Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Lebanon:
Confessionalism and the Crisis
of Democracy
Hassan Krayem
his paper addresses the questions of why and how the process of state building
T in Lebanon failed, and to what extent this failure can be attributed to its
confessional, consociational model of democracy, the role of the ruling elite, or
external factors. It also addresses the prospects for an alternative constitutional
model and for the creation of a secular democratic state.
67
68 SECULARISM, WOMEN & THE STATE: THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Shehabism
This particular distribution of power faced challenges in subsequent years
because of changes in the internal and regional balance of forces. In 1958, a
short civil war broke out, lasted for six months, and caused the death of several
thousand people.2 On July 15, 1958, American Marines intervened to end the
crisis, though initially the conflict escalated. On July 31, after a compromise deal
between the U.S. and the United Arab Republic, the army commander, General
Fouad Shehab, was elected president. Shehab had kept the army neutral in the
crisis and thus gained the approval of most parties. Politically, Lebanon’s power-
balancing approach was reaffirmed after the 1958 crisis.
President Shehab introduced a number of administrative and political
reforms based on his conviction that Lebanon’s problems were caused by
regional, confessional, communal, and socio-economic inequalities. He began
reforming the civil service as well as social policy. Lebanon’s monetary laws were
also introduced during Shehab’s mandate, as was the Central Bank. During the
5. LEBANON: CONFESSIONALISM AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY 69
Inter-Lebanese battles during the civil war years, in the Aley and Shouf
mountain areas in 1983, in Beirut in 1976-1984, and in villages east of Sidon in
1985—increased the sectarian character of the Lebanese conflict. Confessional
segregation reached its peak, and confessionally based militias ruled their various
regions in closed and semi-closed enclaves.
A state of political paralysis prevailed in Lebanon between 1986 and the
end of President Gemayel’s term on September 23, 1988. The inability to elect
a successor at the end of the president’s term created a political vacuum, which
threatened to lead to partition. Gemayel appointed an interim cabinet headed
by the Army commander, Michel Aoun, but the cabinet’s authority was only
accepted in predominantly Christian areas. Executive power was thus split
between Aoun’s military and Hoss’s civilian government. The two governments
stood against each other, both claiming exclusive legitimacy. On March 14,
1989, Aoun and army troops under his command began a self-declared “War
of Liberation,” ostensibly against all foreign forces. In reality, the effort was
directed exclusively against the Syrians. This war had devastating consequences.
Instead of curtailing the Syrian presence in Lebanon, it provoked an increase in
Syrian forces to some 40,000 troops. On January 30, 1990, another war broke
out, this time between Aoun’s troops and the Lebanese Forces militia led by
Samir Geagea. This intra-Maronite war was militarily inconclusive yet politically
decisive because it eroded the capacities of both forces to reject or alter the Ta’if
Agreement that had been reached in Saudi Arabia and was in the process of
implementation.7
incomplete sovereignty for a considerable period of time.9 This resulted from the
inter-relationship between the Syrian presence in Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli
negotiations that started in Madrid in 1991, which thus linked the Lebanese
and Syrian tracks in the negotiations. However, this formula allowed Lebanon to
regain a minimal degree of stability in order to rebuild its institutions, revive its
economy, and reinforce its capacity to face changing regional and international
conditions.
and in appointments to Grade One civil service posts and other public positions.
As mentioned earlier, this new distribution of power was an expression of a
balanced confessional formula, and the elimination of confessionalism was
relegated to an unspecified future. In a transitional phase, according to Article
95 of the Lebanese Constitution, confessional parity is to predominate.
This unstable formula, based on the impossible and unattainable condition
of a confessional balance, leaves the door open to a renewal of conflict, just as the
1943 formula did, and does not allow for the revival of a stable political system,
one that is urgently needed to fulfill such essential tasks as the reconstruction of
the country’s infrastructure, the revitalization of the economy, and the rebuilding
and development of public and private institutions. Still, the Ta’if Agreement
was implemented in a way different from what was originally intended. It led to
an increase in Syrian influence and a lack of balanced domestic representation
in Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The imbalance in confessional
representation is political, however, since in proportional terms Christians and
Muslims are represented in Parliament evenly. Politically, however, the Syrian
management of Lebanese affairs had imposed artificial representation of some
political forces.
In the first two years of the agreement’s implementation, it was obvious that
the Lebanese demanded reconstruction and the state’s revival, but disagreed on
which model should be adopted. Would Lebanon be rebuilt according to the
traditional liberal economic model, which existed before the war? Or would
it seek to revive the strong Shehabist state? Or would a new model that would
provide for both a sharing and a concentration of power be adopted?10
A sectarian balance replaced the hegemony of one sect, and power became
centralized, in contrast to the previous system that was characterized by
a concentration of power in the hands of the President, but with a practical
distribution of power between traditional leaders, often from peripheral areas,
who formed a dominant class ruling the central government. However, the
most alarming consequence of Ta’if ’s implementation was the intensification
of confessional conflict and divisions leading to political and administrative
paralysis.
After the election of General Emile Lahoud to the presidency in October
1998, a different system was applied with a clear separation of powers, but
also an obvious increase in the power of the President and the military. The
President’s relations with the governments of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri were
characterized by continuous conflicts indicating how delicate and difficult it
was to produce a stable formula of governance. The post-Ta’if state has not yet
been able to establish a clear and relatively stable formula to rule, govern, and
5. LEBANON: CONFESSIONALISM AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY 73
exercise authority. One can also note the lack of new socio-political forces and
leaderships fully committed to implementing the agreement and moving the
nation towards a more democratic system.
were not only determined to push for this immediate transition towards a free
and independent political system but were also aware of the difficult agenda
awaiting them after parliamentary elections. In reality the challenges at the
forefront range from controlling budget deficit, managing national debt, and
building an effective and efficient public administration and a more stable
political system based on national reconciliation, greater participation and
institutional development.
The parliamentary elections in June 2005 led to the triumph of the opposition
and the forming of a new government led by the Coalition of 14 March and
support of more than 71 deputies out of 128 in the Lebanese parliament. These
elections were also characterized by a level of genuine competition that had not
been seen in 30 years.
However, the momentum for change created by the Syrian withdrawal and
parliamentary elections rapidly dissipated, and the old divides in Lebanese politics
and society resurfaced. The July 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war and the intensive
polarization it has created, led to yet another political confrontation between
the government supported by the March 14 coalition, and the Hezbollah-led
opposition. This confirmed that the political game continues to be played by
the old sectarian rules. Lebanon today is suffering from an increasingly divided
society and growing political crisis. In addition, its neighbors still tend to treat
Lebanon as an arena for regional conflict. External powers promote and support
the national and democratic aspirations of the Lebanese people partly because
these are directed against another power: Syria.
Conclusion
The compound nature of politics in Lebanon has produced a long and well
established legacy of freedom and open institutions. Syria ruled Lebanon in an
autocratic way and so was rejected and resented by many Lebanese who were not
used to authoritarianism. Fortunately, the Lebanese people have not embraced
authoritarianism regardless of the tremendous pressure of the culture of war and
three decades under the special style of Syrian hegemony.
However, the dilemma and continuing crises of the post-Taif Agreement
state in Lebanon result from the fact that a national and non-sectarian form
of representation cannot be carried out by sectarian forces, within a sectarian
structure, and under a system which is based on a confessional power-sharing
formula. Change requires new forces and a different political and civic culture.
The deficient democracy in Lebanon needs to be addressed through a gradual
program of transcending political confessionalism and the adoption of reforms
that lead towards a secular state system.
76 SECULARISM, WOMEN & THE STATE: THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN THE 21ST CENTURY
ENDNOTES
1. For further details on the National Pact, see Farid El-Khazen, “The Communal Pact
of National Identities: The Making and Politics of the National Pact,” in Papers
on Lebanon # 12. (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1991), pp. 5-17; Tabitha
Petran, The Struggle Over Lebanon (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 33;
and Roger Owen, “The Political Economy of Grand Liban, 1920-70,” in Essays on
the Crisis in Lebanon, edited by Roger Owen. (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), p. 27.
2. For 1958 crisis, see Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: The
Middle East Institute, 1961).
3. See Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle
East (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1979).
4. See Tabitha Petran, op. cit., ch. 5.
5. See Kamal Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976, (New York: Caravan
Books, 1976).
6. Petran, 1987, op. cit., pp. 130-33.
7. Annie Laurent, “A War Between Brothers: The Army-Lebanese Forces Showdown in
East Beirut,” Beirut Review 1, 1 (Spring 1991): pp. 88-101.
8. For a full text of the Tai’f Agreement, see Beirut Review, 1991, op. cit., pp. 119-
172.
9. Richard Norton, “Lebanon after Tai’f: Is the Civil War Over?” Middle East Journal,
v. 45, #3, (1991): p. 466.
10. Michael Hudson, “The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: Why
Consociationalism Failed,” in eds. Shehadi and Mills, 1998, op. cit., p. 237.