-installed steam engines that had brought production at Cerro de Pasco to a record level in 1 8 20 . 37 He also took with him future president Santa Cruz, commander
33
34
35
36
37
' Estado general de la tropa d e artilleria, in fanteria y ca b alleria que existe en los ejercitos de Lima y Alto Perti, asi como en las provincias dependientes de am b os virreynatos ... ' , Bi b lioteca de M enen d ez Pelayo, Santander, Papeles de Pezuela (hereafter cited as BMP, Pezuela) , ms. 5 , cua d. 1 o. In Fe b ruary 1 8 2 1 , fo llowing desertions to San Martin (the most conspicuous of which was that of the 6 5 0-strong Numancia b attalion) , a British naval officer put royalist strength at 7,000, including 2 , 5 00 Europeans : M argaret L. Woodward, ' The Spanish Army and the Loss o f America, ' Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 48 ( 1 96 8 ) , p. 5 9 2 . Of the 3 3 ,000 troops despatched from Spain to America in 1 8 1 0- 1 8 , 6,ooo had reached Peru, the majority in 1 8 1 5 - 1 8 : Edmundo A. H eredia, Planes espaiioles para reconquistar Hispanoamirica (18!0-18!8) (Buenos Aires, 1 9 74), pp. 3 8 2-7. Pezuela to minister of war, 1 1 Sept. 1 8 20, B M P, Pezuela, ms. 1 0 , cuad. 5 . On the same date, coincidentally, plans - in the event fr uitless - were discussed in M adrid to send additional warships to C allao an d C artagena, ' amenazados de nueva invasion por las fu erzas re b eldes auxiliadas por los extranjeros ... ' : J ose C anga Arguelles to overseas minister, 5 Nov. 1 8 20, Archivo General de Indias, Seville (cited hereafter as AGI), Indif. Gen . , leg. 1 5 6 8 . J . R. Fisher, Silver Mines and Silver Miners in Colonial Peru, 1776-1824 (Liverpool, 1 977), p . 1 1 1 . S an M artin protested to Pezuela on 6 J anuary 1 8 2 1 that, on entering Tarma, Ricafort h ad executed the wounded left there b y Arenales ; in his response - of 1 1
Rqyalist Regime in the Vicerqyalty of Peru
65
of the royalist cavalry at Cerro de Pasco, who had defected to the insurgents after being taken prisoner on 6 December. While San Martin's strategy of waiting for the royalist regime to disintegrate rather than risking his troops in open battle seemed to be further vindicated in December 1 8 20 by the declaration of independence in the northern city of Trujillo by its intendant, the Marques de Torre Tagle, Pezuela's political and military indecisiveness provided the backdrop to the famous military coup against him of 29 January 1 8 2 r.38 Essentially, the nineteen principal officers in the royalist army camped at Aznapuquio accused Pezuela of a variety of defects (primarily an unwillingness to attack San Martin, accentuated by specific military errors, fraud, contraband, nepotism, and a tolerance of suspicious behaviour among his close advisors) . 39 Faced with an ultimatum that the army would march on Lima unless he transferred power to La Serna within four hours, Pezuela informed a hastily-convenedjun/a de guerra later that day of his compliance, and left Lima for his country house at La Magdalena. 40 La Serna, for his part, promptly appointed Valdes as his chief-of-staff, promoted J ose Canterac to overall command of the army, and set about the strategic review that would lead five months later to the royalist evacuation of Lima and San Martin's unopposed entry on 1 2 J uly . 4 1 The deposition o f Pezuela, although subsequently condoned i n Madrid (and indirectly sanctioned in advance by a royal order of 1 8 20, authorising La Serna to take over as viceroy ' en caso de muerte, ausencia, o enfermedad ' of Pezuela) undermined the legitimacy of royalist authority in the eyes of many conservative Peruvians, who now felt able to support
38 39
40
41
January 1 8 2 1 - Pezuela deni e d this b ut made the counter-accusat i on that the insurgents had comm i tted atrocities in lea, Huamanga an d H uancavelica, o f which one of the most serious had b een to allow b lack soldiers to rape Spanish women : ' C onferencias en Miraflores y correspondencia con el general enemigo ' , BMP, Pezuela, ms. 6 . Ne i g hb ouri ng towns, including Piura, rapidly fo llowe d the example set b y Truj i llo, an d b y May 1 8 2 1 much o f northern Peru had declared fo r San Martin. For the names of the principal signatories, see Vargas Ugarte, Historia, p. 2 2 1 . They were also liste d i n an anonymous pamphlet (in reality written b y Pezuela ' s nep h ew ' Fernan di to ' ) - Ingenuo, Rebe/ion de Aznapuquio por varios jefes def exircito espaiiol para deponer def mando al dignisimo Virrry . (Rio de Janeiro, 1 8 2 1 ; Lima, 1 8 2 2 ) - which made unflattering remarks a b out many o f them: Garcia Cam ba, fo r example, was described as ' vano, orgulloso . . . bi en i ngrato ', La S erna as ' de conocimientos escasos, fcil de ser engaiiad o ' , and Valdes as possessing a ' trato grosero e insolente ' . The b uilding now houses Peru ' s Museo Nacional de la Historia in Pue b lo L ib re. Initially, Pezuela was ordered to leave Peru w i t hi n 24 hours, b ut La Serna relaxed this condition and he remained until J une 1 8 2 1 . f For an account o f the background to this decision see Timothy E. Anna, The Fall o the Royal Government in Peru (Lincoln N E and London, 1 979), pp. 1 70-8 0 .
. .
66
John R. Fisher
San Martin in good conscience.42 More seriously, it also became a matter of public debate in Madrid, with the publication there before the end of the year of not only the accusations against Pezuela but also his detailed refutation of them written at La Magdalena before his departure for Spain.43 The war of words would continue long after the independence of Peru had been secured, with Valdes' response to Pezuela, written in 1 8 27 but not published until 1 8 94, and the publication in 1 846 of a further pro La Serna account by another signatory of the Aznapuquio proclamation, Andres Garcia Camba.44 The principal thrust of Pezuela's manifesto was that he had been the innocent victim of ' una insurreccion puramente militar' - organised by a tightly-knit group of peninsular officers who, ever since their arrival from Spain in 1 8 1 6 (Canterac, in fact, came in 1 8 1 8) had sought to 'formar un partido' - to which he had given way only to avoid 'una guerra civil'.45 La Serna, he declared, had opposed him with 'una taciturnidad invencible' and an 'arrogancia petulante ', Garcia Camba was 'uno de mis mas acerrisimos enemigos ', and Canterac had dedicated himself to his ' degradacion'; similar charges were made against other leading members of ' el partido de oficiales europeos ', notably Colonel Juan Loriga and Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Seoane.4 6 These charges, coupled with evidence of the subsequent rift between La Serna and the then commander of the army of Upper Peru, Pedro Antonio Olaiieta, following the 1 8 2 3 abolition of the constitution, have led some commentators to explain the
42 43
Printed roya l order, 30 Sept. 1 8 20, A DC , Periodicos, libro 1, fol . 8 1 .
44
Maniftesto en el que el virrey de/ Peru Don Joaquin de la Pezuela reftere el hecho y circunstancias de su separacion de/ mando: demuestra lafalsedad, malicia, e impostura de las atroces imputaciones contenidas en el oftcio de intimacion de/ 29 de Enero de los jefes de/ ejircito de Lima, au/ores de la conspiracion; y anuncia las causas de este acontecimiento (Madrid, 1 8 2 1 ) Andres Garcia C amba, Memorias para la historia de las armas reales en el Peru (Madrid,
.
46
1 8 46). The 1 8 2 7 response of Valdes dealt with not onl y Pezuela ' s 1 8 2 1 accusations but a l so the post- 1 8 24 charges that La Serna and his officers - ' l os mal mirados ' - should not have surren d ered at Ayacucho: ' Exposicion que dirige a l rey don Fernando VII e l marisca l d e campo don J eronimo Valdes sobre l as causas que motivaron l a perdida del Peru, desde Vitoria, a 1 2 de Julio de 1 8 2 7', in Va ldes, Documentos, vo l . 2, pp. 1 7- 1 3 7 ; it i s preceded b y his grandson ' s introduction [pp. 1 - 1 j ; see p . 8 fo r the ' mal mirado s ' reference] , and is foll owed by a l arge number of ' documentos justificativos ' (pp. 1 4 1-497). Another l ess direct but influential authority, Mariano Torrente, sometimes described as hostil e to La Serna - Torata c l aimed (Documentos, vo l . 3, p. 8) that his work was influenced by ' l os Pezue l istas y Ol anetistas ' - eul ogised him as the on l y viceroy ' que ha ya se ll ado con su sangre su fide lid ad en e l campo de bata lla ' , a reference to the wounds he rece ived at Ayacucho: M ariano Torrente, Historia de la revolucion hispano americana, 3 vo l s. ( M adrid, 1 8 29-30), vo l . 3, p. j0 8 . Anal yses of Spanish public opinion towards American independence inc lude Me l chor Fernandez Al magro, La emancipacion de America y su reftejo en la conciencia espaiiola (Madrid, 1 9 j 7) and Luis Miguel E nciso Recio, La opinion ptlblica espaiiolay la independencia hispanoamericana I 8I9-I320 (Va ll ado lid, 4 Pezue l a, Maniftesto, pp. 1 0, 1 3, 1 44. 1 967) . Ibid, pp. 1 1 0, 1 2 j -6.
67
18z 1 crisis in terms of a political conflict between liberal officers around La Serna, who believed that only the 181z constitution could reconcile Americans to the maintenance of Spanish rule, and absolutists - creole and peninsular - deeply suspicious of constitutionalism.47 Pezuela himself went some way towards fostering this interpretation, suggesting, somewhat obliquely, that 'la grande revolucion ocurrida en la peninsula ' had provided an opportunity for 'los menos apreciables ciudadanos' to 'trastornar impunamente la autoridad '.48 He was more direct in his private correspondence, accusing La Serna of 'hipocresia, arteria, malignidad, ingratitud y cautela ', and describing him and his principal officers as 'una rama masonica de! Arbo! que esta en las Cortes, y ministros de! dia (y de! t'po siguiente, si sigue el actual desgobierno de Espana) .. '.49 La Serna, for his part, pointed out to the crown in March 18z4, following the restoration of absolutism, that, although he had been required to pay lip service to the constitution during the previous three years, he had actually decreed in April 18zz that orders received from the liberal government in Spain should not be implemented without his specific authority.5 0 Any individual disobeying this order, he had declared, would be treated 'como sedicioso y perturbador de! orden ptiblico'. 51 Referring directly to Olaiieta's refusal to obey him because of his initial reluctance to abolish the constitution without receiving explicit instructions from Spain, La Serna asked rhetorically if any of those trying to project themselves as ' mas anti-constitucionales' than himself ' se hubieran atrevido en mi lugar a tan clasicas violaciones y modificaciones cuando la Constitucion se ostentaba protegida y recomendada por el mismo Monarca?' . 5 2 In the light of Olaiieta's abolition of the constitution in the provinces of Potosi and Charcas, and the subsequent decision of Valdes - whom La Serna had despatched to repress his insurrection - to . take similar action in the rest of Upper Peru, the viceroy finally decreed the restoration of absolutism in Lower Peru on 11 March 18z4, despite still not having received specific authorisation from Spain for this measure . 53 The evidence available about relations between Pezuela and La Serna
.
47 49 51
50
53
See, for exampl e, Woodward, ' The Spanish Army ', pp. 60 2-604, and Lynch, The 48 Pezue l a, Maniftesto, p. 1 2 6. Pezue l a to La Serna, La Mag d a l ena, 22 Feb. I 8 2 I, BMP, Pezue l a, ms. 1 . L a Serna to minister of grace and justice, Cusco, I 5 March I 8 24, AGI, Lima, leg. 76 2 . D ecree o f L a Serna, Cusco, II April I 8 2 2 , ADC , Intendencia, Gobierno Virre ina l , l eg. 5 2 See note 5 0. I 5 9. D ecree of La Serna, II March I 8 24, ADC , Periodicos, libro I, ff. 377- 8 . The roya l decree of 2 5 D ec. I 8 23, ordering this step, was pub li shed in Cusco on 3 1 J uly I 8 24 : Ibid, fol. 40I-402.
Spanish American Revolutions, pp. 1 7I-2 .
68
John R. Fisher
and their respective circles prior to J anuary 1 8 2 1 also tends to suggest that, although factions certainly existed within the military, they did not necessarily reflect deep-seated ideological disagreements. Rather more important were the broader cultural differences and arguments about tactics between long-serving officers in America like Pezuela (whose service there went back to 1 8 0 5 ) and Ramirez, who felt that only they understood the creoles, and the arrogant, self-confident peninsular veterans who arrived in Peru in 1 8 1 6 determined to repress dissidence with their vigorous professionalism. One of the standard accusations against La Serna, for example, was that as soon as he reached Upper Peru he disbanded two militia regiments from Cusco, including that which had defeated the Pumacahua rebellion, dispersing their men and officers to other units, in order to facilitate the promotion of his peninsular subordinates.54 On the other side, there is clear evidence that La Serna disagreed fundamentally with Pezuela's military tactics - notably in Chile in 1 8 1 7 - to such an extent that he sought permission to resign his command and return to Spain.55 Approval in Madrid for his retirement - ostensibly on grounds of ill-health - was confirmed in 1 8 1 8 , and, having travelled to Lima, La Serna was actually within two days of leaving for Panama when, somewhat surprisingly in view of subsequent events, Pezuela promoted him to the rank of lieutenant-general and persuaded him to remain in the capital, ready to step in as interim viceroy should the need arise. 56 Pezuela's original intention, it seems, had been to restore La Serna to his command in Upper Peru - from where he would receive testimony in J uly 1 8 20 of deep hostility between Ramirez and the ' partido escandaloso' of peninsulares led by Canterac - but this plan was overtaken by the arrival of San Martin and the consequential need to keep La Serna in Lima. 57 Despite reservations about attributing the divisions among the royalists in 1 8 20- 1 to ideological differences, it has to be recognised that the restoration of liberalism in Spain in 1 8 20 profoundly affected develop54
55
56 57
Pezue l a, 1Vfaniftesto, p . 1 1 3. See, too, Garcia C amba, Memorias, pp. 22 3 -4, who observes that the unw illi ngness of creo l es to serve under peninsulares provoke d many desertions of hitherto enthus i astic supporters of the roya li st cause. Vargas Ugarte, Historia, pp. 1 5 2- 3 . Pezue la to minister of war, n o . 80 3 , Lima, 1 4 Feb. 1 820, BMP, Pezue l a, ms. 5 , cuad. 8. Mar iano de l a T orre y Vera to Pezue la, Tupiza, 7 Ju l y 1 820, BMP, Pezue l a, ms. 5 , cuad. 9 ; La S erna to Pezue l a, L i ma, 3 0 Sept. 1 820, BMP, Pezue l a, ms. 5 , cuad. 1 0. D esp i te more pressing matters, a lot of paper and time was wasted in deciding the actua l d ate up to which he should be paid as commander of the army of Upper Peru (eventual l y determined as 5 D ecember 1 8 1 9 ), a matter of some concern to Lima treasury officia l s because of salary differentials : Pezue l a to secretary of state, Lima, no. 489, 5 June 1 820, AGI, Lima, l eg. 762.
Royalist Regime in the Viceroyafty of Peru
69
ments in Peru, to the disadvantage of first Pezuela and subsequently that of San Martfn. 58 The precise chronology is of some significance for, although Pezuela was aware by mid-J uly of the 18 2 0 revolution, thanks to private correspondence with the Spanish ambassador in Rio de J aneiro, it was only on 4 September, four days before San Martin began his disembarkation, that he received a formal instruction to restore the 181 2 constitution. 5 9 The ceremony itself, held on 1 5 September, was preceded by an offer to San Martin four days earlier to arrange a cease-fire, following the receipt of complementary orders to take this step pending the arrival from Spain of peace commissioners entrusted with the task of persuading the insurgents that the restoration of the constitution would enable them to secure all their objectives within the Spanish fold.60 Although the viceroy's initial letter was worded rather abruptly - he stated that the orders from Madrid had interrupted his plans to repel San Martin from Peruvian soil - his offer of talks was accepted, and they got under way outside Lima between respective pairs of delegates on 2 5 September. 61 It was clear within a week that the gulf between the two sides was unbridgeable, not least because of San Martin's insistence on the surrender of Upper Peru to his forces, and formal hostilities were renewed on 7 October, despite a last-ditch plea from San Martin to keep them going on the grounds that ' una mala paz es mej or que la guerra mas feroz ', a reference perhaps to Pezuela's earlier observation that the long war in Upper Peru had caused only ' muertos, miseria y ruina '. 6 2 By the beginning of November, San Martin's army, which had taken advantage
58
59
Standard sources on Spanish po liti cs in I 820-3 inc lude J ose Luis C ome ll as, Los realistas en el trienio constitucional ( I 820- I 82 3 ) (Pamp l ona, I 9 5 8) and Los primeros pronunciamientos en Espana I3I4-I320 (Madrid, I 9 5 8). Broader ana l yses of Spanish imperial po li cy are provided by T imothy E . Anna, Spain and the loss o f America (Linco ln N E and London, I 98 3) and Mic h ae l P. C oste l oe, Response to Revolution : Imperial Spain and the Spanish American Revolutions, 1SI0-1S40 ( C ambridge, I 986) . Pezue l a to ambassador C asaflores, Lima, I 4 Ju l y I 820, acknow l edging receipt of his l etter of I I May I 820 : BMP, Pezue la, ms. 5 , cuad. 6. S ee, too, Anna, Spain, pp. 2 3 4-9, and Anna, Fall o f the R1!Jal Government, pp. I 5 9-6 I . Fu ll deta il s of Pezue l a's correspondence with government officia l s in Spain and with San Martin himself in the period 4 Apr il I 820 - 20 J anuary I 82 I , are in ' C onferencias en Miraflores y correspondencia con e l genera l enemi go ' , BMP, Pezue la, ms. 6. The sweari ng of the constitution in the rest of the v i ceroya l ty was arranged at a rather l eisure l y pace, occurring in Cusco, for examp l e, on I 5 October : decree of president, Cusco, 2 Oct. I 820, ADC, l ntendencia, Gobierno, l eg. I ) 7 . D eta ils of Pezue l a ' s military tactics were discussed at meetings of his junta de guerra he l d on 1 3 and 22 September : BMP, Pezue la, ms. 5 , cuad. I o, fo l . 88-9 I , pp. 1 0 I - I o4. D uring the Miraflores discussions Pezue la met persona ll y w ith San Martin ' s de legates, and the l atter with Pezuela's, but there was no d i rect meeting between the two leaders. San Martin to Pezue l a, I Oct. I 820 ; Pezue l a to San Martin, I I S ept. I 820, ibid. La S erna supported the v i ew that the transfer of Upper Peru to S an Martin was out of the question, but, w i t h remarkabl e p rescience, he suggested t h at t he Chileans might be satisfied if offered Tacna and Arica : La Serna to Pezue l a, L i ma, 3 0 Sept. I 820, ibid.
61
62
70
John R. Fisher
of the cease-fire to secure food, horses and recruits from coastal estates, had advanced to the outskirts of Lima, setting in train the events that would lead to Pezuela's deposition in J anuary. 63 Against this background, ponderous steps were being taken in Spain to appoint, instruct, and despatch to various American destinations the peace commissioners promised in April 1 8 20, a process that led eventually to the departure from Cadiz for Peru via Panama of naval Captain Manuel de Abreu and Brigadier J ose Rodriguez de Arias .64 Arias got no further than Cartagena de lndias, where he resigned his commission on grounds of ill health, citing rheumatoid arthritis.65 Abreu , however, stuck to his task, sailing to northern Peru and travelling overland to the insurgent headquarters at Huaura, where he made direct contact with San Martin on 27 March 1 8 2 1 .66 By the time he presented himself to La Serna in Lima on 30 March, following a preliminary meeting with Canterac at Aznapuquio, Abreu had begun to create the conditions that would lead to an armistice between the two sides, under cover of which the viceroy was able to plan his evacuation of Lima without fear of military action, thereby reversing the situation in which Pezuela had found himself in September I 8 20 . 6 7
63
64
65
66
67
The offer of emancipation t o s l aves who l eft haciendas t o j oin S an M arrin attracted suffi cient recruits to make good t he l osses caused by disease in the forces b rought from Chile : Garcia C am b a, Memorias, p. 3 3 6. A para ll e l appea l to Peru's Indian inhabitants, printed i n b oth Spanish and Quechua, for their support in return for the abolition of tribute was l ess successfu l , at l east in the short term : J o se de S an M arrin . . . a l os Indios Natura l es de! Peru, Pisco, 7 Sept. I 820, B M P, Pezuela, ms. 5, cua d . I o . Fu ll d eta il s are in AGI, Indif. Gen . , l eg. I 5 68. Tho se ori gina ll y cho sen for Peru, C aptain J oaquin Goni an d C apta i n Francisco Xav i er U ll oa, manage d to wrigg l e out of the commission, the first b ecause of a dispute a b out his sa l ary, and the second on the grounds that he had ' tios carna l es en aque ll os paises y Gobiernos disidentes . . . ' : Juan Ta b or to overseas minister, 2 Jul y I 820, ibid. Ari as to A b reu, Cartagena, I I J an. I 82 I , AGI, Indif. G en . , l eg. I 5 69 . The fu ll est account of Abreu ' s activities, covering the period from hi s departure from Porto b e l o on 2I J anuary I 82 I until his arrival i n Tarifa on I 6 June I 822, is his detailed ( 5 5 pp.) ' Di ario Po l itico . . . ' , I8 June I 822, AGI, Lima, l eg. 800. This report was misfi l ed until I 9 7 I in the Audiencia of Mexico ( leg. 2 3 3 0) section of the AGL C onsequent l y, many ear li er investigators, a l though aware of A b reu 's activities, did not see his report, which contains much fasci nating detail of his discussions with San Marrin, La S erna, an d other leading figures. M uch of his correspondence is duplicated in AGI, Lima, leg. 800, copies having b een b rought b ack by a second commiss i oner, Pedro Fernandez de T avira (appointed in Lima as a su b stitute for Ari as), who left Peru in Novem b er for the pen i nsu l a via Panama, reaching Lis b on in M arch : Tav i ra to overseas minister, Lis b on, I 5 March I 822, enc losing ' exposicion b reve y senc ill a ', ibid. A b reu note d i n hi s ' Di ario ' that at his first fu ll meeti ng with La S erna, on I April ' e l virrey me ha blo con l a fri a ld ad propia de su can i cter ' ; Garcia C am b a (Memoria, p. 3 88) commented that even at this ear l y stage it was evident to the roya li sts that he had come as ' un ciego apo l ogisra de l os i ndepen dientes ' . Garcia C am ba (ibid. , p. 3 9 3 ) thought that the discussions were ' inuriles y al.in perjudicia l es ' , but Va ld es (Documentos, vo l . 2, p. 5 7) conceded that ' una suspension de hostilidades . . . nos interesaba ' .
71
Preliminary discussions between respective sets of commissioners led to a formal armistice on 23 May 18 21, initially of twenty days but subsequently extended until late June ; on 2 June, at the hacienda of Punchauca, La Serna and San Martin met face-to-face and the latter proposed the creation of a regency with La Serna as president, offering to travel in person to Spain as part of a commission to arrange the independence of Peru under a Spanish prince . According to Abreu, La Serna, although diffident about accepting the presidency, was tempted by this offer, but, following discussions with Valdes and Garcia Camba, rej ected it because ' los j efes del ejercito se habian opuesto por no anteceder la aprobacion de las Cortes ' . By early J uly, despite Abreu's continuing optimism, it was clear that the gulf between the two sides was unbridgeable, and La Serna and his army voted with their feet by marching out of Lima, ignoring a protest from the audiencia that the city was being cut off from ' la integridad nacional '. 68 The tribunal's misgivings about the fate awaiting the city's peninsulares were borne out before the end of the year by their persecution at the hands of San Martin's minister of war, Bernardo de Monteagudo, who boasted that he used ' todos los medios que estaban a mi alcance para inflamar el odio contra los espaiioles : sugeri medidas de severidad, y siempre estuve pronto a apoyar los que tenian por obj eto disminuir su mimero y debilitar su influjo ptiblico o privado ' . 69 Those expelled unceremoniously, following confiscation of the bulk of their property, included the archbishop of Lima, the bishop of Huamanga, five audiencia ministers, and prominent members of the consulado . 7 0 By contrast, Abreu, who remained in Lima when La Serna left, deprived of his salary ( 3 5 0 pesos a month) , was given l , ooo pesos by Hipolito Unanue in August, and was showered with presents and compliments by San Martin when he sailed for Spain, via Chile and Brazil, in December 18 21. 71 Not surprisingly, relations between
68 69
70
71
Audiencia to La Serna, Lima, 5 Ju l y 1 82 1 , AGI, Lima, l eg. 800. Bernardo de M onteagud o, Memoria sobre los principios politicos que segui en la administracion de/ Peruy acontecimientos posteriores a mi separacion (Santiago de Chile, 1 823 ), p. 1 o. Garcia Camba (Memorias, p. 4 3 6) described him as be l onging to ' la cl ase mas infima de l a sociedad coma de origen africano . . . tenia todo e l caracter perfido y cruel de un zambo, con la imaginacion ardiente y ambici osa d e l a mayor parte de l os mu l atos ' . Pedro Gutierrez C os, bishop o f H uamanga, to min i ster of grace an d just i ce, M exico, 8 M arch 1 822 ; ' Relacion de l os sujetos que han sa lid o de l a ciudad de Lima para l a peninsul a ' , Cadiz, 1 5 M arch 1 822, AGI, Indif. Gen. leg. 1 5 7 1 . Hipoli to Unanue to Abreu, L ima, 1 7 Aug. 1 82 1 , AGI, Lima, leg. 800. T h e presents includ e d 2 l arge gold meda l s, and 2 5 l arge and 5 o sma ll s ilver me dals struck to commemorate Peru's ind ependence ; S an Martin's covering letter stated ' para a l gun espaiio l serv il seria un insulto l a remesa de l as meda ll as de la Independ'a . . . pero para un libera l no creo sera un insulto, s i no q ' e l as recibi ra coma una prueba de mi afecto, para q'e V. las reparta entre sus amigos' : San M artin to Abreu, La Magdalena, 1 D ec. 1 82 1 , ibid.
72
John R. Fisher
Abreu and La Serna, who had maintained correspondence, had grown extremely frigid in the intervening five months : in November, for example, in response to a letter from Abreu which he dismissed as ' un aglomeramiento de frases, disgresiones, reflexiones y consej os insignificantes " the viceroy suggested that his language ' parece mas bien el de un Agente de los disidentes que el de un comisionado por S . M . C ' . 7 2 I n his reply, Abreu accused L a Serna of having sabotaged any possibility of a reconciliation with the ' disidentes ' because of his insistence on treating them as 'traidores, alevosos y rateros ', thereby causing ' el rompimiento escandaloso a que V. E . nos provoco . . ' . 7 3 Monteagudo noted that Abreu's efforts to reconcile the two sides had been ' imitiles ', but expressed the hope that, despite the obstruction displayed by the royalist commanders of the ' tiltimos restos de Ej ercito que mantienen en este territorio ', it was still possible ' que una amigable transacion sea el termino de la actual contienda . . . '. 74 Abreu left Lima still hoping that San Martin would send commissioners to Spain to negotiate the establishment of an independent monarchy in Peru. 75 Despite a reluctance in Madrid to engage directly with Abreu following his return to Spain - he waited for four months in Tarifa before receiving permission to come to court - several new peace commissioners were appointed to go to parts of America other than Peru in 1 8 2 2 , an indication that the constitutional government had not rej ected the idea of a negotiated settlement. 76 There is some evidence that San Martin, too, entertained similar optimism, at least until the end of 1 8 2 1 , a factor which possibly explains his unwillingness to engage Canterac's force of 3 , 3 00 men in September when it evacuated the bulk of the royalist garrison left behind at Callao in J uly. 7 7 La Serna, however, had clearly decided before Abreu left that a negotiated settlement was unattainable, and that the sierra was the best place from which to organise the armed defence of the viceroyalty against insurgency. In fact, the fimeiios had by no means seen the back of the royalists, for, in addition to Canterac's return to Callao in September and his brief re.
72 74
73 75
76
77
La S erna to A b reu, H uancayo, 2 Nov. 1 8 2 1 , ibid. A b reu to La Serna, Lima, 1 2 Nov. 1 8 2 1 , ibid. Monteagudo to overseas minister, Lima, 2 2 Nov. 1 8 2 1 , ibid. A b reu to S an M artin, Callao, 2 D ec. 1 8 2 1 , ibid. Overseas minister to Abreu, Madri d, 1 3 Oct. 1 8 2 2 , ibid. F ull details o f the ir i nstructions are in AG! , Indif. Gen. , l eg. 1 5 70 . Th ose despatched to Buenos Aires, Antonio Luis Pereyra and Luis de l a Ro bl a, signed an armist ice in J u l y 1 8 24 and tried in vain to secure permission for an emissary to go to Cusco to persuade La Serna to o b serve i t : T orrente, vo l . 3 , pp. 408-9 . By then, in fact, the initiative had b een a b andoned i n M adrid : decree o f F erd inand VII, 26 Jan. 1 8 24, AG! , l nd if. Gen. , l eg. 1 j 7 1 . A l most the reverse h appened i n J une 1 8 2 3 , when Sucre withdrew to Callao, all owing C anterac to reoccupy Lima for a mont h : i\nna, Fall o f the Royal Government, pp. 2 1 7- 1 8 .
73
occupation of the city in June 1 8 2 3 , a mutiny in February 1 8 24 of the patriot garrison of Callao led to the royalists retaking both the defenceless capital - which they surrended only after the battle of Ayacucho - and Callao itself, which J ose Ramon Rodi! refused to give up until J anuary 1 8 2 6 . 78 Among the several thousand civilian victims of the bitter siege of its fortresses imposed from December 1 8 24 was the flamboyant publicist Gaspar Rico y Angulo, whose varied career in Peru had included work as an administrator of the Cinco Gremios Mayores and, from 1 8 1 8 , the management of the recently-established lottery of South America. 7 9 However, Rico's main claim to fame, and his value to the historian, was that he had accompanied La Serna to the highlands in July 1 8 2 1 , and for the next three years published, using a portable press, first in Huancayo and subsequently in Cusco, a series of periodicals and pamphlets that constitute one of the key sources for understanding royalist strategy during this period. 80 Rico already enj oyed considerable notoriety prior to the evacuation. Abascal had expelled him from Lima in 1 8 1 2 , allegedly for abusing the freedom of the press to publish libellous material in El Peruano ; Pezuela complained in April 1 8 2 1 of his ' ponzoiiosas erupciones ' (including describing the constitution as ' un aborto de la ignorancia') ; and Abreu attributed the intransigence of La Serna in the negotiations with San Martin to the fact that he was ' gobernado por Valdes y el periodista Rico ' . 8 1 Their low opinion of Rico was accepted by post-independence commentators, including the editor of El Sol (Cusco), which described him in 1 8 2 5 as ' este loco ' and ' el periodista mas estrafalario que ha tenido el gobierno espaiiol '. 82 La Serna, however, praised him as the only civil employee who had left Lima with him, and Rodi! allowed him in 1 8 2 5 to continue publishing El Depositario in Callao, regularly sending copies to Manuel Blanco Encalada (Chilean commander of the naval blockade of the fortresses) , and praising the editor's ' buen humor ' . 83
78 79 80
81
82
83
Jose Ramon Rodi ! , Memoria de/ sitio de/ Callao, eds. Vicente R odr iguez C asado and Guillermo Lohmann Vill ena (Sevi ll a, 1 9 5 5 ). Ri co died in F e b ruary l 8 26, several days after Radi i ' s capitu l ation, as a resu l t o f t h e pr i vat i ons su ffered during t h e s i ege. Their va l ue is accentuate d b y the paucity o f o ffi cia l d ocumentation fo r the La S erna viceregency, a resu l t i n part o f the l oss o f many o f the papers o f t h e vicerega l secretariat, l eft in C a ll ao in J u l y 1 8 2 1 , and the ditching in 1 8 2 2 o ff the coast of B raz il of o ffi cial reports en route to Spain when the ship carry i ng them was attacked by B uenos A ires corsairs : A nna, Fall o f the Royal Government, p. 2 69. Ibid, pp. 6 7-9 ; Pezue l a, Maniftesto, p . 1 2 8 ; Ab reu, ' Diario politico ' . El Sol, no. 1 0, 5 M arch 1 8 2 5 , ADC , Periodicos, lib ro 2 A , fol . 3 1 v . Rodi ! , Memoria, p. 26 1 . M en dib uru l ater dismissed this organ as ' en verdad un dep6siro de insulsas producc i ones de desvergiienzas y a tin o b scenidades ' , containing ' o b servaciones vu l gares mezc l adas con cuentos ridicu l os y sucios ' : M anue l d e Mendiburu, Diccionario historico-biogrdfico def Peru, 8 vo l s . (Lima, 1 8 74-90) , vo l . 7, pp.
74
John R. Fisher
Following the evacuation of Lima, La Serna established himself initially in Huancayo, which served as an excellent base for securing supplies from the fertile Mantaro Valley as well as attacking the montoneras for which the region had become notorious. Canterac's army continued to use Huancayo as its principal base until 1 8 24.84 However, within a very short period La Serna himself was persuaded to reside in Cusco, which he described in September 1 8 2 1 as the ' antigua capital de! Peru, y centro de que podia dar impulso mas facilmente en todas direcciones a las operaciones militares, y a las Providencias de! Gobierno y Estado que convienen en tan extraordinarias circunstancias ' . 85 The idea of elevating Cusco's status to that of viceregal capital was taken up with enthusiasm by its audiencia, which in November urged the viceroy to abandon ' el obscuro pueblo de Huancayo ', lacking in ' ciudadanos de ran go, e ilustracion ' , in favour of ' la Corte de los Y ncas '. 86 This invocation of the city's indigenous tradition was particularly striking, given that three of the four ministers who signed the confidential letter were not only peninsular Spaniards but also hitherto long-standing advocates of the need to transfer the tribunal from Cusco, where, they believed, ' los magnates ' had a long tradition of supporting revolutionary projects, to the more secure base of Arequipa. 8 7 La Serna himself tended to play down the symbolic significance of his move to Cusco, concentrating instead on its practical benefits ; he also attempted to minimise the pageantry associated with his formal reception in the city on 30 December 1 8 2 1 . 88 The city council, for its part, wrote to the crown in
84
85 86 87
88
7 5 -6. A flavour o f what upset M endiburu is prov ided b y El Depositario, no. 1 00, 9 Nov. 1 8 2 3 (reproduced in Valdes, Documentos, vo l . 4, pp. 5 0 3 -4) which insulted both B o livar and Sucre b y suggesting that the fo rmer, ' e l virote ' , ' sen i enterrado en mierda hasta e l cogote/y el d ue l o de su entierro, b ajo y sucio/so l o l o podra hacer Sucreprepucio ' . A va l ua bl e source fo r the army 's activities i s the Boletin def Ejircito Nacional de Lima ( H uancayo an d Jauja), 1 9 i ssues o f w hi c h fo r the period 20 A pril - 2 8 O cto b er l 8 2 2 are in ADC , Peri6dicos, Ii bro l . La S erna to secretary o f grace an d justice, no. 9 , l 1 S ept. 1 8 2 2 , A G!, A ud. de Lima, leg. 76 2 . A udienc i a to La Serna, reservada, 1 l Nov. 1 8 2 1 , ADC , Real A udiencia, lib ro 3 . ' Expediente so b re tras l aci6n de l a A udiencia de ! C uzco a A requipa ' , 2 7 Oct. 1 8 1 9 , A G I, A ud. de C uzco, l eg. 1 0 . Th e audiencia' s campaign in favour of t he trans fe r b egan in 1 8 1 5 , a mere two days after its re-insta ll ation in C usco foll owing the suppression of t he Pumacahua re b ellion : audienc i a to Pezue l a, reservada, l 5 A pril l 8 l 5 , ADC , Real A udienc i a, lib ro 3 . Th e ministers i n o ffi ce in 1 8 2 1 were Jose D arcourt, B arto l ome Mosquera d e Puga, M art in Jose de Muji ca (a ll peninsulares) an d the creo l e Santiago C or b a l an : details of their careers are i n M ark A . B urkho ld er an d D . S. Chandler, Biographical Dictionary o f Audiencia Ministers in the Americas (Westport, 1 9 8 2), pp. 9 2 , 9 8 , 2 26-7, 2 3 1 . A udiencia to v i ceroy, 29 D ec. l 8 2 1 , ADC , Real A udiencia, libro 3 . In this l etter the trib una l o b j ected to his p l an to hold certain ceremonies in his house rather than in the
Rf!Yalist Regime in the Vicerf!)lalty of Peru
75
April 1 8 24, requesting the formal confirmation of Cusco's status as viceregal capital, a move which, although made redundant in December by the battle of Ayacucho, suggested that by the very end of the colonial period the civic leaders had identified royalism as a better guarantor than insurgency of their attempts to assert regional identity.89 The self-confidence of the municipal establishment was undoubtedly bolstered by La Serna's success in establishing a complex administrative structure in Cusco in 1 8 2 2-4. Although he drew back from formally transferring the functions of the audiencia of Charcas to that of Cusco fearing ' una guerra de papeles tan perj udicial y de funestas consecuencias como la de las Armas ' - large areas of central and southern Peru (including the intendencies of Arequipa, Huamanga, Huancavelica and Tarma) formerly dependent upon Lima for judicial administration were brought under the jurisdiction of the Cusco tribunal. 90 In the wider political sphere, the difficulty of communication with the metropolitan authorities, depicted by some commentators as a weakness suffered by La Serna, in the opinion of the audiencia gave his ' sublime personage ' an enhanced authority in the eyes of royalist sympathisers in Peru. 9 1 It certainly allowed him to be selective in deciding how far to go in implementing the provisions of the restored constitution , and to exert considerable control over, for example, local elections without the fear of reprimand. 92 The viceroy followed the example set by the president of Cusco, Juan Pio Tristan, in 1 8 20- 1 of dealing harshly with deserters from the army, decreeing in May 1 8 2 2 that, along with conspirators and those resisting
audiencia's premises. D eta il s o f the su b stanti a l costs o f the pu bli c ceremony are in
89
90 91
92
' Cuad ernos de l os gastos imprendidos en la recepcion del E x'mo Sr. Virey ' , ADC , l nten dencia, Real Haci en da, l eg. 2 2 5 . Th e origina l d ocument has not b een l ocated, b ut a summary in A GI , Lima, l eg. 1 0 24 states : ' C uzco 8 de Ab r il d e 1 8 24. El C av ild o R ea l d e l a Ci uda d E xpone : Que para l a segurida d d e ague ll os d om i n ios y conservaci c\ n d e or den en ell os se h ace indispensable e l gue para e l fu turo se esta bl ezca en e ll a l a C apita l d e ague ! Virreynato gue se ha ll amado de Lima, pues concurren en e l C uzco las circunstancias singu lares de su segurida d l oca l , de su a b undancia, su sanidad, y esta bl ecida opinion ; cuyo conj unto de ventajas tan especia l es a l i ntento, no reune otra a l guna de las de ague ! T erritorio ' . A note inside the summary record s that the proposa l was sent to the president o f the C onsej o de l ndias on 1 2 Jan. 1 8 2 5 , ' para g ' e e l C onsejo consu l te su parecer . . . ' . See note 8 5 . See note 8 6 ; the negat ive fe atures o f i so l ation are stressed in A nna, Fall of the Royal Government, pp. 1 9 2-3 , an d Albi , Banderas olvidadas, p. 3 3 7. Th e su bd e l egate o f Ab ancay re ferred in D ecem b er 1 8 2 2 to an or der fr om the viceroy to ensure that any person e lected to the post of a/ca/de shou ld be ' adicto a l a j usta causa, t i morato . . . ' : J ose f M ' a B argas to diputaci c\ n provincia l , Abancay, 2 6 D ec. 1 8 2 2 , ADC , Gobierno Virreinal, l eg. 1 5 9 .
76
john R. Fisher
arrest, they would be subj ect to summary jurisdiction before military courts . 93 Similarly, considerable publicity was given in Cusco to the reprisals taken against insurgents. These included the burning of the town of Cangallo, described as ' criminalisimo ' and ' un asilo de asesinos y guarida de ladrones ' , the exemplary display of the heads of prisoners captured during an unsuccessful guerrilla attack on the town of Chongos, and a series of executions and beatings of Indian alcaldes in the intendancy of Huamanga for either armed insurrection or passing information to the enemy. 94 Similarly, a series of morale-boosting reports from Colonel J ose Carratala, describing his hounding of guerrillas in the province of Huamanga was published in May 1 8 2 2 . 95 Some attempt was also made to retain the moral high ground by publicising alleged atrocities committed against royalist prisoners by guerrillas professing allegiance to San Martin, albeit in the context of a threat from Canterac that he would respond to their atrocities by burning their towns and villages ' como me ha visto en la precision de hacerlo en Chacapalca, Huayhuay, y otros'. 96 On the other hand, considerable care seems to have been taken to ensure that the rural communities ordered to supply the royalist army with horses, fodder, food and billets for troops received proper payment. 97 There are occasional hints of local resistance to the troops ' increasingly heavy demands - in February 1 8 2 3 the viceroy reminded the subdelegate of Andahuaylas that ' no es justo q'e estas valientes tropas carescan de quanto necesitan ' - coupled, however, with a determination to ensure that firm measures should be taken against abusive soldiers ('delincuentes') who seized animals from communities without making proper payment. 98
93
94 95 96
97
98
D ecree o f La Serna, 1 7 May I 8 2 2 , ADC , Periodicos, l i b ro 1 , fol . I 2 I . Two mont h s earli er h e o ffered su b stantia l rewards - eigh t pesos per man - fo r the capture of d eserters fr om t h e Burgos reg i ment : La S erna to su bd e l egate o f A n dahuayl as, 1 5 M arc h I 8 2 2 , ADC , C omunicaciones de La Serna, l eg. 1 . D etails of T ristan ' s measures are in ADC , Intendencia, Gobierno, leg. I 5 7 ; Garc ia C am b a, Memorias, pp. 3 8 6-7 details T ristan ' s vigorous action against an I 8 2 I b arracks conspiracy. Gaceta def gobierno legitimo de/ Peru, no. 6, 22 Jan. I 8 2 2 ; no. 8 I, 8 J une I 8 2 2 ; unnum b ered issue, 1 9 M ay I 8 2 2 , ADC , Periodicos, lib ro I , fol . 8 7 , 1 24, 1 3 i . Ibid., un-num b ered, 1 9 M ay I 8 2 2 ; Gaceta Extraordinaria, no. I 5 , 5 M ay 1 8 2 2 , and unnum b ered issue, 2 2 M ay 1 8 2 2 , ibid. , fol . I 1 9, 1 2 3 , 1 2 9 . C anterac to S an M art in, H uancayo, 8 F e b . I 8 2 2 , Gaceta, no. I I , 2 5 M arch 1 8 2 2 , ibid. , fol . I 07 . O ccasiona ll y one fi n d s examp les o f h umane treatment : fo r examp le, the re l ease i n I 8 24, in response to an appeal fr om his unc l e, o f a 1 4-year old boy, Jose C astro, b rought to C usco with other insurgent pr i soners : A ntonio M ar ia Al varez, president o f C usco, to La Serna, 29 J u l y I 8 24, ADC , Intendencia, Gobierno, l eg. 1 5 8 . ADC , C omunicaciones d e L a S erna, l eg. I , contains a cons id era bl e num b er o f orders fr om the viceroy to the su bd e l egate of Andahuaylas in 1 8 2 2-3 concerning the supp l y of anima l s , grain, potatoes and other fo odstu ffs, a common theme of which was the need to ensure that ' arreg lados y equitativos ' prices were paid. La Serna to subde l egate o f A ndahuay las, I 7 F e b ruary I 8 2 3 , and 3 0 M arch I 8 2 2 , ADC , C omunicaciones de La Serna, l eg. I .
77
Even the collection in 1 8 2 2 from private citizens of firearms and sabres was accompanied by the issuing of receipts, as well as the threat of conscription into the army as private soldiers and heavy fines for those who disobeyed. 9 9 The broader issue of creating a financial machinery capable o f generating sufficient income t o meet military expenses and those o f general administration (including the salaries of public functionaries who had fled to Cusco from enemy-held territory) was tackled with a similar combination of improvisation, persuasion and respect for established procedures . 100 At the coercive end of the spectrum, in February 1 8 2 2 La Serna authorised the seizure of all property of individuals, lay and ecclesiastical, who had remained in Lima or other places that had declared for San Martfn, with a rather vague promise that they might be reimbursed once order had been restored, subj ect to them not having engaged in the meantime in what he called criminal activity. 101 To some extent this measure regularised a policy already in force, and of which one prominent victim was the leading Lima merchant, Pedro Abadfa, from whose house in Cerro de Pasco unminted silver worth some 20,000 pesos was seized in late- I 8 2 I . 102 There is also evidence of the confiscation of unminted silver suspected of being used in contraband trade in the province of Arequipa. 103 Other expedients included the raising of voluntary and forced loans, a moratorium on the repayment of existing loans, the confiscation of silverware from convents and churches, and the maintenance of the Indian tribute in the guise of the ' tinica contribucion de Naturales ', notwithstanding its abolition by the constitutional regime. 104 Intendants and subdelegates were put under particular pressure to mantain the twice-yearly flow of funds to the treasury from this source,
99 100
D ecree of La Serna, Cusco, 28 Oct. 1 8 2 2 , ADC , Periodicos, libro 1, fol . 1 7 3 . Such re fu gees were entit l ed i n itially to receive two-thirds of their sa l aries, su b ject to a fu rther ' descuento genera l ' or d ered by La Serna in 1 8 2 3 of 1 2 maravedis per peso fo r civilians and 8 maravedis fo r the m ili tary : treasury m i n i ster to intendant, C usco, 10 Sept. 1 8 2 3 an d 2 5 Oct. 1 8 2 3 , ADC , Tesoreria F i sca l , Lib ros Varios, lib ro 1 6 . 1 0 1 O fi cio o f La Serna, 6 F e b ruary 1 8 2 2 , transcribed by C amerae to Gabriel H er b oso, intendant of Huamanga, H uancayo, 2 2 M arch 1 8 2 2 , ADC , C omunicaciones de La Serna, l eg. 1 . 1 0 2 Di onisio M arc ill a to La Serna, H uancayo, 2 Nov. 1 8 2 1 , ADC , T esorer ia F iscal, Ej ercito R ea lista, leg. 3 1 2 . 1 0 3 T reasury m i nister t o L a Serna, C usco, 7 Apr. 1 8 24, (referring t o con fi scat i on of plata piiia w hi ch a German, D anie l S e l nutt, was a b out to ' emb arcar c lan destinamente ' ) , ADC , T esorer ia F iscal, Libros Varios, lib ro 1 5 . 1 0 4 D eta ils o f these (and other) measures are in ADC , T esorer ia F iscal, Libros Varios, Ii b ros I j - 1 6 ; ADC , T esorer ia F iscal, E j ercito R ea li sta, leg. 3 1 3 contains details o f a su b stantia l l oan b y the cura of A co b am b a, Tadeo Valverde, to assist with meet i ng the ' urgentes necesidades de l a Nacion ' : D omingo Ximenez to C anterac, Jauja, 3 0 A ug. 1 822.
78
John R. Fisher
as well as to oversee the collection of church silver and the distribution of forced loans within their territorial jurisdictions. 105 The crucial importance of the head tax as a source of income for the royalists is starkly demonstrated by the accounts of the Cusco treasury for 1 8 2 1 , when it provided no less than 60 per cent ( 2 7 3 ,000 pesos) of total income of 4 5 4,000 pesos for the ramos de real hacienda. This was more than four times the sum provided by the second largest item, namely the income from the a/cabala and monopolies. 106 The arrival of the army in Huancayo brought with it a substantial increase in military expenditure, with pay alone consuming some 40,000 pesos a month by mid- 1 8 2 2 . 107 To some extent it also brought benefits to the regional economy, particularly the textile sector, which experienced a surge in demand for the supply of uniforms. 108 Moreover, despite the inevitable unpopularity of many of the measures taken to increase the income of the Cusco treasury - which grew by 43 per cent in 1 8 2 3 - the city's elite was conscious of certain symbolic benefits . 109 One was the establishment of a mint, made necessary by the increasing difficulty in sending church silver and plata piiia from the mines to Potosi for coining. 110 More important still was the fact that Cusco had assumed not only the responsibility for fiscal oversight of the treasuries of La Paz, Potosi, and Oruro, but also, by virtue of the presence of the viceroy in the city, control of ecclesiastical administration in Upper Peru . 1 1 1
105
1 06 1 07
108
1 09
uo Ill
ADC , Tesoreria F iscal, E j ercito Realista, l eg. 3 I 5 , conta ins details of the co ll ection of church silver in 1 8 2 3 : J uan A ntonio Rodriguez, ' Relacion que mani fi esta l a P l ata l a b rada saca d a de varias Iglesias . . . ' , 2 1 D ec. i 8 2 3 ; l eg. 3 1 4 has correspondence b etween the intendants of Tarma, H uamanga, and Huancavelica an d C anterac a b out the co ll ection of forced loans. Gabriel Perez to C anterac, H uancave li ca, 8 A pr. 1 8 2 3 , refers t o the difficulty of actua ll y raising the cash from ' este po b re vecindario ' . ' E stado de l as entra d as de cauda l es de l a H acienda Nacion a l . . . ' , C usco, 3 Sept. i 8 2 2 , ADC , Intendencia, Real H acienda, l eg. 2 2 5 . Monthl y accounts fo r 1 8 2 2 in ' Relacion de! importe de l os Presupuestos de l os C uerpos en e l mes de l a fecha . . . ' are in ADC , T esoreria F i sca l , E j ercito Realista, l eg. 3 i 3. O t her expenses detailed in this lega jo include payments to spies, and those of esta bli shing a m ili tary hospita l i n J auja. T reasury minister to La S erna, C usco, 1 2 M arch 1 8 2 3 , ADC , Tesorer ia F iscal, Lib ros Varios, Ii b ro 1 5 , reporte d that he had provided 49,000 pesos in 1 8 2 2 fo r ' l a construccion de vestuarios de! Ex ' to ' . D etai l s of the ship ment of 4 2 , 5 oo varas of cl oth fo r the roya l i st fo rces in Potosi in 1 8 2 3 fr om the ' fa b rica de D ' n A ndres Suarez de Vi l l amil ' are in ADC , Intendencia, Gobierno Virreina l , l eg. 1 60. T reasury m i nister to La Serna, C usco, 2 1 F e b . 1 8 24, ADC , Tesorer ia F iscal, Li b ros Varios, Ii b ro 1 5 , reported tota l income in 1 8 2 2 (inc l uding the ramos propios, particulares y a jenos) as 9 3 6 , 000 pesos and in 1 8 2 3 as I , 3 3 5 , 5 5 5 pesos . T reasury minister to La Serna, C usco, i9 A ug. 1 8 24, ADC , Tesoreria F iscal, Lib ros Varios, libro 1 6 . La S erna to m i nister of grace and justice, Cusco, 1 0 M arch 1 8 24, AGI , A ud . of Lima, l eg. 7 6 2 , reported on measures taken in co ll a b oration with the bish ops of Charcas, La Paz, and Santa C ruz (as we ll as those of A requipa and Cusco) to arrange concursos for
79
There is some evidence that by the end of 1 8 2 3 this gradual process of consolidation of authority in Cusco was provoking a belief that an independent Peruvian entity, including Upper Peru, could turn its back on Lima and the coast on a more permanent basis. The best-known and most overt articulation of this possibility appeared in verse-form in Rico 's El Depositario on 9 November 1 8 2 3 under the title ' Sueiio anacreontico ', which seemed to conj ure up the vision of an independent empire, ruled over by La Serna, stretching from Tupiza (in the south of Upper Peru) to Tumbes in the north . 1 1 2 Particular attention was focused upon the declaration that ' O La Serna establece/el imperio peruano/o nadie lo preserva/ de inflnitos estragos ', and to a statement in a later issue ( 2 6 November) that ' los dias s e acercan, y acaso e n e l Cuzco s e datanin unos actos que recuerden con gratitud las futuras generaciones ' . 113 Moreover, an intermediate issue ( 1 9 November) carried a reassuring message from La Serna about his military successes in Upper Peru during the previous three months, and a promise that the war would soon end ' por media de tratados o de operaciones militares ' . 114 La Serna himself, stung by requests from surrounding provinces to explain these remarks, as well as by Olaiieta's direct denunciation of his apparent intentions, informed the crown in March 1 8 24 that the 26 November comment had been referring to nothing more than the impending opening of the mint, and that the invocation of the ' Peruvian empire ' a fortnight earlier had been based on the assumption that it would continue to be ruled by Ferdinand VIl . 1 1 5 He conceded that he had been shown the offending text by Rico the day before its publication, but claimed to have paid little attention to it ' porque no soy de los que se saborean 6 reclamen con sus propias alabanzas '. A few days before sending this explanation, La Serna had written a separate despatch denouncing Olaiieta's insubordination and, perhaps more significantly, offering to resign his command to Canterac if he were required to come to Madrid to j ustify his actions during the
112
1 13
1 14 1 15
t h e fi ll ing of vacant benefices. H e reporte d that a ll h ad gone smoothly except in Ch arcas, w h ere ' e l crimina l Ol aneta ' had suspen d ed the process on the groun d s t h at it infringed ecc l esiastica l i mmunity. F urt h er details are i n ' Relacion de l os ec lesiasticos e legid os y mandados presentar para l os curatos d e l a Paz ' , 1 8 24, ADC , l ntendencia, Go b ierno Virreina l , leg. 1 60 . El Depositario, no. 1 00, 9 Nov. 1 8 2 3 , in Valdes, Documentos, vo l . 4, pp. 5 00- 5 04. The article em b raced disparaging remarks about ' l a repu bli ca de l os li menos ' , and its ' director po l itico ' (Bo lfvar) . Ibid. , no. 1 0 3 , 2 6 Nov. 1 8 2 3 , quoted in Valdes, Documentos, vo l . 4, p. 1 1 5 . ' El Virrey a l os Peruanos ' , C usco, 1 2 Nov. 1 8 2 3 , El Depositario, no. 1 0 1 , 1 9 Nov. 1 8 2 3 , ADC , Periodicos, lib ro 1 , fol . 3 3 6. La Serna to minister of war, no. 1 2 7 , C usco, 20 M arch 1 8 24, in Valdes, Documentos, vo l . 4, pp. 1 1 5 -2 2 .
So
John R. Fisher
previous three years. 1 16 During the period between the publication of these articles in November 1 8 2 3 and the viceroy's attempts to play them down in March 1 8 24, the principal treasury minister in Cusco corresponded with him in January about ' el Prestamo de dos millones de pesos q'e V. Ex'a se propane solicitar de las Naciones extrangeras ' . 1 1 7 A passing reference was made to the unfortunate ' guerra civil ' that had paralysed some traditional sources of income, but it was predicted that, even allowing for this circumstance, the treasury would be capable of raising an annual income of nearly three million pesos, to guarantee the principal and interest on the proj ected loan . 1 1 8 The editor o f E l Depositario, Rico, received a glowing testimonial from La Serna in April 1 8 24 when he applied successfully for a licence to return to Spain : the viceroy described him as an ' hombre de honor ' , whose ' impresos . . . han producido el descredito de los rebeldes ', adding that ' nadie sino Rico h'a impugnado con mas tezon y decision el sistema revolucionario ' . 1 1 9 These comments suggest that the viceroy bore him no ill will, and help substantiate the suspicion that La Serna had, indeed, been party to the floating of the idea of an autonomous entity governed from Cusco . Moreover, there is no doubt that Rico had been a very effective propagandist for the royalist cause, providing a platform for nearly three years for the publication of both news of military successes and often quite subtle political comments : in J anuary-February 1 8 2 3 , for example, several issues of the Gaceta Extraordinaria carried detailed reports of the successes of Valdes and Canterac at and around Torata, while, on the political front, J ose de la Riva Aguero, was effectively denounced in May 1 8 2 3 as ' un criminal ' , and president ' de una reptiblica imaginaria ' . 1 20 By the middle of 1 8 24, with Rico gone, the management of news in Cusco became less surefooted. On 1 5 May, for example, the Gaceta carried news of La Serna's wish to resign as viceroy, and three months later publicity was given to Bolivar's proclamation of 1 5 August, announcing the patriot victory at J unin, and praising the ' bravo Olaneta ', operating
11 6
1 17 1 18 11 9
1 20
La Serna to minister of grace and justice, no. 5 1 , C usco, 1 5 M arch 1 8 24, A GI , A ud. de Lima, l eg. 7 62 . Th e viceroy warned on zo M arch that un l ess Ol aiieta came to h ee l , his fo rmer triumphs wou ld b e b uried in the ' hedionda tum b a de l os Pizarros, Al magros, G i rones, T upacamaros, A ngu l os . . . ' : Va l des , Documentos, vo l . 4, p . 1 2 2 . T reasury minister to L a S erna, Cusco, 3 Jan. 1 8 24, ADC , Tesoreria F iscal , L ib ras Varios, lib ro 1 5 . Th e principa l item of projected income - t he ' tinica contr ib ucion de Natura l es 6 T ri b utos ' - was shown as providing 1 , 2 5 0,000 of a tota l 2 , 8 70,000 pesos . La Serna to minister of state, no. 24, C usco, 2 Apr. 1 8 24, A GI, A ud. de Li ma, l eg. 7 62 . A s noted, Rico got n o fu rther than C a ll ao. Gaceta Extraordinaria, no. 3 , 2 6 Jan. 1 8 2 3 ; no. 3 1 , 2 8 Jan. 1 8 2 3 ; no. p , 3 1 Jan. 1 8 2 3 ; no. 3 3 , 2 3 Fe b . 1 8 2 3 ; El Depositario, no. 8 2, 6 May 1 8 2 3 , ADC, Periodicos, I i b ro 1 , fol . 209- 1 1 , 2 3 5 , 2 5 0- 1 .
Rf!Yalist Regime in the Vicerf!)'alty of Peru
8r
in Upper Peru ' con un ej ercito verdaderamente patriota y protector de la libertad ' . 1 2 1 By September, with the viceroy having left the city to take personal command of the royalist army, the mood of senior administrators was becoming more pessimistic, and at a secret meeting the audiencia ministers, including three of the four who had urged La Serna to make Cusco his base three years earlier, decided to seek from president Alvarez guarantees of their own safety should rumours of an impending evacuation of the city turn out to be accurate . 1 2 2
4.
A yacucho and its a ftermath
In the event the city of Cusco, like Lima and Arequipa, was still in royalist hands when Canterac surrendered to Sucre following the capture of the wounded La Serna at the ' sangrienta y desgraciada batalla ' fought at Ayacucho on 9 December 1 8 24, prompting Sucre's observation two days later that following the signing of the detailed capitulation, ' la campaiia de! Peru esta terminada ; su independencia y la paz de America se han firmado en este cam po de batalla ' . 1 2 3 The royalist prisoners, including 60 senior officers, 5 oo j unior officers and over 1 ,000 troops, were treated with some chivalry, a key feature of which was the choice of remaining in Peru or being repatriated to Spain. La Serna and other senior officers promptly made for the port of Qui lea, from where they departed on 3 J anuary 1 8 2 5 on a long voyage, via Rio de J aneiro and Bordeaux, back to a bitter polemic in Spain about the reasons for the loss of Peru. 1 2 4 Of greater
1 21 1 22
1 23
1 24
Gaceta, no. 49, 1 5 M ay 1 8 24, and proclamat ion of Bolivar, H uancayo, A ug. 1 5 , 1 8 24, ADC , Periodicos, l ib ro 1, fo l. 3 8 8 , 404. A cuerdo o f audiencia, 14 Sept. 1 8 24, ADC , Real A udienc ia, A suntos Ad ministrativos, leg. 1 8 0. Th e three were C or b alan, D arcourt an d M ujica, the fo urth (M osquera) having died in 1 8 2 2 ; the other signatories on this latter occasion were J uan Nepomuceno M unoz, J uan A ntonio de Zavala, and Mateo Ximeno. C amerae to president o f C usco, 1 1 D ec. 1 8 24, A DC , Periodicos, Ii b ro 2 A , fo l. 1 ; Sucre to minister o f war, A yacucho, 1 1 D ec. 1 8 24, ibid., Ii b ro 1 1 . A succinct account of the b attle is provided b y A rmando Nieto Velez, S . J . , junin and A yacucho (Lima, 1 974) . D etails of the actual voyage, particularly illuminating on the ill-feeling b etween liberals and a b solut ists, are provided by A l b erto Wagner de la Reyna, ' Ocho aiios de La Serna en el Peru ( D e la " Venganza " a la " E rnestine ") ' , Quinto Centenario, vol. 8 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , pp. 3 7- 5 9 . When they reached Spain, Pezuela and his sympathisers led the attack against La Serna an d C anterac, accusing them of cowardice an d i ncompetence : ' Di ario de operaciones de la ultima campaiia de! Peru ', B M P, Pezue l a, ms. 1 3 . Valdes, who had commanded the vanguard division, emerged as the principal apologist fo r b ot h himself his fellow-o ffi cers, b laming the defeat upon the perfidy of the common soldiers, whose front rank ' volvio la espalda ' as soon as the fighting b egan, ' llegando los mas al extremo de arrojar las armas y algunos de hacer el fuego a los J efes y Oficiales . . . ' : Valdes, Documentos, vol. 1 , p. 9 8 . [In 1 8 20, T ristan had noted that rein fo rcements fo r the 1 st C usco regiment were secured by rounding-up ' desertores , vagos y mal entendidos de ro b ustez y apt i tu des para el servicio de las A rmas ' : T ristan
82
John R. Fisher
relevance for Peruvianists is the fact that, although nearly 400 officers (and a similar number of ordinary soldiers) who surrendered at or immediately after the battle of Ayacucho exercised the right to be repatriated, a considerably larger number - 5 2 6 officers and nearly l ,ooo soldiers chose to return to ' sus casas en el pafs ' . 125 Olaneta, whose failure to support La Serna was regarded by Valdes as the other maj or reason for the defeat at Ayacucho, resisted the patriots in Upper Peru until his death at Tumusla in April 1 8 2 5 , two months before the peninsular government took the bizarre decision to name him viceroy of the Rfo de la Plata . 1 26 In Cusco the initial response to the capitulation was a half-hearted show of defiance with the audiencia naming as new viceroy the city's former president, Field Marshal Tristan, whose absence from Ayacucho made him the most senior royalist officer not in patriot custody.127 Tristan, it seems, was tempted to rally the royalist forces in Arequipa and Cusco, but having received assurances from Sucre that the safety of those who had capitulated would be guaranteed, coupled with threats that those continuing to resist would be subj ected to summary justice - ' castigados hasta con la capital ' - he stood aside to allow Gamarra to be sworn in as prefect and military commander of Cusco at the end of December. 1 28 The dominant feature of the transfer of authority in Cusco to the republican regime was continuity. The University of San Antonio Abad, closed in 1 8 1 6 in reprisal for the Pumacahua rebellion, reopened in J uly l 8 2 5 . 1 29 The audiencia was replaced in February by the Corte Superior de
1 25
1 26
1 27
1 28
1 29
to subde l egate of Ab ancay, C usco, 1 5 March 1 8 20, ADC , Intendencia, Gobierno, leg. 1 5 7.] Th eir names, ranks and destinations are pu b l ished in Coleccion documental, tomo 2 2 , vol. 3, pp. 402- 3 2 . Th ose who remained in Peru i nclu d ed 4 generals, 29 colonels, 9 3 lieutenant-colonels, 1 5 0 captains, 1 47 lieutenants, and 2 1 2 su b -lieutenants and chapla ins. Va ld es suggested, somewhat unconvincingly, that they might b e of use ' una semilla . . . que podria dar al gun dia fr utos a b un dantes ' - in the event of an attempte d S panish reconquest ; he also expressed some rel ief that the major i ty ' de Oficiales de! pais de distintos colores ' had not exercised the option of going to Spain, b ecause they would have b een ' i nutiles en la Europa, aunque muy b enemeritos allf por su fidelidad' : Valdes, Documentos, vol. 1 , p . 1 o 1 . Garcia C am b a, Memoria, p. 3 26 . El Sol, a new C usco periodical inaugurated on 1 January 1 8 2 5 , printed an account of the b attle on 1 6 A pril 1 8 2 5 , and on 2 3 A pril a somewhat tardy report of the mutiny of the C ocha b am b a garrison against Olaiieta on 1 3 J anuary : ADC , Periodicos, l ib ro 2 A , fo l. 43-6. Garcia-Camba, Memoria, p. 2 8 5 ; T orrente, Historia, vol. 3, p. 5 07 . D ecree of Gamarra, C usco, 30 D ec. 1 8 24, ADC , Periodicos, libro 2 A , fo l. 9 . Th e detai ls o f t h e sweari ng o f alleg i ance b y the c i ty counc il and ot her corporations are i n Gamarra to J ose de Caceres, 3 0 D ec. 1 8 24, ibid., fo l. 1 1 . D ecree o f Bolivar, U ru b am b a, 1 8 J uly 1 8 2 5 , in El Sol, no. 3 0 , 2 3 J uly 1 8 2 5 , ADC , Periodicos, libro 2 A .
Royalist Regime in the Viceroyaity of Peru
83
J usticia, exercising virtually identical powers and even with some continuity of personnel. 1 30 Rhetorical flourishes from Bolivar assured the ' Pueblo querido de los Incas . . . los remotos descendientes del Sol ' of their glorious future, prompting the editor of El Sol to publish an imagined reply from Manco Capac to the ' ilustre rejenerador de mi patria, vengador de la sangre de mis hij os ' , stating that he could now rest in peace ' dej ando a mi Peru descansando, Libertador, a la sombra de tus laureles ' . 131 The reality, of course, for the indigenous inhabitants was that many of the measures taken by Bolivar to give them nominal equality - including the division of community lands and the abolition of cacicazgos - accelerated the late-colonial process of usurpation of community resources by non Indians . 1 32 A classic beneficiary was Pablo de Mar y Tapia, a former functionary of the audiencia as well as cacique of Puroy, who rapidly became one of the region's largest landowners, and representative of Paruro in the national congress, before securing appointment as treasurer of Cusco's ct!Ja nacional in 1 8 3 4. 133 The principal dilemma faced by individuals such as Mar y Tapia was whether they should make do with socio-economic gains or seek political power too. The related question was whether they should identify with the metropolitan elite, striving somewhat unsuccessfully until the 1 8 4os to centralise power in Lima, or with the regional forces that looked back to Cusco's primacy in Peru in 1 8 20-4 and saw that as a basis for reuniting Peru and Bolivia. The crunch came in 1 8 3 6-9 with the creation of the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation, and the establishment of Cusco as the capital of the southern Peruvian state . 1 34 Gamarra, by then identified with Lima and its elite, preferred to side with Chile in destroying the confederation in 1 8 3 9, only to lose his life two years later in his punitive
1 30
131
132 1 33
1 34
D eta ils of its mem b ership are in El Sol, 19 Fe b . 1 8 2 5 , ibid., fo l. 2 6-7. Th e cont inuity was person i fied by S ant i ago C or b alan, oidor since 1 8 1 7, who b ecame one o f the three m i n i sters o f the new court. El Sol reporte d that although he and i ts pres id ent, Vicente Leon, had b een employed b y the fo rmer reg i me, ' no se familiarisaron con el despotismo ' . A su b sequent issue of El Sol (no. 46, 1 1 Nov. 1 8 2 5 , ibid., fo l. 1 04) noted that C orb alan had b een elected to represent C usco i n the nat i onal senate. ' E l J enera! en Jefe de! E jerc i to Unido L ib ertador de! Peru a los habitantes de! C uzco ', 29 D ec. 1 8 24, ADC , Periodicos, lib ro 1 1 ; El Sol, no. 29, 1 6 J uly 1 8 2 5 , ibid., lib ro 2 A , fol . 70-7 1 . D ecrees o f Bolivar of J uly 1 8 2 5 a b ol ishing personal service, the mita, cacicazgos and communal ownership of lan d are in ADC , Peri6dicos, l ib ro 2, fo l. 67, 1 2 7. J orge A . Guevara Gil, Propiedad agraria y derecho colonial : los documentos de la hacienda Santosis Cuzco (!J4J-T822) (Li ma, 1 99 3 ), pp. 2 8 5 -8 , David P. Ca hill , ' Independencia, sociedad y fisca lid ad : el Sur A ndino ( 1 7 8 0- 1 8 8 0) ', Revista Complutense de Historia de America, vol. 1 9 ( 1 99 3 ), pp. 2 6 2-3 . General coverage o f this process is provided by P. T . Parkerson, ' Sub -Reg i onal Integration in Nineteenth- Century South A merica : A ndres Santa C ruz and the Peru-Bolivi a C onfederation, 1 8 3 5 - 1 8 3 9 ' (Ph. D . di ss., University o f Florida, 1 9 7 8 ) .
84
John R. Fisher
attempt to incorporate Bolivia into a Peru ruled from Lima. The more astute Tristan, who had remained in his native Areguipa after 1 8 24, graduated from the office of prefect there in 1 8 3 2-3 to become the confederation's minister of foreign affairs in 1 8 3 6-7 and provisional president of the southern Peruvian state in 1 8 3 8-9 . Like many arequipeiios, he decided soon after the battle of Yungay that southern Peruvian regionalism was a spent force, and that the future lay in retiring from politics and concentrating upon business in guano-rich Lima . 135 If, 1 60 years later, genuine decentralisation becomes a reality in the Peru of the third millenium, perhaps La Serna, like Manco Capac in 1 8 2 5 , will feel compelled to write from beyond the grave to the editor of El Sol.
135
A s early as 1 8 0 8 , when he was a/ca/de of A requipa, T ristan fo rmed a company to yre and the cargo of guano it was carrying fr om C opiap6 to purchase the ship Buen A Callao : A rchivo D epartamental de A requ i pa, Protocolos, Rafael de H urtado ( 1 8 0 8 ) , fo l. j j -9 .

John R. Fisher - Royalist Regime in The Viceroyalty of Peru, 1820-1824

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

John R. Fisher - Royalist Regime in The Viceroyalty of Peru, 1820-1824

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

The Royalist Regime in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1820-1824 Author(s): John R.

Lat. Amer. Stud. 32, j 5--84

Printed in the United Kingdom

Cambridge University Press

The Royalist Regime in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1820-1824 *

This article provides an analysis of royalist strategy in the viceroyalty

and the battle of Ayacucho of December

when viceroy JOSe de la

July. Its focus differs, therefore, from

Following substantive discussion of the period

it concludes with observations on the historical legacy in Peru of the

royalists' elevation of the city of Cusco to the status of viceregal capital in

Royalist Regime in the Viceroyalty of Peru

Royalis t Regime in the Viceroyalty of Peru

2 . The historical context: Peru

Royalist Regime in the Viceroya!ty of Peru

A detailed account of the viceroy's military career is provided by Joaquin de la Pezuela,

Royalist Regime in the Viceroyalty of Peru

Rqyalist Regime in the Vicerqyalty of Peru

Printed roya l order, 30 Sept. 1 8 20, A DC , Periodicos, libro 1, fol . 8 1 .

Royalist Regime in the Viceroyalty of Peru

Spanish American Revolutions, pp. 1 7I-2 .

Royalist Regime in the Viceroyafty of Peru

Royalist Regime in the Viceroyafty of Peru

Royalist Regime in the Viceroya!ty of Peru

Rf!Yalist Regime in the Vicerf!)lalty of Peru

Royalist Regime in the Viceroyafty of Peru

Royalist Regime in the Viceroya!ty of Peru

Rf!Yalist Regime in the Vicerf!)'alty of Peru

A yacucho and its a ftermath

Royalist Regime in the Viceroyaity of Peru

Potrebbero piacerti anche