Saul Kripke: Lecture II of Naming and Necessity

Kripke summarizes the Descriptivist theory of naming in the following theses (where is a cluster of properties, A is an individual engaged in naming a thing, and X is the name) 1. To every name or designation expression X, there corresponds a cluster of properties such that A believes applies to X (i.e., X) 2. One, or some cluster, of the properties , are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely. 3. If a weighted most of the s are satisfied by one unique object y, then y is the referent of the name X. 4. If no unique object is described by the weighted most, then X does not refer. 5. The statement If X exists, then X has most of the s is known a priori by the speaker. 6. The statement If X exists, then X has most of the s expresses a necessary truth. Recall that Searles reason for coming up with a Cluster theory of descriptions was that he wanted to avoid the following problem: For any single description (say, the teacher of Alexander the Great) if we say that description corresponds with, is meant by or is equivalent to, a name (Aristotle), then the statement the name is the description (Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander the Great) is necessarily true. BUT (says Searle) it is not necessarily true that Aristotle taught Alexander (Aristotle might have died young or joined the army, but still have been Aristotle). Thats why names cant be associated with any particular descriptions, and must be a purposely vague cluster instead. What Searle does allow is that:
It is a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of properties commonly attributed to him: any individual not having at least some of these properties could not be Aristotle. [591, quoted by Kripke on 611]

This is Thesis 6 on Kripkes list, and he just denies it:

It would seem that its a contingent fact that Aristotle ever did any of the things commonly attributed to him today, any of those great achievements that we so much admire. [612]

That is, on Kripkes view, Aristotle could in fact have been the guy in Hoboken in 1902 that Searle dismisses as a candidate [588] and even stronger, he could have been that guy and not even have been called Aristotle. Kripke even denies that the famous original Metre that exists in France today (the stick that set the standard length for the metre) might not have been a metre long. To explain this view, we need to understand Kripkes concept of a rigid designator to which he alludes on p. 612. This is defined earlier in Naming and Necessity, and not explained here, but essentially, a rigid designator is a referring expression that picks out the same thing in all possible worlds (in which it exists). To explain this, we need to understand the notion of possible worlds. The term goes back to Leibniz, but was re-

discovered and exploited as a way of understanding modal claims (that is, claims involving logical possibility and necessity). Something is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds. Something is possible if there is at least one possible world in which it is true. Think of possible worlds not as planets, but as ways things might have been. Thus, there is at least one (in fact, an infinity) of possible worlds in which you are President of the United States. There are possible worlds where you are superhero, where you are a bum, where you are the richest person in the world, the oldest, the poorest, the ugliest, the most beautiful, etc., etc. There are possible worlds much closer (in the sense of resembling) to this one, in which you are exactly like you are now, except for one tiny detail (say, one fewer hair on your head). The fact that we can say all this requires that we be able to pick you out in all possible worlds (so that we can say you are President, superhero or whatever). That is what a rigid designator does. On Kripkes view all proper names are rigid designators (there are others too, but all proper names count). There are even some worlds in which you dont exist at all which is why we say of rigid designators that they refer to the same thing in all possible worlds where it exists. Because there is an infinity of possible worlds, you could have any feature on one of them, and you could exists in some without having any of the features you have on this actual world. Thats why Kripke denies thesis 6. [Is he right to do so?] What picture of naming remains if we just hold theses 1-5? Kripke suggests it is naming as a sort of mental ceremony [615]:
By Cicero I shall mean the man who denounced Catiline; and thats what the reference of Cicero will be my intentions are given by first, giving some condition which uniquely determines an object, then using a certain word as a name for the object determined by this condition.

Kripke allows that there are some occasions when we do do this, and gives the example of the name Jack the Ripper which applies to whomever killed the prostitutes in Victorian London, and was intended to do just that. (This sounds like Donellans attributive use of definite descriptions, only here applied to proper names.) Why Thesis (2) is false [616] According to Thesis 2, we believe that the cluster of properties we associate with a name pick out an individual uniquely. However, most people only know of Richard Feynman that he is (was) a theoretical physicist. Thats the entirety of their cluster of properties for that name. Yet they would not deny that that same description (a theoretical physicist) applies equally to Gell-Mann. But, despite all this, says Kripke, I still think [the user] use the name Feynman as a name for Feynman. (And even in cases where we do have a description that picks out an individual uniquely say the man who denounced Catiline it is often the case that what we know about that description is only that it applies to the person (Cicero) so we have a circular definition. (For example, we know of Relativity that it is Einsteins Theory, and we know of Einstein that hes the guy who came up with relativity.)

Why Thesis (3) is false [617-619] According to Thesis 3, if I associate a cluster of descriptions with the name Gdel, then if a weighted most of those descriptions are true of an object, it must be Gdel. For Gdel, most people who use the name only attach to it the description the person who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. But suppose in fact Schmidt proved it and Gdel murdered him and stole the credit. If Thesis 3 were true, then most users of the name Gdel would in fact be using it to refer to Schmidt. But they are not, so Thesis 3 is false. (Second example: Peano and Dedekind [618]). Or, imagine someone thinks only of Einstein as the inventor of the A-Bomb (not true) they still refer to Einstein by using Einstein. Why Thesis (4) is false [619] Thesis 4 is the claim that if the vote yields no unique object the name does not refer. The case of Feynman and Gell Mann is one where there is no unique object. But what about no object? Well, suppose nobody proved incompleteness (perhaps the proof simply materialized by a random scattering of atoms on a piece of paper or the proof doesnt actually work), you could still refer to Gdel with the description the man who proved incompleteness. ALSO: apparently Jonah really existed, even though he never actually was in a whale or preached to the Ninevites (the two descriptions most people know him by). Why Thesis (5) is false [620] Even where theses 3 and 4 happen to be true, and I really do know that Gdel proved incompleteness, I hardly know that a priori. Can the theory be saved? Suggestion: when I do my mental ceremony I say By Cicero I shall mean the man who most people think proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Still open to Peano/Dedekind-type counterexamples. Only in this case, I am the only one who still believes that Peano discovered the Peano axioms actually discovered by Dedekind everyone else knows better. Nonetheless, when I use Peano I still refer to Peano and not Dedekind. The Causal Theory of Reference [622-] In fact, the private reference-fixing depicted by the mental ceremony picture is wrong, and reference is achieved through public community-controlled methods:
Someone, lets say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain. A speaker who is on the far end of this chain, who has heard about, say Richard Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere, may be referring to Richard Feynman even though he cant remember from whom he first heard of Feynman or from whom he ever heard of Feynman. He knows that Feynman is a famous physicist. A certain passage of communication reaching ultimately to the man himself does reach the speaker. He then is referring to Feynman even though he cant identify him uniquely a

chain of communication going back to Feynman himself has been established, by virtue of his membership in a community which passed the name on from link to link, not by a ceremony that he makes in private in his study [622]

Kripke resists calling this a theory, because he doesnt give necessary and sufficient conditions for fixing reference. He even brings up apparent counterexamples:
Not every sort of causal chain reaching from me to a certain man will do for me to make a reference. There may be a causal chain from our use of the term Santa Claus to a certain historical saint, but still the children, when they use this, by this time probably do not refer to that saint. [623-4]

What he is giving is instead a better picture than the one presented by Theses 1-5. What can be said is that:
Its in virtue of our connection with other speakers in the community, going back to the referent himself, that we refer to a certain man. [624] In general our reference depends not just on what we think ourselves, but on other people in the community, the history of how the name reached one, and things like that. [625]

A rough statement of a theory might include two steps: 1. An initial baptism 2. A process whereby the name is passed from link to link. When this happens:
the receiver of the name mustintend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it. If I hear the name Napoleon and decide it would be a nice name for my pet aardvark, I do not satisfy this condition. [626]

(Apparently only men use names.) Statements of Identity [626-631] According to Kripke, names are rigid designators, which means that Hesperus is Phosphorus is true in all possible worlds, and thus a necessary truth. In contrast, descriptions are flaccid designators, that is, only picking out the thing that matches the description in all worlds. Thus the inventor of bifocals picks out Benjamin Franklin in this world but not in other possible worlds, while Benjamin Franklin picks him out in all worlds (that he exists in). That means Hesperus is the evening star is a contingent truth. Interestingly, Hesperus is Phosphorus, although a necessary truth is not known a priori. Thus there can be necessary truths known a posteriori.