SECTION 18, ARTICLE VI

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989 REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner, vs. REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent. CRUZ, J.: After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. 1 On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. 2 On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. 3 The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments. 4 Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability. For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its
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representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments. In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was submitted by the Solicitor General as amicus curiae in compliance with an order from the Court. At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, the Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. That is not a political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco. 6 ... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners therein to annul the election of two members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had not been validly nominated. The Senate then consisted of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party and the petitioner as the lone member of the Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated only himself as the minority representative in the Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected Senators Mariano J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to complete the nine-man composition of the Tribunal as provided for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to this Court, contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the six legislative members of the Tribunal were to be chosen by the Senate, "three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein." As the majority party in the Senate, the Nacionalista Party could nominate only three members and could not also fill the other two seats pertaining to the minority. By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia that the subject of the petition was an internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this argument, holding that what was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the Constitution. The
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petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political question, thus: Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination ... of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate and hence, is null and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceeding in connection therewith. ... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied) It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein." Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the manner or legality of the organization of the Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom or discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives. In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less persuasive. While he may be technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner's removal, we feel that this objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. We may, for one thing, treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually questioning the respondent's right to sit as a member of the Commission on Appointments. For another, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers Cases 7 that where serious constitutional
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questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." The same policy has since then been consistently followed by the Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 8where we held through Chief Justice Fernando: In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by five members of the Court. It is their view that respondent Commission on Elections not being sought to be restrained from performing any specific act, this suit cannot be characterized as other than a mere request for an advisory opinion. Such a view, from the remedial law standpoint, has much to recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority would affirm the original stand that under the circumstances, it could still rightfully be treated as a petition for prohibition. The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality ... be now resolved.' It may likewise be added that the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for ruling, the national elections being barely six months away, reinforce our stand. It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before us is an appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice then; we must act on the matter. Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the petitioner and the respondent are invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan to support their respective positions. It is best, therefore, to make a quick review of that case for a proper disposition of this one. In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the chamber. Included in this reorganization was the House representation in the Commission on appointments where three of the Nacionalista congressmen originally chosen were displaced by three of their party colleagues who had joined the Allied Majority. Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the Reforestration Administration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his place. Cunanan then came to this Court, contending that the rejection of his appointment was null and void because the Commission itself was invalidly constituted. The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court held:
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... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress. The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution because it has not been registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party has not yet achieved stability and suggests it might be no different from several other political groups that have died "a-bornin'," like the LINA, or have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO. The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him, that case expressly allows reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress, provided only that such changes are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. That change fully justified his designation to the Commission on Appointments after the reduction of the LP representation therein. Thus, the Court held: Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also, subsequently thereto. If by reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion from the political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution. In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the petitioner and the respondent (who was supported by the Solicitor General) an important development has supervened to considerably simplify the present controversy. The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on the nonregistration of the LDP which, he claims has not provided the permanent political realignment to justify the questioned reorganization. As he insists: (c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually the LDP itself, then the proposed reorganization is likewise illegal and ineffectual, because the LDP, not being a duly registered political party, is not entitled to the "rights and privileges granted by law to political parties' (See. 160, BP No. 881), and therefore cannot legally claim the right to be considered in determining the required proportional representation of political parties in the House of Representatives. 9

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xxx xxx xxx ... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the right of representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political parties who are duly registered with the Comelec. 10 On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that date, the Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party. 11 This has taken the wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp to shore as best he can. The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. 12 The Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of the Congress. The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among its members, but these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord. If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal. It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in the Commission on Appointments, it did not express any objection. 13 Inconsistently, the petitioner is now opposed to the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has been cut by more than half. As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a general congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even be said that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of Representatives,
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the party has not only survived but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan. To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to us is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. As for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect, the same may be brushed aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue raised may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the House of Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 86649 July 12, 1990 ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG and KABABAIHAN PARA SA INANG BAYAN, petitioners, vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., as speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines; HON. FRANCISCO SUMULONG, as Majority Floor Leader of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines; HON. JOVITO SALONGA, as Ex-Oficio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments; HON. ROQUE R. ABLAN, JR., HON. LORNA L. VERANO-YAP, HON. MIGUEL ROMERO, HON. ANTONIO V. CUENCO, HON. ROGACIANO M. MERCADO, HON. ALAWADIN T. BANDON, JR., HON. JOSE L. CABOCHAN, HON. CARLOS R. IMPERIAL, HON. MA. CLARA L. LOBREGAT, HON. NATALIO M. BELTRAN, JR., HON. CARMELO J. LOCSIN & HON. LUIS C. SINGSON, as Members of the Commission on Appointments for the House of Representatives of the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. GRIO-AQUINO, J.: The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of Representatives of the candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA. On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, upon nomination by the Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out of twelve (12) congressmen to represent the House in the Commission on Appointments. They were: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Hon. Miguel Romero LP (Liberal Party) Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LB-Panaghiusa Hon. Rogaciano Mercado LB (Lakas ng Bayan) Hon. Raul Daza LP Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon Jr. PDP-Laban Hon. Jose Cabochan PDP-Laban Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP Hon. Carlos R. Imperial IND Hon. Ma. Clara L. Lobregat IND Hon Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LB/Unido/NP Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin PDP-Laban/LB (pp. 115-116, Rollo.)

SECTION 18, ARTICLE VI

On September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the Commission on Appointments, representing the Coalesced Minority in the House. A year later, on September 16, 1988, the "Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized. On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal (p. 15, Rollo). Her request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen, namely, Hon. Lally Laurel-Trinidad, Bonifacio Gillego, Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Gerardo Cabochan, Jose D. Aspiras, Oscar Santos, Eduardo N. Joson, Antonio H. Cerilles and Isacio Pelaez. On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, on motion of the Majority Floor Leader and over the objection of Cong. Raul A. Daza, LP, revised the House majority membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Hon. Miguel L. Romero LDP Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LDP Hon. Rogaciano M. Mercado LDP Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon, Jr. LDP Hon. Jose L. Cabochan LDP Hon. Carlos R. Imperial LDP Hon. Maria Clara L. Lobregat LDP Hon. Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LDP Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin LDP Hon. Luis C. Singson LDP Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP (p. 122, Rollo.) Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority. On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (which may be considered as a petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying this Court to declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because: 1) the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is entitled to only nine (9) seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House (p. 29, Rollo);

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2) the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be nominated by their respective political parties or coalitions; 3) the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as representative of the minority was clearly invalid (p. 31, Rollo); and 4) that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in the Commission because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or parties in the House (p. 31, Rollo). Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the Commission on Appointments as a representative of the Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other congressmen and congresswomen of the Minority (p. 31, Rollo). In their collective Comment, the respondents House of Representatives, the Speaker, the Majority Floor Leader, the members of the Commission on Appointments including Congressman Roque R. Ablan, but excluding Congresswoman Lorna Verano-Yap (who filed a separate Comment), alleged: (1) that the legality of the reorganization of the Commission on Appointments is a political question, hence, outside the jurisdiction of this Court to decide, and (2) that in any case, the reorganization was "strictly in consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e., on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties, considering the majority coalition "as a form of a political party" (pp. 115, 118, Rollo). They further alleged that as of March 3, 1989, 160 members of the House (including 26 former Liberals) had expressly renounced in writing their respective political party affiliations and formally affiliated with the LDP leaving only 15 Liberals in the House (p. 119, Rollo).itc-asl After its petition for registration as a political party was granted on August 28, 1989 by the First Division of the COMELEC) and affirmed on November 23, 1989 by the COMELEC en banc, the LDP become the new Majority in the House. They finally argued that as KAIBA is part of the Coalesced Majority which supports the administration of President Corazon C. Aquino, not of the minority, petitioner is bound by the choice of the Coalesced Majority of the members who would sit in the Commission on Appointments. Representative Lorna Verano-Yap, in her comment alleged that the petitioner has no better light than those already selected, to be chosen as a member of the Commission on Appointments because: (1) the Constitution was not violated in electing Yap and eleven (11) other House members to the Commission on Appointments; (2) respondent Yap is a rightful incumbent; and (3) petitioner's claim to a seat on the Commission on Appointments is without legal and factual basis (pp. 217-218, Rollo). The Commission on Appointments took a neutral stand on the petition as the issues involved may touch on the validity of its organization and the legality of the entitlement of the LDP or the LP to representation, which are raised in the case of Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, then pending before this Court (pp. 195-198, Rollo). The issue here is whether the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads:

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Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, asex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) After deliberating on the petition and the comments of the respondents, we hold that the petition should be dismissed, not because it raises a political question, which it does not, but because the revision of the House representation in the Commission on Appointments is based on proportional representation of the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The "political question" issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989, where this Court ruled that "the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution" is justiciable, and, "even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government." The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein." The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen. The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's election to the Commission are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap. There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the Commission on Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
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Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority is unassailable. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

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SECTION 18, ARTICLE VI

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993 TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD),petitioners, vs. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAADA, respondents. NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention. RESOLUTION CAMPOS, JR., J.: In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Taada on October 27, 1992 and respondents Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo on October 30, 1992, said respondents moved for a reconsideration of our decision dated October 20, 1992, on the following grounds: Senator Taada alleges that: 1) The decision was premised on an erroneous appreciation of relevant factual precedents; 2) The decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by the letter and spirit of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions; 3) It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments; 4) The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it elected respondent Taada to the Commission on Appointments. In their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, Senators Gonzales and Romulo allege: 1) That the decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in the two cases of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. 1and Daza vs. Singson. 2 2) It is mandatory to have twelve (12) members of the Commission of Appointments to enable it to function as a constitutional body. 3) The Tolentino Compromise Formula was adopted by the Senate and accepted by all political parties and must govern the selection of respondent Senators to the Commission on Appointments.

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SECTION 18, ARTICLE VI

4) The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-party system which contemplates a realignment of political parties to remove fractional membership of any party in the Commission. On December 16, 1992, the petitioner-in intervention Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed its separate Comments to the Motions of respondents Senators while the petitioners filed on January 7, 1993 their separate Comments on the Motion of the respondents. Considering the grounds set forth in the Motions of the respondents and in the light of the reasons/arguments submitted in refutation thereof, We deny both Motions for Reconsideration on the following grounds: 1) The decision is based on a simple interpretation and application of Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution and We quote pertinent portions thereof. It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate is as follows: LDP LP-PDP-LABAN NPC LAKAS-NUCD 1.5 7.5 .5 2.5

It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application than as above. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is a clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC. xxx xxx xxx We find the respondent's claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.
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SECTION 18, ARTICLE VI

The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No party can claim more than what is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission. 3 The membership of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada in the Commission on Appointments for the year alluded to by respondents is not disputed. The questioned decision however refers to the former Senator's Membership in the Commission during his first election as Senator in 19531954. 4 In the following years the composition of the Commission on Appointments showed varying membership from the Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party, not discounting the various coalitions of the rival groups within their own ranks. During this period, his membership in the Commission was acquiesced to by the other members of the Senate, including the Nationalista Party which had a fractional vote. His membership in the Commission was never contested nor disputed by any party nor member of the Senate so that the question of whether his sitting as member of the Commission was constitutionality valid or not never reached the Court. The older Taada's membership in the Commission on Appointments cannot thus be considered by respondent Senator Taada as a precedent sufficient to overrule the clear mandate of Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution. It is a matter of record that in the political ventures of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada, he had his Citizens Party coalesce with the Nationalista Party and got himself elected as Senator under the banner of the latter party. His election to the Commission was principally due to the alliance of his Citizens Party with the Nationalista Party and not because he was elected thereto on the strength of his being the lone representative of the Citizens' Party. 5Senator Taada was included in the Nationalista Party ticket in 1953 until he parted ways temporarily with the same before the end of 1955. In 1959 he ran as a guest candidate of the Nationalista Party for a term of 6 years and again got re-elected in 1965 for another 6-year term under the Nationalista Party. The Nationalista-Citizens Party coalition of 12 Senators in the Senate from 1965-1967 gave the coalition 6 members in the Commission on Appointments, including the late Senator Lorenzo Taada. As early as those years, the Senate recognized the rule on proportional representation in the Commission by resorting to a coalition of political parties in order to resolve and avoid fractional membership in the Commission. This practice was repeated in 1968-1970 where the lone elected Senator of the Citizens Party was nominated and elected to the Commission on Appointments as the Senator to complete a whole number in the proportional representation to the Commission, with the late Senator Taada becoming the 16th Senator of the Coalition, enabling it to put 8 members in the Commission. Likewise, in 1970, the late Senator Taada filled up the 18th membership of the Coalition to become the 9th member representing the Coalition in the Commission. The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada to the Commission on Appointments does not reflect any practice or tradition in the Senate which can be considered as a precedent in the interpretation of the constitutional provision on proportional representation in the Commission on
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SECTION 18, ARTICLE VI

Appointments. No practice or tradition, established by a mere tolerance, can, without judicial acquiescence, ripen into a doctrine of practical construction of the fundamental law. In the absence of judicial confirmation of the constitutionality of the challenged legislative practice the repeated erroneous legislative interpretation of a constitutional provision, does not vest power on the legislature. 6 2) We take note of an erroneous reference in our decision to the listing of the party affiliation of the Senators based on the result of the election on May 11, 1992, giving the LDP only 15 members and including Senator Teofisto Guingona as a member of the Lakas-NUCDP. Respondents, however, accepted the fact that for purposes of determining the proportional representatives of each political party to the Commission on Appointments, the basis thereof is the actual number of members of each political party at the time of election of the members of the Commission on Appointments in the Senate. 7 In fact, respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona with the LakasNUCDP upheld the doctrine enunciated in Daza vs. Singson, 8 recognizing changes in alignments of membership in the Commission based on changing political alignments at the time of the organization of the Commission on Appointments. The issue therefore has no significance as an argument to set aside our decision. 3) Senator Taada was actually nominated by the LP because the house rules require that the party must make the nomination. In fact he nominated himself as representative of the LP-LDP-LABAN. It was the Majority Leader, an LDP Senator, (Senator Romulo) who presented the motion to elect respondent Senator Taada (along with the Senators belonging to the other Minority parties NPC and LAKAS-NUCD) as part of his function or duty to present for election and votation those previously nominated by the various political parties. In nominating the twelve (12) Senators to the membership in the Commission on Appointments, Senator Romulo moved: Mr. President, pursuant to the Motion just approved, I have the honor to submit for election to the Commission on Appointments the 12 Senators to compose its membership : Senators Angara, Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo for the LDP; Senators Tolentino and Osmea for NPC; Senator Rasul, for Lakas-NUCD; and Senator Taada for LP-PDP, Mr. President. 9 4) This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing for a multiparty system, entitlement to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership in each house. 10 The statement of this Court in Daza vs. Singson 11 to the effect that "under the Constitutional provision on membership of the Commission on Appointments, the members thereof are NOT limited to the majority and minority parties therein but extends to all the political parties represented in each house of Congress", does not and should not be construed to mean that all political parties, irrespective of numerical representation in the Senate, are entitled by Constitutional fiat to at least one representation in the Commission. The Supreme Court in the subsequent case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. 12 made this clear where it ruled that proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership of a party in each house. The mere presence of one Senator belonging to a political party does not ipso facto entitle such a party to membership in the Commission on Appointments. 5) We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 Senators be elected to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding
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SECTION 18, ARTICLE VI

directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations like the case at bar. Section 18 provides, in part, as follows: There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate as exofficioChairman, twelve Senators, and . . . , elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation . . . . The respondent's contention that the use of the word "shall" in Section 18 indicating the composition of the Commission on Appointments makes the election of the Senators mandatory, omitting that part of Section 18 which provides that (they shall be) elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation. This interpretation finds support in the case of Taada vs. Cuenco, 13 where this Court held that the constitutional provision makes mandatory the election of the specified number of Senators to the Commission on Appointments but also ruled that they should be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties. In case of conflict in interpretation, the latter mandate requiring proportional representation must prevail. Such interpretation is the only correct and rational interpretation which the court can adopt in consonance with its solemn duty to uphold the Constitution and give effect the meaning intended by its framers to every clause and word thereof. The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve Senators and twelve Representatives in order that the Commission may function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals with the Commission on Appointments, provides that "the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the members", and in Section 19 of the same Article, it is provided that the Commission "shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it". In implementing these provisions, the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provide that the presence of at least thirteen (13) members is necessary to constitute a quorum, "Provided however, that at least four (4) of the members constituting the quorum should come from either house". 14 Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum, which is less than the full complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission can validly perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto. Even if respondent Senator Taada is excluded from the Commission on Appointments for violation of the rule on proportional representation, the party he represents still has representation in the Commission in the presence of house members from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile. Respondents ask for a clarification of our statement which suggested a practical solution to break the impasse in the membership of the Senate in the Commission on Appointments, which we quote: . . . On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any of the political parties from forming a coalition with another political party in order to fill up the two vacancies resulting from this decision. 15
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SECTION 18, ARTICLE VI

The statement is merely a suggestion but not an exclusive solution. It is not part of the disposition of the case. It does not contemplate a realignment of political parties, as otherwise this Court would have explicitly said so. What we intimated is merely this: That those entitled to fractional memberships may join their half-memberships to form a full membership and together nominate one from their coalition to the Commission on Appointments. For example, the NPC and the LAKAS-NUCD may join their half-memberships and jointly nominate one of their own Senators to the Commission. In the same way the LDP and the LP-PDP-LABAN may nominate Senator Wigberto Taada to fill up the other slot to complete the membership to twelve. But the latter, as a coalition, may not insist in electing both Senator Taada and Senator Romulo to fill up two slots because this is certainly a violation of the rule on proportional representation. Who decides the question of proportionality? The power to choose who among them will sit as members of the Commission on Appointments belongs to the Senate. The number of senators is fixed by the Constitution to twelve, but the numbers of senators to be chosen must comply with the rule on proportional representation. The question of who interprets what is meant by proportional representation has been a settled rule that it belongs to this Court. The acceptance by the Senate of Senator Tolentino's formula to settle temporarily the impasse concerning the membership in the Commission on Appointments by leaving the final decision to the Supreme Court is a Senate recognition that the determination of proportional representation under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution is a function of this Court. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by Constitutional mandate to decide. The framers of our Constitution, in borrowing from constitutions of other states, thought it wise to vest in the Supreme Court the role in final arbiter in cases of conflicts in the interpretation of the fundamental law. In this role, the Court serves as a check on the unbridled use of power by the legislative majority to silence the minority. Democracy may breed but it will not sanction tyranny by force of numbers. The election of respondents Senators Taada and Romulo is a clear disregard of the constitutional provision and when done over the objections of their colleagues in the Senate, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. We quote from our decision: . . . The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Taada as members of the Commission on Appointments by the LDP Majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP Majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers during the Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist. 16 For lack of merit, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED with FINALITY. SO ORDERED.

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