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PHENOMENOLOGICAL MAPPING: A METHOD FOR DESCRlBMG ANDCOMPARING STATES O F CONSCIOUSNESS

Roger Walsh
Imine. Culifomiu

INTRODUCTION

States of consciousness have long been a central concern of transpersonal psychology. Indeed. the field arose out of the recognition of 3 family of traqersanal states in which the sense of self expmded beyond (trans) the individual person or personality to encompass wider aspects of life and the cosmos. Such experiences have been highly valued across cultures and cenhxies--ow own being a notable exception--and some have even been regarded as the summwn bonum, the highest good and highest goal of existence. The prevalence and importance of altered states of consciou~ness (ASCs) may be gathered from Bourguipoo's (1973. p. 1I) hding that some 90% of culturcs have institutionalized forms of them. She concluded that this is "a striking finding and suggests that we are, indeed. dealing with a maner of major imporlance, not merely a bit of anthropological esoterica." One of the early avumptions that was ofleu made about altered state inducing practices was that h e y exhibited quifinality. That is, many authon, including this one, mistakenly assumed that differing techniques such as various meditations, contemplations

experiences highly valued across cultures und centuries

The a h r vrrba m bank ihe A m c m Aadrmy oiRrllgIon s d JJcrnny Tarcbo for prmc;sloo 0ilu the m c l c ud b b lhsl k y b r r publlrhcdas a k v for h e prucnt m c l e T h d s a h m B o m c L'Allm for bcr u o n w d aulrtance and to

7'hc Journal o f Tronrpersonol Pr.vchology, 1995. Vol. 27. No. 1

25

and yogas necessarily resulted in equivalent states of consciousness. Tlus largely reflected our ignorance of the broad range of possible ASCs that can be deliberately cultivated (Coleman, 1988). For example. consider the varieties of ASC (hat have been identified in Indian meditalive and yogic practices alone. These include highly concentrated states such as the yogic samodhis or Buddhist j h s ; witness-consciousness slates in which c q u a ~ m j r yis so smong that stimuli have linle or no effect on the observer; and states where exo.cmely refined inner stimuli become the objects of attention such as the faint inner sounds of shobd yoga or the subtlc pseudonirvanic bliss of Buddhist viparsona meditation (Goldstein. 1983; Coleman, 1988). Then too there m unitive states in which the sense of separation between self and world dissolves; there are others in which all objects of phenomena disappear such as in Buddhist nirvana or Vcdantic n i n l k a l p samadhi: and statcs in which all phenomena arc perceived as expressions or modifications of consciousness. e.g. sahaj samadhi (Wilber, 1980, 1995; F m J o b 1985). Of coursc this is not to deny that certain states may display sigdicant functional and experiential commonalities.

distinct stare.

sui gmcris

s distinct Asian meditative and yogic slates m now recognized a starcs suigenerir Lhat may exhibit a variety of u ~ q u phenomenoe logical, perceptual. elecuophysiological, and hormonal changes (Shapiro, 1980; Sbapiro & Walsh, 1984; Wilber, Englcr 8r Broun, 1986; Coleman, 1988). Until reladvcly recently, however. lhese Asian meditative and yogic slates were often regarded as pathologiwl and their practitioners were regarded a s neurotic at best or psychotic at wont (Group for h e Advancement of Psychiauy, 1976). Thus one textbook of psychiauy concluded that
The obvious similarities bcwccn schizophrenic regressions and the practices of yoga and Zen mercly indiwtc that the gcncral mnd in oricnul c u l m is to wilhdmw inlo tht self from an ovcrbeanngly difficult physical and social rcalily (Alcxandcr & Selcmich. 1966, p. 457).

The rcasons for this long history of the conflation and pathologizing of religious states are probably several. Most notably, Western psychology, philosophy, and culture arc predominantly monophasic. meaning that their world view is drawn almost exclusively from only one state of consciousness. namely the usual waking m t c . This conuasts with many other cultures and disciplines, e.g., Vedantic philosophy, Buddhist Abhidharma psychology, and Jewish Kabbalah whch are polyphasic, i.e.. drawing their worldview from multiplc statcs including contcmplativc and dram states (Laughlin et d..1992, 1993). A major goal of transpersonal psychology has been to move our culture and psychology from monophasic to polyphasic.

26

The Journol of Transpersonof Psychology. 1995, Vol. 27. No. I

One cause and effect of the prevailing Western monophasia has been a general bias against accepting the very existence of certain altered states; witness the nineteenth-century surgeons who observed appxcntly painless amputations performed under hypnosis and concluded that the subjects had been bribed to pretend thcy fell no pain ( T a t 1986). Related to t h ~ is s thc limited range of Westem categories for states other than waking. sleeping, and pathological ones.

This limitation doubtless plays a role in the widely observed bias in clinical psychiany and psychology to pathologize unusual expericnces (Jung, 1957; Maslow. 1968; Noll, 1983). This bias can be particululy important in cross-cultunl studies because "anthropologisU sometimes fail to distinguish clinic and culture" (Opler, 1961). Relatcd to this is what Michael H m e r (1990) calls "cognicenmsm," the tcndency to assume that one's own usual slate is optimal.
A final reason for the cod3tion and pathologizing of religious ASCS is that most researchers have had little diuccl experience of

,,cognicenhrn"

the states they investigate. Yet clasical dscriptions. psychological and philosophical arguments Fat, 1983; Walsh. 1989d). and personal reporls by Western h i o c d r c s w c h c n who have cxperie n d a l t d states (e.g. Globus, 1993; Hamer, 1990; Tart, 1986, R;un Dass. 1990) suggcst that it may be difficult to Fully. comprehend and differentiate alternate states without direct experience of them. However a number of phenomcnologid. clinical, psychometric. physiological, chemical, and theoretiwl comparisons h v c indicated significant differences bchunn meditative-yogic slates on the onc hand and thosc of psycholo~caldisturhanm, including schkophrenia. on the other (Kornfield, 1979; Shapiro, 1980; Walsh, 1980; Wilber, 1983; Wilber, Englcr & Brown, 1986). Lndeed, several hundred studies now atlest to potential therapeutic benefits of these practices (Shapiro. 1980; Shapiro & Walsb, 1984; Murphy & Donovan. 1989) and. as Ken Wilber (1980. p. 78) concluded, mditative-yogic staks and pathological states "can bc seriously quated only by those whose intellectual inquiry goes no further than superiicial impressions." So Western academic evaluations of the alternate slates of consciousness induced by Asian medibtivc and yogic disciplines have undergone a marked shifl. Many initial evaluations assumed that they werc pathological and regrcssivc wherus more recent arscss. ments havc achowledged thcir uniqueness and potential benefits. The purposc of this paper is I) to examine whether a similar reevaluation may be appropriate for another tradition for which altered states appear to be ccnwl. m c l y shamanism. 2) to e m -

Phenomenological Mapping

27

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ploy a new phenomenological approach that allows more precise, multidimensional description, mapping, and comparison of states of consciousness, 3) to map shamanic states, 4) to then compare shamanistic s t a b with olher states which some authors have claimed are identical, 5) to point out the possibilities of this new pheoomenologicd method for comparing states a) across disciplines, b) wirhin a given discipline. and c) during mahmtion of a particular practice.

Dejining Shamanism

Shamanism is now going through a period of surprising popularity in the West, and shamanic workshops and books arc multiplying rapidly. At the same time there is a gowing appreciation of the c e n d i t y of alternate states of consciousness in shamanism. Indeed the definition of shamanism seems to be changing to reflect this appreciation. Early d e f ~ t i o n of s shamanism focussed on the shaman's ability to contact and control "spirits." Thus Shirokogoroff (1935, p. 269) claimed that the term "shaman" r c f m to "persons of both x x c s who have mastered spirits, who at their will can innoducc these spirils into hemselves and use heir power over the spirits in their own interests, particularly helping other people, who suffer from the spirits." However, contempormy anthropologists seem less imprssed by the importance of spirits than by the altered states in which they are experienced and definitions sccm to have shifted accordingly lo focus on these states (Walsh. 1990; Nipinshy-Nayon, 1993). Within this definitional class there are broad and narrow definis as those of Pctm and Price-Williams tions. Broad d e f ~ t i o n such (1980. p. 408) stipulate that the "only defining attribute is that the specialist enter into a controlled ASC on behalf of his community." N m w definitions on the other hand stipulate a specific category of ASCs, most often stafcs in which shamaaic journeying or soul flight occurs (Eliade, 1964; Noll, 1983; Wdsh, 1989% 1990). and Michael Harncr (1990) has anempfcd to describe and define shamanism in terms of a single specific state. The definition uscd here is a narrow one. Shamanism is defined a a family of traditions whose practitioners focus on voluntarily entering altered states of consciousness in which they experience at ill, themselves. or their "spirit(s)," hvcling to other &s and interacting with othcr entitis i n order to serve their communities. While no single definition will satisfy all researchers, this one has several advantages. First. it dcsnibcs a group of practitioners that

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28

71re Joumol o f Trumpersonal P g c h o l o ~ 1995, , Yo1 27.No. I

almost all researchcn would view as shamans. Second. because of its specificity and narrowness, the definition is able to differentiate this tradition from other traditions and practices, e.g.. mediums. pricsts. and medicine rum. as wcll as from various psychopathologic~, with which shamanism has been confuscd (Walsh, 1990).

SHAMANIC EXPERIENCES

While there is now grcaler interest in shammic ASCs and a beginning appreciation that they may be specific. it is still commonly assumed in bath anthropology and psychology that shamanic states md thosc who expcriencc thcm are pathological OOky. 1982; Noll. 1983). Indced, the "experience of the shaman has been likened to almost every psychopathology" ITeten & Price-Williams, 1980. p. 394). The shaman has b a n called. among other things, mentally deranged, m oubight psychotic, 3 veritable idiot, most often, an hysteric or a charlatan, epileptic. and. ~ r h a p s schizophrenic (c.g. Devereux. 1961; Wissler. 1931; Radim, 1972).
On the other hand an opposite but equally extreme view seems to

parhological and popular comparisom

be emerging in the popular literature. Here shamanic states are being identified with those of Buddhism, yoga or Christian mysticism. Thus, for example Holger Kalweit (1968, p. 236) claims b t the shaman "experiences cxistential unity--the somadhi of the Hindus or what Western spiritualists and mystics call enlightenment illumination. unio mystics." Likewise Gary Doore (1988, p. 223) claims that "shamans, yogis and Buddhists alike are accessing thc same state of consciousness."
Unfortunately there seem to be scriou deficiencies with tbcse comparisons. Almost u n i v e d y they appcy to be bared on gross similarities rather than on careful phenomenological mapping and comparison (Walsh, 1990). One sipificant m d important exception is the work of Richard Noll (1983). Noll did a careful phenomenological comparison between shamanic journey states as described in the traditional literature and thc smtcs ofschizophrenics as docummted in the American Psychiatric Association's ( 1 980) Diagnostic and Sfofistical Manunl o/Menral Disorders. Noll was able to demonstrate, contrary to decades of assumptions. that there arc clear phen'omenological differences b e t w a n schizophrenic and shamanic cxperienccs md that the two could not be rcgardcd as idmtical. For example, Noll demonstrated major difierences on the dimension of control. He pointed out that shamans are generally able to

Phcnomcnologicol Mapping

29

induce and terminate their ASCs at will and modulate their experiences to some extent. while schizophrenics are almost entirely helpless victims of their m t e s and experiences. As will be s h o ~ m later, comparisons on several other phenomenological dimensions also demonstrate sigtuficant differences. Of course it must be noted that Noll focussed on shamanic journey states and not on the earlier life period of the shamanic initial call which may sometimes constitute a major life crisis with considerable bizarre behavior (Elide, 1964; Grof & Grof. 1989). Consequently Noll's data does not fully rule out the possibility that shamans may once have been disturbed or even schizophrenic but subsequently recovered. However to Noll's comparisons can be added several other observations. The fist is that the clinical picture of the initial crisis suggests significant differences from schizophrenia (Grof & Grof. 1986, 1989; Walsh, 1990). The second is that the shaman is said to oflen function as one of the most effective members of the ttibc, displaying superior energy, concentration. memory. knowledge. and leadership (Eliade, 1964; Hmer. 1990; Reichel-Dolmatoff, 1987; Rogen. 1982), qualities that are hardly consistent with the chronic deterioration common in schizophrenia. Taken together. these facts constitute a strong argument against the facile equation of shammism and schizophrenia. Noll's work points to new possibilities and standards for diagnostic and compantive assessment of shunvlic states. Henceforth it will no longer be adequate simply to conclude on the basis of supcficial similarities h i t shamanic stales of consciousness arc equivalent to other m t e s such a s those found in either various fonns of pathology or in other traditions such as Buddlusm or yoga. Rather what will be necessary is a careful multidimensional mapping of s h d c states of consciousness and h e n an equally careful multidimensional comparison of these states with those of other populations. AAer all. as Huston Smith (1987. p. 558) pointed out. "Claims for similarities or differences spin their wheels until they get down to ~ w y s and degrees in which Lhings dilTer or x e allkc." This article aims to expand Noll's work by providing a more detailed (yet still preliminary) multidimensional, phenomcnological map of shamvlic states of consciousness and comparing this with the pathological states of schizophrenia on one hand and with the meditative states of Buddhism and yoga on the other. What will become apparent is that all these states show significant differences and that equating Ulem can no longer be justified. Henceforth each type must be regarded as a distinct class of shtes which differ on multiple sigmficant dimensions.

new

and srandards

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77Ir Journal o f Trompersonol P ~ c h o l o 1995. ~ , Vol. 27, No. I

The Varieties o f Shamanic Slates of Consciousnesr

Ln makmy these comparisons it is important to acknowledge that there is not one single state of consciousness Ihat is invariably sought and used in shamanism but m y . S h a m may induce altered states by a variet)r of means including fasting, solitude, dancing, drumming, and drugs ( H m e r , 3973, 1982; Dobkin de Rios 6; Winkleman. 1989; Walsh. 1989b). Major classes of shamanic altered states include possession. drug and journey states. Shamanic possession states refcr to swtes in which the shaman's consciousness is experienced a being taken over to varying degrees by an ego-alien entity, usully believed to be a spirit. For discussions of s h s d c possession slates, see Peters and Price-Williams (1980) and Walsh (1990).
Drug swtes encompass a remarkably wide variety of slates. For discussion of the varieties of drugs used, see On (1993); for the families of drug slates and lheir classification, see Gmf (1980, 1988); for their relationship lo shamanism, see Harner (1973); for the relationship of drug states to non-drug induced religious states, see Smith (1964); and for n theoretical explanation of this relationship, see Walsh (1990). This is not lo deny that there may be significant overlap or functional equivalence betwan some of these states (Peters. 1989), but nther to say that there seems no reason to assume a single shamanic slate. This paper will focus on mapping the states occurring during the shamanic journey. The journey has bcen chosen for several teasons. First, it is one of the key. some would say one of thc dcfinjng, chmcteristics of shamanism (Eliade. 19@: H m e r . 1982; Noll, 1983). In addition we have many descriptions of it, and the intcnse imagery which occurs & I it h a often bcen confused w i l h schizo. phrenic hallucinations (Noll. 1983. 1985). Even to say that there is only a singlc state of consciousness possible in thc shaman's journey niay be an ovcnimplificahon. As anyone who has done multiple shamanic journeys knows. the slate may vary perceptibly from journey to journey, and therc arc prob. ably significant individual differences betwecn practitioncrj. Of course this is not to deny that there are cormnonalities among lhese states and experiences. However it is to point out that considerable variation may occur and that even the concept of a "state of consciousness" is a somewhat arbitrary and static crystallization of what is, in living experience, a multidimensional dynamic flow of expcriencc. For the. sake of simplicity, in rhis paper I will some. times use the term "shamanic state of consciousness" to refer to shamanic journey statc(s), but the abovc caveats should be kept in mind. mapping
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shaman;c journey

Phcmnwno/ogior Mapping

31

NATURE OF THE S H A M A N l C JOURNEY STATE OF

CONSCIOUSNESS

Trance States The shamanic state of consciousness during journeys is often spoken of a s a trance stale. The term "trance" seems to be widely used but imprecisely defined. Indeed it is usually so imprecisely defined that some researchers I q to avoid ir "partly because ir carries negative connotations, partly because it has never been c l m l y enough defined ( T a r t . 1986, p. 70). 11 seems to have k e n used broadly to cover all waking ASCs and more narrowly to indicate an ASC marked by focussed attention (Peters 9i PriceWilliams, 1983: Winkleman, 1986). Ln this paper the term will be used only in this latter sense. Definitions of focussed attention uanccs tend to include the criteria of engagement in an inner world accompanied by reduced awarencss of, and responsiveness to, the environment (Pamson, Kahm & Hurd, 1986). This is probably uscful as a first step, but it m a y be that the definition and differentiation of trance states can be taken considerably Funher. The following is an initial attempt to begin this process. 1 would suggesr that the key defining characteristic of 3 trance state is a focusing of attention with rcduced a w m n c s s of the expcriential context (objects, stimuli, or environment outside this focus). The focus of the constricted attention may be either internal or external. Whm it is internal, then there is the possibility of rich, intense images and fantasy including journeys of the s h a n i c type.Of coursc shamans would argue for the objective reality of their reaims and experiences md deny that they are merely images (Harncr, 1984, 1990). Given the Tact that the shamanic state of consciousness is a form of
uancc, can we go Further and ask. "what type of a c e ? ' ' In other words, to what extent can we differentiate and map trance states?

the definition and differenriotion of wonce starer

Vaious maps of slates of consciousness have been proposed for millennia. Ancient Asian systems include the Buddhist Abhid h m (Nyanaponika. 1976) and yogic c h o b o systems (Tart, 1983). Recent Western suggestions include maps based on systems theory ( T a r t , 1983), the level of arousal (Fischer. 1986). inducing vKiabls (Ludwig, 1968). developmental stages (Wilber, 1980), and phenomenological dimensions (Clark. 1983). However this m a of study is in its infancy, and none of these maps appear fully appropriate to the plllposes of this paper. Consequently the phenomenological dimenzions examined here are based on the hequency with which these dimensions are described. and the importvlu they arc accorded in descriptions of the states to be

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n e Journal qr' Tompersono1 P ~ h o l o 1995. ~ , 95.01 27. No. I

considered. Based on these criteria the following dimensions particularly relevant.

Seem

K q Dimemiom for A4npping .4l/ered Slarer

I . Degree of reduction of awareness of the experiential context or environment: ranging from c0mp)etc 10 m j h ; l l Or none.

2. Ability to commIIIIicate
3. Concenmtion: important factors here Lnclude: a. The degree of concentntion and b. Whether the anention isfiedimmovably on a single (e.g., Buddhist j h a s and yogic =madhi states) o+ momen_ ran. or h i d where attention is dlowcd to shift b e h e e n selected objects (e.g.. in sharnanic joumcysJ.
4. Degree of control.

Here there arc two irnponvlt +s Of conuol: a. Ability to enter and leave the ASC at will; b. Ability to control the content of experience while i n
ASC.

6. ~~~~e of ~ h This . refers to more lhan low arousal, whch refers simply to the level of activation, since also hplies low levels of agitation and distractibility (Nyanaponik a. 1976).

7. Sensitivity or subtlety of sensory perception. This r nay be either reduce& as in hypnotic anesthesia, or d a n c e d , in Buddhist iosight meditation.

8. Nature of the sense of self or identity.

9. Affect: especially whether the experience is p~easurabl, or painful.
10. Out ofbody expmience (M3BE).k the subject experience

perceiving fmm a point that seems olltsidc the body?

I I . Conlent of inner experience: H~~ many further differentiations can be made such as: 1, the content formlcss or with form? a. ~ ~ ~ ~ i.e., j c s without s , differentiation into spcilic objects or fornu;, c.g., an experience of undiffe~ntiated light clear space in the Buddhist jhanm.

b. With form. differentiated, having specific objects, e.g., visual images. If the content is differentiated, then it m d the state of consciousness can be divided along seven1 subdivisions. Critical subdivisions include: 1) Degree of organization 2) Modality of the predominant objects. e.g., auditory, visual, somatic, 3) Intensity of tbe objects. 3) Psychologicd "level" of the objects. e.g.. personal or archetypal imagery. 12. The developmenwl level of the swte. In some disciplines different ASCs emerge in a fixed sequence of swges, e.g.. the formless somadhi nates of yoga emerge afler earlier swges in which ancntion is focussed on specific images (Wilber, 1980: \Yi1yjlber el al.. 1986). There does nor seem to bc c l w evidence in the literatureof a distinct developmental progression of states in shamanism and so tlus dimension is not discussed funher in lhis paper. These p m e t e r s are obviously broad and preliminary and compyed to the exquisite subtleties of the Buddhia Abhidharma are relatively insensitive. Doubtless they will be refined by further research. Yct even at this stage they allow si-enific3ntly more sensitive phenomenological comparisons than have been the norm previously. In addition, the vcry breadth of these etic categories may confer significant advantages inasmuch as they should easily encompass the relevant emic descriptions from &verse populations.

more sensirive phenomenalogical camparisom

MAPPING SHAMANlC JOURNEY STATES

With this p r e l h h m y delineation of importmt experiential dimensions of ASCs we Can now turn attention specifically to the shamanic journey state and its attendant experiences. The following description of the state is based on three sources of information. The first is the description of journeys in the litenhlre (e.g. Shirokogoroff, 1935; Eliade. 1964; H m e r . 1982; Noll, 1983; Peters 8; Rice-Williams, 1980). The sccond is interviews with native Balinese and Basque practitioners and with Westemen who had undergone intensive long-term (minimum one year) shamanic apprenticeship and !mining in native South American, Huichol, and Nepalese traditions. Undcrsmding these descriptions was fscilitated by a third source of information. namely. seven1 yean personal experience with shamanic journeys. Training for these was obtained primarily undcr the tutelage of Michael Hamcr. formerly professor ofanduo-

pology at the New School for Social Research. who has synthesized his life-long study of, and study with, shamanic pnctitioncrs from diverse cultures into courses on what he calls "core shamanism," which focus significmtly on sharnmic journeying. I mention the personal experience because there is gowing evidence that. due to state specific learning. understanding of alternate states may be significantly enhanced by direct experience of them ( T a r t , 1983, 1992). Space limitations obviously preclude giving detailed accounts of the many individual journeys oblained fmm these several sources, some of which are already available in the litenture. but the general profiles are as follows. The s h a n i c j o u m e y is always undertaken for a specific purpose, such as to obtain information or power with which to solve a problem afflicting someone in the mbe. The shaman first enters an altered state with the assistance of practices such as preparatory fasting, sleep deprivation, and ritual. followed by aids such as drumming. dancing. and singing. Once establjshed in the ASC, the shaman experiences separating from the body, largely losing awareness of the body and environment, and hveling as a free soul or free spirit, to one of the three worlds of h e shamanic cosmology-the upper. middle, or lower worlds. The shaman's attention is fixed on the appropriate world, which is experienced vividly in multiple sensory modalities, i.e.. visual, auditory, tactile, etc. In this world the shaman may fint call his or her personal spirits (spirit helpers, power animals) for assistance. The shaman then roams at will in search of a source of relevant information or power, experiencing a wide range of emotions depending on the specific experiences that occur, and having found the source, ancmpts to bring the dormahon or power back. Reentering the body the s h m m terminates the ASC and communicates the information or tmnsmits the power to the person(s) in need, perhaps prescribing a particular medication, ritual. or c o u m of action intended to alleviate the problem for which the journey was undertaken. With this general outline of h e journey we can now map the shamanic journey state on our experiential dimensions as follows. The shmanic journey state is u s d l y one of reduced awareness of the environment. That this reduction may be incomplete is suggested by the fact that some shamans communicate with spectators during their journeys (Peters & Price-Williams, 1980; Harner, 1982). Concenhtion is said to be increased. This concentntion is momentary rather than fixed, since the shaman's attention moves Freely from object to object.

genera/ projles of shsmanic journeys

Shamans usually maintain good conuol of the state. They are usually able to enter and lcavc h e ASC a1 will and also able to

Phenornenologicnl Mopping

35

partly determine the type of imagery and experiences. This partial conb.01 of experience is similar to that described in lucid dreming states (dreaming in which one recogizes that one is dreaming) (La Bcrge, 1985. 1993) and to a number of psychotherapeutic visualization techniques. These techniques includc guided imagery. guided meditation, "waking dreams." Jungian active imagination. and a variety of other visualization strategies (Noll. 1983; Vaughan. 19953, b; Walsh 1989~.1990'). Shynvls may be yousedand algifatcd during theirjoumeys. This is hardly surprising since they may experience themselves travening shange worlds, placating angry gods, and banling fearsome spirics. Calm is not a word that would usually be applied to shamans' journeys. Theu affect is variable, depending on the types of experiences they undergo.
Shamans usually c o n h u e to expcriencc themselves during jowneys as sepante individuls but now as "souls" or "spirits," freed from the body. As such they feel able to navel through or between worlds, to xe and intcract with other spirits, and to intercede with t h e e spirits on behalf of their pcoplc. The s h a m i c journcy therefore b c m similarities to the out-of-body experiences described (hroughout tbe world. in spontaneous, learned, lucid drwm. or neardeath experiences (Monroe, 1971; Moody. 1975, 1988; Ring, 1980,1984,1986, 1993; Irwin, 1985). 11may be that spontaneous out-of-body experiences such as these provided the inspiration for their voluntary mastery and incorporation into a set of practices and rituals that b c u m e the basis for the tradition of shamanism (Walsh, 1989~.1990).

shamans
'2s

"SOULS " or
"spiria ''

freed

from
the

body

Similar journey experience may 'also occur in other traditions including Judaism, Taoism, Islam, yoga. and T i b e m Buddhism although the journcy is not as c c n d al practice as in shamanism (Evans-Wen% 1958; Siegcl & Hirschrnan. 1984; Baldrian, 1987). For example, onc of the earliest Jewish spiritual disciplines comprised the Merkabah or chariot practices in which pnctitionm t i e d to recreate Ezekiel's vision of the divine chariot. Atter rigorous prayer and discipline, practitioners would experiencc tbemselves ascending though the seven heavens and confronting fearful guardians until they were finally p l e d a vision of the h n e of God. Chariot practices flourished dluing the fin1 millennium of the common era buf as in many other parts of the world. these shamanic practic& were eventually replaced by other disciplines (Idel, 1988; kiplan, 1982; Scholem, 1961). Of course all this is not to imply that these experiences necessarily involve a separation of consciousness from the body. Though this is indecd thc intcrprctation of shamam, most Western researchers.

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72c Journal o/Tra~pr~sonol P q r k o l w , 1995, Yol. 27. No. /

but not all, u*ould regard them as imaginal rather than as truly cxosomatic. The experiential content of the shamanic journey is complex and coherent. The images or phenomena encountered are remarkably rich, multimo&l (e.g., visual and auditory), highly muctured. meaningful, consistent with the shaman's learned cosmology and the purpose of the specific session. and under partial volunrary control.

CO.UPARATIVE

MAPPING

Until now comparisons between different states of consciousness, such as between those of shamanism and schizophrenia, have been rather superficial. All t w often people have simply concluded. on lhc basis of very imprecise comparisons, that these states were identical or that they were different. Multidimensional phcnomenological mapping allows us to move beyond such simple claims, to compare several dimensions of experience, and to say on which dimensions states arc similar and on which they differ. In short. this approach allows us to move from unidimensional lo multidimensional comparisons and to more sensitively compare and distinguish between slates using a multidimensional grid analysis. We can now use this approach to compare shamanic states with those that occur in other conditions. Since it has been claimed that shamanic slates are the same a those of schizophrenia, Buddhism. and yoga, let us map these states on the dimensions of experience that we have used lo map shammic slates and then compare them.

comparing srverol
dimenriom

of qxriencr

Schizophrenic Slates Many pcople who claim that shamans are schizophrenic and that shamanic and schizophrenic states are equivalent seem to assume that there is only one shamanic altered state and one schizophrenic state. Yet we have alrwdy seen that there arc probably multiple shamanic states and the same is cer(ainly bue of schizophre~a (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). To simplify things we will focus here on the state that occurs in an acute schizophrenic episode since it is this that hxs probably been confused most often with shamanic expcricnces. An acute schizophrenic episode can be one ofthe most devastating experiences any human being can undergo. Psychological disorganization is extremc and d i m p u affect. cognition. perception, and identity. Thou@ there are significant variations within and be-

Phenomenolqiml Mopping

37

tween individuals, we can map the acute schizophrenic episode in terms ofour experiential dimensionsand compare it to the shamanic state as follows: Control may be almost enlirely lost The victim of an acutc schizw phrenic episode has little ability to halt the process or modify experiences. Awarcnw of the environment m3y be reduced when the person is preoccupied with hallucinations. and cognition may be so disorganized that thc person may be unable to communicmc. Conccntntion is dnsticdly reduced. and the patient 1s usually highly aroused and agitated. Thc experience is uswlly extremely unplexanl, and emotional responses YC oRen distortcd. The schizophrenic's experience is usually highly disorganized and incoherent. This disorganization extends even to the sense of identity. and schiwphrenics may consequently feel that they are disintegrating, dying, and losing the ability to discriminate what is self and what is not. This d a y occasionally result in a sense of being outside the body, which in these circumstances is called autoscopy, but thc exp4cnce is brief and uncontrolled (American Psychiatric Association. 1994; Kaplan & Sadock, 1995).

Comparuons ojSharnanic and Schizophrenic Srares Once both the shamanic journey and acute schizophrenic states have been mapped on these dimensions, then it is relatively easy to compare them. Table I reveals lhat they differ significantly on seven1 imponant dimensions including concenmtion, control. self-sense. alfect, and content. This comparison makes c l e v that there are major differences between the states of consciousness found in shamanic journeys and in aculc schiwphrcnia. The other shamanic episode that has sometimes been confused with a schizophrenic one is the sharnvlic initiation crisis. At the time of their initial calling a few sharnans-ro-be appear to undergo a major life crisis and exhibit a variety of biwrre behaviors (Shirokogoroff, 1935; Eliade. 1964; Walsh. 1990). These are cerlainly suggestive ofpsychopathology and have bccn given scvcral diagnoses, including schizophrenia. However, this phase is temporary and usually followed by successful resolution and even exceptional subsequent functioning. It has therefore been suggested that it might be interpreted as an example of a developmental crisis lhat has been variously called a "creative illness" (Ellenberger, 1970). "regenerative process" (Pelletier & Garfield, 1976). "rencwal process" (Pcny, 1956), "memoic voyage." ' k i s i o q state." "mystical experiencc with psychotic features" (Lukoff. 1985), "resilience" (Flach, 1988). "spiritual

comparing sharnmic journq and schizophrenic stares

38

7 l e Journal o/Tmmpersono/

P&o/og):

1995. Yo1 17, No. I

emergency," "spiritual emcrgence," and "transpersonal crisis" (Bngdon. 1988; Grof 6r Grof, 1986. 1989, 1990). For a fuller discussion of thc unusual behavior follouing the initial call and its various diagnostic interpretations. sec Walsh (1990). Sufficc it to say here that it seems most unlikely that the initiation crisis can be diaposed as a schizophrenic cpisodc and that it occurs in only a minority of shamans. Consequently it is c l w l y inappropriate to use the initiation crisis s 3 reason to diagnose or dismiss a11 shamms as schizophrenic. Anolher factor that must be considered in comparing shamans and schuophrenics is social functioning. It will be recalled that sham m s are ofien ou~stlmding members of the community, may display considcnble intellectual, artistic, and lcadership skills, and make s i p i f i m t contributions to their conununiy. Such skills and contributions arc rare among schizophrc~cs. Hrnceforth shamanism and schizophrenia are best identified as distinct phenomena. Although it is understandable that early researchers sometimes labelled shamam as schizophrenic. it is also clear that this practice is no longer appropriate. Of course this is not to deny the possibility lhat some shamans may be psychologically disturbed. but it is ceriainly lo deny that lhcy are a11 necessarily so. shamonirm and schizophrenia as distinct phenomena

Cumpurisonr with Other Troditium Within recent years there has b a n a growing tcndency to equate shamans with masters of various contemplative traditions. especially Buddhism and yoga. a d to assume that the sbtes of consciousness lhat the shaman enters are idcnticd to those of these pnctitioncrs and mditions. Yet as wc will see, multidimensional mapping and comparisons reveal some significant similarities but also sigificant differences between these states. Funhermore. in addition to the evidence of careful phenomenologiwl comparisons. there are also significant theoretical arguments against equivalence. These argumcots can be outlined briefly as follows:
1. .4s was mentioned, there are probably multiple s h W c states and drug sates. Thereof consciousness, e.g., journey, possessio~ fore, cyeful comparison betwcen traditions involvcs more than finding onc shamanic state and claiming it to be identical with a state attaincd in other mditions. Rather multiple comparisons are necessary.

2. Other traditions such as Buddhism and yoga havc many distinct practices and paths. Buddhism, forexample, has litmlly dozens of

Phenomcnologicol Mapping

39

meditation practices (Conze, 1956; Coleman, 19881, m d t h e e is no evidence to suggest h a t they induce identical states. In fact phenomenological reports suggest major differences behveen hem. For example the Buddhist conceno;ltive states, the. jhonm. differ dnmatiully from the states of the cenml Buddhist Vipassana (insight) meditation (Buddhaghosa, 1975). lndeed the jhnnic concentrative states y e closer in many ways to yogic somudhis (Goleman. 1988). but thls is hardly surprising given that they were originally derived from yogic concentration practiccs (Nan&, 1980).
3. Yogic and Buddhist practices evolve through apparently inv3nant series of markedly distinct states and stages. e.g.. the ten Zen oxherding pichues and the eight jhonas of Buddism and the vanous stages of yogic s o m d h i (Feuerstein, 1989). Therefore, multiple states may exist even within a single practice.

I n summary, claims that shamvls and masters of other traditions are equivalent and access identical states will need lo make multiple comparisons between multiple states on multiple dimensions; something that simply has not been done. Thesc theoretical a r p men& point to several rcasons why it is difficult to make sweeping claims for identity between sbamanic states and those of other traditions. Of course this is not to d m y that there may be some experiential and functional overlap bctween different states inasmuch as they may involvc similar processes and aims. such as anentional mining and compassionate service (Peters, 1989).
Thesetheoretical reservations are supported by data.For when we a d l y make direct multidimensional comparisons, we find not identity but rather major differences. Thus. for example, let us make a summary comparison in the accompanying table between the prototypic shammic journey state and prototypic states that are likely to occur in advanced Buddhist V i p w meditation and advanced yogic practice. This comparison will be aided by a summary presentltion of the principles and experiences of classical yogic and Buddhist insight mdtations. These desmiptions are b e d on classic two-thousand-ywdd teats (e.g. Prabhavarranh & IshenvooQ 1953; Buddhaghosa, 1975). recent descriptions (e.8.. Goldstein. 1983). intern-ews with advanced Asian and Western practitioners. psychological testing (Shapiro & Walsh. 1983; Brown,Forte & Dysard, 19%. b; Brown & Engler, 1986). and two decades of personal meditative experience (Walsh, 1977, 1978). Classical yoga is a cooccntration practice in which the mind is stilled until it can bc fixed with unwavering anention on i m e r experience such as h e breath. an image. or a mantra (Eliade. 1969; Zimmer. 1969: Feuerstein, 1989, 1990). To do his, the yogi withdraws attention from the body and outer world. a technique called

multidimensional
compomnr find major drfferrncer

pragahara, to focus inwards "like a tortoise withdrawing his limbs into his shell." As a result, awareness ofthe body and outer world is largely losk and the yogi can now focus undisuactedly on ever more subtle internal objects. Finally all objects drop away, and the yogi expRiences s d i which is an example of the classical ecswtic mystical union or unio mysrica (Underhill. 1974; Slace, 1987; Forman. 1990). As previously discussed. Western reseruchers initially tended to dismiss yoga and other contcmplativc practices LS culture specific pathologies. Such interpreLations still occur occasionally, e.g.. Castillo's (1991. 1995) conclusion h a t yogic enlightenment with i t s witness consciousness of the Abnan is a form of dissociation or depersonalization. However, scvenl factors seem to argue against this conclusion. First. these slates are very diffaent from cases of clinical dissociation. Second, studies of deep meditative experiences suggst that experience of self-transcendence is an indepcndent dimension. largely uncorrelatcd with personality dimcnsions or disorders (Gifford-May Thompson, 1994). Finally the phenomenologiwl analyscs presented here suggest enhanced mental ability rather than pathology Lndeed, pathologizing intcrpretations such as dissociation sccm more m d more like pathomorphism: the tendency to misinterpret or mislabel psychological phenomena in terms of pathological categorik. W h m classical yoga is a concenlmion. practice, Buddhist insight mediwtion is a so-called awareness practice. Whereas yoga emphasizes the development of unwavering anention on inncr objects, insight meditation cmphasizs fluid anention to all objects, both inncr and outer. Here all stimuli ye observed and examined as precisely and minutely as awareness will allow. Thc aim is to examine and undmtand the workings of senses, body. and mind as fully 3s possible and thereby to cut rhrough the distortions and misunderstandings that usually cloud awareness. "To see things is they are" is the moao of rhis practice (Buddhaghosa. 1975; Goldstein. 1983; Golcmm. 1988). Table I shows that b e shamanic journey, yogic, and Buddhist states differ on a number of significant dimensions. Perceptual sensitivity to environmental stimuli (Awareness of Environment) shows h a t i c differences between states. In Buddhist Vip~ssana meditation states. both ancient and modem phenomenological reports (Buddhaghosa. 1975; Nyanaponika, 1976; Walsh, 1977, 1978; Gol&tein, 1983) as wcU as recent tachistoscopic tesring (Brown,Forte & Dysard, 1984a. b) suggest that perceptual sensitivity to environmental stimulation can be significantly enhanced: However awareness of the environment is usually somewhat reduced in the shamanic journey and is drastically rcduced, even to the point of nonawareness. in advanced yogic slates (Zimmer,

Jacrors arguing againrr culture specific parhologies

PhenornemIogicn/

Mopping

41

TABLE I
Cow*sJsoNs or m~ STATES OF COhOWSHESS O
~M S
W G C Job%%

m Ymtc AM

B W S T MEDITAIoN. AW SO1LLOFaEr4U

sLnoKlsr (

~ P A W A ~
YffiA

WSIGKT MEDITATION PATAVINI'S

SCHLLGPHRENM

Conml ability to cntcr avld lwvc A X

an will

Yes

J.J. h t i c &tion of control

ability lo control Ibe conmt O f

coatrol rn romc
samodh"

T* L , m

J.J.

crpericncc
Awmncss of Envlrowhnl

J.J. Rrduccd wrrrory J. Onor && a d tody a u m n a r and d1ston.d

Nonc

Ability lo

CommuoiuIe Conccomnon
Amuul

6 Communicnlion is

usually diwamd
T Fluid TT Ficd

J.4
TT Agitation m y h. = x m m c

+
'P Usually

&J.
T?. Lmrncpeacc

J.
Usually very mgadvc lbough m l y

tor++h f f a b l c bliss + Ten& to incrux a , pdfc drrpnv

posiove, OI%D diiomd irwppmpmtc

D i s i n l e p l e d Im of cgo b o d a i e r .

sepvsle

may bc a nonphysical -soul"

OOBE

wll-wm.

Self-wnw is dccrmsrmd inlo a chvlgiog flux: 'ha self'

No

Uachanpg u m a n d c n t Self a -ha

NO.

Unnbable l o distinguish setrand o k n

as a r m

awarmrr Iumslarir'.)

uarcly. uocoafiolled
O

conrcnt

DMnsmcuoo of Single object ( " d l a i t h complex u p & iurcr into heir ruppoV'7 or Purr cardtuent C O ~ I O u w n huli. Stimuli are 1 ' ' s a d ; without fvnhcr &on~ppn'? skwtcd into o continuovr nlu

aod lragmcnlcd

h disorganvcd

1969; Feuerstein, 1989). Lndeed Eliade (1969, p. 78) defined

das "an invulnerable sbte cornplctely closed to stimuli."

These differences in environmental awareness are reflected in differences in communication. Buddhist insi&t meditators can usually communicate. and shamans can sometimes do so (Peters & Price-Williams. 1980).However. in advanced yogic concentnrion, communication is usually sufficient to break concentration and remove the practitioner from the slate (Coleman, 1968).
The types and degree of concentration also vary from tndition to tradition. l n conrndistioction lo schizophrenia. in which conccn-

42

The Jmmol o f Trampenonol P~?cholo~, 1995. Vol 27. No. I

hation is drastically impaired, all three baditions m i n for increased concenhation. Indeed, training attention appcars to be a common denominaror among consciousness altering practices (Novak, 1987). In shamanism and v i p a s m a meditation. concentration is momentary since anention m o v a fluidly from one object to mother (Eliade. 1964; Goldstein. 1983). This is in marked contrast to advanced yogic practice where anention is fixed and immovable (Eliade. 1969; Fcuentein, 1989). Closely related to concentration is control. Two different dimensions of control should be distinguished. The first is thc ability to enier and l a v e the ASC at w~ll.and the second is the ability to determine the experiential content of the ASC. Contrary to schizophre~a where control is drastically reduced. 3 1 1 h e e disciplines enhance both types of control. Practilionen are able to enter and l a v e their respective states at will, although h e shaman may require external assistance such as psychoactive drugs or cntraining stimuli such as drumming. Both shamans and vipasana medilaton are able to exert parlial control over their cxperienccs in h e ASC, while yogis in s o m d h i have almost complete control. Indeed. the second line of Patanjali's classic yogic text states that 'yoga is the control of thought-waves in the mind" (Pnbhavanah & Isherwood, 1953, p. 15). There are also significant differences in arousal. Shamans are l~suallyaroused during their journey and may even dance or become highly agitated Vipassana meditaton. on the other hand, report initial emotional and y o w l lability which gradually yields to greater calm (Wdsh, 1977, 1978; Coldstein, 1983). Calm may become profound in yogic somodhi when much of the normal cognitive processing ceases (Brown, 1986; Eliade, 1969; Shapuo & Walsh, 1984). Although I cannot fully agree with Roland Fischer's (1986) "cmography of nonordinary states" b a e d on levels of arousal, it is interesting to note that he places somodhi at the extreme end of hypoarousal and s c h i w p h n i c states near the exbeme end of hypenrousal. Thc self-sense differs drastically among thc ihrcc practices. Tie shaman usually retains a sense of being a separate individual. though now perhaps identified as a soul rather than as a body. However, the Buddhist meditator's microscopic awareness deconsmcts the self-sense into a f l u xof evanescent component stimuli. This is the experience of onono in which it is recognizedthat the sense of a permanent, separate egoic self is an illusory product of imprecise awareness. This apparently continuous self-sense arises in much the same way Y an apparently dynanuc continuous movie arises from a series of still h e s (Goldstein. 1983; Coleman, 1988). a phenomenon known as flicker f i ~ i o n The . yogi, on the

wo
di/jeerenr d;mer;om cOnrrO/

Phenomenological Mapping

43

other hand may come to rulizc an unchanging banscendcnt Self. or p u w h a (Eliade, 1969; Zimmer. 1969). The shaman's experience may be either joyous or painful as may i a meditator's. However. in advanced stages the Buddhist V the yogi's experiences x e said to be increasingly blissful. The content of the practitioners' experiences also differs h a t i cally between traditions. The shaman experiences orgm.zed coherent im3gm-y consistent with the shamanic worldview and the purpose of the journey. However, both ancient phenomenological reports and recent perceptual testing (Brown & Engler, 1966) suggest h a t Buddhist meditatorj eventually deconstruct all experiences into their constituent stimuli. What remains is the perception of an evanescent flux of simple stimuli which arise and pass away with extreme rapidity. By c o n m , the advanced yogi is said to attain "samadhi without support," an experience of unchanging pure consciousness devoid of images or objects of any kind. Pnctitionerj from the three traditions show significant differences with regard to their experience of the body. Whereas the shaman typically has a c o n ~ o l l c dout-of-body experience (OOBE) or "ecstasis," the Buddhist v i p a . m a meditator does noL Yogis, on the other ha14may lose awareness of the body due to prayaharo (elimination of sensory input) and experience "enstasis." On this point Eliadc. whose theoretical lolowledge of both shamanism and . yoga was probably as extensive a anyone's. was very clear on the differcncc between the two. Yoga canoot possibly bc confused with sbammkm or c W among the techniques of ccstary. T k goal of classic yoga remains pcricct o u l o m ? , mstuis. while s M m is Chclerized by i l l dcspemre cffon to anain the "condition of a spiriL" to accomplish ecmtic flight (Eliade. 1969, p. 339).

d~rerences in erperience oJ [he

body

COMMON EXPERIENCES A N D CAPACITIES

There i s a popular saying that all things am both similar and different. Having demonstrated significant differences between shamanic,Buddhist. and yogic states, the question naturally arises, "in what ways are they similar?" Cctfainly we would expect some similakties sincc all t h e groups of practitioners have undergone long-term intensive mental training designed to cultivate religious sensitivity, experiences, and understandings. I will therefore briefly summarize h e similaitics that can be identified on the experiential dimensions we have becn using.

... .

.....
.

.._ ....-.. . . ... . . . ..< . ..:. ..:...

. .

.....:.................

.. . . : . . , .-....<...: . : ;. . . . . . . . . . ,.--.. -=..::-. ;.. ;.,. <,.;,: .. : .. ....: :- * , . ./---.'.. . ..-. . ;.:.. - :'.:.... < . - 7 . '. . . .- . . . . . . . . . .

: '

'

-. . - .. -..... .. . ...: ..:. . . . . . ...:. . . . . .. . ....

. . ....
I . . T .

.,

, .

Conrrol All three practitioners have developed the ability to enter and leave desired states of consciousness with relative case. Of course this is hardly surprising since this ability was a criterion for inclusion in this study.

Concenfrurion All three g~oups of pnctitioncrs exhibit hcightened concenmtion. However the rype of concentration, fined or fluid, is qxcific to the mining and tali.

In the coune of their initial training all lhree pnctitioners are almost invariably forced to confront a variety of fwrful negative s might be expccted from experiences. The general tendency is, x psychological p ~ c i p l e s of implosive therapy, a gradual decrease in intensity of these negative experiences. In these practices this is followed by a tcndency for more pleasant, even ecstatic and blissful, experiences to arise (Elkin. 1977; Coldstein. 1983; Coleman. 1988). especially in the yogic m a d h i s .

Self-Sense All h e practitioners experience a shift in identity although there are significant differences in the experiences that induce it and the sense of self that results. However the common element is a disidentification from the conventional egoic bodybound selfsense.

All three practices induce specilic, religiously signiticant expcrienccs. What is -!able is that these expenenus are coosistcnt with the worldview and ontocosmology of the tradition. This suggests that there is an intriguing complementarity bchveen a tradition's worldvicw and its yt of transcendence such that an effective technology (set of practices) elicits experiences consistent with and supportive of the worldview Walsh, 1990. 1991). Since worldview and expectation can mold experience, it is therefore an interesting question as to what extent technology or worldvicw is chicken or egg.

COMP.\RISON

WITHIN DISCIPLINES A N D ACROSS

DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES

It seems obvious that phenomenological mapping using the dimcnsions described & w e cur differentiate among at lest somc of the statcs induced by the practices of different mditions. The next logical questions are to what extent it wn diffcrentiate: I) the states induced by diffmnt practices within a hadition, and 2) the states induced at different stages of a single practice. That it may sometimes be able to differentiate among different practices within a uadition can be shown by h e example of Buddhism: Clssical Buddhism employs two centnl meditative p n c tices: concenuation (samarha) and insight (vipussana!. The fonner uses fixed attention, for cxample on the brmth, to develop conccnnation. ultimately resulting in a series of eight increasingly refined jhanm: states of unwavering anention marked by intense bliss. Using the phenornenologicd dimensions employed above, these states are largely indis~guishable hom Ule yogic ones, but this is hardly surprising sincc they were apparently historiwlly derived horn yoga; however, they me clearly disMguish3ble from vipusana. Table 2 makes c l w the major differences in the states induced by the advanced concentration and insight pnctices of Buddhism and the marked similarities of the jhanic states to the yogic ones. However. h e x phenomenological dimensions have a more difficult time differentiating among the different jhanic states because the differences bctwccn thcse swtes are so subtle (Table 3). All of t h m are characterized by extremely high degrees of conuol, wlm, and concenuation. and almost total lack of awareness of the environment and ability to communiwte. They do differ slightly in the specific type of positive affect. e.g.. a combination of rapme and happiness in the first two jhanas, happiness without rapture in the third. and equanimity in the remaining five. Likewise, the content may-also differ, with, for example, the meditator k i n g aware of infi~te space in the fifth and ~niiniteconsciousness in the sixth. Thus it seems h t phenomenological mapping may be used to differentiate and compare contemplative stages of development, but that in s o m e c w s the distinctions may be very subtle and identifying them may require an intimate knowledge of the practice.

dificultier dktinguishing between stares with subtle diflerencer

Is There n Common Afvstical hperience?

One of thc major questions ?hat has dorninatcd philosophical discussion of mysticism sincc William James is whethcr or not Ulere is any core mystical experience that is common across cultures and

46

7 l e Journal of

Tmmpersona/ Psjrholoa, 1995. Yo/. 27, A'o. I

TABLE 2
COMPARISONS OF YDGIC. BLDDHLSI S E L O . ~ JW.IC.
AND ~ u D D H L VLPISSWU ~~ S T A ~

Canaal ability lo enlcr wd leave ASC at will at will

ability lo control ihc c m m 1 of cxperience

Au-ocv

T T Exmmc Control
in romc rurwdhis

of Envhomrnt
Ability to
Communicate

&& Reduced rcnroly

md body ~
~ ~ ~ C O C I I

4 4 Rcduccd sensory and bdy awvcncrr

Usually
Nonc

+ Tends lo inar practice

Unchanging rraruandenl wlfor punuhp WBE
Conlenl
scu-warc

tor-

ir dacommrrcd Mcrgcd with ibc object into a changing flm: of convnmtion "00 self"

nu

7.T Fixed

J.4
+T E x pee

inrcnw happiocu and nw=

No, lar. of body

aw-m

("maasis")

Single objm ("ramadhi with suppa10 or pure

COOY~~L~CIS

("samsdhi uilhout rupponl)

Dceommctioa ofcamplcr crpcrimca iolo k ~ ~ d N e simuli. n l Stimuli m runhcr dsonmucted into a

conMv0ur

Formlerr m l a l qualiticr aod a t T m

N C ~ m iOl-

bqpincrr

traditions. Walter Shce and some advocates of the perennial philosophy argue yes; no. u y "consbuctivists," such as Steven K a e (1978, 1983). who argue that 311 experience, including mystical experience, is conshcted and hence mediated and modified by a variety of conditioned, inescapable, personal. m d cultuml experiences and filters. Others argue lhat the question remains open (Smith. 1987; Rothberg. 1989,1990). For an excellent examination ofthe epistemological assumptions underlying Katz's position. see Rothberg (1989. 1990). Since the comparisons made above c l w l y indicate significant differences between shmanic. yogic, and Buddhist experiences, they would s a m to favor the constructivists and argue against the view that there exists a common mystical experience. Yet this may be only p;ut of the stoy. Although the yogic and Buddhist meditative experiences described here arc indeed advanced, they are not necessarily the most profound. At the highest reaches of meditation, tmwendent experiences of a wholly different kind, radically discontinuous from all that have gone before.

TABLE 3
C~P-HS

e r n THE BUDOW T m m O N

OF THE SECOhD. THOID.

FO~TH . U nS

m 1-a

cmml ability to cntcr and

I a v c AX n will

Ya

ability to maml the

m o m of mpmimc
A

of
Nonc

Envimnmmi

Ability to Communicalc

?'T Fucd
&&
Calm
Extrrnx pwcc

anl tquanirmty
No aflcct doc* &en is nullified by tqmnimity
M q e d vvilh Lbe objm of -muon M q c d w i h rbe objm or
CODMmllOn

No. LZLW of body

n a .

No. Lotr of body

awMmZI

No. Los o f body

0"MnCIS

NO.Lcar of body
auarrrr(l

i-caaari~")

("cnnaril-)
F o d a r mend

("ESl-ziS-)

r-")

Fmmlm mmtd

qualit*rdadccu qualiticr and adsuch ar inmnc rucharinunw bappinm happlncrr and

Formlcu m l a l

qualitia

uobovoded c~m~iouncu

rn

arc said to occur. These are the full ninnno of Buddhism.

samodhi of yoga and the

Herc description and reason x e said to fail. 'Wot by reasoning is this apprehension attainable" (Ko~haUpmishod I. 2, 4). '%or& return along with the mind not artaining it" (Toininyo Uponuhod 2, 9, 1). For thesc experiences. and the realms chey puwtively reveal. are said to be beyond space, lime. qualities, concepts, and limifs of any kind. Hence, these experiences are said lo be ineffable, indescribable, and inconceivable because they are mempirical, transverbal, and batsrational. In h e words of the Third Zco Patriarch Sengstan (1 975): To this ultimate f i l y no-law or description applies. . . .
Tbc more you talk about it Tbc funher astray you wander fmm ihc mtb.

Herc pbcnomenological description, mapping. and comparison fail. For even to ancmpt to qualify. let alone map and mearm,

48

nc Journal o/Tronrpenonol P+holoiy.

1995. Vol. 27. NO. I

these experiences and domains is said to invariably m u l t in paradox, inasmuch as this is Nicholas de CLLW'S "coincidcncc of oppsites," Zen's "not-one, not-two." and Vedanta's "advaita." The paradox of attempting to describe thc coincidence of opposites is. as Kant was to discover. h t the opposite of any spparenlly valid statement is also valid. Almost fifteen hundred years before Kant. Nagarjun&founder of Madhyamika B u d d h i s ~ a c h e d virtually the samc conclusion. "a conclusion echoed and amplified in succceding generations by every major school of Eastern philosophy and psychology: Reason cannot @aspthe essence of absolutc reality, and when it hies. it gencrates only dualistic i n compatibilities" (Wilber. 1983). The primary and liberating task. u y b t h Buddhist and yogic traditions, is not todescribe these states m d experiences bul nther to know them for oncself through direct, transrational inmition and i t s resultant wisdom. prajna or jnana.

direct ~ranrrational inruinbn md

i s
resulranr wisdom

Are the yogic samudhi and Buddhist nirvana identical. or more say precisely, an they indistinguishable? It seems that one -OI that they are different. but thcn one also c m o t say they arc the m e , since both similarities and differences depend on being able to attribute and compare qualities. The answer, at least for yoga and Buddhism, to Ihe qucstion of whether thcrc exists a common core mystical cxpcriencc may be neither yes nor no but lather, horn a Wcstcrn philosophical perspective. 'hhat can be said at all can be said clearly, what we cannot talk about we must p a over in silence" (Wingenstein. 1961. p. 3).
The ineffability of the yogic samadhi and Buddhist nirvana does not answcr the questions of whethcr there exists a mystical experiencc common to diverse haditions or whether all mystical experie n c a are constructed. However, it docs suggcst that although many yogic, Buddhist, and shamvljc stales can be differentiated by phenomenological mapping, there may be some states, perhaps the most profound, that cannot be mapped or distinguished.

Are Shaman. Also Atysrics?

h d what of shamanism? Do its practitioners also access mystical states? I have found no references to cbe unio m?stica in the literature, and one authority categorically states that in shamanism "we never find the mystical union with Ihc divinity so typical for the ecstatic experience in the 'highcr forms of religious mysticism"' (Hultkrantz. 1973). However, there are thrce lines of evidence that suggest that this conclusion could bc incorrect. These arc the facts that shamanism

Phmomcnologi~lMapping

49

is an o n l hadition, that powerful psychedelics may be used. and that some Westem practitioners repon unitive experiences. Since shamamsm is m oral tradition, it is possible that such experiences may have occurred. at least occzionally, but have been lost to subsequent gcnmtions and, of course. therefore, to Western researchers. Without writing. there may be no way to adequately preserve a record of the highest and nrest flowerings of a hadition. AILhough not an essential part of shamanism. the use of psychedelics is common in some a r e a (Hamer. 1973). Peyote and ayahuarca. for example, &re powerful psychedelics capable of inducing experiences that some resemhers regard a s genuine mystical ones (Grof, 1988; Smith, 1964; Walsh & Vaughan, 1993). Finally, Westerners being mined in sliamanic practices may report unitive experiences, and I have personally heard two such accounts. ntese seemed to bc examples af nature mysricisrn, although, of course, there is the possibility chat other types of mystical experience may also occur. All of chis suggests that although the unio mystica is not the goal of shamanic practices, it may sometimes occur.

SUMMARY AND NE.XT STEPS

c/aim

hed
on imprecise comparironr

C l h s that shamanjc states are identical to those of schizophre~a, Buddhism, or yoga a p p w to have been based on imprecise comparisons, and both lhcory and &la argue against their equi\dence. In pan, chis confusion reflects a history of imprecise mapping of altered states. More precise, lhouph still preliminary, multidimensional phenomenological mapping and comparisons of altered states are now possible. The maps and comparisons presented here are obviously only initial steps. However even at this preliminary stage of development they suggest that, while shamanjc, Buddhist. and yogic swtes show some functional and experiential overlap, they arc usually quite distinct and show major differences from schizophrenic states.

An obvious next step would be to use one of the psychomebic tests now being developed, such as B e Phemmenology o f Conrciourness l n v e n r a ~ (Pekala & Kumm. 1986). to obtain quantitative assessments and comparisons of the phenomenology of these slates. Another would be to employ some of the ncw technologies for measuring brain activity, e.g., P F i (posiuon emission tom* graphy) and multichannel EEG (clectrocncephalography) to b o t h compare swtes and begin to understand their physiologiwl corn-

lates. though without falling into the Imp of interpreting altered states as on1.v altered physiology (Wilber, 1993. 1995). Careful interviews of practitioners may also be helpful. However. one limitation here may be that i n t e ~ e w e r who s have themselves not undertaken consciousness disciplines and experienced alternate states may be limited in thcu ability to comprehend h e nuances involved. Cbarles Tart's (1992) argument for using 'yogiscientists" 3s research-practilioncrs may be appropriate here. Whatever fuhlre methods may cvolve, it is clear that we have only begun to appreciate h e variety. value, differences, and developmen1 of altered states and that undersmding them better is a project of enormous i m p o m c e and one of the trampersonal movement's g a l e s t challenges and opportunities.
a project

0 1
enormom imporrance

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