Boyd hypothesized that all intelligent organisms and organizations undergo a continuous cycle of interaction with their environment.

Boyd breaks this cycle down to four interrelated and overlapping processes through which one cycles continuously:

Observation: the collection of data by means of the senses Orientation: the analysis and synthesis of data to form one's current mental perspective Decision: the determination of a course of action based on one's current mental perspective Action: the physical playing-out of decisions

Boyd theorized that large organizations such as corporations, governments, or militaries possessed a hierarchy of OODA loops at tactical, grand-tactical (operational art), and strategic levels. In addition, he stated that most effective organizations have a highly decentralized chain of command that utilizes objective-driven orders, or directive control, rather than method-driven orders in order to harness the mental capacity and creative abilities of individual commanders at each level. In 2003, this power to the edge concept took the form of a DOD publication "Power to the Edge: Command...Control...in the Information Age" by Dr. David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes. Boyd argued that such a structure creates a flexible "organic whole" that is quicker to adapt to rapidly changing situations. He noted, however, that any such highly decentralized organization would necessitate a high degree of mutual trust and a common outlook that came from prior shared experiences. Headquarters needs to know that the troops are perfectly capable of forming a good plan for taking a specific objective, and the troops need to know that Headquarters does not direct them to achieve certain objectives without good reason. In 2007, strategy writer Robert Greene discussed the loop in a post called OODA and You. He insisted that it was "deeply relevant to any kind of competitive environment: business, politics, sports, even the struggle of organisms to survive", and claimed to have been initially "struck by its brilliance".

Boyds Elements of warfare

Boyd divided warfare into three distinct elements:

Moral Warfare: the destruction of the enemy's will to win, via alienation from allies (or potential allies) and internal fragmentation. Ideally resulting in the "dissolution of the moral bonds that permit an organic whole [organization] to exist." (i.e., breaking down the mutual trust and common outlook mentioned in the paragraph above.) Mental Warfare: the distortion of the enemy's perception of reality through disinformation, ambiguous posturing, and/or severing of the communication/information infrastructure. Physical Warfare: the destruction of the enemy's physical resources such as weapons, people, and logistical assets.

Boyd also studied tactics used by the Mongols, Byzantines and Ottomans. Boyd traced military thought back to Sun Tzu. The basic idea derived was that of a combination of light troops (eg storm troopers to probe and identify, but not attack, heavily defended areas) and heavy troops seeking the enemy weak point for a decisive blow. (Maneuver warfare wiki) (additionally, the Boyd believed that many Western commanders focused on winning the battle while Eastern commanders fought against the enemy's mind. Boyd's critique of Clausewitz was that while Clausewitz saw the "fog of war" as producing difficulties and sought to reduce friction so as to fight the enemy more effectively, Sun Tzu actively sought to increase friction and confusion among opposing forces. (Maneuver warfare wiki) Notice: Clausewitz (unlike Napoleon) distrusted military intelligence (beacasue the Germans, unlike Napoleon, had crapola military intelligence), therefore Clausewitz coined the term the fog of war, recommended against utilizing intelligence, and instead concentrating on getting a clear view of the battle (but not through intelligence). In contrast, Sun Tzu recommended that you should attack your enemies perceptions and increase confusion (increase the fog of war). (see Clausewitz wiki)
Maneuver warfare vs. Attrition warfare Example: in World War 1, commanders on both sides preferred heavily centralized planning and attack (against Clausewitzs no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy). Toward the end of WW1, commanders implemented more effective offensive strategies (Storm Trooper / Infiltration troops) that gave decision making power to the lower level field commanders. In addition, infantry attacks were no longer preceeded by heavy artillery bombardment (which signaled to the enemy an attack was imminent), instead artillery fire was combined with infantry attacks. Combined arms attacks (as opposed to segregated arms) was reborn from this idea including the combination of machine gun units (light and heavy) being combined with infantry units. Additionally, artillery worked more closely with advancing infiltration forces. Napoleons use of maneuver warfare allowed his lower level commanders to make decisions and quickly refine battle plans (decreased the time of the OODA loop). During the Franco Prussian War of 1870, maneuver warfare allowed to the Prussian army to quickly defeat the French. However, the German planning in WW1, based heavily on maneuver warfare tactics of the Franco Prussian war failed due to technological advances (machine guns and increased power of artillery) which swung the balance of power to the defensive. Additionally, the centralized command structures of WW1 failed to give low level commanders the ability to maneuver, make decisions, and adapt to the environment as it unfolded. Later in WW1, advances in tanks, storm trooper / infiltration tactics began to swing the balance of power back to the offensive, but not in time to make a difference. As a result, attrition warfare was the norm.

Realize that Boyds maneuver warfare is a paradigm for conventional war. It can be used in analysis of unconventional warfare, however its use in this context should be limited to the security and possibly the political analysis in a Kilcullen: Economic Security Political pillars model. Maneuver warfare seems to be practiced by insurgents, while counter insurgency is a mix of mostly attrition warfare (policing, economic measures, political reform) and limited maneuver warfare.

Fighting Retreats are mostly attrition warfare concepts, however if they are effectively planned, they may incorporate some maneuver warfare. Eg The allied planned retreat across Germany in case the USSR invaded western Europe.