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A thesis prescntcd to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Comnland and Gcncral Staff College in partial fulfillnient of the rcquiremenu for the degree

ARTIIUR S. DEGIIOAT, MAJ, USA 13.A.. Scton Hall University, 1984

Fon Lcavenworfh. Kansas 1997

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


. . . .




6 June 1997 Improving Tactical Maneuver With Digital Situational Awareness

Maser's Thesis, 4 Aug 9 6 - 6 June 1997



Major Anhur S. D e g r o a ~ U. S. Army


U.S. Army Command and General Sraff College

A T M : ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth. Kansas 66027-1352







Approved for public release; disfribution is unlimited

13.ABSTRACT (Madmum 200 words)

This study the uu of digital situational awareness to improve tactical maneuver functions of armored and . lnvest~gates ' mechanrzcd company teams. The concept presented concludes that all maneuver functions realize a wuntial for imoroved execution by enhancing the Operators ability to perceive, comprehend and predict future states of his;nvimnment by'cmploying advanced command and control systems to create digital situational awareness. The Army is expending significant effort towan making qualitative improvements to the lethality, tempo and survivability of warfighting organizations as it develops the force for the 2lst Century. Central to this effort is an initiative to digitize the battlefield by applying advanced information technologies to the battle command systems of the combined arms team. This study explains how and why tactical maneuver is improved by digital situational awareness. This study examines current tactics, techniques and procedures (lTP), findings from Army Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) and Situational Awareness Theory from Human Factors psychology t o determine the nature of performance improvement. For the Army to realix the enhancements it is seeking, it must fully understand the effects that digital systems have upon small units executing tactical maneuver.


Awareness. Battle Command. Tactical Maneuver




N;~mc of Candidntc: XiAJ Arthur S. DcGroat Ihesis Title: Improving Tncrical hfancuvcr with Digital Sitclatio!ial Awxcncss

Approved by:


, Thesis Commiltcc Chairman

LTC Steven L. Davis, M.A.

hlAJ Kevin D. Poling. M S .

-, hlember

SFC John T. Droom. Ph.D.

. Member. Consulting Faculty

Accepted [his 6111 day of Junc 1997 by:

, Dircclor, Graduate Dcgrcc Program

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.
Tl~c opinions and conclusions expressed hercin are thosc of the student author and do not rcprescnt the views of the U.S. Amiy Conlmand and Gcneral Staff College or any other governmental agency. (Kefercnces to this study should include the foregoing stntcment.)

ABSTRACT IMPROVING TACTICAL MANEUVER WITH DIGITAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, by MAJ Arthur S. DeGroat. USA, 77 pages. This study investigates the use of digital situational awareness to improve tactical maneuver functions of armored and mechanized company teams. The concept presented concludes that all maneuver functions realize a potential for improved execution by enhancing the operators ability to perceive, comprehend and predict future states of his environment by employing advanced command and control systems to create digitel situational awareness. The Army is expending significant effort toward making qualitative improvements to the lethality, tempo and survivability of warfighting organizations as it develops the force for the 21st century. Central to this effort is an initiative to digitize the battlefield by applying advanced information technologies to the battle commancl systems of the combined arms learn. This study explains how and why tactical maneuver is in~proved by digital situational awareness. This study examines current tactics, techniques and procedures (TIT),findings from Army Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) and Situational Awareness Theory from Human Factors psychology to determine the nature of performance improvement. For the Army to realize the enhancements it is seeking, it must fully understand the effects that digi~al systems have upon small units executing txtical maneuver.

Completing this thcsis has been a significant cliallengc worthy of thc effort expended. I express sincere t1i:inks to a11 of those who huvc supported my effort and inspired me to work tow,irds developir~g solutions to the Arniy's challenges of the future. First, I wish to acknowledge my nicntor, MG (K) Lori E. Maggart, former Chief of Artnor and Cavalry, for instilling

me thc passion. wisdom and commitment to work towards

PI-eparingfor the f ~ ~ i iof ~ rmounted e conlbat. His efforts to accelerate the transformation of our will n follow along the path he has Force to Army XXI serve as a guiding light for those w l ~ o ~ l~clped bet. Secondly, I wish to thank SFC Jolin T. Broom. Ph.D. for his efforts as a mcmbzr of my research cornmittce. lIc has singularly providcd me the greatest support in this effon and by his example, serves to remind me of the awesome power of a soldier's intellect.

Next. 1 wi>h to acknowledgc the men and worncn of the sonibincd arms team whom deserve nothing but tlic k s t warfighting capability our Nation can provide. It is from their sacrifices that I draw cncrgy for ninking the Army of the future bztter than it is today. I remain solely responsible for any errors or faults in this thesis.


AI'PKOVALPAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ACKNOW1.EDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CIIAPTER



2 . L.ITERATUREKI5VIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. METIIODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .







The United States will be the first nation to pass through the Information Revolution. cmcrging with different strengths that can give us an edge across the entire spectrum of contingencies against which the nation may need to commit its military.' Admiral William A. Owcns. USN

Introduction -- -The United St;ltes Army is going to extciisive efforts to irnprove thc w y lactical units an effolt to will fight i n the twcnty-first century. Since 1989, the U.S. Army has k c n porsl~ing "reconccptunlizc and redesign the force at all ecl~clons, from foxhole to the military i~ldustrid base. to meet the needs of a volatile and ever changing w o r ~ d . "This ~ process of transforming the

US.Army is known as Force XXI. The Force XXI process secks to conceptualize, develop.
experiment and field new warfighting technologies, orgmiwtional dzsigns, and doctrine to insure that the U S . Army renxiins the world's dominant land force in the future. Central to this f rhe hutrli~field. effofort is the concept of digiri:urion o

D~jization ofthe Battlefield "Digitizing the battlefield" is the cerilral initiative of this trcmcndous undertaking. The Army is currently inserting advanced information trchnologics (digital) into combined anns units in order to enhance their lethality, ternpo, and survivability for future operations. Recent experimentation and operational tesu indicate that digital command and control systems provide tactical commander5 with unprecedented amounts of information necdcd for planning and exccuting tactical maneuver. To date, combat infonnadon, when distributed over digital data

networks and whcn graphically prescrited i n rnultimcdia formats, has ( I ) enhanced the commander's awarencss of the tactical situational, (2) crcatcd a shared or conimon view of the battlsficld wit11 other mctnbers of his unit. and (3) assistcd conlnlandcrs in the task of visualizing fi~ture statcs and actions. The Army refers to the product of this ncw capability as digicnl sitrrarior~al uwnrcness. ?he capability to providc digital siturrtional awareness to Anicrican soldiers is fully endorsed by the Army's senior lcadm duc to its potential for enhancing battlefield performance. General William Hsrtzog. the Training aiid Doctrine Command Co~nmandcr, stated that

In respnsc to a "Digitiz.ation and situational aw;lreness arc thc hciirt of futurc wnrfig~itin~."~
Command and Gcncnil Staff Collcge studcnt's question rcgarJing Army mcxlernization funtling, General Ilcnnis J. Rcimcr. Army Chief of Stiiff smted that. "The potenti;il of digitimtion is so grcat that we (tlie A n y ) must stay thc course."' While thc Army's commitnlcnt to this concept is firmly establizhcd. not all is known about ik potential effect upon tactical mancuver opcrations.

Di&il . Situation -.- . Awareness . -- Digital s i t d o n awacrncss is as rnonu~ne~~tal a change in comlndnding and controlling maneuver operations as was the development of the wirdess radio. While thc Army considers this capability as an evolutionary step i n battlcficld technological development, the ptential effects of this new capability may be revolutionary if applied cffcctivcly. Digital situation awareness. in thc curre:lt military application, is the capahility to automatically share friendly and enemy position locations, terrain data. targcting information, and logistics status over digital comlnonications nctworks or t(zcrical irtrcmcrs. Data burst transmission of grapliical overlays. dynamic situation displays, and automatic combat reporting may providc tactical leaders and

soldicrs with more essential information needed to perform many critical mancuwr functions fiistcr than ever possible with current a~liilog (voice-only radio) systcnis. Thc challenge the A ~ m y cui~cntly faces is dderinining how to best apply

new inforni;itional capability to dcrive a

maneuver advantage over potential futurc advcrs;iries.

Entohasis --

on Mancuvcr

The Army has been sccking to insurc maneuver dominance for the past two decades. The Ammy's capstone warlighting doctrine of Ficld Manual IW-5. Acny Operatioils (1993). contiriucs tlic evaluation from attrition-oricntcd warfare to establish a primary emph:~sison the role of mmcuvcr to achieve dccisim. This enipllasis on the conccpt of maneuver supporls the current U.S. Joint doctrine for land-based warfare. Joint Publication 3.0, Joint O p a t i o n s (1995), states "that the focus of land-based warfare is to rcndcr opponents incapable of resisting by shattering the morale and physical cohesion (their ability to fight as an effective coordinated \vhole) rather than to destroy them physically by attri~ion."~ It is upon this conceptual basis that are focused on developing improved rnaneuvcr capabilities for its the A m y ' s Force XXI cffor~s tactical units. "Thc line of thought [hat digitizing the battlefield is only automating the corninaid and control function for improving the speed and accuracy of information is only paltially ~orrect."~ and corltrol What the Army is seeking to gain by digitizing its force is tlic net gain of corn~nnnd
(C2) cnhancements of every lowcr-echelon warfighting unit, reali7d as greater combat pcwcr

for forniations os a whole. Simply stated, the Army seeks to derive grcater combat power from its units by enhancing C2 functions that will enable a net gain in perfomlance of ':critical elements of combat power--maneuver, fircpowcr, protcction and leadmhip."' These desircd i~nprovements are measured in terms of increases to lethality. survivability, and the ability to increase and rcgulnte the tempo of battle.

The Army defines maneuver ah both a system and a function. Mmeuver drrivcs its conccptual basis from FM l(X)-5 as a battlcfield operating system. Rattleficld operating sywlns are defined in FM 100-5 as the mnjor/lrnctio~rsperforn~cd by the force on the battlcficld to succcs\fully execute battlcs and engagcnlents in order to accon~plishmilitary objecti\.es directed by the operational comn~ander. The Army further specifies rnwcuver as a function in TiUI>OC Pamphlet 11-9. Bl=ijit -. of the Battlefield (1994). This definition is provided latcr in this chapter. This

paniphlct srrves as a coninior~ refevmcc source for tllc development of all Army warfighting functions and is used by field commanders, cornbat dcvclopers, analysts, planners, doctrine devclopcrs, and ~rainers.This resc, uscs the TRADOC Pmphlet I 1-9 methodology for
s the Army-wide standard frm~ework for an;~lyzing combat functions duc to its status a

d~.vcloping doctrine, niatcriel, and training.

Force XXI Exjcr!~!cnIation In an effort to accc.lerxe the developnicnt of enhanced concepts and battlcfield systems. Army is undertaking a large-scale exprimentalion program. This program is a n~;ijor the U.S. axis of cffort within the Force XXI process and is centcred around the conduct of advanced. warfighting experimcnis (AWE). Based upon results from scvcral battalion-sized AWES, the Army is currently preparing to conduct two major AWFJ in 1997 and I998 at the brigade and dibision Icrcls. 1 1 c primary purpose of these AWES is to examinc the potential of digital situation awareness. Thc Army designated the 4th Infantry Division (Mechani7d) at Fort IIood. Texas, as t11c Expcrimcntal Force or (EXFOR) for thesc experiments. Thc EXFOR'S success during these AWES will bc mcasurcd by how well they can utilize their digital infomation advantage to out think, dccide and act over the Opposing Force (OFFOR). It is irnpcrativr that the EXITORoptimize their advanced information systenis to

producc digital situation awareness and improw critical tactical functions such as mmcuvzr. Arniy's Test and Expcrimcntion Command (TEXCOM) is the lead agency responsible n i e U.S. for "determining whethcr (txtical) capahilitics arc increased or the timc line (to cxccutc bartlc A critical stcp towards optimizing thcsc r~cw tilsks) is reduced by [he technology being tcs~ed."~ capabilities will be the continued dcvelopmcnt and refinenlent of tactics, techniques, and proccdurcs for tactical maneuver. The intent ofthis study is to support this dcvelopmen~al proccss.

objective of the 1J.S. Arnly's In sun~rn;~ly, iniproving tactical nimeuver is a furidarne~ital

digitiration effort. Ilowcvtr, dcveloprnental work to date has nor ideotified prcciscly how lo the function of t:ictieal maneuver. This apply this new 'apnhility to m,axi~nizcits potential a i t h i r ~ thcsis inrends to suppo1.1General Ifn~izog'sdirective to " Optilnize the utility of the digitization capabili~ies that we are putting into the force t o d ; ~ ~ . " ~

Definition of thc Problem --rile purpose of this thcsis is to idcntify relationships between digital situational
ill older to support the Army's effort to dcvclop awareness and tactical m:mruvcr f~~nctiows

doctrine, tactics, techniques and proccdurcs (DTI'I') fordigital warfighting. The prinlary research qucstion that this thesis serves to answer is: What specific tactical mancuver fimctions and tasks ciin be i m p r o d by providing lcadcrs and soldiers with digital situntional awareness? h4ore specifically, this research seeks to idcntify potential applications of digital situational awareness capabilities to improve the functions of tactical mancuvcr for the mounted
(mechanized and armorcd) combined arnis company teams.

In order to answer the primary rcsearch question, the following five secondary questions require rcscxch and analysis:
1. What arc nianeuvzr functions for tactical units?

2. \Vh;~tis situational awareness in the tl~coreticaland military contexts?

3. What nleasures of perfor~narlce(X10P)constitute improvcn~ent to current nxineuver

4. What spccific siti~ationnl awareness capnbilities arc produced by digital corn~nantl and

control systcms at the brigade level and bclow?

5. Whnt are the current tactics, techniques, and procedures for digital situational
awarcncss snd do thcy ilnprove tactical inancuvcr functions?

In ordzr to c~tablish a contcxt for t h i 5 rcsexch, it is essentiill to first review the grrlcsis of this research prohlc~n, then briefly exanli;ie :he digitization effort of the Force XXI Battle and the Army's process for developing TI'P Conl~nand-Brigade and Below (FDCD2) F~ogrum, for digitally equipped units. The purpose of this review is to pro\ ide ;in account of the dcvelopment of this research problan. as w l l as background information rrgarding the FTICF.2 program and 'lTP dcvelopment as thcy relate [o the research problem. The problem of dcvcloping optin~al t;rtisal ;~pplications for new battlcficld technologies is not new to the U.S.A~rny.IIowcvcr, thc scope of the digitbation initiative is orders of magnitude greater in complexity th;m the Amy's past experiences in integrating new capabilities. This increase in cornplzxity n~nnifestsitself into every clement of foicc dcvelopl~lent--dmrine, training, leadership, orgarliwtionnl design. materiel, and soldier systems
(DTLOMS). For the p l ~ r p of o ~this study, thc prirn;~ryconcern is d e v e l o p r ~ ~of ~n doctrine t and

TIT'. This increase in complexity is c:~used by at least five factors.

A Co . . n - gI~&Ircn. The first cause of increased complexity in dc\eloping new tactical n~et;~ods is the new and imique nature of digital systems. Digital systems rcprescnt new ways and mea11sof performing battlefield functions. This is contrasted to the US. Amy's pas1 experience integr;~ting prodirct-in~proved or enhmced versions of existing systems, such as the prxess of clianging from an M I tank to an MIA1 lank. Second, the developinent of prc!totypc systenls for experimental purposcs pnr;lllel to the dc.vclop~nc.nt of ohjecrive systems produces profound program challengcs givw current resource coi~straints within the Army niodcmizttion effort. The Army's digitiration effort is one of the first rnodzrni7~tion efforts perfoimcd within the new requircinent~ determination process

in 1995-1996. Undcr this new process, the Chicf of Staff, U S . Army h ~ "placed s [he ins~itutcd
TRADOC Cornmandcr as the approval authority for all Army warfighting requiremcno."'O By doing so, TRADOC is the primary agent for managing the conlplexity of balancing the digitization programs that meet contemporary operational needs of the ficld comin;mders for go to Nar systems, xith the development of future systems based upon concepts and expcrimcntation. Suppor~ing the si~nult;~neous development of two separate, but converging digital systems with tactics, techniques and procedures remains a daunling task for the foreseeable future. Third, effort to dcvelop optimal applications of digital capabilities given the current nlethod of horizontal technology iiitegration (IlTI) of commercial-based technologies into niilita~ysystcms is problematic to many force development precesses. This is problematic due to the inherent, rapid pace of change associated with this strategy. "While 1lTl has the potential to provide force improvements in order of rnagnitude kyond old ways of doing business, it chmges

thr, environment and processes by which the Army modemi7.cs."" One of these critical processes affcct~d is the developincnt of optimal doctrine and TIP. Thc fourth factor causing increased complexity of tlcvcloping military applications of disital c;lpabilities is the dynamic manner i n which the U.SArmy defines the conceptual and physical ellviroilrnents of a. future battle. The significant intellectual work perforr~~cd within the military over [he past four years has resulted in the establishment of several visions of what a future battle may entail. ,411 documents, such as the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staffs JO'IH Vision 2010; -. TRADOC Pamphlet 52.5-5; Force XXl O p r r s t i m ; TKADOC Black Book L & Co111Ixit in . . the 2lst Century; and operational concept wargalnz rcports rrom [he Office of the

Secretary of Defense's (OSD) Kwolution in Military Affairs (RIMA) program, provide descriptions of the operational environment within uhich units will fight with digital systems in the future. Whilc these visions provide focus to the overarclling digitization initiative, cu~lccptual dispa'rities and lack of consensus among Army 1c;iders as to their impact upon the development of tactics exaccrhates the prohlerii of designing optimal ?TP for digital warfighting. Last, the current low to mid-lcvcl of maturity of both the comp~~tational and con~municution;II technologies requircd for military ;ipplicaiiuns inhibit development of new,
o p r i m l tactical metllods. As General Hartzog stated, "We have made great progress in

identifying those technologies rcquired for the future but we are not over the technological hump yct. ,912 The Arniy's recent AWE Focused Dispatch validstes this challenge by determining that "shortf;~lls in interi.onnec~ivityamong currently fielded digital systems imposes more of a burden on the uscr than they return in tenus of useful capability and improved force eff~ctiveness."" Dzspite increasing maturity and usability of digital systems, the development of optimal TIT will remain a difficult task until the U.S. Army propels itself over this hump.

Developirig TIT for Forcc XXI is a critical task. To meet this task the U.S. Army has uridcrtaken profound s t e p to deal effectively with new strategic complexities that influence the path of Army inodcrr~ization. "In the last several years, the rapidly increasing pace of change in both world conditions xid technological advancer~~ent has prompted the Army to not only clinngc itself but change the way it changes."" The U.S. TRADOC, chartered by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Amiy, as the "architect" for the future A m y , established "a sct of dynamic, audacious organizations to identify the physical and mental clcmcnts of c!iange required by the A \ray in front of
1115 bow-wave


of change in this WOI-Id in which our Army works."lJ These

organiz;~tionswere establis!icd i n h h y of 1992 ns the Battle Lab Prograr~i.

The h t r l e Lab Program is primarily rssponsiblc for identifying conccprs and

rcquircincnts for new doctrine, training, leadcr dcvelopmcnt, organization$. ~~iatericl, and soldier systems. As such, the Battle Labs pcrfomi the central role in "documenting the TI'P of how to ol)c"a~con the digitized banlcfie~d."'~ To date, the Rattle h b Program has developed two sets of digital TIT--differentiated as operational (go to war) nnd experimental. The oper;ltional sct of

TTP was developed to support the fieldi~lg of MIA2 digitally equipped ranks to the 1st Cavalry
Division :it fort Hood. Texas. The cxpcrirncntal set of 'IlT's was developed for t!ie EXFOR.

What is Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below? One of thc Army's programs responsible for developing this digital capability is the FnCB2 program. It is imperative to understand the basic elements of the FBCH2 program as it relates to this research. FBC82 is a program dcvclopcd "to provide the Army with near-femi digital command and control capabilities to Forcc XXI units at brigade and subordinate cchcloiis."" Thc FEiCR2 system is comprised of: (I) applique @olt-on) and embedded system liardwxe, (2) FBCB2 software, (3) position navigation and reporting capability. (4) interface to and/or satellite-based communications system, and (5) A combat identification capability.

T i c principl significance of this program is its effect upmi the devclopmcnt of Amiy command and control systems. The FUCR2 program, initintcd by tlic dcvclopnicnt of the MIA2 tmk as thc Army's first front-line digital system. "rcorientcd thc development of the digl~al

battlefield architccturc from the boltom-up instead of from the t ~ ~ - d o u n . " Consequently, '~ the
FRCB2 is the fil-st Amiy commnnd arid control system being developed to optiniize the
inforniationnl needs of thc lower-echelon warfightcr. while designed to be fully interoperable the tactical pcrforniance with existing and emerging higher-echelon C 2 systcms. Thercfo~c, enli'ancemenfs, or value-added from digitization, will most likely be rcalizcd within lo?verechelori \vafighting functions. This will require detcrmin:~tio~i of optimal warfighting 'ITP. In order to appreciate the program ohjcctives of FUCB2, it is instructive to considzr the cxisting brigade and &low command and control systerri s l i o r ~ f d that l ~ FBCB2 is attenping to overcome. The Army's approvcd User Functional Dcscriptiori (UFD) (TRADOC,1996) for

FF3CB2 dcscribcs existing C 2 system shortfalls as:

1. Inadequate rncans to disseminate bnt~lefieldinfomintion higher, lower and Ialerally.

2. Primary reliance on voice communications. 3. Antiquated or obsolete informati011technologies at the tactical lcvel of war.
4. No capability to receive or transniit imagcrylgraphics.

5. hlanual-only mcans of sharing podion information and combat idcntifica~ion.

6. No mcans of accessing military and non-military distributed databases.

7. Liniited functionality to support C 2 of logistical functions.

This same source cnunicratss h e cq~abilitics that the objcctive FBCI32 system will providc. This list is found at Tablc 1. Wlierc the Fl3CB2 program dsvelops what the future Army will fight with, TTP will detcrminc how the Army will light. Therefore, understanding the digital-ITP devclop~ncntal process is esscnti;~l to this research.

How Does the Army Dcvclop Iligital Tactics, Tcchniq~~cs. and Procedures? As previously stated, the U.S. Army TlWDOC has dcvelopcd both expcriment;tl and operational 7 1 P for the employment of digital systems to command and control tactical opcratiions. This 7 1 P has been developed in en iterative manner over the past three years. Aftcr every major test, experiment, or fielding of ;I new system or version of software, subjcct-matter
experts and users have rolled feedback back into the 1 T P literature to reflect new discovcrics of

how c o ~ r ~ ~ n and a n dcontrol functionr are improved. While this "rolling b;~seline"approach has primarily on the encrblit~gfrrncrion bccn generally effective fo date, the resulting TTP is foct~sed this work is essential f o the of command and control - not on tactical maneuvcr itself. W ~ i l c the effect of this ncw development ofdigitnl warfighting, it is insufficient to fully dctern~ine capability upon the primary funcfion of factical maneuver. Another challenge to developing effecfive niethods for employing digital situational

awareness tools is overcoming existing pc~for~nancc proble~ns of executing convenfional

(nondigital) lTP. The current versions, or baseline. digital Tl'P is based upon conventional TI'P and thus contains some inherent execution shortcomings. Numerous empirical studies exist that describc unit prforn~ance shortcomings regarding execution of fnctical oycrations in both training exercises and in actual co~nbal.An extensive analysis was performed after Operation
techniques, particularly as they wcre Desert Storm to irlcnfify the s h o ~ ~ c o ~ nof i n current g

twenty-first century batfle. employed under conditions deemed applicable to n~odcrn, Additionally. lcssons learned through [he Army's Combat Training Centers ( C K ) highlight systemic challenges units have in executing tactical opcraticms today. Consequently, the Army's effort to idenfify and realix [he potential of digitization will rcquire continurtl work to optimize new capabilities towards enduring battlefield functions, such as maneuver. This will require overcoming existing execution shortfdls while developing

optimal methods ofeiilploying digital situational awarencss towards enhancing the Army's tactical mancuver cqxlbility. The Army, through TRADOC. inust provide digitally cquippcd units with dtjnirive tactics, techniques, and proccd~:rcsthat enablc thern to exploit thc unique

capabilities they possess to mancuver thcir lmits on tl:c riiod'rn battlefield to achicve dccisive
victory. AssumJ!i<,ns Analytical research on this topic rcquires the following assumptions: 1. 'Transition to Force XXI will remain one of thc Arnmy's top peacetime priori~ies."'9 Illis rescarch assumcs that rhc Army will continuc its conin~it.nci~t towards aggressively supporii~ig the devclop~ller~t of h;rrtlc comm;lnd capabilitiss--both operationally and tccR~~ic;~lly.

2. Digital con~munications and inforniation systcnls will continue to improve technically

in their ability to enhance the breadth, spccd, arid quality of information flow among appropriatz irlsmbers of l;ugc, complcx organizitions. such as txtical units.

3. Opcra[iond rcquirernents developed by the Army are fixed and valid for the purposes
of developing and acquiring digital systems for the Army. This rescarch will assurnc that

operational r e q u i r e ~ ~ ~ edocuments nts (OKDs), mission nceds statcnlents (IMNSS), and user
functional dcsoription (UFD) fully document the objective functionality of digital situaiional awarencss capabilities that the Army will field to tactical ma~icuvcr units.

. - . to the._T!in~c Limits

This thesis will no addrcss research, dcvelopmcnt, or acquistion of materiel systems. The following limitations were imposed upon this study to enable intellectual foci~s and foster precise oulcomes. These limitations are:

I . T y p of Military Organization. The population for this study is limited to combined

anns, armored, and mcchaniied ground-maneuver units. This rcsearch will refer to this force 12

'typc as the nzounterlforce. While aviation and dismounted forces arc intcgr~l clcmcnts of the co~lrbined-'mnst m n , they arc beyond ihe scope of (his resexch. 2. S i x of Military Force. This research will limit its scopt: lo company-sized units.

3. Type of Digital Systems. lhis study is limited to tl~c cornrn:ind and control and
ni;lncuver systcins inhcrent to tile FBCH2 program. PI-imarily,FBCB2 is organized with the Control System (Phoenix hllA2 tilnk's Intervcl~icular information Systm (TVIS), the Xlilne~~vcr \.arinnt), and the FDCB2- Appliqui system. These digital sytterns are currently fielded to both

experimental and opt:r:~tion;~l iinits.

4. Tiine. 'I'liis rescarch is liri~ited to the nc:tr-term dcvclopincnt:~Iperiod of l k c c XXI as

dcfincd in tl~c Force XXI Campaign Pla!~(TRADOC, 1095) as 1995 to 2003.

01)cr~tionaI Dfin&ojs Sevcral opcntional tcrrns require definition for the purpose of this study. Due to the experimental nature of many of these new concepts and programs, doctrinal delinitions do not yet exist. Where doctrinal definitions exist, thcy habe been uscd. \$liere they do not exist. official U.S. Army sources werc uccd to providc acct:ptable definitions. The fol!owing opcr;llion;lI definitions apply to tzrrns that ;ire intcgral to this study. Tactical -. Maneuver. -- - Tactical maneuver is tlcfincd in TKADOC Pam 11-9 Blucyrint~f

a ;lrtlefield (1994), as "the cmploynient of forces on the battlefield through movenicnt and
direct fire in combination with lire support, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantitgc in resjxct to enemy ground forces in ordcr to acc~'nip1ish the mission." TKADOC Pamphlet 1 1-9 dccornpres the tactical nlaneuvsr syslern into four critical functions - mow, engage encrny with dircct lire, control battle space, and inkgrate direct fire with maneuver. These functions are the bais olrhis rcsc.uch. A detailed listing of thcse functions, along with dxxdin;!te tasks is found at Table 2 of this thesis.

Digitization .--

of the Battlefield. Digiti7~tion of the b;~ttlcfieldis one of the ccntral

initiatives of the Army's >fidernization Plan. Digitization of the battlefield, or digitization, is

dcfincd in the Unitcd Statcs Army Posture S t a t c ~ n for ~ ~Fiscal ~ t Year 1997 as, The application of information technologies to acquire, exchange, and employ timely battlcfield infornl;ltion throughout the entire battle space. It enables friendly forces to share a relevant, common picture of the battlefield while communicating and targeting in real or near-real time. It will reduce the fog of war and decreae decision making time by optimizing the flow of cornmand and control infonnntion." !)&jtal Cornnl1111ications. CarJinc (1994) lrccuratcly defines digital communications as: Thc encoding of any information into a discrete or discontinuous signal by partitioning the signal and assigning it a numerical binary code (one or zero) value. T h e codes arc less sensitive to noise, intcrference from other frequencies, signal distortion and fading, and have greater transrnirsion efficicncy than continuous vwiahlc (analog) signals. Because these using mathematical sigi~als are in a ncmerical code thcy can he processed by compt~ters algnrithms to nmipul:lte the information for many purposes. Conversion of the digital signal into an analog signs1 is done by use of a moilulator-dcn~dulator(modem) device. This digital technology and the analog-to-digit:~land digital-to-analog conversions are thc physical basis that pcnnit thc transnlission and processing of vast amounts of data by computers and is the cnabling technology of the Information Revolution.
.- . C o r n n d . Rattle command is the U.S. Army's new command philosophy. This Battle

philosophy provides the conceptual fra~nework for the integration of intellectual, organizational, procedural and technical aspects of com~nanding soldicrs and units in battle. U.S .Army Field blanual 100-5, O p a t i o n s (June 93). defines Haulc command as, The art of battle dccision-making, leading and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions. It includes visualizing the current and future states, formulating concepts of operation to get from one lo another, and doing so at least cost. Assigning missions, prioritizing and allocating resources, selecting the criticd time and place to act, and knowing how and when to make adjustments during the fight are also inc~uded.~' Situational -. -- .- . Awareness. -.- The Army entaprise strategy is thc unified vision statement for the modcrniution of Army command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
(C-11). I'his document dcfines situational awarcncss within the current niilitary context. It is

dcfined as.

The p p l i i c and instantaneous knowledge of your own location and the relative locations of friendly and enemy forces in your area. For l o w r echelons dou-n to combat crews, situation awareness is essential for survival and combat e f f e c t i ~ e n e s s . ~ TR..ZDOC Paniptilet 525-5, Force XXI 01xrations ( 1 August 1994). expands this definition to include, "creating 3 common, relzvnnt picturz of the battlefield scaled to specific levels of interest and special needs."23 Argv Rattle Cornmand.Systzln. The Army Rattle Command System (BCS) is defined in the US Army 1:ieltl hi:inual 24-7. Ar~nv Rattle Com~iiand Svstcr11hfiin_:~ement Techniques (1995), as thc ovcrarching systeni that consists of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures
(?TI') arid tools uscd to command and con!rol forces on thc tactical battlefield. The ABCS

provitles the riiex~s (equipment and procedares) to: ( I ) collect m d organix large amounts of information. (2) combine information from multiple sources. (3) prwess information to analyze trends, (4) develop courses of actions based on situntio~ialfactors. (5) exchange information efficicr~tly among and within command posts (CP) and (6) present information as graphical displays and textual summaries. The ABCS is the keystone of the digitimtion of the battlefield effort that provides the conimaridzr an integrated digital inforrnation network that supports warfighting systems and ensures co~iimand and control decision-cycle superiority. Taelical Decision-hakinc Proce.3. . . -- -

This research references the two prin~ary tactical

decision-making processes uscd mort often at the brig~ide and below level, the Combat Decisionhlaking Process (CDMP) and Troop Leading Procedures ('I'LP). According to US A m y

Command and Gcneral Staff College (CGSC) Student Text (ST) 101-5, and Staff Decision Process. "the CDMP is an abbreviated form of the deliberdte decision-making process (DDMP) uscd by commanders and staffs in combat situations to plan quickly."24

'Troo~I m d i n e Proce.du-. ---

The TLPs are an eight step procsss used to be combat (x ithout staff support) to pl;in, prepare, and cxecute tactical operations. TLPs are generally enlployed by sniall units, comp.mies, and platoons, and they complement the CDhlP of higher echelon units, such as battalions and brigades.
A tactical internct is an integrated battlefield communications network Tactical Internet. . - .

modeled after the commercial Internet. This network will provide reliable. seamless, and secure coniniunicatio~is connectivity required to support systems of the FIKIJ2 program. Information

flow within this network is based upon the exchange of common tactical message sets that have
k e n devclopcd for use by most tactical data systellis uscd by Army and other services and agencies. The t;tctical internet is a critical enabling capability for devdoping a sharcd picture of the hattlcfield among elenlcnts of digital units.

Sisnificance of the Study Desert Storm showed the potential with only the first generation of systems and concepts. Today the moving to the second generation and developing the upcrational concepts, doctrine and tactics that go with it. Honorable William T. Peny. Foreign Affairs The purpose of this research is to advance the Army's effort towards realizing the tactical w~rfighling potential of digital situational awareness. This study intends to add to the body of rcscarch of this ricw area of strategic irnportancr, to the U.S. Arniy. Prior to one of the Army's advanced warfighting expcrimcnts, LTC Joseph E. Orr, Conimandcr of Task Force 2-33 Annor, one of the Ammy's first digitally equipped units, challenged his troops "to be a part of something greater-a digital team."25 This study is an attempt to support the Army's effort in rriaking digitization something greater.

The complex nicthod of conceptualizing new digital T I T ' requircs focused analytic research to supplement the milititry judgment of the 'lTP developers involvcd in this process. To date, little analytical research has been conducted to support this essential undertaking. This study's resulting recommendations provide a concepto;ll perspective to support the development of the next generation of digital, maneuver-oriented TIT. This study, when ir~cluded with other analytical research, experimental findings, and expert military judgment. will
~ its goals and objectives for Force XXI. assist the Army i r realizing

Wi!!iam A. Owens, Dominant Battlesge K Dciense Unircrsity Press, 1995). 3.

e (Washington, DC: National

. ,s Ar111~~f.thc 'US. Army, F3rc1: XXI, Amcr~ca 2lst CC@!IQ. (R. Monroe, VA: Office of thc Chief of Staff, Army, (January 1995), 1.
'William W.Hartzog, discussion with mthor, notes, Ft. Monroe, VA. 28 November 1995.

Dennis J. Reimer, authors address notcs. Ft. Leavenworth. KS. 25 October 1996.

U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-0, J~u.Ogerations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1995), N 8-9.

U.S. Amy, FM 1100-5. Army O~crations (Washington, DC: Dcpanmcnt of the Anny. 1993), 2-19. ' ~ e n n i sSteele. "Countdown io the Next Century."

(November 1996): 20.

9 ~ i l l i a nW. i Hanzog, discussion with author, notes. Ft. Monroe, VA, 28 November 1995. %.s. Amiy. Rguiremcnts Deternlination. (Ft. Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, March 1996). preface. U.S. Arnmy, !996 Modernization Plan (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1996). 15. "u.s. Anny, Land Combat i n the 21st Century (Ft. Monroe, VA: U.S. Army TRADOC, 1996). preface.

U.S. Anny. AWE FOCIISC~ Diyatch: Final Kcport (Ft. Knox, KY: Mounted Uattlcspace Battle Lab, June 1996). 1-5. U.S. Army, Battle Labs: Defininx the Future, (Ft. Monroe, VA: U S . Anny TRADOC. hlay 1995), preface.


"u.s. Arniy, US. Armv Di~itiz3h.n X l a s t c r P b (Washington. DC: Anny Digitization Office, March 1996). 6- 1. lS~hristopher V. Cardine. D i g i t h i o n of the Battlefield (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U S . Army War College, 1995),21.

"u.s. Army, l!?j!~t Venture Campaign Plan (Ft. Monrw, VA: US. Army TKADOC, April 1995). 3.
2 0 ~ Army, . ~ . U S . Army Post~~re Stilment N 97 (Washington, I X : Dcpartmcnt of the Army. 1996), 68.

2 ' ~ . Army, ~ . U S . Armv E n t e r i s a of the Anny. July 1993). 18.

(Washington. DC: Office of the Secretary

2 3 ~ Army, . ~ . TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations (Ft. Monroe. VA: U.S. Anny TRADOC. 1994). 2-1. ' 4 ~ .Army, ~ . CGSC Srudcnt Text 101-5, &nml;ind and Staff Dxision Prmess (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Anny Comnlarld and General Staff College, 1996), 3-5. U.S. Army, AWE Focused Dis~atch:Final Re~ort (Ft. Knox, KY: Mounted Battlespace Battle Lab, June 1936). App A.


Innovation is fostered by information gatliercd from new connections; from insights gained by journeys into other disciplines or places; from active, collegial nctworks and fluid, open boundaries. Innovation arises from ongoing circles of exchange, where information is not jwt accu~nul;itcd or stored, but created. Margxet J. Wheatley Inadershie and the New (1994)

This chapter rcviews relevant literature regarding key facets of the rcscarch question. The purpose of this review is to examine published literature that; ( I ) identifies authoritative works in the field , (2) provides essential information on spccific subject areas, and (3) answers several; secondary research questions. This rcview provides definitive information of the following three areas of this research:

1. Current maneuver 1I'P for digital company tcxns.

2. Results of Advanced Warfighting Experiments.

3. Situational Awareness Theory.

Mzthcd This chapter begins with an o:-erall description of the project's informational needs that are satisfied by this literature review. This is followed by ;in exaniination of the Army's digital

TTP nianuals that describe current applications of digital situational awareness. Next, this

rcview pro\'idcs relevant insights fioni scveral of thc Army's Advanzcd Warfighting Experiments

I T . (AWE) that establish a PI-elirninarybaseline of psrfornmce indicators of current digital T

Finally, this chapter concludes with an overview of Situational A ~ a r ~ n cTheory ss in order to

establish a foundation for analyzing the Army's current utilization of this concept.
Information Needs and A v : t i l a i
The following questions must be answered in order to determine the current state of

digital TI'P:
1. What arc currcnt digital

l T P applications for thc mout~led cornpany team?

2. What insights have bcen gained by recent Advanced Warfighting E x p i m c n t s that

indicatc thc effcct th;it digital situ;ttional awarcncss has on nlaneuver functions?

3. What principles of Siluation Awareness Theory effecf the Army's intcgrntion of

digital technology into TI'P? This information is available through three sources. First, current digital TTP is available through HQ, TRADOC's Joint Venture Office at Fon Monroe, Virginia. Secondly, the
Battle Command Battle Laboratory and the Centcr For Army Lessons Lemcd, both at Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas rnai~~tain expr.rinicntal data and repolis from the Army's Advanced Wariighting Experiments. Thc third source of infortnation is thc Army Research Institute Field Office at Fort Knox, Kentucky where current lirerature on Situational Awareness Theory and Human Factors Rcscarch is maintained. These three sources provided thc information contained in this study.

CurrentDiQitaI Tactics. Techniaues and Procedures (TIT)

There arc two pri~nary sources for 1 T P for U.S. Army digital units at thc company lean1

level. Ihey are:

1. ST 71-1-1,TTP for the Digitized Com~anv Team (1995).

C p ~ ~(1 . 996). ny 2. ITKS?vi7 1 - 1- 1 (AppliquC), TTP for t h e ~ p l q ~ i C - E o ~ i i ~ e ~ - Ttatn

Ench of these manuals is written for a different user. The Special Text (STj is writt?n for company teams with MIA2 tanks and Rradley It~fanlty Fighting Vehicles ( L W ) digitallyequipped with the Inter-Vehicular Information System (IVIS). The Fort Knox Supplemental h1atcri;rl (FKSM) is written for AppliquC-cquippcd company teams of the EXFOR. \Vhilc the 1VIS and Appliqui units have different capabilities at the present time, the objective digital system as described in thc FRCD2 program will comprise the cnpi~bilitiesof both of these systems. Therefore, the this study examines both of these sources.
Team 27 new tsclics. tcchniq~m or ST 71-1-1.1TP for the Dipitizcd C o i i i ~ ) m ~ cont;~ins

procedures that employ digital situ;ilional awarmcss capabilities for maneuver functions (See Table 3 of Appendix). Illesc new 'lTPs span the planning. preparation and execution over the spectrum of tactical missions that a company team performs, including attack, defend and other
operations such as passage of lines and ~ithdrawal.The distribution of these 27 new 1TPs over

the four maneuver functions of TP 11-9. Rlueprint of the Rattlefield is: 1. Movemcnt -- 8 new TIR. 2. Engage the Enemy -- 6 new TI'Ps.

3. Control Ba~tle Space -- 6 new 'ITPs.

4. Integnte Dircct-Fire \\it11 hiancuver -- 7 new Trl's.

The ne;~rlyequal distribution of t h m new 'ITPs across the 4 maneuver functions indicates that
digital sit~iational awareness has a significant impact upon company team maneuver. A review of this manual identifies several general applications of digital capahilities that require mention. First. all of the new ?TPs arc characterized as significant improvements to conventional prilctices. These improven~cnts are dcscribcd ;is the capability to:

1. PCI-formvarious steps of tactical tasks sintrrlratreorisly. 2. I'ufonn cliticnl tasks earlier within the sequence of Iargcr processes.

3. Perform functions with rnorc accurate aid tinlely informarion.

4. Collabor~rrivrly pcrforni tasks with higher. lower and adjacent nnits.

5. Pcrform critical leader tasks while physically rrnrore from the unit.
6. Maintain a more accurale orienrdion of the situation.
7. Diswninate critical infortnation precisely using graphical rrprrsrntutions. Sccondly, the MI A2 tank's fwtargct designation capability impacts upon TTP equally as niucli as the digital information system doss. Far-tnrget designation entails the use of the vcbiclc navigation system, l a w range finder and microprocessor to auto~~iatically determine target locations and generate icons on the infdrniation display. These imns can be hbcled and near-instantly passed to other units to orient them toward enemy targets, haz;wd areas and tertain features. Presently. I3 of the 27 ncw 'ITPs i n this manual integrate the use of the far-target designation capability of the MIA2 tank with the digital information system (IVIS) to improve critical nianeuver functions. The specific functions effec:ed are engaging enemy targcts.

I Tthat controlling battle space and integrating direct rue with nxmeuver. The only mancuver T
does not combine the use of far-target designation and 1VlS is the movemcnt function. This finding is significant to this rcsearch bccause it suggots th;~tat the company team level, the far target dcsignation capability, while not a feature of the FBCR2 program, is an csscntial enabling capability to achieving ilnprovcments in tactical maneuver through digital situational awareness. Moreover, the lack of far-target designation systcnis in the EXFOR niay prove to be a significant limit over the effectiveness of the digital capability they possess.

Lastly, tl~is source identifies new TTPs that were previously not feasihlc to perform. The ability to digitally diss<minate graphic overlays and reports creates conditions whew the performance of security operations (counter-reconnaissance) can occur sin~rrl~ancurrs to cornp'my bmle position preparation and engagement area planning at a remotc lwation. Funhcrinore, the ability to send obstacle inforni;~tionin graphical foml sirnultancous to their emplacement creates ncw methods of integrating and synchronizing rnnneuvcr. This manual posits that in addition to enhmcing maneuver "the cumulative effcct of these advancrd battlefield capabilities is a more tactically agile and lethal company team."' This is significant because agility and lethaliiy are essenri:il characteristics of tactical maneuver.

~r.i m ~ ~is! the p a only nv FKSM 71-1-1. (Appliqui), TI'P for the A ~ l y l i c j i ~ i - E ~ ~ ~ ~ cT
other source of 1TP for digitally-equipped company teams. This manual was produced in 1996 by thc Mounted nattlc Space Rattle Lab. Fort Knox, Kentucky for the EXFOR. This manual was based upon the TI'Ps previously developed for the IVIS-equipped units of the 1st Cavalry Division. As such, these TITSare very similar to those described in the Special Text (Sce Table

Despitc their similaritics, the Appliqo6-equipped company team 'ITP does vary slightly from their IVIS-cquippcd counterpart. Specifically, this source cites six diffcrences. These differences result frutn having different capabilities in each of the digital forces. The appliqut digital units are equipped with an electronic combat identification system (Battlefield Combat Identification System [BCIS]) that enables them to perforni precision combat identification procedures that the IVIS-cquippcd units currently cannot perform. This capability impacts upon the TIPSassociated with the rnancuver functions of engaging enemy targets and integrating direct fire with maneuver.

While tlic combat identification system gives the Applique cornpany team ail increased fratricide prevention capability over the rVIS company team. thcir lack of a fa-target design;ition systcm on their combat platforna reduces their ability to rapidly and precisely derive target locations. A review of the AppliquC 7Tl's clearly indicate the limitations that manual target dc.terminatio11 procedures place upon the unit as they conduct maneuver and employ direct fires. Another variation of significance is that this source describes a technique where. "the ability to know where the friendly forces are without having to maintain visual contact enables the company team to maneuver along several axes, thus moving up to an objective and massing coinbat power rnore rapidly on thc enemy."' This 7TP represents a much bolder approach to the corlduct of company level mancuvcr than the other source. However. this tactic is not fully
described in this manual.

I 1 1 sumrimy, the ST and FKSM both represent the currcnt state of TTP development for the digitized company team. l l i s review has determined the level to which digital situational awareness systcms have been integrated into the four functions of tactical rnaneuvcr. Additionally, variations between the capabilities of the uniquely equipped digital units were identified to highlight thc inlpxts that ancillary systems, such as far target design;ition and BCIS, have upon the use of digital information systems. This review of 'ITP is not sufficient alone to detcrniinc the current state of digital operations. Therefore, t!iis study examined relevant Advanced Wrufighting Experiments to complete this review.

-of Advanccd Wa~&h&ng Ex~erinients (Arn) Results

There arc two primary sources for information regarding experimental insights from digital maneuver operations at the battalion-level and below. These sources are: Final Report of AWE Desert IIa~nmer, (1994) 1:inal Report of AWE Focused Ilispatch, (1996) 24

This revizw of experimentation provides insights into the effects that new TI'Ps and systcms have upon tactical maneuver. Advanced Warfighting Experiment Operation Desert Ilan~mer VI (AWE ODI-I-VI) was conductud at the National Training Center. Fort Irwin. California during 2 - 24 April 1994. This was the U S . Army's first large-scale, field experiment aimed to "examine the bartlcfield impacts of a battalionltask force possessing digital communications across all Baflleficld Operating Systems (BOS)."' This import;mt experiment was predicated upon a central hypothesis that " a battalion/task force using Force XXI Rattle Cornrnand (systems) would outperform a unit without such communications.'" Jn addition, numerous, subordinate hypotheses were developed in the arcas of battlefield lethality, survivability and tempo, the bartleficld operating systems (UOS). and the force development systems of doctrine, training, lendership, organi7ationc. materiel and soldier support (DTLOlMS). Overall, the central hypothcsis was neither validated nor refuted. The AWE Fin;tl Rcpm states technical immaturity of these digital systems (many still in prototype stage), insufficient quantities of digital equipment for all vehiclcs and an inability to establish hascline data for comparison were cited as contributing factors to the inability to answer the hypothesis. Additionally, this report establishes that ( I ) current digital systems provide limited improvements -in lethality, survivability and tempo, and (2) despite the inability to answer the central hypothr.sis, this experiment was extremely successful in gaining warfighter insiglirs into the

potential value-added by digitization.

This rep011specifics 7 improvcmcnls observed of the AWE Task Force that relatc to cori~pany team maneuver functions. Thcse inlprovements cite digital ?TFs employing situational awareness capabilities as causing: 1. Increased flexibility and ability to react to unexpected actions.

2. Increased ability to integrate direct tircs with obst;icles.

3. Increased ability to nlancuver CSS assets securely.

4. Reduction in the number of critical navigation errors.

5. Increased number of fighting vehicles that participate in decisive engagenicnts,

6 . Dccrease in the time expzndcd to complete actions upon contact

7. Incrcnsed ability to hand-offtargets to other elements to engage.
While lnnny 1 T P s wcre validated as feasible during this experiment, many were not due to technical shor~falls of the systems provided. Most of thcse centered around the lack of intcroprsbilily (intcrconncctivity) between the mnneuver, intelligence, firc support and air defense systems. In the c a w where important TrPs were not fully evaluated. sornc threads of

feasibility were subjectively derived by thc Suhjcct-Mattzr Expcrts (ShlE) [hilt observed the
e x p i m e n t . It was upon this basis that thercpon recommended "continuing development of doctrine and training literature through itcralive AWES." and "continuing materiel development of thcse systems."5 Where AWE Desert Hammer VI focused on the broad areas of improving lethality, survivability and tempo. AWE Focused Dispatch focused specifically on training support and

Tm for digital warfighting at the small-unit level. Major General (Retired) Lon E. hiaggart.
then chief of Armor and Cavalry, stated, where;^ luTC 94-07 (AWE Desert tlarniner VI) proved that digitized systcms arc powerful, the new AWE (AWE Focused Dispatch) was charged with figuring out how to k g i n maximizing that powcr."6 AWE Focused Dispatch was conducted 14-31 August 1995 as a series of experimen~s 'rnploying constlucti\e. virtual and live siniulations at both Fort Knox and the Army National Guard Western Kentucky Training Area in Grecnville. The final report states the ovemrching for goal of the experiment "was to refine the digital tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)

hand-off to the Experimental Force (EXFOR) paticipating in the follow-on Task Force AWE. It was ;~cconiplislicdby focusing on the processes of how to best employ digital t~hnology."' is the most con~prchensive work describing the The AWE Focused Dispatch Final Rcpo~i pe~for~ii;ince of digital 1TP to date. Foulteen company ream. maneuver TTFs werc exaniined in these experiments. Of these fourteen TTPs. thirtee~iwcrc validated as feasible and effective. One TTP was refuted due to the inability of current systems to send a digital contact report in adcquale rime to initiate an engagement. Whereas these TTP were validated for continucd use by digital units, their status as iniprorernenrs over conventional 'ill's werc nor determined by this

Comparable to AWE Desert Hammer VI, significent technical shortfalls existed that limited the interconnectivity required bctween digital systems to optimizc their effectiveness. This report declares that "the stovepipe legacy systcms used in this AWE dcrnonstrated that systems without seamless int?rconnectivity and integration impose more of a burden on the uscr than they rctum in tcmis of uscful capability and improved force elfecti~cness."~ This finding is team most valid when applicd to the battslion/task force lcvel. AWE conclusions of con~pany operations wcre gmcrally much more favorable, primarily because they wcre not directly effccted by these stovepipe systems. The Focused Dispatch Final Report makes several conclusions about digital 7TP for company tcmm maneuver that are important to this study. They arc:
1. Current hartlw;~re designs inhibit usage during vehicle niovcment.

2. Digihl systems allow more efficient use of the IeaJers tirnc.

3. Digital situational awareness reduced uncertainty for thc company cornmander.
resulting in efficicrit niovcment and rapid responsc time.

4. Current co~nbat nct radios are insufficient to moiv requircd digital information. Fartarget designation systems are essential to optinlizc digital 'ITP.
5. Current Val-iablc hlessage Formats (VMD arc too lengthy to use during contact.

6. Computer icons arc simpler to use than conventional graphical control measures.
To sumrn;~rizc, the final rcports of these two AWES provide information that establish the current cffectivcness of digital ITPs. These sources also identify critical technical shortcomingr that limit the potcntial of digital systenls for improving tactical maneuver. Perhaps the grcatest value of these rcports

the effort plxcd in articulating the "art of thc possible"

gained by extrapol;tting potcntial capabilities and TITSbased upiln subjective corlclusions of the current sietc. Exploring tlicse potcntialilies is the aim of [his rcsearch.

Awareness Situational . - .-- -.Theory

This section of this literature review examines the current state of Situation Awareness (SA) research from the scientific field of Humm Factors Psychology. The objective of this rcvicw is to dctcrn~inc what principles or insights may relate to the Army's effons to crcate digital situational awareness To meet this objective the following qucstions niust be answered: I. Wl~at is the origin of SA theory?

2. What is thc definition of SA from psychological and military pcrspectivcs?

3. What research findings and theoretical principles may relate to the A m y applica!ions?

The Origins of Situation Aw;~rencss(SA) SA as a cognitive and behavioral study originated in the U.S. military. Flach (1995) states "the term situation awareness originated with fighter pilots of the U.S. Air Force as they attcniptcd to aniculatc the difficulties of managing the complex information processing dernands of air combat. The term has more recently been embraced by thc human factors comtilunity to

define a domain of research wliose goal is to study cognition as i t occurs in complcx, dynamic work e~lvironmcnts."~ The tcrrn situation awareness spread rapidly throughout the Air Force and into co~rlniercial avi:ltioo literature. In April of 1994, then Air Forcc Chief of Staff, General blerrill
A. hlcPeak tasked Arnmstrong Laboratory to define SA, and to detcnnine whether it can be

measured and ~ e a r n c d . The ' ~ Laboratory organized a team of researchers as the situation Awareness Integration Team (SAINT) to conduct the inquiry and answer General McPe:ik's qwstions. SAINT'S technical report was submitted and briefed to Cencnl McPeak and the Air Force Science board in June of 1994. This report included a literature review of human factors research in this field of psychology and proposed an operational definition of SA for Air Force use. More importantly the team determined positively that SA could be measured and learned. Theorigin of U.S. Arnly applications of situation awareness theory is traced to two Arnly Research Institute (ARI) projects initiated in 1989 as "Research in Future Battlefield Conditions and the Comhat Vehicle Comniand and Control (CVCC) Program."" These research efforrs were aimed to support the Army movement toward vehicle-baed automated command and cor~trol (C2) systems, and to identify new challenges sniall unit commanders will f:ice in managing battlefield information. The A m y Research Institute's Field Unit at Fort Knox, Kentucky conducted basic and applied research to "enhance soldier preparedness through identification of future bactlcfield . coriditions and to develop training methods to meet those conditions."" Additionally, the CVCC program aimed to identify "the information management performance of equipped with a future command and control syste~ii."" To sumninrize, SA theory resides primarily in the field of Human Factors rcsc;trch as a branch of psychology. The migration of this research into the military was first officially leaders

recognized in aviation applications by the U.S. Air Force and then to ground conibat applications
by the U.S. Army as p;ut of the digilization initiative. The significance of this origin is that Iluinan Factors ~rsearch is a field of science relevant to current military developmental efforts towards enhancing battlefield awareness and information management through technology and training.

Situation Awareness Defined Billings (1995) in an effort to describe SA as a ficld of research states !hat "we must reincrnkr that in many cnscs we are no longer able to appreciate the true situation without the aid of machines. Arid if this is true, however, then those nuchines must tell us more of what we need to know. and must do it more effectively and less ambiguously than they have done to date."" For reasons previously stated in this study. these assertions are the basis of the U.S.Arniyy'sdigitimtion effort. Situation Awareness is dcfined by Endsley (1995) as "the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status i n the near future."" This definition is citcd in nearly all major works in the field. Endslcy further declares SA as both a process and a product by adding that "situation awareness is a state of knowledge, while situation assessmmf is the process used to achicvc that ~ t a t e . " ' ~ Endsley makcs several other statements regarding the definition of SA. First, he niaint;lins that "SA does not encompass all of a person's knowledge. It refers to only that poltion pertaining to the state of a dynamic cnvironine~it."~'In other words it is situaritmul. Secondly, l-:ntlsley states that SA is "explicitly recognized as a constmct separare from decision-nxlking and performance; and that SA, decision-nuking and ptxformance arc different stages with different factors influencing them and with wholly different approachcs for deding with each of


them."" Lastly. Endsley statcs th:it SA exists as a construct at both the individual and collective or cww levels. The U S . Air Force's SAIXT rcport defined SA as: a pilot's coriti~iuous perception of self rind aircraft in relation to the dynamic environment of flight, threats. and mission, and the ability to forecast, then execute tasks based on that

Furthermore, this rcport states that most rche;irchers "have written extensively on the cognitive

underpinnings of the SA co~istruct as a m m u l n~oclel."~~ Tlie SAINT report recommends that the
U.S. Air Force emphasize the cognitive nature of this construct; and to view the role of information technology as a enabling effort that supports the constluct. Simply sti~tcd, all of the variations of SA definitions point to "knowing wha; is going on." Scvcral critical distinctions arc established by these definitions that directly relate to Army applications of this construct toward dcveloping digital situational awareness. 'Ihesc are further examined in Chapler 4. Research Findings Applicable to US Army Efforts T3is review of SA research resulted in identifying nine compelling insights that may relate to the Amiy's effort of creating digital situational awareness capabilities as a riieans of

e inti-oduced arid improving pcrformnnce of tactical tasks and functions. While thcse insights w
described below, analysis of their implications arc addressed later in this study. Insight #I. n i c 'Ilirce Lev~ds of SA. Endsley (1988) describes the three levrls of SA comprising this construct as "perception of the cnvironmcnt (level 1 SA), cornprehension of the current situation (level 2 SA) and projection of future status (level 3 SA)."" Thcse levels of SA

arc commonly used by researchers and information system designers to dcvrlop applications that enhance this cognitive process.

Insight #2. The elenicnts of SA. Pew (1995) defines SA as "comprising five elements of awar~ness."'~ They are: 1. Spatial a w a r e n e s kcep current with the physical aspcts of the envilonrncnt.
2. hlissiodgoal awareness: keep current with c~lrrent phase and goals of the mission.

3. System awareness: trxking the opentional status of information systcms.

4. Resource awareness: keeping track of physical and hu~nnn resources involved.

5. Crew awareness: knowledge of current activities of other crew members.

Pew believes that most automation systems arc developed primarily for enhancing spatial awareness, howevcr automation can objectively enha~~ce all other elements as well. Insight #3. The States of SA. Pcw (1991) makes all important distinction in dcfining the three statcs of SA as irlral, at;ainable artdacfuul. Billings (1995) delines ideal SA as "a perfect match between the real situation and the observer's mental model of that situation."" "The attainable cace, which is ncver ideal, represents the bcst level of awareness in a perfect obsemer who assimilated all of the infonnation available about thc ~ituation."~'He continues to define
5 fallible n~ortals actually have at any given m ~ m e n t . " ~ actual S.4 as "what we a

1 % (1994) ~ tskes his model one step further by analyzing two possible relationships. These rcl;~tionships are valid as the Army examines its digital applications. Pew proposes that if operators arc found consistently to have actual SA that is inadequate compared to that which is ~~ttoinnlde, we have either an information transfer problem, or we have a training prob!em because wc havcn't taught operators how to gain and use information. tie further posits a design problem when nttai~table SA falls short of the ideal because the information available to an operator is not in a useful format. The last situation is caused when information was ncver made available to the operator because the sy.\te~ndesigner ncver Lhought the operator needed the

information. This condition is described in the AWE reports as a major shortf;dl of current digital battle command systems. Insight #4. Beitcr Distribution of Attention. A research study by Curv and Ephrath (I 977) finds "that monitors (operators) of an automated system actually performed hcttcr than manual conrrollers (in a flight t a ~ k ) . "This ~ finding confirms many othcr studies in the SA field that determine that operators using automated information systems to support their SA arc able to better distribute their attention across othcr systems and information sources to aid in ksk performance. Insight #5. Effects of SA on Cognitive Workload. Studies have determined that auro~x~ted SA systems can either increasr: or decrease cognitive wo:-klcaddepending on their design. Billings (1991) found that automation can improve SA by reducing excessive workload.

I k slates that ai~tornated SA can r d u c e cognitive workload "by relieving the operator of inner
loop control, by providing integntcd information and allowing the operator to operate at a higher ~ r v e l . "Billings ~ (1991) also found cases where automation has made "he information acquisition and assessment tasks more difficult because of the plethora of information now availi~ble, some of it not well represented."" This rcsearch suggests that design is critical to the effectivrncss of automated SA systems--which can either enhance or degrade the operator. Insight #6. SA and Knowledge and Technical Ability. Research indicates that high degrees of level 1 SA (percept~ml) (!om ,lot improve performance if the opcmtor docs not possess the knowledge and technical ability to comprehend or apply the information he possesses. In othcr words, an increase to one's perceptual SA does not, per se, result in increases in comprehension or projection abilities. Therefore, Endslcy (1995) suggests that "good SA can thcreforc be viewed as a factor that will increase the probability of good performance hut cannot necessarily gu.uantce it."m

Insight #7. Information-Bascd Task Perfornimx. Endslcy (1995) determined that the value added by the SA concept is that auto~natzdnicans can be designed to bettcr provide information to operators to aid in task perforin;mce. He states that the SA concept "provides a means of moving from a focus on providing opcrators with (Iutu to providing opcrators with
infornmtion. When focusing on data, all of the intcgration, comprehension and projection is still

up to the operator. When focusing on information, the design focus is on presenting what the operator really needs to know in the fomat that it is needcd in, thus allowing the olxrator to achieve more SA at a given level of w o r k ~ o n d . "This ~ finding is critical to the Army's continued dcvcloy~nent of battlc commnntl systems that empower, not cncumber h e soldiers that operate thzm. Insight #S. SA and the Effects of Stress. Autoination supported SA systems have been found to effectively offset thc negative effects that stress places upon human performance. The most widespread finding of the effects of stress on operator SA is that people tend to narrow their field of attention. Sheridan (1981) has termed this effect "cognitive tunnel vision"'' Rcscarch has found that this oftcn results in operators coming to premalure closure, and arriving at decisions without considering peripheral information. Additionally. when undcr stress operators have been found likely to focus rnohtly upon ncgative information. disregarding the positive aspects that coincide with the situation. Many SA rcsearchcrs believe this an area wlisre autolnatcd information systcms may enhance SA in dynamic environments of stress. Insight tf9. SA and Out-of-the-Loop Performance Problems. Endsley and Kiris (1995) problems in situations where conducled a study to examine out-of-the-loop perforn~ance operators dcrive information from automated systms. This research determined that opcraton only trained on automaicd systems are ,nore likely to be handicapped when their systems fail than operators of automated systems that have 1e;uncd task performance first by manual means.

Secondly, this research found that full-automation of SA tends to change the nature of operator activity from ocriw infornlatiorl processor to passive. This passivity was found to negatively effect SA by reducing operator vigilance in mo11ito1-ing the system, as well as inducing cotnplacency. Endsley and Kiris concludc [hat "lhis shift from active to passive processing byas 111ost likely rcsyonsible for decreased SA under automated ~onditions.)~ This important study further concludes that partial-automation of SA is a better design approach than full-automation becsuse it requires the operators to actively process information.

Concludinv Olservations This literature review concludes with [!we observations:

1. Digital situational awareness (DSA) near-cqually effects all four functions of tactical

maneuver (moving, engaging, conrrolling battle space and integrating direct-fire with maneuver).
2. While both IVIS-based and AppliquC-based TTPs are similar, some differences exist

resulting from differing ennbling ciipobilirirs such as BClS and far-larger designation.

3. Far-t.uget designation systems are critical enablers of digital TTP at the company
.team level and below.
4. Maneuver 1TPs are enhanced by application of DSA because of an:

Increased capability to orient oncself and to orient others. Increased amount of precise information lo base decisions and actions upon.
Increased ability to provide context for critical data throllgh the use of graphical

images of friendly, targcts and terrain. Incr'aed interaction betwecn leaders and subordinates during tvecrrtinn of tasks, even when physically remote from each other.
5. AWE insights conclude that despite tcchnological problems, current TIT' applications

are valid.


6. AWE findings rcport that digital situational awareness generally results in a more
flexible, tactical unit that is capable of adapting to ri~pidly changing situations without loss of

effcctiveness. 7. AWE reports posit that dctcrmining optimal TTP applications of DSA are not possible until the Army rcsolves technical problems such as stovcyiping of systclns, lack of intcrconnectivity, and bandwidth limitations.

8. Currcnt DSA applications niake l ~ r o c c s s eflciencies that rcduce the time rcquircd for
task pcdor~nance, and ultim;itcly results in a grcnter ability to recporrd effectively in dynamic cnviron~nents. 9. The U.S.Amiy application of situ:itional awareness is consistcnt with thc Human Factors definition of SA. However, tlicrc is little cviJcncc t l ~ the t Army is intcgrating the other structures of SA theory, such as the three stirks of SA, five elements of SA and individual and crew SA, into its effort to create digital situational awareness.

10. SA rcsc;uch findings extensibsly address the ncgativc effects ofautomatcd systems
used to develop and maintain SA. AWE rcports suggest that the Army may be red is cove^-ing lessons already learned in this field.

U S . Arniy Annor Center. Spccial Tcxt 71-1-1 Tactics. Technioues and Procedure of the D/gitized>mp:w Team (Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor Ccnter. 1995), 3-1

U.S. Army Armor School Fort Kmx Swdcmentd Material 71-1-1 Tactics. Tzcl~niques and Procedure of the A I , D I ~ ~ L I ~ - E Company ~~~L~ Team DUC (Fon ~ Knox, KY: Mounted Battlespace Battle Lab, 1996), 3-7.

' U S . Arniy Armor Center I:ina!-Kq~rt Advanced W a r f i ~ h t i nExwrin3ent ~ O~cratiot~

Warfighting Battlespace Lab, 1994), exec sum-1. Desert IJarnmcr VI (Tort Knox, KY: Mour~lcd -I

Ibid., exec sun]-3.

' Ibid., abstract.

Expcrimcnt Foa~sed Disp3m:l' (Fort Knox. KY: Mounted Warfighting Battlespace 1.A. 1996). introduction. --.

'U S . Army Arrnor Center Final Rmort Advanced Warfi&ine

hid.. iv. Ibid., 1-5.

John M. Flach, "Maintaining Situation Awareness when Stalking Cognition in the Wild." Pra-eedines of the International Conference on Experimental Analvsis and Measurement gf Situation Auweness , ed. Daniel J. Garland and Mica Endlsey, (Daytona Beach. FL EmbryRiddle Aeronautical University Press. 1995). 25. Grant R. Mshlillan, "Report of the Amlstrong Laboratory Situation Awareness Integration Team," Sitr~ation Papers and Annotated RibliomghalJCF-TR-19940 8 5 ,ed. M.Vidulich. C. Dorning~w, E. Vogel and G. McMillan. (Wright-Patkrson Air Force Base, Ohio: Armstrong L h r a t o r y . 1994), 37.
" Carl W. Lickteig and Cathy D. Emcry. lnforniation Manarcment Pzrfonnnncc of Future Platoon An Initial 1 n w s f i ~ ; , gTechnical ~ Report 1000. (Alexandria. VA: . .. -- - lxu_d~.~~: U.S. Anny Research Institilie for thz Bcl1;lvioral and Social Sciences. June 1994), v.
l2 13

bid. bid.. I.

"Charles E. Billings, "Situation Awareness Measuremsnt and Analysis: A Connmmt:uy." ~ r o c c e d i n ~ the ~ o International f Conference on ~xwrimental Analvsis and , Mcnsurement of Situation Awareness, ed. Daniel J. Garland and Mica Endsley, (Daytona Beach, -.. -FL: Embry-Riddle Xcronautical University Press. 1995), I. Mica A. Endsley. 'Tlleorctical Underpil~nings of Situalion Awareness Theory: A Critical Rcvicw," Proceedings of lie International Conference on Exrxrimcnml Analysis and &tsi~rcrnentof Situation Awareness ,ed. Daniel J. Garland and Mica Endslcy, (Daytona Beach. FL: Emhry-Kiddle Aeronautical University Press, 1995). 18.

hlica A. Endsley. "Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems" Ibid. 36. hid. McMillan. 38.

Humm Factors -. - - 37 (Janunry 1995), 33.



Annotated .--- - Biblbr&v -

mCynthia-~ominguez. "Can SA be Defined?," Situation Awareness: P a ~ e r s and AIJCF-TR-1994-0085, ed. M. Vidulich. C. Dominguez, E. Vogcl and G. Mchlillan Wright-Patterson Air Force Rase, Ohio: Armstrong Iabontory. 1994). 9.

" Endsley,

'Toward a Theory," 36

zi Richard W. Pew. "The State of Si~uation Awarenrsi Measurement: Circa 1995." Confermce on Ex~crimnental AndySLand.b&s~c~nenUf Procecdixs of the Intern?~ignal Situation A w a r . e ~ s ed. . Daniel J. Garland and Mica Endsley, (Daytona Beach, FL: EmbryRiddlc Aeronautical University Press. 1995). 8-9.
" Billings.




Mica A. Endsley and Esin 0. Kiris, "Thc Out-of-the-Loop Perfoni~ancc Problern and 37 (( 1995), 384. Ixvel of Control in Automation" fluman Fact01:~


Ibid. Billings. 4. Endsley. 'Toward a Theory." 40.


M~bid.. 51.

Ibid., 52. Enddey and Kiris, 394.


We must have freedom of mind, no prcjudiccs. no prepossession, no fixed ideas, no opinion ncceptcd without discussion and merely kcause it has always bcen heard or practiced. Them should be only one testreason. Marshal of France Ferdinand Foch, quotcd in Liddcll Hart, Foch: The h h of Orleans (1931)

Pu r --


This chapter describes the analytical approach used to "arrive at a dependable solution"' to the research question. The organization ofthis thesis paper parallels the research method used. F ~ c h chapter of this study presents information gained through specific research stzps and serves as a building block for following procedures. Therefore. this work follows a logical. scquentinl process of gutlicring facts and evidence, performing analysis and culminates in formulating conclusions and making recommendations.

Rescarch Design This study is most accurately charactcrizcd as a rlt.scripfive comparison form of rcsearch. An eight-step analytical process was designed and uscd in this effort. The eight steps of this rcsearch design are: I : Definition of the Problem. Prcliminq inquiry resulted in the development of a Ste~ ce~itral issue characterizing a problem in the development of digital warfighting TIT'. 'Ihis

central issue was further exarnined and structured as a primary research question based upon verification of the problems existence. The preliminary research pe~fonneil to establish the existence of the problem identified compelling indicators as to the importance of this researclt to the field of contemporary military scimce. Cbi~ptzr one rccordcd the results of this preliminary process. S t 3 2: Determination of Variables to the P d e m . The next step of the research dcsign

aimed to deterniine the critical elements, or variables, of the problem. A more detailed review of relcvmt literature assisted in isolating and refining the variables that m'ake up the rescarch problem. Thcse variiibles are FBCR2 capabilities and maneuver functions and tasks. This step resulted in identification of precise infornintionnl needs for this study. Tlicse informational nerds became the focus of the literat~~re rcview. Additionally, this step also resulted in a several revisions of the primary rese;uch question. This step was also addressed in Chapter one.

3: Identification of Current State of the Variables. A focused literature review was

pcrfolmed and resulted in mcering the studies information needs arid providing answers to secondary research questions. This step was critical in thc determination of the current state (or
wl~at is) of the variablcs nceded later in the research process for deriving conclusions and

recornniendations for potenrid (or w h t could be) applications of digital SA. Both Chapters one and two provide the results of this step. of a Relational hlodel of FBCR2 Caix~bilities ?ncuver Steu 4: E1;tiibIishnicn1 functions. - After determination of the current states of each of the variiibles, it was essential to relate them to one another. In this study, the FBCB2 capabilities were rclated to the tactical maneuver functions. The outcome desired is the identification of which I-BCB2 capabilities are involvcd in the pcrforrnance of each of the maneuver functions and tasks. Both subjective and objective data were uscd as evidence proving the existence of these relationships. This data was

gained by the literature review of TrP and AWE findings. Rcsults of this step arc found in Chapter four. S -. Criteria to Determine Irnprovcnicnt P o t c m . t g 5: Anplication of Scmcnin~!

Detcrniinntion of critical relationsliips bctwcen the major variables is insufficicnt to answer the primary rcsearch question. Therefore, Step 5 takes this process a step further in order to scarch for evidcncc of an in~yrovedrelationship betwczn the variables. This step rcquired the dcvelopnient and definition of scrccrling critcri;~ that measure actual or potential irliprovcnicrits to the perforniance of maneuver functions when aidcd by digital SA. The results of this step are found in Chnptzr four. It is imporrant to note that Steps 1 through 5 generally follow an inductive reasoning methodology where "obsemed facts are used to generate a theory."' 'Iliis theory is priliiarily a set of ass~~niptions (gained by obscmation) that describe a valid relationships bctwcen the two research variables. The remaining steps of this =search follow a deductive reasoning process that asks "what are the consequences of the theory."3 This step S t e p ~ ~ & i l v sto i sDetcnnine What htaneuver Functions Can Be I m p ~ e d . --

analyzes the evidence gained from Steps 4 and 5. The outcomes of this stcp detcrniinc whcthcr
the relationsliips caused by the integration of FBCR2 to maneuver functions have a performance improvement effect. More impon:intly, this step answers the primary research question. The outcomc of this step is expressed as determination of the prcsznce. nature and description of a causal effect. These findings are addressed in Chapters four and five. of Current State t~.fotential State. The next step of this research Stco 7: Corn~arison design compares the current state of digital ITP to thc potential state of the improved FBC82enabled maneuver functions and tasks. Conclusions ye then made relative to the potential state.

This s;ep results in establishing both scope and significance for the answcr to the primary I-cscarch question. Conclusions made of this comparison arc expresscd in Chapter five. Sle,8 Formulate Recomnic~idrltions for Potential ~ ~ A p ~ l i c a t iand o n Furthcc s Research. . The last step of this research dcsign is thc formulation of recommendations based

upon the answer to the primary research qucstion. Additionally, rccomniendations arc made for furthcr rcsearch in this field. Recommendations arc found at Chapter five. This rcsearch would be incomplete witlrout a mechanism for drawing conclusions as to thc validity of thc rescarch design itself. To cornplcte this rcse:~rch,conclusions are made in Cl~aptcr five that address the following coriccms: 1. Did the rcscarch dcsign adequately addrcss thc rcsearch question?
2. Did the rescarch design accurately define the variables?

3. Can the results of the study be generalized to larger tactical echelons?

This scction provides an overview of the measurcmcnt theory used to answcr the rcsearch qucstion of this study. Specifically, a nica~urenient theory describes "a set of assumptions about the w3y thc world of tlicory is related to the world of obscrvalion." For this study, a measurcmcnt theory was dcsigned to logically relate FBCB2 digital situational awarcncss capabilities to the funclions and tasks of tactical nianeuver to produce a set of FBCB2enabled maneuver functions. Then, the FRCB2-enabled maneuver functions were examined against screening criteria that indicate the prcscnce and naturc of improvement. In a practical sense. the measurement system of this study is used to determine causal relationships between observations and the thcorctical underpinnings of the digital situational awareness concept m applied to the ground maneuver.

The specific measurement p r ~ e d u r e devised and employed is e o ~ n p o s ~ of d Stcp 4 (dzvelop relational model) and Step 5 (apply evaluation criteria) of the overarching research design addressed earlier in this chapter. First, a relational model was developed to link specific

F H C Bcapabilities ~ to each maneuver function and task. The basis for these linkages are:
evidence of applications in current 'ITP, observations from AWES, and subjective judgnlents from military experts. The product Step 4 is a modcl showing FBCB2-enabled maneuver functions and tasks. Thus, this model only shows the logical "I-elatedness" of tlie two variables and docs nut make any judgments as to the nature or value of these relationships.
The objective of Stcp 5 of tlie measurement priredure is thc? identification of the nature

of the relationships iron1 the rel:~tionalmodel. Specifically. this step applies screening criteria to idcntify current or potential i~~iprovcments for each maneuver function and task. The product of this step is a matrix that identifies improved FRCB2-enabled maneuver functions and tasks. This research procedure recognizes [hat these causal relationships are not mutually exhaustive, meaning that other variablcs are involved that may influence performance in addition to FHCB2 situational swarencss. However, this liniitation does not inhibit the search for a valid answer to the primiq resejrch question. hforcover, this measurement procedure looks only to examine maneuver functions where evidence of improverncnt potential exist. Therefore, the identification of negative e f f c t s of applying digital situational awareness to maneuver are not within the scope of this research. Thus, the outcomes of this measurement procedure allow the determination of logical, casual relationships (if they exist) that indicate potential performance increases for maneuver TrP at the company team level.

Screening Criteria ldcntifying iniprovemcnts in the performance of nianeuver functions is the goal of this research. Thcrcfore, selecting valid screening criteria that indicate improvement arc essential. This study uses three screening criteria: Criterion one is the speed of function or task performance. This criterion determines whether there is evidence that a maneuver function or task could be performed faster. This criterion assumes that an increase in task perforniance, without loss of effectiveness, would
. iniprovement to current capabilities. constitute m

Criterion two is the level of interaction between leaders and subordinates. This criterion dctcrmines whcthcr evidence exists to indicate an increasc in leader and subordinate interaction before, during and after the performance of a mancuvcr fimction. This criterion assumes that increased intcractionis achieved without dcgradation of timeliness of action. leader autonomy, or task overloading of the soldiers involved.
Criterion three is the level of oricnt;ition. This criterion determines whcthcr evidence

exists to indicate an increased capability to achieve and maintain physical alignment of unit co11ib;ltvehicles and weapon systems in relation to critical aspects of terrain, enemy targets. and othcr friendly forces. This criterion assumes that achieving increased levels of orientation will cause improvement to performance of maneuver related usks. For the purpose of this study. an improvcnicnt is defined as the presence of one or more' ssrecning criteria for a specific FBCB2-enabled maneuver function and task.

The rcsemh design described in this chapter provides the means to answer the primary research question. The mcasurcnient procedure used includes accepted (albeit inexact) features for comparison. deterniining causal relationships and dcriving valid conclusions for the current

state of digital T I ? applications. More importantly. this research dcsign enables the formulation of recommendations as to potcnti;~lapplic;~tions of digital siluational awareness capabilities lo improve tactical performance.

Art and Science Research and Thesis (Fort Leavenworth. KS: U.S. Army Cornmand and General Staff Collcge. June 1996). 9. Claire Scllitz, L.S. Wrightman. and S.W. Cook, &search Methods in Soyii!l Relatio~i~ (New York: Holt. Kinehart and Winston. Inc.. 1976) 6.

'u.s.Arniy, ST 20-10 Master of Milititrv

Ibid.. 38.


Armed forces execute dominating maneuver when they successfully exploit technology, organization, training, and leadership to attain qualitatively superior fighting power as well as dramatic positional advantages in time and space which the enemy's countermeasures cannot defeat.' Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor. Breakine the Phalanx

This chapter highlights the analysis of data gathered to answer the primary research question. The results of this analysis are represented in two models. The first model identifies tactical maneuver functions that are enabled by digital situational awareness capabilities of the FBCB2 system. The product of this analytical model is FBCBZ-enabled maneuver functions. The second model takes the FBCB2-enabled maneuver functions and measures them against screening criteria that indicate their potential for improving performance. This chapter concludes with a presentation of findings gained through synthesis of these two models.

Analvsis of FBCB2 Capabilities Related to Maneuver Functions Determining which maneuver functions can be improved by applying digital situational awareness required the construction of a model that logically relates digital capabilities to specific maneuver functions. The FBCB2 Capabilities Related to Maneuver Functions model at Table 4 portrays these connections. This model determines a maneuver function or task

to be designated as being enabled by FBCR2 if any of the FBCR2 system's twenty capabilities are found to aid i n the pcrformancc of the function

l l maneuver functions and tasks affected by Analysis of Table 4 information finds .

awareness affects each PBCB2 capabiliries. Furthermore, the degree to which digital situ;~tion;ll
nianeuver function is not equal. While all fulictions were found to be affected by FBCB2, they were so to varying degrccs. Analysis of the variations between FBCB2 affects suggest that maneuver functions involving the eniploymcnt of direct fire have a grmter relationship with FBCB2 capabilities than other maneuver functions that do not involve direct fire. A more detailed analysis of this model finds patterns that describe these relationships in deeper dimensions. Additional analysis was perfonncd to niorc fully understand the significance of the relationships of FBCB2 to tactical maneuver functions as represented in Table 4. The first area of inquiry was to determine the number of different FBCB2 capabilities involved in the performance of each maneuver function. This was accomplished in order to gain insighrs into which maneuver functions were most affected. in a quantitative scnse, by digital situational awareness. This measurement procedure records the number of FUCB2 cupahilities involved in the perfomlance of each maneuver function. For this analysis, the maximum number of possible FBCB2 capabilities found in any one maneuver function is twenty. Therefore, a scote of twenty capabilities would mean that every l.BCB2 capability is utilizcd in the performance of a p;iriicular maneuver function. After scoring the maneuver functions in this manner, they were rank ordered. By rank ordering the maneuver functions from the most FBCB2 capabilities to the Icast, insights were gained about the variations in F'BCI32 affects. ?11e FBCB2-enabled maneuver functions in rank ordcr are:
1: Integrate Direct-Fire with Maneuver Function (20 FBCR2 capabilities)

2: Control Terrain Function (average 10 FBCB2 capabilities)


2a: Co~ltrol by Fire Task (10 FBCH2 capabilities) 2b: Control by Occupation Task (10 FBCB2 capabilitics) 3: Engage the Enemy Function (average 7.7 FBCB2 capabilities) 3a: Process Targets Task (8 FBCB2 capabilities) 3b: Select Weapon Systems Task (8 FBCB2 capabilities) 3c: Select Targets Task (7 13CB2 capabilities) 4: Mo\z Function(averagc 5.3 FHCB2 capabilities) 4a: I'ositionlReposition Forces Task (6 133CB2 capabilities) 4b: Negotiate Terrain Task (5 E73CB2 capabilities) 4c: Navigate Terrain Task (5 FRCB2 capabilities) There are several signific;int outcornes achieved by this stcp. First, a list of 10 FRCB2enabled maneuevr functions was developed for further 'analysis. Secondly, patterns began to form regarding the applicability of each FBCH2 capability towards maneuver functions. This data suggests that e v e j FBCB2 capability is elriployed in the maneuver fi~nction of Integrating Direct Firc with Maneuver. Ten of the twc.nty, or half, of the FBCB2 capabilitics were involved Battle Space function. Engagement of the Enemy and in the performance of the Cor~trolling Move functions were found to be positively affected by FBCB2 , but with lesser numbcrs of FBCB2 capabilities applic'd. This information clearly establishes that digital situational awareness capabilities have a strong influence upon the four maneuver functions. Another rneasurernent procedure used to better understand the relationship &tween maneuver functions and FBCB2 capabilities involved focusing upon the specific FBCB2 capabilities over the full range of mancuver functions. Where the previous measurement determined the number of FBCB2 capabilities in each mancuver function, this procedure aimed to dcterrnine the number of times each one of the twenty FBCB2 capabilities was involved in all 48

ten maneuver functions and tasks. This procedure took a deeper look into the relationship lxtween digital situational aw;ireness capabilities and maneuver by measuring the nun~ber of of all tcn maneuver functions and tirncs t h t FI3CR2 capabilities are involved in the perfor~n;inze tasks. llerefore, the best score a FHCR2 capability could receive would be ten applications. This would mean that an FBCB2 capability was involved in every rnaneuver function and task. The rank ordering of FBCBZ capabilities froni the most to the lcast maneuver applications.are:

1: Frieridly Situational Awareness Rcporfs (10 maneuver applications)

2: Overlays (9 maneuver applications) Coordinate Combat Operations (9 nlaneuver aypliciltions)

3: Report Eneniy Inform3tion (G mnneuvcr applications)

Report Identification Friend/Foc (6 maneuver applications)

4: Report Combat Information (4 rnaneuver applications)

Obstacle Report (4 mweuver applications) LogisticlJPcrsorinel Rcport (4 rnaneuver applications)

5: Medevae Report (3 maneuver applications)

Battle Darnage Assessment Repo~t (3 mmeuver applications) Request for CAS (3 maneuver applications) Call for Fire (3 mancuver applications) Intel Planning (3 maneuver applications) Analysis of this data indicatcs that FJ3CB2 cap;rbilitics that aid in general purpose tasks, such as providing situational awareness and enemy information, have the greatest impact upon the prfonnnnce of all tactical nianeuver functions. Perhaps this significant impact is realized because d i g i ~ d situational awarocnzss mitigates the great difficulty in exchanging situational awareness data within voice-only radio rransmissions.

Dctcrinination of which F K B 2 capabilities leust support maneuver functions and tasks was the final rncasurcrncnt procedure used to analyze the relationship between FBCB2 capabilities and nlancuvcr functions. This rneasurenmt was performed the sarnc as the procedure used to idcntify the niosr applications of FBCB2 capabilities to maneuver functions. Inverting the rank order procedure from least to most maneuver applications was the only difference in this mcnsur~mcnt.A threshold of two or less maneuver applications was established in order to eliminate duplication of data from thc prcvious imalysis. Thc rankings are: I: NRC Reports (1 mancuvcr application) Alerts (1 nlalicuvcr application) RScS (1 maneuver application)

OPOKD (I maneuver application)

Plan Combat Ops ( I nlancuver application) 2: EPW Request (2 rnancuver applications) Analysis of this data indicates that planning-oriented and single purpose tasks, such as

NDC and EPW reporting, hnve the least impact upon tactical maneuver functions and wsks. This
may be cawed by either thc lack of necd to digitize these tasks or shortconlings to the dcsign of the FBCB2 capabilities that support them. Determination of which factor is causing this finding this finding is helpful in understanding the is beyond the scope of this research. Reg;~rdless, nature of the relationship between digital situation:~lawmness and tactical nianeuver functions.

Annlfisof 1'R_CH2-EM~ed Maneuveflunctions Related to Screening Critcria .The next major step of this analytical process was to examine the FBCB2-enabled maneuver functions for evidence or performance improvement. This step involved applying

three screening criteria dcsigned to indicate actual or potential improvemenls to the perfonnance


of the FBCB2-enabled maneuver functions and tasks. The resulting data of this process is presented in Table 5. A simple three step process was used to complete this step of the research. This process was to: 1. Identify which FBCB2 capabilities are involved in the performance of each FBCB2enabled maneuver function from Table 4. 2. Determine the presence of the screening criteria for each application.

3. Establish a rationale for each positive screening criterion

The data in Table 5 indicates the presence of one or more of the performance improvement criteria to each of the FBCB2-enabled maneuver functions and tasks. Therefore,
1 1 maneuver this data suggests that digital situational awareness can improve the perfom~ance of a

functions and tasks. Moreover, five of the ten, or 50% of the maneuver functions and tasks showed presence of two or more of the screening criteria indicating a rather significant potential for improvement. In one case, that of the positiodreposition forces task of the move function, evidence of all three improvement criteria were found. Preliminary analysis also finds that while all maneuver functions are improved by digital situational awareness, they are not improved for the same reasons or to the same degree. Secondary analysis of this data was performed in order to reveal greater meaning of how digital situational awareness actually improves task performance. The first concern was to examine the distribution of performance criteria to the maneuver tasks. The rank ordering of the improvement criteria from most prevalent to least was found to be:

I. Increased Orientation (present in 7 of 10 maneuver tasks)

2. Increased Interaction (present in 6 of 10 maneuver tasks)

3. Increased Speed of Task (present in 3 of 10 maneuver tasks)

The most prevalent improvement criteria is increased level of orientation. Evidence of this criteria were found in seven of the ten, or in 7096, of the FBCB2-enabled maneuver functions and tasks. Moreover, the confidence level of this finding is very high because it is based primarily upon AWE observation data. The significance of this finding is that tactical functions that require maintaining physical orientation, or alignment, of combat vehicles, weapon systems and units can benefit most from digital situational awareness. Evidence of increased speed of maneuver task performance was found the least. Three of the ten maneuver tasks, or 30%.contained evidence of digital situational awareness capabilities as enabling the tasks to be performed faster than without digital systems. Interestingly, evidence of increased speed in task performance were found in many maneuver functions at the sub-task level. However, increased speed in sub-task performance via digital systems was not found to result in the major task or function being performed any faster. Simply stated, there is evidence of being able to do some of the lower-order tasks faster. The significance of this is that digital situational awareness systems do have a positive impact at the sub-task level even if the primary tasks they support are not performed at a greater mte. Most of the sub-tasks identified as being accelerated were planning-oriented procedures. The final step of this analytical process was performed in order to examine which improvement criterion impacted the most toward each maneuver function. The objective was to examine the data from Table 5 to determine which criterion, increased speed, level of interaction or orientation, were the predominant cause of improvement to each of the maneuver functions. This analysis proved useful in determining the nature of these enhancements. By examining the data in Table 5, it appears that both the Move and Control Terrain functions are improved predominantly by increasing the level of orientation of subordinate units through the use of digital situational awareness displays. The FBCB2 capabilities that assist in

roule planning, dissemination of hazard area inforniation. such as obstacles and enemy position. arid navigation aids were foulid to cause this increased levcl of orientation which are essential to performing the hlove and Control Terrain functions of maneuver. The Engage the Enemy function indicates that increases in spied of task perfomlance were the most beneficial applications of digital sitoational awareness. More specifically, incre:csing the speed at which several critical task can be performed by the use of digital situational awareness systems rssults in an overall improvement to the performance of this nianeuver function. The PHCBZ capabilities that allow first-line leaders to continuously and passively monitor the locations of their subordinates in relation to known or suspected enemy positions appear to reduce the lime they require to select targets, select and assign subordinate weapons systcni for eng.lgezncnt, and to put fire control mechanisnls into place within the window of time normally allotted in such circunistance. This affect results in creating advanlage for digitally equipped units to act faster in time-competitive situations common to direct fire engagements. Lastly, the Integrate Direct-Fire and Maneuver function was found to improve primarily tlirol~ghdigital systems that increase the level of interaction between leaders and their subordiniites. FBCB2 capabilities that suppon combat identification were found to have a niajor impact in this area. Additionally, the capability of integrating movement with engagement activities while leaders are physically remote historically has bcen found to be a niajor obsracle

in the perforrnmce of this function. The FBCUZ capabilities that enable sharing of situational
information in graphical format between commanders and leaders were found to offer new mcchanisrns for achieving integration during the execution of these activities.

The analysis of data gathercd in this rcsearch effort resulted in identifying eiglmt findings. These findings provide the answer to the primary rcscarch question, as well as serving as a basis for making conclusio~~s and rccornmendations. In addition to answering the prirn'uy rcscarch question, thcsc findings offer insight into the nature of time relationships betweerm digital sifi~ntional awareness capabilities and tactical maneuver functions and tasks. The findings are:
1 . All tactical nmancuver furmctions 'md tasks an: affcctcd by FBCB2 capabilities. The

tlegrces to which the functions are affected by FBCB? vary. IImc Integrate Dircct Fire with hlancuvcr function was found nmosl affected by FBCB2 wliilc the Move function was found time Ieat affected. 2. Tactical maneuver functions and tasks involving thc employ~ncnt of direct fire derive a grcatcr benefit from PBCB2 capabilities than tho.% functions that do not require fire.

3. I-3CB2,capabilities that aid in d ~ performance e of general purpose tasks, such as

sharing situational awareness information, have thc greatest impact cpon tactical maneuver functions and tatks.
4. Planning-oricntzd and single purpose FBCR2 capabilities have the least impact upon

tacticd mancuver functions and tasks.

5. Digital situafional awareness can improve all tactical nianeuvcr functions and tasks.
I~~mprovcmcnts to niancuvcr funcfions were generally found bcing caused by multiple reasons such as incrcases to the speed of task perfornmance, incrcases in leader-subordinate interaction and increases in lcvels of oriantation of those executing maneuver activities.

6 . Tactical nmancuver funcfions and tasks bencfit the most from increased levels of
orientation produced by digital ,ituational awareness capabilities.

7. Increases in the speed of task pcrforninr~ce as a result of I3CB2 were fwnd primxily at the sub-task icvel. This indicates that digital situational awareness has a positive affect at lower lcvels even if the major tasks and functions which they support are not nccclerated

8. ,Move and Controlling Rattle Space functions generally improve in tcrnis of incrcnses
in orientation; Engagement functions are improved by the spced of their execution; and Integmtion of Direct Fire arid bianeuver function improves by increased levcls of interaction

'Douglas A. Mscgregor. Rreakine the Phalanx (Westport, Connecticut: Pracger Publishers, 1997), 37.



This chapter provides concluding st; that describe the nature of the study's findings. These conilusions attempt to explain why digital battle command systems effect tactical ni;ulcuvcr as described in previous chapters of this study. This chapter then ni:ikes several rcconimendations concerning future digital TTP devclopmcnt and applications of situational awareness. 'Ihis chapter concludes with an evaluatio~~ of tl~c rcsexch design used in order to establish a degree of confidence in its findings and conclusions.

Conclusions This study makes five conclusions based upon the findings listed at the end of chapter four. These conclusions are made to explain why digital situational awareness effects the tactical maneuver functions a s found in this study. The conslusions are:
1. Digital situational awarcness can improve all maneuver functions by increasing the

speed of t;~skpaforrnancc, increasing leader-subordinate interaction during task execution and incrcxcing the levc!s of orientation of operators conducting maneuver activities. nlcse improvements are based upon threc reasons. First. FUCB2 was found to enable units to petform mancuvcr tasks more rapidly by performing marly of thcni simultaneously and earlier in the sequence of the larger processes or functions that they support. The shift from sequential cisk performance to simultaneous was

observed during A W Desert Ibnrner. where simultaneoos target hand-off procedures enabled by digital situation:il awareness was found to decrease the time required for maneuver units to conlplete actions on contact.' Observers of A W E Focused Disp;~tchconcluded that increased levels of situational awareness gained from digital systems resulted in units performing cedain tasks earlier in [he sequence of larger proccsscs or functions, thus increasing the speed of its exccl~tion and achieving more expeditious niovement and decreasing the rcsponse times required to act to uncxpecled b;~ttlcficldsituations. 2 Secondly, digital situational awareness has been found to improve tactical maneuver because i t increases the level of interaction between icadcrs and subordinates. This iricrcascd intet.action is gained by technical nicans that enable incrcascd collabor~tionduring task p f o n n a n c c and increased levels of participation by operators who arc physically rernotc but connected via digital conlniunications. These resultant effects expand the influence that both leaders and subordinates have in executing rn~ancuvertasks by reducing many of the constraints imposed by physical separation and the limitations of conventional com~nand and control systems. Moreover. AWE Desert Hanimcr observers concluded that this increased level of interaction rcsultcd in increasing the number of fighting vehicles that participate in decisive engagements.3 Thirdly, maneuver functions perfonlied with digital systems have been found tu improve levcls of orientation by increasing the accuracy. timeliness and usability of information provided when prcsentcd in to the 0pcr:itor. Most noteworthy is the finding that tactical il~fomiation graphical fonnnt, such as icons, has been found to accelerate operator perception. comprcl~cnsion and projection of future states by simplifying the use of graphical control m c a r u r e ~ .n~ i i s enhancement accounts for AWE observations attributing digital situational awareness as the primary factor in reducing the number of critical navigation errors, increasing

the ability to integrate direct lire with obstacles and to increases in the secure rnancuver of combat service support units.5 2. The degree to which digital situatio~~al awarencss improves tactical maneuver in (a) the level of situational awarencss required for functions vary based upon differcr~ces effective execution of each function, (b) the type of elements of situational awaicness required to

pelform thc function, and (c) the availability of key enabling capabilities such as far-target dcsignalion and combat identification devices. The reasons why these three areas differ is of digital situational awareness as applied to t:~ctical import;int in understan'ding the pl~enomena maneuver. This research concludes that each m;ineuver function has different informational requirements that operators need in order to perform them. More specifically, the levels of opwitor situa1ionaI aaareness required to perform them appears to be the reasori that some maneuver tasks are more effected by digital systems than others. This study finds that those rnancuver tasks which require the lowesr level of situational awarencss derive the greatest benefit from FRCB2. By using Endsley's "construct of the levels of SA, the ability to perceive ones' appears to be best provided by the currcnt bBCB2 system. erivirorinient (level I ~11)"~ Conversely, the current state of the FUCR2 system is lirnited in its capacity to support operators pcrforniing maneuver tasks or functions requiring significant dcgrecs of level 2 and 3 SA. The type of awareness required by the operator also appears to effect the degree to which digital systems improve maneuver. By comparing the inforniational requirements of operators pcrforrning each of the tactical maneuver functions to Pew's "five elements of awareness"' it appears that the typc of awarencss rcquired for task performance, such as spatial, goal, systcrn, resource or crew, greatly effects the degree to which digital systems are used. This study concludes that the current state of FBCH2 provides information primarily supporting the

elements of spatial and resource awareness. Thus a maneuver task requiring a high degrce of crew awarcness such as load, aim and fire a weapon system would not be significantly improved by the current digital battle command system. Another reason for this variance in levcls of improvement due to digital situational awareness is the availability of key enabling technologies such as far-target dzsignation and combat identification systcms. The tactical maneuver function of Engaging the Enemy is pndicatcd upon tasks that select targets and weapon systems to engage t h m with. In this case, the principle task is to obtain unknown information - not it's dissemination. Digital units with
bl l A 2 tanks equippd

with far-target designation capabilities use advanced technical means to

and automatically integrate it into their digital b;~trlecommand dcrivc unk~~own.itiforti~irtio~i systcni for rapid ditsemination. The degree to which cn~bling capabilities such as far-target

designation are available and integrated into the battle command system greatly effects the degree to which digital situational awareness improves tactical maneuver.

3. Increased level of orientation is found to be the greatest benefit gained by employing

digital battle command systems to tactical maneuver fitnctions. As was found in recent developments in aviation, contemporary ground conlbat has evolved to a level of complexity that dcnlands thc aid of advanced information systems in order to perforni effectively. The difficult cognitive task of maintaining orientation while performing company teanl maneuver requiring synchronized actions with up to 24 friendly individual combat platforms, against an infinite array of threat systems, within a dynamic physical battlefield environnlcnt has k e n ex;rcerbated by recent increases in operation;ll tempo. In;rdcquacics with current command and control procedures and communications systems in sustaining operator orientation to acceptable levels appear to be mitigated to a significant degree by technical solutions that create digital situkional awareness. AWE observations to date have found that digital battle command systems advance

operator situational awareness to a higher state of orientation than conventional command .and control systems. These factors appear to account for the nature of improvements observed of digital systems.
4. Tactical nlancuver functions that involve c~nployn~cnt of direct fire receive the

grearest benefit from digital situational awarcncss because digital systems reduce cognitive workload by "providing intcgrated information that allow operators to perform at a higher level"' while performing direct fire tasks. The capability to depict and convey engagement information within ,an intcgratd graphical display appcars to "allow the operator to achieve more situational awxeness at a given Iivel of workl~ad."~ This would account for AWE observations hat

describc units being capablc of integrating more combat systcms into dccisivc engagcmenu as wcll as completing [he engagcmcnts much faster than non-digital units.

5. Tactical rnaneuvcr functions receive a greater benefit from FBCR2 capabilities that
provide information for multiple uscs rather than single uses because it precludes some of the operator's out-of-the-loop perforniance problcms associated with fully-automating tasks. The findings of Eridslcy and Kiris' "out-of-the-loop"~O research coriducted in 1995 appear to account for this conclusion. blaneuver tasks performed with information solely provided by digital means where not found to derive significant levels of improvement during rccent AWES. Examples of this are chemical and air altack early warning and reporting tasks. The near-full autoniation of these tasks within FBCB2 was found to cause operator complaccncy and passivity during perforniance. Conversely, maneuver tasks performed with padial-automation of operator siruational awarcncss information were found to have significantly fewer out-of-thc-loop problems.

Reco~nniendations Iliis section ninkes recommendations as to how the Army can 1naximi71:the application of digital situational awareness towards improving tactical maneuver in the future. The purpose of these recom~iiendationsis to provide a broad, conceptual basis for the continued developnie~it of digital warfigliting tactics, techniques and procedures. As such, they are intended to set an azimuth for future research, experimentation and implcnicntation.

1. This study finds that current applications of digital battle command effectively
support irnprovernent of tactical nimcuver functions and tasks and reconimends the continued devclop~ncnt of FBCB2. To do so would require a continued conimitnicnt to develop digital architcctures using the new. bottom-up approach establishc.d by nlCD2. This design focuscs on tl~c info~miationalneeds of the small-unit wartighter and builds upward to his command structure. This study finds this new paradigm estential to optimizing the use of digital technology on the battlefield.

2. The availability of key enabling systenis that capture or derive critical target
information such as far-target designation of the MIA2 and combat identification devices are crucial in gaining a digital situational advantage. These enabling systems should be developed for all combat platfor~ns, especially infantry fighting vehicles. This study's findings strongly rccommcnd that procurement decisions i n the future take into account the major rolc these systcnls have upon achieving qualitative performance in~provcmcnls when utilizing thesc systems embcdded within a combat platform.

3. This study recommends that the A m y initiate a major effort to recngincer thc tactical
decision making process given the significant changes in perform:mcc conditions that digitiwtion creates. The central focus of such an effort should be to find procedures to better distribute the use of available time to develop more flexible plans given the grcatcr propensity for digital units

to synchronix activities during cxecutian. Several Army organi7;itions, such as the National Training Centcr and the Command and General Staff College, are currently exploring modifications to the current planning process that capture the new conditions that digital systems create when monitoring, planning and directing tactical engagements and battles. Army senior leaders should continue to support such effort. 4. Recommend that the A m y continue to support research of naturalistic decision niaking theories for potential application to digital battle conimand at the snlall-unit level. This arm of research explains how decision making occurs as a natural though process of people involved in dynamic situations such as combat. Models like Klein's (1986) Recognition Primed Dccision ~ o d c l " appear to have great relevance towards the performance of digitally-enabled tactical maneuver and battle cornn~and functions. This study recommends expcrimcntation and incorporatio~~ of naturalistic dccision making strategies inro digital battle command processes that support tactical maneuver. 5. This study finds the research completed in the situational awareness field as extrc~ncly relevant lo the development of battlefield awareness. The suttes, levels and elements of situational awarcncss are useful constructs for n i i l i t q developxs and practitioners to use to develop futurc warfighting capabilities. The Army should integrate mom of these constructs into its leader development models and warfighting 'ITP. For example, understanding the five elements of situational awareness (Pew, 1995) would help conipany commanders to develop better information requirements. such as CCIR, as well as improving reporting techniques employed to dissrtrninate critical combat infomlation. Developing 'ITP that accounts for the three states of situational awareness (Pew, 1994) would assist in identifying reconnaissance objectives that arc linked to key decisions and actions that may increase the probability of success of tactical engagements. These and other applications should be explored for the future.

6 . Reco~nmendthat the Army re-examine the information sysiem design descriptions of

current and proposed digital systems based upon tlie findings in the Human Factors field. Contemporary rrscarch indicates that information systcm design has as much to do with creating cognitive overload as does the volume and frequency of infomiation involved or procedures employed by the operator. Clearly, the Army must address all the variables effecting this important challenge if i t intends to achieve a significant warfighting advantage by leveraging enhanced infomiationiil cap;~bilitics.The Information-Based Task Performance motlcl described in Chapter Two appears to be a lucrative place to &gin such an effort.

7. This study reco~nmends that the developrnent of our opcrators must parallel or exceed
the rapid dtlvelopments of the materiel systems i n which thcy will fight with. Current technologies do not replace the human operator's function in deriving lcvel 2 SA (comprehend the environment) and 3 SA (predict future states of the environment from the current), and making tactical decisions. Ixader development through education and training is increasingly an essential enabling capability to digital warfighting. Situational awareness theory suggests that our warfighters will require a rich and broad array of mental models gained by repetitive. simulated and actual engagement experiences if they are to be capable of comprchending lhe information that is now available to them. This study reconimcnds focusing the warfighting aspccts of Army leader development towards developing the mental models required to comprehend tactical situations and predict future states from them.
8. This study recornn~ends that the Army continue to develop digital teclinologies

employing the strategy of partial-automation in order to prccluJe or mitigate tlie potential for operator out-of-the-loop performance problems. Additionally, training strategies must contend with the dual nature of training both manual and automated modes of many critical tasks in order to maintain the capacity for operators to perform during periods of system failure. To do so

would rcquire the Anny to develop a full complement of training literature. including Soldicr's Manuals that incorporate both digital atid rn;~nualprocedures. 9. Future research of this topic should bc focused upon comparing these findings with the data gained from the rccent Amly Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighling Experiment cornplcted in March. 1997. Validating or refuting the conclusions made in this study based upon new evidence would advance this most important field of contemporary military science. Towards this end more rese.uch is rccomllicnded. of Research Desim Evaluation--The research design results in an acceptable degree of confidence for conclusions about the n~anner in which digital situational awareness improves tactical nianeuver functions wilhin the parameters set forth in this study. Given the relative immaturity of this field of military science, this research design was intended to induce an unproved solution to the primary research question based upon observed facts gained during exp-rimentation and theoretical conclusions of the literature review. Towards this end this research is successful. However, a shortcoming exists that requires articulation for those undcrtaking furlher research of this topic. The validity of applying the conclusions made reg;uding the czpabilities of the FBCB2 systern in the f u t ~ ~is r esomewhat lirnitcd due to the changing nature of the prototype system examined. Effort to extend the validity of these findings was made by controlling this variable by examining boll1 objective and Sllpplied FBCB2 capabilities. Any major changes to the capabilities being developed for the objective kBCR2 system will require further rescarch to determine optimal applications. Despite this shortcoming, the conclusions made in this study remain within acceptable level of validity. While this study examined the effects of digital situational awareness on maneuver functions at the company team level, it's findings are not limited to this echelon alone. The


conclusions and recon~mcndationsmade are reasonably valid for extrapolating to battalion and brigade echclms as well. During the conduct of this research significant evidence was found to validate the causal relationsl~ipbetween digital situational awarcricss and maneuver functions at echelons above company. Moreover, many of the conclusions and reconlmendations regarding the use of situational awareness apply to other battlefield funcfions other than maneuver. The battle command and fire support functions are found to share reasonably similar relationships with digital systems as dues maneuver. In these instances, this study may serve a broader prposc of advancing the development of digital warlighting at all tactical echelons. If so, then this research was successful.

'u.s. Arnmy Amlor Ccntcr Final R c ~ o rAdvanced t UUarfigh_th Ex~eriment 01xri!tim Desen 1I.lrn1i~cr VI (Fon Knox, KY: Mounted Warfighting B;~ttIespaceLab, 1994). D-9.
2 ~ . Anny ~ . Armor Center Final Rwon Advanced Warfighting Experiment Focused Dis~atch (Fort Knox, KY: Mounted Warfighting Battlespace Lab, 1996). 3-9.


Final Revon A(1vaoccd \.Varfi$lling ExDeri~ilent Owration Desert Hammer V ! . D-32. Final-.R e s r-. t Advanced -. Warii~hting Experiment Focused Dis-mch, A-78.

'~bid.,3-9. 6hfica A. Ends!ey. "Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems" HumanFactors 37 (January 1995). 36. 7

Ibid., 35.

Mica A. Endsley and Esin 0. Kiris. "The Out-of-thc-Loop Pcrforrnance Problem and Level of Control in ~ut&nation"Iluman Factors 37 (January 1995). 381. ?Endsky, 'Toward a Theory." 51.

%ndslcy and Kiris, 394.

. I I Gary A. Klein, R. C a l d e w o d and A. Clinton-Cirocco, "Rapid Decision Milking on the Fire ~ r o u n Procecdinrs k of the Himan Fxtors Society 30th A w l Meeting (1986). 576.


Table I . Capabilities of Force XXI Battle Command-Brigade &Below (F13CD2)

Friendly Situational Aw;lreness Rcpbning Idcntify Friend or Foe (IFF) Conduct Intelligence Planning Rcport Enemy Inform;~rion CollecrlI)isseminate Combat Informntion & Intelligence Plan Combat Operations Prcpve and Issue O r d m Coordinate Combat Opcralions Request Fire Support Collccr / Rcport RECON & SURVEILLANCE I~iformation Prcpnrz and Issue Alcrts Repon NBC Information Report Battle Damage Assess~nent Request hlEDEVAC Report Obstacles Prepare and Conso1id;ik Overlays Plan & Report I.ogistical/Pzrsonncl Information Rcpon EI'W, Non-Conlbatants & De1.1' mces Network h4anagement

Source: U.S. Army. Force XXl Battle Command - Bricade and Below (FBCB21User Functional Descrifiog ( h n Knox, KY: U.S. Army Arn~or Cenlzr, 1995). 1. . ..-.--

Tahlc 2. hlancuver Functions and Tasks

T.A I. 1 MOVE: T A . ~ . I .Position/Reposition I Forces -TA. 1 .I .I .I Prepare for Movement -Inad -Inspect

-TA 1 .I. 1.2 hlovc While Mounted -initiate Movement -Forrn;~tions Rr Movement Techniques -Respond to Vehicle Emergc~icics -Trsnsfer Bctween hlodes of Convc).mcc -TA Close into Tactical Positions -Disembark From Conveyance -Deploy Into Position TA. 1.1.2 Negotiate Terrain -Travel Over Unimproved Terrain -Ford,'Swim -Cross Gaps in Stride -Self-Breach Obstacles -Self-Recovery
TA. 1.1.3 Niivigate -Detemine Distance, Dircction, Location and Elevation -Select Routes -Provide Data for Navigation Aids -hlaintain Orientation -Determine Rates of Movement

T.A 1.2 ENGAGE ENEMY: TA. 1.2.1 Employ Direct-Firc -TA. 1.2.1.I Process Direct-Fire Targets -TA.I . Select Direct-Fire Targets -Designate Target AreadFields of Fire -Prepare Sector Sketch -Choose Tiugets for Engagement

Table 2. h.l;incuver Functions mtl Tasks (Ccntinued)

TA.1.2.1 Enlploy Direct-Fire (continued)


-TA. I .2.1 .I .2 Select Direct fire Systems -Detcrniine System Capabilities -Determine System Availability -Choose Weapon Systems -TA. Engage Dircct-Fire Targets -Empli~ce Direct-Fire Wupons -Update Fire Conwol Systems -P~.epare Ammunition -1,oad. Aim and Fire Weclpcns

T.A 1.3 CONTROL BAITLE SPACFf ERRAIN: -TA. 1.3.1 Control Terrain Through FirdFire Potential
-TA.1.3.2 Occupy Terrain -Occupy Fighting Positions -Occupy Suppon Positions

?'.A 1.4 DI'TEGKA'I'F, DIRECT FIRE WITH MANEUVER: -Combine all tactical direct-fires with the m'meuver into a cohesivc action.


U.S. Arrny, TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9 Bllie~rint of the Bat!lr.ficld (Fort Monroe. VA: U.S. Anny Training and Doctrine Command. September 1993, D- I .

T:~blc3. Current Digitized Company Team TTPs (As Related to Mancuver Functions)

Moncuvcr Function: .- - hlove hlove Dispersed During Limited Visibility (AJ) Select Xianeuvcr Routes with Digital Information System (A,I) h'ivigate Using Digital Information System (Waypoints) (A.0 Maintain Fomiation Orientation by Monitoring Automatic Position Reports (A.1) Move Toflhrough Breached Lanes with Digital Route I~~forniation (A,I) Inspect Subordinate ~Mancuver Graphics Whilc Remote (A.1) Usc Movemcnt En Masse Formation (AJ Monitor Movcment Progress with Digital Reports (A.1) hlove on Dispcrscd/Separ;ite Routes (A)
...--Function: E. n . gageJ~c~y hlancuver

Digital Call-For-Fire Technique (A,I) OrienUControl Fires aitli Digital TRPs (A.1) Prspare/Disseminatc Digital Sector Sketches (AJ) Shift Fires Bctween Ovenvatch and Maneuver Forces with Digital Icons (I) SelectJhIonitor Target Engagements with Digital TRPs (I) Integrate Platoon and Company Fire Plans Digitally (A,I) Pcrform Prccision Combat Idenlification (A) M;~ncu\;er Function: Control Terrain Digitally Exchange Graphics wit11 Adjacent Units (AJ) OricntlMonitor Rcorg;inizatioo-Consolidatioriwith Digital Infomiation (A.1) Perform Overwatch of Kcy Terrain while Maintaining Awareness (I) Monitor Fricndly Forces Opzrating in Terrain Bcyond Physical Vicw (A,I) Initiate Be Prepared Missions with Digital Graphics (A,I) Coordinate I Exccute Patsage of Lines with Digital Situational Awareness (A,I) Maneuver Function: Inteqate Direct Fire with Maneuver -Develop/Fight With Digital Fire Plans (AJ) Control Direct Fires and Mancuver with Digital Information (AJ) Digitally Disseminate Results of Leaders R a o n (AJ Pcrforrn Digital Obstacle Reporting (A.1) Integrate Fires and Xfancuver by Dynaniic Digital Overlay hlanagcment (AJ I ) Direct Fire and Mmeuver with Digital Icons ( Intcgratc Adjaccnt/Supporting Unit Mancuver/l-'ircs by Digital Overlay Exchange (A.1) Note: The designation (A) denotes an Applique TIP; (I) denotes an IVIS-based TIP. Source: U.S. Army Armor Center, Special Text 71-1-1, %&s, Techniqucs and Procedures for the Dicitize~oj!~panv Team (Fort Knox. KY: U.S. A m ~ y Armor Centcr, 1995). 3-1.

Table 4. Relationship of ITBCR2Capabilities and Maneuver Functions

Noler: FBCB? cqabiliry "ncwork managernenl" is reqilircd for all func1ionsl!;zks

Titble 5. Relationship o f FBCB2-Enabled Maneuver Functions to I n ~ p r o v m c n Criteria t

hlancuver Functiot~s and Tasks lntegrdtion of DF

w l mmcover

Incrcasc in lender & Increase in spced of task perfo~mnnce subordinate interaction

Increase in level of orietitation

Y E S (A. D)


YES (D, S)

Cootn)l terrain with fire (kcupy tcmlio

Engage: Process targets Engage: Sclw.1 weapon

YES (D. S)

YI 3 (D. S)
YES (D, S)

P i 0

Y I 3 (A. D)

Y ? 3 (A. D)

AJ-suns Engage: Sclect tiugets

YFS 0, S)

YES (D. S)
YES (A, D)

Engags: Engngc targets

fove: Positiodrepsitioo

YES (A. D)

Key: Basis for findings are A: from AWE ohscrvntion; D: ftuni culreiit digital 'I-TP, S: subjeutivc judgmem by sul~jcct-ni;~tler cxpcrt

Rooks hlacgregor, Dougls A. &~k&thhpfir?l;~~~. Wcstport, CT: Prazger Publishers, 1997 Owens, William A. Dominant Rnttlespace Knowlcdgc. Washington, DC: National Defense University Prcss. 1995. S~.llitz,Claire. L.S. Wrighlman, and S.W. Cook. Rcscxch Methods in Social ReIa!ions. New York. NY. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976. Scnge. Peter M. The Fifth Discipline. New York. NY: Doublcday. 1990. Turabinn. Kate L. A hfnnual for Writers of Tern1 Piiwrs. Theses, and I)issenations. 6th ed. Chicago, 1L: The University of Chicago Prcss. 1982. CA: Bcrrett and Wheatlcy, Margaret J. Imadcrship and the New Science. San ~rmcisco. Koehler Publishers, 1992.

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. Amiv Enternrise Strat&.


Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of the Army,

A m v h10demi7A~tion..Plan-1996. Washington, DC: -- . -Arniy. 1993.

Office of the Secremry of the

. -Armv Posture Statement FY 97. A m y , 1996.


Washington, DC: Hcadquartzrs, Depaut~ncntof the

. "Battle Command" (Draft 2.1). Fort Leavenworth. KS: Battle Command Battle Laboratory, 1994.
(Finalme). Fort Leavenworth.-KS: Rattle Command Battle Laboratory. 1996.

. Battle Command Technique.<and Procedures; A Cornm.l_n&s:Guide -

. Ba~rleLabs: Dcfinhg the Future. Fort hlonroe, VA: Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Co~nmand,1995.

. Field hlanual 24-7. Annv Battle Command Sy.s!xns Mana~enientTcchni~ues. Washington. DC: Hcadqualters, Department of the Amy. 1995.

U.S. Army. Field Manual 1M)-5, Operations. Washington. DC: Headquarters, Depfilllent of the Army. 1993.

. Field Manual 101-5. Command-and Control for Commanders and>&ff (Final Draft). Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Coni~iiand and Gcnenl Staff College, 1995. . Field Manual 101-5, The Stiiff and Cornbat Orders. Washington. DC: Headquarters, Department of h e Army, 1940.

Report: Advanced Warfi~htinc 13pryrinient D-cscrt I l a n i n ~ Fort . Knox, KY: Mounted Battlespace Battle Lah. 1994.

Final .

. 1:inaI Report: Advanccd Warfiehtin~I 7 x p c r ~ ~ eFocused nt Dis9;itch Fort Knox, KY: hlounted Battlespace Battle Lab, 1996.

. .Force XXI, Amcrifa's~nnv of the 21st Centurv. Fort 1Monroe. VA: Ikadquarcers, Training and Doctrine Command, 1995.

. Fort Knox Supplzmcntal Material 71-2-1, The Dicitizcd Battalion Task Force. Fort Knox, KY: Headquarters, US Army Armor Center, 1995.
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Joint . Vcnture Campaign Plan. Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command. 1995.
. Lmd Combat in -. . the 21st -- Centurv. - Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, Trainilig and

Doctrine Cotnrniuid. 1996.

. R~equirenientsDetermination. Fort Monroe. VA: Headqu,mers. Training and Doctrine Command. 1996.
- . Student Text 20-IO,&.asters of h l i l i t a s and Sciznce Rescarch and Thesis. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Anny Command and General Staff College, June 1996.
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Knox, KY: US Arniy Amior Center, 1995.

. Student Text

101-5,.C~mind and Staff Decisio!~Process. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College. 1996.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-XXX, "Concept for Battlefield Visualimtion" (Final Draft). Furt Monroe. VA: Hcadquartcrs. Training and Doctrine Command, 1995.

U.S. Army. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, T i e Evolution of Full Dimension O!xrations Conce?t. Fort hlonroe, VA: Ileadqunrters. Training and Docmine Command, 1994.

-. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-69, Conceet for Information O~erations.Fort hlonroe, VA: I leadquarters. Training and Doctrine Cornniand. 1995.
. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7 I. Force XXI Division Opxations Cone-e@. Fort Monroe.

VA: Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Cornmand, 1996. Functional Dexription: Force XXI Battle Command Rrigade and Below. lJser Fort Knox. KY: Headquxiers, Arnior Ccnter, 1994. Articles and Periodicals

. . .

Endsley. Mica A,. and Esin 0. Kiris. "The Out-of-the-Loop Performance Problm and Level of Factors, 37, January 1995.384. Control i n Automation." k1111iian Longhouser, John E. MG "Converting Computing Power into Comhat Power." &rjy Reseiuch, Develo~ment a&jcauisition Renort. March-April 1996.4. Steele, Dennis. "Countdown to the Next Century," AnX. NovemLxr 1996. 20

Billings, Charles E. "Situational A w a r ~ n ~Me;lsurcmt.nt ss and Analysis: A Co~nnientary." presented as p a t of the "Proceedings of the International Conference on Expcrirnental Analysis and hleasuren~cnt of Situational Awareness." Daytona Bcach, H , :Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. November 1995.

a r College monograph. Cardine. Christopher V. "Digitiwtion of the Battlefield." A m y W Carlisle Barracks, PA: U S . Army W.u College, 1995.
Doniinguez, Cynthia. "Can SA be Defined?" Situational Awareness: Papers and Annotated Bibliogpghy, Report AUCF-TR-1994-0085. Wright-Patterson Air Force h s e , OH: Arrnstrorig Laboratory. 1994. End,ley, Mica R. "Theoretical Underpinnings of Situ;~tionalAwareness Theory: A Critical Review." Paper presented as part of the "Proceedings of the International Conference on Experimental Analysis and Measurement of Situational Awareness." Daytona Beach, 1 : L : Ernbry-Riddle Aeronautical Univcrsity. November 1995. Endsley, Mica R. "Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems." Texas Tech University. Lubbock, TX. 1995.

Faliesen. Jon J. Technical Report 984 "Overview of Army Tactical Planning Perfonnance Research." U S . Army Research In.\titute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1993. Fedcrico, Pat-Anthony. "Expcrt m d Novice Recognition of Similar Situations." Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego CA, 1995. Fischzr, Susan C., and James Geiwetz. Tcchnical Report 103 1 "Training Strategies for Tactical Pattern Recognition." U S . Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Santa Barbara, CA, 1996. Flach, John M. &hintainin~ Situiitio~ialAwareness when StaIkin~ C_o&n*on in the Wild. Paper prescntcd as part of the "Procecdinrs of the International Conference on . . Exycrimental Analysis and Measurement of Situational Awareness." Daytona Beach, IL: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. November 1995. Ilalpin, Stanley M. and Kecne, Delane S. "Dcsert Storm Challenges: An Overview of Dese~t Storm Survey Responses." U.S. Amiy Research Institute Tor the Behavioral and Social Sciences,.Research Report 1633. 1993. Licktcig, Carl W., and Cathy D. Emery. Technical Report 1000 "Inforniation Management Performance of Future Platoon Ixadcrs: An Initial Investigation." U.S. Army Reseach Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Fort Knox, KY, 1994. and Temll F. Saxon. "Critical Factors in the Art of Battle Command." US Lussicr. James W.. Army Rcsearch Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Fort Leavenworth, KS 1994.
a n Improve the Mayfield. Thorns D. "Parallel Planning: How Digital Information Systems C Combat D~ision-Making Process." School of Advanced Military Studies moiiograph. Fort Leavenworth. KS: Command and Gcncral Staff College. 1995.

hIcGinnis, Michael "Battlefield Information for Commanders." Naval War Collcge monograph. Newport. RI: US Naval War Collcge, 1995. McMillan, Grant R. "Report of the A~mstrong Laboratory Situational Awareness Integration Team." S 3 o n a l Awareness: P a ~ e r s and Annotated Biblioerqhy. Report AUCFTR-1994-0085. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. OH: Armstrong Laboratory. 1994. Nichipomk. Brian. Report DRR-659-A "Information Technologies and The Future of Land Warfare." RAND Arroyo Center. Santa Monica, CA 1994. Pew, Richard W. 'The State of Situational Awareness Measurement: Circa 1995." Paper presentcd as part of the "Pr&eedings of the International Conference on Experimental Analysis and h:casurement of Situational Awareness." Daytona Beach. FL: EmbryRiddle Aeronautical University, November 1995.

Hartzog. William W. GEN, Comni:i~ld~'r, U.S. A m y Training and Doctrine Command. hlceting not'rs by author. 28 Novemher 1995. Hzatlqualters. Fort Monroe. VA. Reimer, Dcnnis J. GEN, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. Addrcss notes by author. 25 October 1996. Fort Leavenworth. KS.

1. Combined Arms Rcscnrch Library U.S. Army Con~mand and General Staff College I Reynolds Ave Fort Leavcnwonh, KS 66027-1 352

2. Defense Technical Center Cameron Station Alexandria. VA 223 14 3. LTC Stcven L. Davis Center for Army Tactics USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth. KS 66027-1352

4. hlM Kevin D. Poling Center for Army Tactics USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027- 1352 5. S I C John T. Brown, Ph.D. Combat Studies Institute USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
6. Commander US Army Training and Doctrine Command Headqoarters Fon Monroe, VA 23651
7. Commandant U.S. Army Arnior Center Fort Knox. KY 40121

8. Commander 1 1 1 Corps Fort Hood, TX 76546