INFANTRY OX THE KANSAS FRON'SIER 1866- 1880

A thesis presented to the Faculty of thc U S . Army Command and General Staffcollege in partial fdfillment of the requirements fir the dcgrec MASTER OF MIL.ITAKY ART AND SCIEKCE

JOl IN M. SULLIVAN, JR., MAJOR; USMC B.A., Worccstcr Stntc Collcgc, Worccstcr, Mnssnchusctts, 1978

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1997

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidatc: MAJ John M. Sullivan Jr., U S Marine Corps Thcsis Title: Infantry on the Kansas Frontier: 1866-1880

Approved by:

, Thesis Committee Chairman

--Ib , Member

Accepted this 6th day of June 1997 by:

Director, Graduate Degree Programs Philip 1. Brookes, Yh.D.

T l a opinions and conclusions cxprcssed hercin are those ofthe student author and do not
ncwssxily repxsent tllc vicws of the U.S. Army Command and Gcncnl St;fiCollcgc or ;u~y other govcmmcntal agency. (References to this study include the following statement.)

ABS'I'IIACT

ISFANTRY ON THE KANSAS FRONTIER, 1866-1880 by Major John M. Sullivan, Jr., USMC, 137 pages. This thesis focuses on the Army's infantry in Kansas during thc development of the American frontier in the years following the Civil War until 1880. lrifa~itry companies were tlic mainstay ofthe frontier ,&my during tlicsc years of westward expansion and development. Yet, twentieth centur) literature and Holl~?voodmovies overlook the role of the infantry on thc frontier. A small, fiscally constrained Army could not have safeguarded the nation's fiontier without tlic employ~nent of infantry alongside the cwalry. 'The ceritral and western portions of the starc of Kansas encapsulate the Army's role in the development of the nation's frontier. Two overland trails. the Smoky Hill and the Arkansas, passed through this: area and wcrc primary routcs for west\vard expansion. The Kansas Pacific railroad, one of two major westward lines, \\as built during thesc years. Settlement grav in this area undcr the Ilomcstead Act of 1862. Thcse elements brought conflict with the Indians, Kansas was the scenc of some of the most sustained and violent Indian attacks in the last half of the 1860s. To mcet the tasks of frontier development, the Army employed both cavalry and infantry.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Iowe a great deal o f thanks to many people who helped me develop and construct this thesis. First. Iwould like to acknoicledge and to thank my committee; Dr. Jerold Brown, C o l o ~ i cJames l Hawkins, USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel James Martin, USA. A l l were extre~ncly t l ~ o ~ ~ g hand t f u lhelpful throughout [he entire procss. Dr. Brobbn, my commirtee chairman; was especially helpful in outlining the thesis subject and mentoring me through the h l M A S process. His depth o f knowledge on the American Army and frontier history, as well as his attention to detail, contributed immensely to the completion o f the thesis.

I must also thank Major M a n y Sheil, his wife Carol. and Major Kevin I'orter for kindly
assisting a b ~ l n r i ~ by ~e proofreading this tl~esis.Their colnmcnts and obscrvatio~is were always on target and relevant. Equally deserving o f thanks are Mr. George Elmore, National Park Historian ar Fort Larncd Kational Historic Site, for recommending to me the subject o f the thesis and providing advice and information on source material; Mr. Robert Wilhelni, Director o f Fort Hays State Historic Site, for the research material and advice he provided; as well as M r . Douglas McChristan, National Park I h t o r i a n at Fort Laranlie National Historic Site. for the research matcrial and ad\ice he too provided. Finally, but never last in importance, 1 thank m y wifc, Oy, for her patience and support as Ispent countless hours o f our time on this thesis over the last "best year o f our lives" here at Command and General SraffCollege. This thesis could not have been completed without her daily support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paec .

APPROVAL PAGE ........................................................................................................ ABSTR.4CT .................................................................................................................. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................. I.IS1. .OF ILLUSTRATIONS .......................................................................................... CHAPTER ONE TWO
THREE

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111

vi

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. THE FRONTIEK AND I'I-IE ARMY ................................................. COMMAND AiiD CON I ROL ............................................................ FORTS AND LOGISTICS .................................................................. OI'ERA'I'IONS ...................................................................................... ACTION O N THE SMOKY HILL TRAIL I867 ............................... CONCLbSlON .....................................................................................
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FOUR FIVE SIX SEVEN

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114 123 132 137

FIGIJRES ...................................................................................................................... BIDL.IOGK.4PHY ........................................................................................................... INITIAI.. DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................... . ...... . .............................................

Figure I . Distribution of Arm) infantry and cavalry in Kansas. Scpternbcr 1867 ...................
2 . M3p of the Forts in Kansas. 1866- 1880.....................................................................
j.

Page 29 123 124 128 129

Distribution of Army infantry and cavalry in Kansas. 1866-1880 ............................

4 . Typical day's duty for an infantryman in garrison ..............................................

5 . Amiy infantry and ca\.alry engagements in Kansas. 1866- 1880...............................

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

A man without a horse has no business on the prairie Hcnn M. Stalley: h@ I~irrly Travels and Adventures. Hollywood movies contribute to the avcmgc .hicriean's perception of the Anny's role on to thc rescue of thc fronticr of post-Ci\ il \+jar America, The image of thc cavaln r~dmg bclcaguercd senlcrs under attack by Indians is a lasting aid rneniorable one. Early motion picture director D. W. Gritfith first established this imagc in 1913 with his movie, 7'he Uallle of
I~ldrrhrirsh(iiilch. By 1939 a l d the release of Jolin Ford's Stclgecooch; the image of the cavaln

and the frontier had taken a firm hold on American folklore. \Vhile such cavaln rescues took place and were certainly mc~noruble for those rcscucd: tlwc IS anothcr element to the front1c.r Army that has reccivcd scant attention, the infantr).. .Along side the cavalry s e n d the infaitn; they formed the backbone of d ~ post-Civil e War frontier A m y . ' With thc cessation of hostil~t~es in 1865: thc nation's encrgy was channclcd into the dcvelopmcnt of the frontier. Along nit11 tlic emigrants and tlic Indians, the Army bccame one of the ccntral actors in the \\cst\vard expansloll of whit2 ci\il~zation From thc end of thc C n il \liar until the Spanish-Amcrican War in 1x98, the priman a c h i t y of the Army \\as focused on the frontier. Whilc the mission might not have been a popular one with the Armp's Icadcrship, it was novenhelcss executed in a professional manner. All the ivhilc it should not be forgottcn that this all occurred in a time of evtrcme fiscal restraint. A nation that considered itself at peace and one that

n-as tradttionlilly wary of a largc Army prcfcrrcd to economize on its defense. Thu result was that often only a thin line of soldicrs mauicd thc frontier posts. That infantry served on the plains should not conic as a surprise. Tllc rcorganization of thc Army after the Civil War author~zed fort)-five infantry and ten cavalry regiments. Before and even during thc Civil War, the regular Army infantry garrisoncd the isolatcd posts on thc nation's frontier. Aficr the nar: in even greater numbers the i n h t r ) . marched to the West to safeguard emigrants and Indians, There was almost no way the Anny; given its stmcturc, could cxccutc its mission on thc frontier without employing infantry.' The role of the Ann? in the post-Ci\ il War Wcst is well documented. Journals i d nicmoirs of soldicrs, cmigrants, and ivritcrs \vcrc published by the end of the 1860s. Thc trend continued into tl~c tncnt~eth centur). as historians documented the devdopmcnt of the West. The cvploits of George Amstrong Custer and the Seventh Caval? account for niuch of the literature on thc Anny of the Wcst. Because the Anny's primary adversary, the Indian, uas most oRen mounted on ponies, it is not surprising that the c a v d n and not the infantry reccivcs thc lion's share of attention. In Moll!~vood's portrayal of the Anny on the West: thc soldiers seen are almost esclusivcl!~cavalry. Infantry marching on a stark plain in pursuit of Indians. manning isolatcd posts, or escorting \\.ago11 trains is not matcrial for books or film. It is ironic then that the Army's most succcssfiil Indian fighter: Gcncral Nelson A. Miles, was an infantryman. Very few publishcd works focus on the role of the regular Army infantry in the
development of thc nestern frontier of the United States. Wlcn n~cntior~cd in books, there is only

the bricfest rcfcrcnce to spcc~tic infantry units or their leaders. l i e infiultry's role is limited almost as an aficr thought and linked to th? actilitics of the cavalry. \Vhcn historics focus on campaigns or battles of the Indian wars: thcy tend to focus on the cavalry units and ofticcrs. It is no wondcr then that the infantry is overlooked by many when thc subject turns to the frontier Army.
2

Writer and adventurir Ilei~ry kt: Stinky a&oGp&ed dciieral *infield Scott Hancock's cspcdition in Kansas in April 1867. The column, out to intiniidatc Indians in central and western Kansas, consisted of both infmtry and cavalry. Stanley, though, had his doubts about the misdoni of tlie inclusion of infant?. He recorded his thoughts in his book, My Early Travels ond
Adventures:

Though our espericnce on the plains has only bccn limited we think it a foolish policy to take foot soldiers on campaign agamst mounted lndians. E\-en if dil: infantn were needed as escort for [wagon1 trains still \vc are of thc opinion that they would of more liarni than good. Four or fivcsoldisrs cannot ride on loaded wagons: and the! must. thcrcfore, nccessarily nnlk. It is an old saying on the plains; and one \\.hich has proten to bc trus-viz., that "A man nithout a horsl: has no business on the pramc." . . . .fifteen miles a day on an average is the utmost a foot soldier can tra\.el. The dullest mind will pcrceive the usclcssncss of infant? trawling at that rate to ovcrtakc Indians \vho tra\el fifiy or s i q milts a day.' Stanley's comments might v c n well sununarizc a common conception of infant? on the frontier. Ho\\cvcr: they do justice to the contribution of the combined tclun of infantry and cavalry. Each had a rolc to play, leaders \vho used the capabilities of each pro\-cd morc successfi~l

A combination of many clemcnts brought nhitc civdization to tlie frontier; forcniost among
then, the scttler, farming: thc milroad. and the Army. For its part, tlic A m y fought few decisive cngagcmalts agalnst the Indians. Clnslxs were most often thc rcsnlt of the Indian's style of to locate, close with, and destroy Indian irregular warfare. A frustratcd Amiy found it d~fficuul warriors. The subjugation of the Indian took longer than many envisioned. If it was a forcgonc conclusion, it was not settled ovcmiglit. For the Army, it was oRcn a slow, bitter assignmalt. To examine the infantry's rolc on thc frontier, its rolc in Kansas offcrs an excellent casc study. During thc period 1x66 through 1x80: Kansas prolides a picture of the activities that wcre taking place throughout the nation's frontier. During thcse ycars Kansas was one of the most rapidly developing statcs in the count?. It was also onc of the major gateways for emigrants

moving tvest\\ard. T u o major overland trails passed through the state, the Snioky Hill and Santa

Fe. Additionally, one of two railroads towards the West coast would ultimately be laid through the state. Writing on the Indian wars of 1867-1869, John Momett noted: ".

. . . no lands on the

American frontier of 1867-1868 were more coveted by young farming families starting out in life than the rich soil of ~ansas.'* If the infantry's contribution to the taming of the West is given little coverage, it is almost ignored in the literature of Kansas. There were almost always companies from infantry regiments

assigned to the posts in central and western Kansas during these years. The geography of western Kansas, primarily plains, would certainly seem to be an unlikely territory to employ infantry. However, as noted earlier, the Army could not execute its frontier mission without infantry. Even if cavalry were the preferred force, there were just not enough cavalry regiments available. The Army played an influential role in safeguarding the development and organization of Kansas. Historian Craig Miner, writing on the settlement of the high plains of Kansas in the 1860s, noted: "Historians have long been aware that western town building was so strongly related to the early markets provided by the military that dangers were exaggerated to keep the soldiers around as

customer^."^

Between 1867 through 1869, that threat was very real; indeed, these were the most

violent years in the Indian-white relationship. The Army's relationship with the local citizens was integral to the development of Kansas after the Civil War. This was especially so between 1866 and 1880, when the state was dependent upon the Army for protection and until the frontier had moved West beyond the state's borders. Additionally, by 1880 the Indians had seceded all their land in Kansas and been relocated to reservations in the Indian Territory. That year, the population of the state had grown to 400,000 persons. The focus of this thesis then is the question: Was the Army infantry effective in providing security on the Kansas prairie from 1866 to 1880? In answering the thesis question, a secondary 4

question arises: How \\is thi Amit's irifantiy employed on thi: KaiiSas Frontier from 1x66 through 1880? To a n s w r these questions, examination of tlic frontier Army, infantry organization,

cquipnicnt, doctrine and tactics, command and control, logistics, and operations against the Indians

The stagc \vas now set for the infantry in Kansas. Historial Craig Miner, commncnting on thc start of post-Civil War espansion in central and western K.msas in 1866, wrote. "The Civil War was o \ w The negotiators w r e read!.; the soldiers were ready; the loconiotivcs were rcady; the p l o w were rcady. But thc Indians were not ready."' Tlic Anny spent the next thirty ycnrs on the frontier safeguarding cspansion and balding Indians. For the first fifteen of those years, infantn and cavaln; pcrfonncd thcse smic missions in central and ncstcm Kansas.

'Edward Buscomber, ed., The BPI Companion to !he Wesrern we\\ York: Da Capo Press, 1988): 59.
uf Warjbr rhe Y e w 1866 'Secretan. of War; Ann~rrrll<cpurtof the S(~crefcrr.v (Washington; DC: GPO. 1866): 3.
3

Stank), 8 5 .

John hl. lvlonncn: Thr Barrle of'Beecher Island and rhr Indian War ofl867-1869 (Boulder: CO: University Press of Colorado, 1992). G 5 . ' ~ r a i gMincr, Wcsl of Wrchrta (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1986); 34.

CHAPTEII

nvo

THE FRONTIER AYD THE ARMY

The end of the Ci\11 \Var released an enormous amount of the nation's energy on its frontier. Emigration westward. brought to almost a stand stdl during the war, renewed 1~1th increased bigor. The uphea\.al of the population brought about by so many men in uniform from 1861 through 1865 released an cnergy that sped settlement m d dcrulopment to the fronticr. As the an Army very countn sought to bring order m d securlty to this westward expansion it c~nploycd much changed from that of tlic Civil War. The dcvelopmcnt of the fronticr 111 Kansas was rcflcctive of thc dcvclopmcnt throughout the West. Instrumental to wliirc settlement in central and

Images of the Army on the post-Cii il \liar fronticr bring to rnmd cavnln units engaged in combat with \cry mobile Indians. The nnnies of Sheridan and Custcr, not Miles or Hancock; are Luiiil~ar to most. Yet. in reality. infant? units; alongside the cavalry: garrisoned dl: posts throughout the nat~on'sfronticr. They fought Indians, guarded and escorted traffic on the overland
trails, cscortcd railroad constn~ct~on parties. and attempted to kcep thc peace bct\vccn white scttlcrs

and tlie Indians Yet ver). fc\v published works focus on the role of the infantry in the development of tlie western fronticr, though they were thc Army's mainstay on the fronticr. Follo\ring the Civil War, the regular Army assumed the mission of providing security on the frontier in expectation of the inevitable clash of cultures. The period from 1866 to 1880 was a tinic of intense activity for the Army throughout thc ncstern frontier Follo\v~ng the reorganization of July 1866, the bulk of the new regular Arm) was comprised of infantry units. Man?: of these
6

infant- units soon found themselves garrisoned on thc central plains, guarding new settlements and routes of travel against a detcrmined and mountcd enemy, the Plains Indians.' The post-Civil War Army undenvent many dramatic changcs The enormous wartimc Union Am]! dcmobilizcd many unlts soon after the Civil War cnded. Historian Robcrt Athearn notcd: As usual: after a war, the nation was eager to reduce the accumulated debt, and the armed forms werc the most obvious subject for economy. The magnificent armies that had stood before Vicksburg, Atlanta, and Richmond, now melted into history. Only a feeble, unrecognizable skelcton remained. Stretching out beyond the Mississippi for thousands of miles lay the vast, unsettled west: dominated by hard-riding. hard-fighting nomadic Indians, equippcd with the frnest horses on the continent and frequently the best arms. It was to be the job of the little postwar Army to establish ncn forts and to maintain old ones; to kccp open lines of communication: such as thc stagc and freight routes, and to protect new ones, like the railroads; and, finally; to kccp the hostile Indians from pouncing upon widely scattered scttlemcnts that lay nestled in the mountains and strewn along the plains.' By 1866, most of the volunteer units were gone or mustered out of service. A war w a r y nation was ready to channel irs energy in othcr directions. Mmnwhile: a smaller, professional regular Am~y now reemerged, Thc process of demobilization of volunteer units began almost as soon as the war ended. As of 1 May 1865, there were 1,034,064 volunteer troops in the Union Army awaiting orders to muster out. The proccss moved at a furious pacc. By Novembcr 1866, only 11,043 men remained in the Army. The principal demands on the Army now were reconstruction duty in the formcr rebellious States and guarding the western frontier. In Congress, Radical Republicans were bent on a harsh rcconstmction policy, which in turn required a large army to enforce policy. Those in Congress who supported President Andrcw Johnson's less severc policy of reconstruction favored a smallcr, less expensive peacetime army. Gencral Ulysses S. Grant, Commanding Cicneral of the Army in 1866, believed the current demands placcd on the military required a regular Army of approximately 80:000 men; whilc the Secretary of War differed in opinion and envisioned an army end strength closer to 50,000.'

ARer much debate, Congress passcd a military bill that I'rcsidcnt Johnson signed on 28 July 1866. This act set thr: regular Army stnicturc at forty-five rcgirnents, or four hundred and fifty companics of infantn; tcn regimcnts or one hundred-twenty companies of cavalry; and five regiments or sixty companies of artillen.. Two cavalry regimcnts and four infantn regiments were comprised of colorcd troops. Company strcngth \\as sct at a maximum of one hundred privates, minimum of fifty privates per company: giving the Anny a maximum end strcngth of 75.382. In Koiernber of 1866, the company strength nas set at s~xtyfour printcs per company. giving the Army a strcllgth of 54,302. This set into motion the two principal formations employed a10112the fronticr; thc and the infantry. Any plans to employ the massive \oluntecr army in

subj,jugatingthe western fronticr passed with the enactment of this restructure. The once mighty Union Army, which had dcfeatcd tlic Confederacy in battlc; nas now strretchcd thin along thc \vestern frontier and on reconstruction duty in the South Solid leadership \\.as now csscntial if the Xnny \vas to meet all its taski~y.' The Army's leadership in 1866 included many combat vctcrans The regular Army officer corps of 1866 ~vas a mixturc of West Point graduates .and Civil War veterans. M ~ i officers y who held scuior rank in volunteer units during the Civil War soon found themselves taking great rcductions in rank with 11ic restructure of the regular Army. Historian Robert Utley has notcd that. "Gcncrals became coloncls; majors: and even somctimcs captains: nhilc colonels and majors found thernsclves lizu~cnants."~ Indi~iduals \vho once comnandcd divisions and regiments now conunanded companies. To makc matters norsc; promotions in the postwar army nerc few and far bet\vcen. One benefit of this, though probably not appreciated at the time, was that in an area \vherl: only a company or tno comprised the local garrison, comn~anders were often experienced,

professional, and combat veterans Howcver, the downsizing of force structure iu~d the rcductions
in rank for most officers affected the morale of thc fronticr army: egos aRcr a11 were very fmgilc.

On the whole, though, they essentially performed their duties in a professional and competent ~nmner.~ The post-Civil War soldier differed in niaiy \vays from the citizen soldicrs of the Army of the Potomac, ewn though many were ex-Umon aid Confcderarc soldiers. The lndian Wars soldicrs canle from vcn diverse backgrounds. I\.Iany were poorly educated aid a good percentage of the enlistees came from the bonom of the cconornic scale Ho\vc\cr; it was not uncommon to find wll-educated men who joincd for the adventure or to escape from a past. A large percentage of enlistees ncre recent ininiigrants, primar~ly of German and Irish descent.' tlistoriar~Don kcky, nriting on tlic frontier Amy, noted: Since the bcginnins of national standing annies: voluntary cnlistccs haw entered their ranks for a wide variety of reasons, h.lilitarism was not a dominant national ideal in the l!nited States from 1865 through thc 1890's. and thus identification with such .an ideal \vas conspicuously lacking as a motive for joining the regular Army. Therc was no national conscription to compel scrvicc: and the rank and file arniy life attracted few nho possessed a i y first hand knowledge of it as a way of life. Ncverthdcss~ many types of men d ~ d enlist, volunteering for a tlircc or five-year tcnn of scrvicc, at a basc pay of thirteen dollars a month.' Pcrhaps this points out that soldicrs thcn joincd the Ann? for man!. of the same reasons as young men do today. I t seems a rite of passage thcn as today: and certainly not for the money, perhaps for the escltement Instead of excitement, the soldicrs found instead isolation and an often very dull routinc. Located on thc stark and inhospitable plains, thc soldicrs occupied dreary and primitivc posts. From tlicse forts, the Arm) \vould attempt to accomplish its mission of providing security to the

developing frontier. Their task very much resembled what today is tcmicd operations other than
war (OOTW). hluch to the chagrin of many senior off~ccrs, the Army canie to closely rcsemblc a frontier police force. Ncver enough of them to guard the entire frontier, the men w r e marched from one point to another. nherevcr the current crisis dcninndcd. In 1866, frontier duty became

even busier as Llic \Vest came ali\x with new emigrants. With these emigrants c,mc increased security missions for the Army. With the end of thc Civil War, Americans and recent immigrants renewed in earnest the nest~vard migration that had been slowd by that recent conflict. Many of the travelers \\-ere licadcd for California, Nen- Mexico, Oregon, and the Colorado and Montana goldfields. Others; attracted by the possibilities of o\vning their o m land as a result of the Homestead Act of 1862, settled on the central plains. The Homestead Act, signed by President ..Zbrahani Lincoln during the Civil War: opened govcnlmcnt land in plots of 160 acres to cit~zcns or intended citizens over the agc of t\vcnh-one. Claimants wcre required to quickly build a house aid Pam? the land for five ?cars. aRcr which the land \\.as theirs, in fee simplc. Historian Roben Utley has noted: "The surgc of migrat~on \vould add a million citizens to tls census roles of the western states and tcrritorics bctneen 1860 and 1870, and another nvo and one half-niill~onby 1880."' A high percentage of tlicsc immigrants passed through Kansas and man) settled in ncn toivns or on their own

homestead."
The cidvancc of the railroad West was one of thc significant niilestoncs in the dc\elopmcnt of the frontier. l i e continuation of railroad construction follo\ving the cessation of the \var brought further population rno\cment througliout the frontier. Tv.0 great bands of tracks wcre laid \vcst\vard from the Missouri River, \\Me still another expanded east\vard from the Pacific. Kailroad construction brought with it new scttlemaits which soon developed along the rail\vay route. The railroad also brought \vhitc civilization increased access to the \rest. Construction of the \vcst\vard railroads, for a period in 1866, averaged o\cr a mile each day. This expansion took place under the watchti~l eye of the Anny, to whom protection of the railroad was a priority."

In late 1866, shortly after a two-montli tour of his new co~mnluid, General William
Tccumseh Shermm. commander of the Division of the Missouri, rcponcd to the Sccrctary of War 10

his observations of the \vest. Hc found the frontier generally peaceful, but sau crisis brcwing betwen the whites and the Indians. Sherman found that the people on the frontier regarded the Indians as hostile, and demanded Anny protection. Since the Army \\as responsible for protecting scttlerncnts and tra\d routzs, he recommended then that military should too view the lndians as hostile and that forces should be arrayed accordingly. Shcnnan also made the first of many requests to return the lndian Bureau; since 1819 the responsibihty of the Dcpartmcnt of the

a r Department. The militan ofien viewd with skepticism the Indian agent's Interior, back to the W
attitude towards the Indians and felt they lacked control over their cbargcs."

.,

Thi: civil government in Washington established Ind~an pohcy. Accord~ng to Russell

From the conclusion of the Civil \Var through the end of the Rutherford B. Hayes administration, the national objectiw of the United States were to promote economic dcvelopment a i d settlement in the Western rcgibns. Accomplishment of these objectives required the federal g o w r m n t to formulate an lndian policy that would deal with the inevitable contlict of the t\vo cultures. To acconiplisl~ these objectives, three goals were incorporated into Indian policy: first: the rcnloval of Indians from the major cast-west irnlnigrat~ontrails where they \\ere an obstacle to thc dcvelopment of the transcont~nental railroad routes; second, the increase of the reservation system to reduce contact between the races; and third. the use of thc resenation system to assirn~latc the Indians into mainstream American culture. This Indian policy focused Ann). operations and became a cornerstone in national security policy during the pcriod.l' The fict that the lndian Bureau and not thc War Dcpartmcnt developed Indian policy con ti nu all^ frustrated senior Anny leadership, since the Arniy's response to the Indians n a s reactive rather than proacti\ e The State of Kansas \\as still a frontier statc in 1866. Howevcr, the nest fifteen years would see major transformations take place in the statc. Thc Civil War had brought thc dcvelopnicnt of the statc to a near standstill. With the Civil War over: the statc became a gateway to the w s t . Emigrant traffic increased along the overland trails that passed through Kansas as nhite settlers migrated \vestward from the eastern United States. This in-turn acerbated problems

\\it11 the 11ldlans The trails over which thc emigrants passed and tcrrito? that they sometimes

scttlcd on wcrc. until rcccntly, primarily occupied by thc nomadic lndlans. Kansas is part of an arca knonn as the Ccntral Plains. The Ccntral Plains wcrc part of a Ixger tcrritor). that strctchcd frorn the Missouri River wcst to the foothills of thc Rocky I\,lountains. Once portrayed as the inhospitable, '%real American Desert." curly pioncers heading w s t travcrscd this area nit11 much trepidation and as quickl!. as possible. 'The terrain consists of rolling grassl;ulds and a treeless plain. Several rivers, primarily the Arkansas, Smoky Hill, Saline. and Solomon: provide \\atcr as ~vcll as transportation routes and subscqucntly thc areas of around thcse rivers became homesteads. Durinz thc summer months; the plain \\as co\cred by nutritious grass that providcd an abundnnt food source for a multitude of \vildlife. Great herds of buffalo roarncd this area however, making this prinlc hunting tcrritor). for t l ~ c local i n d ~ m tribes." Politici;uns in Kansas. anxious to devclop thc state aftcr four years of war, distributed parnphlcts'in the states cast of thc Mississippi River extolling the agricultural prospects in Kansns. Gradually emigration shifted from Mimlesota and the North\vest to Kansas. Thesc new scttlcrs steadily expandcd in a \vcst\vard direction across thc state; ncw to\\ns emcrged a i d ncw counties wcre organized; covering the state by IXYO. Kansas Govcrnor Samuel Cranford saw great

prosperity ahcad for Kansas in 1866, a land that was safc frorn marauders and 1ndims.l'
Shcr~dm differed somcwhat in his opinion. Attcr touring the plains in the sununcr of 1866, he noted: Thcsc plains can ncver be cultivated like Illinois, ncvcr be filled with inhabitants capable of self-govcmrncnt and self-dcfensc as against Indians and marauders, but at best can become a vast pasture field; opcn and frcc to all for the rcaring of hcrds of horses, mules; cattle and shccp I S I h e eastern portion of Kansas compriscd the nar~on'sprc-Civil War fronticr. While thc Civil War had clearly slowcd the devclopmcnt of this ncw state, pcace changd all that. As the

frontier continued to mow \vest\vard through Kansas, traffic increased dramatically along two earlier tmils. the Santa Fe and Smoky Hill. Thcsc wst\vard movenicnts brought cncroachmcnt onto laid that until recently was the homeland a i d hunting grounds of lndinns As more and more whites passcd through or scttled into these areas, Indian resistance increased ensuring conflicts. Tlic local citizenry looked to the Anny to pro~idc them protection aid security. During the Civil War, the Anny in Kmsas continued to provide escorts to passengers and freight along the Santa Fc and Smoky Hill Trails. Somc of these Am); troops were former Confederate soldiers who chose service in the West rather than rem~in in a prison crimp. The! were knonn as "Gahanized Yankees." Almost sis thousand total. these "Gdvanized Yankees" \\ere fonned into sis regiments of U.S. Volunteers in late 1864 Ultimately three of the six regiments, the Second; Third: and Fifth: saw actix sen-ice in ccntral aid westcni Kansas durinz 1865 into late 1866. Following the end of the Civil War, thcsz soldiers manned the frontier until the Regulars returned." Other niilitan units: local, state. or territorial militias, w r c miscd in response to India1 attacks, These units covcrcd for the regular Anny that was concentrated in the eastern portion of the United States 1ndi;ms routinely menaced travel along these two routes: perhaps attracted by the absuice of the Ammy. Thcse raids prompted retaliaton expeditions in Kansas and in castern Colorado Tcrriton in 1864 and 1x65. Most Indian dcprcdations were usually the acts of a few marauding bands of warriors rather thai a general clash betwen whites aid Indians. As usual in guerrdla warfare. the militan \\.as frustrated in identifling tlic perpetrators and often lashed out at the first Indians they encountered. The situation soon deteriorated as a result of the excesses of the militias as they sought to repress local uprisings. An expedition in 1863 in particular: which included a dubious volunteer unit from Colorado. ended with tlic massacre of a band of Cheyennes in western Colorado along the Sand C m k , This incident was to have far reaching effects later on 13

for n ~ i l i t a rclat~ons ~~ nrth the Indians and ti~lurc attempts at placing lnd~ans on rcscrvations. Tlus same incident had repercussions in Eastern newspapers and left a v c n negative and lasting image of the Anny to many of the citizcns brrck East. Actions of this type by militias imbued a reluctance Indian campaigns." in tlic Army to acccpt volunteer units from the States during fi~ture

populated the arca of central and \vcstenl Kansas were nomadic by Thc lndians ~vho
nature. Principally of die Chcycnne, Arapahoe; Kiowa, and the Conimche tribcs, thzy were predominantly buflhlo hunters. 7liesc lndians roamcd over tlie plains folloning thc shifting hcrds during the spring and summcr months. The arm betwccn the Arkansas Kivcr in ihe south 'and tlic Plane h v e r in tlie north cncompasscd the prme hunting arca for thcsc four tribcs. During the cold winter months. thc Indians n-ould move south of the Ark;uisas Rivcr into present day Oklahom~ l'hcrc they rcmaincd until the spring. With the onset of spring the Incl~ans returned to Kansas to hunt. The nliite incursions into this area disrupted the Indian's ability to roam at will Thc introduction of the horse to the plains in the early eighteenth century increased thc range a i d mobility of these lndians. The ncM mobility meant tlie Indians now moved morc often and covcred a much greatcr d~stance.Thc horse also had another tlicn unforeseen cffcct. It rnadc the Indian a morc formidable thrcat to thc wliitc scalers and a morc clusivc foe for tlic ~rrn).'" These Indians \\ere also hardy \rarriors As historian Robert Utley noted. The tribcs also shared a long history of Ivarfarc and, accordingly, \\.ell-dcvcloped military traditions m d inst~tutions. Above all else, societ:tv rcwarded tlic succcssful wrrior. He fought principally for the honors or war, both individual cmd group, for plunder and revenge, and for dcfcnse of homc and family against the aggressions of cncmy warriors similarly motivated. largely governed hostilities with nhites as \yell as other Indians. Whites This war con~plex offered opportunities for plundcr and honor and somctimcs presented a thrcat to home and farnil!. that required defensive action or retaliation.'" Slicnnlui proposed
III

1866 to rcstrict the lndians (nith the conscnt of Sccretar). of the lntcrior) to

the ttrritov south of the Arkansas Rivcr and east of Fort Union (Nc\v Mexico). Any lndians

found outside these reservations \vithout a written pass by a militan authority clearly defining their purpose ~ o u l d be subject to immediate military action." Thc increase in \vcstern migration by thc whites decreased thc area in nhich the Indians could mo\,e ficcly, l i e "Great .herican Desert" \\-as no longer a barrier to westward white espmsion. As previously noted, thc area bctween the Plane River in the north and the Arkansas River in the south \\-as a favorite Indian hunting ground. The two o\.erland trails in Kansas, the Smta Fe and Smoky Hill, passed through this prime hunting area of the Indians and brought them into increascd contact with the white travelers, 0 t h with prcdictltble results: conflict. Mistrust and misunderstanding were \ e n conunon between thcse t\vo cii il~zations.Sherman: the militan comm;u~derresponsible for maintaining peace, predicted trouble betwen the Indians and white settlers and emigrants. By the winter of 1866, he bcgan plans for the Army's employnicnt in protecting strategic sites on the frontier. Foremost Sherman deemed protection of railroad construction
;I

priority for the ~rmy.':

Construction of the Union Pacific. Eastern Di\.ision (U.P.E.D.) railroad: interrupted by the nar: resumed at a greater p:ice through K ~ l s a on s its n a y to tllc Pacific. In January of 1x65: there \\ere forty miles of railroad complete in Kansas. In J a m a n of 1868, Kansas governor S a n d Crawford proudly notcd in his annual message that the U.P.E.D. railroad was complctcd from Wyandotte, Kansas; to within thirty-five miles of thc state's nestem boarder, a total of 335 miles. The railroad increased access to the intxior of the state." The impact on population growth. economics, and politics in Kansas and throughout the countn was inlmensc. The railroad brought homesteaders ,and contributed to the success of

homestead fanning; brought in the goods and se~viccs required to expand the frontier, 'and made
Kansas a centcr of the large-scale cattle industn, hlilitarily, the railroad would save the govcn~mcnt money in supplying the westcni garrisons and immeasurably increase the efficiency of 15

the Aniiy on tlic fronticr by increasing its mobility. Shzrman bslievcd that the U.I'.E.D. railroad \ u s the most important projcct then in development on the frontier. Me knew that in the fuhlre it would facilitate thc military's interests on the frontier. In turn: thc Army played a major role in the protecrion of the constn~ction and operations of thc railroad. However, in 1866, thc shortage of regular Army units in Kansas put the soldiers in a defensive posture. Not untd the spring of 1867 \\odd enough soldiers be present in the state to allow tlic Ann). to go on the offinsive." The A m y maintained its presence in Kansas through a scries of forts; that \\ere part of a system that stretched 0
t h

haphuzardly over the nation's frontier. Six forts \vcrc located in the

ccntral and n-cstcrn portion of the statc and \verc cstablishcd to provide security to the frontier as both the Indian ;md the scttlcrs made contact with each other. These forts were locatcd primarily along the Santa Fe and Smoky Hill trails. Shennan considered thc protection of these routcs as an essential task of the militan. I'ort Zarah (est3hlishcd 186J), Fort Lamed (established 1859). a i d Fort Dodge (cstablishcd 1864) ncre locatcd along rlic route of thc Santa Fc Trail. Fort Ellsworth (cstablishcd in 1x64 and renamed Fort Hnrker in 1866): Fort Fletcher (cstablishcd 1865, later raianed Fort Hays in 1866); and Fort Wallacc (established 1865) followcd the Smoky Hill Trail vicinity of the Union Pacific hilroad. For thc ncxt fifteen years these posts were and the gcr~eral the focal point of infantry activities tliroughout ~ a n s a . . ~ ' From tlicse posts, the infantry units carried out their various fronticr missions: primarily cscort duties for wagon trains, emigrants, and railroad constniction parties. Often each post \vas commanded by a captain and it \\as a rare occurrence whcn more than t\vo or thrcc companics wcrc stationed at one post at an!. given time. To further complicate administration of these forts, the commanding officers of these posts changed oAin as companies mo\.ed from one post to another. ORen undcrstrcngth, the co~npanies w r c burdcncd nith tasks that left them little time for training. 16

For the Army, the principal activities for the nest thirty years were rcl:ltcd to duty on the \vestcrn frontier, The prirnar). dutics of thc soldiers rcmaincd to protect thc n w population scttlcn~cnts: the travel routes \vt.s~; and the development of tlic ra~lroadline. This small: fiscally constrained regular .4rmy played a greatcr rolc along the Kansas frontier starting in 1866 as thc fronticr cspandcd nest and conflict bctwccn the settlers aid Indians increased. Infant? units,
often overlooked by historians, assumed a critical rolc in safeguarding and developing the K ~ l s a s

frontier.'!' The n c s ~ chapter \\ill csamnie the Army units; specific all^ infantn units, assigned to central and \\cstcm Kansas. The Anuy's I~mitation on total end strength of persom~elresulted in onc or two companies assignrd to cacli post along tlicse t\vo o\erland trails. This placed uniquc rcquircmcnts on command and control and placcd rclativclp junior officers in a pos~tion as the priman esccutors oTAmerican policy in its frontier. It also meant that this small Army was spread thinly througllout thc statc. hard pressed to c a r n out the multitude of required missions.
I

Secretary of War, Annual Report cfthe Secretary of Wtrrj i ~ r the Ycur 1866 (Washington. DC: GPO, 1866). 3. (Hereafter cited as Atlnucrl Report.) 'Robert G. Athcarn, Lfillinnr Tecumseh Shermtrn ond the Sertl~mentoj'fhe West (Norman Uni\crsity of Oklahoma; 1956): 15 Robert M. Utley. kionllcr Kegulrrrs (Neu York: klacmillan, 1973; Lincoln University of Nebraska; 1984): 10.
An Act to Increasc andlrix the !Mlrm<\: I'toce Lsmblrshment of the UnrredStates, Statutcs at Large 14: chp. 299; 332-338 (1866); Secretary of\Var, (1x66) 3.
4

Don Rickey, Jr, IG-Q Miles o UUJ on Rcrrt~scmd HUJ,5th ed. (Eomian: University of Oklahoma; 1963): 17-10.
X

Ibid., 21. 17

Utlcy: 2

10~tlcy 2.; : Junction City WecklJ; Union, 15 Junc 1867.

"Utlcy. 7. Control of the Indians \\.as originally the responsibility of the military. Thc 1 1 undcr thc War Department; Bureau of Indian Affairs was crcatcd in I824 for this purpose. and k Secretary of War: Annucrl Reportji1rlY66, 20. " ~ u s s c lD. Santala: The tire (:hnpaign o f 1 8 % :' lnsrrrtmenr (Fort Lea~en\ronli:SACGSC, 1994). 11 Srudy in rhe Use ofthe Military

'''In 1820, Major Stephen H. Long led an expedition to discover the source of thc Red river. Long statcd in his report that thc m a he co\crcd between the Missouri river to tlic eastern basc of thc Rocky hloulitains \\;is in his opinion, ". . . . almost wholly unfit for cultivation, 'and of course. uninhab~table by a people depending upon cigriculturc for their subsistence." The off~cid map of his espedition labeled rhc plains arca, \vhich includcd Kansas, "l'lis Great American copid by map makers for the next half centur).. Ray Allen Desert." 'This designation ~ v a s Billington. IVemvard Exptmsion (Nen York- hlricrnillan; 19-19), 452. 1.icutcnant Colonel Gcorgc Custzr descl.ibed the arca bounded on the north by the uppcr Mssouri; on the east by the loncr Missouri arid Mississippi, on the south by Tcxas, and the nest by the Rocky Mountains; General George A. Custcr, hly Li/e on the IJlriin.r (Chicago. Lakcside Press, 1952. Reprint; Nonuan: University of Oklahoma: 1966). 3-5; Timoth! Z\vink, IGrr Larncd (Ph.D. diss., Oklahoma State Univcrsity: 1980). 36. " ~ a i l u c lJ. Crawford: Kansas in the .%xties (K:uisas: A.C. hlcClurg & Co.. 19 1 1; Kansas Heritage Press, 1991), 228 '%ecretan. of War: Annual Rcporr/or 1866. 20 Sccritary of War, Annual llepurt/i,r 1865; 1 12 The xinual repon noted that in July 1865 tmwlers alo~ig the Snioky H~ll stagc rouk from Dcnvcr to Fort Leaven\\onh \\.ere ne\er out of sight of wagon trains belonging either to emigrants or mcrchants; Secretary of War, Annual I k y ~ o r t j i 1866; ~ r 2W. Gcneral Grant rcported in his annual report in 1866 to the Secretan of War that: "With a frontier constantly cxtcnding and encroaching upon the hunting grounds of the Indian, hostilities, opposition at least, frequently occur;" Secretan of War, Annual Report noted in his report to the Secretary /i)r1867; 34. Lieutcn.ant Gcncral William Tccumseh Sl~emlw of War in 1867, thrit Chcyerme, Kio\ra, and Arapdioe bands had notified conunmders of posts and tllc stage drivers and agcnts along the Smoky Hdl and Santa Fe trails that as soon as the grass grcw; thcy [the Indians] \ \ o d d insist on the whitcs \virhdm\ving from these roads: Dcc Brown: Galvaitlzed Yunirees (Urbana: Uni\crsity of Illinois, 1963, Lincoln- Lhivcrs~ty of h'ebmska, 19x6); I20 Robert hl. Utlcy, l.>unriersmen in BIIIC(New York: hlaeniillm, 1967. Reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 198 1): 2 12-2 13. Utlcy notes that few Regular Anny units rcmaincd out
I$
17

West: most notably the Fifih and Ninth Infantry, and statc and territorial volunteer units took obcr the Rcgular's rcsponsibilitics The Regular Arm>-units in thc Wcst recorded engqements in Colorado, Kansas. atid Ncn Mesico in 186 1; Ncw Mesico in 1862; and in Arizona in 1865. lg\Villimi M.Lcckic, The Military Conquest of'thf,Sourhern Plains (Norman: Univcrsity of Oklahoma, 1963): 6-8. '"tlcy.

Frontier Regulars: 6.

"Secretary of War; Annual Reportfi,r 1866, 21 "Lcckie; 6; Sccretan of War, Annual Report j i ~ r1866, 20.

23.1unction C f [ yIfirklj Union. 25 Januan 1868.

(Norman: Univcrsity "Homer E. Socolofsky and Iiuber Sclf. Hi.stur;calAtlas (Jf'k'unSa~ of Oklahoma, 1972); 32. By 1867, terminal Facilities were dcvclopcd at Abilcnc ;Ind this town w ~ s the primary markct during tlic nest four p r s for T e u s longhorns coming up the Chisholrn trail. Ellswmh and Dodge City becarnc thc primar). railllwds for cattle in 1875, and rc~nained so for thc ncxt ten years. Estiniatcs of five million longhonl cattle wcrc driven up the trail to Kansas in this twenty )-car period. The census bureau noted that Kansas' population in 1860 was 107,206, by 1870 population had risen to 362.872. an increasc of 238 5 pcrccnt, the third highest percentage gro\\.th in the nation The Interior Dcplrrtmcnt notrd for 1867 that Knnsas had produccd 40,000,000 bushels of corn, 2:500.000 bushels of \vhcat, and 1,000,000 bushels of potatoes. 24. Junction City U'cekly [hion; 25 Fcbruary 1871 and 30 iioveriiber 1867; Robert Ci. Atl~can~:

2 " ~ y Frontiersmen . in Blue: 348

CHAPTER THREE C O M M A N D A N D CONTROL

I t is these awful distances that make our problems out here so difficult. General William Tecumsch Sherman, 1866.1 Robert G. Athearn, Wl/icim lkcurnseh Shertnan and

of the Wesr. ~ h Serrle~nenr c

I n his 1866 annual report to the President o f thc United States, Secretary o f War, Edwin

M. Stanton included in the chief operations o f the War Department the task o f "the
establishments ofposts and garrisons on the frontier and in Indian country."2 Following the end o f t h e Civil War and the mustering out o f voluntecr units. the regular Army settled down to handle the security o f the United States. While ca\.alry units soon moved into Kansas, the majority of soldiers operating in the state over the next tivent). years were infantryman. Afier four years o f primarily conventional warfarc, the soldiers o f the regular .Ammy had much to relearn o f t l ~ c irregular war on the frontier. These officers and soldiers, their training, equipment, and tactics were for the most part products o f their Civil War experience. The infantr) 're g'iments that took up positions in central and \vestern Kansas in 1866 were trained and equipped for fighting regular not irregular forces. The Army was dispersed throughout the United States into geographical commands known as military divisions. These military divisions, usually commanded by a major general, were further subdivided into military depanments to assist in command and control. I n 1866, the Military Division o f thc Missouri (commanded by Lieutenant General William Tccumsch

Sherman since 1865) comprised the Departments of Arkansns, the Missouri. the Platte, and Dakota. The division hcadquartcrs was located in St. Louis, Missouri. The Department of the Missouri, the largest department in the division, ericornpassed the states of Missouri, Kansas, and the territories of Colorado and New Mexico. Its headquarters was located at Fort ~eavenworth.3 Historian Robcn Utley noted: The department com~nander,'sit~~ated high enough to gain pcrspcctivc \\ ithout losing focus bn local conditions, was the key link in the fronticr ~ i r m ~ chain ' s of command. I-lc kept in touch \\it11 post commandcrs, set standrds and guidelines, and usually provided positive leadership.4 The Department of the Missouri was fi~rtlier subdividcd into four districts: Kansas,
headquartered at Fort Leavcnwortli; Upper Arkansas, h~ad~uartered'at Fon Harker; New

Mexico; 1ieadqu;inercd in Snnta Fe; and the Indian Territory. headquartered at Fort Gibson. Tlic District of i!pper Arkansas consisted of the territory i n Kansas wcst o f a north-south linc drawn through Fort Harker. ~I'lirough this district, the Smoky I lill route, the Santa Fc Trail, and thc U.P.E.1). railroad passed and thc area encompassed the frontier settlements of Kansas. Within this area were thc principal posts in Kansas that guarded tlie frontier, Forts Harker, Zareh, 1-arned, Dodge, Hays, and Wallace. From the lalc 1860s until 1880, this district was the scene of
: ,

tlie most active service of the infantry units in ~ a n s a s . 5 In 1866, !lie ~epartmcnt of Missouri. commanded by Major General Winfield Scott Hancock, was charged with the protection of the Smoky Hill and Arkansas (Santa Fe Trail) routes and settlements on the tributaries of the Upper Arkansas andsmoky I j i l l Rivers. This mission required protecting and assisting the construction of the U.P.E.D. railroad, which strctchcd from Wyandottc. Kansas, to Fort Riley and was on contract for 250 more miles of track. To cover the dopurtmcnt's arca of responsibility. Hancock had at his disposal Battery B, Fourth Artillcry, tlie Third, Seventh, and Tcnth (colored) Regiments of cavalry, the Third. Filih,

Thirty-scventh, and Thirty-eighth (colored) Regimcnts of infantry, and 150 Indian scouts. 'I'his limited number of soldiers ensured that the units w r c spread thinly throughout the department.6 In his annual rcport to the Secretary of War in 1869, Sherman noted that, "While the nation at large is at peace, a state of quasi war has existed: and continues to exist, over one-half its extent, and the troops therein are exposed to labors, marches, tights, and dangers that amount to war."7 He most certainly was speaking of the Army's activiiies in both the Division and Department of the Missouri. For that year alone, the Army recorded over thirty-eight engagc~ncnts with Indians throughout the L)ivision's arca of responsibility, including fourteen in of Missouri alone, Kansas. I'roni 1 January rhrougl~I5 October 1869, just in the Dcpartrne~n Sheridan reported numerous skirmishes in which six soldiers and ninety-two lndians were killed, and seventy-ninemcn, women, and children murdered by the lndians.8 Following the cessation of hostilities at the end of the Civil War, the regular Army underwent a reorganization
ill

structure and in personnel strength. War Dcparlment Gcneral

Order No. 92, dated 23 Novcmbcr 1866, providcil for the expiuision of thc number of infantry rcgiments from nineteen to forty-tivc. This required more of a rcorganization than the creation of all new regiments. The first, second, and third battalions of regiments 11 through 19 bccame regimcnts 1 1 through 19, 20 through 28, and 29 through 37, respectively. For example, the second battalion, Eighteenth Infantry became the new Twenty-screnth Infalltry. Regirncnts 38 through 41 were to be made lip of colored soldicrs, while regiments 42 through 45 were known as Vetcrans Reserve Corps regiments, which were led by wounded officers and soldicrs of the Volunteer Service and the regular ~ r m y . 9 The regular Army infantry regiments would go through one more reorganization before the turn of the century, in 1869. However, this time around the Army grew smaller rather than larger. War Department General Order No. 17, dated 15 March 1869, reduced thc number of

reginicnts froni forty-five do\\n to twcnty-five. l'liis reorganization affectcd scveral infantry regiments located in Kansas. The Thirty-seventh Infantry was broken up, half going to tlic Third Rcgi~nent and thc other half going to the Fifth Regiment. The Thirty-eighth Infantry was likewisc divided. half going to the Twenty-fourth Regiment and the remainder to tlie Twentylifth Regiment, which wcre now the only two colored regiments of infantly.lo

By the beginning of 1866, most of thc volunteer units had becn transferred froni Kansas
or mustered out of scrvice. Regular Army infantry and cavalry regiments now took up posts tl~roughontboth Kansas and the remaining frontier area in tlie West. Howevcr, while the Army rcstructurcd its infantry and cavalry regiments most ofthe units rcniaincd undcr strength. Even as the units rcccivcd new recruits. conipanics rcniained understrcngth. All the while, tlie onc or two company post rcrnained tlie norm. The Arniy soon discovered that the wide area of responsibility assigned to each post grcaily taxed the capabilities of thesc iompanies. Isolated settlements and wagon trains rcmaincd vulnerable to Indian attack. Fortunately for the Army and the local population in Kansas, there werc relatively few incidents with tlie Indians that ycar. Karcly did rcgin~ents.infanty or cavalry, ever assemble all of thcir companies together at onc post or in the field. No longer did thc Arniy leadership think in ternis of organizations, si~ch as divisions or corps, both of which \verc some common in the Civil War. Tlic company bccame, defacto, tlic basic unit on thc frontier. Most opcrations were at the company lcvel or a combination of companies. A rcvicw of the thirty-threc official engagements by the rcgular A m y infantry in Kansas for the years 1866 through 1880 reveals that twentyeight involved only one or two companies of infantry. The one or two coillpany post was familiar to most of the infantr).men
ill

Kansas. Thus it is not hard to understand how tlie lik of a soldier rcvolved

;iround his company, rathcr than tlic regimcnt. E\ en the development of the Thirty-sevcnth
,

Infantry from thc Nineteenth Infantry in 1867. and the breakup oTthe Thirty-seventh Infantry 23

into the ~ h i r d and Fifth Infantry Rcgiments in 1869, did nothing to help foster regimental idcntity. I I The company structure reniairied fairly constant from 1866 to 1880. Each infantry company was authorized one captain, one first lieutenant; and one second lieutenant. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) comprised a first sergeant, a quartermaster krgeant, four sergeants, and eight cbrporals. Additionally, a company was authorized fifty privates, though that numbcr could be increased up to one hundred based on the nature of the service at various stations. Minimum strcngth for an hifantry regiment was set at 836 nicn: while maximum . . strengtli for n regiment was set at 1,196 men. This structure did not always match actual Lroop strengths of'companics employed on the frontier. The Third Infantry's strength in September 1866 was 783 soldiers, whilc thc Fifth Infantry stood at 959, of whom 666 were recent recruits. By 1879, these two regiments strcngth stood at 544 and 465 rcspectively.12 The strength o f a ~ompany often lluctuatcd. Company strength at Fort Hays during 1867 averaged one officer and tifty-five soldiers. On any given day, only some of t l i m soldiers were available for duty whilc others were abscnt on detached duty, which might be within or outside the District of Arkansas. Additional duties could quickly overwhelm these companies. Escorts to overland mail stage, paymasters: and wood trains would often lcwc barely enough soldiers for garrison duties.13 Brigadier General John Pope, cornniariding the Department of the Missouri, noted in his. annual report for 1871: "The system of small posts, however, so ~ i d e l y scattered and in suchremote places, is very prejudicial to any high stati of discipline and 1norale."14 Desertions were a serious problcrn to the already under strength con~panies and garrisons in Kansas and the Army as a whole. For example, from October 1866 to September 1867 the following infantry .regiments recorded these totals for desertion: Third Infantry-l 19, Fifth Infantry-1 14,

Thirty-seventh Infantry-170: and Thirty-eighth Infantry-1 50. During this same period, the Sixth Cavalry had 327 men desert, whilc the Seventh Cavalry had an astounding 512 soldiers desert. The Tenth Cavalry had only thirty-eight men dcsert during this period. The mobiliw o f the cnvalrymcn and their frequent field duty must have contributed to this difference. On the other hand, for the black troops there \\ere fewer opportunities outside o f the Army and they wcre easier for the Provost Marshal to track down.15 There were many diffrrent reasons for thcse desertions. Poor pay was the most often cited reason. A private in 1873 was paid only thirteen dollars a month. This compared poorly \\hen matched against the civilian employees at a post; blacksmiths averaged one hundred dollars a month, carpenters ninety dollars a month, and cven teamsters ncre paid forty-five dollars a month. A l l werc princcly sums o f money to a privale. \bho in-addition often found liimsclf performing man? o f similar type duties. The proximity o f the goldliclds in Colorado and Montana tcrnpted many soldicrs loo. And if all that as not enough, the quality and variety o f tlie food \%,asgenerally poor and the liSc at spartan posh often dull. With so many job opportunities, most o f which paid better than tlie Army, the growing West tempted many soldiers to dcsert. Whatever the reasons: desertion was a serious business for the junior ofticers o f any company.l6 Solid company grade leadership is key to unit discipline. In 1869, the ofticer-soldier ratio in the infantry company nas one ofticer to t\\.enty-three soldiers; in 1871, this ratio dropped to one to twenty-one; the number dropped cven lower in 1876, one officer for every sixteen soldiers. As noted earlier, even as Army manpower dropped due to reorganization, the requirements for the numbcr o f officers reniaincd constant. Additionally. the demand for officers for detaclled scrvice outside the department contributed to the drain on company l e x l le;ldersliip. Rather than thc three officers the structure called for, often only one or two, and 25

sometimes none at all, wcre available for duty at the post \\it11 their company. A rcvicw of tlie
roster of officers availablc tbr duty contained in the official Post Kcturns for Fort Hays betwecn October 1866 and September 1865 reveals, with few cxceptions, one oflicer for each infantry company assigned to tlie post. Onc of tliesc officers, at one point a tirst lieutenant, was also tlie post coniniandcr in addition to commanding a company. This Incant that relatively junior officcrs werc for the most pan directing the execution of government policy in the wide area encompassing thc post, far from the dircct supervision of their scniors. This shortagc of officers placed additional reliance on the leadership of N c O S . ~ ~ lot. In 1868, tlicre v.erc thirty-four officers The olllcers oftliis Army wcrc a ~niscd assigned to tlic Third lnfiintry. Ofthese, six \\.ere forcign born, sis wcrc West Point graduatcs, :uid three had bccn ni;ijor generals of volunteers in tlie Civil War (one, William Penrose, was a captain in 1868). Thc Fifth infantry officers expericnced a similar situation. Out of thirty-four ofticers. five wcre forcign born, fivc were Wcst Point graduates. two had been breveted to major gcncral and one. Henry Danklicad, a Brigadicr General of Volnnteers (back to captain in 1868). 130th tlic Thirty-seventh and 'Sliirty-eighth Infantry were similar. With the csception of a few sccond lieutenants, all officcrs on the fronticr were Civil War veterans, and most held ranks during that \var that werc often two or three greater than tlieir current grade in 1866.18 Onc should note that the distribution of West Point graduates in the infantry regiments rcmaincd lower than the cavalry rcgiments for tlic same periods. For instance, in 1873: the Sixth
\\,lie graduated from West Point, while and Scventli Cavalry had ten of twelve second lieutenan~s

the Third and Fifth Infantry had three and two, respectively: of ten second lieutenants. I-lowcver, .l'liese two infantry rcgiments did erijoy onc advantage however. During this same tinic the Third Infantry had five second lieute~iants who were Civil War combat vcterans, the Fifth Infantry had h c c , wliilc the two cavalry regiments had only one each. It appears that during this period the 26

Army was weighting the cavalry, and that West Point graduates found duty in the cavalry more appealing. Cavalry, often the darling of the Army, expanded at the expense of the infantry. During Congressional hearings on the reorganization of the Army in 1877, several infantry officers raiscd the issue of the merits of the seeming favoritism for the cavalry over the infantry. Senior Army officers, such as Winfield Scott Hancock, Nelson B. Miles, and William B. Hazen, were quick to point out to the Congressional committee the success stories and advantages of the infantry during Indian operations. It should be noted that these comments from very experienced and capablc Indian fighters were also delivered with the intention of protecting the infantry force structure.19 On this infantry versus cavalry controversy, Robert Utley noted that the "

. . . . cavalry remained the arm most likely to close with Indians in combat."20
explained the variance of posting more West Point graduates to the cavalry.

This perhaps

As the spring arid summer of 1867 neared, Hancock had companies from the Third, Fifth, Thirty-seventh, and Thirty-eighth Infantry regiments in posts throughout the District of the Upper Arkansas. This was the time of year when the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Comanche, and Kiowa began moving northwards through Kansas from their winter camp sites to the hunting grounds between the Arkansas and Platte Rivers. That year was one of constant alerts with nineteen engagements between infantry units and hostile Indians, a significant increase over the previous year.21 The District of Upper Arkansas was a focal point for Army activities in Kansas during the time frame between 1866 and 1880. It was through this district that the Smoky Hill and Santa Fe routcs passed, as well as thc U.P.E.D. railroad. New settlements and isolated farms were spreading and countics were being formcd in what was the last of the unorganized area of Kansas. It was also the area of the most intense clashes with hostile Indians in Kansas between 1866 and 1880.22 27

The majority of Indian raids in 1866-1869 occurred in the northwestern area of Kansas. This encompassed an area from White Rock Creek in the east to the forks and upper reaches of the Smoky Hill, Saline, Solomon, and Republican rivers to the West. To guard the Smoky Hill route, the development of the U.P.E.D. railroad and settlements in the area, the Army established three posts in 1866: Forts Harker, I-lays, and Wallace. Detachments were temporarily stationed at several other smaller posts, such as Downers Station, Fort Monument, and Smoky Hill Station,
to cover the Smoky Hill stage route, and later the construction parties of the U.P.E.D. railroad.

Along the Santa Fe Trail and the area south ofthc Arkansas River were Forts Zarah, Larned, and Dodge, each responsible for protecting settlements and kceping open the lines of communication.2~ The Department of Missouri started out the year 1866 with the following infantry regiments stationed on the posts in central and western Kansas: Third, Fifth, Thirty-seventh, and Thirty-eighth. Each regiment consisted of ten companies, lettered A, B, C, D, E, F, G, t-I. I, and K. During this samc period, thcrc were three regiments of cavalry (Third, Seventh, and Tenth) operating in the department. The Third and Fifth Infantry regiments were long time regular Army outfits, while the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth Infantry were formed in 1866. The Third infantry had a long and illustrious heritage dating back to its formation in May of 1796. The regiments participated in hcaky fighting during the Mexican War, most notably at Cliapultepec and Mexico City. In the years just before the Civil War, the regiment saw activc service against the Navajo in New Mexico. Companies from the regiment were moved to the East at the opening of the Civil War and arrived in time to participate in the First Battle of Bull Run in July 1861. The regiment saw further fighting during Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg. The Fifth Regiment, organized in June of 18 12, was active in the West during the Mexican War and against Indians in the Southwest. The Firth Infantry was one of the few 28

regular Army units to remain in the West during the Civil War. 'l'hc regiment did see action against a Confederate force at I'eralta, h'en Mexico in April 1862, a battle that ultimately drove the Confederates back into Texas. The Fitih Regiment, though, spent the remainder of the war in the west. As noted earlier, both the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth \rere not established until atier the cessation of thc Civil ~ a r . 2 4 These four infantry regiments were spread thinly throughout Kansas by late 1866. The situation was the same throughout the rest of the Department of Missouri. This thin line of infantry found the difficult situation of command and control exacerbated by the distances between each fort. The Army considered the addition of cavalry the answer to these distances. The follo\ving year, 1867, Shermm reported to the Secretary of War that "We have been very short of cavalry all the time."2j In September 1867, the infantry and cavalry regiments were distributed in Kansas area ofthe District of lJpper Arkansas in the following manner.

I'OST Fort Dodgc Fort I larker

INFANTRY
A & H, 3d Infantry

CAVALRY 13, 7111 Cavalry A. D, G , & M, 7th Cavalry K, 10th Cavalry

Fort Hays Fort Larned Fort Wallace

I, 3711 Infantry F, 3d lnfi~ntry K: 5th lnfi~n~ry E. 37th Infantry B & 11, 38tll Infantry G, 5th Infantry C,E, 8r G , 38'11 Infantry R, C, & D, 3d Intintry K, 37th Infantry E, 3d Infantry

E, H, & K, 7'11 Cavalry F & G 10th Cavalry A, 10tll Cavalry F & 1, 7'11 Cavalry

Total

2 l co~nnanies

15 comnanies

Fig. 1. Distribution of Army infantry and cavalry in Kansas, September 1867. 29

I t is notcwortliy that tlie number of cornpanies assigncd to thew posts in the summer of' I867

(TABLE I) reflects the seriousness of the Indian thrcat. Generally it was a rare occasion when more than two companies from a single regiment were assigncd to thc samc post in the District of the tippcr Arkansas. Companies from the infantry regiments in Kansas were also located in Colorado Territory and New Mexico undcr similar circumstances. Several senior officers, Pope among tlicm, believed this was dctrinicntal to unit discipline and recommended concentrating companies at key posts in tlic winter niontlis. After routine garriso~~ duties and wagon escorts, the number of soldiers availnblc on a daily basis for training was lin~ited.As a result, both cornpany and regimental tactics suffered from this shortage. Inf;~ntrycornpanies were not permanently assigned to any onc post and often remained at a post for only a short period of time. Companies were sliifted around the military dcpartriient based on thc situation as detennincd by the division or department commanders. As such, companies were oftcn shifted tlirougliout tlic departmcnts to respond to crises and requests by local commanders for additional troops. l'lie relatively small size of tlie Army also contributed to thc need to movc companies from one post to another. l'he department commanders could expcct no additional troops from Washington, and they got none. The following example of Fort Wallace, the most western post in Kansas, and the companies assigned therc is typical of other posts in Kansas during the 1866-1 880 time frame. Hale and fifty-one soldiers from Company E, Third On 6 October 1866, First Lieutenant Joscpl~ Infantry, arrived at Fort Wallace and assumed the duties of post garrison. I-lale also became the post commander. As a lieutenant, deep i n Indian country, he was expccted carr); out his dutics with very little dircct supervision. Six wceks later, on 20 Novcmber, two officers and fifty-cight soldiers of Company D,Nineteenth Infantry, slio\r.ed up at Fort Widlace to reinforce tlie

30

garrison. During the same month, C o i i i a n y 1, seventh Civaliy, &dc i i t o the post to join the garrison and its commanding officer Captain Myles Keogh, later killed in action at the Little Bighorn with G. A. Custer, assumed the duties o f post commander.26 Still more troop movements were in store for the companies at Fort Wallace. Shortly after arriving at Fort Wallace. Company D, Ninetcentl~ Infantry, was taskcd by the department headquarters to provide a detachment o f one officer and forty-five soldiers to guard thc Overland mail stations along the Smoky Ilill route at Cheycnne Wclls, B i g Springs, and Hollow Creek, Kansas ageinst Indian attacks. First Lieutenant John Haninlcr and forty-fivc soldiers marched out o f Fort Wallace to these isolated stations and took up posts with thc civilian station workers. About tcn to fifteen miles separated each mail station. Company D soldiers were replaced at these stations by Flak and Company E, Third Infantry in April 1867. The soldiers from Company D (now named Company D, Thirty-seventh Infantry) marched back to I:orl Wallace to rcjoin thc remainder o f the company and assumed post garrison duties along with Company I, Seventh Cavalry. During thc spring and summer o f 1867, the security o f the stations along the Smoky llill routc was a primary mission for the infantry. 'The companies here strung out along the routc in small dctachmcnts and leadcrship remained very dccentmlized.27 During Mu) and June 1865, Fort Wallacc was under a virtual state o f sicgc by hostile Indians. Thc isolatcd stagc stations and wagon trains on the Smoky Hill route wcre also under constant attack. To relieve the prcssure on the post and to reinforce units in Kansas, Hancock made several adjustments to intintry locations in his department. A series o f unit reassignments took place throughout the Department o f the Missouri and as a rcsult, more infantry took up posts in Kansas. On 8 August 1867, companies 13, E, G: H, I,and the regimental hcadquartcrs o f the Fifth Infantry Regi~nent arrived at Fort Wallace after a wcek's march o f 120 miles from Fort I.yon in the Colorado Territory. Captain Henry C. D;unkhcad o f the Fifih Infantry now

, .',

'I

..I:

31

commanded thc post arid had six con~panies of infantry at his disposal. But this was unusual to have h i s many infantry conipanies at one post. In July, 1.ieutcnant Coloncl Custer and eight companies of the Seventh Cavalry arrived next at Fort Wallace in pursuit of liostilc Indians along t l ~ c Smoky Hill route. The arrival of Custer and his companics over\\~hclmedthe alrcady limited supplics at the post. Shortly tlierc after Custer and a dctail of cavalry left for Fort Harkcr to secure additional supplies for the crotrded post. Custcr's moti\.es for this march angered Hancock arid as a result, he was courtmartialcd several montl~s latcr. In the meantime, incantry companies continued to come and go at Fort Wallace.

E. Filih Infantry, dcparted Fort Wallace on 16 August for tlic sixty-thrcc mile march Con~pnny
eastward to Do\vncrs Station \vhcre i t replaccd Company H. Thirty-seventh Inhntry, as the station gnrrison. Two days later, on I8 August, Company G, Fifth Infantry, dcparted Fort Wallace for duty at Fort Hays 135 miles away. Early the next month, on 5 September, Company

D, Thirty-seventh Infantry, marched out of Fort Wallace for duty in New Mexico. Company E,
IFiftliInlintry, Mas next to leave, and marched for Fort Hays on 21 Septeniber 1867.28 'I'hese series of unit moven~ents from post to post reflect thc seriousness of the situation in Kansas that summer and dernonstrate the tendency to assign infantry companies in reaction to Indian attacks. 'Shc \bide spread Indian depredations kept the infantry and cavalry companies on the movc in the surnmcr of 1867. Tliis tendency continued for many more years until the Indian threat i n Kansas subsidcd The examplc of the Fifth Infalltry is unotlicr example of the shifting of units and the tendcncy to disperse thc regiments. In 1869, Fifih Infantry was stationed at thc following posts: at Fort Hays; and tlirce Headquarters and two comp:~niesat Fort Ilarker; two cornpa~iics Infantry's companics were posted at Forts Harker, companies at Fort Wallacc. In 1870 the Fif~li
32

Hays, and Wallace. In 1871,thc regimental headquarters and three companies moved to Fort I.eavenworth, one company to Fort tlarker, two companies to Fort Hays, and three companies to Fort Wallace. Only in 1872 bvere five companies assigned to the same post Fort Leavenworth, the site of the Department of the Missouri hcadquancrs. The remaining five conipanies were spread among three other posts. This situation in 1872 was indicative of thc concentrating of companies for reasons of training and discipline when the threat of Indian attacks subsided.29 By the end of 1870, there wcre twelve infantry companics assigned to posts in Kansas. The Third 1nf;uitry was distributed along the Santa Fe trail at Forts Larned and Dodge. The Fifth Infantry was occupied along tlic Smoky Hill route and U.I'.E.D. railroad at Forts Harkcr, llays, and Wallacc. And tivs companics of cavalry were stationed in this same area during this time. Such dispersion precluded thc opportunities for training at the battalion or regimental level. Regimental commanders wcre often reduced to figure heads, with their companies widely dispersed they routinely dealt only nith the companics assigned to the same post with the regimental headquarters.30 Kegirncnts were somctimcs rotated from onc military division to another. When the next period of confrontation betmeen the Army and tlic Indians bcgan in 1874, thc Third Infantry was postcd in garrisons in Louisiana, while the Fifth I n h t r y , with its headquartcrs at Fort Leavenworth, departed Fort Dodge for operations in the Indian Territory against the Cheycnnc, Kiowa, and Comanches. The Nineteenth Infantry now had conipanies postcd in the District of the Upper Arkansas, t ~ conipi~nies o at Fort Larncd, two at Fort Dodge, and one at Fort Wallacc. Fort I-hrker was closed in 1873, and Fort Ilays was garrisoned bvitli compnnics of the Sixth ~avalr~ I .j 'l'he final years ofthe 1870s saw in addition to the Nineteenth Infantry, the Sixteenth and Twenty-third Regiments serving in \bestern Kansas. Forts Hays, Dodge, and Wallace remained 33

the mainstays of infantry posrs in Kansas. Between 1878 and 1880, Fort Dodge was usually

garrisoned by threc companies of the Ninetccntll Infantry; with cavalry companies only passing
through, whilc Fort Wallace generally had two companies of the Sixteenth Infantry on post. Fort 1-arncd was closed in 1878 after almost hventy years as an infantry post; Forts Dodge and Wallace would follow suit in 1882. Only Fort Hays remained an active post until 1889.32 By distributing these small companies over such a wide arca. it was impossible to give total coverage lo all exposed settlements in Kansas. Since it was almost impossible to predict wherc and \vhcn hostile Indians \vould strike, the soldiers were far too fcw to cover all points at oncc. This oftcn led to anger and fcclings of frustration by local civilians who bore thc brunt of Indian attacks.
When the Civil War endcd in 1865, thc Army had on hand an enormous amount of

equipment in \varehouses throughout the Korth. The Secretary of War noted in his annual report to the President for 1866: "The stock ofclothing. equipage, quartermaster, subsistence, hospital. and ordnance stores. arms, ammunition, and ficld artillery is sufficient for thc immediate equipage of large armies."33 While sufficient amount was on hand, the Army chose to s a w money by stocking this gear for future issue and to stop further procurcmcnt of most items, with

unforeseen results. A glaring deficiency existed in the infantry rifles, which were by now
obsoletc muzzle-loaded weapons. Good, bad. or otherwise, except for minor modifications, this wartimc issue was the bulk of the equipment used by the Army on the frontier for the decade following the Civil War. Stocks of the Pamiliar looking Union Army uniform were in abundance and would not be depleted until 1880. The soldiers in Kansas wore dark blue blouses trimmed \vith sky blue piping and light blue trousers. The uniform was o f a single \veight, which meant the soldier clcarly felt t l ~ c extremes of the Kansas sumnlers and \\inters. The uniform was oftcn made of 34

inferior quality materials which wore out quickly on frontier duty. Contemporary drawings of infantry~nan on 1-lancock's 1867 expedition show a variety o f headgear worn by the soldiers. The 18%-partern black campaign hat was not as popular with the soldiers as the smaller forage cap.

A pair o f often shoddily made boots rounded out the soldier's uniform. For guard mount at even
11ie most isolated post, the soldiers went to great pains to present a neat military appearance. While in the field though, the soldiers oftcn wore tlicir oldest uniforms and companies olien presented a nlotley collection ofuniforni types that presented a non-military appearance. In a letter to the Arnryancl A'uvy Jourrrul in 1867, one infantryman recommended the Army dispense with the bluc uniform, instead should adopt a uniform that was not "a prominent color. but rather
a neutral tint that w i l l not slio\v dirt."34 A cost conscious governlncnt continued to economize

on moderniz3tio11o f the soldier's unifbnn. There were only minor changes in the next few decades. I t rcmnined an uncomfortable, but functio~ial uniform.3j 'l'lic infantryman marched with an average load o f f i f i y pounds o f equipment. This oftcn consisted o f sixty rounds o f anniiunition, an overcoat, \vool blanket. rubber blanket (ground sheet), extra clotl~es:cantccn, three to five days rations; and his 5 8 caliber Springficld muzzlcloaded riflc. The blanket roll was often preferred over tlie regulation knapsack for carrying equipment in the field. The bayonet usually remained bchinll; for it was unconifortable to carry and o f limited utility in Indian fighting.36 At tllc end o f tlie C i v i l War, rhe 1861 Springfield rifle was the standard infantry weapon o f the norther11arniy. The ritled musket brought profound changes to warfare and the Springfield rille proved to be a superb weapon during the C i v i l War. On the fror~ticr, tlie riflc rrmaincd an effrctive \%caponconsistent with the poor marksmanship o f the soldier and the slow rare o f tire o f a muzzle loader. Some Indians on the frontier were soon showing up armed with

breech loading rifles. iiaturally. tlie soldiers themselves cagerl!. awai~ed tlie issue of a brccch loading riflc. Early in 1866, a board of Army officers convened to lest and evaluate current breecliloading ritles and review plans to convert muzzle-loading Springfield rifle-muskets into brccchloaders. Dascd on tcsts, and tlic fact that so many Springfield ritles were alrcady in tlie
inventory, a rccomniendation was madc to convert lhcse rillc-muskcts into breech-loaders. Tlic

Secretary of War accepted this reconimendation and the conversions were ordcred. Among the other cliangc to the weapons was a rcduction from .58 caliber to S O caliber and the introduction of the mctallic cartridge. During the same year, the Springfield Armory dcvoted its production to repairing used wcapons and making preparations to cornmelice the breech conversions. The Secretary thought the conversion so successft~l, that he rcported to thc I'resident that the weapon
was bclicvcd to be bctter than tlie IJrussian ncedle gun. Contemporary ordnance reports showed

that the average inrantry rifle lasted seven years, thus the remaining Civil War era stocks of neapons were cxpectcd lo last for a long wliile.37 A new riflc, the Modcl 1873 Springtield, was introduced in 1873 arid the caliber for all Arniy rifles, carbincs, and pistols was fixed at .45 caliber. By the end of 1875, the infantry regiments tl~roughoutKansas and thc Army were issued the .45 caliber Springtield trap door ritle. The ritle rcni;hed an accurate and powcrful wcapon, which could penetrate two inches of wood at ovcr sixteen-hundred yards. Though many Europcan countries introduced magazine fed weapons and smokeless powder for the cartridges, the U.S. Arniy continucd to reaffirm its prefercnce for the singlc shot Springfield. This would remain the standard infantry weapon, and thc carbine vcrsion the standard cavalry weapon. until the introduction of tlie Krng-Jorgenson in 1893.38

Companies of the Third and Fifth infantry bcgan duty 011the Kansas liontier in 1866 still using the muzzle loading 1861 Springfield riflc. Custer noted sarcastically in 1867 that the Indian Bureau had graciously furnished the Indians with breech-loaders, yet the infantryman was still equipped with a muzzle-loading riflc. No doubt an infantryman, facing an Indian foe who n,as mounted on horseback and better armed than him, had even more reason to be concerned. Tlic infantrymen were still required to go through the time consuming procedure of loading "minie balls" and drawing ramrods between each shot. Tlic soldiers souglit to engage the Indians at a distance. taking advantage of the weapon's great range. Thc Indians on the other hand prefcrred close-in fighting, using thcir wcapon's short range and taking advantage of the slow rate ol'fire of the soldiers. l'lic infantryman awaited eagerly the moment in April 1867 whcn, Captain Keogh: conimanding Fort Wallacc, riotcd that a shipment of breech-loading rifles arrived for the two infantry companies assigned to thc post.j9 Accuracy had nevcr becn the forte of eithcr the soldier on the frontier or tlic Indian. Infantry units during tlie Civil War relicd on the effects of massed rifle fire. Poor marksmanship was oftell the result of little or n o target practice, not to mention tlie fact that many soldiers entercd tlic Army without much espcriencc \\.ith lirearms. To many of the ofliccrs, limited the number of rounds marksmanship was just not a priority. A shortage ~Fammunition available each year for tlie infan~ryman's marksmanship training. This only aggravated the situation. In 1874, after reviewing the situation, the War Department authorized each man ten rounds per month for targct practice. Givcri the maximum effective range of tlie rifle. and tlie increased ratc of fire wit11 a breech-loading rifle ovcr the old muzzle loader, Hancock felt a "thorough and liberal system of target pmctice"40 would increase the infantryman's accuracy and help consene ammunition through fire discipline. Priority for target practicc still remained the prerogative of the local commander.41
37

l'lic infantry rifle had a maximum range o f 1,000 yards, considerably greater than the maxirnurn range o f thc cavalry carbine. Sincc the cavalryman fought

dismounted. tlie

infantryman \vitli his rifle and bayonet was morc cffectivc than tlic cavalrynian with his carbine, pistol. and saber, and was niorc feared by the 1ndian.42 The primary task o f tlic infantry and cavalry in Kansas was to establish new posts, and maintain thc old ones: to kccp open lines o f communication, such as the stagc, freigllt, and emigrant routes. and to protect new ones like the U.P.E.D. railroad; and to prevent hostile Indians from attacking new settlements tliat were spread out ovcr the plains. Tliesc tasks wcre siniilar to those o f other Anny units on thc American frontier during the last half o f the nineteenth ccntury. I n 1869, nineteen o f tlie Army's twenty tivc infantry regiments and a11 ten cavalry regiments wcre stationed i n Texas, tlic Indian Territory, the wcstern states, and the tcrritories. Tllc Army however; never produccd a set o f formalized tactics to m e t the niission of Itidian fighting on the f r ~ n t i e r . ~ j The lack o f a means to rapidly transport soldiers to a strategic point or isolated

settlement required a contingent o f troops bc stationed on the spot. Citizens dcmanded too, that
troops be stationed nearby. A snlall regular Army forced in turn dictated that thcse posts bc small. Thus, the company post became the norm to the soldiers. The necessity o f guarding so many scattcrcd sites olten did not leave enough troops to searcll for Indians in some o f tlic more remote areas i n western ~ a n s a s . ~ ~ Historian Robert Iltley, commenting on the Arniy's Indian fighting strategy, noted: Torn between dispersion and concentration, the Army pursued an Indian strategy that combined dispersion for defensc with temporary concentration for offense. I t mas not a satisfactory strategy. The dispersed garrisons were too fc\\ and too weak to present an cffcctive defensc. Thc offensive expeditions, formed only by weakening the dcfcnses, took too long to asseniblc and proceeded under handicaps tliat too olten negated thcir efkctivcncss for offensc.4j

The Army, throughout its campaigns against the Indians, never developed a formal manual of Indian-fighting doctrine. Historian Robert Athearn has observed that the Army, fresh from experiences in the Civil War, would learn through difficult experience "that Indian warfare was a singularly different kind of conflict from any they had known before."46 Viewed by many officers, operations against the Indians were a short term activity of the Army. One general officer with experience fighting Indians went as far as to tell Congress that fighting Indians was

of relatively little importance in determining the structure and strength of the Army. The Army continued to focus on the next war and paid closer attention to the activities in Europe, especially the Franco-Prussian War. And why not, the Army considered itself the nation's defense force, not a frontier police. Similarities still exist with many of today's Army officers and their view on 0 0 ~ w . 4 7 Although the soldiers stationed in the West did not have a formal Army publication on Indian operations, there is evidence that they recognized tactics based on common sense and experience. In the summer months, the Indians were on the move and the Army found it difficult to locate Indian villages. However, soldiers recognized the weakness in the Indians inability to move their villages during the winter months. In the winter, the lack of available grass and bark weakened the Indian's ponies. The harsh climate and heavy snow cover further deterred the Indians from movement. Thus, they were vulnerable while the Army could still move.48 Through experience, the Army developed the combination of the sustained offense, using multiple columns of infantry and cavalry to converge during the winter months on Indian campsites. Sheridan determined that: The best way for the government is to now make them poor by the destruction of their stock, and then settle them on the lands allotted to them. . . . As soon as the failure of the grass and the cold weather forces the bands to come together in the milder latitudes south of the Arkansas, the movement of troops will take place from [Forts] Bascom, Lyon, Dodge, and Arbuckle, which I hope will be successful in gaining a permanent

Experience h;~dshown that tlie most c f i c t i v e method of ending an uprising was to carry the war to the home of the lndian.50 Infantry and cavalry units might be employed together in attempts to combat and punish Indian raiding parties. Such tactics were usually not successful in the spring and summer months on the plains. For example, on 5 June 1870, Second Lieutenant Tlicodore F. Forbes with thirty out of Fort I-lays ti, cooperate wirh a soldiers of companies E arid G, Fifth Infantry, mr~rched detachment ofcavalrymen from the Seventh Cawlry nlio were in pursuit of Indians reported to be in the vicir~ity of the Grinnell Station on the Saline River. After one day into the scout, the cavalry commander, Captain George Yatcs (who was killed along with Custcr six years later) sent Forbes antl his men back in the direction of Fort Hays, while the cavalry continued on. The infantrymen returned to Fort Hays on the evening of the June 6 wirhout having discovered any signs of recent Indian encampments. Forbes noted that on "the firrt day out 1 kept my men well up with the Cavalry [sic], but the second day I found it impossible to do so. without great punishment to tlie men."SI A more successful infantry-cavalry combination took place at Wasliita, Indian Territory in 1868 during a winter campaign. There the infantry guarded the logistics base which enabled tlic cavalry to mass its combat power and strike the Indian village.s2 Mobility, or lack of it, then was tlic primary liandicnp when the infantry went on the offense against the Indian. Even the cavalryman suffered in this sense when compared to the light mobility of the plains Indian. Colonel Hazen, Sixth Infantry, testified in 1877 to the House Military Committee meeting on the reorganization of the Army: After the fourth days march of a mixed comm;~nd, the horse does not march faster than the foot soldier, and after the seventh day, the foot soldier begins to out march the horse, and from that time on tlie foot soldier has to cnd his march earlier and earlier each (lay, to enable thc cavalry to reach the camp the same d;~y at all.53

Ilistorian George Grinnel Bird thought differently when he commented on tlancock's 1867 expedition: "That he [Hancock] n~arclied with infantry and a pontoon train in pursuit of mounted Indians sho\vs how little qualiticd for tlie command of such i n expedition." On tlie prairie in the summer, the inhntry was certainly at a disadvantage. However, with tlie Army's eniploymcnt of the winter campaign, in concert with converging infantry-cavalry colunins, the infantry became a potent Indian fighting force.54 Though not employed in Kansas, future large sc;lle infantry operations against the Indians became one ofthe most S U C C ~ S S ~ U I Army tactics. Miles arid his subordinates: First Lieuteriant Jan~es I'ope of the l:ifli Infantry. were w r y Lieutenant Frank Ueltl\r i n and S ~ x o n d successful in tracking arid defeating the Sious in Montana during the 1876-1 877 campaign. All three were veterans of earlier campaigns in Kansas during the early 1870's. Miles thought that it was a mistake not to think infantry was important in fighting Indians. However, companies of thirty or forty men were not always cffrctive, especially when soldiers were engaged in other activities related to garriso~~ duty. Srnall infantry companies. dispersed over many small garrisons pcrforniirig a11 manncr of duties military and nonmilitary alike, often left little time for regimental drills or other excrcises.jj The seeming inability of the Army to prevent Indian depredations against tlie civilians in Kansas in 1867 alarmed the Kansas state government. In June 1867, Kansas Governor Samuel Crawfbrd: after noting tlic Arm> troops in Kansas had done everything possible to prevent Indian attacks on tlie railroad, settlements, and tlie owrland routes, offered tlic Secretary of War a volunteer force from Kansas to assist the Army. The Secretary deferred the request to tlic military division commander, Shemian. After some initial hesitancy, Sherman authorized Crawford to call out a volunteer battalion of six to eight companies of cavalry. However, many citizens of Kmsas, primarily those in the District of Upper Arkansas, were not ns understanding 41

as Governor Crawford was \\it11 the A m y efforts. A contemporary newspaper editorial in Junction City, Kansas, expressed its opinion when it stated: "They [Kansas militia] have a decided aversion to: and contempt for regular Army tactics in carrying on Indian war and Volunteers do not want to be under regular Army officers."s6 As Indian depredations increased in 1868 and 1869, so to did llic demand from the local citizenry for Army assistance and protection from Indian attacks. The soldiers continually found themselves in the unenviable position o f arriving on the scene o f an Indian attack long after the perpetrators had fled. They then were often faced the wrath o f an angry citizenry. The shifting policy o f peacc and offense against the Indians often put the Army i n a reactive rather than offensive posture. Public opinion out West (and back east forjust the opposite reasons) could sometimes be scathing in i t s opinion o f the Arnmy. The Junction City Weekly Union editorialized its frustration, and presumably that o f its readers. in Septembcr 1867: The proprietor oftlie train, after thc light was ovcr, went to Fort Zarah for help to bury his dead and get what goods. kc., the red skins had left. 'flie ofliccr in command there would not send anybody to help him. . . .These military officers on the plains are getting to be interesting institutions, . . . We have yet to hear o f over two cases where the regular officers or soldiers have been any use in fighting the red skins. They appear to take delight i n witnessing these murders by Indians, and the plundering o f trains, without offering any 11clp.j7 On a less personal note, but critical nonetheless, the same nelispapcr noted a year later in October 1868: They [Indians] never attack a party too strong to be ~ h i p p c d .Their practice is to sweep down upon wcak settlements, isolated travelers, or hunters or unguarded trains. . . Against such a mode o f warfare the tactics o f civilization are useless. It is this mode o f warfare that prevents our well fed and trained troops from protecting the settlements. Our troops are now advanced to Forts Wallace and Larned, but the Indians arc in thcir rear, and when the troops are brought back to light them, they w i l l he heard o f at some other wcak point where they are not expected. There is no special blame to be attached to the soldiers or officers. They do the best the! can, but their best w i l l always be ineffective against savagesjg Slicr~nan \\.as frustrated too. He noted to the Secretary o f War in 1868:

Overall tllcsc mattcrs tlic military authorities have no control, yet their public naturc implies public protection, and we are daily and hourly called on for guards and escorts, and are lcft in thc brcccli to catch all tlic kicks and cuffs of a war of races, without the privilege of advising or being consulted beforehand.59 Slierman also kne\\ that time was 011thc side of t l ~ c Army. As the railroad pressed on through Kansas, follo\red by tlie increase in scttlcnicnts and the decrease of the buffalo, the Indians would bc clcarcd from the arcas of white settlers and established on rescwations. The prairie,.inside and outsidc Kansas, would eventually be pacified. Tlic Army infantry in the meantime would continue to remain on duty throughout Kansas and thc Wcst guarding the overland routcs, isolntcd scttlcrncnts. and the railroad.60

1'0 execi~~ its e niissio~iin ccntral and wcstern Kansas, thc Army cstnt~lishcd a chain of
fbns to ser\.e as operating bases for its units. The conditions of operations on tlie stark and isolated plains placed unique and demanding logistical requircmcnts on tlic Army. 'I'lie infantry pla>ed a critical role in tlic cstablishmcnt of a system of forts arid securing logistical lincs of support.

I lioben G. Athearn, IVillimn ficum.seh Sherrnun trnd the Strrlrtwenr of the Wesr (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1956). 66.
2 ~ e c r e t a of r ~ War, Annual Report of the Secretary of Warfor the Year 1866 (Washington. DC: GPO, 1866), 1. (Hereafter cited as Annual Report). jlbid., 6. In 1867, the Dcpartmcnt of thc Arkansas was rcmovcd fi-om tlic niilitary Division of tlic Missouri. Lkpnrtment commanders from 1866 through 1880 werc: Major General Mancock, 20 August 1866 to I2 September 1867; blajor Gcncral Shcridan: 12 Scptcrnber 1867 to 13 September 1867, and 2 March 1868 to 20 illarch 1869; Colonel A. J . Smith, 13 September 1867 to 2 March 1868; Major General Schofield. 20 March 1869 to 3 May 1870; Llrigadicr Gcnc~nl Pope, 3 May 1870 to 1880. 4 ~ o b c r M. t Utley, Fronlier Regulars (New York: Macmillan, 1973; Lincoln: IJnivcrsity of Nebraska, 1984). 35. %Secretary of War. AnrruolReportjor 1868. 17. During 1868 the District of Upper Arkansas was ttic most difficult to manage and the scene of the most intense activities against thc Indians in the Dcpartmcnt of Missouri. Also, see Marvin M.Garfield, "Tlic Military Post as a 43

Factor in the Frontier Defense of Kansas, 1865-1869," Kansas Historictrl Quurterly, I (193 11932): 61. 6Secretary of War, Annual Reporf for 1866.20-21. 7Sccretary of War: Annual Reporf for 1869,24. Xlbid., 14. Francis B. Hcitman, Ifirorictrl Register and Dicfionar?; offhe United Stares Army, vol. 2, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1903; Urbana: Univcrsit) of Illinois, 19653,433-435.
-()/IN Act to increcrse u,r(lfix the Milirary Pecrce Esrublishnrenf ofrhe Cnifed Slates, Statutes at Large 299: sec. 4, 332 (1866). 'The Veteran Rescrvc rcgimcnts were assigned to thc four Milirarq Departments: Washington, the East, the Lakes. and l'enncsscc. These soldiers were to be used as guards and watchman for government warehouses, public ccmctcries, clerks and messengers to public offices, and other such duties that wcrc within their capabilities.

IOSecretary of War, Anrrrrnl Reportfir 1869: 235-238.

I 1 Don Rickey, Forty A41le.s o Duy on Ueans and H[ry, 5th ed. (Nonnan: University of Oklahoma, 19i6). 77; Hcitman, 427-446. Most c;tvulry engagements in Kansas during this pcriod tcndcd to follow suit, and nith a feu notable exceptions, this went for the othcr engagcmcnls 011the frontier.

12~turules ut 1.urge 299, scc. 4,333 (1866); Secretary of War, Annuul Repurrfor 1866, 12; Secretary of War, Anwuul Report 1878, 9. End strength for the Army at the end of 1866 stood at 37,515; at the end of 1878 it was 24,76 1. I j ~ o u s eDrff~icrrlfies , With Irrdicms, 4151 Cong., 2d sess., 1870, H.K.240, 63 14~ecretary of War, Annual Ri,porrfor 1871,44. I j ~ e c r e t a of r ~ War, A~rnucrl Report forl867; 475. Cavalry regiments consistently outnunlbcred infantry regiments for desertions; in 1867, the Army recorded 13, 608 dcscrtions. 16~ccrctar). of War, Annual Reporf for 1870,24: Adjutants Gcncral Oflice, Official Army Registerfir 1873 (Washington. DC: GPO, 1873), 44-45; Post Returns for Fort Wallace, June 1868; Secretary of War, (I 870), 44-45. 171louse, Reorgunizution offhe Armny, 45th Cong., 2d scss., 1877, 1 I. R. 56, 44. The ratio in thc cavalry company for this same period was one ofticer to twenty-scvcn enlisted for 1869; and one officer for evcry twenty-thrcc cnlistetl in both 1871 and 1876; House, Dijficrr1fie.s Ib'irh Indians, 4 1st Cong., 2d scss.. 1870, H. R. 240, 63; Post Returns for Fort Hays, October 1866 through September 1867. 18Adjutants General Oflice, O ~ i c i uA l m y Registerfor 1866-1868 (Washington, DC : GPO, 1866- 1868).

1~1-louse, Reorguniruriotr of the Arnry, 45th Cong., 2d sess., 1877, 1-1. R. 56, 454.

2 2 ~ o m e E. r Socolosky and Huber Self, Ilistorical Atlus o/Kutr.scrs (Norman: Univcrsity of Oklahoma. 1972). 29-40; Heitman, 427-446. 23~ohn H. Monnet. The Buttle of Beccher Islandand the Indian War 1867-1869 (Boulder: University of Colorado, 1992): 26; Post Rcturns for Fons H a y and Fort Harkcr, November 1866. Whcn established, Fort Harker was first named Fort Ellsworth and Fort Hays was originally nilrned Fort Flctchcr. Both posts' were rcnamcd in Novcmbcr 1866; Hcrbcrt bl. Hart. Tour Guide of Old IVestcrn Forts (Fort Collins: Old Army Press. 1980): 55-64. Infantry detachments were often stntioncd at thc mail stations along thc Smoky Hill Trail, principally in 1866-1869; Secretary of War, Am~uulReportfir 1868. 17. 24~ccretary of L h r , Annrirrl Reportfir 1866, 19; Adjutants General Office. Ofjiciul Arnry l<eg~srer for 1866 (Washington, DC : GPO, 1866); Edward Sigcrfoos, Historical Sketch oftlrc Fifrh UwitedStutes Infuntry (Regimental Press, 19 1 j), 10. 25~ecretary of War, Annual Reporrfor 1867, 35-45. 26Post Rcturns for Fort Wallace, October-November. 1866. 271bid.. Company D, Nineteenth Infuntr) was rcorgani~cd as Company D,Thirtyscvcnth 111fantnin January 1867, in accordance with War Dcpartnicnt Gcncral Ordcr No. 92 of 17 November 1866, which increased the number of Army inhntry regiments from nineteen to forty-fivc. C Montgomery, "Fort Wallacc and its Relation to the Frontier,': 2 8 ~ r s Frank . C.'ollcction.sof Ki~nsu.s Stare Historirul Sociel~: (v. 17, 1926-28): 232; Post Keturns for Fort Wallace, August-September, 1867; Secretary of War, Annwl Report for 1867,41. 29Brian C. Pohnnka, cd., Xelson A. Miles; A 1)ocumentar.v Biogruphy o/His Military Curecr 1861-1903 (Glendale: The Arthur Clarke Comp;~ny,1985), 74-76. Miles did managc to get t11c I3ftl1 Infantry's regimental hcadquartcrs moved the more comfortable Fort 1.cavenworth i n 1871. Fort Leawn\vorth \\as also tlic hcadquartcrs for the Department of the Missouri. jo~ecretaryof War, Annuul Report for 1870.6. 3111eitma11, 440-44 I ; Secretary of War, Annual Report 1874.70. 32~ccrctary of War, Annuul Rep(~rlsfor 1878-1880; Hart, 55-64 33Sccrctary of War, Annual Reportfor 1866,3.

j4~rmS andhhvy Journul, 27 June 1867,506 3jutley, 73-77; Ilarper 's Weekly, June 1867; Ricky, 122- 126,244. 36Utley, 221. Stephen J. Allie, All He Could Carry - U S Army hlfantry Equipment 1839-1919 (Lansing, Kansas: Caraway Printing: 1991), 18-22. 3 7 ~ e c r e t a qof War, Anwuul Reportfor 1866, 5. 38~ecretar)of IVar, Annunl Reportfir 1873, 16: Perry D. Jamicson, Crossing the DeudlyCro~md(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1994), 110; litley. 72; Roger W. Gaston, l'he L.nitedSt;[(~te.s E~ilistedSollier, 1865-1880 (M.A. thesis, Northcast Missouri State University, 1989), 44.
A. Custer, 1C$ LiJ2 on the Pluins (Chicago: Lakeside Press, 1952; Lincoln: 39~corgc University of Nebraska, 1966), 45; Post Returns for Fort Wallace: April 1867.

o f r h e h m y , 45111 Cong.. 2d scss., 1877, 11. R. 56, 5 401-lousc, l~zorgtmiztriion 41Secrctary of War. Annual Krport,for 1973, XVIII. l'llc emphasis o n marksmanship was oftcn detcrmincd by the local commanders. In 1872, the Third Infantry obviously placed importance on shooting when thc requisitioned a Reginlcntnl Target Prize to be \\.om by the pri~c man of ~ h rcginlent: c Lerlers Scnt, Fort Hays, 8 L)cccmbcr 1872. 421louse, Reorgurrixtion o f t l ~ e Army. 45th Cong.: 2d sess., 1877, H. R. 56: 138. 43~the;1rn, IS. Secretary of War, (1 869), 24: Jamicson, 36; Utley, 46, o f War, Annutrl Reportfor 1868, 5-13 44~ecrelary

Keorguwirulion of the Army, 45th Cong., 2d sess., 1877, 11. R. 56. 5; Utlcy, 44 471-~ousc.

4%ccrctary of War, Annual Report for 1869,20 %larvin tI. Garfield, "Dcfcnse of the Kansas Frontier, 1864-65," Kunsas His~oriccrl Qtrtrrterly 1 (193 1-1932): 145. Come AI Once! (Hays, Kansas: Thomas Moore Prcss, 1976; 5 II3laine Burky, C~ister, Ilays, Kansas: Society of Fricnds of Historic Fort Ilays, 1991). 94.

5 2 ~ o s Returns t for Fort Hays, June 1870. 53tlouse, Reorgunizcrriot~ o j h e Artw?;, 45th Cong., 2d sess., 1877, 1-1.R. 56. 5; IJtley, 454. 54~ieorge Bird Grinnel. The Fighting Cheyennes (Neb\ York: Charles Scribner's SOIIS, 1915): 239.

A. Greenc, Yellowstone Curnrncmd (Lincoln: Ilnivcrsity of'Ncbraska, 1991). 55~ero1ne Greene's book gives a superb account of infantry operations and the effecti\wms of infantry in winter against the Indians in Montana following the Battle of the Little 13ighorn; House, Keorgmizuriorr o f the Arn~y, 45th Cong., 2d sess., 1877, H. R. 56, 5 ; Utley, 237.
j6~unctionCity Wivkly tihion. 29 June 1867; Samuel J. Crawford, Kunsus in the Sixties (Kansas: A. C. McClung & Co., 191 1; Kansas Ileritnge Press, 1994). 252-258; Secretary of War, (1 867); 35. 57~uncriorr C:iry Week1.v h i o n , 28 September 1867 581bid., 24 October 1868.

CHAPTER FOUR FORTS AND LOGISTICS

A military fort on the plains suggests very forcibly the peculiar inspiration of a ship at sea; isolation within and desolation without.1

De B. Randolph Keim, Sheridan 's. Troopers on the Borders: A Winter Campaign on the Plains

An emigrant train, or a mail or stage coach passing through Kansas over the Santa Fe or Smoky Hill routes bctween 1866 and 1880 would pass by a scries of Army forts. l'hcse forts, sentinels on the Plains, represented to travelers isolated outposts of civilization arid security. For a short period of time, the forts traced the outline ofthe frontier in Kansas. These posts were garrisoned with either infantry or cavalry companies, and most often by both. Thc infantry, however. provided the mainstay of the garrisons of these isolated posts. Thc system of forts established in central and western Kansas were situated to provide protection over the Santa Fe and Smoky Hill trails and outlying settlements. The key posts along both trails were laid out and established in the years prior to and just after thc Civil War. These posts were not situated in accordance with any prearranged plan, but rather on current military neccssity in a specific area along these two overland trails. The posts wcre not mutually supporting, usually several days march from each other, and difficult to supply. When it was built, the railroad linked these posts to one another and to the military department's authority. These posts provided a basc of operations for the infantry and logistical centers in executing their mission in ~ a n s a s . 2
48

The rorts

ill central

and wcsrcrn Kansas, fi~nction:das they were, did not rcscmble the

conimonly held image o f a fortress surrounded by a log palisadc. Instead, they were a collection o f buildings situatcd around a main paradc ground and a flag pole. The structures usually

consisted o f oflicer quarters: enlisted barracks, stables, \vareliousc. and post headquartcrs.
Elizabeth Custer, wife o f George Armstrong Custer, recorded her first vicw and impression o f Fort Rilcy ill 1867: I t \vas my first vicw o f a fronticr post. Ihad cithcr bccn afraid to confess m y ignorance, or so assured thcrc was but one variety o f fort. and the subject needed no investigation, that Fort Riley came upon mc as a grcat surprise. 1 supposcd o f coursc, it would be like Fortress Monroc, with stone walls, turrets for sentinels, and a deep moat. As Iheard more about Indians since rcaching Kansas, a vision o f the enclosure where \ve would eventually live was a grcat comfort to me. I could scarcely believe that the buildings, a story and a half high. placed around a paradc ground. wcre all there \vas o f Fon ~ i l e ~ . 3 Mrs. Custcr's description o f Fon Riley \ \ o d d be similar to a description o f any o f the other forts in Kansas. On thc trcclcss plain, the fort \bas often the picture oistark isolation. However: the post played a central role in supporting tlic Army's activitics on tllc fronticr, and its dcsign, while oftcn primitive, was functional. I n 1864, as the Civil War raged in thc cast therc wcrc only two forts o f importance in Kansas. These forts guardcd tlic overland trails \wst across tlic central plains. l'hcy wcrc, F o n Kilc!, located on the eastern fringes o f Indian country, and Fort i.arncd, cstablishcd along thc Sarita Fe Trail. A third post, Fort Lyon, situated in Colorado Territory, provided the uestern most post along the routes across thc plains. I n tltc post-Civil War years, other permanent forts \verc established in central and western Kansas between 1865 and 1867, and their locations continued to spread wcstward through Kansas to the Colorado boarder. This was indicative o f the Army's rolc as frontier security as post-war emigration incrcascd.4 'l'hc oldest o f these posts. Fort Larned, was established in 1858, on the right bank o f Pmnee Fork, eight milcs from its confluence with the Arkansas River. This important frontier

post was named in honor o f Colonel Benjamin F. Larned, Paymaster General o f the Army when the fort was founded. Fort Lamed became the principal headquarters for tlie troops guarding trafijc along 140 miles o f the Santa Fe Trail. The post also served as the headquarters o f tlie Indian agency and served as a distribution point for tribal annuities. The post eventually had quarters built o f sandstone for four companies o f soldiers, primarily infantrymen, three sets o f

officer's quarters, a bakery, and a hospital. Fifty milcs south o f Fort Hays, Fort Larned was
seventy three miles down the Santa Fe Trail from Fort Harker, the nearest station o f the U.P.E.D. railroad. Not until early in 1872 did tlie railroad and telegraph connect thc post with Fort ~ca\.en\\orth.S The Army established t ~ ncw o posts in central Kansas in 1864 in response to problems n i t h the Indians and the requiremcnt to protect tlic trails and thc nevisettlemet~ts.The gap between Fort Riley and Fort Larncd was too great to be covered by the garrisons o f those two posts. Indian activities continued to threatcn traffic along the Sanla Fe Trail, and thc new stage route to Denver along the Smoky H i l l Rivcr. A t one point, mail contractors for the Post Office Department tliscontinuud service along the Santa Fe Trail. Addition;lll), frcight OII the plains headed west on the Smoky Hill route was under constant Indian attack and Deriver was tcniporarily cut off, it \vas too dangerous to move without an Army escort. blore protection was needed on tlicse two routes. Thus the Army established t\vo new posts, Forts Iillsworth and ~arah.6 Fort Ellswortli was established in June o f 1864 at a point tiliere tlic Smoky I-lill route forked from tlie Santa Fe Trail. TNO and a half years later, on 20 November 1866, the post relocated a mile away and was renamed Fort liarker after Union Army Brigadier General Cliarlcs Harker. The post had quarters for four companies and, for a period o f two years (I8691871). was the site o f the Fifth Infantry regimental hcadquarters. The grassy land around !he

50

post providcd good grazing areas and the soil arforded productive vcgctable gardens on the post. Four miles from Fort Harker was the town of Ellswonh, which by 1871 was one ofthe centers of the cattle operations in Kansas. The U.P.E.D. railroad reached Fort Harker in July 1867, and connected tlic post with Fort Riley, ninety miles distant to the northeast. Fort I-lays was sevcnty niiles to the West over the Smoky I l i l l Trail. \\liile Fort Larned was seventy miles to the southwest. Fort Harker for a period of time was one ofthe strongest out posts of \bestern Kansas and provided effective securih from Indian incursions alony the Smoky ~i11.7 For protcction along thc Santa Fe Trail, Fort Zarah was established by the commander of the military Department of Kansas, General S. R. Curtis, in July of 1864 and named after his son, Major Zarah Curtis killed at Baxrcr Springs in 1865. Located on Walnut Creck two miles from tlic Arkansas River, the p a t \\us thirty rnilcs east of Fort Lnrned arid forty tive rnilcs southwest of Fort Harker, the ricarest station of thc U.P.E.D. railroad. Initially the post fell under the responsibility of thc commander of Fort Larned, to whom the comrna~lder of Fort Zarali reported.

I n 1865 and 1866, an Indian agency for the Cheyenne and Arapaho operated from the post. Fort
Zarali was established as an independent post in June of 1868, and was only recordcd as a separate fort in the War Departments Annual Reports for tlie years 1868 and 1869. The post was abandoned in October of 1869, although detachments of infantrymen would temporarily occupy the area from time to time. Troops from Fort Larned once again assumed responsibility for the area. In its short pcriod of existence, Fort Zarah and the infantry escdrts from the post during a pcriod of frequent Indian raids enabled traffic to continue along the Santa Fe under the watchful eyes of tlie ~ r m y . 8 The next significant post heading south from Fort 1.arned on the Santa Fe Trail was Fort Dodge. 'l'lic post was established in 1864 on thc north bank of the Arkansas lliver on the Santa Fe Trail and was the most western of that trail's forts in Kansas. The post was eighty miles
.

51

southwest o f Fort Hays and the nearest station o f tl!c U.I1.E.D. railroad. Fort Dodge had quarters for threc companies. The land around the post was unproductive and vegetable gardens at the post were poor. Sincc post gardens often provided a source o f much needed fresh vegetables, a shortfall such as this affected the soldiers welfare. The nearest rimber mas twenty miles away and had to be transported to the post by contractor. This compounded the house keeping function at the post and was labor intensive. Once again reducing the ability o f the post to provide security for passing emigrant trains and freight.9 The forts along the Smoky Hill protected emigrants, the mail and passenger stages, and, by 1866, survey and grading parties o f the U.P.E.D. railroad. Moving \wxtward along the route to ~ c n v e froni r Fort Hnrher. the first significant post one encountered \\.as Fort Fletcher. This post \\as first established in October 1865 ncar the North fork crossing o f the B i g Creek, sis miles cast o f the stage station on the Smoky Hill route. The post \\as abandoned in'May 1866, follouing the closing o f the stage service. Just five months later in October 1866, the post was reoccupied to provide protection to rmvelers on the Smoky H i l l Trail: and also in anticipation o f the approach o f the lI.I'.LD. railroad. General Order 22, issued by department headquarters at Fort Leavenworth on 17 November 1866, renamed the post Fort Hays after the ljnion Brevet Major General Alexander Ilays who was killed at the Battle ofthe Wilderness in May o f 1864.10 The site o f Fort Hays, though, was poorly chosen. A severe flood along B i g Creek on

the night o f 5-8 June 1867 swept through the fort and d r o w k d several soldiers. The soggy survivors ;lisplaccd the nest morning and attempted to recover as much property as possible. The post was relocated on 2 1 Junc 1867, to a site selected by Major General Winlield Scon I+ancock fifteen miles away on Big Creek ncar the crossing o f the U. P. E. D. railroad. B y November o f 1867, a rcporter from the Juitrrion Ciry Ii'eekly Union who visited Fort Hays noted that: "This post i s beautifully located. well arranged, and kept strictly in compliance with

52

military order and discipline."l I Thc ne\\spaperman went on to notc the erection ol'wintcr quartcrs at the post which he described as ample and comfortable. Quarters for four hundred men were built at Fort Hays. The post remained quite active until its closing in 1889. Fort Hays was scvcnty-six miles wcst of Fort Harker, and one liundrcd thirty-five miles east of Fort Wallace. Military supplies for the post arrivcd from Fon Leavenworth, via Forts Riley and tlarkcr, initially by wagon train: and by Octobcr of 1867, via the U. P. E. D. railroad.12 The western most of the permanent posts in Kansas along the Smoky Hill Trail \vas Fort Wallace, named after Brigadier General W.H.L. Wallace, who was killed at the nattle of Shiloh. The post was erccted on the south fork of the Smoky Mill River, opposite the mouth of Rose Creek. Fort Wallace, wllilc not as large as either Fort Harker or Fort Hays. had quarters for four posts in Kansas from I866 to 1878, Fon Wallace "bore the brunt" of companies. Of all t l ~ c cnpgemcnts and operations against thc Indians. Visiting Fort \\iallace i n 1868 with Major Cicncral Sheridan was alithor De B. Randolph Keim. 1Ie found the post dreary, "the quartcrs were small and well ventilated by a series of cracks. and other openings: which suggested no allowance in the construction for shrinkage."13 Soldiers from the post covered the stage route cast towards Fort Hays and west to\\ards Denver. Fort Hays was one hundred thirty-five miles to the east, while Denver lay over two hundred miles west. An isolated post, the U.P.E.D. railroad reached Fort Wallace late in 1868.14 As noled earlier, the Smoky I-lill route west of Fort Harkcr traversed prime Indian
'

hunting grounds. The stage route had stations over thc entire route to Denver where horses were changed and the passengers fed and billeted. Each station, betwen ten and fiftcer~miles apart, providcd tempting targcts to the Indians who often ran off the statio~i's horses and killed the station keepers. If tlic soldiers could not break up the attacks along thc route, they could at least protect the stations from attack. Thc soldicrs who guarded these stations, primarily detachments

53

of infantrymen. were gcncrally from the garrisons assigned to either Fort Wallace in the West or Fort Hays in the east.15 Two other forts guarded the Smokq Hill route for a shon period of time during the licight

of Army operations against the Indian in 1867. Downers Station and ivlonumcnt Station werc
formerly stage stations on thc Denvcr routc. Each of these posts had at least a company assigned, rather than a detachment, and were recorded in the Secretary of War's Annual Report for 1867 under posts of the District of Lppcr Arkansas. Donner's Station, established on 30 May 1867 by a company of soldiers tiom the Thirty-se\entli Infantry, was situated on the Smoky Hill Trail fifty miles west of Fort Hays and lifty miles east of Monument ~tation.16 Soldiers of Compiuny I of the Thirty-eighth Infantry established the garrison at Monument Station in August of 1867. The post was situated on the Smoky Hill stage line. ninety milcs west of Fort Hays and fort).-seven milcs cast of Fort Wallacc. The Post Return for August 1867, recording the occupation of thc post. noted "no post records showing the establishment of this post."17 Very tcrnporary in nature, both Downer's Station and Monument Station were clokd by the spring of 1868, however, the detachments of infantry from Fort Hays and Fort Harker continued to man the key stage stations between those two forts. Both the travelers on the route between the stations and the stations themselves were targets during thc latter half of the 1860s. The detachments provided security to the stations but could do little to stop attacks along the routc. Though the detachments would march out to the'sitcs of cach d~.prcdntion,they generally found the Indians long gone and the soldiers were left to bury the dead. By 1879, the frontier trace had passed Kansas and thc A m y reevaluated the need for the forts. Thc railroad had by now crossed the state from east to west for over a decade. Occasional Indian problems still cropped up. but never ofthe scale of the lare 1860s or even the 1874-1875 54

tinir frame. Major Cieneral Jolin Pope, the commander of tlic Dcpartmcnt of Missouri, f i t that the majority of posts still open in Kansas should be closed. I-le elaborated on this in his annual report to the military Division of the Missouri: Some ofthcm [forts]. by reason of changed circumstances, no longer fulfill any important military object beyond the sheltcr of troops, and could be dispensed with if accolnmodations for thcir garrison could be had elsewhere. Lamed, Hays. an? Lyon [Colorado] are no longer needed for military defense of the frontier, altliough the troops now occupying them are at times entirely necessary for this service. The posts themselves are out of position for prompt use-in an) prospective troubles with Indians; so far out of place that it is not easy to use their g:~rrisonsat points where the only Indian troublcs are likely to occur in the future.18 Pope went on to recommend that Fort Wallace remain active for protection of Kansas's western frontier because of its commanding position of the routes traversed by the remaining Indians. However, the War Department tholight differently. Fort 1.arned closed later in' 1879, followcd by Fort Dodge in 1882. Fort \%illace closed in 1884, and Fort Hays remained an activc post until 1889. Onl) Forts ~ i l c ?and . Lea\~enworth still operated as tlic last two forts in'Kansas: both forts re~nain active posts i n 1997. The posts in central and western Kansas became the home for the soldiers stationed on the plains. Additionally, the forts sewed as logistical bases for Army opcrations throughout Kansas. 130th infantry and cavalry companies kept a visible presence along the overland trails using these posts. When escorting wayon trains or mail and stage coxlies along the trails, the troops moved from one post to another. These posts were usually garrisoned by at least one company of infantry, and often one or two companies of cavalry. During the height of Indian depredations in Kansas froni'1867 through 1869, the garrisons'of several key posts swelled from companies to several regiments, both infantry ind cavalry. Once tlic site for a post \\.as selected, one of thc first orders of business for the soldiers was erecting some kind of shelter. Far from civilization, and subject to the cxtremcs in weather, construction of shelter created an additional burden on the soldiers. The Secretary of War
.

reported to tlie President in 1866: "Measures have been adopted for the purpose of providing suitable shelter for the troops now stationed on the plains."19 The Arm) saw to it that the soldiers themselves built these posts. Shelter initially often consisted of tents. Primitive dugouts or crude huts were often used, until more permanent structures could be built. Living conditions for these posis in the 1860's \\as often very uncomfortable, a condition acerbated by bad neathcr. The carly temporaq structures at these posts often subjected their occupants to the environment. A correspondent visiting Fort Harker in 1867 noted: Wc arc living in a hovcl. I t is twelve feet square and made of rough logs sct upright, palisade svle, and plastered \vith,mud, sticks, straw, and boughs. The mud persists in falling to the inside at all hours of the day and night. It drops on our plates at dinner time, and into our mouths if we are so cardess as'to sleep with our mouths open, othcnvise into our faces. Recently we had the bright idca of stretching a piece of canvas above our bed, and thus defy the mud. Unfortunately the first night h e were under this canopy it snowed, and the tent cloth caught several bushels of snow that drifted through the cracks in the roof and walls. Towards morning a thaw released a stream of water on to us.20 General Sherman, now Commanding General of the Army, reported in his annual repon to tlie Secretary ol'IVar in 1869 o n the poor quality of the b:macks at frontier posts, I haw personal knowledge that the huts in v.hic1i our troops are forced to live arc in some places inferior to what horses usually have in this city. Nearly all these posts are lcrnporary in nature and character; but as time progresses and roads become established, we can choose the real strategic points, and at these we should have good quarters for troops, and I hope the Secretary will ask a liberal appropriation, subject to his control: for erection of necessary barracks.21 Sherman had another good reason for his request for additional funding for barracks
, improvement. Shortly before lie assumed his current assignment, War Department General

Order No. 05, published in Noveniber 1868, announced strict guidelines on the construction of buildings on militiiry posts: No permanent barracks, quarters. hospitals, etc., . . . shall be ercctid but by the order of the Secretary of War. . . . In view of the frequent changes in stations of troops, involving the abandonnierit of military posts, officers are prohibited from expending any labor or money on them beyond uhat is allowd by the strict letter of the law and regulation, upon penalty of being held peculiarly responsible for a violation of this order.22

It was bclieved tliat since tlic frontier was continually moving westward and the Indian threat was subsiding, these posts would soon loose their strategic value, so why pump more money than necessary into them'? As it turned out, many of tlic posts remained active much longer than e~~ected.23 Tlie posts did not necessarily limit offensive operations. Historian Robert Utlcy has noted tliat: "The fixed-post systcm prevailed over the roving columns did not signify that a purely defensive strategy had prevailed. The forts served as bascs for ofCcnsive as well as defensi1.c opcrations."24 Sherman, then conimander of the Military Division of the Missouri, noted in a letter lo Congress in March of 1867: "Thesc troops will occup? posts, readily built, but designed for defcrisc by a fraction of the garrison, while the balance can operate as escorts or eipcditions bctwcen posts."?.j Military roads b e t w m tlie posts scrved as vital trnnsportation links ro the posts in areas not covered by the railroad. Thesc roads often follokcd the easiest path ovcr the terrain between
trio posts. The posts along the route of the U.P.E.D. railroad in 1867, Forts Harkcr and Hays,

werc connected by military roads with the post on the Santn Fe Trail, Forts Larned and Dodge. Thcse roads scrvcd as communication links to the forts nearest the railheads. Military supplies ;~nd troops moved o\.cr these roads from one post lo another. Civilian traffic took advantage of tliesc roads too. In efkct, these roads connected tlie Santa Fe and Smoky Hill trails and allowed tlie Army to use the railroad to its advantage in supporting tlie Kansas posts.?.6 Tlie stage was often used by tlic Army to transport the mail between department headquarters and outlying posts. The railroad too, once completed: providcd cheap and rapid communications betwcen the posts. .With tlic railroads came the telegrapli. Rcgimcntal and dcpartmcnt headquarters control over the network of posts tightened with the access to rail and tel~~ra~h.27

57

Even bcfore tlie C i v i l War, the War Department had determined the cheapest and most satisfactory mcthod o f supplying the forts on the Plains was through contracts with privately owncd freighting companies.

Uy 1865, tlic Secretary o r War reported to Congress that: "The

troops operating on the great western plains.

. . .arc supplied principally by trains of the

'

Quartermaster's Dcpartment from dcpots established on !he great routes o f overland travel to which depots supplics are convcycd by contractor."28 Generally, heavy wagons pulled by ten oxen were used and each was capable o f hauling f i f i y tive hundred pounds each. Lighter wagons, d r a w by mules or horses, were also used and were cspccially cfkctive in the winter months when the grass was covercd by a light snow.29
''

Thc depot at Fort Leavenworth, i n eastern Kansas on tlic Missouri River, was the site of the headquarters for tlie Department o f t h e Missouri. Fort Leavenworth furriishcd qtmterniaster's and subsistence s,tores to the ICansas posts by rail for those along tlic U. P.E. D railroad, or a combination o f rail and wagon trains for those posts not located along the rail routes: Wood, grains, and other food stuffs were most often transported and provided by civilian' contractors. The posts generally kcpt fourto six months subsistence on hand, in case o f ~niannounced troop movements and the tenuous nature o f the logistics line. Quartermasters often encountered distribution difficulties since troop movements from one post to another \verc frequent. This resulted in certain posts being under stocked: wliile others recei&cd supplies for units no longer assigricd to the post. This could create a problem if an infantry company marched to a ncw post and cxpcctcd to be rcsupplied there and found that the quartcmiaster at this post cxpectcd the newcomers to bring their own supplies.30 The logistics functions requircd to support these widely separated posts were performed by soldiers from the line units, i.e., infantry and cavalrymen. Each post maintained a certain number o f wagons organic to units assigned to the post. These wagons were needed in

58

cmergencies when a contractor failed to fullill their contract and provided transport for supplies accompanying the infantrymen on field operations. Robert Utley noted that infantry companies required at least one six mule wagon, while a cavalry company requircd three wagons, primarily to haul the grain for the liorscs. 'I'lle Secretary of War in his annunl report to tlie President in 1875 noted this and stated: Owing to the fact that our Army is dispersed in small detachments to garrison military pons scattered at wide intervals throughout extensive districts of unpopulatcd territory, it becomes necessary to transport everything needful from remote furnishing depots. Where there is no railroad or water communication an immense amount of bvagon transportation is requircd. Soldiers detached from the line: without any knowledge of the work. and against their wishes, are used as teamsters, hostlers, and herders for this means of tran~~ortation.31 Tl~e Secretary of War went on to note the disadvantage of untrained soldiers performing this duty and higliligl~ted the advantages of the German Army's professional trmsportation c 0 r ~ s . 3 2 Others noted thc cffcct on small infantry companies performing logistical requirements at each post. War Department regulations required every post, if possible: to procure fuel and hay through the '.labor of the troops."j3 To a cost conscious Army, this sccmcd a logical and cconomical measure. Ilowever, combined with their militar). duties, this \\ark as a laborer certainly affected tlie morale of the soldiers. Pope, then commander of the military Department

of the Missouri, felt this issue important cnough to rncrit a comment i n his department's annual
report. "Many of our garrisons are now so small that it requires nearly all the men for building and repairing quarters: procuring forage and fucl, and other necessary labor, so that there is but

'

little time or opportunity for drills or other military exercises."j4 The Army's reorganization in

1869, with the commensurate reduction in pcrsonncl, including a rcduction in infantry

rcgimcnts, only exnspcrated the situation.

In light of tlie troop reductions and gcncrally small company s i x , Pope argued that
certain posts in Kansas should be closed, tliough not abandoned, and their garrisons concentrated

at key forts along the overland trails. During the winter months, when the Indians were in their camps, many posts w r c not needcd. He also reasoned that wliether a post was large or small, the sanie functions to support the post were necessary, only at a s~naller post, the negative effect \vas greater. I-le was not alone in this thought; the Secretary of War seconded this idea, writing: "The necessities of service required and although they \\ere occupied by very small forces, yet the expense incident to the retention and operation of the posts existed to almost as great an extcnt as it would have done had the nuniber on duty been larger.'.35 Pope reckon& that these . . centralized posts would be easier to supply and be lcss of a burden on the transportation system
In particular, he had i n mind Fort I-lays, srrategically located on the U.P.E.11. railroad. Instead of

year-round garrisons at several posts, the troops would winter at Fort Hays and, in the summer, detachments would be sent out to cover the area around those previous forts. While this might be militarily sound, until 1880 il was politically unrealistic. Thc local populace drew great comfort in lking i n the shado\r of the post's'security.36 Phil Shcridnn, as i)i\ision of Missouri commander. did not agree with Pope's recommendations. By 1871, Sheridan felt that active operations against Indians in Kansas were at an end. He thought that the Army should provide protection for the Indian, coverage to the general line of the frontier and commercial lines of transportation. and to "form hcrc and there a nucleus for thc youthSuI settlcmerits constantly springing ~ ~ . Though " 3 ~ Fort klartxr would close in 1873, Forts Dodge, Lar~~cd, I-lays, and Wallace remained active for several morc years, the last closing i n 1889. Ne\crtheless, Pope continued to make the recommendation for consolidation of posts i n subsequcnt department reports. While it might bc economical, consolidation of companies at a few selected posts was not feasible for one important reason: the citizens,' foi scctirity,'demanded year-round Army presence along the ovkrland trails. In the
'

meantime, tlien, both infantry and cavalry conipaniek continu;d to campaign on the ~iain4:38 60
'

Operations in the field could be a logistical nightmare ror the post quartermasters. The distances to cover over the vast, often bleak plains were demanding on the supply efforts. A major campaign required the assemblage of companies from several different posts, since rarely was a regiment assigned to a single post. This requirement to assemble added additional burdens to an already over stressed supply system. With each post often forty to seventy miles apart and, in the late 1860's, little rail transport available, a considerable logistical effort was required to support any type of movement. This had serious effects on Sheridan's 1868 winter campaign and also during the 1874-75 Red River War. In both cases a lengthy supply line caused unexpected delays and a shortage in food and forage. Only through persistent efforts of commanders such as Sheridan and Miles did the Army columns remain in the field and operational. It was essential that columns travel with their supplies. Infantrymen on the march, not as skilled as the Indian in foraging, were forced to transport their own rations with them. Colonel Xelson Miles, commander of the Fifth Infantry, believed that for operations in the field ox-trains owned by the government were the most economical. Wagons continued to accompany the units during field operations, even after the advent of the railroad. It was the supplies and not the marching ability or stamina that determined the length of the campaign.39 The railroad had a significant effect on military operations in Kansas. Its protection provided an additional mission for the Army, especially when its construction aggravated the Indians. The railroad also assisted the Army in executing its frontier missions by moving troops and supplies faster and cheaper than wagon trains. Ultimately, the Union Pacific railroad would help drive the Indians from the belt of land between the Platte and Arkansas Rivers and assist thriving white settlements in the area. Once this happened, the role of the Army in central and western Kansas diminished. 61

'l'lie dcvelop~nenl of the U.P.E.D. railroad contributed to initiation of the Indian War in 1867-1869. Thc route of the rail road, which generally followed the Smoky Hill River, passed through the Cheyenne's favorite hunting grounds. The rapid progress of railroad construction through Kansas at the Civil War's end,was also expected to diminish the cost and difticidty of military transportation. The timely completion of the U. P. E. D. railroad to the eastern base of the Rocky Mountains, therefore, was a priority.40 I'ope'went on to write in 1866: Thc speedy and complete solution to our Indian difficulties \vill do away at once with the necessity of troops, and h e enornious expense of maintaining them i n such remote regions, it would seen1 no proper steps which the government can take should be omitted in fonvarding tlic construction of these roads. In this view, the qucstion of the number of troops assigned ' to duty on the great overland routes should, to a reasonable extent. bc considered. A sufficient force should be placed along these routes, not only to insure reasonable security to travel and immigration, but also sufficient to make the working parties for the railroads perfectly secure, and to be ahle, when ever necessary, to render material aid in their construction.41
'

Pope's idcas were sharcd by other Army officers, particularly Sherman. Pope's superior and commander of the military Division of Missouri. The railroad. a source of logistical support for the infidntq, also bronght on a security mission for them. Sherman believed military protection of the railroad construction parties was a task for the ~ r m y . 4 2 These roads, although in the hands of private corporations have more than the usual claim on us for military protection, because the general govcrnrnent is largely interested pecuniary. They aid us materially in our military operations by transporting troops and stores rapidly across a belt of land hitherto only passed in the summer by slow trains drawn by oscn, dependent on the grass for food.-lj The Secrerary of War. in his annual report to the Prcsident in 1867, noted that the U.I'.E.D. railroad \ u s now being used by the Army to move forward supplies to the posts located on tlic plains west of the Missouri River. The Union Pacific and the Kansas I'acific from June 1867 through September 1868 transported for the military 36,347 tons of ammunition and 13,810 persons. Thc transportation costs for supplies to the posts in Kansas remaincd high, and after

1867, transportation continued to be divided bctween wagon trains and the railroad. The
completion of the railroad did ultimately lower the costs for wagon tran~~ortation.44

The railroad eventually put the Kansas forts within easy reach of supplies. The railroad reduced the time to cover the seventy six niiles frum Fort I-larkcr to Fort Hays to three hours. This was a significant reduction in a timc when the average wagon movement was ten to fifteen miles a day. In January of 1868, "End of the Track" for the U.P.E.D. railroad was forty-six milcs west of Fort I lays. Eight months later: by 16 August of 1868, the railroad rcnchcd across Kansas four hundred miles west of Sheridan, Kansas. Not u~ltil April of 1870, howver, would the

U.P.E.D. railroad rcach into Colorado Territory, primarily duc to financial problems. By
September ofthe same year, service to Denver began. The stage route to Dcnvcr, along the Smoky I l i l l Ri\cr, \\as replaccd by the railroad. 45 Along the frontier, including Kansas, the railroads affected the military in othcr ways as well. Sherman. who always supported railroad construction on the frontier and clearly
envisioned its positive d'fects back in the late 1860s, told the Sccretary of War in 1880:

These railroads haw completely revolutionized our country in the past few years, and imposc on the milit;iry an entire chongc of policy. Hitherto n c have bcen cornpellcd to maintain small posl along wagon and stage routes of trawl. These are no longer necded, because no longer used, and the settlements \\~liicligrew up speedily along the new rail roads afford all the security nccessary?6 With the establishment of the forts came the development of local communities. A military post had many attractions to the settlers, security being only one of them. Thcre was also money to be made. The soldier's pay w s only a small fraction of the money that benefited the local economy around a post. The Amiy often spent large amounls of money in thc region to purchase supplies for the forts. The Quartynaster Section of the Department of Missouri, located at Fort Leaven\\onh, ~ o u l d announce in the newspapers, such as the Juncfion Cify
CVwkly Lhion and the Leaverrworih Daily Conservalive, that the Arniy \vas accepting proposals

for supplies from contractors. Tbc contractors, loc;~tedtlirougl~outthe arca, would deliver . .. . supplies oloats. shclled corn, hay, horses, cattle. and cords of hardwood to posts i n Kansas. . . . ,. . . . . . Some posts, such as Forts Larned, Dodge, and I lays: would e<entually be able to purchase frcsh . . .. vcgetables and meats from merchants in towns adjacent to tlic posts. Considering the poor . . quality of Army food and its bland taste. frcsh vcgetables and meats were important to the soldiers wellhre.47
. . The forts also m;~intainedcivilians on a payroll to provide scn.iccs as blacksmiths,

teamsters, guides. and couriers. Pay for tlicse employees pumped furtlicr money into the local
,

!.

economy. For cxiunple. at 1:ort Hays from 1867 through 1889, the avcragc monthly civilian payroll was $1.550.60. \\liilc for the peak years of 1868-1869, the avcragc was $7,528.14. Thus thesc forts provided rnorc than security to the surrounding arca, thcy also provided economic

Thcse new towns wcre given a foothold for future dcveloprnent. Even after the Indian threat had subsided, ;IIC local conimunitics wcre not always anxious to sce a post close and the garrisons m o \ ~ out. The community felt dependent on thc post as an economic niarkct. The local communities faccd a paradox; the frontier and an Indian threat kept the post activc as a market. yet made lilc in the to\\n isolatcd and dangerous. Even tlic forts thcnisclves were not immune to Indian attack. Fort LVallace was attacked in June 1867, and, for a period of time immediately following: under virtual siege. As the frontier moved on past Kansas, and the Indian threat to the area subsided, it was time for tlic posts to be abandoned. The effect of this reduced the federal cash flow into these towns. Lieutenant General Sherman envisioned this in 1867. whcn lie wrote: These military posts will soon become wl~at they were l~eretofore on our western boarder, tlic nuclei of towns. enabling us to withdraw our troops, and to concentrate thcm at in the direction of the newer and rnorc cheaper posts of supply, or to move them still fi~rthcr exposed senlcments.4') 64

The pain felt by the local community, perhaps, is not all that different from today's communities when a base closes. Like today, these towns managed to get by with the forts closure. The Kansas cities and towns of Ellsworth, Hays, Wallace, Larned, and Dodge City remain today, testimony to the names of the forts that once existed nearby.50 l'hc Army forts in central and western Kansas were positioned to support the military's primary mission of protecting travel along the Santa Fe and Smoky Hill Trails, isolated settlements along these trails, and to assist in the development of the U.P.E.D. railroad. Forts Zarah, Larned, and Dodge followed the Santa Fe Trail, while Forts Harker, Hays, and Wallace sewed as sentinels over the Smoky Hill and U.P.E.D. railroad routes. The positioning of these posts, between the years 1859 and 1867, however did not sccm to follow any strategic dcsign of frontier defense. Instead, department commanders established a post based on a current military requirement. Until the advent of the railroad, movement of troops between the posts would remain slow and cumbersome; and supplying the posts remained expensive. Both infantry and cavalry companies were assigned to these posts, though the infantry provided the mainstay of each garrison. Finally, thcsc posts served as the nuclei of new settlements by providing both security and a market for their goods. The conditions the infantry faced were typical for the frontier posts throughout the west. They overcame isolation, poor communications, and difficult terrain to accomplish their missions. By the summer of 1867, the infantry companies in Kansas were actively engaged in combat with the Cheyenne, Kiowu, Arapaho, and Comanche warriors. For the next eleven years, these companies remained poised to carry out the nation's Indian policy. Periods of intense boredom were broken by frequent campaigns and escort duty. On many occasions these resulted in skirmishes with Indians. As we shall see, finding and fixing the Indians proved very difficult for the Army.
65

1 lle U.Kandolph Keim. Shcridun : s Troopers on !he Borders: A kYinrer Campaign on (Ire Plui~rs (I'hiladclphia: D. k!cKny, I 885; Williumstown, klussacl\usctts: Corncr House. 1973). 59.

2~arvin I t . Garfield, 'Thc Military Post as a Factor in the Frontier Defense of Kansas, 1865- 1869," Ku~t.~cz.s Ilisroric~~l Quurterly 1 (1 93 1-32): 50. 3Elizabeth Bacon Custer, Tenring on the Pluins (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1971). 366-367. Fortress Monroe is located on the Virginia coast. - 4 ~ i l b u Sturtevanl r Nqe, P1trin.s lnditrn Roidws (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1968), 3. ~ u . s .\Var Department, Outline Dercriptiows oftlre Posts in the Aiilituiy Division oftlie ,%4ssissouri ( ~ h i c a & : GPO, 1876), 130: Leo Oliva, Forr Lurnc,d (Topeka: Kansas Stutc Historical Society, 1985), 9; Secretary of War, Arlr~uul Reporl ofthe Secrcrrrry of Fi'urfor rhc Year 1870 cited as Annutrl Rrporl). The Atchison, Topcke (Washington, DC : GPO, 1870). 68. ( Hcrcl~fter c of Larned, eight miles from and Sonta Fe railroad along with a tclcgraph line reached ~ h town the post, in 1872; Oliva, 6 I. H. Garfield, 'The Defense ofthe Kansas Frontier, 1864-1 865," Kun.sa.s 6~arvin lfistoricr~l Quurlerly 1 (1 93 1-32): 140- 142; Nye, 7. 71bid., 43; Post llerurns for Fort I-larkcr, December 1866; U S . War Department, Ourline L)escriprions (!/the Posrs iri (he S4ilirury L)ivision ofrhe Mssouri (Chicago: GPO, 1876), 123; .luncrion City Weekly Union, 3 August 1867; Secretary of War, Annual Report for 1868. 732; Garfield, 55. 801iva, 18; Secretary of War, Annual R ~ p o r tfor s 1868-1869, 732; Post Kcturns for Fort Zarah, June 1868. ')Secretary of War, Annuul Report for 1870, 68. Fort Dod,w was received rail service in 1872 when track from the Alcl~ison,Topcka, and Santa Fe railroad reached Dodge City, five n~iles to the \vest; U S . War Department, Ouiline Descriptions o f ~ h ePosrs iit the :Milituiy Division of the Mi.s.issouri, 123. 1 0 ~ e Oliva, o Fort Ha9s (Topeka: Kansas State Ilistorical Socicty, 1980), 3-7; Post Returns for Fort H a ~ xDecember , 1866.
1 1.1uncrion C : i y Weekly Union, 24 November 1867.

12l'ost Return for Fort Hays. June 1867. Mrs. Elizabeth Custer provides a first hand ;mount of this harrowing experience in here book. Tenrinl: on ihc P1uin.s. 632-612; U.S. War Department. Ourline Lle.srriplion.s of'rhe Post.s in rhc Militrq Division ofthe .2.li.s~ouri,130.

14u.s. War Department, Outlint Descriptions ofthe Posts in the Militor); Division of the 1\4issouri 133; Mrs. l'rank C. Montgomery, "Fort Wallace and its Relation to the Fronticr,'' Collections ofKarr.ras Stute l~~storicol Society 17, (1926-1 928): 9.
I jpost Keturns for Downer's Station. For a time in 1867-1868, troops from Downer's Station were also assigned to stations along the Smoky Hill trail.

16~ecretary of War, Annual Kcportfor 1875, 1 12 1 7 ~ o sReturns t for klonument Station, August 1867-Junc 1868

1 g~ecretary of War, Anrruol Reportfor 1879, 83.

19~ecretary of War, Annuol Report for 1866,4.

20Arn1~ ant1:Vory Journal: Vol. 1V (February 16, 1867), 414.

21Secretary of War, Awnucrl Report for 1869, 3 1

2 j ~ o b e r M. t Utley, Frontier Regulars (New York: Macmillan, 1973; Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1984), 82: 2 4 ~ o b c r bl. t Ilrlcy, Frontiersmen in Blue (New York: Macmillan, 1967: Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1981). 345. . 2 j ~ e n a t e Exptdiriorrs : Agninsr the Indicms, 40th Cong., 1st sess., Ex. Doc. No. 7, 1. lomcr I.. S&olofsky and Huber Self, Historical~itlos of Kuwsus (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1972), 20. 27kaynond L. Welt?, "Supplying the Frontier Military Posts," Kurrsczs Historical Quarter/y 7 (May 1938): 158. 28~ecretnry of \Var, Annual Reportfor 1865, 112. 29~rna Risch, Quartermaster Support ofthe Army (Washington, DC: GPO, 1962), 476. ~ O U . SWar . Dcpanrnent, Outline Descriptions ofrhe Posts in the Military Division ofrhe :\4i.issouri. 6; Risch, 481

3 I Sccrctar?; of War, Annuul lieportfor 1875, 6. The soldiers often maltreated and ovemorked the horscs and thc teams were often rendered unfit for servicc rather quickly. Additionally, line companies wcrc short handed as it was, and these duties strippcd the companies further. The Gcrman Army during this san;e time trained and employed transport

service companies and battalions, with successful resnlts; Jamcs A. tluston, The Sirrtws oflVur: Army Logistics 1775-1953 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1966). 324. Thc Army established the Transport Corps in August of 19 18. 3 2 ~ e l t y 157; , Risch, 476-477: Utley, Fronricr Regulars, 48. lltley further states that the in the number of wagons. cavalry had to haul its o\vn forage for their horses, thus the differe~lce 33secretary of War, Annrrul Repurr for 1869.230.

.
,

3 4 ~ o u s e I<eorgc~nizu~iorr . of the A m y , 45th Cong., 2d sess., 1877, H. R. 56, 50. 3j~ccretary of War, Annuul k'pOr1 for 1874, IV.

fur 1870, 12-14. General Pope felt so strongly on 36secretary of War, AnnutrlKq~orl rhis issuc, that his report for 187 1 contained verbatim the portion on this plan. His annua\ reports as department commander cor~tinued to emphasize this theme.
37Sccretary for War, Annual Report for 1871,24. 3%ccrelary of War, Anrrutrl Reportfor 1875, 77.

Culled lhc W d k - A - H e u p (Saint Cloud, 39 Neil Bard Thompson, Cruzy M~r.sc Rcl,orr for 1875, 84. hlinnesota: North Star Press, 1979). 43; Secrctary for War, A~muul

of Msso~rri, 39th Cong., 1st scss.. I-louse Ex. Doc. 76, 10. 4 0 ~ o u s eDqxrlmenf .

'!?Robert Ci. Athearn, Willium lecrrmseh Shtrnrcrn and rhe Serrlen~enlofthe Wesf (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1956), 24. 43Secretary of War, Annuul Report for 1867. 36. 441bid., 533; Risch, 478; Craig hliner, Wesr ojFVichira (L,a\\.rcnce: University of Kansas, l986), 35.

4j.l~ncri011 Ciry Il'eekly t h i o n , 1 February 1868; lbid., 26 September 1868.

46~ccretnry of War, Annuul Report for 1880,4. 47Oliva, Fort llays, 39. 481bid.: 42. 49~ecrctary of War, Annual Report for 1867,37.

..

CHAP-I'ER FlVE OPEKATlONS

Indian wars never bring honors or reward. 1 Lieutenant General William Tecumseh Sherman, St.cr@ruryo f Wur '.v Armuul Reporl of 1868 . . Kansas cntercd the post-Civil War era \\.it11 a rapid espansio~i of its frontier westward Concurrent with this, the small Rcgular Army resumed its mission of liontier sccurity. In doing so. the Army employed both irihntry and cavalry regiments. 111what was to become an economy of force operation. tlic Army placed infantry units at strategic sites throughout the state with the .. task to dcfend these sites.. The cavalry, on the other hand, would be the mobile strike force While there were never enough soldiers to adcquatcly cover the state, more infantry than cavalry were always located in Kansas. Parceled out in company or dctaclimcnt-sized elements, the infantry ncvertheless were very activc participants in all the campaigns to sccure the frontier in. Kansas.
It was not long bcfore the first indications of an approaching conflict appeqcd.

reported to the Secretary Following a tour of his military departnlent in 1866, General Slicrma~i
of War:

1 h a w myself no doubt that hostilities will again brcakout on the Plattc, Smoky Hill, and the Arkansas rivers before the beginning of winter, and 1 have accordingly made all the armngenients possible with the small force at my command in this view; what can be done will certainly be done to protect the overland routes, but I fear without much success in case of a general outbreak. I will carefull> instruct the posts along tlic Arkansas on my return, and will place them in the best possible condition for active servicc into which any day they may be called.2

Yet tlic year 1866 was one of tlie more peaccful years of tlie decade in Kansas. Although Indian depredations occurred against isolatcd white settlements and overland traffic along the Smoky Hill and Santa Fe Trails, the scalc, but not the ferocity, of the incidents was much less than that of tlie 186465 time frame. In February of 1866, the Army issued an ordcr that required wagon trains to consist of at least twenty wagons and lhirty armed men before they were allowed to procced beyond Fort Riley or Fort Larncd in an cffort to provide some sense of security to travelers on the ovcrland trails. Commanders at thesc two posts were expccted to enforcc this ordcr. However, there was also a general feeling in the Army, and especially held by Sherman, that the civilians should bear more responsibility for thcir own defense. Besides, Sherman and his officers realized that there wcre just not enough troops available to cover all points. For now, prorcction for the construction of tlie two Union I'acific railroad lincs was a priority, primarily becausc they would provide tlie nation both economic ant1 military advantages.3 The Army was proactive, too, in providing protection to the Kansas frontier. Military escorts to freight and stage travel along thc Santa Fe and Smoky Hill Trails had continued throughout tlie Civil War. As notcd carlicr, the Army also established scveral new posts during tlic war to lend protcctiori to those venturing beyond castcrn Kansas over those two trails. The' posts were especially active during the spring and summer months. 1-lie Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, and Comanches traditionally reniaincd pcaceful and in their villages in the western Indim Territory during tlic winter months. Therc they and their ponies rested and waited out the winter for the spring, with its better weather and taller grasscs. Although there werc Indian depredations'in Kansas in 1866, tlie A m y did not record any engagements with the Indians in Kansas in 1866.4 This re1atib.e peace providcd a necded breathing spacc for the Regular Army as it transitioncd from a wartime footing to its frontier duties in Kansas. This proved important for

71

the Army. for Slicr~na~i reportcd in 1867 on the low number of troops available for duty. "About the close of the year 1866 we were especially embarrassed by tlie fact we wcre conlpelled to niuster out of scrvice all volunteers that had bccn orgariizcd for the war of rebellion, before they could be replaced by regular troops

. .. ' ' j

Volunteer units mustered out of service were

somctimes slowly rcplaced by Regular Army units, if they were replaced at all. .The end result was troops thinly spread over a very wide frontier. The Regular Army units that continued to flow into Kansas took on the primary role of fionticr security. Army officers, most veterans of the Civil War, began their education of combating a new foe. For many of the ofticers and h'COs, ihe Civil War \WS their introduc~ion and only cxpcriencr i n the A m y . Tllose soldiers soon learned that large formations in a conventional struggle \r.erc a thing of thc past. Onc such individual was First Lieutenant Frank

D. Bald\vin. A Civil \Par veteran and newly appointed to tlie Thirty-seventh Infantry (formerly
the Ninctcenth Infantry), he arrived at Fort Ellswor~hin mid-1 866 and joined his inllintry c m p a n y . I le provcd an energetic company conimander. His actions and those of his infantry company were typical of other infantry compnnies over thc next decadc in ~ a n s a s . 6 Though based at Fort Ellsworth, Baldwin's infantry company spent little time at that austere post. Instead, his soldiers wcre placed at thc nearby stage stations along both the Smoky Hill and Santa Fe Trails. These detachments, usually four to five privates under tlie command of an NCO, were supposed to dctcr Indian attacks arid provide a riiodic~~m of security o n the overland routes. The company also continued to provide escorts to wagons and mail or stage coaches, either walking along side, riding in wagons, or even sometimes atop the coaches thctkelves. The energetic Baldwin provcd a superb combat leader and infantry officer, although he preferred a lieutenancy in the cavalry, in which he saw the primary offensive arm of ~ r on ~
'

the frontier. Baldwin anticipated faster proniotions in the cavalry since it was an offensive force 72

sure to suffer casualties, which in turn \vould provide upward mobility. However, the Army denied his transfer to the cavalry. Baldwin was to play a niuch more active role in the Fifth Infantry during the Red River War in 1874;for which he was awarded one of his two Medals of Honor (the othcr for Civil War heroism). In the niebntime, hc experienced guard duty at isolated posts at the company level.7 Throughout the spring and summer of 1866, infantry dctachrrients from Fons Dodge, Fletcher (Hais), and Wallace, like those at Fort Larned, &!larded stage stations and wagon trains along overland trails. These were defensive measures, which generally tied down troops to static positions. They did not, however, hinder the movement of the Indians, who E;nerally avoided the soldiers and sought more lucrative targets. In most cases, \\hen the Indians did strike isolated farms or wagons, the soldiers arrived after the fact. This \ u s niorc a case of lndian action followed by an Army reaction. For a nation that did not consider itself at war: this cycle of +ion-reaction was a typical response an Army.

Sherman, i n an attempr to break this cycle, decided early in 1867 that this would be the dccisive year in which it was to protect the plains in the coming summer. He had received a number conflicting reports from both civilians and a few niilitary officers regarding a pending outbreak of Indian hostilities in 1867. Sherman toured his depanment in late 1866 to see for himself what the threat was to the frontier. Though he saw few signs of problems, be decided it was time something \vas done about the Indians. The few troops on the frontier were tied to defending straregic points. leaving the Indians free to strike at will. "Our troops must get amonpst them, and must kill enough of t l i e ~ to~inspire fear and then conduct the remainder.to places \vhcrc Indian Agents can and will reside amongst them; and be held responsible for their

This probleni required more than tlic present defensive military strategy. Sherman planncd an offensive campaign against any lntlians v.110 would not remain on the reservations or n.ho attacked isolated settlements and disrupted traffic on the overland routes. In early 1867, Sherman gave instructions to Hancock, then tlic commander of tlic Department of Missouri, to conduct a campaign ';.

. . .to show tlie flag to the Cheyennes and Kiowas south of the

~rkansas."g For Kansas, the effect of this plan was whit became known as Hancock's War and resulted in a summer of furious attacks by the lndians on civilians: the railroad, and the ~ r m y . 1 0 Tlic spring and summer of 1867 were particularly violent months in Kansas. The Army recorded thiny-tlirce engagements in Kansas with hostilc lndians throughout 1867. Oftliose
engagements, infantry units participated in nineteen of them. The Thirty-seventh Infantry was

especially involved that year, detachments from that rcgiment fought in elevcn engagements, more than any other infantry rcginient in Kons;~s.The engagemenls, whilc often very violcn~, . wcrc not tlccisivc encounters. Typically tlie skirmished involved small nunibcrs of infantn, against often large bands of Indians and reflected tlic pattern orthe frontier as a whole: 13y July 1867, eighteen infantry companies from three different intiantry regiments were spread over seven different pbsts in central and western Kansas. At tlie same time, thirteen cavalry companies from two regiments covered four posts: though the Scventh Cavalry, with seven companies, was concentrated in the area around Fort Wnllacc. The other three posts had only one company of cavalry each, whilc two morc cornpanics guarded the "End of'rrack" of the U.P.E.D. railroad. Two colored regiments: h e Thirty-eighth Infant? and Tentli Cavalry, provided a share of these companies in Kansas and saw their first combat that year.1 1
'

.l'lius we see hvo patterns developing. First. the infantry would always out number the
.

. cavalry in Kansas. Secondly, the infant?, spread ovcr all tlic posts in central and wcstcrn

Kansas or i n small tletachments at stage stations, provided defensive forces, whilc the cavalry
74

was oftcn concentrated and provided the striking force that moved from post to post. This system offered the best chance of dealing quickly and cffectively with the Indian thrcat. From his distant headquarters in St Louis, tlancock was also roused by what he

interpreted as the dcvclopment of a serious Indian problenl and began plans for a spring
cspedition in the Department of hlissouri. I-lc was prepared to strike i n March of 1867, as soon as the roads dricd from the wintcr storms. "My object in making an expedition at this time is, to show tlie Indians within the limits of this department [Missouri] that we are able to chastise any tribes who may molest people who arc traveling across the plains."12 \?it11 four companies of the Thirty-seventh Infantry, on 26 March, he moved by rail to Fort Riley and then bcgan the march to Fort I-larker. In early April, Hancock asse~liblcd tlie remainder of his troops at Fort Iiarker. For this campaign infantry and cavalry nere drmvn from scveral different posts in Kansas. Hancock now had a force of spproximatcly 1400 men: seven companies of the Tliirtysevcnth Infantry colnrnanded by Major John Rzilia: eleven companies of thc new Seventh (though nonlinally co~nnlanded by Lieutenant Cavalry, commanded by Colonel A. J. Sniitl~ Colonel Curtcr); and a battery of the Fourth Artillery. On 3 April. I-lancock marched tlic expedition to tlie soutl~wcst.sixtyfive miles to Fort Larncd. Tlierc ~lancock held council with Indian agcnts and scveral, but not all, of the local Chcyennc chiefs. He lecturcd them in a bclligercnt manner and offered them the choice of pence or war. Hancock clearly planned to fight if that was what the Indians wanted. lie then conveyed to the Chcyenncs his intention to march to their camp on the Pawnec Fork and deliver his message to the remaining chiefs.13 Aftcr tlie rnecting broke up, Hancock marched the command to the vicinity of the lndian villagc and established his own camp. A band of hostiles soon drcw up to the front of the command and both sides prepared for combat. Hancock deployed his infantry to the front and
75

brought up tlic cavalry. A battle \\.as averted by a quick council mediated by thc Indian agent, Major Edward W. Wykoop. Howcver. the Cheyenne, inany who rementbcred the attack on tlie Cheyenne camp on tlic Sand Creek in Colorado Territory in November 1864, fled the villagc tluring the next night. Unable to prevent tlie Indian's depanurc, tiancock approached the vill& thc following morning where he lcarncd a quick lesson in Indian mobility versus his own. Thc village was deserted and its inhabitants had slipped by and avoided Hancock's soldiers. .. Suspecting bad faith on the part of tlie Indians, lie secured tlie village with his infantry. I-le then, sent off Custer and eikht companies of the Seventh Cavalry in pursuit, north in the direction of the Snioky Hill route. Hancock was obviously frustrated by these Indians, for this was quite different from an! of his Civil War ~ x ~ e r i e n c e s . ~ 4 Now in tlie spring of 1867, thc mail and stage stations along tlie Smoky Hill Trail drewthe deadly attention of tlie Indians. The stations, each ten to twelve miles from the other, bvere usually occupied by three to ten civilian workers of the stage company. Tlicir very location was enough to make them tarsets of attack. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes heading north and away
2

from Hancock to hunting areas between the Arkansas and I'latte Rivers crossed tlie stage line betwecn Fort Hays and'Fort Wallace. Angcred at I-lancock's posturing, the stations were tempting targets to these Indians. The horses and mulcs located at the stations provided an additional incentivc too. These attacks werc very much one sided affairs. The effect of an Indian raid on Lookout Station on tlic Smoky Iiill route was notcd by Custer on thc 17 April as lie pursue? the Indians. "They killed and burnid the three rncn employed at the station; also burned the station and hay, and run off eighteen horses arid four mules. They scalpcd one of the men before burning them."lS Other statioiis along the route also camc undcr repeated attacks. Too many attacks such as thesc could disrupt overland traffic on that route if something was not done quickly. 76
.

'Therefore, on 24 Apr~l, Custer ir~structed tlic cornmanding orficer of Fort flays to

provide infantrymen as guards to the stage stations at Stormy Ilollow, White Rock, Downer's, and Castle Rock. He sent word to Fort Wallace to di, the same, beginning with Grinnell Springs station and west to Cheyenne Wells. Keogh at Fort Wallace posted dctachnicnts from Company E, Thirty-seventh Infantry at these mail stations. Custer instructed the infantry to fire at any Indian who approaclicd within one thousand yards of a station. Apparently, all Indians were
considered hostile to Custcr. Additionally, to protect stage coaches, which by now had backed

op east of Fort Hays at Big Creek station, infantry escorts werc provided. Custer's horses, worn and lacking forage: werc in no shape to allow him to provide cavalry escorts. For now, it was left to the infantry to protect the Smoky Hill route, while Custer and eight compnnics ofthe Seventh Cavalry remained idle at Fort Hays. Infantry activity i n Kansas reached its height from April to September 1867 along the Smoky Hill Trail, to include a bold Indian attack on Fort Wallace in June and this will be examined in greater detail in the next ~ h a ~ t e r . 1 6 I learing from Custcr of the Indian depredations on thc Smoky Hill, Hancock decided to burn the deserted Cheyenne village at I'awnee Fork near the Santa Fe trail on the morning of 19 April. Soldiers from three companies of tlie Thirty-seventh Infantry pulled down the lodges and burned thcm along with other camp equipment. l'liis task completed, I-lancock and the Tliirtyseventh Infantry and three companies ofthe Seventh Cavalry marched south for three days to Fort Dodgc. Ilere Hancock consulted with the local Indian agent as well as several Kiowa and Comanche chiefs, ostensibly to warn tliern against further depredations and hopefully forestall any concerted action with the Cheyennes. Convinced his message got through, ilancock and the foot sore men of tlie Thirty-seventh Infantry marched north to l'ort Larncd, then link up with tlic very immobile Custer at Fort Hays two days later, on 3 ~ a ~ . l 7 on to

Hancock apparently did not realize the aninlosity the destruction of the Cheyenne camp caused among tlie Indians. His cxpeditiori now at a close, lie distributed his infantry to Forts Dodgc, 1-arned, and Hays. Additionally, he activated and garrisoned Fort Zarali and Monument Station with an infantry company each. Once rcady, Custer was to make a circuit of tlie area between the Arkansas and Platte Rivers. In the meantime, Custer and eight companies of tlie Seventh Cavalry holed up at Fort Hays awaiting supplies. Additionally, infantry companies from tlic Third, l'liirty~sevcntli, and 'l'liirty-eighth Regiments were placed defensively along tlie Santa Fe and Smoky Hill Trails. These Army actions left the Indians free to roam and strike anywhere in Kansas. i'ieitlicr infantry nor c;ivalry at this point were effective in preventing numerous attacks or cliasrising tlic guilty bands of lndians.18 South from Fort I-lays, Major I lcriry Douglas, Third Infantry and commanding officer of Fort Dodgc, was responsible for tlic protection along Santa Fc Trail from Fort Zarali to Fort Lyon (Colorado Territory). Ilnncock authorized him in April 1867 to draw on cornparlies from tlic Thirty-seventh Infantry at all posts alone this route if the situation required. This was i n addition to his two companies of Third Infantry at Fort Dodge. The problem was how to employ tlie intiintry against the Indian. Douglas rcported with dissatisfaction tlie ability of closing with the Indians. "Infantry they will riot fight, and escape easily from thern."l9 Dodge faced the paradox that effcctcd the infantrynlen in the late 1860s and early 1870s: the Indians took advantage of tlie infantry's lack of mobility, but respected their firepower. The Cheyenne, who were magnificent horsemm, soon discovered that the cavalrymen (or mounted infantry) \vere not their equal in horsemanship and, consequently, became hold in engagements. However, the Indians tended to give the infantry a wide berth to avoid the sustained firepower of stationary tr0o~s.20

Yct infantry and Indian engagements still occurred. Company I, 'I'liirty-seventh Infantry skirmishcd with lndians ncar the abandoned Fort Aubrey in southwest Kansas on 3 1 May. Two privates werc killed i n action. Again on 16 June, Douglas's infantry engaged a party of Chcyenne at the stage station at Cimarron Crossing. An estimated seventy lndians struck the station at the tnotncnt a wagon train heading cast towards Fort Dodge was crossing the river at that point. Two civilians in the train wcre killed, but tlic detachment of Thirty-seventh lnfantry assigned to the stage station repulsed the attack. Back at Fort Dodge. Douglas. upon getting the word of the attack, put forty men from the Company ],.Thirty-seventh Infantry in wagons and sent tlicm off to Cimarron Crossing under the command of Lieutenant t l c n y Karples. .They escorted the wagon train in to Fon Dodge and along the n a y traded a few desultoy shots with tlic Indians. Karples lost one man killed to an accidental discl~arge.Hov.ever, any chance ror a decisive cngagcmcnt was avoided when thc Cheycnne brokc off their attack leaving thc infantry to their escort duty. The intrcpid men of Company I, while based at Fort Dodge, would have six more engagements with Indian over the next three months as detachments guarded stage stations and cscortcd trnffic betweco Fort Lurned and,Fort Lyon. With their ample mobility. tlic Indians could pick the tinic and place to strike,'and could easily out distancc infantry pursuing in a wqon.21
,,

,-.

The Army campaign in Kansas fizzlcd out by the end ofthe summer of 1867. The rcsults of the Army's efforts wcre inconclusive, with vcry little lo slio\\ for their exertion. The lndians had raided almost at will in central and western Kansas and, for tlic most part, the Army seemed powerless to stop theni. The isolated infantry detachments could make attacks on protcctcd stations and coaches hazardous, but the lndians could pick the time and place for an attack. l'hc cavalry, \vhcther on scout or out to chastise, always scemcd a step bchind. At a cost of nineteen dcad and fifty wounded, the Army had killed only ten Indians. The civilian loss in
79
!

lives and pl-operty damage was much yreatcr and contributed ro a high level of frustration and suspicion among the local civilians. In the meantime, presidential politics brought about a turn over of pciso~ialiliesin t h i Department of t l ~ c Missouri. Phil Sheridan, \vho had angcred I'rcsitlcnt Andrew Johnson by hii harsh implementation of reconstruction policies, rcplaced
.
,

I-lancock in Scpteniber as the department commander. Hancock in turn, more suitable in demeanor to Johnson, took ovcr Sheridan's prcvious post as commander ofthe Fitih Military District in New 0rleans.22 While the Army in Kansas attempted to chastise the Indians that summer of 1867, Congress was having sccontl thoughts. In July of 1867, following a brief from Shcnnan on the plains campaign, Congress dccidcd on a different approach to the Indian problem. Congress

organized a peace comn~ission to travcl ro Kansas, meet with the hostile chiefs: hear tlleir
grievances and make peace ifpossiblc. The result was the Treaty of ~McdicincLodge. 1'Rc Indians \verc assigned rcservations betwccn rhe Washita and Red Rivers and allowed to hunt buffalo south of thc Arkansas River. 111turn the Indians agrccd to stop molesting traflic along the overland routes and drop opposition to thc development of the U.P.E.D. railroad. A combination of the A&, Kansas in 1867.23 I'eace secmed to reign ovcr the Kansas fronticr during the spring and carly sumrner of 1868. In May, thc post at Downer's Station was deactivated, and company E, Fifth Infantry, rnarchcd to Fort ilays at a leisurely pace of ten to tiftccn miles a day. Howcvcr, events were building and 1868-1869 would prove the dccisivc years in the Army's suppression of the Cheyenne. Arapahoe, Kiowa, and Comanchc tribes on the southcrn plains. Indian attacks against khitcs i n Kansas increased in latc summer 1868. A frustrated Sheridan tried several campaigns to bring an end to the Indian attacks. Eventually, winter campaign by the Army in 1868, in the the treaty, and the approach of winter brought a temporary pcacc to

form o f total warfare was employed. This brought the battle to the Indian villages insidc the Indian Territory and dampened their spirits. The infantry's contribution in this campaign was primarily in "holding down the fon," which cnablcd a concentration o f cavalry to strike a hard blow. But this campaign was only in its conceptual stages when thc Indian raids of 1868 bcgan.24 U y August o f 1868, Indian depredations in western Kansas rencwed with a fury. Attacks first took place in the Smoky Hill valley and along the line o f the Kansas Pacitic railroad (formerly the U.P.E.D.) and spread up the Salinc and Solomon River valleys o f nonhwcstern Kansas. Sheridan estimated the number o f warriors from the four tribes, Cheyenne. Arapahoe, Kiowa, arid Comanche, at six thousand, against which he could muster only t\vent?; six hundred

soldiers, fourtccn hundred infantry and twelve hundred cavalry. His infantry wcrc scattered at
the various posts, stations: or as escorts along with about four hundred cavalrymen. This left him a force o f approximately eight hundred cavalrymen with which to pursue and round up the hostiles. Thc infantry guarded the strategic sites, which enabled Slieridan to mass his cavalry. 'Today this would be called

ah economy o f force operation.2j

Next, Sheridan issued an order for the Indians to return to their reservations and assured Govcrnor Samuel Crayford o f Kansas that tlie Army would enforce this order and punish the perpetrators. Sheridan, however, was quick though to warn Crawford that this might not happen until winter. I n August Sherman was already mentally envisioning a winter campaign. I n the

meantime, to further reassure Crawford. Sheridan wrote him on 21 August explaining:

I n ordcr to rest in conlidence and protect tlie line o f settlements north from this point [Fort I-larker] to the Republican [River], General Sully w i l l erect small blockhouses on thc Salinc and Solonlon and Republican, and garrison them with a small infantry force, and keep a sufficient force o f cavalry scouting between these different points.26

The citizens of Kansas, thc Indian agents, and the Army were all plainly caught off guard by successive Indian attacks, occurring almost daily during August tlirough October. Thc attacks soon spread soutli to the vicinity of Fort Dodge. Once again, tllc Amiy was on the defcnsive. Infantry units continued to guard construction crews of the Kansas Pacitic Railroad, as well as stations along the Smoky I-lill and Santa Fe Trails. Two rcginients of cavalry, the Scventh and 'fcnth, were sent to cover scnlc~nc~irs in the Arkansas and Smoky Hill River vallcys.27 As expected. isolated homesteads and trawlers were the most vulnerable to Indian attacks and tllcre was littlc Sheritlan could do for them. Soon thc mail stations and the Army also received the attcntion of the Indian's raids. On the morning of 23 August, ten rnilcs from Fort \Vallace a band of Indians attacked a detdiment of Company B, Fifth infantry, returning from guard duty at a mail station. The post returns for Fort Wallace laconically note that the attack \+as repulsed. Two days latcr. an NCO and nine privatcs from Company 13. Fiftli Infantry, beat back an atlack on the Lakeside mail station. All along the Smoky I-lill Trail and Kansas Pacific

nilr road line, infantry detachmcnts, fiom five to ten men each, from Fort Hays and Fort

Wallace, continued to perform their guard dutics All the whilc (to include 1867) their protection of the Kansas Pacific construction crcws enabled the steady sprcad of railroad tracks westward. I n January, the track stretclicd three hundred five miles wcsr from the Missouri River. By 16 August, the "End of'I'rack" had reached Shcridan, Kansas, four hundred rnilcs +best from the Missouri Rivcr. Weather and financial problcms more than Indians caused delays in construction.28 Shcridan now c1i;se limited offensive operations against the Indians that began in late August. Using a tactic lic cmploycd during the Civil War; Slieritlan allowed his aide. Major George A. 1-orsyth, to organizc a scout detachment of fifty frontiersmen. Assembled from mcn found at Forts Harkcr and Ilays, Forsyth easily found plenty of volunteers. The scouts moved

west totvards the Republican River to give relief to that area. Enroute, they took up the trail of a band of Indians that had struck a wagon train outside the town of Sheridan, thirteen miles from . Fort Wallacc. Forsyth and his scouts werc tliemselvcs ambushed by the Indians on the banks of the Airkee in Colorado Territory on 14 Seplcrnber. \Vhile under siege, Forsytli dispatched a runner lo reach Fort Wallacc with a request for aid. Captain Henry Bankhead, Fifth Infantry arid comma~~din Fort g Wallace, quickly assembled a relief expedition of cavalry (Tenth Cavalry) and mounted infantry (Thirtyeighth and Fifth Infantry) and went out to Forsyth's aid. They rett~rncd with the wounded Forsytli and his command on 30 September.' Forsyth's expedition, while s p e c t a c h r far its sukival of a nine day siege against an estimated seven hundred and fifty \varriors, was one more'inconcl~~sive act in the long summer. The action kept the Indians on the run;but put a small band of soldicrs and scouts against a much larger India11 forcc.29

;.

111

September: Sheridan ordered his next offensive action. Lieutenant Colonel Alfred

Sully was to assemble a foicc and nl&e into the area south of:tlie Arkansas River to attack Cheyeme villages and run off their stock: Sull! assembled nine companies oftlic Seventh CavaI? a n i tlliee cornp:rnies of ihe Third lnfanlry. almost six hundred men, and then proceeded fro111 Fort llotlgc on 7 September. Sully proved an aggressive Indian tighter durilig an 1861-65 expedition, but this tiinc around he was more timid or at least'appeared that way to'Shcridan. Furthermore, Sully did not fit Sheridan's leadership idcal, Custer was more his type. With cavalry leading and guarding the flanks, the infantry rode in the center in a long convoq of wagons. Sheridan explained what happened next:
'
'

O'n arriLing at tlk Cimarrdn it was found that the villages had moved, and the trail was . followed with more or less skirmishing until crossing the Korth Fork of the Canadian or Middle Rivei \ u s r&hcd, \+lien the Indiaiii made a brisk attack. But were driven off; after which the command moved north towards Fort Dodge and went into camp at Chalk Uluffs Crcck io await'a further escort of infantry for the Wagon train. The amount of infantry with it not bcinr! considered sufficient to guard it successfully, Captain Hale's company from the ~ o l o r i i & ' ~ a ~ t aAs1ibury.s in from Layned, and Brcvet Major Beebe's company of the 38th were sent; but so much time was consumed in getting these companies from remote points, ' 83 . : r ,

that the rations for tlic expedition at Dodge and with the command were eaten up, and not much since has been acconlplished by this command.30 For all purposes: this ended the Army's active campaigns o f the summcr. Again, i n the summer o f 1868 the Army generally failed to &aimand maintain contact with the Indians: When the soldiers made contact, it was usually at the instigation o f the Indians who retired at will. I n the case o f Forsyth, he was plainly overwhelmed and fortunate the Indians broke contact. Sully'scase is less excusable; hc allo\\ed the Indians to retain the iniriativc. The scouts o f the Seventh Cavalry around the Arkansas and the Tenth Cavalry around the Smoky Hill and Solomon failed to dccisively engage the Indians. As in 1867, isolated settlements suffered tlic

..

most. The infantry generally provided capable defenses to the mail and stagc stations and Kansas I'acific railroad \\.orking parties. 'The summer also saw some coordinated infantry and cavalry movements: Sully's in parriculnr. His expedition was also telling in the rolc o f the inlintry and the difticulty in massing the requisite inrantry slrength from such sniall and isolated garrisons. Ir also illustrated the active role played by the infantry on campaign against the Indian.

.
Sheridan did learn that to defeat the Indians he must bring the war to their home. I n

September, Shcridan told Crawford: "When the winter starves their [the Indians'] ponies, they will \\.ant a truce and shan't have it,,unlcss the civil influence conlpels me again as it did last \vintcr."3 I

ow ever; unlike 1867, there was no civil call for another peace commission.

So

Sheridan meticulously planned a six month winter campaign. He planned for multiple columns o f cavalry and infanttry to converge on the Indian village in Indian Territory. Shcridan would bank his logistical support against the Indians lack o f mobility during tllc winter months. Only one column came from Kansas, tlic main effort, w l ~ i c lconsisted i o f eleven compinies o f the Seventh Cavalry (wirh Custcr), five companies o f infantry on foot, and the Nineteenth Kansas

84

Volunteer Cavalry (commanded by Colonel [Governor] Crawford). The column would assen~ble at F o n Dodge and then move south towards the lndian villages in the Indian Territory. This campaign led to the decisivc battle, or massacre according to some, at Washita in November. There, Custer and his cavalry struck a Cheyenne villagc, dealing it a severe blow. The remaining portion o f the campaign, all outside Kansas, resulted in the tribal submission o f the Kiowas and Comanches. l'he campaign also had a psychological effect on the warriors that dampened their war-like attitude. The infantry with the Seventh Cavalry was again used to guard the supply trains and the forward operating base establislied in l n i i a n Territory. Without this infantry assistance. Custcr would 11m.e bcen forced to dilute his combat pouer by stripping cavalry cornpanics to guard his supply base. For the Army, the year 1868 ended on a more successful

Unlike the previous year, in 1869 the lridians struck western Kansas before the onset o f summer. The attacks began in latc May and wcrc principally focused in the nonhwestern area o f the state. 130th the Filih and Seventh Cavalry spent a good deal o f the nest few months scarchiny for the lndian perpetrators. The inpantry companies continued as they had in previous years, guarding mail and railroad stations and providing escorts. The infantry sometimes joined the cavalry as they scoutcd the area. Thc infantry w i r e sometimes mounted or rode i n wagons on these scouts. Occasionnlly, the infantry also walked along with mountcd cavalry, though on short scouts the infantry struggled to keep up with tlie,cavalry I n June, as the post train from Fort Wallace was under lndian attack near Sheridan, a company o f infantry was mounted on mules and sent o f f in pursuit. N o surprise, they were not able to overtake the Indians. This episode, h o w \ e r , indicates how the post commander could make up for the lack o f c a a l r y at his post by using mounted infalltry, assuming, of course, that horses or mules were available and the men could ride. While the ferocity o f the Indian attacks 85

equaled anything of the past two years in Kansas, the attacks werc not as nearly wide-spread. Incidents were generally isolated after July, the majority orthe Indians remained south in Indian Tcrritory and ~ e x a s . 3 3 ,
..

As a relative peace settled on.Kansas in 1869, the Thiny-seventli Infantry was

reorganized, half of the regiment became the Third Infantry, the remaining hajf became the Fifth
Infantry Kegi~ncnt. By the cnd of 1869 thc Third Infantry. headquartered at Fort Dodge, had five of its ten companies in central and western Kansas posts; the Fifth Infmtry, headquartered at Fort tlnrker, had seven of ten there. A similar reorganization took placc with the Thirty-eighth infantry, which merged with Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infintry Regiments. 33 Pope, as the commander ofthe Department ofthe Missouri, dcscribed the annual activity ofthe Fifth Infantry for 1869: During the summer large portions of the Fifth Uniletl Stntcs Infantry have been distributed in small guards at short intervals along the Kansas I'acilic Railroad [formerly t l ~ c lJ.I'.E.D] and , dctachmenrs of the I'liird and Filih at stage stations between Forts Wallace and Lyon [Colorado ~errilory1.3j

In 1869, thc year Colond Nelson Miles arrived in Kansas to takc command, thc Fifth
l n h r y bcgan its ascent as one of the Army's premier Indian fighting regimcnts. Miles himsclf became one thc best Indian fighters thc A m y produccd during thc 1870s and 1880s. He . . , devcloped and honed his Indian fighting skills i n Kansas and the Indian Tcrritory. During the early 1870s: Miles icnrned thc iniponancc of gaining and maintaining contact \vith the Indians and thc need to pursue them with a persistencc. He recognized the ability of infantry to overtake an lndian village during winter, when man was as mobile as the horse. Milcs was aware ofthc logistical problems of supplying cavalry horses with Soragc on the winter campaign trail. tlc had noted that a good number of the Scvcnth Cavalry's horses died during the Washita campaign Miles also carefully trained and ~lrilled his soldiers. turning the Fifth Inhnlry into a proud

fighting force. He found time to do this training even as his companies continued the usual guard and escort duties. This was a tribute to his persistence. He was anxious to employ his lessons learned against the Indians. Miles would get his chance later, outside of Kansas, immediately following the Battle of the Little Big Horn in 1876, After the turmoil of 1869, the years of 1870-1873 were relatively peaceful ones in central and western Kansas. Pope felt that: "This result is mainly due to the fact that these

Indians have been fed and furnished with nearly everything they have asked for, and by these means much temptation to depredate removed."36 This was still not enough to prevent young Indians from an occasional foray into Kansas from one of the reservations located in the Indian Territory or Texas. Detachments from Companies B and F, Third Infantry, fought brief skirmishes with these Indian raiders on 31 May 1870 at Bear Creek and Carlyle Station. The following year, on 2 July 1871, Third Infantry companies were again in combat with hostiles. This time two companies, C and E, were engaged just outside Fort Lamed. There was also some cavalry activity. A detachment of cavalrymen from the Seventh Cavalry had two inconclusive engagements with hostile Indians in June of 1870 along the Smoky Hill. Later, in May 1872, a detachment from the Sixth Cavalry fought a running engagement with hostiles between Fort Dodge and Fort Supply in the Indian Territory (I.T.). These constituted the only engagements for those four years. None of these engagements were considered serious enough to warrant mention in the commander of the Department of Missouri's Annual Report. However, other infantry and cavalry units remained quite active in nearby Indian Territory, Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona over this same period. Even with all of this activity though, in 1873, the Army did not record any engagements in Kansas with hostile 1ndians.37 The principal activities of the infantry

comp;mics for this period could be surnrnctl up as follows: "'l'hc companies at post [Fort Dodge] have pcrformed the usual garrison and escort duty during the montli."38 The tempo picked back up the following year. By 1874, there were a few changes in infantry regiments assigned to posts in central and western Kansas. Companies from thc Ni~leteenthInhntry were no\v assigned lo Forts Larned, Dodge, and Wallace. Fort Hays had cavalry companies only and Fort Harker closed in 1872. Thc 'I'liird Infantry was now garrisoned at v:irious posts in Louisiana, while the Fifth Infantry was concentratcd primarily $1 Fort Lcavenworth, with two companies at Fort Riley and one company at Fort Gibson, Indian 'l'erritory. Additionally, detachments of infantry still performed guard duty on the Kansas Pacific and Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe (A.T.M.F.) railroads.39 From 1869 thr&gh 1873, the Comanche, Kiowa, ;lnd Cheyenne had endured the cramped reservation lifcsryle. 'The warrior spirit still existed in a number of young men in tliese tribes and tcnsion was building on the reservations. It finally explodcd in tlie summer of 1874 \vhcn the warriors struck thc area around the reservation in Texas and southern Kansas. The Indians soon becamc bolder, attacking even military trains. On 24 June, a devachment from Company A: Third Infantry and Company C;. Sixth Cavalry enroute to Camp Supply from Fort Dodge werc attacked by an unidcntitied band of Indians. Thc soldiers briefly skirmished with these hostiles, and suffered one wounded bcfore the Indians fled. Slicridan now unleaslled his forces against these unruly Indians and once again employed the tactic of the converging, combined columns of infantry and cavalry in \\hat bccame known as the Red Kivcr War. Miles commandcd one of the columns. \vhicIi offered him his first major opportunity for Indian fighting. He assembled four cornpanics of his Fifth Infantry and eight companies of the Sixth Cavalry at Fort Dodge in July. Included in tllc Fifth Infantry was Lieutenant Frank Baldwin, formcrly of the Thirty-seventh Infantry. Both officers, as well as their soldiers, performed well 88

in the difticult campaign that was fraugilt with severe logistical problems. The column persistently tracked the Indians through the India11 Territory and'into Tcxas. By hlarch 1875, the Indians. cold, hungry, and wear), began surrcndcring to the Army in mass nombers. These Indians were hounded into defeat rather than by battle. Eitlicr way, the victory of the war proved permanent. The ~ h e y e n n e Comanches, , Kio\\as: and Arapahoes settled onto their reservations. never again to challenge the Army. At the cnd of the campaign, the companies of the Fifth . lnfantiy rcturned for duty in Kansas. A little o k r a year later in the summcr,of 1876, following the defeat of Custer's seventh Cavalry at the Lit~lc Bighorn, b1ilt.s and the Fifthinfantry lcfi Kansas permanently for duty in Montana. The lessons he and tlic rcziment leal-ned in Kansas paid big dividcuds in future Indian figliting.40 There was one painful gasp left in the Red River War, and it occurred in wcstcni Kansas.
,

In April of 1875. one band of seventy Cheyennes fled Texas to join the Northern Cheyenne. A
detachment frorn the Sixth Cavalry tracked tlicm to the vicinity of Fort b'allacc. There the
cavalrymen were joined by a tlctacluncnt frorn Company K. Ni~ictceritli Infantry. Together they purs;~cdthe Cheycnnes. and finally surprising them on the nioming of 23 April at the Nonh Fork of thc Sappa Creek in nortl~westernKansas. Here the Army soundly defeated the Cheyenne band, inflicting almost as many Indian casualties in one battlc as the combined total of the Red River War. Peace once again settled on western ~ a n s a s . 4 1 The end of the summcr of 1878 witnessed the last'clash betueen the infantry and the Indians in western Kansas. The seeds of this clash were planted in IS77 when nine hundred Northcrn Cheyennes wcrc sent south by tlic Army to the Indian Territory to live on reservations with tlic southern band of that tribe. Poorly fed and tired of the reservation life, several bands attempted to flee north towards the Platte River to their former homes. Pope planned to stop these Indians from 'crossing north over the Kansas Pacilic Railroad line. Units in western Kansas
,

ncrc alcrted to take measures to arrest these Indians if founil o f f thcir reservations. This sct in motion what becamc the infantry's finai engagerielits in \vestern Kanias: all occurring i n September o f 1878. Dctachments from companies o f the Sixteenth and Ninctccnth lnfantry, stationed at Fort Dodgc, together with companies from the Fourtf~ Cavalry participated in two o f tlic clashes, on 21-22 Sepwmber at Sand Crcck and, a few days la~cr, on 27 September at Punished Woman's i:ork. . . Even in the final year o f Indian engagements, t l ~ c infantry companies

co~~ti~~ doing u e dtheir share o f the Army's mission in ~ansas.42 Activities around Fort Wallace remained quiet during that ycar. Company F, Sixteenth Infantry, commanded by Captain William G. Wedemyer, was thc lone unit at Fort

alla ace as the

ycar 1878 opcned. Over a decade had passed since Fort Wallace was ihc scene o f the desperate Indian attacks o f Juric 1867. Onc last great Indian scare remained. I n October o f 1878, a group o f Northcrn Cheyenne attempted to flee north to their homeland following the engagements with h c Army the prcvious month. Along thcir way north, the Nortliern Cheycnnc committed the last depredations in western Kansas. Weden~ycr was told to prcparc to join the search for these Indians. Howcver~ the Northern Chcyenne passed wcll to the north o f the post, and thc Sixteenth Infantry remained at Fort Wallace. For the final years o f the post, infmtry companies, mountcd on cavalry horscs, continued to scout h e area searching for signs o f Indians. Otherwise, Wedemycr and his thirty-one soldicr's activities were summarized as: "performed the usual garrison duties during the 1nonth."43 There was nothing usual about thc Army's role in Kansas to any o f the local populace "It was not possible to give covcr to all exposcd settlements, sincc it was impossiblc to foresee where; upon the extended frontier, the savages would s~rike:and the troops were far too few to cover all points at once."44 General Scliofield's comments in his 1869 Annual Report for the

Department o f the blissouri would not have given comfort to the white settlers o f Kansas had tllcy rcad them. The citizens o f Kansas, for \\horn protection from liostilc Indians could be a matter o f life or death, were often critical o f the Army's performancc. During the height o f Indian attacks in thc summer o f 1867, the Leuver~wrrh Daily Conservurive debotcd front page columns to the latest Indian depredations and the military's response. The articles often took a heavy-handed approach to the Indian pkoblcm and could be quite critical o f the Army. The employment o f infantry in Kansas drew negativc comments; the papcr was plainly interested in cavalry. The newspapcr commcntcd that summcr: l'hc attempt to tight Indians wit11 infantry has been so often made and failcd. that one would naturally suppose it would be abandoned by this time. Supply trains and infantry w i l l ncvcr catch thmi. It i s very apt to be the other way. Cavalry, well mounted and lightly equipped, next to tlic frontiersmen, i s the only forcc that can be successfully employed in bringing thc red devils to t e r r n ~ . ~ S I n June: the

newspaper went on to note with a sense ofexaspcration:

"The Junction

Lkiow says that about one company o f colored infantry pcr day passes through tlicrc on their way
out to fight Indians. Infantry i s a poor arm o f the service for that business."46 To stress tlicir point oncc again, a \\eek later the Leavenworth paper once again stated that: "Infantry arc o f no avail. If no mounted men arc at hand, the War Dcpartment should acccpt the tender o f our wide &akc Governor, and let him put a regiment o f Kansas Mounted Rifles in tlic tield."47 As the summer strctchcd on and thc numbers o f Indian depredations increascd, so too did the level o f frustration o f the whitcs in Kansas for tlie Army's apparcnt ineffectiveness. Thcrc was just not enough soldiers in Kansas once all the posts were manncd, station guards posted, and escorts provided to track all the Indian bands during the summer months Xaturally. tlic tliouglit o f cavalry riding to the rescue o f a bcleoguered wagon train or pursuing Indian raiders appealed to the civilian in Kansas. Yet: one o f these same citizens was

91

very likely to livc within thc protection affordcd by an infantry unit. Ofien forgotten \%as just how many wagon trains or staie coaches found sanctuary at a station along the overland trails that was guarded by a dctachment o f infantry. When considering just how many cavalry pursuits actually caught or stoppcd an attack. perhaps the negative comments on the infantry \%erenot always warranted. The glamorous-cavalry caught thc attention o f the Kansas populace who wcrc apt to overlook the day to day prcscnce o f the inl:antry. The n e w was not always bad. I n October 1868, the Jzrncriun Cily Weekly Uwiun reported citizens were returning to their homes in Saline, and Solomon River vidleys following the summcrs Indian attacks, the Smoky I-lill, "...relying with confidence upon the protection promised by the troops nou stationed at points cast and west o f tlicni."~8 Thc infantry interacted \\it11 civilians in Mays unrelated to Indian fi_rhting. I n such a Kansas, the local garrison at a military post often sparsely populated area as central and wes~ern represented law and order. Thc employment o f the military as a posse comitatus became an issue i n Kansas and throughout the country in 1878. After over a decade o f military activity in the South during Reconstruction, tlic southern Democrats passed legislation that becamc the 15'1' section o f thc act ofcongress o f 18 June 1878. This act providcd that: From and after the passagc o f this act i t shall not be lawful to employ any part o f the A r m y of the Unitcd ~tates,'nsa posse comitatus, or othcrwise, for the purpose o f executing the laws, cxcept in such cases and under such circurnstanci.~ such as employment o f said forces may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act o f ~ o n ~ r c s s . ~ 9 Up to this point, officers in command o f troops could aid officers o f the law in making arrcsts. I n such sparsely populated arcas as westcrn Kansas, the military was frequently employed in assisting law enforce~ncnt officers. Soldiers sometimes escorted federal marshals and local sheriffs. Soldiers still provided guards at the train stntions along the Kansas Pacific .and A.T. & S.F. railroads. Shern~an criticized this posse comitatus Act i n his annual report. H e

felt in ccrtain regions " . . .the Army was the power chicfly relied upon by law abiding pcoplc f o ~

protection. and chiefly feared by the la\vless classes."~0 Nevertheless, thc Army abided by this Act and does so today. Uccause o f this Act, today the .Army i s \vclcomed by most Americans when it i s cmployed to assist in domcstic disasters. The Act also signified a waning o f the Army's responsibility in western Kansas, perhaps along the entirc frontier.

By 1880, the last campaigns against the Indians i n Kansas wcrc completed and no
engagements w r e recorded after September o f 1878. Thc result o f this was that there were fcwcr tield opcrations, which in turn brought about smaller garrisons at cach post. Forts Hays: Dodge, and Wallace rcmained activc posts and continued to provide a military prescncc in western Kansas. Besides tlic inevitable garrison duties, the aged posts required morc and more maintenancc, leaving lcSs'timefor field duty. Fewer campaigns meant duties became routine and more monotonous. This left soldiers with timc on their hands.
I t was

also a time o f a rising

sense o f professionalism in the Army. Thc establishment o f Fort Leavenworth as the site o f a professional school was only a ycar a\vay in 1881. For the soldiers at Fort Hays and Fort Dodfe, the nearby towns o f Hays City and Dodge City provided opportunity for cntcrtainrnent. 'This \vas not the case for thc isolated Fort Wallace. 'Two companies o f the Sixtccnth Infantry rcmained at the post. the occasional excitement being the passing Kansas Pacific railroad, or a scout in the rolling hills o f northwest Kansas. Life at these posts was rarely glaniorous at the best o f times ;~ndmost oftcn just plaili dull. A fcw o f the soldicrs at Fort Wallace perhaps remembered the exciting and sometimes desperate times when active campaigns against Cheyennes, Comanches, Kiowas, or Arapaliocs were a common occurrence.51 The U.S. Army infantry was an active participant in the defense o f Kansas from 1866 througli 1880. Throughout thc bitter years o f intense Indian activity o f 1867 through 1869, infantry coniprised the miijority o f the Army's combat power in Kansas. They perforrncd

yeoman duty by securing the strategic points, the mail and stage stations, railroad construcrion parties or wagon trains, \vhich enabled the Army to concentrate the cavalry for offensive actions. Throughout this period, a civilian was much more likely to fall undcr the protection o f an infantry detachment than a cavalry company. H i s presence at what were initially isolated posts, enabled tlic nucleus o f towns to grow undcr his security. Aggressive combat leaders, such as Nelson Miles: realized just how effective infantry could be during a winter campaign when his infantry mere more mobile than Indian's in their winter villages. By the end o f 1880, the i~ifantry'swork was nearly completed. Only Forts Dodge and Wallace retained infantry companies. Within two years both o f those posts were deactivated and their garrisons reassigned to other posts outside Kansas. The era o f Illcinfantry in on the plains o f central and western Kansas was over by 1882

'Secretary o f War, Annual Report oftlre Secreruiy of il'urjbr rhe Year 1868 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1868), 6. (Hereafter cited as Annual Report) 2~ecretary o f War, /1nnual Report for 1866: 30. 3hlurvin H. Garfield, 'The Defense o f the Kansas Frontier, 1866-1867," Kansas Ilisroricul Quurrer!~I (I93 1-32): 327; Senate, Protecrion to Trains on the Overlund Route, 40th Cong.. 1st sess., Ex. Doc. No. 2: 2. Department ofthe Missouri, Gencrul Order No. 27, dated 28 Fcbruay 1866. 4~arnuel J. Crawford, Kansus in the Skties (Kansas: A. C. McClung & Co., 191 1; Kansas Heritage Press, 1994). 23 1 ; Francis U.Ilcitman, Hisrorical Regisrer und Dictiouary of the CnitedStafesArmy (Washington, DC: GPO, 1903), 427. j~ecrctary o f War, Annual Reporrfor 1567, 3 1. 6 ~ o b c rH. t Steinbach. The Long March (Austin: University ol:~exas,1989), 24.

Tecur.seh Sherman aud [he Sertleruent of the West 8 ~ o b e rG. t Athearn, CYilliav~ (Norman: University o f Oklahoma, 1956), 106.
'

9 ~ o b e rM t . Utley, Fronriw Regulars (New York: Macmillan, 1973; Lincoln: Univcrsity o f Nebraska, 1984), 1 14. 94

10~thear11, 100; Robcrt L. Westgate, Forr Walluce: The Last Post Wesr atuflts Role in the Defense ofthe Kansus Fronrier 1865-1880 (MA. thesis, Emporia State University, 1980), 99- 102.
I I~ecretar)of War, ~ n n ; , uReportfi~r l 1867,44; I-leitrnan. 429-430.

With lndiuws, 4lst 'Cong., 2nd sess.: House Ex. Doc. 240, 78. I 2 ~ o u s eDifficu1rie.s , 13lbid., 23; William 11. Lcckie, 7he Militciry (:'onquest of the Southerw Plains @orman: University of Oklaliomn. 1963), 46. l k e c k i e , 42. 15House, Difficulties With lndicms: 69. at Once! (Ilays, 16post Keti~rns foi Fort I-lqs, April 1867; Blaine Uurky, Cusrer Ci~rnc Kansas: Thomas Moore Press. 1976; Hays, Kansas: Society of Friends of Historic Fort Hays, 8 1991). :

1x1louse, Drfjicu1tie.s Wilh Intiian.~: 69; I.eckie, 46.

1 ~ H O U Difficulties S~, With Indiuns, 63

zllbid., 62-63; Secretary of War, Annncil Keportjor 1867.46. 22blarvin 1-1.Garfield, "Del'cnse of lhe Kansas Fronticr 1866- 1867:" Kunsus Ifi.sk~rici11 Quurrerly 1 (I93 1-1932): 344; Paul A. Hutton, Phil Sherid& and His Army (Lincoln: . University of Nebraska, 1985), 26-27. Shcridan \ u s obviously not hurt professionally by his rclicf. I-le rcplaced Sherman first as the Military Department commander, and later as Commanding Gcrieral of the Army. 23i.,eckie, 61; Secretary of War, Annuul Reporrfor 1867,57; Ullcy, i 38-1 39. 24Post Returns for Downer's Station, May 1868.
. ..

25~ecretary of War, Arinucrl Keporl,fir 1868, 17.

2 7 ~ c c k i e73-74. , Six conlpanies of the Tenth C:avalry spent the month of August covering one thousand miles \bithotit killing a singlc Indian: Secrelary of War: Annuul Keporr for 1868, 17. 28post Returns for Fort Wallace, August 1868; Juncrion C i v Weekly Union, 26. Scptembcr 1868. Sheridan was named in honor of Phil Sheridan. Typical of "End of Track'' to\vns that sprung up during railroad construction, like Coyote, today is a ghost town. Construction rate slowed over thc next two years, advancing only eighty-five miles. 29Post Returns for Fort Wallace, September 1868; Wes\gate, 165. 30~ecretary of War, Annual Reportfir 1868, 18.
'

3 1 Marvin ti. Garfield, "Defense of the Kansas Frontier 1868- 1869," Kansus llisloricul Qutrrrerly, 1 (193 1-1 932): 463.
3 2 ~ c c k i e88-1 , 14; Kye: 134; Secretary of War, /1nnual Reportfor 1869,34-45: Westgate, 17 1. 3 3 ~ o s Keturns t for Fort Wallace, June 1869; Burke?, 74-77. 34~ccretary of War, Annucrl Report for 1869, 25, 236.

3 6 ~ r c r e t a of r ~War. Annuul Rel~orrfor1870, 8 371bid.. 10. Located ill Indian Territory, the reservations for the Cheyenne and Arapahoes were along the waters of the Canadian River, while those of the Comanches and Kiowas were between the Canadian and Red Rivers. . 38Post Returns For Fort Dodge, January 1871 39Secretary of War, Annual Reportfor 1873, 7-16.

%ticy, 2 13; I'ost Returns for Fort Dodge, June 1874

4 1 ~ t l c y 230; . Post Returns for Fon Wallace. April 1875; Secretary of War, Annual Report for 1'575, 75. 4 2 ~ e c r e t a of r ~ War, Annuul Reportfor 1878.40; I-leitman, 444 4 3 ~ e s t g a t e ,174; Post Returns for Fort Wallacc, Octobcr, 1878. '%ccretary of War, Annuul Rq~orrfor1869, 68.

4 j ~ e a v e n r ~ o r Doily 1 h Lbnservu~ivr, 30 April I 867. 461bid., 22 June 1867 471bid., 28 June 1867.

49l'os.se C.'omilotu.sAcr, Srurutes nt Lrrrge, scc. 15.263 (1878): Sccrctary of War, Annuul Heporrfir 1878, V I .

5 ISccrctary of War, Annuul Report for 18XO,25,

CHAPTER SIX ACTION ON THE SMOKY HILL TRAIL 1867

I am collecting all the infantry I can to protect the Smoky Hill mail route in its entire length. My orders are to clear out all Indians between the Plane and Arkansas [Rivers], but our mounted force, especially, is inadequate for that purpose.l Major General Winfield Scott Hancock, Letter to Lieutenant General William Tecumseh Sherman

General Sherman, glumly recalling the past year, reported to the Secretary of War in his Annual Report, "As the spring of 1867 opened, reports of Indian hostilities came pouring in from every quarter . . . ."2 The recent disaster near Fort Phil Kearny in the Dakota Territory, fresh in his mind and still a topic of considerable interest to Sherman and those outside the Army. There eighty-one soldiers and civilians under the command of Captain William J. Fetterman were killed to the man in an severe battle with Indians on 21 December 1866. By April, Sherman's attention shifted to the plains of central and western Kansas. There the department commander, General Hancock, was in the field on campaign to brow beat the Indians into remaining peaceful or else. Hancock's actions, combined with the return of spring and the restless nature of the Indians, contributed to a summer of intense Indian attacks in Kansas. The Indians, Cheyenne, Arapahoe, Comanche, and Kiowa, for their part, singled out the Smoky Hill route west of Fort Harker for the focus of their raids. Its stage and wagon traffic, and the scattered settlements in the vicinity presented them with lucrative and targets. While the cavalry scouted for the Indians and their villages, the infantry were left to guard the trail.3 98

The lndian raids started early that spring'in 1867. On 26 March, the Indians struck the Goose Creek station, fourteen miles west o f Fort Wallace. They killed several o f the stations occupants and drove away the others. I n response to thc attack upon the stage station, Captain Mylcs Keogh, commanding Fort Wallace, sent out a Company L; Scver~th Cavalry, and twenty infantryman from two companies o f the Third and Thirtyseventh Infantry, i n wagons in pursuit o f the raiders, who were suspected to be Cheyenne. The infantryman were still armed with muzzle-loading Springfield rifles. B y the months end new, breech-loading

ringfi field's would

arrive. No doubt the soldiers were Fortunate that the Indians were no where i n sight when they arrived at Goose Crcek. The muz~lc-loaders, already obsolete, put the soldiers at a disad\mtage, and this was Further aggravated bq thc tc~~tlency o f the Indians to prefer close-in combat. 4 The Indian attacks continued into April around the Smoky Ilillroute. Hancock's destruction o f the abandoned Cheyenne village on the I'awnee Fork, south o f the Smoky Hill, on 19 April, further enraged the Indians. The situation became serious enough that the stage and the mail traffic on the route was threatened. The Superintendent o f the Smoky Hill Route, W. 1-1. Cattrcll, wircd Hancock late in April and requested the assignment o f soldiers to help guard the stage stations. Specifically, he asked for troops for the stations be~neen B i g Creek near Fort Hays: to Pond Crcek, two niiles west o f Fort Wallace to ensure the route remained 0~en.5 Back at Fort Wallace, Keogh was tasked by the ~ i s t r i co t f Upper Arkansas to send infantry to take 11p post at the Overland Mail Stations east to Grinnell Springs. On 28 April, early in the morning; f o p - f i v e soldiers o f Company E: Third Infantry marched east over the Smoky Hill route to man the stations at Henshaw Springs, Russell Springs, Smoky Hill, Monunicnt, Carlyle Hall. Chalk Bluffs, and Grinnell Springs. Each station were generally assigned a live man detail led by a corporal or sergeant. Since each station was on average ten miles from one another, and Grinnell Springs was seventy-six miles from Fort Wallace, the 99

stations wcrc not mutually supporting. I-lo\vever, the soldiers. augmented by the well armed civilian station keepers, could at least make an attack on the station hazardous to the Indians. Soldicrs o f the Thirty-cighth Infantry at Fort Hays likewise scnt five man details to guard thc stations west o f the fort, at Lookout Station, Stormy Hollow, Whitc Kock, Downer's, and Castle Rock. The last was just nine miles east o f Grinncll Springs station. B y the end o f April then, the Smoky Hill route fioni Fort Hays to Fort Wallace was manned by infantry.6 The stagc stations along the route wcrc structurally reinforced for defrnse. Through bitter experience tlic stage company determined some sort o r additional defenses were needed at cach station. The Pond Creek station, two miles west o f Fort Wallace, was typical o f the fortified stations along the Smoky Hill route: The stage station, in which tlic hostler and drivcrs lived was built o f stone and wood, and nest to it was the stable: o f similar construction. 'lie two wcre joined by a covered trench three fect wide and tive feet deep. Behind thcsc dwellings \\;is a corral protected by a stone wall. Another co\ered trench led somc ten yards from the stable to a ten-foot-square pit, roofed with stone supported by wood on a le\;el with the ground. with porlholcs opening on all four sides. A similar trench lcd from the station l~ouse to ; Ipit on the other side, and a third such arrangement led fiom the corral to a larger pit in the rear.7 The soldicrs and station keepers wcrc instructed to shoot whenever they saw an Indian This could also endanger a relief colunin, when the shaky guards hairing ondcrgone attacks were very likely to firc at the first sign o f anyone's approach on the station. Nonetheless, such construction garnercd conlidence in the soldiers, station keepers, and passengers. Thcsc entrencl~nient's provided their civilian station rvorkcrs and the soldiers cover to rcturn firc against the 1ndians.g .4 contemporary account, recorded at Fort Wallace i n June 1867 noted: When attacked, the men creep intothese pits, and, thus protected. keep up a tremendous fire through the portholes. Two or three men, with a couple o f brecchloaders each, arc a match for almost any aniount o f assailants. Icannot say how many times thesc little forts have been uscd since their construction, but during the three wceks we were in the neighborhood, the station [Pond Creek] was attacked twicc. The Indians are beginning to understand these covercd rifle pits, and the more they know o f them the more careful they are to keep a respectful distance from tlicni.9

'I~lius,if alerted in timc, thc guards could put up an adequatc dcfcnse. Unfortunately, this was not always possible. Scveral of the stations were situated in such a manner that the lndians could approach the station without being seen. Hence, the lndians could quickly strike a station, fire to thc killing or wounding the station keepers, running off the horses, and sometimes selti~ig buildings or hay. I t also made it difficult for the soldiers to identify the band of lndians that attacked. 10 The Indians effectively used the weather and the covcr of darkness to attack the stations. Attacks often occurred around two o'clock in the morning. TIICstations were susccptiblc to fire, thus we sec many references to the lndians attempting to burn the stations. This also provided n diversion to enable the theft of thc station's stock. Keogh, back at Fort Wallace, quickly pcnncd a descriptiol; to thc hcadqunrters of the Department of Missouri, of an attack on a stage station that took place on 9 May: During a heavy thunderstorm last night, thc lndians made an attempt to burn thc stable at "Chalk Bluff' by piling hay against one of the doors. owing to the darkness of the night. This attempt to burn the stable was not discovered until tlic hay had been fircd the alarm was given by the sentry on post. Whcn the guard turncd out and by grcat exertion succeeded in extinguishing tllc flames without damagc to thc stables and at the same time opcncd firc upon the Indians driving them off. Whethcr the lndians sustained any loss could not he ascenained owing to darkness.11 The infantryman at the stations wcre required to maintain watch night and day; tlie Indians could strike anytime of day. Failure to remain alert could mean death and the loss of one's scalp, evcn \vithin sight of the station. With only fivc to ten soldiers posted to each station, always on duty, ir did not take long for tlic soldiers to w a r themselves out.12 The transl'cr of the infantry from Fort Wallace to tlie stations and the inccssant nced for the cavalry on scout duty began taking its toll on Kcogll. "It is ridiculous to expect me to protect the different stations unless 1 close up thc post and dividc tlie garrison betwccn Willow Creek and Monument station. If the Indians are not followed up to their village and killed, then it is 101

~~sclcss to expect peace or rest along this route."l3 Mcanwliile, cast at Fort Hays, Custer tasked the Thirty-eight Infintry to post guards as escorts to the stages: The infantry cscorts would ride inside or atop the coaches to Grinnell Springs station. There soldiers assigned to Fort Wallace would escort the stage westward. Soldiers from Fort Hays \rould in-turn wait for the next east b y n d stage, taking it back to Fort Hays. This rotation kept unit integrity at each post and ensured covcrage along the most danzerous portion o f the trail. By the end o f April 1567, it could be said that General 1l;lncock's expedition through ccntral and western Kansas had stirred up a veritable hornet's nest. India11attacks occurred in the areas around the Smoky H i l l route and the stage stations were under virtual siege. The raids along the Smoky H i l l that simmer were more frequent and savage than those on the Arkansas route.14 Hancock wrote o f the extent ofthe raiding and why it frightened so many. "The Indians 011the Smoky H i l l arc not in bands o f four or five, but genemlly in bands o f from twentyfi\.e to one hundred ant1 fity, or rnore."lj B) the end o f May, as noted earlier, Company H,

Thirty-seventh Infantry established a post at Downer's station in an attempt to bolster security along the Smoky Ilill. Yct, with only sixty men in the company, the soldiers were hard pressed to combat so many Indians. The post remained quite active throughout the summer, enough so that C o m p a t ~ E, Fifth Infantry replaced Company 1.1, in August.16 I n May, the lndians targeted the stage and mail stations for funher attacks, which now occurred at almost a routine pace. .The small infantry details at each station were kept busy and needed to maintain plenty o f nerve. On I &Pay the Big Timber station was attacked; 8 May Monument station was attacked and burned; II May Pond Creek station the lndians attempted to burn the station; 19 May Snioky H i l l station another attempt to burn a station; 26 May Russell Spring station suffered a daylight attack: and on 27 May Pond Creck station attacked and stock run off. Typical o f these attacks was 3 May, when the Indians struck the Chalk Bluff station, 102

. sixty-tlircc miles cast of Fort Wallace. I llc station guard consistcd of a'sergeant and five

privates Company T:: Third Infantry. 'l'he Indians crept up on the station around two o'clock in the morning and attempted to run offthe station's stock. The alert guards drove off their Indian attackers without loss and Indian casualtics were unknown.17 Indian attacks on the vulnerable stage stati&s conthued in'io June. I-lensliaw itation, nine miles cast of Fort Wallace, was struck early in the morning of 5 June. Four civilians were killed arid tlic stations horse rail off before tlic ten infantrymen drove off the attack with sustained rifle fire. A messenger was sent off to Fort Wallacc to report the attack. By the time a relief column of cmalry arrived the station, the I d i a n s \\ere long gone. tl;~ncock at Fort

ofthe situation on tlie Smoky Hill. Ilancock then M'allace. on 16 June notified Slierma~~ departed for Denver later lhat day, and stripped the post of ~ e o ~ and l i forty soldiers of the Seventh Cavalry as an cscort.l8
,

The Indians, emboldened by their successes and thc Army's failure to stop them, tlirentened Fort Wallace itself as the month of June neared. On 21 June, around noontime. perha'ps bcl'ic\.iq the fort weakened by tlk departure of Hancock: tlie Indians, mosrl) Cheye~inc Dog ~dldicrs, struck the post with several hundred warriors. Lieutenant Joseph Ilale, Company

E, ~ l i i i d Infantry, was temporarily commanding the post. He had arnied tlie civilian workers at
the post and was forthate that a U.P.E.D. railroad sunrey with a escorl of twenty-five men of the Thirty-seventh Infantry was at the post for supplies. The Indians struck fast, a portion of them striking thc post \ragon train southeast of the post at a stone quarry. At tlic Indians first appearance. Lieutenant Male assembled t~venty-sevencavalrymen n h o had been on various post duties. Assigned to Lieutenant James Ucll, they were sent to the relief of the wagon train at the quarry and to intcrccpt tlic attackers. At the same time, another, larger crowd of lndians advanced from the north towards Fon Wallacc. They were opposed by I03

soldiers and civilims on foot, positioned by Ilale, and took up an irrcgolnr line on the forward cdge of a low slopc north ofthe post. Presently Bell's mounted platoon came up, having cscorted the wagon train and \vorkers back to the fon, and passed to the front to delay thc enemy advance. Halting just out of musketry range the lndians dismounted and fonned a line standing ready to mount. The Indians, instead of circling the soldieis in thcir usual manner, attempted a maneuver similar to that used by cavalry, \%ithskirmishers out in front followed by a battle line. Tmcnty or thirty lndians rode out as skirmishes, but, \\here driven off by thc sustained fire of thc infantry and dismounted cavalry. A brave attempt by mounted troopers of the Sevcnth Cavalry to extcnd the left flank of the skirmish line ended in a failure and the only two soldiers killed that day died here. 19
'

Afier some two hours more of desultory firing at long range, thc Indians unable to draw

out the soldiers and respectful of the forts firepower. rode off and the action for tlic day was ovcr. The soldicrs estimated tcn lndians killed. Thc soldier's spirits and confidence rose as a rcsult of tlic repulse of the lndians. For thc next three weeks, the post was undcr virtual siege and, while ablc to protect itself, thc infantry and cavalry there could do little else to safeguard the road.20 ~ s c o duties n for the infantry with the stage were another task and a further attempt to provide security on the Smoky Hill route. William Bell, an Englishman on a survey party of thc tinion I'acitic Eastern Division (U.P.E.D.) railroad, described a coach as it approachcd his party on the Smoky Hill route: "Two large objects, however, quickly came in view: which soon developed into hvo stage coaches: covered outside with soldicrs and their riflcs."?.l 'She presence of the soldiers did not detcr all attacks on the stage. So fur casualties among the soldiers escorting the stagcs on the Smoky Hill route had been light. The first death occurrcd on I I Junc whcn tlic lndians attacked a coach heading east, thrce niilcs from Big Timber.

Licutcnant Bell and three privatcs from Company E, Third Infantry, wcrc the escort. Lieutenant Bcll road inside the coach nith
:I

rifle. and the privates rode along atop the coach. Thc Indians

waited in a wash-out near the road arid managed to surprisc the soldiers on the coach. Once the auack commcnced, thc guards dismounted and fought on foot for four hours and kept the lndians at bay. Tlicy managed to kill nvo lndians;.one soldier, Private Jacob Miller, was killed by the Indian's initial volley and one other wounded as the fight progressed. By now armed with

brcccli-loaders, thc infanlryrnen's fire was heavy enough to discourage the circling Indians. The bullet riddled coach continued on to Fort Wallace. A particularly deadly attack occurred a week latcr i n the vicinity of Dig 1-irnbersstation and nvo morc privates from Company E, Third Infantry, Edward McKally and Joseph Walldrof, were killed on 18 June. Attacks continued on 'other stages. four more tl~at month in the vicinity of Fort Wallace, but the presence ofthc guards cnsurcd the mail route remained open.22 Around the same time of this I I June attack, though, live civilians were killed and scalped by Indians within five miles of Fort Wallace. The Army \\as quick to point out these mcn \\ere killed by their own recklessness and total disregard o f orders posted regarding travel along the route. It is, Iiouever, indicative ofjust how dangerous travel was just a short distance from any guarded post and the limitation of infantry in securing the route.23 By mid June, Kcogh reported that every station east from Fort Wallace to Grinnell Springs had been attacked by Indians on average four times cach. The Leuvenivor[h Duik
.

Cowscwurive rcponed on 7 June 1867 that: "A passenger on tlic Smoky Hill routc ...reports the
road well protected, every station having soldiers and defensive works sufficient to defend against any force that comes. A small guard and escort are sent now with every coach."24 Losscs among the infantrymen at these posts were limited to wounded, none yet had been killed. Meannhile, as the infantry held the stations and escorted tlic stages and wagon trains, the cavalry 105
'

continued to scour tlie area northwest of'rort Hays along the Smoky Hill route. Custcr and six companies of the Seventh Cavalry had left the fort on I June for an extended scout. Custcr's tired and hungry cavalry later rode into Fort Wallace on 13 July. Meanwhile, the Indians were not about to allow themselves to bc drawn into a fight with such a large force, and simply avoided Custcr. They did. however, continue to strike at isolated bands of soldiers wlicn they thought they had the advantage. This olieri resulted in indecisive skirmishes. l'his also demonstrated the difficulty of tlic soldiers finding and fixing tllc enemy as \\ell as the logistical requirements of maintaining such a forcc in tlie field.25 In an action that lead to his court-martial latcr that summer. Custer assembled a detail of seventy-two cavalrymen to ride along wit11 him to Fort Hays to securc rations and forage for his cornpanics at Fort \Vallace. The column rode off on 15 July at a breakneck pace. Thc Indians, keeping true to form, followed the detail waiting for the cliance to pounce on any stragglers. Their patie~!ce\\as rewardcd on the 17 July when, wcst of Downer's station, they struck Custer's rcar party. One soldier was killcd and onc wounded and left for dead. 'l'he column continued on without stopping or recovcring tlie bodies. I t was lcft to Captain Anthony Carpenter and soldiers from his Company H, Thirty-seventh Infantiy, posted at Downer's station, to recover the mcn. This \\as after Custcr passed tlirougli the station and Carpenter \\as notilied of the skirmish. The \sounded soldier was treated and survived, and the dead man buried. The infantrymen were startled and upset at tlie actions of their fellow soldiers.26 The Thirty-eighth Infantry, one of four colored infmtry regiments raised as a result of the'reorganizatiori of the Army in 1866, found itself tighting tlie first of many future skirmishcs . . with Indians in June 1867 along thc Smoky Hill route. Kansas newpapers had taken notc of tlie entry of colored infan~ry onto tlic frontier. They \vishcd the soldicrs well, and while doubting thc \\isdom of using infantry against the Indians, seemed happy cnougli for their arrival. Thc threat lo6
,

of Indian attack seems to have caused a temporary bond between the ~ h i t and e coloreds, why

o i l y Corr.servarivc question the race of one's prokctor. A correspondent for the Leaverrivorrh D
wirnesscd the skirmisli at Wilson's Creek, near Fort Harker, on 26 June 1867 In the camp was a detachment of Company K, 38th Infantry. . . .as the Indians yelled and fired, tlle [soldiers] returned lire with a louder yell. The colored troops being armed with Springfield muskets, altered to breech-loaders, the lndians supposed they had an easy thing of it, rode on in all confidence, but when they saw the [soldiers] loading from the breech, they turned their horses and made tmcks across the plains, carrying off hvo of their number killed, and several apparently severely wounded . . . the general impression here seems to be that, properly officered: they are better fighting Indians than white soldiers.27 The Indians apparent surprise at the soldiers breech-loaders gives some idea on the paucity of these weapons on thc frontier by mid-1 867. In his annual report for 1867, S h e r n m outlined the mission of Hancock's ikpnrtment of the Missouri:

I n the [Dlepartment of the Missouri Ge~icral Hancock is charged with thc protection of tlie Smoky Hill and Arkansas routes. . . .This is a most difficult problem. He will, of course, continue to give every assistance to the construction of tlle Union Pacitic railway, now done lo Fort Kiley: and under contract for two hundred and ti@ miles beyond; and he will do all that is possible to encourage and protect the settlements on the tributaries ofthe Upper Arkansas. . .28
in 1867 Sherman clearly designated the railroads and their construction vital and warranting military protection. "During the year, two most important enterprises, in which the \\,hole civilized world has an interest, have been in progress within this Indian country - the Omaha I'acitic'railroad and the Kansas h c i f i c railroad ....My itistructions have been to extend to both these roads as much military prorectiorl and assistance as tlie troops could spare consistent with their other heavy and important duties

. . ."29

The infantrymen assigned to Forls Harker and Hays soon found themselves assigned to details that guarded U.I'.E.D. railroad survey, grading, and construction parties. The Indians liercely resisted the incursion of the railroad. As a result, the railroad \vas quite vocal in the

ncccssity o f military protcction. \\'ith the shortage o f cavalry in Kansas, t l ~ c task fcll predominantly to infantry. Thc following actions o f Company

E, Thirty-eighth i n h t r y ,

assipned to Fort Hays, during the month o f July 1867 wcrc indicative o f the infantry's rolc in the railroad de\elopment in Kansas, and the importance o f small unit leadership on the frontier:
.!

1 I July - onc sergeant and ten privates to proceed as escorts to survey tcam
I 3 July - one N C O and founccn privates to guard Mr. Rosc, U.P.E.U. contractor

- one NCO and ten privates guard working party near Fossil Creek
14 July - t\\o NCOs and ten privatcs escort survey team

.
;

. . 15 July one,XCO and tcn privates escort survey party

- one N C O and fourteen privatcs relieved o f guarding M r . Kosc, U.P.E.1).

contractor

17 July - one N C O and four privates act as escort to U.I'.E.D. contractor

19 July - onc K C 0 and tcn pritates provide cscort to,survey.party

The nearer the railroad approached a fort, the more responsibility that post's infantry nould take on guarding the railroad construction parties. I t is interesting to note how dcccntralized defense o f railroad construction partics were. This \vas u o r k for the noncornrnissioncd officer and privates. I.ikc today's Army, t l ~ c NCOs in the fronrier Army wcrc the backbone ofthat force. Many o f the infantry's Trontier missions resembled wcre an NCO.in chargc o f a dctnil o f five to tifieen privates executing thc ;~ssignedtask. The railroad construction parties. when without propcr military escort. where favorite targets o f Indian attacks and often did:a poorjob o f defending thc1nselves.30
,

I n July. the Ovcrland Stage and U.P.E.D. railroad companies continued to press both

Sherman and Kansas Cjovernor Saniuel Crawford for increased protcction from Indian attacks. Stage traflic to Denver was nearly severcd and threatened to bring construction o f the railroad to lo8

a standstill. While Crawford. like the good politician he was, was anxious to raise a volunteer force (with federal assistance), Sherman was skeptical. He felt that tlie newspapers and citizens ncre exaggerating tlie Indian threat. Sherman traveled to Fort Hnrkcr that month to see for .hi~nself and wrote: 1 bclievc there are other causes than Indians why the Smoky Hill stage has not run. The railroad \\as dcl;~ycdby high water and not by Indians and the stages have stopped for want o f connection and because it i s not profitable. Iwant bbth railroad and stage companies to prosper. but cannot excuse them from doing their share o f service unless they make efforts to equal the occasion. A l l our posts and intermediate stations to Denvcr are safe. Trains o f iragons go with light escort and even single carriers run from post to post.31 While the stage and railroad cornpanics may have used the Indian threat to their advantage. there \ws no denying that up t i l l tlic end o f June, the threat was, in fact, very real. Though in part due to their own failure to protect themselves. both the stage and railroad had suffered many dead and bvounded drivers, station keepers, survey and construction parties. Statistics do not tell tlie story o f the psychological effects o f living under siege had upon western Kansans. Wliilc tlic nt~mbcrs o f killed appeared low to someone in Chicago, t i any resident o f central and wcstern Kansas, the attacks were frequent enough to cause gcnuinc fright. Early in' July. Thomas Kincaid, a scout riding with the Seventh Cavalry wrote: "If any man thinks thcre
i s no war with, or danger from the Indians, let him make a trip from [Fort] Wallace to [Fort]

t l i r k c r and then he w i l l realize it."32 Indian raids along the Smoky H i l l continued through August and September. On a scale sli~litly less fi-equent than April through July, attacks happened ofien enough to make travel along the Smoky H i l l route a hazardous trip. A lieadlinc story in a Leavenworth paper in September alarmingly read: 'TR0h.l FORT ILARKER! Indians Attack a Railroad ['arty Several Persons Killed! The lndians made an attack on the Workman o f thc U.P.R.R. west o f Fort Hays last Friday, killing several and driving then1 back to the f o n for protection"33 Reports such as

tliis kept the infantry busy. They would at least go to tlic scene, though after the f x t . No doubt, the next railroad party that \tent out, was accompanied by an NCO and five or so privates By summer 1867, Congress began to search for an alternative solution to tlic Indian problem in Kansas. The military solution was not producing decisive rcsults, and citizens in Kansas were in an uproar over the Indian depredations, while citizens back east were criticizing tlie military's ofknsivc operations against

tlk peace loviny Indium

llistoriari Marvin Garfield,

writing on the defense of rlie Kansas frontier in 18G7. noted: The Indian Peace Commission, which had been appointed in July by act of congress, held a meeting in St. Louis on August 8. As a result General Sherman ordered all department commanders in the division of the Missouri to assume defensive tactics only, thus giving tlic Indians a cliance to receivc messages sent out from the Peace Conimission and to act on t11en1.~4 Even as the Peace Commission was mecting, infantry reinforcements were tlowing into western Kansas.
0118

August, Co~npnnics D. E, G, H: & I, Fifth Inlhntry arrived at Fort

Wallace, a k r a march from Fort Lyon, Colorado. A week after arriving, Company E left the post and marched eastward over thc Smoky Hill route to take up post at Uowcr's station. On the l i August Company Ci began tlic long n~arcli to Fort Hays, one hundred thirty miles to the east. to join the garrison at that post. This left Companies B, 11, & 1 to augment the two understrength infantry companies from tlie Third and 'l'liirty-scventli Infantry then garrisoned at the fort. By this latc in the summer, the Indians no longer posed a dircct threat to the fort, but tlic additional infantry \bas probably great comfort to those at the post.3j At Medicine Lodge on ? I Octobcr 1867, the Kiowa and Comanclics ageed to sign a treaty. A week later, the Cheyenne and Arapahoe also settled with tlie cornmission and signed tlie treaty. 'The persistent efforts of the Arniy had kept them on the move. So they sat and dealt with tlic Peace C:ommission. With winter approaching, the Indians began to look to winter villages south ofthe Arkansas. The Indians were assigned to new rcscmations established in the 110

vicinity of tlic llcd and Wasliita Rivers. l'he Indians rctaincd the right to hunt buffalo south of the Arkansas River and agreed to kccp thc peace, stay away from tlic overland trails, and riot to niolcst any ~ h i t e s .With the suri~mcr'scxcitcment over and winter approaching. the Indians road happily off to establish thcir winter vill&es in the Indian Territory. The following summer would once again see many of these same Indian bands once again terrorizing the Smoky I-lill route.36 'l'he summer of 1867 was a particularl! difficult one for the Arniy. Thc Indians seemed to raid scttlcments and travel in central arid western Kansas more frequently. Yet the canipaigns arid skirmishes against the Indians were unspectacular, arid clearly not dccisivc. They were characterized by mostly long periods starching for Indians, or for infantry, on guard or escort duty, kccping a wary cye open for the approach of Indians. 'I'hc actions of thc infantry that summer of 1867 were typic;il of the next thirteen years in Kansas. I3ut not quite on the same scale. for thc railroad reached Fort \Vallace the following summer. 1868, and by 18i0 the Indian threat, \vliile not totally gone, was nonetheless diminished. \chile often overlooked for cavalry actions, the infantry's pcrliormancc was instrumental in tlic Army's ovcrall mission on the frontier.
-

11-louse,Difficrtltivs With Indians. 4 1st Cong., 2d sess., 1870, H. K. 240, 61. 2~ecrctary of War; Awnuul Repurr uf the Secretary uf Fbbr fur the Year I867 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1867). 32. (Hcrcaticr cited as ~ r ~ n u u l ' ~ l r ~ o r t ) .

'host Rcturns for Fort Wallace, March 1867; Post Letter, Fort Wallace, 28 March 1867. 5Robert I.. Westgate, Furl Wulluce: The Lusr Pusl Wesr rrnd irs Role in the Defense of State University, l980), 109. the hirnsus Frontier, 1865-1880 (h1.A. thesis.. E~nporia 6Post Rcturns I'or Fort \Vnllacc, April 1867; Lnwrcnce A . Frost, The Court-nmrtrul of C;eweruI Gcorjie Armsrrong Custer (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1968). 147. Blainc

Burkey, c'u.srer, Conre or Once! (Hays, Kansas: Thomas Moore Press, 1976; )lays, Kansas: Socicty of Friends of Historic Fort Hays, 199 I), 9.

8 h r k e y , 9; Leavenitorfh Dtril); Conswvative, 24 May, 1867. ~flicsc rulcs of engagcmcnt, to tire on sight of any Indian, wcrc very open ended and hopefully would never mcct approval in any present Operation Other Than War.
A. Bell. ~Vew Tracks in Aiorrh America (New York: Scribncr, Welford & Co., 9~illiarn 1870; Nbuquerque: Horn arid Wallacc, 1965), 66.

1 0 ~ o rWallace, t Lctter Sent, 8 May 1867.

I 1 Fort Wallace, Letter Sent. 10 May 1867

1 2 ~ i l b uSturtevanl r Nyc, Plains Indian Raiders (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1968), 83.

1 4 ~ o b e rM. t Utley, Frontier Rep1ur.s (New York: Macmillan, 1973; Lincoln: L'niversity of Nebraska. 1984), I 18.

I S ~ o u s eL)ifficuliie.s , Wirh Indium, 41 st Cong., 2d sess., 1870, 1-1. I<. 240, 61

16l'ost Keturns for Downer's Station, May 1867. 17l'ort Wallacc, Letters Sent, 5 May 1867

22~unclior1 City Weekly Union, 22 Junc: 1867: Fort Wallace, Letter Sent, l l June 1867; f Mrs. Frank C. Montgomery, "Fort Wallace and its Rclation to the Fronticr," C'ollr.ctions o Kanscrs S ~ t r fHi.storicu1 e Soriel);, 17 (1 926-28): 232; Elizabeth Bacon Custcr, Tenting on ihe Pltrins (Norman: University of Oklahonia, 197l), 682-684.

?4~euvenworth1Jaily Corrserwrive, 7 June I867

2 6 ~ u r k c y 30; , Post Returns for DoLvner's Station, July 1867; Frost, 136. Colo~iel Smith, co~nmander of the Seventh Cavalry and the District of Uppcr Arkansas, preferred charges against Custcr, at Gencral Hancock's request, for In September the trial began at Fort Leavenworth and lasted for a month. Custcr \\as found guilty and suspended from rank and command for one year. General Sheridan later requested Custer's return in September 1868, one month short of the years suspension, to participate in a wintcr campaign. This eventually lead to the battle at Washita in November 1868, which renewed Custer's reputation as an Indian fighter. See Frost for details on the court-martial proceedings. 27f,crrvenu.orrh Duib: Conservurive, 3 July 1867 2%ecr?tary of War, Annual Repor! o/l866,21.

3 0 ~ 0 Relurn s~ for Fort llays, July 1867; Spccial Orders, Fort Hays; Craig Miner, West o f Wichita (Lawrence: University of Kansas. 1986). 18. 3 1 Marvin H. Garfield, .'The Dcfcnsr of the Kansas Frontier. 1866- 1867," Kunsos Ili.%roricul Quarrer1.v 1 9 I ) :3

34Garfield, 341. 35Post Return for Fort Wallace, August 1867; Post Return for Fort Hays, August 1867. 36Nyc, 6 I .

CHAPTER SEVEN

When in contact with the Indians, the infantry is, in my opinion, far superior to the cavalry, and Ithink the Indians dread them more than they dread the cavalry. . . I Colonel Nelson A. Llilcs. IfoUse ofRepresentatives Report on the Reorgcmizczrion of rl7e Army The beginning o f the 1880s saw the Army's role in central and western Kansas wind dolrn, thc last ppsts would close and the infantry units moved on to other posts. The last engagements with hostile Indians were over. The Indians were settled on reservations outside the state and no longer roamed and hunted the area between the Arkansas and Plattc Rivers. While the soldiers guarded federal property, with the passagc o f the lJosse Cornirarus Act in
. .

1878, the St+ o f Kansas was now responsible for law and ordcr within its boundaries. Looking back in 1880 ovcr the previous lineen years, . . an infantryman in Kansas could only imagine the years when soldiers like himself represented security on the wild and dangerous Kansas frontier. One must wonder just how long pacification o f the frontier and the plains Indians would have taken had the million-man Korthern Army be sent \vest in 1865. The reality was nluch different, o f course. The volunteer Arrny demobilized rapidly following the cessation o f the Civil LVx. 'l'he small Regular Army once again reemerged as thc nations standing defense force, though at a period !vhcn the country sought renewed prosperity and considered i t s e l f in a state o f peace. Peace inturn meant a smaller A m y , which was fiscally constrained. Limited to approximatcly seventy-five thousand troops by act o f Congrcss i n 1866, the aggregate strength o f 114

the Army was closer to fifty-five thousand men. This resulted in the Army being thinly spread along the frontier. The mainstay of this Army from 1866 were its forty-five infantry regiments. Most often understrength and filled with new recruits, the infmtry regiments nonetheless formed the backbone of the Army on the frontier. This remained the case even when three years later, in 1869, a frugal Congress reduced the number of infantry rcgimentc from forty-five to twenty-five. The Army's end strength that ).ear was now set at fifty-two thousand. though Congress expected that only two thirds of those troop billets would be filled, lowering the actual number of troops to thirty thousand. Along with the ten regiments of cavalrv, this then \bas the force with which the government would provide security for a rapid expansion and devclopmcnt of its frontier. Consider too that the frontier competed with the rest of the country for troops. Reconstruction duty i n the South conrinucd to rcquirc troops hell into the 1870s. Following the deniobili7ation of volunteer unirs, additional Regular Army forces returned to the west. Military Division and Department commanders requested more cavalry for their area of responsibility. With only ten regiments of cavalry i n the Army, though, it was necessary that infantry units were required too on the frontier. The primary pre-Civil War duties ofrhe infantry werc on the frontier and it \vas only natural the; would return after the war.
I

The number of infant? units in Kansas fluctuated throughout these years. In the desperate years of 1867-1869, a time when the majorit); of Indian attacks occurred, there werc companies from four different infantry regiments in central and western Kansas. During this same period there were less than two regiments of cavalry in the same area. Through sheer numbers alone, the infantry took on the majority of the burden for providing sccurity. These infantry companies manned the series of forts on the Kansas frontier. The small regular Army was taxed by the demand fbr troops. As a result, companies, riot regiments, were 115

tlic basic unil in Kansas. This placed relatively junior officers, capvains and in some cases, lieutenants, i n positions whcrc they directly administered policies o f thc government. I n some circumstances, they were tlic government. interpreting and setting policy. A frugal government filrthcr burdcncd thcse officcrs when it came to equipping and arming these infantryrncn. The equipment o f the infantry o f the Army in Kansas was predominantly o f the Civil War era, excess left over from that war. Though functional, it was not stale o f the art. The basics o f tlic uniform and equipmerit would not change appreciably over tlic next twenty ycars, with tlic cxccption o f tile soldiers rifle. Thosc first infantry units arriving in Kansas in 1866 wcrc still equipped'witli the b> then obsolete muzzle-loading I861 rnodcl Springfield riile-musket, With a maxi~iium range o f one thousand yards, the Springfield rinc gave the infantryman greater range than thc cavalryman's Springfield carbine, arid the Indian respected this difference in rangc. Thc soldiers were trained to tight coriventional forces maximizing the range o f their

\\capons. On tlic otlicr hand thc Indians wcrc irregulars \\ho frustrated the soldiers with their
desire for close cornbat. Despite the fact that for almost thirty years following the end o f the Civil War tlic Army uas predominantly engaged on the nation's frontier, the Army never formalized any set o f tactics for Indian fighting. Whilc a fcw officers such as Nelson Miles and George Custer thrived on the challengcs o f frontier duty, the frontier rcrnairicd a backwater for most. The Army continued to focus on the European model arid mcthod o f warfarc. That is not to say that the soldicrs did not

establish procedures and localized tactics. The process o f converging colu~nns o f infantry arid
cavalry that was used with so much succcss in Montana against the Sioux by Milcs in 18761877, could trace its beginning in Kansas in the late 1860s, as'could the effcctivcness o f the wintcr campaign against the Indians.

I16

Thc problem for the infant^, and the Arniy for that matter, was locating. closing with, and dcstroying tlic cncmy, tlie hostile Indian bands. In true irregular warfare stylc, the lndians avoided contact with the soldiers unless the situation was in thcir favor. Mobility of the Amiy on the frontier was a problem fur both the infantry and the cavalry. On a long campaign, tlie infantry could out distance the cavalry's grain fcd horses. The infantry colnpnnies carried thcir wcigl~t'whenit came time fur skirmishing with the lndians. Of thc scventy-one kngagements the Army recorded with Indians in Kansas between 1866 through 1880, the infantry participated in thirty-five of them. At timcs. thc infantry fought alongside the cavalr?;man. Most of thc engagements though were at the company or even detachment level. Generally, they wcrc sharp. but brief engagements and most often initiated by the lndians and generally broken ofl'by the Indians. During t l ~ c summer months thc Indians proved too elusive for thc cavalry. The Indians struck isolatcd wagon trains, settlements, and stagcs at will. The presence of small detachments o f infantry \vould often discourage or at least make attacks l~azardous to the lndians. Of course; the soldiers could not be every whcrc, the Indians often'struck c l s c ~ h c r e . . since .
'

It should be remcmbcrcd that the infantry pcrfonncd these missions during ;I period the

nation considered itsclf at peace. Following four years of bloody Civil War, thc country was anxious to gct on with

development and prosperity. To thc soldicrs performing escon. duty or on

campaign against thc lndians, it might often seem anything but peace. Tlicsc missions today \vould fall under the current tasks of Opcrations Other do not preclude thc possibility of combat. American infantry today facc many of the similar missions as the frontier infantry. Amcrican troops in Somalia from 1992 to 1994 faced a very similar situation to the infantry in Kansas. They operated in a territory outside civil authority, limitcd infrastructure, and populated 117

TI^ War (001'W).

Not quite war, they

by irregular forces. 'I'lic troops were expcctcd to kccp open lincs ofcommunication, escort supplies, and protect the populace. And like Amcrica in the post-Civil war years, the Unitcd States in 1992 had just cndurcd a rccent war and bclicvcd itsclf in a state of peace. Unlikc our infantry in Kansas though: the troops in Somalia were well equipped and well trained. I-lowever, like the infantry in Kansas, they werc strctched thin and trained to combat conventional forces, not irrcgulars. Nonetheless, both adapted to the different situations and without the benefit of formal doctrine. Tlie difference today is that tlic Armyrccognizes that OOTW type missions are rclcvant arid have produced doctrine and training to prepare its soldiers. The Army during tlic liontier ycars still focused priniarily of thc Europcan niodcl of war and did not envision tlic need to dcvclop training or doctrine for combating irregular forces. The development of Kansas and the frontier was closely tied to tlie major routes of transportation. The Smoky Hill and Santa Fe Trails and the Kansas Pacific railroad were vital, llcncc their protection bccamc a priority for the Army. Small detachments of infantry, most oficn under tlie command of an NCO, provided security to railroad survey and grading parties, nut1 construction crews. The forts on both tllcsc trails wcrc garrisoncd infantry units tilat provided the escorts to wagon trains and thc mail during periods of the worst Indian attacks and liclpcd to keep these routcs opcn to traffic. the daily presence of the inlhntry. Tlie forts 'l'he local populacc was also apt to o~erlook of ccntral and western Kansas wcnt on to provide tlie nuclei of new settlements. Many settlemcuts c~nergedin tlie viciuity of tlic fort arid grew under the protection of the soldiers. Iliesc citizens also prolitcd financially from tlie presence of the Army. The forts, with their requirenicnts for labor, supplies, and food, were an economic boon to the nearby tomns. With the cavalry often out on scouting duties or in pursuit of hostile Indians, it was the infantry that was most often used for security duties. Wcary emigrants often encountered
118
.

infilntryman securing the stage stations along the route or escortirlg wagon trains. A wagon train or stage under Indian attack was more likely to head towards and find safety at the nearest stage station or fort than a cavalry company arriving on scene first. The down side ofthis relationship with the local citizenry was noted by Robert Utley:
A chronic dilcmma sprang fi.on~ promise seemingly implied by the Army's principal mission

in thc west: to protect the settlements and tralel routes from the Indians. l'hc wcstcrn population tended to construe this as a guarantee of absolute protection and to blame the Ar~uy for every murder or robbery perpctrdted by lndinns.2 The local populace mas not oftcn reassured by the presence of infantry units in Kansas. They naturally Lbondered how infantry, who marched fifteen miles a day, could ever catch Indians who rodc sixty miles a day. Though a blinding flash of the obvious: it misscd the point in tmo areas. First: the infantry were most often acting as garrisons to the forts and stage stations along the most traveled routes. They providcd llavcns for the trave!ers and allowed the cavalry to mass. When the infantry marched with thc cavalry on campaign, they secured thc supply depots and maintained the lines ofcom~nuuication.Secondly, when rhc infantry did march on the campaign they kept the Indian villages on the move. The Indians, if nothing else, respected the firc po\ver ofthc infantry and gave them a wide berth. Finally, if the Indians out rodc thc infantry. they also ohdist;~ncedthc cavalry
\\'it11 available forces in Kansas at a premium: Gcncral Sllcrman and his replacement,

Gencral Sheridan, employed their infantry in an economy of force operation. The infantry would act as escorts on thc overland routes and guard strategic sites: the posts, mail stations, railroad construction sites. He then massed his cavalry to acr as his offensive combat power. On the campaign trail, thc infantry safeguarded the cavalry supply trains and the lines of co~nmunication.Sometimes mounted on horses and mules, the infantry accompanied thc cavalry

on scouts and in retaliatory pursuits o f Indians. The inlantry bccanie the general jack o f all trades. So thcn, two patterns emerged regarding the employmcnt o f infantry. First, thcre were more infantry companies assigned to the posts in central and wcstcrn Kansas. Sccond, the infantry: spread out over these same posts or at the stage stations. provided the defensive forces, while the cavalry was oftcn massed and acted as the offensive striking power that moved from post to post. T h i s system offered thc best chance o f dealing quickly and cff'ectively with the

Indian threat. Again, through their numbers and these n~ethods o f employmcnt, the infantry were central to the security missions perforrned by the Army in Kansas \Vllile the infintry were active participants in all forms-offrontier missions. literature a ~ the ~ dmovies havc not been kind to tl~em.I t is not that the infantry i s maligned, but rathcr ignored. I f thc infantry i s mentioned at all. I t is usually a footnote to the cavalry actions. Books and movies have instead focused on thc cavalry, the glamorous arm o f the service. Since thc cavalry stood the best chancc o f closing with the mountcd Indian, they are the focus o f attention. Perhaps part o f the reason is that so much o f the fronticr literature tends to focus on the flamboyant cavalr);mnn George Armstrong Custer. Custer's and thc famed Seventh Cavalry's introduction to the fronticr in Kansas in 1867 did not particularly enhance the Arnmy's Indian fighting reputation. To the infantri went the mundanc task o f "holding down the fort" while the cavalry tracked and defeated thc Indians. Yet, i t \bas the infantry that rcsisted the 1ndi;tn incursions along the Smoky H i l l and Arkansas routcs as the cavalry scouted in vain for the Indians. But if

flamboyance and success were solely responsible for so much press, then surely infantryman
Nelson Milcs deserves more print. Arguably the Army's most successful Indian fighter, who hounded both Sitting Roll and Geronimo into captivity, and a flamboyant character i n his own.
-

120

right, he went on to fi~~isli an illustrious career in 1903 as the last Commanding General of the Army. However, Custer, not Miles, and the cavalry, not the infantry, are synonymous with the old west lore. And if lasting fame was enhanced by a supreme disaster, such as the Little Big Horn, then the infantry certainly had theirs with the Fetterman disaster in 1866 outside Fort Phil Kearny i n Wyoming. In the end, both forces in Kansas perfor~ncdtlie role Illat best suited their capabilities and limitations. ' h i s thesis began with the question: Was the Army infantry effective in providing security on the Kansas prairie tiom 1866 through 1880? The answer is yes based on the documented actions of infantry companies throughout central and western Kansas. The infantry played their vital role by securing tlie forts. railroad construction sites and stage stations. and strategic sites escorhig wagon trains O\ er tlie overland routes. Their positioning secured t l ~ c throughout central and western Kansas, ensuring lines of communication and transportation remained open in an economy of force operation. The infantry was also an active participant along side the cavalry troopers in the frequent campaigns against the Indians in Kansas and [ought thcir share of the skirmishes. The infantry represented the permanence of security to new scttlc~nents, emigrants, and tlic railroad. against the Yet ncithcr the infantry nor the cavalry delivered the dccisiw blow in con~bat Indians in Kansas. That happened outside of the state, in nearby present day Oklahoma and Texas, during the Red Kiver War of 1874-1875: and infantry played a significant role in that war too. But in Kansas, the infantry performed yeoman service by taking on the not so glimorous duties and executing tlie often tlia~ikle~s missions. I:inallq, this tllesis has attempted to show that there were, in fact, infantry units on the Kansas prairie in the post-Civil War years, not just cavalry. Neglected in print and on screen, the infantry operated in central and western Kansas in appreciable numbers throughout the frontier 121

years, and most olicn in greater numbers than thc cavalry. Assignccl to austere and isolatcd forts, operating in difficult and inliospitablc cnvironmcnt, often poorly equipped, fed, and housed, arid
\vitli little appreciation tiom their fellow citiz&,

tlicse infiintryman,overcarne significant

obstacles IO acconlplisli tllcir niissions. Unheralded and neglected by history, tlie infantry in central and wcstcrn Kansas represented tlie majority of c o ~ i h power t of the frontier Army. Since Kansas was reprcsenkilive of the frontier, the infantry's role and contributions cqually applied throughout the west
.

.
1 House: Rrorgnni:uiiorr oftlie Army. 45th Cong., 2d sess., H. K.56, 270

in Blur (New York: Macmillan, 1967: Lincoln: 2llobert M. Utley. Froniiersmo~ Llniversity of Nebraska: 1981): 348.

NEBRASKA
\

.
Re~ublican

. .

Ott

- .

Figure 2. A m y forts in Kansas, 1866-18x0

OISTRIDI~TION OF REGULAR A I I M Y INF.4NTRY A N D CAVAL.RY IN KAXSAS: 18661880 Scptcmbcr 1866 INI'AN'IKY A. 3d Intintry I' & Ii. .3d lnfantrv

POST Fort Ilodgc For1 I-larkcr Fort llavs Fort Lnrncd Fort Wallace

CAVALRY

U&L ) . 3d Infantry

M,2d Cavalry
September 1868 INFAN'I'KY : , & H, 3d Intiintry A, I E, 3 1 111fantry 13, 38th Intintry C. 5th Infmitrv E. 38111 111fa11try C & K. 3 Inlilntry L3: C, & I? 5th l t ~ f ; ~ t ~ ~ r y I. 38111 111fa11try D; 3d 111fa11rry September 1x69 INFANTRY A & 11; 3d Infantry 1-1& K. 5th Inlimtrv E & G. 5th Infantry C. D, & K, 3d 111fhntry l 3 > C, & I). 5th 1 t i ~ : ~ t r Y

I'OS I' Fort Oodge Fort Harker Fort Il a w I:or~Lurncd Fort \Vullncc Fort Zarah

CAVALRY B, 7th Cavalry H & M, 7th Cavalry

A: 10th Cawlry Il & I. 10th Cavalry

I'OST Fort Dodgc I:ort I-larker .~ Fort Hays Fort Lnrncd Fort l4'allacr Fort Znrnh
~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~

I
1

CAVALRY G, 10th Cavalry D & K. 7 1 1 1 Cav;~lrv G & H. 7th Cavalry E, 7th Cavalry A. 10th Cavalry

DISTRIUUI'ION OF R~~CilJLAli ~\liiM\iINFANTKY AND CAVALRY IN KANSAS, 18661880

POST Fort Dodye Fort I Inrker Fort Hays Fort I.arned Fort Wallace

INIFANTRY A & 1-1. 3d Infantry F, H, & K, 5th Infantry 1 3 & Ci, 5th Infantry B & C, 3d 11hntry A, B, C. & 1: 5th Infantry Scpte~nber 187 1 INI~IIN'I'RY A & 1-1; 3d Infantry F, 5th Infantry E & Ci, 5111 Infantry B & C, 3d Infantry

CAVALRY
Ci, 10th Cavalry C & 1, 7th Cavalry I I & M.7th Cavalry
-

I,. 7th Cavalry

I'OSI' Fort L)odge Fort Harker Fort H a y Fort Larnetl Fort Wallace

CAVALRY Ci, 6111 Cavalry

I
September 1872 INFANTRY A, 3d Infantry C;, 5th Infantry HQ 8 : C.E, 3cl 1nf;intry E, 9 1 1 Infantry D & F, 5th Infantry H, 3d lnlhntry Scprc~tiher1873 INFANTRY A. 3d Infantry D,5th Infantry C & E. 3d Infantry C & F, 5th Infantry H, 3d lnlintry CAVALRY
Ci & H, 6th Cavalry

POS'I' Fort Dodge Fort Harkcr Fort Hays Fort L.arned Fort Wallace

HQ & A,B,C,L, 6th Ci~valry

D,6th Cavalry

POST Fort Dodge Fort H;~rker 1,'ort I lays Fort L a r ~ ~ e d I'ort Wallace

CAVAI.RY G, 6th Cavalry

HQ & B.C,D,F, 6th Cavalry

D, 6th Cavalry

DISTRII3lJTION 0 1 ' REGULAR ARMY IXFANTRY AND CAVALRY IN KANSAS, 18661880 POST fort L)otlec Fort Harker Fort I-lays Fort I x n e d I'ort Wallace Scptemher 1874 INFANTRY C: & G , 19th 111fmtry CAVALRY F,G, & L, 6th Cavalry
B,C: & D, 6th Cavalry

A & U, 19111 Infantry K, 19th InSantry Scpteniber 1875 ISFANTRY A & C, 19th Infantry

I'OST l'ort Dodge Fort Harker Fort Hays Foli Larncd Fort Wallace

CAVALRY

F, 5th Cavalry
A: 13, U;& E, 5th Cavalry

U, 191h Infantry K, 19'11 Intintry

Scpternhrr 1876 INFANTRY A & C. 19th Intintry G . 5th Infiintry
I

11, 5th Cavalry

I'OSS Fort Dodge Fort Harker Fort Hays Fort Larned Fort W;~llacc

CAVALRY . F, 5lh Cavalry HQ & A,R,D,E, 5th Cavalrv

H, 5th Cavalry

13, 19'11 Infantry

K, I 9'11 Infintry
September 1 877 INFANTRY F & Ci, 19th Infantry H. 23d lnfantrv

POW Fort Dodgc

CAVALRY

Fort I larkcr

DISl'KI131JTION O F REGUI-AR ARMY INFANTRY AXD CAVALRY IN KANSAS, 18661880 September 1878 INFAXTIIY I: & ti. 19th Infintry B, 23d Infantry

POW Fort Dodge Fort Harker Fori l lays Fort l..arned 1:ort Wallace

CAVALRY

Ci, 16111 lnfantr) Det. 19111 Infantry 1 1 1 Infa~~trv F. I 6

POST I'ort Dodge Fort Harker Fort t l a w Fort Wallacc

,September 1879 INFANTRY D.F, & G, 19th lnfiuitry Dct. ?3d lnfantrv F & G, 16th Illfantry Septcmher 1880 INFANTKY C: G, & I: 19th Infantry Det. 16'11 Infantry

CAVALRY

I'OST I:ort Dodge I'ort l larkcr Fort Hays Fort Inrncd Fort Wallace

CAVALRY

A,D,E,K,L, & M.

I' & G. 16th Infantry

FIGURE 4 TYI'ICAL DAY'S DUTY FOR AN INFAXTRYMAN IX GARRISON

Revcill; Breakfast call

.
,

A little before daybreak

7:00 AM 8:00 AM

Surgeon's call. Those claiming to bc unfit for duty report to the post surgcon.
Fatigue call. \Vork details announced and set to work. Guard mount. Prechosen soldiers turned out Tor guard shift. Recall. Work details return to barracks. Dinner call. Fatigue call.. Work details return to duty. Ilecall. Retreat. Assembly, roll call. Tattoo. Taps. Lights out.

8:00 AM 9 0 0 AM

12:oo PlM 12:30 I'M 1:00 PM 4:30 Ph1

Sunsct
.

Source: Tirnothy A. Zbbink, I.i,rr Ltrrned: Garrison on the Cenrrul Greur Plains, (Ph. D. diss., Oklahoma Statc University, 1980). 124. Koger W. Gaston, The UniredSrures E~disrerlSoldier. 186.7-ISYO, M A thcsis, Xortheasl hlissouri State L;niversity, 1989), 32.

KEGULAK ARMY ISFANTKY AND CAVALRY ENGAGEMENTS WITH INDIANS - 1866. 1880. INFANTRY ENGAGEMENTS IN BOLD TYPE.

1866

DATE

LOCATION
None recorded

TROOPS ENGAGED

19 April 23 May 27 May 31 May

Cimarron Crossing, Kansas Big Tin~bers, Kansas Pond Creek Station Bluff Ranch, near Fort Aubrey Cimarron Crossing Chalk Bluffs Near Big Timbers Kear Fort 1)odge Near Grinsell Springs Big 'Tin~bers Cimarron Crossing Xfar Fort Wallace Monument Station North Fork of Republican River Wilson's Crccli South Fork of Republican River Ncar Fon Wallace h.lonumcn1 Station Bluff Ranch Fort Aubrey Downer's Station Cimarron Crossing Bcavcr Creek Ncar Fort Hays Saline River . Fort Aubrey Prairie Dog Creek

Detachs B and C 7th Cavalry Detach E, 3d Infantry Company I, 7th Cavalry Detach I, 37th lnfantry

5 June Y Junc

I I June 12 Junc 1.1 June 15 June 17 June 2 1 June 22 Junc 24 Junc 26 June 26 June 26 June 26-78 June I I July 15 July 17 July 21 July 22 July 23 July

Detoch I, 37th lnfantry Dctach F, 7th Cavalry Detichs E, 3d lnfantry and I, 7th Cavalry Company B, 7th Cavalry Detach H, 37th Infantry E, 3d lnfantry Detacl~ Detach I, 37th lnfantry Detachs I), 37th Infantry, G and I. 7th Cavalry Dctach F, 7th Cavalry Cos. A,E,H,K, and M. 7th Cavalry Detach I ( ,38th lnfantry Detach D, 7th Cavalry Company G and detach I, 7th Cavalry Cornpany F, 7th Ciivalry Dctach I, 37th lnfantry Detach I, 37th Infantry Detachs II and K, 7th Cavalry Detach I, 37th lnfantry Detach M, 2d Cavalry Detach G . 38111 lnfantry Company F, 10th Cavalry Detach I, 37th lnfantry Company F, 10th Cavalry

'

2 August I5 A u g ~ ~ s t 21-22 August

REGULAR ARMY IXFANTKY AXD CAVALRY EXGAGEMENTS WITH INDIANS - 18661880. INFANTRY ENGAGEMENTS IX B0I.D TYPE
DATE LOCATION TROOPS ENGAGED

1869

29 January

Mulberry Creek

Dctaclis C,G,I-I, Sr K, 9th Cavalry Cos. A.B,C,D,E,F,G,tl,l,K, h4, 7th Cavalry

13 March

Near Fort Harker

B;

10 May
13 May 3 I May
I June 19 J u n e

Fort Hays Beaver Creek or Elephant Rock Buffalo Crcek Camp on Solomon Rivcr Fort Wallace Shcridan Near Republican River Prairie Dog Creek

Detachs E & G, 5th Infantry A,B,F,H,I,I., & M. 5th Cavalry Dctacli G, 7th Cavalry Dctach G, 7th Cavalry Detachs D,C, & J), 5th Infantry Dctacli E, 7th Cavalry Detach M, 5th Cavalry C,D, & bl, 2d Cavalry; B,I.,F,L, & M, 5th Cavalry

19 Junc 8 July

26 September

Bear Creek and Carlyle Station

1 Junc 13 June
1871 2 July 1872

Detachs B & F, 3d Infantry Detach M, 7th Cavalry Dctacli M, 7th Cavalry

Solomon River Grinnell

Fort Larned

Cos. C & E,3d Infantry

22 May

Betwccn Forts Dodge & Supply

Detach E, 6th Cavalry

REGULAR ARMY INFANTRY AND CAVALRY ENGAGEMEN'I'S WI'I'II INDIANS - 18661880. INFANTRY EXGAGEMENTS IN BOLD TYPE. DATE
1873 1871 2 1 dune

LOCATIOX None recoriled

TROOPS ESGAGED

Bear Creek Redoubt

Ietach A, 3d Infantry; detach G. ith Cavalry lctach B, 6th Cavalry

I O November

Kcar Fort Dodge

1875

3-6 January

Hackberry Creek

Ietach F, 5th Infantry; detach K, 19th Infantry .)etach K, 19th Infantry; detach H. 5th Cavalry letacli H, 5th Cavalry

23 April

North Fork of Sappa Creek Betnzen Buffalo & Snioky I i i l l Stations Nonc None Kone recorded Near Bear or Bluff,Crcek Sand Creek

27 October

Punished Woman's ~ o r k

h n p a n y I, 4th Cavalry lonlpnny A, 16th Infantry; letach F, 19th infantry; Cos. :,G.FI, 8; I, 4th Cavalry Uetnchs D,F, & G , 19th Infantry; ietachs B,F,G,H, & I, 4th Cavalry

None recorded None recorded

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allie, Stephen J. All f i k Could Carry: US Army Infantry Equiprrrent. 1839-1Y 10. Lansing Kansas: Caraway, 1991.
I .

Athearn, Robert G. M'illium Tecurnseh Sherman and rhr Sertlement ( f t h e West. Norman: Lniversity of Oklahoma, 1956. Bell, William 4 . .Vew Trucks in North Anrerica. New York: Scribner, Wclford & Co., 1870. Reprint, Albuquerque: Ilorn and Wallace, 1965. .
Exparrsio,?. New York: Fvlacmillan Company. 1949 Billington, Ray Allen. Wei~ward P Yuwkers. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1963. Reprint, Lincoln: Brown, Dce, T ~ G'trlvanized University of Nebraska, 1986.

Burky, Blaine. C:uster, Corne A1 Once! Hays, Kansas: Thomas Moore Press, 1976. Reprint, Hays. Kansas: Society of Fricnds of Historic Fort Hays, 1991. Crawford, Samuel J. Kunsas in the Sixties. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co, 191 1. Reprint, Ottawa Kansas: Kansas Heritage Press, 1994. Custer, Elizabeth l3acon. Tenting on rhr Plains. Norman: University of Oklahoma, 197 1 Custer. ~ e o r i A. e M y Life on the Pluinr. chicago:. Donnelley & Sons, 1952. Reprint, Lincoln: Lniversity of Nebraska: 1966. Ellis, Richard N. General P u p and ti..S. It~clianPulicy. Albuquerque: University o r New Mexico, 1970. Frost, Lan rence A. The C.'mrrt-Marrial ofGmerul George Armstrong Custer. Norman: Ciniversity of Oklahoma, 1968.

Greenr, Jerome A. Yelloic.stone Cotnnrund. Lincoln: University o f Xebraska, 1991

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