[Classification]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center
Type of event: Interview
Date: Tuesday, September , 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred , FAA General Consul
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Mike McCormack

Hired in February 1982 as air traffic controller Philadelphia tower. Academy, June 82 at
tower, full performance level may 84. Training specialist 18 months promoted to area
super for 3 years. Specialist op branch Jamaica New York. Q&A specialist, then section
supervisor. Then promoted ass air traffic man NY Tracon. Ass air traffic ma NY center.
98 air traffic manager ZNY to present.

Air traffic manager has overall responsibility for running ZNY all operations including
500 employees, direct indirect supervision, highest level of customer service. Operations
of air traffic management. David LaCates is number two. All operations managers and
support managers report to LaCates.

Ground up: ATCs, then op supers, then op manager, then LaCates, then McCormack.

Administrative supervision: op manager oversight over area of specialization, 5 op

managers.
OMIC: specific responsibilities for an entire shift, all the operational guidance and
supervision for that shift. OMIC may have admin responsibilities depending on position.

9/11 OMIC was staffed by Bruce Barrett. Overall operational supervision for NY center
for the day shift
OSIC and CIC - one position that has a title change dependent on who is fulfilling.

Estimated times:

At about 835 in office. Receive call from Barrett on private line informing of possible
hijack in Boston Center. Boeing 767, f!290 headed southbound. Immediately went to
operational floor, based on projection of aircraft path it would enter New York airspace
in area b. also called LaCates on private line to inform of possible hijack. Immediately
goes out to floor and calls LaCates. Possible hijack.

Goes to area b. sees Paul Thumser and Ivonna Dowis in middle of area. Both appear to be
in charge. Aware of AA11. Watch desk knows. Receives page on text pager "confirmed
hijack in progress aall 1, BOS-lax last known alt f!290 transponder off, target turned
southbound after alb. WOC notified." from Ron Rejeri (?), sent to him from North East
region. Wrote that text down exactly. Noted that at 845. Does have note from his pocket
that was written down on 9/11. Note gives idea of train taken by text message. 848 am
might have been when it was sent. Time may not be accurate on pager. Copy of note in
kept by commission.

Went to Paul Thumser and Ivonna Dowis and told them confirmed hijack. Went to watch
and spoke to Barret and Mulligan to give info on confirm hijack. Rosenberg tells spoke to
company and says people killed and they have "knives and bombs". LaCates is not there
at time. Information relayed at some point.

Did two thing in area b. told Ivonna and Paul to make sure communicating with watch
desk and make sure the watch desk knows to contact military. Asked have contacted com
center and com center. They said yes. Then Pete mulligan said in process of contacting
military. ATCSCC Herndon. Com center eastern region op center. Making sure of
parallel communications. Eastern region com center would notify Washington com
center.

Went back to area b. by then LaCates there. Informs him of confirmed hijack, knives and
bombs. Told Ivonna and Paul of seriousness. Confirm hijack, gave approx primary local,
said to get out to floor, told AA11 to Washington en route center - spoke to Louis
Ramirez (?) (counterpart at Washington Center). Told him to beware.

Went to various positions at area b. started track of AA11 (alpha) and tried to give approx
altitudes, etc. go between three or four radar as people fed info. Made sure Ivonna and
Paul kept relaying info.

As became aware the AA11 called NY Tracon, spoke with bob birch, thought it was
visually flying along Hudson river and descending towards new York area. Aircraft may
attempt to land at Newark. NY tower as still on phone call from NY Tracon and said hit
WTC. NY tower relayed info to McCormack. Heard controllers talking loudly on
UAL 175. All at same time. Told birch to wait and informed that there might be another
one. At that point the got off phone. Received no information except "large aircraft" on
what hit WTC. Was in area b during this time.

As talking with New York Tracon getting reports of ELT. Two different sectors told him
of ELTs. Understanding of getting an ELT signal - accidentally, accident, vast majority
that they get are false alarms. Always react as if it was an emergency until known
otherwise. But those reports went off prior to the AA11 hitting the WTC.

While on phone with birch near sector 55. Then would walk up to the area b desk. And
speak on two phones. Spoke to secretary and asked her to make all managers report to the
operations floor.

Refer to October 16th statement. Inform birch of more hijacks, and don't assume
everything is over. Thought it was a very good possibility from listening to background
conversation, and knew of problem with 175. Said there may be another crash on WTC.
That was based on ELT hits before AA11 struck WTC. After reviewing statement, says
that was based on awareness of 175. Did not look at displays regarding 175.

Reviewing Dave Bittiglia, r42 "UAL175 recycle transponder...UAL 175 do you read.
Delta 149 do you read?" reads statement through 853.

Estimates of time based on statements and notes taken that day. Conversation with bob
birch might have lasted a few minutes. Overhearing Dave asking over 175 is when he
gives information on phone to birch.

At time not aware of convey of suspicious overheard over AA11 by UAL 175 to r42.

Thinking of another crash into the trade center. Up until then though AA11 was going to
emergency land New York. Perhaps bomb went off so that's why it lost all electrical.
Thought inward airport. Most visible. That's why called Newark Tracon. That's when
actually get report of aircraft into trade center. Thought 1) it was AA11 and 2) didn't
discount the other possibilities but first contingency was it was a hijack and somehow it
was deliberately flown into WTC. Based that on bombing from 93. Thought in mind back
to 93 trying to take trade center down again. As Bittiglia tried to get 175 and no response
kept thinking may be another one.
Did not speak to anyone other than birch.

Told Lacates to turn on CNN and keep passing information.

Went to Bittiglia to figure out over 175. Dave and Thumser explained it was descending
and had began turning at eastern pa. Allentown area. As turning toward New Jersey
thinking not good. Thinking possibly trade center. As completed second turn thinking
trade center. It would be pointing directly towards New York City. And was assuming it
was headed towards WTC and was thinking it was headed to the same tower. **was
thinking the two ELT reports were from 1) small aircraft reported hitting 2) AA11 did hit
and 3) 175 on its way to hit. Thought two had hit same tower and thought 175 was hitting
next.
Reports from aircraft trying to see aircraft and reported in that aircraft had
descended.** ****** wasn't unusual to think could have continued descent.

Based on ELT, reports in media, unverified unknown aircraft general aviation from
upstate New York headed to WTC from ATC working position from New York Tracon,
report from helicopter lost over New York. Later on found on inaccurate. Thinking
possibly small aircraft, possibly another aircraft, possibly another aircraft, possibly a 767
all into tower. Thought it was a coordinated attack.

Rumors from Tracon telling ZNY controllers of reports about lost aircraft in
conversation.

Thinking potentially prior to loss of 175 on radar could have been two hits on trade
center. As processing that info keeping in mind that assumptions could have been totally
off.

Other managers reporting to floor. One of the first was Kevin Delaney. Told Kevin to go
watch CNN so Lacates could come back. Delaney had his portable. Told to call on phone
not just run back and forth.

Made sure watch desk aware of 175. Called his superiors at eastern region. Between 852
and 856. Eastern region air traffic region to inform of more than one hijack and another
probably hijack headed in. doesn't remember which admin folk he gave this information
to. Reply gotten from eastern region that no manager was available. Said it was an urgent
matter. Said he needs to speak with them immediately. Says don't put on hold. Told no
manager available. Based on what admin was saying impression was that managers were
all busy with AA11. Indicated words to effect that it was too busy to put call through.
Managers were too busy reporting upward regarding AA11. Couldn't break through that
wall. Was trying to reach frank Hatfield or Rick DuCharme. Asked for them by name.
Did not get into specifics. Said that there was more. Emphatic that there was more. Tried
several times. Call never completed. They don't have a mobile phone number that is a
cell extension from desk. They don't have that same system. Carrying hard line on
person. Didn't have access to that an that time. At desk other numbers for managers. But
priority was to be on floor.

Relayed through Lacates that second aircraft hit trade center. Went to the watch desk.
Spoke to Bruce, Pete and Marty ******again. Asked them the status of the airports. As
informed of status Bruce said maybe ATC zero. McCormack said do it and let me know
if there's any push back. Ultimately at ZNY that decision is McCormack if McCormack
is there. Otherwise decision is OMIC. Reasonably sure in mind of UAL 175 was what hit
WTC second, in mind was third.

United Airlines still had transponder code on and still getting altitude read outs. When
mode c is on have to validate that that is accurate within three hundred feet. Doesn't
recall last alt read personally seen on UAL 175. Above 5k.
After ATC zero needed to think how to protect ATC system, country, and security of
facility. Thinking of three coordinated attacks on one point. Didn't know if isolated or
not. Thought to get rid of traffic. Had Bruce and Lacates get all supervisors and managers
into a "round up" at watch desk to inform of info known so far. Made decision at that
time to elevate physical security at New York center. Not letting anyone in or out. All
visitors escorted off premises. Started delegated. Bruce head of air traffic. Bruce
assistant. John Azzerone in charge of physical security. Paul Ferril in charge of
personnel.

904 bob Filser informed military had scrambled and wanted to know current location of
aircraft and it seemed they were asking about 175. Said something like fighters in air.
Told him too late.

Paul yelled somebody scramble McGuire as looking up hallway, see below.

At that time phone call from ed McCennan manager of Syracuse tower and it is hub of
responsibility for many areas. Somebody had told him to call McCormack. Vented on
him that couldn't get through to region. Two possibly three hit, ATC zero, kicking out
visitors. Not a regional officer. Not hearing back from appropriate person, McCennan
informs McCormack to get on national Telcon. Went to McCormack's conf room and
dialed in on speaker. David Cannols was there from headquarters. Was a high ranking
administrative official within air traffic. Atl on 9/11 was bill peacock. Head of air traffic
of country. He'd report to administrator. About three or four levels removed from
Garvey. Reported to Dave everything that had happened up to that point. Probably
around 915 or 925 would fit. Probably 915. Told him of events as best known as well as
possibilities. Shortly after that people on Telcon started talking of another missing
aircraft. Look for primary. Said Dave, you know where that's headed for? He said yeah.
We've got the widows down we'll be safe. Heard fast moving primary east bound to dc.
Started counting down miles to white house. 5 4 3 2 1 and heard aircraft turning away.
Thought white house too small, and then thought it would hit capital, and shortly
thereafter it hit pentagon. Didn't expect that. They may have given call sign or company
of aircraft on Telcon. No one on that Telcon thought it was AA11. They thought it was a
craft from out west they had lost track on . Right about same time of pentagon hit
Cleveland center got on telcon. Gave call sign and beacon code and last known position
and said it was heading eastbound. McCormack called out to the Barrett and area c and
gave beacon code and call sign and told them to look for it incase it was incoming.
Immediately said yeah track Pittsburgh headed eastbound. At that point shortly thereafter
they said had lost target.

During telcon no mention of shoot down. His assumption was that it was a controlled
flight into the ground deliberately crashed. Made assumption based on rapid loss of
altitude. Based thought on air 90.

Shown documents:
Had never seen the air piracy documents prior or post 9/11.
Had seen SSI document shown. There documents are not marked sensitive.****

Aware of a process in existence of coordinating with military in case of hijack. Knew

person would be out of Washington. The process followed at ZNY - events taking place
too quickly to go through the process that had been set up. Always good to have parallel
forms of communication going on at all times. Wanted to make sure everyone had same
or similar info to make decisions. Made attempt in interest of expediency to give them
information so they would be prepared to have orders. That way military would gain
situational awareness quicker. Does not know what the policy was intended to address.
Process would be time and resource intensive, and thus would have a natural delay.
Aware of one off the coast of Africa that was not deliberate and aware of Egyptian 990
that was deliberately flown into north Atlantic. Prior to 9/11 personal natural assumption
would not be to think that a 9/11 event would happen.

Quicker get any assistance, military of otherwise, is better. In a situation where the
circumstance is for their to be a landing in Cuba, etc intent, then time is critical, but might
be less critical then in 9/11 scenario.

Prior 9/11 had direct line capability to NEADS. When spoke of military priority to Paul
and ivonna, thought OMIC would make call on how to contact NEADS, direct or
commercial line. Was not aware that Boston had already called. AMIS - unknown.
Military radar has alt on primary? Knows they can do that, does not know where they can
do that. At one point during event Pilsner said it was tough to get the number.

Procedures are much more defined now to contact military.

Thumser and scramble McGuire comment - took it as an emotional reaction to events.

Said to no one in particular. Knew there were no fighters or tactical capabilities. Were not
on hot pads or anything like that.

Was aware that on 9/11 ac did not have air defense capability for at least a year or two.
Bradley in ct capability for air defense? No. Knew they needed tactical air defense
fighters out of new England.

Spoke with region after and informed them that in between hijacking had knowledge that
WTC would be hit again. Understands that it was emotions that existed in those short
minutes. But also informed them that a better system needs to be in place. Now there is
one. Thought that perhaps someone could have been contacted through them to warn
people at WTC. But knows no warning would have changed events.

Shortly after phone with New York tracon and as walked to Dave's display to see track of
aircraft was when he realized the WTC was still threatened.

Pre 9/11 role of roc? They would then phone out information to the appropriate parties.
Assume WOC, appropriate air traffic division, flight standards, security things like that.
Official protocol to request military assistance? Center, roc, WOC, same time notifying
various eastern region elements, WOC would have own guide, hijack coordinator, then at
that level would start coordination with military. Then someone through Herndon would
call ZNY and the military cell in Herndon would coordinate.

Now, direct communication systems with CONOR, with NEADS, dens (which is
monitored), then based upon that info would develop coordination. Additionally have
combat air patrols and different times and direct coordination with those patrols. And
then air defense communication with a zone out of Washington center. Additionally have
hot phones to NEADS or CONNOR on separate phones. Or they can call ZNY directly.

Every year as part of refresher program have training on procedures for hijack. Does not
know if there were every multiple hijack scenario testing. Prior 9/11 no awareness of
faa/military/dod exercises here at ZNY. Thought believes there have been some at
Kennedy that were simulated as hijack on ground at airport. No knowledge of one with
an airborne aircraft.

No knowledge of a major power loss in an aircraft.

Herndon - prior 9/11 no knowledge of Herndon's role. Now they are plugged into
command center.

Produce log of 9/11. Don't know who asked him to do that might have been Ron regerie
who drafted.

Shows chronology of events document:

Guess it would be developed in eastern region air traffic. Based on how the id facilities
and the short cuts they used. Unique to this timeline at top "Richard Knowles" reference.
Data radar dump AA11 McCormack confirmed hit. Maybe had already pulled NTap
(national track program) or SATORI. Simultaneous loss of radio and radar considered
to be an aircraft accident (8020) unless otherwise confirmed. "Maybe not AA11 into
WTC per McCormack" (935) - what was actually relayed "maybe not just AA11 into
WTC" as said on telcon. Thought possible small aircraft, general aviation, and 175.
Guessing eastern region did notes. No knowledge of Richard Knowles or Richard Nolan.
Speculation on what's read on timeline.

For record of timeline from ZNY and commission received final version of timeline from
McCormack.

Area B issue: To much to handle alone. Delegated to Bob Ott responsibility of looking
after people involved with aircrafts, particularly area b. wanted them to be brought
together, get employee assistance program counselor here, a nurse from medical, one
controller offered an Episcopal priest, gave permission, gave permission for two
psychologists or psychiatrist. And told Kevin Delaney to get verbal statement for high
level law enforcement. Set up tape recorded. Talk in open on what saw. Gave employees
chance to support each other and so got record if authorities came that night or within the
hour. No law authority ever came to ZNY. Fully expected for an authority to come
quickly. Didn't reach out to FBI self. Didn't tell headquarters or region. Concern
expressed by union. Only in event if information had to be given out that day. Non
standard procedure. Mark Deplama, facility rep expressed concern. At a couple points in
day went to room to check on staff. Never saw or listened to tape. Did any controllers
have concern? General concern about having to go through the taping. Didn't want to put
things in a formal way that would be used in an investigation. Some worry about who
would receive tape. Reassured that tape would not be used for disciplinary purposes.
Strictly would be used for law enforcement personnel. Was it taped one at a time or in
general groups? Probably both. Were others present - FAA nurse, contract employee
assistant counselor, two psychologists, and Episcopal priest, a couple management
officials, supervisors involved, controllers involved. Employees had election to speak in
front or in group. Commission staff informed McCormack that staff had asked his staff if
they would object to staff reviewing tape, and McCormack's staff for most part had no
objection. Only objection from Kevin Delaney. Commission staff informs McCormack
staff was told by Delaney that he destroyed it.

McCormack first discovered tape was no longer available when George couldn't find
tape. Employees had asked about tape. George Leonard asked QA Marty Fournier and
QA specialist George Tracy over tape. Fournier did a complete search, did not find it.
McCormack and Lacates checked safe, it wasn't there. Delaney told McCormack post
Delaney's commission interview that he "destroyed" tape. Could mean it was recycled.
Did not follow up on what he meant by "destroyed". He was glad to know that there was
information on it. Had not followed up in detail. It was absolutely Kevin Delaney's call
on whether or not to destroy tape. It is encouraged for all that is extraneous to be gotten
rid of. As things are incorporated into personal statements they are gotten ride of.
McCormack thinks Delaney said "destroy". If Kevin had destroyed it would be over a
year ago when accident package was formed that tape would be destroyed. Things that
are in formal file or package there is a chain of custody log. Would think that no copies
of tape would be made. McCormack thinks tape has been irrevocably lost.

Delaney was not in the building on the day of this interview to discuss the matter.
McCormack will follow up on it.
 Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center (ZNY)
Type of event: Introduction to interviews
Date: Tuesday, September 30, 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred , FAA General Consul
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Basic introduction to the air traffic system as controlled by ZNY:

Mike McCormick, the Air Traffic Manager of the facility, greeted Commission staff and offered an
overview of the operation at ZNY, and a tour of the facility.

According to McCormack ZNY is both a domestic and oceanic operation. He noted that these two task sets
are related but distinct - related in that they share resources, but distinct in that they have separate physical
layouts and their approaches to air traffic control rely on different modes of communicating with aircraft.
ZNY is the third busiest air route center in the United States but it covers the smallest domestic airspace.
ZNY is highly condensed, and many of its sectors control aircraft in the climbing or descending periods of
flight. This factor makes ZNY different then typical cruise level flight controls.

McCormack explained 6 systems of distribution at ZNY: Sections A-F.

A through D are domestic. This space covers New York New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. New York Tracon
handles Newark Airport, and is generally capped between 17k and 19k ft.

Sections E and F are oceanic, and cover a quarter of the northern Atlantic airspace. The oceanic sections
also work often with the Portuguese Islands, Canada and the United Kingdom. Section E handles the
Caribbean, and Section F handles the North Atlantic. The Oceanic areas all have warning areas and thus
coordinate often with the military.

American Airlines Flight 11 (AA 11) was never intended to pass through ZNY airspace. United Airlines
Flight 175 (UAL 175) was. Airplanes can file and fly whatever is most advantageous to their travel on any
given day.

Individual variables are used to choose an aircraft's route, and often the winds make the highest difference
to what route is taken. This is especially the case early on in the day. The Air Traffic Controllers (ATCs)
know what the preferential routes are. Wind and weather are the only real variables, and there is some level
of predictability.

Sectors have the responsibility to hand off (a complete transfer of communication, transponder frequency
and air traffic control) an aircraft to the sector it is traveling into, or to point out (a verbal communication of
an aircrafts position) an aircraft to a sector that an aircraft may be traveling through for a short period en
route (clipping). Air traffic controllers are responsible for all aircraft in their sector whether they emit
primary beacon code or are emitting a transponder code. A handoff and a point out are terms used for radar
operators. In the oceanic sectors airspace control is performed by verbal communication to the pilots, and
there are no hand offs or point outs. A controller will normally do an automated handoff. A point out is
generally only used if the controlled aircraft is going to clip someone else's airspace for a short period of
time, and thus it is not necessary to transfer communication. There are such things as automated point outs
but generally not used here.

Kennedy Sector at ZNY is both a high and low position, and covers airspace from surface to unlimited. It is
unique to NY sector. For the most part, only sectors to the west own all airspace to the grown. In the east
Tracons usually cover lower altitudes.

ATCs at ZNY mostly stay in the same areas, but can bid to be moved to new areas. Generally an ATC will
begin and end their career as ZNY employees.

ZNY does not have super high or ultra high areas since most aircraft that travel through ZNY are usually
climbing or descending. All the domestic airspace covered by ZNY could fit in one of Salt Lake City's
super-high areas.

Within one facility untracked data blocks can be "forced" to different sectors, but they cannot be
transferred, forced, to another facility. Full data blocks can be forced but for primary targets the
information needs to be keyed first. On the receiving end the controller must key for the proper display for
that information.

ZNY holds that it did not receive very much help from Boston regarding AA 11 and UAL 175 on 9/11.
ZNY looked in through their own sector areas to locate the primary. ZNY vectored an aircraft to pass over
the target and that is where ZNY received their information. The position was not a transfer from Boston.

There was a temporary wall on 9/11 that blocked access from the control center to the cafeteria. Area F
now has new sectors, and can watch what is being handled by Area E. The flight data unit is has not
changed. Areas A through to the TMU are all about the same, but since 9/11 additional land lines with
direct coordination to NEADS and CONNOR have been added as well as: Telcon hotline with dens,
CONNOR phone patched into VICs, and added recordings to the MOS desk. All TMU lines were taped on
9/11, as well as the TMCs, STMCs, and OMIC lines. The only phones that were not taped and still are not
taped are phones on the area supervisor desks. Since 9/11 internet access is now available at the watch desk
of the OMIC. Headline news is broadcast from the NOM/NAS area.

ZNY now has the ability to coordinate with NEADS, especially over use of airspace with Giant Killer in
the Whiskey areas.

Regarding the Otis Air Force Base scramble of F15s, McCormack noted that they "Just came into our
airspace. Were aware of them, and knew more military aircraft came in over the course of several days."

Under other official circumstance ZNY would have both accident packages for AA 11 and for UAL 175,
since both accidents occurred in ZNY airspace. Cleveland Center has the package for United Airlines
Flight 93 (UAL 93).

At one point all three flights, AA 11, UAL 175, and UAL 93 were in ZNY airspace.