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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Headquarters
Type of event: Interview with Tony Ferrante
Date: April 19, 2004
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA Headquarters Building, Washington, D.C.
Participants - Non-Commission: Brook Avery, Chief Consul Office, FAA
Participants - Commission: Team 8: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown
Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details.

Background:

Ferrante began his career with the FAA in 1982 after ten months as a military
controller. He was a controller at Pittsburg Tower, in Miami, and in 1988 took a Staff
position. In 1989 was a Supervisor for Miami Tower, and in 1991 was an Assistant
Manager. In 1993 he became a Specialist in Civil Operations at FAA Headquarters. In
1994 he was promoted to Assistant Division Manager of Civil Ops. In 1995 he became
Manager Terminal Flight Service Operations and Procedures (ATO-120). In 1997 he
became Assistant Manager of Air Traffic Investigations (AAT-201). In 1998 he became
the Manager of Air Traffic Investigations (AAT-200). He has had various details since.

In the fall of 2001 Ferrante reported to David Cannoles (AAT-20). AAT-20 is

responsible for Evaluations and Investigations. Ferrante headed the Investigations
division. Cannoles reported to Jeff Griffith and Bill Peacock.

September 11, 2001 (9/11):

On 9/11 Ferrante was in Chicago. When he returned to the FAA Headquarters

building on September 12, 2001, he immediately began to oversee what information had
been gathered. The forerunner of the DEN line had been established, and he checked that
line periodically. He met with the FBI and began turning over information and data
records. Cannoles and Doug Gould were present as well. They reviewed air traffic
controller (ATC) tapes, controller statements, facilities logs and Ferrante reviewed
SATORI radar data. Ferrante believes the Doug Gould reviewed the SATORI with the
FBI.

Traffic Situational Displays (TSDs) were located in the offices of Monte Belger,
Mike Sorello (sixth floor), Jeff Griffith, the Air Crisis Center (ACC), and "perhaps" Bill
Peacock's room. Ferrante believes snapshots of the air traffic system shut down from the

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TSD were provided to the FBI. Some TSD data was used in the FAA's Summary of Air
Hijacking Events.

On Thursday 13 September 2001 Ferrante and his colleagues began

reconstructing events of the attacks for the aforementioned FAA book. The
Administrator, Jane Garvey, wanted more information and materials on what hade taken
place.

Cannoles specified that he wanted the exact data that recorded the events. The
parameters were to start from the taxi instructions given to the aircraft, through the point
where the flights were received by air traffic control, and then up to the point at which the
hijack was confirmed. Their primary resources were facility logs, personnel statements,
radar data, and voice data. In the normal investigative progress, the record is five minutes
before the initial contact with the air traffic system to five minutes after the last contact
with the air traffic system.

Ferrante specifically noted that for every entry in their log book there is an
underlying document.

Ferrante believes Col. Atkins, as the military liaison, may have been exposed to
any NEADS logs in possession of the FAA during their timeline efforts. Ferrante knows
of no classified documents that contributed to the FAA timetable. Ferrante had his
assistant gather the chronology information and gave the reports from Dave Cannoles at
"somepoint" on the afternoon of September 16, 2001. During his normal course of work,
if an investigation indicates that there were traffic violations, then the investigator will
seek to review all the materials from all the facilities.

Ferrante knows that John White was monitoring the FAA Tactical Net from
Herndon Command Center. He also understood that the Herndon Command Center might
have been running two or three separate lines at the time with the facilities.

Ferrante stated that the Summary of Air Hijacking Events was designed
specifically to explain how the air traffic system performed; not how FAA Headquarters
operated. The item was created specifically to formally brief the FAA senior executives.
Ferrante further explained that Washington Operations Center (WOC) notification of an
event is not included in such an item. The item would contain the technical issues that are
pertinent to what was done in the air traffic system to address an event.

Ferrante understands that the military notification times on 9/11 become an issue,
but that notification to the WOC was never addressed. Ferrantee explained that the
tasking to uncover notification issues was focused on how the facilities communicated
regarding the aircraft. They also addressed when the air traffic system partook in
notifying the military.

Ferrante did not personally look at the communications that originated from FAA
Headquarters on 9/11, and is not aware that this effort was made by any of his colleagues.

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Further, he commented that a field facility or Regional Operation Center (ROC) may
have had different reporting responsibilities than Headquarters.

Ferrante explained that in his career he never was exposed to a response to a

hijacking that was not operated by FAA Security. He commented as well that it was
unusual for a Boston Center controller to notify Otis ANGB of the event. The
investigators recognized this example and looked to see if other facilities notified either
the ROC or the WOC.

Ferrante commented that the notification to the military regarding UAL 93 was
solely the knowledge on the aircraft that was passed to Colonel Atkins in the Crisis
Center.

Ferrante explained that pre-9/11 a Supervisor or Operations Manger in Charge

(OMIC) at a Center would call either the ROC or WOC. The WOC at Headquarters
notifies Civil Aviation Security (ACS), and then the crisis management guidance is
initiated for ACS to notify the National Military Command Center (NMCC).

The communications on the Tactical Net are not represented in the Summary of
Air Hijacking Events since Ferrante did not know there was a Tactical Net, or what the
role of the ACS was on 9/11.

Ferrante assumed that Darlene Freeman's group conducted the assessment of

what the ACS did on 9/11. He has no knowledge on this topic.

Ferrante did ask the Regions to look for the notifications that were performed at
the different Centers. David Cannoles worked with Freeman's group on the effort.

Ferrante commented that the notification of the threat to UAL 93 may not have
been in the chronology because it occurred after their information indicated that the flight
had crashed. Ferrante commented that he would need to look at the log entries they
received to see if there was information that was in his possession when compiling the
Summary of Air Hijacking Events to see if there is an entry for a 10:07 AM notification to
NEADS. He believes that the only UAL 93 notification he was aware of involved Col
Atkins. Ferrante took the position that incorrect information was not included in the
report. Ferrante believes that "somebody" at the FAA built a chronology based off of
either NEADS materials or from a running chronology that was developed in the
Cannoles conference call room. He believes the built chronology was given to him by
David Cannoles or Dan Diggins. Ferrante also worked with Doug Gould.

Ferrante stated that he did not partake in discussions on the differences between
the FAA and the military chronologies. Ferrante believes it was clear to David Cannoles
that the Summary of Air Hijacking Events was not an assessment of the management flow
of information. Ferrante was not consulted on the chronology that was issued in August
2002 by the FAA.

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