Binay VS Domingo Facts: On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No.

60 (A resolution to confirm and/or ratify the ongoing burial assistance program extending P500 to a bereaved family, funds to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury.) Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of P400,000 for the implementation of the program. However, COA disapproved Resolution 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds. COA denied the petitioners reconsideration as Resolution 60 has no connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc of the inhabitant of Makati. Also, the Resolution will only benefit a few individuals. Public funds should only be used for public purposes. Issue:WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause\ Held:Yes Ratio: The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local

government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein." Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken

as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise. Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by themunicipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouseof the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from saidblock of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code (2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipalityof Virac is unconstitutional and void. Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is anuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.

Macasiano vs. Diokno Levy D. Macasiano vs. Honorable Roberto C. Diokno G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992 Medialdea, J.: Doctrine: Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. Facts: On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon, pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1979, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions.. On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Paraaque issued a resolution authorizing Paraaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Paraaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets. On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to respondent Palanyag.

Issue: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid. Held: No. The ordinance or resolution authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for a flea market is invalid. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has the authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance. Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with people, houses and traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow the establishment of a flea market along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the problem of congestion. Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount

considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community. Every local government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective, the local government should refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare. Parayno vs Jovellanos G.R. No. 148408 Subject: Public Corporation Doctrine: Police power Facts: Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioners gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law. According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire; 3) residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to

expose residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of traffic. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she filed a case before the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an invalid exercise of the latters police powers HELD: The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the gasoline filling station is not under Sec 44. The Counsel in fact admitted that : That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as differently defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code; The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making them. hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that gasoline service station under Section 44 necessarily included gasoline filling station under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a gas service station did not automatically embrace those in a gas filling station. As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioners gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner. A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are

reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution. Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either. Moreover, petitioners business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location. On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of Calasiao, we again note: Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander.. recommended to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185. It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is in the heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao. Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning Ordinance. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from

enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location. TANO v. SOCRATESFacts: The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of:(1) Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled: " AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"(2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in any business,trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the articles for which a permit isrequired to be had, to obtain first a Mayors and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessaryinspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesa and,( 3 ) R e s o l u t i o n N o . 3 3 , O r d i n a n c e N o . 2 e n t i t l e d : " A R E S O L U T I O N P R O H I B I T I N G T H E CATCHING, G ATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT O F LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMST h e petitioners contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of du e p r o c e s s o f l a w , t h e i r livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XIIand Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor had the absolute authorityto determine whether or not to issue the permit.They also claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar asthe Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocationand entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their businessendeavors to a successful conclusionPublic respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the ProvincialGovernment's power under the general welfare clause; they likewise maintained that there was noviolation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional Held: NORatio: In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and thepowers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), andunder Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1)

(vi), which unquestionably involve theexercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.***Sec. 16. General Welfare . Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for itsefficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, amongother things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology , encourage and support the development of appropriate and selfreliantscientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve thecomfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (emphasis supplied).It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) toestablish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of fiveyears; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. It imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniangpanlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penaltiesf o r a c t s w h i c h e n d a n g e r t h e e n v i r o n m e n t s u c h a s d y n a m i t e f i s h i n g a n d o t h e r f o r m s o f d e s t r u c t i v e fishi ng . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers andlakes or of ecological imbalance." The petition is dismissed.

Lim vs. Pacquing [G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995] 16AUG
Ponente: PADILLA, J. FACTS: The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409). On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).

On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A JaiAlai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes. On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local governments.

In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771. ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and nonimpairment clauses of the Constitution. HELD: NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional. RATIO: Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers). Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADCs franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Courts First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution. And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADCs possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)

MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village 328 SCRA 836 G.R. No. 135962 March 27, 2000
Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers. Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.

Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras

on November 23, 2010

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras

however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938. HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code Sections 5(c) & 16, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of RA 7160
Posted on June 23, 2012 by albinoski2005

1 Vote

General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code Sections 5(c) & 16, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of RA 7160 Section 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply: X x x. (c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; Section 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,

promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.