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Persons and Family Relations

PATERNITY AND FILIATION

LPU- Cavite

Dean Mawis

Concept of paternity, filiation and legitimacy, FC 163 Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate. (n) Legitimate children, FC 164 cf. FC 165 in rel to NCC 256-257, 166, 167, 168, 169 Family Code Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm f the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. (255a, 258a) Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code. (n) Civil Code Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (109) Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in Article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case. (n) Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same. This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the effective date of this Code. (1413a) Art. 167. In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife, may provide for receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation of property. (n) Art. 168. The wife may, by express authority of the husband embodied in a public instrument, administer the conjugal partnership property. (n) Art. 169. The wife may also by express authority of the husband appearing in a public instrument, administer the latter's estate. (n) Angeles vs Maglaya, 469 SCRA 363 September 2, 2005 Facts: - Nov 20, 1939 when Aleli Maglaya was born - 1948 when deceased Francisco married Belen Angeles

- 1988 when her mother Genoveva died - March 1998 when Aleli Maglaya filed in Rtv Caloocan petition to be made administratix of late Francisco Angeles estate since she is sole legitimate daughter of Francisco. This was contested by his wife Belen Angeles. - RTC: Aleli failed to prove filiation - CA: reversed decision and said that Aleli was indeed a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva ISSUE: WON CA erred in declaring Aleli as a legitimate child HELD: YES - Law applied: FC 164 children conceived or born during the marriage of parents are legitimate - Aleli never showed any evidence of a marriage existing between Francisco and Genoveva. In fact, if they did marry, it would have rendered Franciscos marriage to Belen as bigamouse. However, Aleli herself recognized Belen as the surviving spouse in her petition for letters of administration o Without evidence of marriage, one cant presume Aleli to be legitimate child - CA erred in declaring that birth certificate indubitably establishes legitimacy o In order for legitimacy to be established, birth certificate must bear the signatures of BOTH mother and father. Only attending physicians signature was in the certificate. Thus it only showed the fact of birth of a child and not legitimacy - Papers and photogrpahs that show Francisco Angeles as her father is not sufficient enough to prove filiation. RESULT: at best, could only be declared a natural child and NOT a legitimate child. - SSS vs. Aguas ISSUE: WON Janet and Jeylynn are legitimate daughters of Pablo? HELD: Only Jeylynn is - Jeylynn proven by birth certificate where signature of Pablo is present and the fact that she was born on 1991 when marriage between Pablo and Rosana who were married on 1977 was still susbsisting o Pablo never once questioned legitimacy of Jeylynn o Presumption of legitimacy, conditions that husband may contest (398) - Janet birth certificate shown was only photocopy with no confirmation by civil register regarding her date of birth. Thus if one cant show that one is born during the marriage then cant be presumed legitimate Said that she was adopted but no papers to prove it and only legally adopted children are considered dependent children. Thus she cant be a beneficiary. SSS vs. Aguas, G.R. 165546, Feb. 27, 2006 FACTS: Pablo Aguas, SSS member and pensioner, died 12/8/96. Pablos surviving spouse, respondent Rosanna filed a claim with SSS for death benefits. She indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylynn, born 10/29/91 4/97, SSS received a sworn letter from Pablos sister Letecia contesting Rosannas claim for death benefits, alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode more than 6 years before the and lived w/ another man, de la Pena; Pablo had no legal children w/ Rosanna. Letecia enclosed birth cert of Jefren born 11/15/96 to Rosanna and de la Pena and that the 2 were married 11/1/90 Rosanna contends that Jeylynn was a legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by her birth cert bearing Pablos signature as father

Persons and Family Relations

LPU- Cavite

Dean Mawis

Janet, who also claimed to be the child of deceased and Rosanna, joined as claimant. It appears in her birth cert that her father was Pablo and her mother was Rosanna. SSS summoned several persons; some stated that spouses real child was Jeylynn, Janet was only an adopted child but there were no legal papers. SSS ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as claimant. As for Jeylynn and Janet, they were not Pablos legitimate children. ISSUE: WON Jeylynn ad Janet are legitimate children of deceased (thus entitled to death benefits) HELD: YES (Jeylynn); NO (Janet) Jeylynns claim is justified by her birth cert w/c bears Pablos signature (showing she was born 10/29/91; Rosanna and Pablo were married 12/4/77 and marriage subsisted until latters death on 12/8/96). Under A164, FC, children conceived or born during the marriage of parents are legitimate. Presumption of legitimacy cant extend to Janet because her date of birth wasnt substantially proven. Under RA1161, only legally adopted children are considered dependent children. Rivera vs Heirs, GR No. 141501, July 21, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners are allegedly half-brothers, half-sis-in-law and children of a half-brother of deceased PACITA. Respondents are allegedly siblings, full and half-blood of ROMUALDO; respondents are denominated as heirs of Romualdo. Respondent Angelina is allegedly the daughter of Pacita and Romualdo. From 1927 until her death in 1980, Pacita cohabited w/ Romualdo w/out the benefit of marriage because the latter was married to Musngi who died on 4/20/63. In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired several properties. Pacita died 7/3/80 without leaving a will. 8/8/80, Romualdo and respondent Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition w/sale (an extrajudicial settlement of Pacitas estate). Petitioners filed a case for partition of Pacitas estate and annulment of titles. RTC made 2 findings 1) Pacita was never married to Romualdo 2) respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Romualdo ISSUE: WON respondent Angelina was illegitimate daughter of Pacita HELD: NO, a closer examination of the birth cert reveals that respondent Angelina was listed as adopted by both Pacita and Romualdo. And mere registration of a child in his birth cert as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, it does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child. Thus, she cant inherit from Pacita. Pacita was 44 y.o., on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth; Pacita had been living childless w/Romualdo for 20 years Makati v Harper, GR 189998, August 29, 2012 FACTS: November 1999, Christian Harper came to Manila on a business trip as the Business Development Manager for Asia of ALSTOM Power Norway AS, an engineering firm with worldwide operations. He checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel. He was due to check out on November 6, 1999. In the early

morning of that date, however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by still unidentified malefactors. It appears that at around 11:00 am of November 6, 1999, a Caucasian male entered the Alexis Jewelry Store in Glorietta and expressed interest in purchasing a Cartier lady's watch valued atP320,000.00 with the use of two Master card credit cards and an American Express credit card issued in the name of Harper. But the customer's difficulty in answering the queries phoned in by a credit card representative sufficiently aroused the suspicion of saleslady Anna Liza Lumba (Lumba), who asked for the customer's passport upon suggestion of the credit card representative to put the credit cards on hold. Probably sensing trouble for himself, the customer hurriedly left the store, andleft the three credit cards and the passport behind. In the meanwhile, Harper's family in Norway must have called him at his hotel room to inform him about the attempt to use his American Express card. Not getting any response from the room, his family requested Raymond Alarcon, the Duty Manager of the Shangri-La Hotel, to check on Harper's room. Alarcon and security personnel went to Room 1428 at 11:27 a.m., and were shocked to discover Harper's lifeless body on the bed. Respondents commenced this suit in the RTC to recover various damages from petitioner pertinently alleging: The murderer succeeded to trespass into the area of the hotel's private rooms area and into the room of the said deceased on account of the hotel's gross negligence in providing the most basic security system of its guests, the lack of which owing to the acts or omissions of its employees was the immediate cause of the tragic death of said deceased. RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. CA affirmed. Petitioner argues that respondents failed to prove its negligence; that Harper's own negligence in allowing the killers into his hotel room was the proximate cause of his own death; and that hotels were not insurers of the safety of their guests. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES WERE ABLE TO PROVE WITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE THE AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT THEY ARE THE WIDOW AND SON OF MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER. Held: Suntay v Suntay, GR 183053, October 10, 2012 FACTS: Petitioner Federico is the argued that respondent Isabels Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabels father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina. The marriage of Isabels parents had previously been declared by the CFI as null and void.Federico anchors his opposition on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federicos Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the decision

Persons and Family Relations

LPU- Cavite

Dean Mawis

declaring the marriage of Isabels parents null and void be upheld. ISSUE: In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabels parents a case of a void or voidable marriage? Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child? RULING: Petition dismissed Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be declared null and void, the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerate the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article89 which provides that: Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate. 1. Who are considered legitimate children (a) Conceived during marriage cf. ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3(dd), FC Art. 168 Sec. 3 . Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (d)That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage; (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have

been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the /termination of the former marriage. (259a) 1. valid marriage Arbolario v CA, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003 FACTS: spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan had 5 children, all are dead now Child FACTS AFTER DEATH Agueda Colinco 1.Antonio Colinco (+) (respondent) Ruth Orpha and Goldelina, and 2. (respondent) Irene Colinco Catalina Baloyo - Juan Purificacion Arbolario (+) Arbolario Juans children with Francisca (petitioners) Voltaire, Lucena, Taala, Fe, Exaltacion Eduardo Baloyo sold his entire interest to his sister Agueda by virtue of a notarized document acknowledged before Notary Public Deogracias Riego. Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to the other half. Julian Baloyo died without any issue Respondents contend that they are the only heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement, The Colincos filed a civil case against spouses Rosalita Salhay and Carlito Salhay to recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by [respondent] spouses (Salhays hereinafter) since 1970. Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and that said spouses allegedly purchased the disputed portion of Lot No. 323 from the deceased lessor sometime in [September] 1978. The petitioners filed a Civil Case for the cancellation of title with Damages against the Colincos They contend that the Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement executed by the Colincos was defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their alleged half-sister, Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the distribution of the aforesaid lot RTC ruled in favour of the Abolarios declaring them as heirs of Purificacion Arbolario Their 1987 Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement was made in bad faith, because they knew all along the existence of, and their relationship with, the Arbolarios. The Salhays, on the other hand, had no document to prove their acquisition and possession of a portion of the disputed lot. CA declared the Arbolarios as are illegitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion, the daughter of Juan and Catalina. They were born before the death of Catalina, under the extramarital affair of Juan and Francisca Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father or mother. no clear and reliable evidence to support the allegation of the Salhays that they purchased from the decedent, ISSUE: W/N the petitioners have a right in the lot in question.

Persons and Family Relations

LPU- Cavite

Dean Mawis

HELD: Illegitimacy of Petitioners A marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an undisputable fact. No marriage certificate was shown, petitioners relied on the fact that they were born after the first wife died Evidence of Purchase Sc stood by the findings of the CA and ruled that no supporting evidence was presented to prove the sale. Partition the partition of the property had not been contemplated by the parties, because respondents merely sought recovery of possession of the parcel held by the Salhays, while petitioners sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition respondents had entered into. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of co-owners, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and a right to enjoy the allotted estate without supervision or interference Petitioners were unable to establish any right to partition Failed to establish that they were legitimate brothers and sisters of Purificacion Questions as to the determination of the heirs of a decedent, the proof of filiation, and the determination of the estate of a decedent and claims thereto should be brought up before the proper probate court or in special proceedings instituted for the purpose. Such issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of ownership and possession. 2. terminated marriage under FC 42 in rel. to FC 43(1) Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n) Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate, and their custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided by the court in a proper proceeding; 3. void marriages under FC 53, 36 Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after complying with the requirements of the immediate preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (as amended by E.O. No. 227) 4. voidable marriages, FC 45 Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after

attaining the age of twenty one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a); Suntay v Suntay, GR 132524, Dec. 29, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner Federico is the argued that respondent Isabels Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabels father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina. The marriage of Isabels parents had previously been declared by the CFI as null and void.Federico anchors his opposition on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federicos Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the decision declaring the marriage of Isabels parents null and void be upheld. ISSUE: In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabels parents a case of a void or voidable marriage? Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child? RULING: Petition dismissed Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be declared null and void, the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerate the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children

Persons and Family Relations

LPU- Cavite

Dean Mawis

born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article89 which provides that: Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate. (b) Born during marriage (c) Conceived by artificial insemination cf. NCC 40, FC 164 Civil Code Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a) Family Code Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm f the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. (255a, 258a) (d) Adopted children Rivera v Ramirez, GR 189697, June 27, 2012 Facts:On February 7, 1995 Eleuterio P. Rivera (Eleuterio) filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City covering the estate of Rosita, who allegedly died without a will and with no direct ascendants or descendants. Eleuterio claimed that he was Rositas nephew, being the son of her brother Federico. Eleuterio submitted to the intestate court a list of the names of the decedents other nephews and nieces all of whom expressed conformity to Eleuterios appointment as administrator of her estate. On March 28, 1995 the RTC issued letters of administration appointing Eleuterio as Rositas estate administrator. On September 6, 1995 Eleuterio submitted an initial inventory of her properties. On April 18, 1996 he filed in his capacity as administrator a motion with the court to compel the examination and production of documents relating to properties believed to be a part of her estate, foremost of which was the Sta. Teresita General Hospital that respondent Robert Ramirez (Robert) had been managing. Robert claims, together with Raymond Ramirez (Raymond) and Lydia Ramirez (Lydia), that they were children of Adolfo by another woman. Robert opposed the issuance of the subpoena. on March 25, 2005 administrator Eleuterio moved for the joint settlement in the same case of the estates of Rosita and her husband, Adolfo considering that the spouses properties were conjugal. Eleuterio expressed willingness to co-administer the late spouses estate with Adolfos heirs, namely, Raymond, Robert, and Lydia Ramirez. Robert agreed to the joint settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses but insisted that the court also probate the deceased Adolfos will of October 10, 1990 which Robert presented. On July 17, 2006 Eleuterio, as administrator of Rositas estate, reiterated his motion to compel examination and production of the hospitals documents in Roberts possession. On February

12, 2007 the RTC granted the administrators motion and ordered Robert to bring to court the books of account, financial statements, and other documents relating to the operations of the Sta. Teresita General Hospital. The RTC also declined to inhibit Atty. Pacheo as Raymonds counsel. Robert moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that the documents belonged to the hospital, which had a On February 17, 2009 the CA rendered judgment, annulling the RTCs orders insofar as they granted the production and examination of the hospitals documents. Essentially, the CA ruled that Eleuterio and Rositas other collateral relatives were not her heirs since she had an adopted child in Raymond and that, consequently, Eleuterio, et al. had no standing to request production of the hospitals documents or to institute the petition for the settlement of her estate. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Eleuterio and his relatives were not Rositas heirs and, therefore, had no right to institute the petition for the settlement of her estate or to seek the production and examination of the hospitals documents. Held: The CA found in an article that Rosita had adopted Raymond as her child. An adopted child, is deemed a legitimate child of the adopter. This being the case, Raymonds presence barred Eleuterio and Rositas other collateral relatives from inheriting intestate from her. A further consequence is that they also did not have the right to seek the production and examination of the documents allegedly in Roberts possession. But, whether or not the late Rosita had judicially adopted Raymond as her child is a question of fact that had neither been considered nor passed upon by the RTC in a direct challenge to the claim of Eleuterio and Rositas other collateral relatives that they have the right to inherit from her. The relevant issue before the RTC was only whether or not the duly appointed administrator of Rositas estate had the right to the production and examination of the documents believed to be in Roberts possession. Indeed, one of the reasons Robert brought the special civil action of certiorari before the CA is that Eleuterio had no right to inspect the requested documents and have access to Adolfos estate when Eleuterios authority as administrator extended only to Rositas estate. The Court understands the CAs commendable desire to minimize multiple appeals. But the issues regarding the late Rositas supposed judicial adoption of Raymond as her child and the consequent absence of right on the part of Eleuterio, et al. to file a petition for the settlement of Rositas estate were never raised and properly tried before the RTC. Consequently, the CA gravely abused its discretion in adjudicating such issues and denying Eleuterio and his relatives their right to be heard on them. (e) Legitimated children 2. Rights of legitimate children, FC 173-174 Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties. (268a) Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames; (2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and

Persons and Family Relations

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Dean Mawis

(3) To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code. (264a)

NCC 364, 374, 376 Civil Code Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion. Art. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. NCC 888, NCC 979 Civil Code Art. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (808a) Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child. (931a) Moore v. Republic, 8 SCRA 282 Facts: Petitioner Elaine Moore (American citizen) is married with Joseph Velarde (also American) had a son out of wedlock William Michael Velarde (now 14 yrs old) born also at US. Said marriage however was dissolved through a decree of divorce from SC of California on 5/31/49. Elaine had 2nd marriage with Don Moore on 9/29/56 at LA, CA. William (minor) lived with them. Elaine filed @ CFI Rizal a motion to have her childs surname be changed into Moore instead of Velarde. TC denied such petition therefore this appeal. Issue: Government of the Phil. Opposed such petition with the following issues a) WON law permits minor to adopt surname of the 2nd husband of his mother b) WON justifiable reason exists to allow change of name c) WON mother has the authority to ask such Held: Regarding the 1st issue, RP said that through NCC 364 legitimate child should use the surname of his father. NCC 369 moreover cites that in case of annulment, child conceived before such decree shall use the surname of his/ her father. Likewise, same concept rules over decree of divorce; therefore law does NOT sanction such change of name. SC upheld such position, saying that confusion may arise wrt (with respect to) paternity and that said change may even redound to the prejudice of the child. Moreover, the child is still a minor and therefore aforesaid action is premature. Said child may in his mature age decide for himself to instigate such change of name. Naldoza v. Republic, 112 SCRA 658 Facts: Zosima Naldoza married Dionesio Divinagracia on 5/30/70. They had 2 children: Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Dionesio abandoned conjugal home after Zosima confronted him about his previous marriage. Also, he allegedly swindled 50k from Rep. Maglana and 10k from a certain Galagar, etc.

Classmates of Jr. and Bombi were teasing them because of their swindler father. To obliterate any connection between her children and Dionesio (thereby relieving the kids of the remarks of classmates), Zosima filed @ CFI Bohol on 4/10/78 a petition to change surname of her 2 children from Divinagracia into Naldoza (her maiden name). TC dismissed pet. saying that aforementioned reasons (swindling, abandoning, previous marriage of Dionesio <but their marriage has not yet been annulled nor declared bigamous> ) were not sufficient grounds to invoke such change of surname. Furthermore, change of name would give false impression of family relations. Issue: WON two childrens prayer to drop their fathers surname is justified Held: NO. Following NCC 364, since Jr. and Bombi are LC (legitimate children), therefore they should use their fathers surname. Said minors and their father should be consulted about such, mothers desire should not only be the sole consideration. Change of name is allowed only upon proper and reasonable cause (Rule 103 Sec 5 ROC). Change of name may even redound to the prejudice of the children later on, may cause confusion as to the minors parentage and might also create the impression that said minors are ICs, which is inconsistent with their legal status. In Oshita v. Republic and in Alfon v. Republic, their petition to change names have been granted, but petitioners in said cases have already attained mature age. In this case, when these minors have attained the right age, then they can already file said action for themselves. Ong vs CA, 272 SCRA 725 FACTS: -Respondents Alferdo Ong Jr. and Robert Ong are children of Saturnina Caballes allegedly by Manuel Ong. -Manuel (representing himself as Alfredo Go) was introduced to Saturnina by Vicente Sy and Constancia Lim (in 1953 at a night club in cebu). They had a relationship and lived together for 4 months. It was also established that prior to meeting Manuel, Saturnina cohabited with a paralytic. -Alfredo Ong Jr. (registered as Alfredo Go Jr.) was born in 1955 and Robert Ong (registered as Roberto Caballes) 1956. Roberto is surnamed Caballes because the midwife informed Saturnina that it should be the case since she werent married with Manuel. Manuels support dwindled. He stopped seeing her. She discovered his identity and asked for support but he refused. -In 1961 they asked for support but Manuel denied them. In two occasions Dolores Dy, Manuels commonlaw wife, treated private respondents like close relatives of Manuel Ong by giving them on November 2, 1979 and January 6, 1977 tokens of affection, such as family pictures of Dolores Dy and Manuel Ong and by visiting them in their house on A. Lopez Street in 1980. -Manuel Ong also gave money to Alfredo, first, as the latters high school graduation gift and second, for the latters educational support. Manuel Ong even told Alfredo to comeback with a list of what he needs for school but when he came back with some friends in September 1982, Manuel turned down his request and ordered him to leave and threatened to call the police if he did not leave. -September 30, 1982, Alfredo filed a complaint for recognition and support against Manuel Ong. The complaint was amended on November 25, 1982 to include Robert as co-plaintiff. Manuel died in May 1990 while the case is pending. TC-declared Alfredo and Robert illegitimate children of Manuel in accordance with Art. 283, pars. 2 and 4 of the Civil Code.

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CA-affirm TC, cited Art. 283, par. 3 as an additional ground for ordering the recognition of private respondents as illegitimate children. Issue: WON Alfredo and Roberto are illegitimate children of Manuel Held/Ratio: Yes. Alfredo and Roberto are sons of Manuel. Using Article 283 Paragraph. 4 (The father is obliged to recognize) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father . Art. 283 operates as a blanket provision covering all cases in the preceding ones, so that evidence, even though insufficient to constitute proof under the other paragraphs, may nonetheless be enough to qualify the case under par. 4. In this case, the testimony of Saturnina Caballes that she had illicit sexual relation with Manuel Ong over a long period (1954-1957) which, had it been openly done, would have constituted cohabitation under par. 3 is proof that private respondents were conceived and born during such relationship and constitutes evidence of Ongs paternity. This relationship was further established through the testimony of Constancia Lim. The evidence for private respondents is not negated by the admission of Saturnina Caballes that she had relation with another man before, because the relationship terminated at least a year before the birth of Alfredo Ong, Jr. and two years before the birth of the second child Robert Caballes. SC agree that this DOES NOT fall in Art 283 (2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family--- the times during which Manuel Ong met Alfredo and gave the latter money cannot be considered proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. The fathers conduct toward his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Does NOT fall in Art 283 (3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father----------While Saturnina Caballes testified that she and Manuel Ong lived together for four months as husband and wife in order to justify a finding of cohabitation, the

relationship was not open and public so as to constitute cohabitation. Petitioner claims that Manuel is sterile (due to illness during World War). For despite living with 2 other women, Dolores and Victoria Veloria (later established as Victoria Balili) but they didnt have a child. CA dismissed this for there is no medical proof and Manuel acknowledged a Lourdes Balili (born 1939) as his natural child with a Victoria Balili. An adult male is presumed to have normal powers of virility and the burden of evidence to prove the contrary rests upon him who claims otherwise. Petitioner has not overcome this presumption
Rep. vs CA, 300 SCRA 138 Facts : The petitioner was born at Capitol Medical Center in Quezon City on January 19, 1971 to parents Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. On January 10, 1927, after a marital disagreement, Vicencio left their Meycauayan Bulacan conjugal property and never returned nor gave support to his family. Leabres found an ally in Ernesto Yu who would later end up as her husband. On June 29, 1976, Leabres filed a petition , known as Civil case number E-02009 with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the dissolution of her conjugal partnership with Vicencio. In a decision given by Hon Regina C. Ordoez Benitez dated July 11, 1977, the

petition was granted. The petitioners mother filed another petition in 1983 to drop the surname of her husband therefrom and this, known as Special Proclamation 8316346 was again approved in a decision rendered by Hon. Emeterio C. Cui of Branch XXV. Yet again, under Special Proclamation number 84-22605, Leabres filed a petition to declare Pablo Vicencio an absentee. Hon. Corona Ibay- Somera decided in favour of the petitioners mother on April 26, 1984. The positive results of these petitions paved the way for the marriage of the petitioners mother and Ernesto Yu on April 15, 1986. Evidence was established that the petitioner had not remembered much her real father, Pablo Vicencio, and that in his absence, it was Ernesto Yu who had taken Vicencios place. Although petitioner uses the surname Vicencio in her school and other related activities, she contends that in such situations, confusion arose as to her parentage leading to inquiries as to why she is using Vicencio as surname ; causing much embarrassment on her part. In two occasions when she ran as a beauty contestant for Lions Club Affair and Manila Red Cross, her name was registered as Cynthia L. Yu. His stepfather had given his consent thereto upon prior consultation with him. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) , having participated in the cross examination of Cynthia Vicencio and her witnesses, manifested opposition over the petition. The court argued that there was no valid cause for the denial of the petition and that taking into account the fact that the court cannot compel the stepfather of the petitioner to consider adoption , failure to observe the process should not be a cause for disallowing petitioner to legally change her name, in addition to the opportunity of the respondent to improve her personality and welfare under a socially recognized surname, that of her stepfather. On August 31, 1987, the Manila Regional Trial Court Branch 52 granted private respondent Cynthia Vicencios petition for change of surname from Vicencio to Yu. The same was affirmed by the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 1989. Issue : Whether or not the appellate court made a mistake or violated standards in affirming the decision of the trial court to allow the change in private respondents surname to that of her stepfathers surname. Decision : Recognized inter alia in Republic vs. Hernandez, the following are sufficient grounds to warrant a change in name ; a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce , b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption , c. ) when the change will avoid confusion , d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of an alien parentage, e) when the change is based on sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase sign of former alienage, in good faith without prejudice to anybody and f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that desired change of name was far a fraudulent purpose or would prejudice public interest. Private respondent asserts that she falls under one of the justifiable grounds, specifically under avoidance of confusion since she has been recognized by society as the daughter of Ernesto Yu although she admits to having used Vicencio in beauty pagents and in her debut. In the argument of the Solicitor General , it argues that change in surname might give rise to legal complications since her stepfather has two other children with her mother and such complications may affect even the issue of inheritance should the stepfather die.The OSG further argues that change of name would be easy through adoption which Ernesto Yu did not opt for. The court contends that though confusion may arise with regard to parentage , more confusion with grave legal

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consequences could arise if private respondent is to use his stepfathers surname even if she is not legally adopted by him. Legal constraints lead the court to reject private respondents desire to use her step-fathers surname and no assurance exists that the end result would not be even more detrimental to her person, as it may trigger deeper inquiries regarding her parentage. It is also noteworthy that as a result of Republic Act 6809, the private respondent although already 18 when the appellate court rendered its decision , was still considered a minor. The court reversed and set aside the appealed decision to allow private respondents change of name from Vicencio to Yu and granted the instant petition to retain surname due to lack of legally justifiable cause for allowing such change. C. Illegitimate children 1. Who are considered illegitimate (a) under NCC Civil Code (b) under FC 165 Family Code Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code. (n) Uy v Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009 FACTS: The status, filiation or paternity of a person, or his/her legal standing or position in relation to a parent cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement. This is the ruling in this case of Ana. Ana was one of the two children of Ina, a single mother.She was born on April 27, 1969 when her mother was having an illicit affair with Al, a married Filipino-Chinese businessman. When Ina gave birth to Ana, Al was even around and attended to her needs although he gave the instruction that Anas birth certificate should be filled out in such a way that Anas paternity and filiation could not be traced to him. But Al financially supported Ana and her brother Fred. He had regularly and consistently given her allowances. While Ana was still in high school, Al provided her with employment at their family lumber and construction supplies business. Later Al recommended her employment in another company. Ana and Fred were known in the Chinese community as Als illegitimate children. When Ana got married, Al even sent his brother Lino as his representative who acted as father of the bride. Als relatives also attended the baptism of Anas first child. But Ana still wanted to formally establish her illegitimate filiation. So on October 27, 2003 she filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against Al. In answer, Al denied that he had illicit relationship with Ina and that Ana was his daughter. During the hearing Ana testified that Al was the only father she knew; that he took care of all her needs until she finished college; and that he came to visit her on special family occasions. She also presented documentary evidence to prove her illegitimate filiation. Instead of presenting evidence Al filed a Demurrer to Evidence. He presented another decision in another case of the same nature where Ana had already filed a similar petition against him and where a Compromise Agreement (CA) was entered between him and Ana dated February 18, 2000. In said agreement Ana admitted and acknowledged that there is no blood relationship between her and her brother Fred on one hand and Al on the other hand. This CA was approved by the other court and became the decision in said other case.

Based on this other decision, the RTC granted Als demurrer to evidence and dismissed Anas petition. Was the RTC correct? No. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of it is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Thus under Article 2035 of the Civil Code, no compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: the civil status of persons future supportfuture legitime. The CA dated February 18, 2000 obviously intended to settle the question of Anas status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate daughter of Al, that Ana and her brother are not the children of Al. Although unmentioned, it was the necessary consequence of such compromise that Ana also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child. The CA is therefore contrary to law and public policy. It produces no legal effect at all. It is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligation. So the RTC order must be set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings (Uy vs. Chua, G.R. 183965, September 18, 2009. 600 SCRA, 806). 2. Rights of illegitimate children, FC 173, 172, 175-176 Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a) Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a) Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a) Osmea de Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil 22 Facts: - Plaintiffs say that they are the legitimate children of the defendant Pio Valencia in the latters lawful wedlock with plaintiff Catalina Osmena - Defendants on the otherhand are the illegitimate children of defendant Pio Valencia with Emilia Rodriguez his commonlaw wife.

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- Plaintiffs allege that they alone have the right to the surname Valencia Issues: WON the illegitimate children could use the surname Valencia Held: Yes Ratio: This cannot happen since if plaintiffs were correct then they could stop numerous inhabitants from using the surname Valencia as well. Moreover, Pio Valencia has acquiesced to this as well. Finally, there is no law granting the exclusive ownership over a surname. Mangulabnan v Acero, GR 71994, May 31, 1990 Facts: Edna Padilla Mangulabnan filed an action for damages and support for her child Alfie Angelo. The TC ordered Ambrocio Tan Chew Acero to pay monthly support. He then moved for a reconsideration but was denied on December 5, 1984. CA annulled the orders of the TC on the ground that even as to illegitimate children who are not natural children, there is a need for the latter class of children (spurious children) to be recognized either voluntarily or by judicial decree, otherwise they cannot demand support as in the case of an acknowledged child. Issue: WON recognition of an illegitimate child like the minor Alfie whose father is married and had no legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of his conception is required before support may be granted. Held: NO Ratio: The requirement for recognition by father or mother jointly or by only one of them as provided by law refers in particular to a natural child under Article 276 of the NCC. Such child is presumed to be the natural child of the parents recognizing it who had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of conception. Thus, an illegitimate child like Alfie is not a natural child but an illegitimate child or spurious child in which case recognition is not required before support may be granted. However, under Article 887 of the NCC, in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be proved. The status of the minor child had been provisionally established as affidavits of petitioner and 2 witnesses, and the birth certificate were presented to prove the paternity of the child

Held: Yes, the child being born outside of a legitimate marriage is considered illegitimate since his illegitimacy is not cured by his parents later marriage. As such he is covered by Art 176 of the family code that mentions among other things that a mother shall have parental authority over the illegitimate child, regardless of whether the father acknowledges paternity over the child. Acknowledgment of paternity is only a means of compelling support for the child not entitling custody. Moreover the Family Code does not distinguish b/w the natural and spurious nature of the illegitimate child as they are treated in the same category. Furthermore absent any compelling reason for depriving Loreta custody over the child (such as neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction w/ a communicable disease) custody shall remain w/ the mother, with the father granted visitation rights. (action moot since child off to Japan during the pendency of the action) Maramag vs De Guzman, GR 181132, June 5, 2009 Facts: Petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while respondents were Loretos illegitimate family. Loreto designated respondents as beneficiaries in his life insurance policies from Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife). Petitioners insituted in the RTC a petition for revocation and/or reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious, with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. Pursuant to the motion to dismiss incorporated in Insular and Grepalifes respective answers, the TC dismissed the complaint with respect to the illegitimate children, who are the the designated primary beneficiaries in the life insurance policies, for lack of cause action. However, trial court ruled that the action may proceed against the concubine, Insular Life, and Grepalife. Insular and Grepalife filed their respective motions for reconsideration, arguing, in the main, that the petition failed to state a cause of action against them. TC granted, and dismissed the case against them. In doing so, the TC court considered the allegations found in Insulars answer.1 CA dismissed petitionersappeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action involved a pure question of law. Further, it found that due to petitioners failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration, the dismissal against Insular and Grepalife had already attained finality. Issue: WON the TC erred in granting the motion to dismiss? NO Arguments: Petitioners: The finding that Eva was either disqualified as a beneficiary by the insurance companies or that her designation was revoked by Loreto was raised only in the answers and motions for reconsideration of both Insular and Grepalife. For a motion to dismiss to prosper on that ground, only the allegations in the complaint should be considered. Ratio:

Briones vs. Miguel, 440 SCRA 455, October 18, 2004 Facts: 1) Review of CA decision awarding custody of minor child to mother (custody til child reaches age 10 then he is to choose w/c parent he wants to stay with) w/ visitation rights to the Father, Joey D. Briones. 2) Mar 5, 02 files for Habeas Corpus claiming the child was visited by s Maricel and Francisca Miguel relatives of the mother of the child, Loreta Miguel, under the pretext of taking the child to SM, then they did not return. 3) claims that he extensively looked for the child but failed so he was compelled to file for habeas corpus. 4) mother Loreta alleges that the child was not taken as he was fetched by her w/ the consent. 5) and met in Japan and had a relationship together w/c bore the child Michael Kevin Pineda (relationship eventually soured accdg to Loreta because of illicit relationship w/ another woman, now married to Japanese national). 6) petitions for joint custody when the mom Loreta is away. Issues: WON the natural father of an illegitimate child may be denied custody of his own child.

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When a motion to dismiss is premised on Sec. 1(g)2 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength of such allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. However, this rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of the allegations if: the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice; such allegations are legally impossible; the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence; by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or in the course of the hearings related to the case. It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance Code states that the insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy. From the petition filed before the trial court that, it is clear that although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. Thus, they are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. De la Cruz vs Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009 FACTS: Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased father, and because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child. Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity. ISSUE: Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity. RULING: Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument. Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in the private handwritten instrument. The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private

handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. Manungas v Loreto, GR 193161, August 22, 2011 Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012

DOJ Opinion No. 11 Series of 1990 DOJ Opinion No. 4, Series of 1998 D. Action to impugn legitimacy Reyes vs. Mauricio, G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010 Facts: On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. For the parties failure to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trial on the merits ensued. In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffzes filiation. In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the respondents testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the questions of the petitioners counsel. It noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that the respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioners allegation that the respondent had previous relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. Issue: whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTCs findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze. Held: One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an

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admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception.38 Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy. However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear and categorical assertions. The court sustain the award of monthly child support, without prejudice to the filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in arrears, considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during the pendency of this case. 1. Grounds, FC 166 Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: (1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse; (2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband,

except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or (3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a) Memorize! (a) Physical impossibility of access Andal v. Macaraig, 89 Phil 165 Facts: Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as guardian ad litem, brought an action in the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in Camarines Sur. The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas and that Emiliano was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved. Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. Maria Dueas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father. Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. Maria Dueas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. Issue: Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano. Ruling: Mariano is the legitimate son of Emiliano. It is already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. It is also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such proof

Macadangdang v. CA, 100 SCRA 73 FACTS: Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March 1967. She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24, 1967. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw.

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2. Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. HELD: 1. Yes, the child Rolando is presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw. The fact that the child was born a mere seven months after the initial sexual contact between the petitioner and the respondent is proof that the said child was not the petitioner since, from indications, he came out as a normal full-term baby. Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the respondent and her husband. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 days which preceded the birth of the child. This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. Hence, proof of the physical impossibility of such sexual union prevents the application of the presumption. (Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p. 513 citing Bevilaqua, Familia p. 311) 2. No, the wife may not institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. Crispin Anahaw served as a refuge after the respondents' reckless and immoral pursuits after her flings. And she deliberately did not include nor present her husband in this case because she could not risk her scheme. She had to be certain that such scheme to bastardize her own son for her selfish motives would not be thwarted. Hence, in general, good morals and public policy require that a mother should not be permitted to assert the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock in order to obtain some benefit for herself (N.Y. Flint vs Pierce, 136 N.Y.S. 1056, cited in 10 C.J.S. 77). In the case of a child born or conceived in wedlock, evidence of infidelity or adultery of the wife and mother is not admissible to show illegitimacy, if there is no proof of the husbands' impotency or non-access to his wife (Iowa-Craven vs Selway, 246 N.W. 821, cited in 10 C.J.S. 36). The Court says, and as between the paternity by the husband and the paternity of the paramour, all the circumstances being equal, the law is inclined to follow the former, hence, the child is thus given the benefit of legitimacy. Concepcion vs. CA, G.R. No. 123450, Aug. 31, 2005 Facts: Ma. Theresa Almonte married Gerardo Concepcion, which they begot a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo Concepcion found out that his wife was still married to Mario Gopiao. Hence, he filed for annulment on the ground of bigamy. Theresa averred that he married Mario but that was only a sham and she never lived with him at all. RTC ruled that Theresas marriage with Mario Gopiao is still valid and subsisting thus the marriage with Gerardo is bigamous and the child born was condemned illegitimate. Custody was then given to Theresa. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She argued that a putative father cannot have visitation rights over the illegitimate child and the childs surname be changed to the mothers maiden name. Gerardo opposed the motion and insisted on the visitation rights and retention of the fathers surname to the child. Issue: Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate. Ruling: Jose Gerardo is deemed born legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been

sentenced as an adulteress. The fact that the child was conceived and born at the time the spouses had lived together. The law and only the law determine, who are the legitimate or illegitimate children, for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein is merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is. (b) Biological or other scientific grounds A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC (RULE ON DNA Evidence) RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence, as defined in Section 3 hereof, is offered, used, or proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all criminal and civil actions as well as special proceedings. Sec. 2. Application of other Rules on Evidence. In all matters not specifically covered by this Rule, the Rules of Court and other pertinent provisions of law on evidence shall apply. Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be defined as follows: Biological sample means any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones; DNA means deoxyribonucleic acid, which is the chain of molecules found in every nucleated cell of the body. The totality of an individuals DNA is unique for the individual, except identical twins; DNA evidence constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples; DNA profile means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating from that person; DNA testing means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct identification) or if the biological samples originate from related persons (kinship analysis); and Probability of Parentage means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative parent compared with the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals in a given population. Sec. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case; The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and

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The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy of integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. Sec. 5. DNA Testing Order. If the court finds that the requirements in Section 4 hereof have been complied with, the court shall Order, where appropriate, that biological samples be taken from any person or crime scene evidence; Impose reasonable conditions on DNA testing designed to protect the integrity of the biological sample, the testing process and the reliability of the test results, including the condition that the DNA test results shall be simultaneously disclosed to parties involved in the case; and If the biological sample taken is of such an amount that prevents the conduct of confirmatory testing by the other or the adverse party and where additional biological samples of the same kind can no longer be obtained, issue an order requiring all parties to the case or proceedings to witness the DNA testing to be conducted. An order granting the DNA testing shall be immediately executory and shall not be appealable. Any petition for certiorari initiated therefrom shall not, in any way, stay the implementation thereof, unless a higher court issues an injunctive order. The grant of DNA testing application shall not be construed as an automatic admission into evidence of any component of the DNA evidence that may be obtained as a result thereof. Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. Post-conviction DNA testing may be available, without need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory judgment provided that (a) a biological sample exists, (b) such sample is relevant to the case, and (c) the testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction. Sec. 7. Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence. In assessing the probative value of the DNA evidence presented, the court shall consider the following: The chair of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they were handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples; The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests; The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standards-setting institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be properly established; and The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided. The provisions of the Rules of Court concerning the appreciation of evidence shall apply suppletorily. Sec. 8. Reliability of DNA Testing Methodology. In evaluating whether the DNA testing methodology is reliable, the court shall consider the following: The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested; The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or methods; The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant scientific community;

The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the correctness of data generated; The existence of an appropriate reference population database; and The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles and the significance and limitation of statistical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles. Sec. 9. of DNA Testing Results. In evaluating the results of DNA testing, the court shall consider the following: The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the relevance of mismatching DNA evidence; The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the other evidence presented in the case; and that DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA testing shall be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity. Sec. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the Convict. The convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In the case the court, after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, if shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause. A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, or with any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the petition to the court of origin and issue the appropriate orders. Sec. 11. Confidentiality. DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall be confidential. Except upon order of the court, a DNA profile and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall only be released to any of the following, under such terms and conditions as may be set forth by the court: Person from whom the sample was taken; Person from whom the sample was taken; Lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action; Duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and Other persons as determined by the court. Whoever discloses, utilizes or publishes in any form any information concerning a DNA profile without the proper court order shall be liable for indirect contempt of the court wherein such DNA evidence was offered, presented or sought to be offered and presented. Where the person from whom the biological sample was taken files a written verified request to the court that allowed the DNA testing for the disclosure of the DNA profile of the person and all results or other information obtained from the DNA testing, he same may be disclosed to the persons named in the written verified request. Sec. 12. Preservation of DNA Evidence. The trial court shall preserve the DNA evidence in its totality, including all biological samples, DNA profiles and results or other genetic information obtained from DNA testing. For this purpose, the court may order the appropriate government agency to preserve the DNA evidence as follows: In criminal cases: for not less than the period of time that any person is under trial for an offense; or in case the accused is serving sentence, until such time as the accused has served his sentence;

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In all other cases, until such time as the decision in the case where the DNA evidence was introduced has become final and executory. The court may allow the physical destruction of a biological sample before the expiration of the periods set forth above, provided that: A court order to that effect has been secured; or The person from whom the DNA sample was obtained has consented in writing to the disposal of the DNA evidence. Sec. 13. Applicability to Pending Cases. Except as provided in Section 6 and 10 hereof, this Rule shall apply to cases pending at the time of its effectivity. Sec. 14. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on October 15, 2007, following publication in a newspaper of general circulation. FC 170, 171 Family Code Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. (263a) Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases: (1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; (2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a) Agustin, June 15, 2005 Facts: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999 The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child Arnel is actually married and has a family of his own at the time he impregnated Fe Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964 July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court Issue: (1) whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity

testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination Held: The petition is without merit. It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual relationship produced the child, Martin. Being the first case where DNA testing was the focal issue the court examines the history of DNA testing o The court opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals o In People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile The SC upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence since both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence There is no violation of the right of self incrimination in DNA testing Herrera vs. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005 Facts: 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi Alba before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner (Rosendo Herrera) Rosendo Herrera denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondents mother Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity. respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D who testified that the test is 99.99% accurate Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against selfincrimination trial court and CA granted the motion to conduct DNA paternity testing Issue: Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation. Petitioner asks for the conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated into our judicial system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity suit Relevant Provisions The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows: ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. xxx ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

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(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide: SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. Held: By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved from the issue of according official recognition to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis People v. Vallejo It all boils down to evidence and its admissibility Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court. [48] Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.[49] Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as follows o The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence o This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue The court goes on to discuss the Vallejo case on the caution with the method employed in the actual testing DNA. o In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests Nevertheless, the petition is dismissed Estate v. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007 FACTS: petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate

scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules on succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus are married It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born In notarized document, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The court dismissed the petition CA affirmed in toto ISSUE: WON petitioners can be recognized as illegitimate children of the decedent based on the notarized document HELD: NO The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgment. records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.

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Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, 3 or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected. petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia because It was not a case of legitimate children asserting to be somebody else's illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to declare that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus. The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioner's alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED. Lucas v Lucas, GR No. 190710, June 6, 2011 FACTS: Jesse U. Lucas (Jesse), filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse narrated his mothers account of her history with Jesus S. Lucas (Jesus) and attached several copies of his personal documents. Though Jesus was not summoned and was not served a copy of the petition, he nevertheless learned of it and obtained for himself a copy. He then filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting among others that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him as respondent. Unbeknownst to Jesus on the day before he filed his Comment, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. After learning of the RTCs order, Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father. Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba. This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration of his own which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by

Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case. ISSUE: Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order. HELD: Petition GRANTED. Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading. Section 4 of the Rule on DNA evidence. The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public. Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states: The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established. Court order for blood testing equivalent to search under the Constitution.

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In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained; Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. (c.) FC 166(3) Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: (3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a) 2. Effect of a mothers declaration, FC 167 Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (256a) Chua Keng Giap v. IAC, 158 SCRA 18 FACTS: the petitioner, Chua Keng Giap insists that he is the son of the deceased Sy Kao and that it was error for the respondent court to reject his claim. He also says his motion for reconsideration should not have been denied for tardiness because it was in fact filed on time under the Habaluyas ruling. This case arose when Chua Keng Giap filed, a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the regional trial court The private respondent moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner's capacity to file the petition. The latter, it was claimed, had been declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao, for the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. The decision in that case had long become final and executory. The motion was denied by Judge Jose P. Castro, who held that the case invoked decided the paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner.

Holding that this was mere quibbling, the respondent court reversed the trial judge in a petition for certiorari filed by the private respondent. The motion for reconsideration was denied for late filing ISSUE: WON Chua Keng Giap is the child of Sy kao HELD: NO The issue of his claimed filiation has long been settled, and with finality, by no less than this Court. That issue cannot be resurrected now because it has been laid to rest in Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals, 8 decided on September 28, 1984. In that case, Sy Kao flatly and unequivocally declared that she was not the petitioner's mother. "Petitioner Sy Kao denies that respondent Chua Keng Giap is her son by the deceased Chua Bing Guan. Thus, petitioner's opposition is based principally on the ground that the respondent was not the son of Sy Kao and the deceased but of a certain Chua Eng Kun and his wife Tan Kuy. "After hearing on the merits which lasted for ten years, the court dismissed the respondent's petition on a finding that be it not a son of petitioner Sy Kao and the deceased, and therefore, had no lawful interest in the estate of the latter and no right to institute the intestacy proceedings. Who better than Sy Kao herself would know of Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than any one else, it was Sy Kao who could say as indeed she has said these many years that Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED 3. In subsequent marriages, FC 168, 169 Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage; (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (259a) Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy. (261a) People v Quitoriano, January 20, 1997 FACTS: 1. Quitoriano was charged of the crime of rape. 2. He allegedly raped the victim, Edna Pergis, on December 24, 1992 3. in June 1993, her aunt, Teresa Pergis, discovered that Edna was pregnant. 4. On August 2, 1993, private complainant filed a complaint for rape against accused-appellant 5. She gave birth on October 31, 1993. CONTENTIONS: Accused: private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the alleged rape; therefore, the child could not have been the accuseds ISSUE: Whether or not the child could have been the accuseds. HELD:

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Yes. The fact that private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the alleged rape does not discredit her testimony. Dr. Honesto Marquez, a physician from the Marinduque Provincial Hospital, explained that the normal gestation period is 40 weeks or 280 days, but it can also extend beyond 40 weeks if the woman is having her first pregnancy. It is undisputed that the child delivered by private complainant on October 31, 1993 was her first. Hence, it is not impossible that the child was conceived in December, 1992, the date of the alleged rape. 4. Presumptions, FC 170, 171 Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. (263a) Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases: (1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; (2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a) 5. Prescription of action to impugn legitimacy Gaspay v. CA, 238 SCRA 163 Facts: FlavianoGaspay died intestate on 10/14/83, then married to AguedaDenoso (childless). On 7/6/88 privresp Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro alleged @ TC that shes acknowledged IC of Flaviano with Claudia Pason, prayed for issuance of letters of admin of Flavianos estate. Petitioners are Jr. (adopted son) and Eriberta (next of kin) who filed for an MTD (motion to dismiss) saying that Guadalupe is a stranger. TC denied the MTD saying that such was based on indubitable grounds but TC nonetheless dismissed petition saying that testimonial and documentary evidence failed to prove status of Guadalupe, failed to show Guad consenting to the acknowledgement asIC and that such action should have been filed in the lifetime of Flaviano. CA reversed TC on 9/30/91 saying that: Evid is ample to prove filiation as IC Evid is sufficient to show that Guad consented to the acknowledgement as IC Action can be instituted after death of putative father Issue: WON Guadalupe is an Illegitimate Child Held: YES.TC did not discount the testimony of Martin Garin (agent to logging concessionaire of Flaviano for 18 years) who verified handwriting and signature of Flaviano in a letter addressed to Lupe and Toming (Guad and his husband Bartolome Alfaro) regarding the hospitalization expenses of Guads daughter. CA said that TC must have assumed that Flavianos handwriting must have metamorphosed during the years but it could be

possible that handwriting of Flaviano never changed at all. Also when Guadalupe filed said action, she still used Gaspay affixed to her legal surname as married to Alfaro, thereby shouting to the world her consent to the acknowledgment of an IC. As to the action being instituted after death of putative father, CA said action based on acknowledgement may be brought even after death of putative father. She thereby proved entitlement to the admin of estate. Moreover, the petitioners neglected to apply for a letter admin 30 days after the death of Flaviano Gaspay. 6. Who may impugn Benitez-Badua v. CA, 229 SCRA 468 Facts: Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties, upon their death the fight for administration of Vicentes estate ensued. Vicentes sister and nephew prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes estate. On the other hand, Marisa Benitez-Badua opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased spouses and is capable of administering the estate. In RTC, both parties submit their pieces of evidence. Petitioner Marissa, prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses by submitting documentary evidence and that the spouses continuously treated her as legitimate child. On the other hand, respondents proved by testimonial evidence that spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage because the spouse Isabel was treated by an obstetrician-gynecologist which prevented her to give birth. The older sister of Vicente also declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the spouses, who were unable to procreate, as she was there at the time the spouses were having this problem. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was the biological child of the spouses and has the right to be the sole heir. Ruling: Petitioner was not the biological child based on facts. Live of Birth Certificate was repudiated by Notarized of Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. The claim for inheritance of a child who is not the biological or adopted child of deceased was denied, on the ground that Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the child by nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where the husband or his heirs denies as his own a child of his wife. Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao, 378 SCRA 563 FACTS: William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed an action for compulsory recognition as "the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao" against herein respondents, who are the legitimate children of William Sr.. Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William's untimely demise Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. he failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the necessity to meet him Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao.

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William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billy's birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company 4 and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. 5 William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together. 6 During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billy's godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyao's legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio. 7 Corazon also presented pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other important meetings. During the occasion of William Liyao's last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, "Hey, look I am still young, I can still make a good looking son." Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter's direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs. However, after William Liyao's death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where he shared his last moments with Corazon Testifying for the petitioner were a friend, owner of a beauty parlor and Enrique Yulo On the other hand, respondents stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married. Her father lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated from her husband Linda added that Corazon, while still a vice-president of the company, was able to take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office. Tita Rose stated that after assuming the position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any check signed by her late father representing payment to lessors as rentals for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao, declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office to fetch Corazon Garcia. The court ruled in favor of the petitioners CA reversed it. ISSUE: WON petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao? HELD: NO Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. 22 The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. 23 The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code 24 provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: By the impotence of the husband; By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; By the serious illness of the husband. Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner presented a document entitled, "Contract of Separation," executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future. The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. 27 Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. 28 It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory. 29 It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother's alleged paramour. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Republic v Magpayo, GR 189476, Feb. 2, 2011 FACTS: Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng

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who, as respondents certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEOF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG." In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage. Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon Citys 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG." On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court. The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondents petition and directed the Civil Registrar ofMakati City to: 1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein respondents Certificate of live Birth]; 2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG"; 3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and 4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of the [respondent] (emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original) The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be made through appropriate adversarial proceedings. Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it directed the deletion of the name of respondents father from his birth certificate. HELD: The petition is impressed with merit. (in favor of the Republic) 1. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that

the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. *** Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however. The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mothers surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy. The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondents supplication. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ." ******** Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads: SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) 2. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding. As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto. Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case."A petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby." Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not

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named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out. Makati v Harper, GR 189998, August 29, 2012 Rivera v Ramirez, GR 189697, June 27, 2012 Mangulabnan v Acero, GR 71994, May 31, 1990 Manungas v Loreto, GR 193161, August 22, 2011 Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012 Reyes vs. Mauricio, G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010 People v Quitoriano, January 20, 1997