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Contention One: Inherency The perpetual War on Terror has created an ever-lasting state of emergency, to fight the others. This is the ultimate deployment of biopolitical control that acts through such concentration camps as Guantanamo bay. These camps stripe the occupants of their rights and dehumanize them.
Jess, White, 7/04 Project Officer of World Refugee Day (The Human is a Battleground) http://stateofemergency.nomasters.org/reader/human.html What is the human today? And what is life? While once the answers perhaps seemed self - evident, today this is far from the case. Emerging

biotechnologies have moved both life and death from the natural realm into the realm of decisionism and hence the realm of sovereign power . Schools of bioethics
are devoted to such questions as, when is an embryo life? When is a foetus too old too abort? What counts as death - the end of the heartbeat? Brain-death? Yet while technologies have forced debate on such matters, another more sinister redefinition of the border between the human and the animal is taking place in the sphere of a politics that is rapidly being subsumed into biopolitics. Life, politics, and the politicisation of life: From Aristotle to Arendt, classical political thinkers have sought to delimit politics, setting it apart from mere life, which, they argued, was an essentially private affair. In Ancient Greece, this distinction is evident in the lack of a single word for human life, signified by the split between zoe: natural life, and bios: the politically qualified life. The purpose of politics was therefore not simply life but the good life, a life that is not naturally given but is an achievement. Hence only through political action could one create a good and truly human life. Yet while these thinkers conceived of natural life as that which must be excluded from the polis, the realm of politics, zoe is nonetheless presupposed as that which must simultaneously be excluded and politicised through its transformation into bios. For Agamben, the relationship between what he terms bare life and the polis is one of inclusive exclusion: bare life is immediately included as that which is held in a ban, or maintained in a relation of abandonment, in order to enable the existence of politics. Agamben gives the name bare life to that threshold between bios and zoe which separates the political sphere from the sphere of natural life, and the polis from the private realm. And yet today this threshold has succumbed to instability. As the management of biological life becomes the supreme political task, the border between bios and zoe crumbles, and Arendts assertion that life and death are non-worldly and anti-political can no longer be sustained. As life and death are politicised, we see, in

concerns with racial purity and biological heredity - which became the fundamental tasks of the Nazi state - and in the movement of death from a zone of pure biological fact into one of politics by virtue of new medical technologies, the necessity for biopolitics to pass over into thanatopolitics (a politics of death). Death is always lurking behind the states care for life, a realisation that has existed since
Socrates described an art of medicine in which the doctor would let die the ones whose bodies are [corrupt] and the ones whose souls have bad natures and are incurable, they themselves will kill.2 Biopolitics In his 1976 lecture series at the College de France, Society Must be Defended, Foucault pointed to racism as that which reinscribes the right to kill in the sphere of a state supposedly committed to the fostering of, and care for, life. Foucault argues that in the biopower system killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race. 3 As Foucault points out, war today has two functions: it exists not only to destroy a political adversary but also to destroy the biological threat, to destroy the sort of threat that those people over there represent to our race. It is in this context that we should view the recent warnings by a senior

In the context of Iraq, we see how this mobilisation of a biological discourse, which as Foucault points out is simply reinscribed onto the notion of the political enemy, is utilised to deadly effect, justifying the indiscrimate targeting of a civilian population conceived as both enemy and subhuman threat, and undoubtedly contributing to the torture, degradation and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners.
British military officer that the US occupying forces in Iraq view the Iraqi population as untermenschen (subhuman). Human Rights?

How then do we respond to this new biopolitical control? The primary response to the inscription of biological life into the realm of state power and of politics, has been the assertion that inalienable rights are attached to the human in and of itself. Yet to invoke human rights is not only to legitimise the power of the state that must enforce them, but to be implicated in the very development of a biopolitics that has turned human life into a site for political control. Far from being neutral in relation to this power, human rights declarations are mechanisms by which sovereignty, which was previously legitimated through recourse to the divine, now finds its basis in a national or sovereign people. To locate rights in the biological life of the human, is to bring this life further into the realm of sovereign power. As Agamben puts it: It is almost as if starting from a certain point, every decisive political event were double sided: the spaces, the liberties and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with certain powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals lives within the state order, thus offering a new and more dreadful foundation for the very sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate themselves.4 The truth of this is perhaps best revealed in the 1679 writ of habeas corpus show us the body. Habeas corpus was a writ aimed at the undermining of arbitrary imprisonment, and provided that an individual who was detained must, if a writ was lodged, be brought before a magistrate within a certain period of time. Interestingly however, the writ operated without reference to the standard mechanisms of political legitimation: it referred not to the subject of feudal relations, or the citizen imbued with political rights, but simply to the body, the human in and of itself. While, as Hansen and Stepputat argue, habeas corpus curtailed the exercise of arbitrary state violence by defining the body of the citizen as an integral part of the sovereign body of the people and thus entitled to due process, it did so only at the cost of entangling the body, or something akin to Agambens bare life, in the sphere of sovereign power. This analysis of Agambens goes beyond the more familiar critique of human rights, which suggests that in their application, human rights are in fact the rights of citizens. Certainly this recognition provides an initial insight into the mobilisation of the category of the human, and the concomitant dehumanisation that has always accompanied it. Yet to point to the nationally demarcated sphere of application of human rights is not enough to explain the changing nature of the human that has accompanied the progression from a sovereignty legitimated through the life of a people, to a biopolitics of national populations, to the emerging biopolitics of humanity. While today the possession of citizenship is an essential precondition for access to human rights, it is by no means enough to guarantee such access. If today biopolitics increasingly operates on a global scale, taking all the people of the globe as a population to be monitored, ordered, hierarchized and intervened into with

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food parcels or with missiles, then citizenship can no longer play the role, or at least cannot play it alone, of policing the binary opposition between those who are, and those who are not granted human rights. Increasingly this role is being taken up by the very notion of the human: a notion that must not be conceived as either natural or neutral. In an era devoid of middle grounds, as epitomised by Bushs threat you are with us or you are with the terrorists, the role of humanity in the simplistic dualism between good and evil, freedom and terror, is not to mark out the universal or the common, but to offer decisive proof of the authority of the US imperial project. Humanity is not a value-free term but one imbued with a particular political coloration. Just as tolerant liberal multiculturalists can tolerate anyone as long as they are liberal, multicultural and tolerant, the Bush regime, despite its brutality, justifies its actions through reference to notions of humanity and freedom, thus imbuing such notions with a specific geopolitical content and function. Hence anyone who threatens this geopolitical project, or even challenges the benevolence or desirability of a US empire, is quickly written out of the sphere of humanity. Guantanamo: This has become most evident in the context of the war on terror, and internment by the United States of thousands of people termed unlawful combatants, including British and Australian citizens, IN GUANTANAMO BAY. GUANTANAMO BAy, along with spaces like Australias detention centres, is, in Agambens terminology, a camp, defined as a localization of a state of exception. While the state of emergency, or exception , is often conceived as a temporal suspension of law aimed at the restoration of order, in the camp this regime of exceptionality finds a permanent spatial arrangement . And if, within the state of exception, sovereign power confronts bare life without the mediation of law or rights, then the camp is the ultimate

biopolitical space, in which the state directly takes over the management of the biological life of the human.
As Agamben has warned of the proximity between biopolitics and thanatopolitics, what

Guantanamo demonstrates is the complicity between the direct management of human life, and dehumanisation. As previous wars and colonial projects have demonstrated, the divide between the human in and of itself, and the inhuman is a slippery one. Jamal Al Harith, a Briton recently released without charge from Guantanamo after two years tells: After a while we stopped asking for human rights - we wanted animal rights. In Camp X-Ray my cage was right next to a kennel housing an Alsatian dog. He had a wooden house with air conditioning and green grass to exercise on. I said to the guards, I want his rights, and they replied, That dog is a member of the US army. Once humans are stripped of the mediation of law and citizenship and placed outside the discourse of human rights, it is not long before they find that it is with these mechanisms that the political construction of the human begins and ends. As those detained in Camp X-ray and Camp Delta are accused of complicity in a crime against humanity (September 11) or of fighting for the inhuman Taliban regime, they are written out of the very status of humanity. Yet it should not be conceived that the humanity from which they are expelled is self-evident, or pre-existing. Just as it is the exception which creates the norm, it is through the figure of the inhuman, as the negative but constitutive term, that humanity itself is constructed.

The system of tribunals fails to use any due process, provide Habrus Corpus, and ignores international law
William Fisher, Staff Writer for IPS, 4/13/05, (RIGHTS: U.S. JOINT CHIEFS WANT TOUGHER RULES ON 'TERROR' DETAINEES) lexis

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff want Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to approve new guidelines that would formalise the Bush administration's policy of imprisoning so-called enemy combatants without the protections of the Geneva Conventions, Human Rights Watch (HRW) says. The guidelines would also enable the Pentagon to legally hold "ghost detainees" who are denied access to the International Committee of the Red Cross, according to the HRW. In a letter to Rumsfeld, the rights advocacy group said, "Denying the protections of the Geneva Conventions to
persons apprehended in the global war on terror is unsupported as a matter of law, represents a radical deviation from the standards that have traditionally guided U.S. military operations, and places U.S. service members and civilians detained by enemy forces at greater risk of mistreatment." The new memorandum, now in final draft, is known as the "Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations: Joint Publication 3-63", and is dated Mar. 23, 2005. "If the draft memorandum is approved, it will formalise 'enemy combatant' as a class of prisoner that the Bush administration says has no protections under the Geneva Conventions," HRW attorney John Sifton told IPS. "There are no categories of prisoners unprotected by one or another of the Geneva Convention." An additional concern, he said, is that the draft memorandum would give the military authority to classify as an enemy combatant anyone whose name appears on a government watchlist. "The proposed watchlist

includes a wide variety of groups from Sikhs to followers of Peru's Shining Path, and potentially hundreds of thousands of people named Ahmed or Mohamed. This is a huge and radical departure that could further erode the rule of law." The letter to Rumsfeld, signed by HRW Executive
Director Kenneth Roth, says if the Defence Department acts on the new guidelines, "U.S. military personnel may be committing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and placing themselves at risk of prosecution for war crimes." The organisation argues that the U.S. government's decision in January 2002 to "disavow the applicability of the Geneva Conventions in the global war on terror" has been at the root of alleged detainee abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. HRW says the new rules "will send a message to the world that the Geneva Conventions are not law, but mere policies that can be changed according to tastes of a particular government." This in turn would have "a profound impact on future armed conflicts between states and the soldiers and civilians affected by them, including Americans." They also contain overly broad criteria for designating as an enemy combatant anyone who appears on a government list that contains common names and aliases shared by tens of thousands of persons worldwide. The Pentagon document has not yet been publicly released, and is to be submitted to Rumsfeld for approval on Apr. 16. The Defence Department declined to comment on the reported draft memorandum or the HRW letter to Rumsfeld. Last June, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down two decisions related to the detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In the first case, the justices ruled that detainees had the right to due process and must be allowed to contest their imprisonment before a "neutral decision-maker". The second case confirmed that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to hear such challenges. The Defence Department

then created special military tribunals to determine which Guantanamo prisoners posed threats to the U.S. These bodies have been criticised for denying detainees the most basic due process, including attorney-client confidentiality. Little information about those held at
Guantanamo has been released through official government channels. But stories of 60 or more of the prisoners are spelled out in detail in thousands of pages of transcripts

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filed in U.S. District Court in Washington, where detainees have filed lawsuits challenging their detentions. Court documents publicised last week are giving dozens of Guantanamo

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detainees what the Bush administration had sought to keep from public view: identities and voices. The government is holding about 550 terrorist suspects at its naval base in Cuba. An additional 214 have been released since the facility opened in January 2002 -- some into the custody of their native governments, others freed outright. The detainees appeared last year before the three-officer military tribunals which, after quick reviews, confirmed their status

as "enemy combatants" who could be held indefinitely. In the transcripts, one terror suspect asked his U.S. military judge: "Is it possible to see the evidence in order to refute it?" In another case, Guantanamo prisoner Feroz Ali Abbasi was ejected from his hearing for repeatedly challenging the legality of his detention. "I have the right to speak," Abbasi insisted in transcripts reviewed by the Associated Press. "No, you don't," the tribunal president replied. "I don't care about international law ," the tribunal president told Abbasi just before he was taken from the room. "I don't want to hear the words 'international law' again. We are not concerned with international law."

finally, The process of detainment will spread, destroying multilateralism and soft power
Judith, Butler, 04, Professor of Rhetoric at Berkeley (Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence) My fear is that the indefinite

detainment of prisoners on Guantanamo will become a model for the branding and management of so-called terrorists in various global sites where no rights of appeal to international rights and to international courts will be presumed. If this extension of lawless and illegitimate power takes place, we will see the resurgence of a violent and self aggrandizing state sovereignty at the expense of any commitment to global cooperation that might support and redistribute rights of recognition governing who may be treated according to standards that ought to govern the treatment of humans. This is a form of sovereignty that seeks to absorb an international coalition, rather than submit to a self limiting practice by
virtue of its international obligations

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Contention Two: Advantages Sub point A Bio power This bio political control over the other justifies wholesale slaughter of entire populations and nuclear annihilation.
Foucault in 78 (Michel Foucault, philosopher, former director at the Francais Institute at Hamberg, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, pg 136-137, Nov. 1978)
Since the classical age, the West

has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. Deduction has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the social body to ensure, maintain or develop its life . Yet wars were never as bloody as the have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death-and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which is
has so greatly expanded its limits-now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended;

they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as mangers of life and survival-of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individuals continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle-that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, ad the large -scale phenomena of population.

also, It is a moral obligation to protect humyn rights

San 93 (Secretary General of Amnesty International)
The issue is not an argument between human rights organizations and governments; it

is a struggle between the people and their governments. What is at stake today is a vision of the world in which all human beings can live in the knowledge that certain basic rights are inviable. It is the duty of each of us individuals and collectively to see that these rights are always protected .

finally, The people must rise up to defend against all breaches of freedom or be thrown into a world of tyranny.
Petro, 74 (Law Professor at Wake Forest, Wake Forest Law Review.)
However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway - "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume's observation : "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once ." Thus it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been of so many other aspects. The road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration." Ask Solzhenisyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit .

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Sub point B Soft Power Lack of soft power creates a perception of hostile hegemony thereby stroking an isolationist public legitimacy is the only way to sustain unipolarity Kori Schake, Director for Defense Strategy, National Security Council, and Klaus Becher, Senior Fellow for European Security, International Institute for Strategic Studies, August 02 (How America Should Lead Policy Review) lexis
IF THE AMERICAN-LED Century is to become the American-led Centuries, the U.S. needs to foster and promote the sources of American power: the legitimacy and quality of leadership ensured by America's democratic institutions and rule of law, the dynamism of the global economy,
the innovative juggernaut of the American military, international respect for U.S. analysis and diplomacy, the sparkling generosity of individual Americans and their charities, the magnetic attraction for immigration that enriches diversity and expands the talent pool, the good sense of the American people, the belief in progress and harnessing technology, the prospect of more capable webbing together of the instruments of power. All the things that have made the U.S. strong show every likelihood of making it stronger -- and while America certainly doesn't have all the answers, as a society it is open to finding right answers and correcting its course. The U.S. could

very likely sustain the current American-dominated international order unilaterally, shedding the constraining and frequently aggravating alliances and institutions. However, that would be a costly way to dominate, and one with which the American public is likely to be uncomfortable. An international order in which other states did not want U.S. dominion and regulation would be a much more burdensome and hostile international order -- one much more likely to make American taxpayers feel isolationist, with all the damaging consequences for American well-being.

and, The end of unipolarity results in multiple nuclear wars, systemic global conflict, and magnification of all impacts Niall Ferguson, Professor, History,School of Business, New York University and Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, October 04 [A world
Without Power - Foreign Policy] infotrac.

So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an
altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populousroughly 20 times moreso friction between the world's disparate tribes is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalizationthe integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capitalhas raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalizationwhich a new Dark Age would produce

would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing transAtlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis,
unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economyfrom New York to Rotterdam to Shanghaiwould become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile , limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa , the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne . If the United States retreats from global hegemonyits fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontierits critics at home and abroad must

not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolaritya global vacuum of power.

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also, Hard Power exercised without soft power obliterates US leadership in numerous ways domestic public backlash, overextension of resources, counterbalancing, loss of international coop and acceleration of nuclear proliferation.
G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice @ Georgetown University and Transatlantic Fellow @ the German Marshall Fund of the United States, October 02 (Americas Imperial Ambition) lexis . Unchecked U.S. power, shorn of legitimacy and disentangled from the postwar norms and institutions of the international order, will usher in a more hostile international system, making it far harder to achieve American interests. The secret of the United States' long brilliant run as the world's leading state was its ability and willingness to exercise power within alliance and multinational frameworks, which made its power and agenda more acceptable to allies and other key states around the world. This achievement has now been put at risk by the administration's new thinking. The most immediate problem is that the neoimperialist approach is unsustainable. Going it alone might well succeed in removing Saddam Hussein from power, but it is far less certain that a strategy of counterproliferation, based on American willingness to use unilateral force to confront dangerous dictators, can work over the long term. An American policy that leaves the United States alone to decide which states are threats and how best to deny them weapons of mass destruction will lead to a diminishment of multilateral mechanisms -- most important of which is the nonproliferation regime. The Bush administration has elevated the threat of WMD to the top of its security agenda without investing its power or prestige in fostering, monitoring, and enforcing nonproliferation commitments. The tragedy of September 11 has given the Bush administration the authority and willingness to confront the Iraqs of the world. But that will not be enough when even more complicated cases come along -- when it is not the use of force that is needed but concerted multilateral action to provide sanctions and inspections. Nor is it certain that a preemptive or preventive military intervention will go well; it might trigger a domestic political backlash to American-led and military-focused interventionism. America's well-meaning imperial strategy could undermine the principled multilateral agreements, institutional infrastructure, and cooperative spirit needed for the long-term success of nonproliferation goals. The specific doctrine of preemptive action poses a related problem: once the United States feels it can take such a course, nothing will stop other countries from doing the same. Does the United
Pitfalls accompany this neoimperial grand strategy, however States want this doctrine in the hands of Pakistan, or even China or Russia? After all, it would not require the intervening state to first provide evidence for its actions. The United States argues that to wait until all the evidence is in,

quite paradoxically, overwhelming American conventional military might, combined with a policy of preemptive strikes, could lead hostile states to accelerate programs to acquire their only possible deterrent to the United States: WMD. This is another version of the security dilemma, but one made worse by a neoimperial grand strategy. Another problem follows. The use of force to eliminate WMD capabilities or overturn dangerous regimes is never simple, whether it is pursued unilaterally or by a concert of major states. After the military intervention is over, the target country has to be put back together. Peacekeeping and state building are inevitably required, as are long-term strategies that
or until authoritative international bodies support action, is to wait too long. Yet that approach is the only basis that the United States can use if it needs to appeal for restraint in the actions of others. Moreover, and
bring the un, the World Bank, and the major powers together to orchestrate aid and other forms of assistance. This is not heroic work, but it is utterly necessary. Peacekeeping troops may be required for many years, even after a new regime is built. Regional conflicts inflamed

. This is the "long tail" of burdens and commitments that comes with every major military action. When these costs and are added to America's imperial military role, it becomes even more doubtful that the neoimperial strategy can be sustained at home over the long haul -- the classic problem of imperial overstretch. The United States could keep its military predominance for decades if it is supported by a growing and increasingly productive economy. But the indirect burdens of cleaning up the political mess in terrorist-prone failed states levy a hidden cost. Peacekeeping and state building will require coalitions of states and multilateral agencies that can be brought into the process only if the initial decisions about military intervention are hammered out in consultation with other major states. America's older realist and liberal grand strategies suddenly become relevant again. A third problem with an imperial grand strategy is that it cannot generate the cooperation needed to solve practical problems at the heart of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. In the fight on terrorism, the
by outside military intervention must also be calmed

obligations

United States needs cooperation from European and Asian countries in intelligence, law enforcement, and logistics. Outside the security sphere, realizing U.S. objectives depends even more on a continuous stream of amicable working relations with major states around the

But it is impossible to expect partners to acquiesce to America's self-appointed global security protectorate and then pursue business as usual in all other domains. The key policy tool for states confronting a unipolar and unilateral America is to withhold cooperation in day-to-day relations with the United States. One obvious means is trade policy; the European response to the recent American decision to impose tariffs on imported steel is explicable in these terms. This particular struggle concerns specific trade issues, but it is also a struggle over how Washington exercises power. The United States may be a unipolar military power, but economic and political power is more evenly distributed across the globe. The major states may not have much leverage in directly restraining American military policy, but they can make the United States pay a price in other areas. Finally, the neoimperial grand strategy poses a wider problem for the maintenance of American unipolar power. It steps into the oldest trap of powerful imperial states: self-encirclement. When the most powerful state in the world throws its weight around, unconstrained by rules or norms of legitimacy, it risks a backlash. Other countries will bridle at an international order in which the United States plays only by its own rules. The proponents of the new grand strategy have assumed that the United States can single-handedly deploy military power abroad and not suffer untoward consequences; relations will be coarser with friends and allies, they believe, but such are the costs of leadership. But history shows that powerful states tend to trigger self-encirclement by their own overestimation of their power . Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon, and the leaders of
world. It needs partners for trade liberalization, global financial stabilization, environmental protection, deterring transnational organized crime, managing the rise of China, and a host of other thorny challenges.

would-be

post-Bismarck Germany sought to expand their imperial domains and impose a coercive order on others. Their imperial orders were all brought down when other countries decided they were not prepared to live in a world dominated by an overweening coercive state. America's imperial goals and modus operandi are much more limited and benign than were those of age-old emperors. But a hard-line imperial grand strategy runs the risk that

history will repeat itself.

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and, The acceleration of WMD proliferation causes nuclear wars and global escalation
Victor

Utgoff, Deputy fo Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, Institute for Defense Analysis, 02 (Survival) http://survival.oupjournals.org

Widespread proliferation

is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear six-shooters on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

moreover, the legitimatization of torture destroys our European relations as well as our soft power
James Kitfield, 1/15/05, Staff Writer for the The National Journal, (Give 'Em Hell, George?) lexis "But in an extraordinary series of decisions in 1949,Truman put forward ideas and molded a successful strategy that was neither American nor European in nature, but rather Western.' That solidarity between America and Europe remains the best recipe for global security today," said Serfaty. "My concern now is that the United States is no longer in control of events, but rather, events are controlling us. And if the present outreach by the Bush administration to allies in Europe is spurned, or is unsuccessful, then the issues we face together will worsen, the bad feelings across the Atlantic will grow, and the Western alliance that is already splintering may never recover."

The question now is whether those moves are mostly stylistic flourishes designed to temporarily mask the hard edges of U.S. foreign policy -- or whether they are signs of a substantive effort to adjust the Bush Doctrine in the face of demands by allies for more consultations and consensus-building. The answer could well shape the history of the early 21st century and determine whether the United States reclaims leadership of the industrialized democracies. Either America will lead the West in a collective effort to confront crises in Iraq, Iran, and elsewhere in the Middle East, and in North Korea -- not to mention the long-term challenges of terrorism and the proliferation of doomsday weapons; or, a United States determined to address disparate crises with ad hoc coalitions of the moment will continue to go its own way, unfettered by traditional alliances and suspicious of international legal structures. "If you look at the Bush administration's actions after the election, I think they've clearly realized that their often- brusque style has been counterproductive, and that by reducing our attractiveness overseas, it has diminished American soft power," said Joseph Nye, a former dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and the author of Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. "Given that President Bush has declined invitations to admit any mistakes, however, it's difficult to know whether his administration is pursuing a more multilateral course at the moment simply because the U.S. military is overextended in Iraq and they have run out of good options, or whether they are aware of the damage done to America's image and are quietly trying to change course.
That's the million-dollar question." Danielle Pletka is vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, the intellectual home of influential neoconservatives in the Bush administration, most of whom will remain in the second term. Speculation that Bush's outreach campaign amounts to a substantive change in foreign-policy direction, she says, is a gross miscalculation of the nature and core beliefs of Bush and his senior advisers. "There has been a change in atmospherics: The substance of Bush's foreign policy has been expressed more politely, the outreach to other leaders has been enthusiastic, and that's all to the good," Pletka said in an interview. "But I have seen zero evidence of a change in the underlying policy . The basic idea that the United States is going to use its muscle to promote democracy as a long-term solution to Islamic extremism in the Middle East has become so mainstream as to be conventional wisdom today, and I would call that a resounding victory for neoconservatives." A Controversial Doctrine Certainly, the Bush administration has failed to win wide acceptance, even among its traditional allies, for the Bush Doctrine. From the very beginning, the post-9/11 Bush Doctrine for fighting the global war on terror and countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction was based on a bold premise: that American power, unconstrained by traditional bonds and honed to a domineering edge by a transformed high-tech military, could not merely check or contain, but decisively defeat those threats. In announcing this doctrine, Bush took aim not just at Al Qaeda, but also at any terrorist organization with global reach. His doctrine also included those nations that sponsored terrorism, exhibited "rogue" behavior, and pursued weapons of mass destruction. In his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush named three of the worst offenders as part of an "axis of evil" -- Iraq, Iran, and North Korea -- and then in his 2002 National Security Strategy document, he implied that the United States would be prepared to attack them preemptively, if need be. The Pentagon, meanwhile, continually insisted that any such campaigns would result not from close consultations with traditional alliances such as NATO, but rather with an ad hoc" coalition of the willing." When all of those controversial premises seemed to coalesce around the Iraq war, the Western alliance essentially split. In a second term, the Bush administration confronts a choice between trying to recast the doctrine in a way that mends the rift and wins wider international support, or continuing to fashion a more "go-it-alone" approach that emphasizes American "exceptionalism." Ironically, the Iraq difficulties may provide Washington and its allies with the chance to undertake a sobering period of reflection, and the opportunity to seek a middle ground where their interests still intersect. "Despite a lot of happy talk from the Bush administration, I'm pessimistic that they are willing to take concrete steps to improve our alliances. But even if their mind-set has not changed at all, it's difficult to imagine the next international crisis they would be willing to provoke," said Philip Gordon, director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. "The reality of the situation is that the United States military is badly overstretched, we're facing huge deficits and running out of money, and we have few allies in Iraq," Gordon said. Those difficulties have provided a certain breathing space, he said, for all sides to contemplate where the Western alliance goes from here. "At some point, our allies are likely to stop fearing our power, and start worrying more about the weakness of a United States that remains bogged down in Iraq. That would be a sea change in international affairs." To reclaim a middle ground on which a

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united Western alliance can once again stand firmly, some analysts say, the Bush administration needs to consult more closely with traditional allies, and to show greater deference to international law. That seemed to be the message behind the Bush administration's planned trip to the European Union and to NATO in February, as well as behind recent declarations in support of the Geneva Conventions against torture. Follow-on initiatives designed to win international support might include greater U.S. participation in efforts to reform the United Nations, and a long-promised Bush plan for reducing emissions that contribute to global warming. Re-engagement in the Middle East peace process, meanwhile, could once again cast the United States in the role of "peacemaker," a position from which it derived significant global legitimacy in the past. "I think the Bush administration underestimated the degree to which the
legitimacy of American power is linked to a fundamental respect for international law," said David Hendrickson, a professor at Colorado College and the co-author of "Iraq and U.S. Legitimacy" in the November/December 2004 edition of Foreign Affairs magazine. "There were times in the past when we departed from international law, but they were generally viewed as the exception and not the rule. For the Bush administration to treat international law disdainfully with doctrines like 'pre-emption' and memos seeming to authorize torture not only alarmed our traditional allies , but it diminished us in world opinion." For their part, allies will need to meet the Bush administration halfway, at least in part by taking seriously U.S. concerns about the volatile mix of rogue states, terrorists, and weapons of mass destruction. Already, Britain, France, and Germany have taken the lead in negotiations designed to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program, while Japan and South Korea are closely involved in similar negotiations with North Korea. The next step is for the United States and its allies to fashion coherent approaches, and agreed-upon packages of carrots and sticks, that can lead to successful conclusions to those negotiations.

and finally, Transatlantic cooperation is essential to prevent bioterrorism attack that are highly probable, quick timeframe, and as dangerous as nuclear war.
Daniel Hamilton, 6/11/03, Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations @ Johns Hopkins University, (FDCH Congressional Testimony) lexis Third Priority: Transatlantic Homeland Security Third, we must develop "transatlantic" approaches to homeland security and societal protection. When the United States was attacked, our allies immediately invoked the North Atlantic Treaty's mutual defense clause, in essence stating that the September 11 attack was an attack on a common security space - a common "homeland." It is unlikely that a successful effort to strengthen homeland security can be conducted in isolation from one's allies. The U.S. may be a primary target for Al-Qaeda, but we know it has also planned major operations in Europe.

A terrorist WMD attack on Europe would immediately affect American civilians, American forces, and American interests. If such an attack involved contagious disease, it could threaten the American homeland itself in a matter of hours. The SARS epidemic, while deadly, is simply a "mild" portent of what may be to come. Bioterrorism in particular is a first-order strategic threat to the Euro-Atlantic community. A bioterrorist attack in Europe or North America is more likely and could be as consequential as a nuclear attack, but requires a different set of national and
international responses. Europeans and Americans alike are woefully ill-prepared for such challenges. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, it has become very clear that controlling borders, operating ports, or managing airports and train stations in the age of globalization involves a delicate balance of identifying and intercepting weapons and terrorists without excessively hindering trade, legal migration, travel and tourism upon which European and American prosperity increasingly depends. Efforts to protect the U.S. homeland against cyberattack, for example, can hardly be conducted in isolation from key allies whose economies and information networks are so intertwined with ours.

Unless there is systematic trans-European and trans-Atlantic coordination in the area of preparedness, each side of the Atlantic is at greater risk of attack. Uneven "homeland security" coordination and preparedness within Europe renders North America more vulnerable, particularly since North America's
security is organically linked to Europe's vulnerability to terrorist infiltration. Similarly, if U.S. and Canadian efforts render the North American homeland less vulnerable to terrorist attack, terrorists may target Europe. Just because the Cold War has faded does not mean that Europeans and North Americans are less dependent on one another.

Sub point C Hard Power Allied support is critical to global power projection Unilateralism guts the ability of countries to provide base and overflight rights
Joseph S. Nye Jr, 7/27/04, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the Kennedy School of Government (Soft Power; The Means to Success in World Politics) p. 26

Soft balancing was not limited to the UN arena. Outside the UN, diplomacy and peace movements helped transform the global debate from the sins of Saddam to the threat of American Empire. That made it difficult for allied countries to provide bases and support and thus cut into American hard power. As noted earlier, the Turkish parliaments refusal to allow transport of ground troops and Saudi Arabias reluctance to allow American use of air bases that had been available in 1991 are cases in point. Since the global projection of American military force in the future will require access and overflight rights from other countries, such soft balancing can have real effects on hard power.

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moreover, Base and overflight rights are a critical foundation of US hard power preponderance cannot be leveraged without it
Barry R Posen, Professor of Political Science @ MIT, 03 (Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony International Security) Lexis

Command of the commons is the military foundation of U.S. political preeminence. It is the key enabler of the hegemonic foreign policy that the United States has pursued since the end of the Cold War. The military capabilities required to secure command of the commons are the U.S. suit. They leverage science technology, and economic resources. They rely on highly trained, highly skilled, and increasingly highly paid military personnel. On the whole, the U.S. military advantage at sea, in the air, and in space will be very difficult to challenge let alone overcome . Command is further secured by the worldwide U.S. base structure and the ability of U.S. diplomacy to leverage other sources of U.S. power to secure additional bases and overflight rights as needed.

finally, Loss of hard power leads to nuclear war and global conflict
Zalmay Khalizad, Research Analyst at the RAND Institute, Spring 95 [Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War Washington Quartely) lexis

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global riva l or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
,

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Thus the plan: We demand that the United States federal government substantially reduce its authority to detain without charge by placing charges against the detainees of Guantanamo Bay. The detainees will receive full due processes. Well clarify.

(Might need to change)

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Contention Three: Solvency We solve for our advantages in three separate ways Productive and disruptive resistance can come from anywhere because we are all object of biopolitical control

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Slavoj Zizek, 02, Senior Researcher @ Institute for Social Studies @ Ljubljana (Welcome to the Desert of theReal!) p 91-96

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moreover, By restoring humynity back to Guantanamo, we use democracy against the state, and give infinite justice back to the other. We preclude political change
Simon, Critchley, 99, Philosophy @ Essex, (Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity) 281-283

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and, By sticking to its core beliefs, and protesting these atrocities, the U.S. can overcome the mistakes of Guantanamo Bay and regain its soft power.
Joseph S. Nye Jr, 7/27/04, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the Kennedy School of Government (U.S. democratic alliances key to restoration of lost 'soft' power - Reprinted from The Jakarta Post) http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2004/Nye_allies_key_to_soft_power_jakarta_post_082704.htm Admiration for American values does not mean, of course, that others want to imitate all the ways Americans implement them. While many Europeans

admire America's devotion to freedom, they prefer policies at home that temper the liberal economic principles of individualism with a robust welfare state. Despite all the rhetoric about "old" and "new" Europe, at the end of the Cold War opinion surveys showed that two-thirds of Czechs, Poles, Hungarians,
and Bulgarians perceived the U.S. as a good influence on their respective countries, but fewer than a quarter wanted to import American economic models.

Popular culture can often be an important source of "soft" power. Simple items like blue jeans, cola, or Hollywood movies helped produce favorable outcomes in at least two of the most important American objectives after 1945. One was the democratic reconstruction of Europe after World War II, and the other was victory in the Cold War. The Marshall Plan and NATO were crucial instruments of economic and military power, but popular culture reinforced their effect. The dollars invested by the Marshall Plan helped achieve U.S. objectives in reconstructing Europe, but so did the
ideas transmitted by American popular culture. Today, about two-thirds of the people polled in ten European countries say they admire America for its popular culture and progress in science and technology, but only

a third think the spread of American customs in their country is a good idea. The U.S. doesn't have to make others look like little Americans, but it does have to live up to its core values in order to use its soft power effectively. This is why the examples of the prisons at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have been so costly. It is also why a free press that reports these problems, congressional hearings that investigate them, and a recent set of Supreme Court decisions that give detainees legal recourse are also so important. America is not perfect, but as long as it abides by its core values, it can overcome its mistakes and regain its soft power in democratic countries. For example, America was extraordinarily unpopular at the time of the Vietnam War, yet it recovered its soft power within a decade, and it is interesting to consider why. Part of the answer may be that when students were marching in the streets protesting, they did not sing the "Internationale"; they sang "We Shall Overcome." America's democratic values will be the key to success in restoring its soft power.

finally, Now is a key time for the US to regain its soft power by picking up on its moral and judicial duties through our prevalent democratic system
Joseph S. Nye Jr, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the Kennedy School of Government, 7/29/04, (Can America Regain Its Soft Power After Abu Ghraib?) Even before the Abu Ghraib photos were published, anti-Americanism had been rising around the world. Polls showed that the United States lost some thirty points of attraction in Europe in 2003, and Americas standing had plummeted in the Islamic world from Morocco to Indonesia. In 2000, nearly three quarters of Indonesians had a favorable view of the US. By May 2003, that had plummeted to 15 percent. In Jordan and Pakistan, a 2004 poll shows that more people are attracted to Osama bin Laden than to George Bush. Yet both these countries are on the front line of the battle against Al Qaeda. Clearly, the Bush Administration has squandered Americas soft power. Skeptics about soft power argue that anti-Americanism is inevitable because of our role as the worlds only military superpower. They regard popularity as ephemeral and advise us to simply ignore the polls. We are the worlds leader and should do what we determine to be in our national interest. As the big kid on the block, we are bound to engender envy and resentment as well as admiration. But the ratio of hate to love depends on whether we are seen as a bully or a friend . We were even more preponderant in the 1940s, but the Marshall Plan helped our soft power. Similarly , the United States was the worlds only superpower in the 1990s, but anti-Americanism never reached the levels that it did after the new unilateralism of the second Bush administration. Can the United States regain its soft power? We have done it before. Anti-Americanism soared during the Vietnam War in the early 1970s, but we recovered within a decade. Not only did we change our policy in Vietnam, but the emphasis on human rights and freedom in Eastern Europe by Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan helped to emphasize attractive American values. More specifically, we will have to deal with the abuses that were exposed at Abu Ghraib. Fortunately, we have begun to do that. Whatever our flaws as an occupying power, the symbolism of Abu Ghraib did not reduce the United States to the moral equivalent of the tyrant it replaced. Democracy matters. American abuses were widely published and criticized in our free press for all to see. Congressional hearings have made officials testify in public. And the

American Supreme Court has asserted its independence from the executive branch by recently ruling that detainees at Guantanamo Bay and in military brigs in the United States must have access to legal representation. One of the greatest sources of American soft power is the openness of our democratic processes. Even when mistaken policies reduce our attractiveness, our ability to openly criticize and correct our mistakes makes us attractive to others at a deeper level . Vietnam is a good
example. When protesters overseas were marching in the streets against the Vietnam War, they did not sing The Internationale, but rather Martin Luther Kings We Shall Overcome. And that remains the best hope for those of us who believe that the United States can recover its soft power even after Iraq and Abu Ghraib.

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Lexington High School 2005-2006 The way to defeat terrorism is by upholding human rights
AFX News, 3/10/05, lexis
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took a veiled swipe at the United States in a speech in which he said some countries were violating human rights in their fight against terrorism. International human rights experts 'are unanimous in finding that many measures which states are currently adopting to counter terrorism infringe on human rights and fundamental freedoms,' he said in the address to a conference on terrorism in Madrid.
Although he did not name any country, many of the attendees took that to be shielded which came in for frequent criticism from participants during the three-day conference.

criticism of US President George W. Bush's administration ,

The US-led war on Iraq, the curbing of civil liberties under its Patriot Act designed to boost data collection to detect terrorist suspects, and the extra-judicial detention of hundreds of so-called 'enemy combatants' at the US facility at Guantanamo, Cuba, were all described as counterproductive in the long term by several speakers. 'Human rights and the rule of law must always be respected.
'As I see it, terrorism

is in itself a direct attack on human rights and the rule of law. If we sacrifice them in our response, we are handing a victory to the terrorists,' he said.
'Human rights law makes ample provision for strong counter-terrorist action, even in the most exceptional circumstances,' Annan told the audience, which included NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, European Commission President Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, and the presidents of Afghanistan, Algeria, the Dominican Republic, Pakistan and Portugal. Other top officials present included US Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer.

'Compromising human rights cannot serve the struggle against terrorism. On the contrary, it facilitates achievement of the terrorist's objective -- by ceding to him the moral high ground, and provoking tension, hatred and mistrust of government among precisely those parts of the population where he is most likely to find recruits,' Annan said.
'Upholding

human rights is not merely compatible with a successful counter-terrorism strategy. It is an essential element in it.'

and, It is a moral imperative that we must resist falling to the intolerance the government supplies us with.
. Sami A Al-Arian, 2/1/02. [P.H.D.., September. We Must Resist. http://www.academicfreespeech.com/sami_state6.html]

Since Sept. 11th our nation has been at war, not just with the ugly face of terrorism, but also with the ugly face of intolerance and bigotry. We should not sacrifice our freedoms and civil liberties to feel safe. Yet, this is what many politicians and powerful groups want us to submit to. And we must say NO. We should not surrender to intimidation or fear so we may feel secure. Yet, this is what many politicians and powerful groups
want us to bow to. And we must say NO.

Albany Law Review, Winter 2003 v67 i2 p501(25), The Torture Victim's Protection Act, the Alien Tort Claims Act, and Foucault's archaeology of knowledge.
(Michel Foucault)(Torture: Paradigms, Practices, and Policies), Author: Eric Engle Recently, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) tried to reduce the United States' obligations under the Convention against Torture. (126) Though in this particular instance, the court intervened to overturn the BIA's decision, (127) a decision clearly in contravention to the Convention, it may be indicative of a future trend. If

the United States gradually begins to accept small or insignificant amounts of torture, it will likely generate

even more enemies. To justify this progression, the United States might try to draw on foreign case law. In looking at the European Court of Human Rights, one finds cases that arguably support finding exceptions to international law's absolute prohibition of torture. (128)

and, The current system of tribunals is unfairly stacked against the others
Carol D. Leonnig, Staff writer for the Seattle Times, 3/28/05 (Military tribunal ignored evidence on detainee) Court-ordered tribunals About 540 foreign nationals are detained at Guantnamo Bay as suspected al-Qaida or Taliban fighters, or associates of terrorist groups. In response to a landmark Supreme Court ruling in June that allowed the detainees to challenge their imprisonment, the military began holding new review tribunals last fall.

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During tribunal hearings, a panel of military officers considers public and secret evidence, and the detainee is offered an opportunity to state his case and answer questions. The panel then decides whether a captive should be designated an enemy combatant and be detained further. A second panel later reviews how dangerous the detainee would be if released. According to the Defense Department, 558 tribunal reviews have been held. In the 539 decisions made so far, 506 detainees have been found to be enemy combatants and have been kept in prison. Thirty-three have been found not to be enemy combatants. Of those, four have been released. In January, U.S.

District Judge Joyce Hens Green ruled that the tribunals are illegal, unfairly stacked against detainees and in violation of the Constitution. The Bush administration has appealed her decision.