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G. Regime of separation of property 1.

When applicable (a) In the marriage settlements, FC 143-146

spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a) (d) Judicial separation of property

Art. 143. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that their property relations during marriage shall be governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisions of this Chapter shall be suppletory.(212a) Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute community. (213a) Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property. (214a) Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties.chan robles virtual law library The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary. (215a) (b) When mandatory, FC 103 & FC 130

Ugalde v Ysasi, GR 130623, February 29, 2008 Facts: Lorea Ugalde and Jon de Ysasi got married before Municipal Judge Remigio Pea of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental and on March 1, 1951, Rev. Msgr. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding at the San Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod City. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any antenuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III. Later on, they separated and the respondent contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith. Petitioner alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife and that she had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties. Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains against respondent before the RTC of Negros Occidental. Thereafter, respondent contended that he and the petitioner entered into an agreement which provides that their conjugal partnership shall be deemed dissolved. Pursuant to this, an Amicable Settlement was submitted to the CFI of Negros Occidental. CFI approved the Amicable Settlement. Respondent likewise alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce from him before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second marriage with Richard Galoway and upon the latters death, she contracted a third marriage with Frank Scholey. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches, and res judicata. Further, respondent alleged that their marriage was void because it was executed without the benefit of a marriage license.TC- ruled that there was no conjugal partnership of gains and that since they entered into an amicable settlement which was later on approved, the petitioner may no longer repudiate it.CAaffirmed the decision of the trial court Issue:1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Trial Court's Decision which dismissed the action for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains? 2.Whether or not the TC exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of the petitioner and respondents marriage? Held: 1. No. Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. Thus, the applicable law is the Civil Code(RA 386).Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains: Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:(1) Upon the death of either spouse;(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;(3) When the marriage is annulled;(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191. (Emphasis supplied)The finality of the Amicable Settlement approving the parties' separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided on the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains(S.P. No 3330), the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved. The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when it was approved by the CFI on June 6, 1961. The CFI's approval of the Compromise Agreement

Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n) Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n) (c) Reconciliation in legal separation, FC 66(2) Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty

resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent on even date. 2. Yes. The trial court then proceeded to rule on the validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage. The trial court ruled that it was shown by competent evidence that petitioner and respondent failed to obtain a marriage license. Hence, the marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and void, and no community of property was formed between them. The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage, which was only raised by respondent as a defense to the action for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. The validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage was the subject of another action, Civil Case No. 430 for Judicial Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage before RTC of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental. In 1995, the said court ruled that the marriage was null and void for failure to comply with the formal and essential requirements of the law. 2. Property covered, FC 144 Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute community. (213a) 3. Administration (a) By the owner-spouse, FC 145

(c)

FC 100 (3); 101

Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a) Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a) 4. Family expenses, FC 146 Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties.chan robles virtual law library The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary. (215a) 5. Conveyances between the spouses, FC 87, NCC 1490 Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (133a) Civil Code Art. 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other, except: (1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or (2) When there has been a judicial separation or property under Article 191. (1458a) H. Judicial separation of property 1.When possible, FC 134 Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. (190a)

Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property. (214a) (b) By the other spouse, FC 142, 101

Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. (n) Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a)

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007 FACTS: Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged. Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed. ISSUE: Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her to share in the conjugal property? HELD: No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction: Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos. Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides: Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos. 2. For sufficient cause, FC 135 cf. FC 55 (10); 229(4), 231, 232 Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;

(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court; (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101; (5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. (191a) Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. (9a) Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates: (4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority; or Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same: (1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty; (2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example; (3) Compels the child to beg; or (4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness. The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority. If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances. The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. (33a) Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority. (n) Ugalde v Ysasi, GR 130623, February 29, 2008 Facts: Lorea Ugalde and Jon de Ysasi got married before Municipal Judge Remigio Pea of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental and on March 1, 1951, Rev. Msgr. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding at the San Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod City. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any antenuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III. Later on, they separated and the respondent contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith. Petitioner alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife and that she had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties. Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains against respondent before the RTC of

Negros Occidental. Thereafter, respondent contended that he and the petitioner entered into an agreement which provides that their conjugal partnership shall be deemed dissolved. Pursuant to this, an Amicable Settlement was submitted to the CFI of Negros Occidental. CFI approved the Amicable Settlement. Respondent likewise alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce from him before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second marriage with Richard Galoway and upon the latters death, she contracted a third marriage with Frank Scholey. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches, and res judicata. Further, respondent alleged that their marriage was void because it was executed without the benefit of a marriage license.TC- ruled that there was no conjugal partnership of gains and that since they entered into an amicable settlement which was later on approved, the petitioner may no longer repudiate it.CAaffirmed the decision of the trial court Issue:1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Trial Court's Decision which dismissed the action for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains? 2.Whether or not the TC exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of the petitioner and respondents marriage? Held: 1. No. Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. Thus, the applicable law is the Civil Code(RA 386).Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains: Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:(1) Upon the death of either spouse;(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;(3) When the marriage is annulled;(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191. (Emphasis supplied)The finality of the Amicable Settlement approving the parties' separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided on the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains(S.P. No 3330), the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved. The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when it was approved by the CFI on June 6, 1961. The CFI's approval of the Compromise Agreement resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent on even date. 2. Yes. The trial court then proceeded to rule on the validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage. The trial court ruled that it was shown by competent evidence that petitioner and respondent failed to obtain a marriage license. Hence, the marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and void, and no community of property was formed between them. The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage, which was only raised by respondent as a defense to the action for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. The validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage was the subject of another action, Civil Case No. 430 for Judicial Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage before RTC of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental. In 1995, the said court ruled that the marriage was null and void for failure to comply with the formal and essential requirements of the law. Sales v Sales,

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007 FACTS: Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged. Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed. ISSUE: Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her to share in the conjugal property? HELD: No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction: Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos. Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides: Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos. 3. Voluntary separation of property, FC 136, FC 74-75, FC 134 Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their common properties. All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse,

shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest. (191a) Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: (1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage; (2) By the provisions of this Code; and (3) By the local custom. (118) Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern. (119a) Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. (190a) 4. Effects of judicial separation of property (a) liquidation of CPG or ACP, FC 137 par. 1

Art. 137. Par.1 Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated in conformity with this Code. (b) support pendente lite, FC 137 par. 2

Art. 137. Par. 2 During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children. (192a) (c) regime after JSP, FC 138 of FC 66 (2)

Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply.(191a) Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a) (d) binding effect on third parties, FC 139-140; of FC 66(2)

Art. 139. The petition for separation of property and the final judgment granting the same shall be recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of property. (193a) Art. 140. The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously acquired by creditors. (194a) Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a)

Roberto Laperal Jr. et.al vs. Ramon Katigbak, et.al. 116 Phil 672 Facts: 1. The Laperals instituted a complaint against Katigbak and Kalaw seeking the recovery of P14000 evidenced by various promissory notes and for the return of jewelry delivered to Katigbak for sale on commission. 2. Upon confession of judgment by Katigbak, the court rendered judgment against him to pay the Laperals the said sum and return of jewelry. 3. About a month after the decision was rendered, Kalaw filed a complaint against her husband Katigbak for judicial separation of property and separate administration 4. Court granted the said complaint. 5. Laperals filed another complaint against Kalaw and Katigbak seeking the annulment of the proceedings for the above complaint, to enforce judgment secured by the Laperals on the fruits of Kalaws paraphernal property and to secure a ruling declaring the real property as conjugal property of Katigbak and Kalaw. 6. Court dismissed the complaint and rendered the property as paraphernal. a. Ramon and Evelina got married in 1938. b. The subject property was registered in the name of Evelina Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak on December6, 1939 only two years after the marriage. c. Evelina declares that her mother Pua was the one that had bought the property for her Issue: Whether or not the property is conjugal Held: NO Indeed, all properties acquired during the marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal. The presumption however is not conclusive but merely rebuttable. This is a case where the presumption has been sufficiently and convincingly proven. 1. The land in question was purchased for the wife with her own separate funds. Other than invoking the presumption, the burden of denying the evidence so presented was shifted to the appellant. 2. Deed to the disputed land is in the name of the wife. 3. At the time of its purchase, the property was already of such substantial value as admittedly, the husband, by himself could not have afforded to buy, considering that singular source of income then was his P200.00 a month salary from a Manila Bank.

5. Revival of property regime after JSP, FC 141 cf. FC 67, 135, 142 Art. 141. The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for a decree reviving the property regime that existed between them before the separation of property in any of the following instances: (1) When the civil interdiction terminates; (2) When the absentee spouse reappears; (3) When the court, being satisfied that the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements will not again abuse that power, authorizes the resumption of said administration; (4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree of legal separation resumes common life with the other; (5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof; (6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least one year, reconcile and resume common life; or (7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute community of property or conjugal partnership has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the spouses, they agree to the revival of the former property regime. No voluntary separation of property may thereafter be granted. The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by Article 67.(195a) Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify: (1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime; (2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and (3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each. The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtorspouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. (195a, 108a) Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee; (3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court; (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101; (5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. (191a) Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;

(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. (n) 6. Transfer of administration of exclusive property, FC 142 cf NCC 196; FC 96; FC 124 Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. (n) Civil Code Art. 196. With the conjugal partnership subsisting, the administration of all classes of property in the marriage may be transferred by the courts to the wife: (1) When she becomes the guardian of her husband; (2) When she asks for the declaration of his absence; (3) In case of civil interdiction of the husband. The courts may also confer the administration to the wife, with such limitation as they may deem advisable, if the husband should become a fugitive from justice or be in hiding as a defendant in a criminal case, or if, being absolutely unable to administer, he should have failed to provide for administration. (1441a) Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (206a) Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding

contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a) I. Property regime of unions without marriage Review: FC 6, 35 (2), 35 (3), 35 (5), 36, 38, 53; FC 41, 44; FC 45 (Void and voidable marriages) Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer. In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. (55a) Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; (3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter; (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: (1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; (2) Between step-parents and step-children; (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; (5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and (9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82) Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.chan Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a) Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a) 1. Unions under FC 147, 6, 35, 36, 53, cf. NCC 144 Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a) Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which

shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer. In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. (55a) Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians; (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; (3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter; (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41; (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53. Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. Civil Code Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. (n) VALDEZ VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996 Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5, 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated June 22, 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin were placed in the custody of their mother and the older children chose which parent they want to stay with. The petitioner and respondent are also directed to start proceedings in the liquidation of their property as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code and to comply to Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. Issue: Whether or not the property regime should be based on coownership. Arguments: Petitioner: Petitioner argues that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases

where the parties are psychological incapacitated, (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129, (4) It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay. Respondent: Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership (Art 147 Family Code). Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family. Cario v. Cario (2001) GR 132539, Facts: Death benefits During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982 Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased Issue(s): Whether or not properties purchased at the time the parties are living together are considered common property Held: Property regime applicable for bigamous marriage. Ratio Decidendi: for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto 1st marriage void: first marriage lacked marriage license; therefore, void ab initio It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party

can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. 2nd marriage void: The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages; the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime For 1st marriage: Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. For 2nd marriage: Article 148 applies. Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao Gonzales vs Gonzales, 478 SCRA 327 Facts: Before they started living together on March 1977, Francisco Gonzales offered Erminda Gonzales to be his partner in Fiesta Pizza, his pizza business, and to take over its operations. She accepted the offer and took care of the business daily operations, personnel management, outlets supervision, and met people during inspections. - Despite their marriage on Feb. 4, 1979, the same was declared void under FC 36 on Feb. 12, 1997. Erminda then sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and claimed the pizza business to be conjugal property where she contributed to 80% of the total management. Francisco, however, claimed that it was exclusive. Issue: WON properties should be divided equally between husband and wife Held: YES because the marriage was declared void, the property regime that applies is co-ownership under FC 147. Under the rules of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union (under a void marriage) are presumed to have been

obtained through joint efforts and will be owned by them in equal shares absent proof of the contrary. Francisco admitted in a handwritten letter dated Sept. 6, 1989 that Erminda had helped in the management of the business and was not a mere housewife. Hence, the business is co-owned and both Francisco and Erminda are presumed to have contributed jointly. - Art 147 applies when )1) when man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other without benefit of marriage (2) when man and woman live together under void marriage o Presumption is anything acquired during both instances are obtained through joint efforts and shall be divided equally. Party who didnt participate in acquisition by other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in acquisition if formers efforts consisted of care and maintenance of family and household. Dio v Dio, GR 178004, January 19, 2011 FACTS: January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio. The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code HELD: The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared

void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. Unions under FC 148 of FC 50 in rel. to FC 49(2) and FC 50 Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a) Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (n) Bienvenido v. CA 237 SCRA 676

Agapay vs Agapay 276 SCRA 340 Facts: Miguel Palang married Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol on July 16, 1949 October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii July 15, 1973 Miguel married with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, jointly purchased a parcel of rice land. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 issued in their names September 23, 1975 Erlinda allegedly purchased a house and lot and title was issued in her name October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel died July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages of the house and lot together with the riceland Issue Who is the owner of the two pieces of property Held: Carlina, the first wife Under FC Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision since it for relationships that have legal impediments o Art 147 is the law that recognizes relationships without legal impediment and proof of care and maintenance of family and household equates to joint effort. Erlinda failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to buy the subject Riceland hence the riceland reverts to the first marriage With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old- however the notary testified that the property was purchased by Miguel but put in the name of Erlinda- the transaction was essentially a void donation Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage Compromise agreement entered into by Carliana and late Miguel is not a separation of property and should not be inferred as such. NO LIQUIDATION WAS MADE. Tumlos vs Fernandez GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000 FACTS: Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not

complied with. Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage. ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148. HELD: SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were coowners of the subject property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. Adriano v CA, 328 SCRA 738 Malilin vs Castillo, 333 SCRA 628 FACTS: Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still subsist. They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondents name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation. Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter. ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under the name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they started living together. HELD: The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry each other and were living together could not have owned properties in common. Under Article 148, if

the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution, property or industry, shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is coownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each other. Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioners complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied. Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case. The case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings. Villanueva vs CA, 427 SCRA 439 Facts: 1. Eusebia is the legal wife of Nicolas having been married to the latter on October 7, 1926. 2. Out of the said marriage they begot 5 children. During their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements. 3. Nicolas is also a co-owner of a parcel of land which he inherited from his parents as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares. 4. In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his family and cohabited with Pacita wherein Procopio is their illegitimate son. 5. Nicolas then was the only person who received the income of the properties. Pacita from the time she lived in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation and had no properties of her own. 6. Nicolas suffered stroke and cannot talk and walk anymore. 7. Natividad knew of Nicolas physical condition visited him at the hospital. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, Procopio, the illegitimate son was the one who receives the income from the said properties. 8. Natividad went to Procopio to discuss about the properties. And the latter replied that it is not yet time to talk about the said matter. 9. Eusebia filed a complaint against her husband Nicolas, Pacita and Procopio. She sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita several properties claiming that said properties are conjugal properties with Nicolas. 10.Eusebia died in 1996. Issue: WoN the subject properties are conjugal Held: YES Petitioners claim that the subject properties[16] are exclusive properties of Nicolas except for Lot No. 152, which they claim is Pacitas exclusive property. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code.[17]

Article 105[18] of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal.[20] This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal. 1. subject properties were in fact acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. The tax declarations[23] covering the subject properties, along with the unrebutted testimony of Eusebias witnesses, establish this fact. a. Moreover, on whether Lot No. 152 is conjugal or not, the answer came from petitioners themselves. Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957.[25] The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. b. Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are not conjugal. The presumption in Article 116, which subsists unless the contrary is proved, stands as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. The burden of proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and convincing. [26] Petitioners failed to meet this standard. 2. Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are not conjugal. The presumption in Article 116, which subsists unless the contrary is proved, stands as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners

may have. The burden of proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and convincing.[26] Petitioners failed to meet this standard. 3. The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.[33]Otherwise, the law would be giving a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and immoral. What petitioners fail to grasp is that Nicolas and Pacitas cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of Eusebia, the legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already living with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from 7 October 1926, the date of Nicolas and Eusebias marriage, until 23 November 1996, the date of Eusebias death, are still presumed conjugal. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that any of the subject properties was acquired outside or beyond this period. Atienza vs.de Castro G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006 Facts: -Lupo Atienza hired De Castro as accountant for his two corporations(Enrico Shipping Corporation andEurasian Maritime Corporation) in1983 -Then their relationship became intimate despite Lupo being a married man! They lived together in the later part of 1983. They had 2 children, after the second child they parted ways. -Then Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for a judicial partition of a land between them in the Bel-Air subdivision -Lupo said Yolanda bought the said property with his own funds. -Yolanda on the other hand said she bought it with her own funds. -Trial Court said that the contested property is owned common by him and Yolanda and ordered the partition into two equal parts. -CA reversed the TC! Saying that itwas the exclusive property of Yolanda. Issues: WON the disputed property is the exclusive property of Yolanda Held: Yes Ratio: Since they are not capacitated to marr yeach other in their cohabitation, FC 148 applies. Under this regime only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their contributions. Absent of proof of contribution, it shall be presumed to be equal. He did not show any evidence that he contributed in the parcel of land while the accountant showed bank accounts which apparently shows that she was capacitated to buy the said land. -evidence of De Castro: job as accountant and business woman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending, and jewelry retail, promisorry notes of dealings with clients, bank account statements, and business transactions = had financial capacity on the other hand Atienza merely provided evidence

that Yolanda had no such sufficient funds and didnt provide for evidence regarding his own capacity to pay for such property. Signey v SSS GR No. 173582, Jan. 28, 2008 Facts: -Rodolfo Signey, SSS member, died onMay 21 2001, in the records he had designated Yolanda as primary beneficiaryand his 4 children with her as secondary beneficiaries. -3 women started claiming his death benefits from SSS (in order) 1. Yolanda Signey (petitioner) O Claimed death benefits first (July 6 2001) 2. Gina Servano (respondent) o Claimed death benefits (July 13 2001) o Has 2minor children with Rodolfo o Claims that she and Yolanda were common law-wives, while Editha is the legal wife. 3. Editha Espinosa (respondent) o Claimed death benefits (Oct 2001) o Claims that she is the legal wife -SSS denies Yolanda, saying Ginas 2 children are the primary beneficiariesunder the SSS Law -Says also that the marriage between Yolanda and Rodolfo is null and void because Rodolfo was still married with Editha -Yolanda files a petition with SocialSecurity Commission (SSC) along with awaiver of rights by Editha wherein Edithawaived all claims of benefits from SSS because she (Editha) was married to a diff person -SSC affirms the SSS Decision oDespite the new waiver by Editha, SSC gave more weight to the confirmed marriage of Rodolfo and Editha o SSC: Mere designation by Rodolfo in the records of who his beneficiaries were is not a controlling factor -SSC then applies SSS Law (RA 8282)where it says that dependent legit / illegit children may be primary beneficiaries, and they have to be minors. O Rodolfo had one legitimate child who diedearlier than he did O His children with Yolanda are all over 21years old O His children with Gina are qualified (them being minors) Issue: 1.W/n petitioners marriage with the deceased is valid? 2. W/n petitioner has the right to the benefits against the illegitimate children? Held: No. There is no merit to the petition1. The existence of a prior marriage between Editha and Rodolfa is supported byevidence2. Section 8(e) and (k) of RA 8282 is very clear (court applies statcon) (found in thecase pg. 638): O It defines who are dependents: Legal Spouse Legitimate, adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not employed and is under 21 years old

O Whoever claims entitlement benefits should establish his/her right by substantial evidence O Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and bec the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. O Ginas 2 minor children are entitled to 100% of the benefits o Has 2 minor children with Rodolfo o Claims that she and Yolanda were common law-wives, while Editha is the legal wife. 4. Editha Espinosa (respondent) o Claimed death benefits (Oct 2001) o Claims that she is the legal wife -SSS denies Yolanda, saying Ginas 2 children are the primary beneficiaries under the SSS LawSays also that the marriage between Yolanda and Rodolfo is null and void because Rodolfo was still married with Editha -Yolanda files with SSC -SSC affirms the SSS Decision Issue:3. W/n petitioners marriage with the deceased is valid?4. W/n petitioner has the right to the benefits against the illegitimate children? Held: No. There is no merit to the petition3. The existence of a prior marriage between Editha and Rodolfa is supported byevidence4. Section 8(e) and (k) of RA 8282 is very clear (found in the case pg. 638): o It defines who are dependents: Spouse Legitimate, adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not employed and is under 21 years old o Whoever claims entitlement benefits should establish his/her right by substantial evidence o Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and bec the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. Ginas 2 minor children are entitled to100% of the benefits Borromeo vs Descallar GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009 Facts: 1) Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983. In 1984, he met respondent Antonietta OpallaDescallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together. 2) In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 19851 and March 10, 19862 and A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 covering the properties in Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. 3) However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Thus they erased Jambrichs name from the document only retaining his signature in certain areas. 4) Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two sons. 5) April 1991, respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City.

6) Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about P150,000.00. To pay the debt he sold his rights to the Agro-Macro properties to the petitioner. 7) On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged. 8) On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before the Regional Trial Court, alleging that the deed of sale issued for the property in favor of the respondent do not reflect the true agreement of the parties, the latter having paid nothing for the said properties. 9) Respondent denies the allegation citing that she had paid for the property solely and exclusively using the money from her copra business. 10) RTC rules for the petitioner (Borromeo) citing the proofs presented on the earning capacity of Jambrich at the time the property was purchased over the supposed earnings of the respondent from her Copra business (which were markedly fictional since the respondent was still working as a waitress for P1000 a month at the time of the purchase of the properties. 11) April 10, 2002 Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA sides w/ respondent citing: In the case at bar, the title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto. Issues: WON Respondent has a right over the said property. Held: NO, it was proven in the RTC trial that the properties in question were in fact purchased from the exclusive funds of Wilhelm Jambrich who at the time of acquisition had sufficient income compared to the waitress wages of the respondent. As such the purchase of the property could clearly be attributed Janbrich and subsequently to the petitioner. Furthermore the vice of alienage plaguing the sale of the property to Jambrich was in fact cured by the transfer of the property to the petitioner who is a Filipino citizen citing the case United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed. This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. (222a) NCC 2035 Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. (1814a) ROC Rule 16 Sec. 1(j) RULE 16 Motion to Dismiss Section 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: (a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party; (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; (c) That venue is improperly laid; (d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; (f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; (h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; (i) That the claim on which the action is founded is enforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and (j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. (1a) RPC 20, 247 and 332 Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.chanrobles virtual law library If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.chanrobles virtual law library These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents.chanrobles virtual law library Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the

Heirs of Maramag vs De Guzman, GR 181132, June 5, 2009 Lacbayan v Samoy, G.R. No. 165427, March 21, 2011 (see J. Brions Separate Opinion) IX. FAMILY RELATIONS

A. What governs family relations, FC 149 Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. (216a, 218a) B. Effects of family relationship on legal disputes FC 150 151 Art. 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfblood. (217a)

infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.chanrobles virtual law Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No criminal, but only civil liability, shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons: 1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line.chanrobles virtual law library 2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and 3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.chanrobles virtual law library The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the crime. Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104 FACTS: The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed saidcomplaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genove va deGayon, alleging substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said spousesexecuted a deed copy of which was attached to the complaint, asAnnex "A" whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the su m of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein described, and locatedin the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo,including the improvements thereon, subject to redemption within five(5) years or not later than October 1, 1957; that said right o f redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva deGayon, or any of their heirs or successors, despite the expiration of theperiod therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damasohad, by virtue of a deed of sale copy of which was attached to thecomplaint, as Annex "B" dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00;that plaintiff had, since 1961, introduced thereon improvements worthP1,000; that he had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said property upto 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a lan dacquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying that anorder be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership inand to the aforementioned property.In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that herhusband, Silvestre Gayon, died on January 6, 1954, long before theinstitution of this case; that Annex "A" to the complaint is fictitious, forthe signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not hers; thatneither she nor her deceased husband had ever executed " anydocument of whatever nature in plaintiff's favor"; that the complaint ismalicious and had embarrassed her and her children; that the heirs of Silvestre Gayon had to "employ the services of counsel for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at least P200.00"; and that being abrother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert effortsfor the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his complaint.She prayed, therefore, that the same be dismissed and that plaintiff besentenced to pay damages. ISSUE : Whether or not the contention of the Mr.Gayon that anearnest effort toward a compromise before the filing of the suit istenable. HELD: As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as an allege dobstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:No suit shall be filed or maintained between

members of the same family unless it should appear that earnestefforts toward a compromise have been made, but that thesame have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision appliesto suits "filed or maintained between members of the same family." This phrase, "members of the same family," should, h owever, beconstrued in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which:Family relations shall include those:(1) Between husband and wife;(2) Between parent and child;(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;(4) Among brothers and sisters.Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-inlaw, whereas her children are hisnephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as none of them is included in theenumeration contained in said Art. 217 which should be construedstrictly, it being an exception to the general rule a nd SilvestreGayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, itfollows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222,and plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaintdoes not bar the same.WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the caseremanded to the lower court for the inclusion, as defendan t ordefendants therein, of the administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence of such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the deceased SilvestreGayon, and for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision,with the costs of this instance against defendant-appellee, Genovevade Gayon. It is so ordered. Wainwright v. Versoza, 26 SCRA 78 Magbaleta vs Gonong, 76 SCRA 511 Tribiana vs.Tribiana, G.R. No. 137359, Sept. 13, 2004 Hiyas Savings vs. Acua, G.R. NO. 154132, August 31, 2006 C. The family home 1. What constitutes the family home, FC 152, 156, 161 Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. (223a) Art. 156. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his or her own property. Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home. (227a, 228a) Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home. (n) 2. Who may constitute the family home, FC 152, FC 161 Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. (223a)

Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home. (n) 3. When deemed constituted, FC 153 Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (223a) 4. When terminated, FC 153 compare with FC 159 Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (238a) 5. Beneficiaries, FC 154, 158, 194-196, 199 Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. (226a) Art. 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide. (235a) Patricio vs. Dario, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006 Facts: Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio andtheir two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among theproperties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon.Petitioner Perla, Marcelino Marc and, Marcelino III, extrajudicially settled his estateThereafter, Perla and Marcelino Marc formally advised Marcelino III of their intention topartition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partitionthe property claiming that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spousesMarcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely,his 12-yearold son, the grandson of the decedent. He argued that as long as the minor is living in thefamily home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Hence petitioner andMarcelino Marc instituted an action for partition. Issue: Whether or not the partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse toaccede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home. Held: The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual

. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of thehouse specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly bythe husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not thebeneficiaries contemplated by the Code.Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) Thehusband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents,ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate,who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be amongthe relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3)they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despitethe death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or foras long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property orconstituted the family home.As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, oran unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term descendants contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home withoutdistinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouseswho constitute a family home.As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to availof the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family homesince 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support fromhis paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legalsupport falls primarily on Marce lino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legalsupport upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is theobligation imposed on the grandparents. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal supportnot from his grandmother, but from his father.Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties which bindthe obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot becompromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount. Exemptions, FC 155, FC 157, FC 160 Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. (243a) Art. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law. In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation. For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. (231a) Art. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply. At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor. (247a, 248a) 7. When may be sold, FC 158 Art. 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide. (235a) Honrado v CA, GR 166333, Nov. 25, 2005 Cabang vs Basay, GR No. 180587, March 20, 2009 Fortaleza v Lapitan, G.R. No. 178288 August 15, 2012 Facts: Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan (creditors). As security, spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baos, Laguna (subject property). When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001. At the sale, the creditors son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife R ona emerged as the highest bidders. Then, they were issued a Certificate of Sale that was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership on November20, 2003 and the registration of the

subject property in their names on February 4, 2004. Despite the foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitans formal demand to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property. Issue: Whether or not the Honorable court of appeals gravely erred i n not holding that thepetitioners were prevented by the respondent from exercising their right of redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a redemption price of a highly equitable and more than double the amount of the foreclosed property, especially that the foreclosed mortgaged property is the family home of petitioners and their children. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property, which was even notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the public auction. 8. Rights of creditors, FC 160-162 Art. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply. At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor. (247a, 248a) Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home. (n) Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. (n) Ramos v Pangilinan, G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010 Facts: Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the company to pay the respondents back -wages, separation pay, 13th month pay &service incentive leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of

execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos name situated in Pandacan. Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution tosatisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that thePandacan address is actually the business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC. Issue: Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid. Ruling: Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988,then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225,229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 governs extrajudicial constitution. On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judiciall y or judicially, and the exemption iseffective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art.155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved. In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with t he procedure mandated by the CivilCode. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid. Equitable PCI Bank v. Martinez, G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010 Facts: Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained a loan from petitioner Equitable PCI Bank secured by a real estate mortgage over a condominium unit in San Miguel Court, Valle Verde 5, Pasig City, Metro Manila, where the spouses are residing. The mortgage was signed by respondent Oscar Martinez both as a principal debtor and as a president of the registered owner and third-party mortgagor, respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. Pursuant to respondent-spouses failure to settle the obligation, petitioner initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage by filing an ex parte petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Respondent spouses filed a civil case or Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO), Injunction and Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale seeking to enjoin the impending foreclosure sale. One of the contentions raised by respondent-spouses was that that theextrajudicial foreclosure will cause grave injustice and irreparableinjury to respondentspouses and their four (4) young children because their family home, in which they were residing since 1997, at least insofar as the unencumbered area in excess of 180.750 sq. m., is exempt from forced sale or execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Petitioner, on the other hand, will not suffer any loss if the foreclosure will not proceed. The trial court granted the issuance of preliminary injunction. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not respondent-spouses have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure and public auction of the third-party mortgagors property while the case for annulment of REM on said property is being tried? Ruling: No. Respondent-spouses alleged proprietary right in the mortgaged condominium unit appears to be based merely on respondents averment that respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. is a family corporation. However, there is neither allegation nor evidence to show prima facie that such purported right, whether as majority stockholder or creditor, was superior to that of petitioner as creditor-mortgagee. The rule requires that in order for a preliminary injunctionto issue, the application should clearly allege facts and circumstances showing the existence of the requisites. It must be emphasized that an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly against the pleader. Rationale: The court ruled that the claim of exemption under Art. 153 of the Family Code, thereby raising issue on the mortgaged condominium unit being a family home and not corporate property, is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual agreement of the real estate mortgage. Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged condominium unit constitutes respondents family home, the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same Code allows the execution or forced sale of a family home for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution. Respondents thus failed to show an ostensible right that needs protection of the injunctive writ. Clearly, the appellate court seriously erred in sustaining the trial courts orders granting respondents application for preliminary injunction. De Mesa v Acero, G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012 FACTS: Claudio D. Acero Jr., being the highest bidder, acquired the ownership of a parcel of land formerly owned by petitioners Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa (Spouses De Mesa). The property was sold at a public auction after Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan they secured from Acero. Thereafter, respondents Acero and his wife Rufina (Spouses Acero) leased the subject property to its former owners who then defaulted in the payment of the rent. Unable to collect the rentals due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Spouses De Mesa. The MTC ruled in Spouses Aceros favor. In their defense, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to nullify TCT No. T221755 (M) on the basis that the subject property is a family home which is exempt from execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have not been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan. However, the RTC dismissed their complaint. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the family home is exempted from execution

HELD: Petition DENIED. Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. It is likewise without dispute that the family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter. For all intents and purposes, the negligence of Petitioners De Mesa or their omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the De Mesa to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriffs duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home.

Honrado v CA, GR 166333, Nov. 25, 2005 Cabang vs Basay, GR No. 180587, March 20, 2009 Wainwright v. Versoza, 26 SCRA 78 Magbaleta vs Gonong, 76 SCRA 511 Tribiana vs.Tribiana, G.R. No. 137359, Sept. 13, 2004 Hiyas Savings vs. Acua, G.R. NO. 154132, August 31, 2006 Heirs of Maramag vs De Guzman, GR 181132, June 5, 2009 Lacbayan v Samoy, G.R. No. 165427, March 21, 2011 Adriano v CA, 328 SCRA 738 Bienvenido v. CA 237 SCRA 676 Sales v Sales,