CRIMES INTEREST

AGAINST

PUBLIC

LEONILA BATULANON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 139857 September 15, 2006

G.R. No. 146731

January 13, 2004

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. FACTS: Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed LeonilaBatulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the membesa of the cooperative. During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered. It was found that Batulanon falsified four commercial documents, all checks/cash vouchers representing granted loans to different persons namely: Omadlao, Oracion, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon, making it appear that said names were granted a loan and received the amount of the checks/cash vouchers when in truth and in fact the said persons never received a grant, never received the checks, and never signed the check vouchers issued in their names. In furtherance, Batulanon released to herself the checks and received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted it to her own use and benefit. Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed against Batulanon. The prosecution presented Medallo, Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma as witnesses. Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers testified that Batulanon forged the signatures of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that Oracion is Batulanon sister-in-law and Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to minors. On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence this petition. Batulanon avers that the crime of falsification of private document requires as an element prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan transactions because these loans are accounts receivable by the cooperative. ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by Batulanon was Falsification of Private Documents.

AGUSTINA M. ENEMECIO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) and SERVANDO BERNANTE CARPIO, J.: Facts: Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Bernante for falsification of public document. Enemecio asserted that Bernante made it appear in his leave application that he was on forced leave from 15 May 1996 to 21 May 1996 and on vacation leave from 22 May 1996 to 31 May 1996. In truth, Bernante was serving a 20-day prison term, from 14 May 1996 to 2 June 1996, because of his conviction of the crime of slight physical injuries. Bernante was able to receive his salary during his incarceration since then CSCST-CFT Superintendent Andres T. Melencion approved Bernantes application for leave. Enemecio contended that Bernante was not entitled to receive salary for that period because of his "falsified leave applications." Issue: whether Bernante should be held liable for falsification Held:No. Enemecios contentions do not deserve serious consideration. Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of falsification of public documents through an untruthful narration of facts are: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third person.24 As the Ombudsman correctly pointed out, Enemecio failed to point to any law imposing upon Bernante the legal obligation to disclose where he was going to spend his leave of absence. "Legal obligation" means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated. Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by making false statements in a narration of facts absent any legal obligation to disclose where he would spend his vacation leave and forced leave.

HELD: Yes. Although the offense charged in the Information is Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents, Batulanon could be convicted of Falsification of Private Documents under the well-settled rule that it is the allegation in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the information. The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, par.2 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.

indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of Falsification under Article 171 because there is nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that Batulanon is also guilty of Falsification of Private Document with respect to the case involving the cash voucher of Dennis Batulanon.

There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the loan transactions are reflected in its books as accounts receivable. It has been established that PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting loan. These alleged borrowers are not members of PCCI and neither are they eligible for a loan. The CA correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and not commercial documents because they are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactionsnor are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law.Rather, they are private documents, which have been defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth. As there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents, it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with Falsification of a Private Document or with Estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the Estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime is Estafa. We find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in the cases of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show that Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: by: Ibatulanon to

G.R. No. 107383 December 7, 1994 FELIX NIZURTADO, petitioner, SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, respondents. VITUG, J.: FACTS: That on or about August 25, 1983, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Caloocan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, a public officer, being then the Barangay Captain of Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify and attest Resolution No. 17 Series of 1983 by making it appear that on August 25, 1983 the Barangay council of Panghulo met and identified Tshirt manufacturing as its livelihood project, when in truth and in fact, as the accused fully well knew, no such meeting was held, where T-shirt manufacturing was identified and approved by the Barangay Council as its livelihood project, and thereafter, accused submitted the falsified resolution to the MHS-MMC-KKK Secretariat which endorsed the same to the Land Bank of the Philippines, which on the basis of said endorsement and the falsified resolution, encashed LBP check No. 184792 in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), which check was earlier received by him as Barangay Captain of Panghulo in trust for the Barangay for its livelihood project and for which fund accused became accountable, and upon receipt thereof herein accused, with deliberate intent and grave abuse of confidence did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) out of the vs. THE

funds for which he was accountable, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the said amount. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable of falsification HELD: YES. Accused-appellant was charged with having committed the crime of malversation through the falsification of a public document punishable under paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The pertinent provisions read: Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: xxx xxx xxx 2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; In falsification under the above-quoted paragraph, the document need not be an authentic official paper since its simulation, in fact, is the essence of falsification. So, also, the signatures appearing thereon need not necessarily be forged. 11 In concluding that the Barangay Council resolution, Exhibit "D," 12 was a falsified document for which petitioner should be held responsible, the Sandiganbayan gave credence to the testimonies of Barangay Councilman Santos A. Gomez and Barangay Treasurer Manuel P. Romero. The two testified that no meeting had actually taken place on 25 August 1983, the date when "T-shirt manufacturing" was allegedly decided to be the barangay livelihood project. The Sandiganbayan concluded that Nizurtado had induced Romero and Gomez to sign the blank resolution, Exhibit "J" 13 on the representation that Romero's proposal to build a barangay service center would so later be indicated in that resolution as the barangay livelihood project. Galeos vs People GR No. 174730-37 February 9, 2011 Villarama, Jr., J.

Facts: Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu on April 16, 1986. He was elected Mayor of the same municipality in 1988 and served as such until 1998. Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T. Rivera (Rivera) for the positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of the Municipal Engineer. In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), Galeos answered "No" to the question: "To the best of your knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the government?" while Rivera indicated "n/a" on the space for the list of the names of relatives referred to in the said query. Ong is related to Galeos, within the fourth degree of consanguinity as his mother is the sister of Galeos mother, and to Rivera within the fourth degree of affinity as his mother is the sister of the mother of Riveras wife. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the recommendation of OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas that criminal charges be filed against Ong, Galeos and Rivera for falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision convicting Ong, Galeos and Rivera. Issue: Whether the accused herein are guilty of the crime of falsification? Ruling: Yes. Art. 171.of the RPC provides: Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: 1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; 2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; 3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them; 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a public

document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false. All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been established by the prosecution. A narration of facts is merely an account or description of the particulars of an event or occurrence. Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his SALN if he has relatives in the government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). When a government employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Sometime in November, 1976, Manalili, who used to get his own driver's license in San Fernando, Pampanga, was able to secure petitioner's driver's license No. 2706887 through fixers at the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) agency in said locality. 46 On January 24, 1978, petitioner renewed his license at the said office by paying the amount of P10.00 for which he was issued official receipt No. 0605870. 47 In the renewal of drivers' license, the practice then was simply to present an official receipt showing that at the previous year the licensee had paid for his driver's license to any agency of the LTC, and to pay the renewal fee. As long as the transaction did not involve the issuance of "another form," a driver did not have to fill up an application form for the renewal of a license. The said agency would then issue an official receipt evidencing the renewal of the license but the driver's license itself would not be changed. 48 Thus.on January 24,1978, when driver's license No. 2706887 together with official receipt No. 864321 49 were presented to the San Fernando LTC agency, the personnel therein issued officialreceipt No. 0605870 in the name of petitioner. Although the receipt was not personally signed by office registrar Victor Martin but by his assistant, the receipt 50 was genuine and the amount indicated therein was actually paid to and collected by the San Fernando agency. 51 The driver's license itself may not have been issued by said agency 52 but its form was likewise genuine. However, according to Martin, it was 'not OK' because it "did not emanate" from his office and "a facsimile was not printed over" his name therein. 53 Moreover, according to the officer-in-charge of the license Division of the Bureau of Land Transportation in East Avenue, Quezon City, nonprofessional driver's license No. 2706887 in the name of Michael DavaTolosa "is not registered" in their index card. 54

USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS MICHAEL T. DAVA vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTG.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991 G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991 FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS:The information specifically charges the petitioner with having made it appear in his driver's license No. 2706887 that "officials of the Pampanga LTC agency participated" in inpreparation and with having used the said driver's license knowing that it was falsified. The charges therefore are found on the provisions of Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code which punishes any private individual who shall commit any the falsification enumerated in Article 171 specifically paragraph 2 thereof which penalizes the act of causing it to appear that persons (public officials) have participated in any act proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. The information also charges Dava with having knowingly used a false document under the last paragraph of Article 172. The evidence at hand proves that petitioner, misrepresenting that he had no driver's license, asked his friend, Manalili, to secure one for him.

ISSUE: Is there a violation of Art. 172?

HELD:Yes.Hence, while there is no doubt that driver's license No. 2706887 was a spurious one, the evidence do not pinpoint the petition as the actual falsifier. Unfortunately, however, there are pieces of evidence which prove beyond reasonable doubt at he caused the falsification and made use of the falsified driver's license knowing it to be so. The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial proceed penalized under the last

paragraph of Article 172 are following: (a) the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person; (b) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c he used such document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d) the use of the false document caused damage to another or at last it was used with intent to cause such damage. 55 Except for last, all of these elements have been proven beyond reason doubt in this case. It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who requested Manalili to get him a license. He misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any time been issued a driver's license. 56 Through this misrepresentation and capitalizing on Manalili awareness of the dire necessity of obtaining a driver's license the shortest time possible to enable petitioner to perform duties as detailman, petitioner was able, in a very subtle clever manner, to induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing the subject driver's license. For indeed, there was no way Manalili could obtain a drivers license in so short a without having to deal with "fixers." Thus, as petitioner calculated, Manalili, who appeared to have been motivated by a sincere desire to help a friend, did not hesitate to deal with three fixers whom he knew were not employees of the LTC to whom he paid P70.00 for the license even if the legal fee then was only P15.00. 57 As it was in truth petitioner who induced and left Manalili with no choice but to seek the aid of fixers, the fact that it was Manalili and not petitioner who dealt directly with said fixers cannot exculpate petitioner from the charge of falsification. He is, beyond reasonable doubt, a principal by inducement in the commission of said crime. Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the spurious character of his second driver's license No. 2706887. Having already obtained a driver's license, he knew that it was not legally possible for him to secure another one. Otherwise, there would have been no need for him to misrepresent to his friend Manalili that he was not then a holder of a driver's license. But even with this misrepresentation, petitioner cannot even begin to believe that Manalili would be able to secure a driver's license through legal means in about an hour's time. 58 The patent irregularity in obtaining driver's license No. 2706887 was more than sufficient to arouse the suspicion of an ordinary cautious and prudent man as to its genuineness and authenticity. In fact, Manalili testified that he himself was surprised when the fixer handed to him the plastic jacket of the driver's license of Michael Dava on November 4, 1976, a few hours after he had sought the fixer's assistance. 59 In those days, all plastic jackets emanated from the

LTC Central Office, which accounted for the delay in the release of the license applied for. Under these circumstances, no "reasonable and fairminded man" would say that petitioner did not know that his license was a fake. 60 A driver's license is a public document within the purview of Articles 171 and 172. The blank form of the drivers license becomes a public document the moment it is accomplished. 61 Thus, when driver's license No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner's personal data and the signature of the region of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the same was simulated, the driver's license became a public document. The third element of use of the falsified document is proven by the fact that when petitioner was apprehended by Lising on April 12, 1978 it was in his possession and it was what he presented Lising to show that he had a license. Because he was a detailman who did his job with the use of a car, it is probable that from November 4, 1976 (its date of issuance) until April 12, 1978, petitioner used driver's license No. 2706887. The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to another person or at least an intent to cause such damage has become immaterial. In falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein. In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts that the following ruling in People vs. Sendaydiego, 63 should be applied in his favor:The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger. We agree with the petitioner that the presumption enunciated in the Sendaydiego case is not absolute as it is subject to the exception that the accused should have a satisfactory explanation why he is in possession of a false document. 64 His explanation, however, is unsatisfactory as it consists mainly in passing the buck to his friend, Manalili. As stated above, Manalili himself could not

have acted on his own accord without the prodding of petitioner. We cannot help but comment on petitioner's allegations on the role of fixers in government agencies. To him, a fixer is a "necessary evil" who could do things fast for the right amount. He is "not necessarily involved in the commission of forgery or falsification of official documents" and he shares his fees with "insiders." 65 Fixers indeed appear as undetachable fixtures in government licensing agencies. Why they proliferate is a sad commentary not only on our bureaucracy but also on our own people. While not all fixers are engaged in illegal activities for some simple serve as "facilitators," they nonetheless provide sources for exploitation of the unknowing common people who transact business with the government and for corruption of the gullible government employees. Their unwanted presence must be dealt with accordingly and the soonest this is undertaken by our government agencies the better for all of us. The decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby affirmed.

Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a black wallet from his back pocket. Inside the wallet were twenty-three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of which were suspected to be counterfeit. They confiscated the same and marked them sequentially with IIB2 to II-B24. They likewise marked the P500.00 bill that was returned by informant to appellant with IIB-1. Appellant was consequently arrested and brought out of his cell into the office of the Intelligence and Investigation Branch (IIB) of the Manila City jail for interrogation. Meanwhile, the twenty-four (24) P500.00 bills confiscated from appellant were turned over to the BangkoSentralngPilipinas for analysis. Pursuant to a Certification dated August 7, 2007, Acting Assistant Manager LoidaMarcega Cruz of the BangkoSentralngPilipinas examined and found the following bills as counterfeit, viz: one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number BB020523; six (6) P500.00 bills with Serial Number BR666774; nine (9) P500.00 bills with Serial Number CC077337; five (5) P500.00 bills with Serial Number PX626388; one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number UU710062; and two (2) P500.00 bills with Serial Number WW164152. After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession and use of false bank notes under Article 168[3] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND USE OF FLASE BANK NOTES

MARK CLEMENTE y MARTINEZ @ EMMANUEL DINO, - versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 194367, June 15, 2011 VILLARAMA, JR., J.: FACTS:Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. An informant in the person of inmate Francis dela Cruz approached JO1s Domingo David, Jr. and Michael Passilan. The informant narrated that he received a counterfeit P500.00 bill from appellant with orders to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail Bakery. The bakery employee, however, recognized the bill as a fake and refused to accept the same. Consequently, JO1s David and Passilan, along with the informant, proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise inspection. Pursuant to their agreement, the informant entered the cubicle first and found appellant therein, lying in bed. The informant returned to appellant the latter's P500.00 bill. The jail guards then entered the cell and announced a surprise inspection. JO1

ISSUE: Whether the accused is criminally liable for the crime charged.

HELD:NO.The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments. As held in People v. Digoro, possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes.In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers,

they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill. Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.

ISSUE: Whether Gigantoni was guilty of usurpation of authority HELD: No.Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on usurpation of authority or official functions, under which the petitioner was charged, punishes any person: (a) who knowingly and falsely represents himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or (b) who, under pretense of official position, performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority under which the petitioner stands charged, while the latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions. The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from the service negatives the charge that he "knowingly and falsely" represented himself to be a CIS agent. In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution. Hence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish by positive evidence the allegation that the accused falsely represented himself as a CIS agent, by presenting proof that he knew that he was no longer a CIS agent, having been duly notified of his dismissal. It is essential to present proof that he actually knew at the time of the alleged commission of the offense that he was already dismissed from the service. A mere disputable presumption that he received notice of his dismissal would not be sufficient. The Solicitor General has argued in his memorandum, that it makes no difference whether the accused was suspended or dismissed from the service, "for both imply the absence of power to represent oneself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was deprived of ". The observation of the Solicitor General is correct if the accused were charged with usurpation of official function (second part of Article 177), but not if he is charged merely with usurpation of authority (first part of Article 177). The information charges the accused with the crime of usurpation of authority for "knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government." Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official functions. It has not been shown that the information given by PAL to the accused was confidential and was given to him only because he was entitled to it as part of the exercise of his

USURPATION
PEOPLE vs CORTEZ G.R. No. 74727 June 16, 1988 MELENCIO GIGANTONI y JAVIER, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents. YAP, C.J.: On May 14, 1981, as an employee of Black Mountain Mining Company, Gigantoni went to the office of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) allegedly to conduct verification of some travels made by Black Mountain's officials. Upon reaching the said PAL office, he falsely represented himself to the PAL legal officer as a PC-CIS agent investigating a kidnapping case, and requested that he be shown the PAL records particularly the passenger manifests for Manila-Baguio-Manila flights covering the period February 1 to 3 1981. To further convince the PAL officials of his supposed mission, Gigantoni exhibited his Identification card purporting to show that he was a PC-CIS agent.Gigantoni then secured xerox copies of the requested manifest and the used PAL tickets of one Cesar (Philippe) Wong, an SGV auditor, and that of a certain Daisy Britanico, an employee of Black Mountain. Thereafter, he left the PAL premises. PAL general counsel Ricardo Puno, Jr. subsequently learned from General Uy of PC-CIS that Gigantoni was no longer a CIS agent since June 30, 1980 as he had been dismissed from the service for gross misconduct. Atty. Puno immediately alerted the NBI as Gigantoni would be coming back to the PAL office the following day. When Gigantoni returned to the Makati PAL office, in the presence of Atty. Boro and a PAL security, Gigantoni was confronted by Atty. Puno as to his real Identity. He later admitted that he was no longer with the CIS; that he was working for the Black Mountain Mining Corporation; and that he was just checking on a claim for per diem of one of their employees who had travelled. Upon the arrival of NBI agents, Attys. Puno and Boro turned over the person of Gigantoni to the NBI.

official function. He was not charged in the information for such an offense. In fact, it appears from the record of the case that the information, which was not claimed to be secret and confidential, was readily made available to the accused because PAL officials believed at the time that he was a CIS agent. And this was the only offense with which he was charged in the information, that he knowingly and falsely represented himself to be a CIS agent.

USING FICTITIOUS NAME

LEGAMIA v. IAC CORAZON LEGAMIA y RIVERA, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. L-63817 August 28, 1984 ABAD SANTOS, J.: FACTS: Corazon Legamia was accused of using an alias in violation of CA No. 142, as amended. The facs appear that Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years. uring their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes. Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural Credit Administration when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration for death benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher evidencing payment was also signed "Corazon L. Reyes."

It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be Identified who are living with men prominent in political, business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed. In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had their own Corazons.

ILLEGAL USE OF UNIFORMS OR INSIGNIA PERJURY

G.R. No. L-65006 October 31, 1990 REOLANDI DIAZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents. PARAS, J.: According to the information filed Reolandi M. DIAZ, then a Senior Clerk at the Jose Abad Santos High School and, therefore, a public employee, did then and there feloniously commit falsification of official documents, to wit: by executing and filing in the office of the Civil Service Commission of said municipality a Personal Data Sheet, CS Form No. 212(65), an official document, stating and malting it appear therein that he was a fourth year Bachelor of Arts student in 1950-54 at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges which document is a requirement for his reappointment as School Administrative Assistant I of the Jose

Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution. ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable under CA 142. HELD: NO.

Abad Santos High School and wherein the academic requirement to said Position is at least a fourth year college undergraduate, when in truth and in fact, the said accused well knew that the statement is false and he did not reach the fourth year in a Bachelor of Arts degree course, and consequently, by reason of said untruthful narration of facts, his appointment to the said position was approved by the Civil Service Commission. ISSUE: whether falsification HELD: no. In the case of People v. Rufo B. Cruz and the earlier case of United States v. Tupasi Molina the crime committed under the foregoing facts, is perjury. This offense, as defined in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. The elements of the crime of perjury are (a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter. (b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. (c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. (d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bar. G.R. No. 93173 September 15, 1993 HONORIO SAAVEDRA, JR., petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 67 and GREGORIO M. RAMOS,respondents. Andres B. Soriano for petitioner. The Solicitor General for public respondent. thr crime commited was

On 2 July 1987, the owners of Pine Philippines, Inc. (PPI for brevity), including private respondent Gregorio M. Ramos, sold their shares of stock to petitioner Honorio Saavedra, Jr., for P1.2 million payable in installments. A "Memorandum of Agreement," and a "Deed of Assignment" were executed to evidence the transaction. The former document contained an automatic rescission clause in case any installment was not paid on its due date. Payments were made in the total amount of P936,380.00, leaving a balance of P263,620.00 payable on 15 September 1987. On said date, however, petitioner withheld payment for the reason that the sellers failed to comply with their warranties. Nevertheless, the balance was deposited in escrow subject to release once the warranties were complied with. On 5 November 1987, petitioner filed in behalf of PPI a verified civil complaint for damages 4 against private respondent, alleging that he (petitioner) was the President and principal stockholder of the company. By way of answer, respondent Ramos questioned petitioner's capacity to sue in behalf of PPI, claiming that petitioner ceased to be its president when the sale of the PPI, shares of stock to him was automatically rescinded on 15 September 1987. After executing a document entitled "Recission of Memorandum of Agreement," Ramos and his group filed a case5 on 20 November 1987 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SRC) praying that the rescission be declared valid and legal. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the SEC but the same was denied on 11 December 1987. Petitioner went to the Supreme Court which, on 21 March 1988, upheld the jurisdiction of the SEC and ruled that under Sec. 5, par. (b), of P.D. No. 902-A, the SEC has "primary and exclusive" jurisdiction over the twin issues of ownership and automatic rescission, they being intracorporate disputes. 6 Accordingly, proceedings in Civil Case No. 55247 were suspended. On 7 December 1987, during the pendency of SEC Case No. 3257, private respondent filed a criminal case for perjury against petitioner with the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Pasig alleging that petitioner perjured himself when he declared in the verification of the complaint in Civil Case No. 55247 that he was the President of PPI. 7 In his answer-affidavit, petitioner contended that since the issues of ownership and automatic rescission were still pending and unresolved in the SEC, there was no basis to the charge that he asserted a falsehood by claiming to be the President of the

BELLOSILLO, J.:

company especially when he was such per records extant with the SEC. 8 By Resolution dated 25 July 1988, the Provincial Prosecutor found a prima facie case for perjury against petitioner and on 26 October 1988 filed the corresponding Information with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, docketed as Crim. Case No. 74919. 9 The evidence supporting the charge was the Secretary's Certificate dated 5 December 1987 reflecting private respondent's election as President of PPI by the former owners thereof when they convened following the automatic revocation of the "Memorandum of Agreement" and "Deed of Assignment." ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable of perjury HELD: YES. Clearly, mere assertion of a falsehood is not enough to amount to perjury. The assertion must be deliberate and willful. While there may have been a falsehood asserted, which we are not prepared to accept, no evidence exists to show that the same was done deliberately and wilfully. On the contrary, the records tend to show that the assertion was done in good faith, in the belief that the non-payment of the last installment price was justified by the sellers' non-compliance with their warranties. Besides, petitioner alleges that he has deposited the balance in escrow, which is not disputed. Consequently, a finding of probable cause does not follow as a matter of course even if SEC decides adversely against petitioner, for an essential element of the crime appears to be wanting in the case before us, i.e., that the falsehood is willful and deliberate. Moreover, as a rule, pleadings need not be verified unless otherwise required by the Rules of Court, and no rule requires complaints for damages, as in the case before us, to be under oath. Since the complaint filed by petitioner against private respondent is not required to be verified, another essential element of the crime of perjury is absent, i.e., that the sworn statement containing the falsity is required by law. Consequently, petitioner cannot be prosecuted on the basis of an alleged falsehood made in a verified pleading which is not mandated by law to be verified. 18 Verily, there is grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the Resolution of 25 July 1988 finding a prima faciecase for perjury against petitioner. G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Brion, J.: FACTS: Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping.The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. ISSUE: What court has proper jurisdiction in perjury cases? HELD: It is the court where the Certificate against Forum was subscribed and sworn to which is Makati City in this case. Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours] In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora.Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood

was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.

from the sale; and Ouano's wife paid it P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses. As expected, the highest bid submitted, and thus accepted by the RFC, was that of Francisco Echavez, who offered P27,826.00 for the land. Echavez paid the sum of P5,565.00 representing 20% deposit of the profferred price. Thereafter, on various dates, Ouano and/or his wife delivered sums of money to Echavez aggregating P1,725.00, obviously in payment of the balance indicated in Echavez's computation just mentioned, viz.: P500.00 on April 19, 1958, another P500.00 on April 20, and P725.00 on April 27, 1958. Receipts therefor were given by Echavez, all similarly worded to the effect that the money was being received "as part of their reimbursement for the deposit (of P5,565.00) I have made with the RFC for Lot 3-A-1 which I won in the bidding and which lot I have consented to share with Mr. Paterno J. Ouano, subject to the approval of the RFC." However, the RFC never approved the sharing agreement between Echavez and Ouano concerning Lot 3-A-1. It approved the sale of the lot to Echavez only, on May 9, 1958, on the condition that the purchase price of P27,825.00 be paid in cash. Apparently Echavez found great initial difficulty in complying with this condition. It took all of four years, and patient negotiation and diligent effort on his part, for him ultimately to acquire title to the property, which came about in December, 1963. It was pursuant to the absolute sale of December 9, 1963 just mentioned, that a Torrens title (TCT No. 10776) was issued in Echavez's name. Ouano, in his turn, tried to have DBP either accept and implement his sharing agreement with Echavez, or allow him to pay the full price of the lot in Echavez's behalf. By his own account, he sent a letter dated June 3, 1963 to the DBP, "hand carried by his wife," "requesting among others, that he be permitted to pay immediately either for his share in the aforesaid lot comprising 1,828 sq. meters at the bid price of P7.50 per sq. meter including charges, or for the whole lot;" and that he in fact tried to make such payment but the Bank turned down his request. Shortly after his representation with the DBP were rebuffed more precisely on June 24, 1963, months before the deed of absolute sale was executed by the DBP in Echavez's favor Paterno J. Ouano filed suit for "specific performance and reconveyance" in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Francisco Echavez and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).

MACHINATIONS AUCTIONS

IN

PUBLIC

PATERNO J. OUANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO B. ECHAVEZ G.R. No. 40203. August 21, 1990 NARVASA, J.:

FACTS: The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of land with an area of about 3,710 square meters, situated in Mandawe, Cebu, identified as Philippine Railway Lot No. 3-A-1. It was covered by Torrens Title No. 7618 in the name of the registered owner, Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), now the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Adjoining Lot 3-A-1 are lands belonging to Francisco Echavez, private respondent herein, and petitioner Paterno J. Ouano. What will have to be resolved are the conflicting claims over this lot by the vendee thereof, Echavez, and Ouano. The property was offered for sale by public bidding by the RFC on April 1, 1958. Actually this was the second public bidding scheduled for the property. The first in which both Ouano and Echavez participated, together with others was nullified on account of a protest by Ouano. Now, it appears that prior to the second bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid, and that if it was accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties. To ensure success of their enterprise, they also agreed to induce the only other party known to be interested in the property a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from presenting a bid. They broached the matter to Mrs. Bonsucan's group. The latter agreed to withdraw, as it did in fact withdraw

In his complaint, Ouano recited substantially the facts just related, and further alleged that ". . . on June 3, 1963 plaintiffs wife and his attorney conferred with defendant . . . Echavez for the purpose of again requesting said defendant to sign a document which would be notarized and to permit plaintiff to pay for his share direct to the defendant DBP, but said defendant refused and instead informed them that there had been no agreement regarding joint bidding and joint ownership of Lot 3-A-1." The complaint was amended a few weeks later, chiefly to allege that DBP was on the point of rescinding its contract with Echavez; and that Ouano's offer to the DBP to pay in Echavez's behalf the price of the lot in full (P28,206.61), had been rejected; and that consequently, and "to show his good faith," he had consigned the amount with the Court "for and in behalf of defendant . . . Echavez."

with which it was committed," as mandated by the provisions of Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, this being obviously the provision "of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime" that Article 1411 makes "applicable to the things or the price of the contract."

ISSUE: Whether or not a felony has been committed. HELD: YES. These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has stressed. Ouano and Echavez had promised to share in the property in question as a consideration for Ouano's refraining from taking part in the public auction, and they had attempted to cause and in fact succeeded in causing another bidder to stay away from the auction in order to cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned. In so doing, they committed the felony of machinations in public auctions defined and penalized in Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code, supra. The agreement therefore being criminal in character, the parties not only have no action against each other but are both liable to prosecution and the things and price of their agreement subject to disposal according to the provisions of the criminal code. This, in accordance with the so-called pari delicto principle set out in the Civil Code. Article 1409 of said Code declares as "inexistent and void from the beginning" those contracts, among others, "whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy," or "expressly prohibited . . . by law." Such contracts "cannot be ratified;" "the right to set up the defense of illegality (cannot) be waived;" and, Article 1410 adds, the "action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence . . . (thereof) does not prescribe." Article 1411 also dictates the proper disposition of the land involved, i.e., "the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools