Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila

unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, manhandle and use personal violence upon [Leticia] Aldemo, inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which directly caused her death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs. CONTRARY TO LAW. When arraigned on March 1, 1993, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the [11] offense charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose. Version of the Prosecution

SECOND DIVISION BENJAMIN JESALVA,Petitioner,- versus -PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 187725 Promulgated: January 19, 2011 DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) [2] Decision dated October 17, 2008, which affirmed with modification the [3] decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, dated November [4] 18, 1997, finding petitioner Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben Sabaw (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. The Facts

[1]

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are essentially summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as follows: In the evening of September 8, 1992, witness Gloria Haboc, together with the victim Leticia Aldemo, Benjamin Jesalva [12] (petitioner), Elog Ubaldo, Jo Montales and Romy Paladin were at Nenas place playing mahjong. A certain Mrs. Encinas and Atty. Alibanto were also there. At about 10 oclock that night, Glorias group left Nenas place and boarded the Isuzu panel of petitioner. With the exception of Jo Montales, the group proceeded to Bistro Christina to eat and drink. While Gloria had softdrink, Leticia drank two (2) bottles of beer, and the rest consumed beer and [F]undador until 11:30 in the evening. After they ate and drank, the group, with the exception of Elog Ubaldo who flagged down a tricycle, once again boarded petitioners Isuzu panel as it was usually petitioner who drove them home. The victim Leticia Aldemo was seated at the front seat. Petitioner dropped Romy Paladin at his house first, followed by Gloria, who resided some 20 meters away from Leticias house. While at Glorias house, petitioner wanted to drink some more but Gloria told him to defer it until the next day because the stores were already closed. Gloria then gave Leticia three (3) sticks of barbecue and accompanied her and petitioner at the gate. After petitioner and Leticia boarded the Isuzu [panel], the former immediately accelerated his car and went to the direction th th of 6 Street instead of towards 7 Street where Leticias house was situated.

On September 11, 1992, the Chief of Police of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, filed a [5] criminal complaint for Frustrated Murder against petitioner. Four days thereafter, or on September 15, 1992, the complaint was amended, charging petitioner with [6] the crime of Murder, as the victim Leticia Aldemo (Leticia) died on September 14, [7] 1992. After conducting a hearing on the bail application of petitioner, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on December 18, 1992, granted [8] him bail. On January 11, 1993, the MTC recommended the filing of Murder against petitioner, and then ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to [9] the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon. Thus, petitioner was charged with the crime of Murder in an [10] Information dated January 26, 1993, which reads: That on or about the 9 day of September, 1992 in the Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength, with treachery and evident premeditation with the use of motor vehicle and during night time, did then and there [wilfully],
th

At about 12:20 early morning of September 9, 1992, the group of SPO1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza) of the Sorsogon PNP Mobile Patrol Section chanced upon petitioners Isuzu *panel+ in St. Rafael Subdivision in *Our Ladys Village+ OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon. The police patrol team approached the vehicle and SPO1 Mendoza focused a flashlight at the front portion of the vehicle to check what was going on. There, SPO1 Mendoza saw petitioner whom he knew since childhood seated in front of the wheel so he called out his name. Instead of heeding his call, however, petitioner did not respond, immediately started the engine and sped away toward Sorsogon town proper which is directly opposite his place of residence which is Ticol, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. At about the same time that night, Noel Olbes, a driver for the MCST Sisters holding office at the Bishops Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, was also in OLV Pangpang. While he was walking from a certain Leas house, he saw a woman naked from the waist down and lying on her belly on the highway. Her jeans and [panty] were beside her. Because it was raining, Olbes pitied her so he carried her and her things to the shed some 10 meters away. As he was doing so, a tricycle being driven by Eduardo De Vera focused its headlight in his direction. De Vera called out, What is that? Because he received no response from Noel Olbes, he decided to bring his passenger home first and just come back to check the site later. Meanwhile, upon reaching the shed, Olbes noticed that the woman was bleeding that he even got stained with her blood. Afraid that he might be implicated, he hurriedly left the woman at Hazelwood such that when De Vera came back, he no longer found Olbes. De Vera then proceeded to the police station to report the incident to [SPO1] Balaoro. De Vera, SPO1 Balaoro and SPO1 Sincua eventually returned to comb the area but to no avail. On their way back at about 1:15 oclock (sic) in the morning, they met Lt. Caguia talking with Noel Olbes. De Vera lost no time in identifying him to be the man he saw with the woman. At this point, Olbes admitted the allegation but professed innocence. He admitted he left the woman in Hazelwood where the police found her. Eventually, Olbes was investigated by the police and was not released until the next day. However, because the evidence pointed to petitioner as the last person seen with the victim, a search for him was conducted. He surrendered at one (1)

oclock in the afternoon accompanied by Fiscal Jose Jayona, his [13] first cousin. The prosecution highlighted that, per testimony of Gloria Haboc, Leticia disclosed to her that petitioner was courting Leticia. However, Leticia told petitioner that they should just remain as friends because she was already married, [14] and that she loved her handsome husband. Moreover, the prosecution asseverated that, at around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, while conducting [15] patrol in St. Rafael Subdivision, together with other police officers, Senior Police Officer 1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza), by using his flashlight, saw petitioner on board his vehicle alone. Upon sight, petitioner immediately started his vehicle and drove toward the town proper of Sorsogon, which was directly opposite his [16] residence in Ticol, Sorsogon, disregarding SPO1 Mendozas calls. Lastly, at about 1:00 p.m. of September 9, 1992, petitioner, together with his first cousin Fiscal Jose Jayona (Fiscal Jayona), went to the police station, wherein he voluntarily intimated [17] to SPO4 William Desder (SPO4 Desder) that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle. At about 1:20 p.m. of September 9, 1992, SPO2 Enrique Renoria, together with other police officers, Fiscal Jayona, and petitioner inspected the place, which petitioner [18] identified as the place where he and Leticia sat. They found bloodstains thereat. After the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses, the defense moved for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence. On February 21, 1994, the defense [19] filed before the RTC, Branch 51, its Demurrer to Evidence, which the RTC, Branch [20] 51, denied in its Order dated July 8, 1994. On August 11, 1994, the defense filed a [21] Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 8, 1994 and Inhibition of Presiding Judge, which the prosecution opposed. The Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 51, voluntarily inhibited himself from taking any further action in the [22] case; hence, the case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 52. Acting on the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the defense, the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch [23] 52, denied the same and set the reception of evidence of the defense. Version of the Defense In his relatively short stint on the witness stand, petitioner denied that he killed Leticia. He testified that he did not have any reason to kill her, and that he [24] had many reasons why he should not kill her. The prosecution manifested that it would not conduct a cross-examination on the person of petitioner as his testimony [25] was tantamount to pure denial. To prove that there was a broken chain of circumstantial evidence, the defense presented, as witness, Eduardo de Vera. The CA narrated: 12. Eduardo de Vera declared that on September 9, 1992 at about 12:30 a.m., he was driving his tricycle en route to OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon; upon reaching the junction of the national

road or highway, he saw a man and a woman three meters from the edge of the road; he stopped his tricycle and focused the headlight of his tricycle towards the two; he saw the woman leaning on the left arm of the man while the man was on a squatting position; he asked them what is that? and did not get any response; that the man was hiding his face and saw little blood on the clothes of the woman; he saw the woman with clothes, a polo shirt and pants; he decided to bring home his passenger home (sic) first and then returned to the scene but found no one there; he reported the matter to [SPO1] Balaoro, who immediately accompanied him to the place; they searched for the man and woman but they could not find them; they checked the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital but nobody had been brought there; then they proceeded back to the junction and later to the Sorsogon town proper; upon reaching Barangay Tugos, they saw [Lt.] Caguia talking with a man, whom he (De Vera) recognized as the man with the woman; [Lt.] Caguia directed the man to go to Police Sub-Station 1; at the police Sub-Station 1, he came to know the name of the man Noel Olbes; he saw bloodstains on Olbes arms, hands, face and nose; the po lice interrogated him about it and he replied that he just helped the woman. On cross-examination, he admitted that he has known [petitioner] for a longtime; and he has good relationship with him; [petitioner] was his bondsman in Criminal Case No. 95-3989 for illegal possession of firearms and because of this, he is indebted to him and he thus wants to repay his gratitude to [petitioner]; [petitioner] requested him to be a witness in the [26] case.

hospital and Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon to investigate; they searched the place and went to the hospital but found nothing; on their way back, at around 1:15 [a.m.] they saw Noel Olbes talking with Lt. Caguia at Barangay Tugos; De Vera pointed to Olbes as the man he saw with the woman at the crossing so they brought him to Police Sub-Station 1 for investigation; Olbes told them that he saw the woman lying on the side of the road so he tried to lift her up but when he saw the tricycle (De Veras) he became afraid as he might be implicated in the crime so he brought her to Hazelwood, which is five meters away from the highway; at 2:25 a.m. the patrol team found Leticia Aldemo, whom they found naked from the waist down; at the garage of Hazelwood; they found the long pants of the victim lying beside her and noted that her panty was still on one of her knees; the victims body appeared to have been laid down; they did not find any blood in the garage except where the victims body was found outside the garage, they saw the other pair of shoes of a woman and thick bloodstains; he (SPO1 Balaoro) brought Olbes to Balogo station and entrusted him to their investigator. 7. Noel Olbes testified that he is a driver for the MCST Sisters who are holding office at the Bishops Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon; that on September 8, 1997, he went out with his friends Danny, Oca and Ely in Almendras to drink a bottle of gin; at around 6:30 p.m. he went to downtown Sorsogon and roamed around until 10:30 p.m.; then he went to Bahay Kainan and at about 11:00 or 11:30 p.m., he went to Pena Fast Food and took a bottle of beer; upon the invitation of Lea, he went inside Pena and drank another bottle of beer; he brought Lea to her home at OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon; from Leas house, he walked and upon reaching the junction of OLV, he saw a woman lying on her belly naked from the waist down; the woman was just uttering guttural sound; her jeans and panty were just lying beside her; taking pity on the woman and since it was raining that night, he carried the woman to a nearby shed in order that she would not be run over by motor vehicles; he also took the panty and the jeans to the shed; he noticed that a tricycle stopped for a while and focused its headlight on them and proceeded on its way; when he laid down the woman in the shed, he noticed that she was bleeding and he was stained with her blood; after seeing the blood, he got scared and left; he walked towards the Sorsogon town proper and after about forty-five minutes, two policem[e]n apprehended him and brought him to the police station for investigation; while being investigated, he was not

Relative to the subsequent events, the CA summarized the testimonies of SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro and Noel Olbes (Olbes), as follows: 6. SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro essayed that at around 1:00 a.m. of September 9, 1992, Eduardo De Vera reported to him at the Police Sub-Station 1 that he saw a man, who was in squatting position, and a woman, who had blood on the upper right breast of her clothes, lean[ing] against the man and that after De Vera brought his tricycle passenger home, he returned to the site but he could not find the two anymore; upon receiving the report, he (SPO1 Balaoro), together with SPO1 Sincua and De Vera, proceeded to the diversion road, at the junction going to the

apprised of his constitutional rights and made to sign the police blotter; he was detained as he was a suspect for the injuries of the victim; after 7 or 8 hours, he was released; and he executed a [27] Sworn Statement and affirmed its contents.
[28]

Dr. Antonio Dioneda, Jr. and Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes) testified on the injuries suffered by Leticia, which eventually caused her death: 9. Dr. Antonio Dionedas testified that he encountered on September 9, 1992 a patient by the name of Leticia Aldemo, who was in comatose state; she sustained the following injuries (1) severe cerebral contusion; (2) 2.5 cm punctured wound, occipital area (3) .5 cm punctured wound, parietal left area[;] (4) multiple contusion hematoma antero lateral aspect deltoid left area[;] (5) rd contusion hematoma 3 upper left arm; (6) contusion hematoma rd left elbow[;] (7) abrasion left elbow[;] (8) hematoma, 3 left thigh[;] (9) abrasion right knee[;] (10) multiple confluent abrasion right foot[;] (11) contusion hematoma right hand[;] (12) abrasion right elbow[;] (13) contusion hematoma right elbow[;] and (14) skull-segmented fracture parietal bone with separation. He explained that the punctured wound in the occipital area (lower back of the skull) was caused by a pebble which they recovered from said area; the punctured wound on the parietal left area was caused by a sharp object and may have been secondary to a fall on a rough surface; the first three findings could also have been caused by the punch made by the perpetrator; the fourth finding could have been caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong grip; the fifth and the sixth findings could have been caused also by some of the abovementioned means; the eighth finding could have been caused by a fall or rubbing on a hard object; the ninth finding could have been caused by a blunt instrument or a fist blow while the tenth finding could have been caused by a fall on a rough object and the knee rubbing on a rough object; the eleventh finding could have been due to a fall or by being dragged; the twelfth finding could be caused by a blunt instrument or by a fall or by fist blow and the thirteenth finding could also be caused by a fall or fist blow. He stated [that] the victim died despite the operation he performed on her. xxxx

14. Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes He explained the different kinds of injuries sustained by the victim. In addition, he stated that since there were wounds sustained by the victim in the dorsum part of the foot and sustained injuries on both knees, upper portion of the back of the hand, the victim could have been thrown off while [29] unconscious. The RTCs Ruling

On November 18, 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence, not of the crime of Murder, but of Homicide. The RTC ratiocinated that, in the absence of any direct evidence or testimonies of eyewitnesses, treachery was not established, and that evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were not duly proven. Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this wise: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben Sabaw guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code and considering that there was no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attendant thereto and taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay death indemnity of the sum of P50,000.00 to the legal heirs of the victim, plus P42,755.45 for compensatory damages plus P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees (People v. Aguiluz, March 11, 1992). SO ORDERED.
[30]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.

[31]

The CAs Ruling On October 17, 2008, the CA pertinently held, among others, that petitioner could not point to Olbes as the culprit because, when Eduardo de Vera saw the former holding on to Leticia in a squatting position, Olbes was in the act of lifting her in order to bring her to the nearby shed. The CA opined that, if any misdeed or omission could be attributed to Olbes, it was his failure to bring Leticia to a nearby

hospital, because his fear of being implicated in the crime clouded his better judgment. Thus: All told, We find that the prosecutions evidence suffice to sustain the accused-appellants conviction for homicide. As to the award of attorneys fees, We find the award of P10,000.00 by the trial court meritorious, the records reveal that services of private prosecutor was engaged. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. With the attendant mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender of accused-appellant, the penalty reclusion temporal is imposed in its minimum period. Accordingly, accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva should suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum and SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 dated November 18, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 3243 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty. Accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva is sentenced to serve the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum. SO ORDERED.
[32]

B) THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL COURT, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT STATEMENTS MADE BY PETITIONER IN THE POLICE STATION WERE ADMISSIBLE AS HE WAS THEN NOT UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DESPITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE POLICE HAD HIS FISCAL-COMPANION NOT [35] [TAKEN] HIM UNDER HIS CUSTODY. Petitioner argues that no evidence was ever introduced as to how, when, and where Leticia sustained her injuries. No witness ever testified as to who was responsible for her injuries. He refutes the prosecutions contention that, even if he th th took the 6 Street, the same could still lead to the 7 Street, where Leticias house is located. Petitioner stresses that Olbes should have been considered as a suspect in this case, considering that he was the last person seen with Leticia when she was still alive. He avers that the statements he made at the police station are not admissible in evidence, considering that he was, technically, under custodial investigation, and that there was no waiver of his right to remain [36] silent. Moreover, petitioner alleges that the fatal injuries sustained by Leticia, per the testimony of Dr. Abrantes, are consistent with a fall, thereby suggesting petitioners innocence. Petitioner claims that the evidence shows that there was more blood in Hazelwood than in the place where Olbes spotted Leticia, thereby suggesting that something worse than her jumping out of the vehicle might have [37] happened.

Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA, [34] however, denied in its Resolution dated April 7, 2009 for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds: A) THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RTC DECISIONS CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE BASED ON PURELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WERE BOTH NOT IN ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE REQUIRING THAT SUCH BE ACTED WITH CAUTION AND THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL FACTS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE HYPOTHESIS OF GUILT; AND

[33]

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the OSG, argues that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court, and that we accord great respect to factual findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the CA. The OSG insists that the CA, affirming the RTCs ruling, did not err in convicting petitioner on the basis of circumstantial evidence, because the particular circumstances enumerated by both the RTC and the CA satisfactorily meet the requirements of the rules and of jurisprudence for conviction. Moreover, the OSG claims that the statements made by petitioner before SPO4 Desder, in the presence of Fiscal Jayona, were voluntarily given and were not elicited on custodial investigation. Lastly, the OSG counters that petitioner was not deprived of his rights since he was never held for questioning by any police officer upon arriving at the police station and, besides, he was accompanied by his first cousin, Fiscal [38] Jayona. Our Ruling The Petition is bereft of merit.

Custodial investigation refers to any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit [39] information or a confession from him. The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit [40] incriminating statements. The assailed statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the statement that Leticia jumped out of [41] his vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992. The RTC and the CA did not, therefore, err in holding that the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in the instant case.

the perpetrator of the crime. However, in order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz.: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to [43] produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

We accord respect to the following findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC: After a thorough review of the records of the case, We find that the circumstantial evidence proved by the prosecution, when viewed in its entirety, points unerringly to [petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva as the person responsible for the death of the victim Leticia Aldemo. Truly, the following combination of the circumstances which comprised such evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to [petitioner] and no other, as the perpetrator of the crime, to wit: 1. [Petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva (who was previously courting the victim Leticia Aldemo, and whom the latter advised to stop as she was already married) together with Gloria Haboc, and six other individuals left Nena Ables house at 10 p.m. of September 8, 1992 after playing mahjong thereat. They rode in *petitioners+ red panel. Benjamin Jesalva, Leticia Aldemo, Gloria Haboc and two others proceeded to Bistro Christina. [Petitioner], together with other two male companions, consumed one bottle of Fundador, in addition to the three bottles of beer. At 11:30 p.m., the group left the place. After dropping one male companion at his house, Benjamin Jesalva, together with Leticia Aldemo, proceeded to bring Gloria Haboc to her home, which was only twenty meters away from Leticias residence. After staying at Gloria Habocs house for five minutes, and denied another drink, Benjamin Jesalva immediately accelerated his vehicle en th route to 6 Street instead of the shorter and

Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner could still be convicted of the crime of Homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in the crime through circumstantial evidence, which were credible and sufficient, and which led to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner committed the said crime. Indeed, when considered in their totality, the circumstances point to petitioner as the culprit.

Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. There are instances when, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence. In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted upon under all circumstances, the guilt of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or in secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh [42] impossible, to prove.

2.

3.

Thus, there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as

4.

direct route, the 7 street, where Leticia Aldemos house is located; 5. Leticia Aldemo never reached home as testified by her husband Efren Aldemo; At around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, the police patrolling the St. Ra[f]ael Subdivision saw the red panel thereat and when they approached and beamed a flashlight, they saw Benjamin Jesalva behind the wheel, who suddenly drove away in the direction of Sorsogon town proper, opposite to where he lives. SPO1 Eduardo Mendoza told Benjamin Jesalva (whom he had known since his teen-age years) to stop but the latter did not respond or heed his call; At 12:30 oclock (sic) of even date, Noel Olbes saw the body of Leticia Aldemo sprawled on her belly at the crossing/junction of OLV, Pangpang Sorsogon, Sorsogon, naked from the waist down. He lifted her up and brought the body at Hazelwood, which is about 10 meters away from the highway. The police found the body of the victim at Hazelwood at around 2:15 a.m. of the same day, and brought her to the Sorsogon ProvincialHospital in comatose condition. The police proceeded to inform the victims sister, who in turn informed the victims husband of the incident.

th

6.

victim Leticia Aldemo was his passenger in his vehicle at about 12:30 in the early morning of September 9, 1992 at St. Rafael Subdivision but upon reaching the crossing of OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon near the Provincial Hospital, she jumped out of his vehicle. These declarations were recorded in the police blotter by PO1 Enrique [Renoria] upon the instruction of SPO4 William Desder, the PNP Sorsogon Chief Investigator. 12. At about 1:30 p.m. of the same day, a police team, together with [petitioner] and Asst. Prosecutor Jayona, went to St. Ra[f]ael Subdivision to conduct an ocular inspection. [Petitioner] pointed to the police the place where he and the victim spent their time. The police photographed what appear[ed] to be bloodstains just two meters away from the place pointed by [petitioner]. 13. Dr. Antonio Dioneda testified that the punctured wound in the occipital area was caused by a pebble which he recovered from said area; the punctured wound in the parietal left area was caused by a sharp object and may have been secondary to a fall on a rough surface, the cerebral contusion, the punctured wound in the occipital and in the parietal area could also be caused by a punch by the perpetrator. As to the multiple contusion hematoma anterior lateral aspect of the deltoid left area was caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong grip; the contusion hematoma on the upper left arm and left elbow could as well be similarly caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong grip. As to the abrasion on the right knee, the same could have been caused by a blunt instrument or a fist blow. The multiple confluent abrasion[s] on the right foot could have been caused by a fall on a rough object. The abrasions on the right elbow could have been caused by a blunt instrument or by a fall or by a fist blow. The same is true with the contusion hematoma found on the victims [44] right elbow.

7.

8.

9.

10. In the morning of September 9, 1992, the police looked for Benjamin Jesalva to invite him at the police station but was not able to find him. 11. At around 1:00 oclock p.m. of September 9, 1992, Benjamin Jesalva, together with his first cousin, Asst. Prosecutor Jose Jayona, presented himself at the PNP Sorsogon, Sorsogon headquarters, where he voluntarily stated that the

Petitioners mere denial cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence clearly establishing his culpability in the crime charged. It is well-settled that the positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of an accused. The evidence for the prosecution was found by both the RTC and the CA to be sufficient and credible, while petitioners defense of denial was weak, selfserving, speculative, and uncorroborated. Petitioners silence as to the matters that occurred during the time he was alone with Leticia is deafening. An accused can only be exonerated if the prosecution fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. We find that the [45] prosecution has met this quantum of proof in this case.

All told, we find no reversible error in the assailed CA decision which would warrant the modification much less the reversal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals Decision dated October 17, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22126, affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, in Criminal Case No. 3243, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 140740. April 12, 2002] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUANITO BALOLOY, accusedappellant. DECISION PER CURIAM: At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of 3 August 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho (hereafter GENELYN) was found. The one who caused its discovery was accusedappellant Juanito Baloloy (hereafter JUANITO) himself, who claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in a nearby creek. However, based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with circumstantial evidence, the girls unfortunate fate was pinned on him. Hence, in this automatic review, he seeks that his alleged confession be disregarded for having been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and that his conviction on mere circumstantial evidence be set aside. The information charging JUANITO with the crime of rape with homicide reads as follows: That on August 3, 1996 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, at Barangay Inasagan, Municipality of Aurora, province of Zamboanga del Sur, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Genelyn Camacho, a minor against the latters will and on said occasion and by reason of the rape, the said Genelyn Camacho died as a result of personal violence, inflicted upon her by the accused. Act contrary to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. AZ-CC-96-156. Upon arraignment on 10 December 1996, JUANITO entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Jose Camacho, father of GENELYN and resident of Inasagan, Purok Mabia, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that at about 5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996, he asked GENELYN to borrow some rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog whose house was about 200 meters away. GENELYN forthwith left, but never returned. Thus, Jose went to the house of Wilfredo, who informed him that GENELYN had already left with one ganta of rice. Jose then started to look for GENELYN. Speculating that GENELYN might have taken shelter at the house of their
[2] [1]

neighbor Olipio Juregue while it was raining, Jose proceeded to Olipios house. Unfortunately, Jose did not find GENELYN there. Not losing hope, Jose proceeded to the house of Ernesto Derio. On his way, he met Wilfredo, who accompanied him to the house of Ernesto. GENELYN was not there either. They continued their search for GENELYN, but when it proved to be in vain, the two [3] decided to go home. A few minutes after Jose reached his house, Ernesto and JUANITO arrived. JUANITO informed Jose that he saw a dead body at the waterfalls, whose foot was showing. When asked whose body it was, JUANITO answered that it was GENELYNs. Immediately, the three went to the waterfalls where JUANITO pointed the spot where he saw GENELYNs body. With the aid of his flashlight, Jose went to the spot, and there he saw the dead body floating face down in the knee-high water. True enough, it was GENELYNs. Jose reported the incident to Barangay Captain Luzviminda Ceniza. Upon Cenizas order, the Bantay Bayan members and [4] some policemen retrieved and brought GENELYNs dead body to Joses house. Wilfredo Balogbog corroborated the testimony of Jose that GENELYN came to his house in the afternoon of 3 August 1996 to borrow some rice. GENELYN had with her an umbrella that afternoon, as it was raining. He learned that GENELYN [5] failed to reach her home when Jose came to look for her. Ernesto Derio, JUANITOs uncle-in-law, testified that at about 6:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose, together with Wilfredo Balogbog, arrived at his house to look for GENELYN, but they immediately left when they did not find her. At about 7:30 p.m., JUANITO arrived at Ernestos house, trembling and apparently weak. JUANITO was then bringing a sack and a kerosene lamp. When Ernesto asked JUANITO where he was going, the latter said that he would catch frogs; and then he left. After thirty minutes, JUANITO returned and told Ernesto that he saw a foot of a dead child at the waterfalls. With the disappearance of GENELYN in mind, Ernesto lost no time to go the house of Jose. JUANITO followed him. There, JUANITO told Jose that he saw a foot of a dead child at the waterfalls. When Jose asked whether it was GENELYNs, JUANITO answered in the affirmative. The three then proceeded to the waterfalls, where JUANITO pointed the place where he saw the body of GENELYN. Jose immediately approached the body, and having confirmed that it [6] was GENELYNs, he brought it to a dry area. Ernesto also testified that on 4 August 1996, he saw Antonio Camacho hand over a black rope to Barangay Captain Ceniza. The latter asked those present as to who owned the rope. When JUANITO admitted ownership of the rope, Ceniza [7] brought him away from the crowd to a secluded place and talked to him. Finally, Ernesto testified that JUANITO previously attempted to molest his (Ernestos) child, an incident that caused a fight between him (JUANITO) and his [8] (Ernestos) wife.

Antonio Camacho, a cousin of Jose, testified that on 3 August 1996, he was informed by Joses brother that GENELYN was drowned. He and the Bantay Bayan members proceeded to the place of the incident and retrieved the body of GENELYN. At 8:00 a.m. of the following day he, together with Edgar Sumalpong and Andres Dolero, went to the waterfalls to trace the path up to where GENELYN was found. There, they found a black rope and an umbrella. They gave the umbrella to Joses wife, and the black rope to Barangay Captain Ceniza, who was then attending the wake of GENELYN. Ceniza asked those who were at the wake whether anyone of them owned the rope. JUANITO answered that he owned it. Thereafter Ceniza [9] talked to JUANITO. Andres Dolero corroborated the testimony of Antonio on the recovery of the [10] black rope and umbrella at the waterfalls where GENELYNs body was found. Barangay Captain Ceniza of Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that at about 8:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose Camacho, Ernesto Derio, Porferio Camacho, and JUANITO arrived at her house to inform her that JUANITO found GENELYNs dead body at the waterfalls. Ceniza forthwith ordered the members of the Bantay Bayan to retrieve the body of GENELYN, and reported the incident to the police headquarters of Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. She specifically named JUANITO as her suspect. She then went home and proceeded to Joses house for GENELYNs [11] wake. She saw JUANITO at the wake and noticed that he was very uneasy. Ceniza further revealed that on 4 August 1996, while she was on her way to Joses house, Antonio gave her a black rope, which he reportedly found at the spot where the dead body of GENELYN was retrieved. Ceniza then asked the people at the wake about the rope. JUANITO, who was among those present, claimed the rope as his. She brought JUANITO away from the others and asked him why his rope was found at the place where GENELYNs body was discovered. JUANITO answered: I have to claim this as my rope because I can commit sin to God if I will not claim this as mine because this is mine. Ceniza further asked JUANITO to tell her everything. JUANITO told Ceniza that his intention was only to frighten GENELYN, not to molest and kill her. When GENELYN ran away, he chased her. As to how he raped her, JUANITO told Ceniza that he first inserted his fingers into GENELYNs vagina and then raped her. Thereafter, he threw her body into the [12] ravine. After such confession, Ceniza examined his body and found a wound on his right shoulder, as well as abrasions and scratches on other parts of his body. Upon further inquiry, JUANITO told her that the wound on his shoulder was caused by the bite of GENELYN. Ceniza then turned over JUANITO to a policeman for his own protection, as the crowd became unruly when she announced to them that JUANITO was the culprit. JUANITO was forthwith brought to the police [13] headquarters.

Victor Mosqueda, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the Aurora Police Station, testified that at about 10:00 p.m. of 4 August 1996 he was at Joses house. Ceniza informed him that JUANITO was the suspect in the killing of GENELYN, and she turned over to him a black rope which belonged to JUANITO. He wanted to interrogate JUANITO, but Ceniza cautioned him not to proceed with his inquiry because the people around were getting unruly and might hurt JUANITO. Mosqueda immediately brought JUANITO to the police station, and on that same day, he took the affidavits of the witnesses. The following day, a [14] complaint was filed against JUANITO. Dr. Arturo Lumacad, Municipal Health Officer of the Aurora Rural Health Clinic, testified that he examined JUANITO so as to verify the information that JUANITO [15] sustained wounds in his body. His examination of JUANITO revealed the following injuries: 1. 2. 3. 4. fresh abrasions on the right portion of the cheek; multiple abrasions on the right shoulder; abrasion on the left shoulder; and [16] abrasions on the left forearm.

Dr. Lumacad also testified that he examined the dead body of GENELYN on 4 August 1996 and found the following injuries: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 2.5-inch lacerated wound at her left neck, front of the head; 1-inch wound at the right cheek just below the first wound; multiple contusions on her chest; contusion at the right hip; and [17] fresh lacerations on her vagina at 9 oclock and 3 oclock positions.

He opined that the fresh lacerations could have been caused by a large object inserted into GENELYNs vagina, such as a male sex organ, a rod, or a piece of wood [18] or metal. Presiding Judge Celestino V. Dicon of the Municipal Trial Court of Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that when he arrived in his office at around 8:30 a.m. of 4 August 1996 several people, including Barangay Captain Ceniza, were already in his courtroom. He learned that they came to swear to their affidavits before him. After reading the affidavit of Ceniza, he asked Ceniza whether her statements were true. Ceniza answered in the affirmative and pointed to JUANITO as the culprit. Judge Dicon turned to JUANITO and asked him whether the charge against him was true. JUANITO replied in the dialect: *N+apanuwayan ko, sir (I was demonized). While Judge Dicon realized that he should not have asked JUANITO as to the truthfulness of the allegations against him, he felt justified in doing so because the latter was not under custodial investigation. Judge Dicon thus proceeded to ask JUANITO whether he had a daughter as old as the victim and whether he was aware of what he had done to GENELYN. Again, JUANITO

responded that he was demonized, and he spontaneously narrated that after he [19] struck GENELYNs head with a stone he dropped her body into the precipice. Lopecino Albano, process server in the court of Judge Dicon, corroborated the testimony of the latter as to JUANITOs admission that he was demonized when he [20] raped and killed GENELYN. The sole witness for the defense was JUANITO, who invoked denial and alibi. He testified that he was at his mothers house at around 6:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996. An hour later, he left for the creek to catch frogs; and while catching frogs, he saw a foot. He forthwith headed for Ernesto Derios house to ask for help. There, he told Ernesto and his wife of what he had seen. Ernestos wife asked JUANITO whether the person was still alive, and JUANITO answered that he was not sure. At this point, Ernesto informed him that Jose Camacho was looking for GENELYN. JUANITO and Ernesto then proceeded to the house of Jose to inform the latter of what he, JUANITO, had seen. The three forthwith went to the creek. There, they found out that the foot was GENELYNs and that she was already dead. Upon Joses request, JUANITO and Ernesto informed Joses brother about the incident, and they proceeded to the house of Ceniza. Thereafter, they, along with the members of the Bantay Bayan, went back to the creek to retrieve the body of [21] GENELYN. JUANITO further recalled that after the body of GENELYN was brought to her parents house, he helped saw the lumber for her coffin. Thereafter, he went to Ernestos house to get the sack containing the seventeen frogs he had caught that night, which he earlier left at Ernestos house. He was shocked to find out that the rope which he used to tie the sack, as well as all the frogs he caught, was missing. As it was already dawn, JUANITO left his sack at his mothers house; then he proceeded to the house of Jose to help make the coffin of GENELYN. But, at around 8:00 a.m., policeman Banaag came looking for him. He stopped working on GENELYNs coffin and identified himself. Banaag took him away from the house of Jose and asked him whether he owned the rope. JUANITO answered in the affirmative. At this point, policeman Mosqueda came near them and escorted him and Banaag back to Joses house. At Joses house, Mosqueda announced to the crowd that JUANITO was the suspect in GENELYNs untimely demise. JUANITO was [22] then detained and investigated at the police station. During his investigation by [23] the police officers and by Judge Dicon, he was never assisted by a lawyer. In its challenged decision, the trial court found JUANITO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. On the challenge on the admissibility of the admissions he made to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon, it ruled that they are not the law enforcement authorities referred to in the constitutional provisions on the conduct of custodial investigation. Hence, JUANITOs confessions made to them are admissible in evidence. Moreover, no illmotive could be attributed to both Ceniza and Judge Dicon. It also found
[24]

unsubstantiated JUANITOs claim that he was threatened by his fellow inmates to make the confession before Judge Dicon; and that, even assuming that he was indeed threatened by them, the threat was not of the kind contemplated in the Bill of Rights. The threat, violence or intimidation that invalidates confession must come from the police authorities and not from a civilian. Finally, it ruled that JUANITOs self-serving negative evidence cannot stand against the prosecutions positive evidence. The trial court, thus, convicted JUANITO of rape with homicide and imposed on him the penalty of death. It also ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 by way of civil indemnity. Hence, this automatic review. In his Appellants Brief, JUANITO imputes to the trial court the following errors: I THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO WITNESSES LUZVIMINDA CE[N]IZA AND JUDGE CELESTINO DICON AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED. II ON ACCOUNT OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSEDS ALLEGED CONFESSION THE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON MERE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. Anent the first assigned error, JUANITO maintains that the trial court violated [25] Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution when it admitted in evidence his alleged extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two failed to inform him of his constitutional rights before they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the incriminatory information. It is of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police investigators, for as public officials it was incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution. While these rights may be waived, the prosecution failed to show that he effectively waived his rights through a written waiver executed in the presence of counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. In his second assigned error, JUANITO asserts that the prosecution miserably failed to establish with moral certainty his guilt. He points to the contradicting testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution concerning the retrieved rope owned by him. Consequently, with the inadmissibility of his alleged extrajudicial confession and the apparent contradiction surrounding the prosecutions evidence against him, the trial court should have acquitted him.

In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supports the trial courts finding that JUANITO is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged. His bare denial and alibi cannot overcome the positive assertions of the witnesses for the prosecution. Moreover, he was unable to establish by sufficient evidence that Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon had an ulterior motive to implicate him in the commission of the crime. The OSG recommends that the civil indemnity of P50,000 awarded by the trial court be increased to P75,000; and that in line with current jurisprudence, moral damages in the amount of P50,000 be awarded to the heirs of GENELYN. We shall first address the issue of admissibility of JUANITOs extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza. It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and [26] voluntarily telling the truth. In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope and was asked by Ceniza to tell her everything, JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection with the commission of the offense. It may be stressed further that Cenizas testimony on the facts disclosed to her by JUANITO was confirmed by the findings of Dr. Lumacad. GENELYNs physical resistance and biting of the right shoulder of JUANITO were proved by the wound on JUANITOs right shoulder and scratches on different part s of his body. His admission that he raped GENELYN was likewise corroborated by the fresh lacerations found in GENELYNs vagina. Moreover, JUANITO did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza, which could have compelled her to testify falsely against him. Where there is no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify against the accused or falsely implicate [27] him in a crime, the said testimony is trustworthy. However, there is merit in JUANITOs claim that his constitutional rights during custodial investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to

him incriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense without the [28] assistance of counsel. Judge Dicons claim that no complaint has yet been filed and that neither was he conducting a preliminary investigation deserves scant consideration. The fact remains that at that time JUANITO was already under the custody of the police authorities, who had already taken the statement of the witnesses who were then before Judge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their statements. While Mosqueda claims that JUANITO was not arrested but was rather brought to the police headquarters on 4 August 1996 for his protection, the records reveal that JUANITO was in fact arrested. If indeed JUANITOs safety was the primordial concern of the police authorities, the need to detain and deprive him of his freedom of action would not have been necessary. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense, and it is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by [29] his submission to the person making the arrest. At any rate, while it is true that JUANITOs extrajudicial confession before Judge Dicon was made without the advice and assistance of counsel and hence inadmissible in evidence, it could however be treated as a verbal admission of the accused, which could be established through the testimonies of the persons who [30] heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused. JUANITOs defense of alibi is futile because of his own admission that he was at the scene of the crime. Alibi is a defense that places an accused at the relevant time of a crime in a place other than the scene involved and so removed therefrom [31] as to render it impossible for him to be the guilty party. Likewise, a denial that is unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence is a negative and self-serving evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the [32] declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Anent the alleged inconsistencies in the details surrounding the recovery of the black rope, the same are irrelevant and trite and do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Minor inconsistencies and honest lapses strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies [33] have been coached or rehearsed. What matters is that the testimonies of witnesses agree on the essential fact that JUANITO was the owner of the black rope and the perpetrator of the crime. Even if JUANITOs confession or admission is disregarded, there is more than enough evidence to support his conviction. The following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was JUANITO who raped and killed GENELYN:

1. At about 5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose Camacho bid his daughter GENELYN to borrow some rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog. GENELYN did so as told, but failed to return home. 2. About 7:30 p.m. of the same day, JUANITO arrived at Ernestos house bringing a sack and kerosene lamp, trembling and apparently weak. 3. Thirty minutes thereafter, JUANITO returned to Ernestos house and told Ernesto that he saw a foot of a dead child at the waterfalls, without disclosing the identity of the deceased. 4. When JUANITO and Ernesto were at Joses house, the former told Jose that it was GENELYNs foot he saw at the waterfalls. 5. GENELYN was found dead at the waterfalls with fresh lacerations on her vaginal wall at 9 and 3 oclock positions. 6. At about 8:00 a.m. of 4 August 1996, Antonio Camacho, Andres Dolero and Edgar Sumalpong recovered at the crime site a black rope, which they turned over to Ceniza, who was then at GENELYNs wake. 7. When Ceniza asked the people around as to who owned the black rope, JUANITO claimed it as his. 8. When Ceniza examined JUANITOs body, she saw a wound on his right shoulder and scratches on different parts of his body. 9. Dr. Lumancads physical examination of JUANITO revealed abrasions, which could have been caused by scratches. Guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inferences are based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances [34] produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. All these requisites are present in the case at bar. With JUANITOs guilt for rape with homicide proven beyond reasonable doubt, * we are constrained to affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, pertinently provides: When by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. As to JUANITOs civil liability, prevailing judicial policy has authorized the [35] mandatory award of P100,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto in cases of rape with homicide (broken down as follows: P50,000 for the death and P50,000 upon the finding of the fact of rape). Thus, if homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of rape, the indemnity in the amount of P100,000 is fully justified and properly commensurate with the seriousness of the said special complex crime. Moral

damages in the amount of P50,000 may be additionally awarded to the heirs of the victim without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof; the fact that they suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings, which constitutes the basis for moral damages under the Civil Code, is too obvious to still [36] require the recital thereof at the trial. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Aurora, Zamboanga Del Sur, in Criminal Case No. AZ-CC-96-156, finding accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy guilty of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is AFFIRMED with the modification that he is ordered to pay the heirs of Genelyn Camacho P100,000 as indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages. In consonance with Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE RAMOS, respondents. Nelson Lidua for private respondent. NARVASA, J.: What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent Judge of the right of an individual not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" accorded by Section 20, Article III of the Constitution, with the right of any person "under investigation for the commission of an offense . . . to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right," granted by the same provision. The relevant facts are not disputed. Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he 1 was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the 2 Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a 3 handwritten notes reading as follows: 2-8-86 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE

AMT. OF P 76,000 (APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86. At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was 4 willing to sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties at all; but it would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less consummated. About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In that place and during that time, 5 according to the indictment, he (Ramos) .. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully ... defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the following manner, to wit: said accused ... having been entrusted with and received in trust fare tickets of passengers for one-way trip and round-trip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the express obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale, account for it and/or to return those unsold, ... once in possession thereof and instead of complying with his obligation, with intent to defraud, did then and there ... misappropriate, misapply and convert the value of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated demands, ... failed and refused to make good his obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party .. . On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and supervision of the Fiscal.

At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of 6 evidence dated June 21, 1988, which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K. The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s 7 Evidence." Particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the objection was that "said document, which appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.' By Order dated August 9, 1988, the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission." The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied, by Order 10 dated September 14, 1988. In justification of said Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and People v. Decierdo,149 SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in custodial investigations the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel," and the explicit precept in the present Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation "cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He pointed out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one "for the offense of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets issued to him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the constitutional provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained at the time, or the investigation was administrative in character could not operate to except the case "from the ambit of the constitutional provision cited." These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private
9 8

prosecutors in the name of the People of the Philippines. By Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment on the petition, and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents from proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People ... vs. Felipe Ramos), including the issuance of any order, decision or judgment in the aforesaid case or on any matter in relation to the same case, now pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial Region." The Court also subsequently required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The comments of Judge Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The Solicitor General has made common cause with the petitioner and prays "that the petition be given due course and thereafter judgment be rendered setting aside respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The Solicitor General has thereby removed whatever impropriety might have attended the institution of the instant action in the name of the People of the Philippines by lawyers de parte of the offended party in the criminal action in question. The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue of whether or not it was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the People's Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to resolve it. At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, to which respondent Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The section reads as follows: SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the section, namely: 1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded 12 by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, and
11

2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense." Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more 13 explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III. Right Against Self-Incrimination The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative 14 proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of 16 inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty. That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well known axiom that every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to 17 be put to the latter. The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the
15

protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, 18 expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. Rights in Custodial Interrogation Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative. This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the 19 U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, a decision described as an "earthquake 20 in the world of law enforcement." Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to 21 be informed of such right, 2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means 22 which vitiates the free will shall be used against him; and 3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be 23 inadmissible in evidence. In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the 24 commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the

prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full 25 warnings of constitutional rights." The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in26 custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 27 freedom of action in any significant way." The situation contemplated has also 28 been more precisely described by this Court." .. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which at best may be tanned unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study have taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance. Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the 29 statement is not protected. Thus, in one case, where a person went to a police precinct and before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself up for the killing of an old woman because she was threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances. Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case As Regards Giving of Testimony

It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1) that against self-incrimination and (2) those during custodial interrogation apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a crime. It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation." But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor), in common with all other persons, possesses the right against self- incrimination set out in the first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory 30 question at the time that it is put to him. Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any 32 manner prejudice or be used against him. The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself' signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, 33 or even for himself. In other words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take 34 the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or 35 be used against him."
31

If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his right. But if he does testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any other witness." He may be cross-examined as to any matters stated in his direct examination, or 36 connected therewith . He may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is charged. It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which might incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of which he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against selfincrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the accused should testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that he might be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any particular question which might implicate him for a different and distinct offense, say, estafa. In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit: 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and 2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
37

d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted. It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside. It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the socalled "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos. His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of) the violation of the right of any person against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by the complaining parties, complaining companies, or complaining employers because being interested parties, unlike the police agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to protect, they may in their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue ascendancy and undue influence." It suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the employee has been accorded due

a) to refuse to be a witness; b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal; c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to crossexamination by the prosecution;

process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the making of statements, oral or written, by the employee under such administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability. Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's expressed apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue pressure or influence be brought to bear on an employee under investigation or for that matter, on a person being interrogated by another whom he has supposedly offended. In such an event, any admission or confession wrung from the person under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the vice or defect vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may not in justice be received against the makers thereof, and really should not be accorded any evidentiary value at all. WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of the respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988, and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed with the trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become functus officio, is now declared of no further force and effect. Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

( s )

THE

EN BANC [G.R. Nos. 138934-35. January 16, 2002] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, ESCORDIAL, accused-appellant. DECISION

vs. ANTHONY

All contrary to law and with aggravating circumstance that the said offense was committed inside the dwelling of the offended party and during nighttime the latter not having given provocation for the offense. Act contrary to law.
[3]

MENDOZA, J.: These cases are before this Court for review from the decision, dated February 26, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, BacolodCity, finding accused-appellant Anthony Escordial guilty of robbery with rape and sentencing him to death and to pay private complainant Michelle Darunday the amounts of P3,650.00 representing the amount taken by him, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs. In Criminal Case No. 97-18117, the information against accused-appellant charged him with the crime of rape committed as follows: That on or about the 27 day of December, 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Michelle Darunday y Jintula, against the latters will. All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstance that the said offense was committed in the dwelling of the said party during nighttime while [she] was asleep inside her room. Act contrary to law.
[2] th [1]

When arraigned on February 25, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges, whereupon the two cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely, Jason Joniega, Mark [4] Esmeralda, Erma Blanca, Dr. Joy Ann Jocson, PO3 NicolasTancinco, Leo Asan, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, and Michelle Darunday. Their testimonies are as follows: Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda testified that at around 8 oclock in the evening of December 27, 1996, they and Mark Lucena were playing inside [5] a jeepney parked in front of a boarding house owned by Pacita Aguillon at No. 17 Margarita Extension, Libertad St., PurokAmelia 2, Barangay 40, Bacolod City. As one of them hit his head on the rails of the jeepney, the boys were told by a man sitting inside thejeepney to go home lest they would meet an accident. The man was [6] later identified by Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda as accused-appellant. Living in a boarding house in front of which the jeepney was parked were Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver. They stayed in a bedroom on the ground floor. That same night, December 27, 1996, Teresa went to sleep at around 9:30 p.m., while Michelle and Erma watched television for a while before going to bed. They slept beside each other on two beds placed side by side, with Teresa nearest the wall, Michelle in the middle, and Erma on the other side. While the three were asleep, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man. The man had his head covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches long. He warned Erma not to shout or he would kill her. He then asked Erma where her money was, and the latter pointed to the wall where she had hung the bag which contained her money. Michelle, who by then was already awake, told Erma to give the man her money so he would leave. Erma gave the man P300.00, but the latter said to give him all her money. He told Erma that he would look for more money and, if he found more, he would kill her. For this reason, Erma gave the rest of her money. Afterwards, she was told to lie on her side facing the wall. The man then turned to Michelle and Teresa. Michelle gave him her money, but Teresa said her money was in the other room. However, she was not allowed to leave the bedroom. The man was able to get P500.00 from Erma andP3,100.00 from Michelle. After getting their money, the man gave a t-shirt to Erma to blindfold Teresa and another to Michelle to blindfold Erma. He blindfolded Michelle himself and then began touching her in different parts of her body. He ordered her to take off

In Criminal Case No. 97-18118, the information charged accused-appellant with robbery with rape as follows: That on or about the 27 day of December, 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, with intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation on the person, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take from Michelle Darunday y Jintula the sums of P3,650.00, belonging to said offended party and [on] the occasion thereof have carnal knowledge with the complainant Michelle Darunday y Jintula, against her will, and inside her room wherein she was temporarily residing as a boarder.
th

her t-shirt, threatening to kill her if she did not do as he commanded. He then went on top of Michelle and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. As he had difficulty doing so, he instead inserted his two fingers. He tried once more to insert his penis, but again failed. The man then rose from the bed and took some soapy water, which he proceeded to insert into Michelles vagina. He finally succeeded in inserting his penis into Michelles vagina. Michelle felt great pain and pleaded with the man to stop, but the man paid no heed, and only stopped after satisfying his lust. Michelle said that although she was blindfolded and could not see, she could feel that the man had no cover on his face when he was raping her. She felt that his chest was rough and had some scars. When he placed her hands on his nape, she felt that it was also rough. On the other hand, Erma claimed she was able to see through her blindfold and that she saw the mans face because of the light coming from the lamp post outside the boarding house. Their bedroom window had panes through which the light filtered in. After he had finished raping Michelle, the man sat on the bed and talked to the three women. He told Michelle that he used to make catcalls at her and called her a beautiful girl whenever she passed by his place but Michelle had ignored him. He told them that he was from Hinigaran, but later took back his statement when Teresa told him that she was from Binalbagan, which was near Hinigaran. Michelle then told him that she worked at the City Engineers Office and graduated from the Central Mindanao University. The man cussed when he learned that Michelle was from Mindanao. As he spoke to Michelle, he leaned over the bed and mashed the breasts of Erma and Teresa. After a while, the man told Michelle he wanted to have sex with her again. Michelle pleaded with him, but the man threatened to call his companions and said it would be worse for her if his companions would be the ones to rape her. He ordered Michelle to lie on her stomach and then inserted his penis into her anus. When he was through, he gave Michelle a blanket to cover herself and returned to her a pair of earrings which he had taken from her. He then left, but not before warning the women not to report the matter to anyone or he would kill [7] them. Mark Esmeralda testified that he was in his bedroom on the second floor of their house, toying with a flashlight, when he saw from his bedroom window a man wearing denim shorts coming out of the boarding house. It was around 12:30 in the morning then. The man was nibbling something. Mark saw the man jump over the fence. After 30 minutes, Mark went down from his room and told his parents what he had seen. His parents then went out to check what had happened. Mark [8] identified accused-appellant as the man he saw that night.

Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were so frightened that they were not able to ask for help until 30 minutes after the man had left. They told their neighbor, Tiyo Anong, that a man had come to the house and robbed them. They also called up Allan Aguillon, the son of the owner of the boarding house, who in turn reported the incident to the police. When the policemen arrived, they asked Michelle to describe the assailant, but she told them that she could only identify his voice and his eyes. Accompanied by the police, the three women looked for the man around theLibertad area, but they did not find him. Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were taken to the police station at Bac-Up 6 for investigation. But, at Michelles request, Erma and Teresa did not tell the others that Michelle had been raped by their attacker. Upon returning home, Michelle found her aunt and uncle. She embraced her aunt and told her about her ordeal. Michelle was again taken to the police headquarters, where she was referred to the Womens D esk to report the rape. They were able to go home to the house of Michelles aunt at around 5 to 6 [9] oclock in the evening. PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, one of the policemen who responded to the report shortly after the commission of the crime, also testified for the prosecution. He said that the assailant was described to him as wearing long hair and having a rough projection on the back of his neck, small eyes, a slim body, and a brown complexion. Later on, Michelle Darunday, accompanied by Allan Aguillon, returned to the police station to report the rape committed against her. Tancinco entered her complaint in the police blotter and referred Michelle to the Women s Desk. In the morning of December 28, 1996, Tancinco returned to the boarding house. He found that the intruder was able to gain entry to the house through the window of the bathroom. He noticed that the room beside those of the three women had been ransacked, with the cabinets opened and the clothes in disarray. The following day, on December 29, 1996, Tancinco went around Margarita Extension and learned about the children playing on the street around the time the intruder entered the boarding house. He was told by Mark Esmeralda and Jason Joniega that they saw a man inside thejeepney where they were playing at the time of the incident. Tancinco was likewise informed by Esmeralda that the person he saw inside thejeepney was the same person he saw coming out of the boarding house later that night. According to Tancinco, the children said that they could identify the man if he was shown to them. At around 8 oclock that evening, Tancinco questioned a certain Tiyo Anong and Ramie about the identity of the suspect. Ramie said that the description of the suspect fitted that of a worker at a caf called Coffee Break Corner, about two houses away from the boarding house. Thus, on January 2, 1997, Tancinco and some companions proceeded to the Coffee Break Corner and interviewed the security guard, who told them that a

certain Fidel Hinolan owned the caf. When interviewed by Tancinco and his companions, Fidel Hinolan told them that accused-appellant was his helper and that the latter had gone home on December 27, 1996 to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. Based on the information furnished by Hinolan, Tancinco and his fellow police officers, Michelle Darunday, Allan Aguillon, and PacitaAguillon went to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental at around 10 oclock in the morning of January 3, 1997 and asked the assistance of the police there to locate accused-appellant. PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino asked one of his colleagues at the Pontevedra police to accompany Tancinco and his companions. They found accused-appellant at the basketball court and invited him to go to the police [10] station for questioning. Michelle Darunday remained at the Pontevedra police station. When accusedappellant was brought there, he saw Michelle and blushed. Michelle looked at him and recognized him as the man who had robbed and raped her on December 27, 1996. Accused-appellant was asked to take off his t-shirt. Michelle said that she just kept quiet while accused-appellant tried to talk to her. However, according to Tancinco, Michelle confirmed to him that accused-appellant was the man who had attacked her, identifying him through a rough projection, or a keloid, on the back of his neck and his voice. At the time of his arrest, accused-appellant had a short haircut. He was transferred to the Bacolod police station for further [11] investigation. Allan Aguillon took a picture of accused-appellant (Exh. F) at [12] the Pontevedra police station. At the Bacolod police station, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda were asked whether accused-appellant was the same person they saw on the night of the incident. They were taken one by one to the jail cell and asked to point to the person that they had seen that night. They picked [13] accused-appellant out of four people who were inside the jail cell. Michelle Darunday executed an affidavit, dated January 4, 1997, identifying [14] accused-appellant as the person who had robbed and raped her. She testified that she and her friends had gone to the Coffee Break Corner sometime in September or October 1996. On the way home, she was approached by accusedappellant. He asked Michelle what her name was, and she gave it to him, albeit reluctantly. She usually passed by the said caf when going home and accusedappellant would often whistle at her and call her a beautiful girl. Michelle had [15] simply ignored him and gone on her way. Dr. Joy Ann C. Jocson, Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Department, examined Michelle Darunday and made the following findings and remarks:

1. Abrasions noted on the right and left Labia Minora and on the posterior fourchette. 2. New Lacerations noted on the hymenal ring on the following location 1 oclock position, 3 oclock position, and 9 oclock position. 3. Vaginal introitus admits 2 fingers but with pain. 4. Presently, patient with menstruation. In my opinion, the patient would need a urinalysis (since she complains of pain upon urination) and possible Medical treatment if necessary, for about 7 to 10 days. And if necessary, psychiatric evaluation & management is also [16] recommended. Testifying in court, Dr. Jocson said there was penetration of the victims vagina as shown by the fact that the hymenal rim had lacerations at the 1, 3, and 9 oclock positions. Since the edges of the lacerations were sharp, she concluded that these lacerations were less than a week old at the time of the examination. According to Dr. Jocson, these were caused by abrasions due to force or pressure applied on the vaginal area. When asked during cross-examination whether the victim had abrasions or contusions on her body at the time of her examination, Dr. Jocsonsaid that she could not remember. She could not remember either whether there was sperm in the victims vagina when she examined the latter. She said that no sperm specimen had been taken from the victim. She testified that it could not be determined how many times the victim had previously engaged in sexual intercourse because this would depend on the elasticity of the victims hymen. She opined, however, that it would be less than 10 times in the case of the victim. Dr. Jocson stated it was possible the victim agreed to have sexual intercourse voluntarily based on the lack of marks of violence on the latter, although it was also possible that she was merely forced to have sex because she was threatened. On re-direct examination, she stated it was possible that seminal fluid was not found on the victims private parts because the victim was having her monthly period. She said the lacerations on the victims vagina would result whether the sexual intercourse was voluntary or involuntary on the part of [17] the victim. Leo Asan, an employee at the City Health Office in Bacolod, testified that the medical certificate presented by the prosecution, which was undated, was a faithful reproduction of what was written by Dr. Joy Ann Jocson on January 3, 1997 in the [18] logbook. The defense presented as its witnesses Elias Sombito, Aaron Lavilla, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, Ricardo Villaspen, Nestor Dojillo, accused-appellant Anthony Escordial, Jerome Jayme, and Lucila Jocame. These witnesses gave a

different account of the events that led to the arrest of accused-appellant. Their version is as follows: Accused-appellant testified that he was employed by Fidel Hinolan on January 21, 1996. He said he started on August 6, 1996 as a dishwasher and was later made cashier. Accused-appellant said that he went home to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental on December 24, 1996, arriving there at 2 oclock in the afternoon. Hinolan paid him P500.00, which he gave to his mother as his Christmas gift. He dropped by the house of Aaron Lavilla. At 5:30 p.m., he returned to Coffee Break Corner in Bacolod City. In the evening of December 26, 1996, accused-appellant asked permission from Hinolan to go home to Pontevedra to stay there until January 1997 as the restaurant would be closed anyway during this period. Hinolan gave accusedappellant his permission and paid the latter his salary of P600.00 as well as a P200.00 bonus. Hence, at 2 oclock in the afternoon of December 27, 1996, accused-appellant took the bus home, arriving in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental an hour later. He went straight home to his mother and gave her P600.00, telling her to use P400.00 for [19] New Years Day. Accused-appellant also saw Elias Sombito, who told him to look for Aaron Lavilla because a cockfight derby was being held that day in their barangay. Accused-appellant, therefore, looked for Aaron Lavilla and found him at the basketball court. Aarons mother asked accused -appellant to help her bring to the cockpit some cases of beer which she planned to sell there. Accusedappellant obliged. At the cockpit, Elias Sombito asked him to take care of his cocks. Accusedappellant asked Aaron Lavilla to go with him to the cockpit, but the latter continued playing basketball and only proceeded to the cockpit after the game was finished. The derby ended at around 9 oclock in the evening. At about 10 oclock that night, accused-appellant and Aaron Lavilla went to the latters house and slept there. The following day, December 28, 1996, accusedappellant helped Aaron Lavillas mother with the household chores, cutting the grass and feeding the cocks. He stayed inBarangay Miranda until January 3, [21] 1997. Accused-appellants testimony as to his whereabouts fro m December 27, [22] [23] 1996 to January 3, 1997was corroborated by Elias Sombito and Aaron Lavilla. As to the circumstances of accused-appellants arrest, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino and Ricardo Villaspen testified that at around 11 oclock in the morning of January 3, 1997, three members of the Bacolod police, led by PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, went to the headquarters of the Pontevedrapolice to ask for help in locating a person named Anthony Escordial, said to be a resident of Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, who was wanted in
[20]

connection with a case for robbery with rape. Although Tancinco and his companions showed their mission order toGemarino, they did not show a warrant for accused-appellants arrest. Nonetheless, Gemarino told PO2 Gella of the Pontevedra police and Ricardo Villaspen, the tanod commander of Barangay Miranda, to help the Bacolod policemen look for accusedappellant. The group left the police station, although Tancincos other companions, [24] Michelle Darunday and Pacita Aguillon, stayed in the headquarters. The arresting party, composed of Tancinco, PO2 Gella, and Villaspen, proceeded to the house of accused-appellant in Barangay Miranda, but the latter was not there. They found accused-appellant at the basketball court watching a game. After informing him that he was a suspect in a robbery case, the group invited accused-appellant to go with them to the police headquarters. Nestor Dojillo, the barangay captain of Barangay Miranda, was at the police station. He testified that when accused-appellant, together withTancinco and his companions, arrived at the police station, he (Nestor Dojillo) followed them to the investigating room. Inside the room were Michelle Darunday, three members of the Bacolod police, Villaspen, and Gemarino. Gemarino asked Michelle if she could identify accused-appellant as her attacker, but the latter said that she could do so only if she could see a lump on his back. Gemarino told accused-appellant to take off his t-shirt. When accused-appellant did as Gemarino ordered, Michelle looked at his back for identifying marks, while Allan Aguillon took his photograph. Gemarino then asked Michelle whether accused-appellant was her attacker, but she replied that she was not sure because the attacker was wearing a mask when she was raped. The Bacolod policemen requested Gemarino to allow them to bring accused-appellant toBacolod City as they still had some witnesses who could identify the suspect there. Accused-appellant was allowed to go with them after Dojilloand Gemarino asked the Bacolod policemen not to harm [25] him. Dojillos testimony was corroborated by the testimonies of PO2 [26] [27] [28] RodolfoGemarino, Ricardo Villaspen, and accused-appellant. Accused-appellant further testified that on the way to Bacolod City, PO3 Tancinco began beating him and hitting him with the butt of a shotgun to force him to admit liability for the crime. Because accused-appellant refused to do so, he was taken by Tancinco and his companions to a lodging house where he was subjected to torture. Accused-appellant was told to take off his clothes and to lie down. PO3 Tancinco and his companions then proceeded to hit him with a belt. Afterwards, they covered his mouth and took him to the bathroom. Tancinco put a knife to his neck, telling him that he would be killed if he refused to admit that he was the culprit. As he continued to deny liability for the crime, accused-appellant was subjected to further torture. Later on, the driver entered the room and brought with him a child, whose head was covered, who was instructed to identify accusedappellant. The child, however, did not react upon seeing accused-appellant, who was thus brought back to the headquarters where he was again maltreated.

Accused-appellant said that he was left alone in his cell and tied to a chair. He also said that at around 8 oclock that evening, two of the complainants arrived and the police told them to identify accused-appellant as their attacker. But these two complainants just kept looking at accused-appellant and even asked the policemen if he was the suspect. After the two women had left, PO3 Tancinco took accused-appellant to a house so that he could be identified by another complainant. But this complainant likewise said that he was not the assailant, as the latter had a heavier build and longer hair. Accused-appellant was returned to the police headquarters. At the headquarters, PO3 Tancinco talked to accused-appellant and told him that he would help him if accused-appellant confessed to the crime. But accusedappellant again refused because he said he had not done anything wrong. The police then began beating him up again. PO3 Tancinco burnt accused-appellants [29] lips and tongue with a lighted cigarette. At around 12:00 noon of January 6, 1997, Gemarino, Dojillo, and Villaspen, together with accused-appellants grandfather, a certain Inspector Tamayo, and reporters from Bombo Radyo, went to the Bacolod police station to visit accusedappellant. They found him tied to a chair. When they entered the cell, accusedappellant, thinking that they were members of the Bacolod police, held up his hands and asked for pity. The visitors assured accused-appellant that they would not hurt him. Accused-appellant had a limp because his feet were injured. For this reason, Dojillo and his companions asked the Bacolod police to let them take accused-appellant to the hospital for treatment. Accused-appellant was thus brought to the provincial hospital in Bacolod for x-ray and medical treatment. He [30] was taken back to the police station thereafter. Lucila Jocame, Records Officer of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial [31] Regional Hospital (CLMMH), identified in court the medical certificate (Exh. 12) issued by the said hospital, showing the injuries sustained by accused-appellant, to wit: # 5 CM LINEAR ABRASION WITH CONTUSION HEMATOMA LEFT SCAPULAR AREA. # 1 CM LINEAR ABRASION RIGHT SCAPULAR AREA. # 4 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA LEFT LATERAL CHEST LEVEL OF T12. # 2 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA M/3 RIGHT LEG ANTERIOR ASPECT. # 2 x 4 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA RIGHT KNEE LATERAL ASPECT.

# 3 x 3 CM SWELLING AND TENDER LEFT ANKLE. # 1 x 1 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA D/3 RIGHT LEG POSTERIOR ASPECT. # 1 x 1 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA M/3 RIGHT THIGH POSTERIOR ASPECT. # 2 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA RIGHT PERI AURICULAR AREA. X-RAY # 280 dated January 6, 1997: SKULL APL: CHEST BUCKY RIGHT THIGH: APL: RIGHT AND LEFT FOOT APO. No Radiographic evidence of fracture in this examination.
[32]

The last witness presented by the defense was Jerome Jayme, General Manager of Royal Express Transport, Inc., who testified that the last bus trip from Kabankalan to Bacolod on December 27, 1996 left at 6 oclock in the evening. The trip from Kabankalan to Barangay Miranda,Pontevedra, Negros Occidental would take one hour. On cross-examination, Jayme stated that the said bus would reach Bacolod City by 7:40 to 8:00 p.m. if it left Kabankalan at 6:00 p.m. His companys buses were not allowed to pick up passengers along the way to Bacolod Citybecause of the incidence of highway robbery. Jayme identified in court a certification (Exh. 12-a) he issued which stated that the last bus trip of [34] their company on December 27, 1996 was at 6:00 p.m. On February 26, 1999, the the dispositive portion of which stated: trial court rendered a decision,

[33]

WHEREFORE, it is the well-considered view of this court, after a thorough, painstaking and exhaustive review and examination of the evidence adduced in this case, that the accused ANTHONY ESCORDIAL y GALES, is GUILTY, beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, punished under Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The commission of the crime was attended by three aggravating circumstances of nighttime, that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, and that craft, fraud and disguise were employed by the accused in the commission of the crime under paragraphs 3, 6, and 14 of Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no mitigating circumstance. Applying Article 63, paragraph 1, the accused is hereby sentenced to the maximum penalty of DEATH. He is also condemned to pay private complainant the sum of P3,650.00, representing the money taken by the accused; P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs.

SO ORDERED.

[35]

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that: 1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED TO THE EFFECT THAT ANTHONY ESCORDIAL CAN NEVER BE THE ROBBER-RAPIST WHO RAVISHED MICHELLE DARUNDAY ON THAT FATEFUL NIGHT OF DECEMBER 27, 1996, AS THE FORMER (ESCORDIAL) DID NOT HAVE THE QUALITIES, CHARACTER AND EXPERTISE OF THE LATTER (ROBBER-RAPIST). 2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSAILANT AS DESCRIBED BY THE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES FIT WITH THAT OF HEREIN ACCUSED, THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS THAT THERE WAS NO DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSAILANT EVER MADE BY ANYBODY PRIOR TO THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED. THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES WERE IN FACT DRAFTED, EXECUTED AND SIGNED ONLY SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE ACCUSED WAS BROUGHT INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE BACOLOD POLICE. 3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES PO2 RODOLFO GEMARINO (DEP. CHIEF OF POLICE OF PONTEVEDRA), BRGY. CAPT. NESTOR DOJILLO (BRGY. CAPT. OF MIRANDA AND THEN MEMBER OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF PONTEVEDRA), AND RICARDO VILLASPEN (THEN COMMANDER OF BARANGAY TANOD IN PONTEVEDRA) TO THE EFFECT THAT MICHELLE DARUNDAY FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED DURING THEIR ENCOUNTER IN PONTEVEDRA POLICE STATION. 4. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING ALL EVIDENCES, TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY, OBTAINED BY THE PROSECUTION DURING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE LATTERS SUBJECTION TO CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION WITHOUT LETTING HIM KNOW OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PARTICULARLY HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE. 5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PROSECUTION WITNESSES WERE ABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED IN A POLICE LINE UP DESPITE THE FACT THAT OF THE PERSONS BEING LINED UP ONLY THE ACCUSED WAS HANDCUFFED. 6. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE ASSAILANT BY FACE THAT VERY EVENING OF DECEMBER 27, 1996 AMIDST THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DOING THE

SAME, GIVEN THE DISTANCE, THE INTENSITY OF LIGHT, AND THE TERRIFYING SITUATION, WHICH ALL OBSCURE, IF NOT DESTROY, THE CLARITY OF HUMAN MEMORY AND PERCEPTION. 7. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEFENSE FAILED TO SHOW THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCUSED TO GO TOBACOLOD THAT EVENING OF DECEMBER 27, 1996, DESPITE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SUBMITTED, BY SIMPLY RELYING ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSED TAKING A CARGO TRUCK FROM PONTEVEDRA TO BACOLOD. 8. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED ANTHONY ESCORDIAL HAD MOTIVE TO COMMIT THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON A WRONG PREMISE THAT THE DEFENSE ALLEGEDLY DID NOT REFUTE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINANT THAT ACCUSED ATTEMPTED TO BE ACQUAINTED WITH THE COMPLAINANT AND [36] WHISTLED AT THE LATTER SEVERAL TIMES. The issues raised by accused-appellant concern (1) the alleged violations of his constitutional rights and the consequent admissibility of the evidence against him and (2) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

I. Alleged Violations of Accused-appellants Constitutional Rights A. Accused-appellant questions the legality of his arrest without a warrant. Indeed, PO3 Nicolas Tancinco admitted that he and his companions had [37] arrested accused-appellant without any warrant issued by a judge. Art. III, 2 of the Constitution states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. To implement this provision, Rule 113, 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person only under the following circumstances:

(a)

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

questioning his warrantless arrest. He thus waived objection to the legality of his [40] arrest. As this Court has held in another case: [The accused] waived objections based on the alleged irregularity of their arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment rendered after a trial, free from error. The technicality cannot render subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty [41] when all the facts on record point to the culpability of the accused. B. Accused-appellant invokes Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution which provides that *a+ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. He contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without being informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his choice. Hence, he contends, the trial court erred in not excluding evidence obtained from him during such interrogation for violation of accused-appellants rights under this provision. While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that he had given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In fact, accusedappellant testified that at no point, even when subjected to physical torture, did he ever admit committing the crime with which he was charged. In other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained from accused-appellant which should have been excluded as evidence against him. C. Of greater significance is the fact that accused-appellant was never assisted by counsel, whether of his own choice or provided by the police officers, from the time of his arrest in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental to the time of his continued detention at the Bacolod police station. Although accused-appellant made no statement during this time, this fact remains important insofar as it affects the admissibility of the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant by the

[39]

(b)

(c)

The cases at bar do not fall under paragraphs (a) or (c) of the aforequoted rule. At the time of his arrest, accused-appellant was watching a game in a basketball court in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. He was not committing or attempting to commit a crime when he was arrested by the police on that day. Nor was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest could be effected even without a warrant. The question is whether these cases fall under paragraph (b) because the police officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that accused-appellant had just committed a crime. The phrase personal knowledge in paragraph (b) has been defined in this wise: Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 must be based upon probable cause which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part [38] of the peace officer making the arrest. In these cases, the crime took place on December 27, 1996. But, accusedappellant was arrested only on January 3, 1997, a week after the occurrence of the crime. As the arresting officers were not present when the crime was committed, they could not have personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the commission of the crime so as to be justified in the belief that accused -appellant was guilty of the crime. The arresting officers had no reason for not securing a warrant. However, the records show that accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged against him during his arraignment on February 25, 1997 without

prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday, Teresa Gellaver, Mark Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega.

Erma

Blanca,

Ma.

II. Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses Accused-appellant contends that: (1) he does not possess the character, qualities, and expertise of the assailant who robbed and raped Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver; (2) the records are bereft of any description of the assailant made by these prosecution witnesses prior to his arrest as the affidavits of Darunday, Blanca, Joniega, and Esmeralda were executed only after his arrest; (3) the testimonies of the defense witnesses, namely, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, Barangay Captain Nestor Dojillo, and Ricardo Villaspen, show that Michelle Darunday failed to identify accused-appellant when the latter was presented to her at the Pontevedra police station; (4) Tancincostestimony that Michelle Darunday properly identified accused-appellant at the Pontevedra police station could not be believed as the said witness had motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant; (4) the identification of accused-appellant at the Bacolod police station was tainted because only accused-appellant was handcuffed among the persons presented to the prosecution witnesses; and (5) it was highly improbable for the prosecution witnesses to identify the assailant by face considering the distance, the intensity of light, and the circumstances at the time of the commission of the crime. A. Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda pointed to accused-appellant as the man they saw on the night of December 27, 1996 and the person they identified inside a jail cell at the Bacolod police station. Erma Blanca, on the other hand, testified that she saw through her blindfold accused-appellant raping Michelle Darunday. She identified accused-appellant in court as their assailant and [52] as the man whom she saw inside the jail cell at the Bacolod police station. Ma. [53] [54] Teresa Gellaver and Michelle Darunday identified accused-appellant as the suspect brought before them at the Bacolod police station and the Pontevedra police station, respectively. The test is whether or not the prosecution was able to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon observations [55] of the suspect other than the line-up identification. As held in United States v. [56] Wade: We think it follows that the proper test to be applied in these situations is that quoted in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 488, 9 L ed 2d 441, 455, 83 S Ct 407, [W]hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint . Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959). See also Hoffa v United States, 385 US293, 309, 17 L ed 2d 374, 386, 87 S Ct 408. Application of this test in the present context requires consideration of various factors; for example, the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any pre-line-up description and
[50] [51]

As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial [42] inquest. However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police. An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a [43] group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings might well settle [44] theaccuseds fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is [45] inadmissible as evidence against him. Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on January 3, 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been made when accused-appellant did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-ofcourt identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him. Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should have been held inadmissible for being the direct result of the illegal lineup come at by [46] exploitation of *the primary+ illegality. Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object immediately when these witnesses were presented by the prosecution or when specific questions regarding this matter were asked of them, as required by Rule 132, 36 of the Rules on Evidence, accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object to [47] the admissibility of these testimonies. Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not render the in-court identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the [48] fruits of the poisonous tree. This in-court identification was what formed the basis of the trial courts conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not derived or [49] drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof, it is admissible as evidence against him. However, whether or not such prosecution evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is another matter altogether.

the defendants actual description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is also relevant to consider those facts which, despite the absence of counsel, are disclosed concerning the conduct of the lineup. We now consider whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses meet the test as laid down in that case. 1. Michelle Darunday testified that her assailants face was covered with cloth when he entered the room and that she was blindfolded when she was [57] raped. She could thus only see the assailants eyes, which Michelle described [58] as chinito (chinky), although she testified that she could also identify his [59] voice. Otherwise, Michelle did not see her attacker. Yet, she testified that she immediately recognized accused-appellant as the assailant when she saw him at the Pontevedra police station. Michelle stated: PROS. CARDINAL: Madam Witness, a few days thereafter, can you recall any development of your case? WITNESS: That was in January 3, when somebody told us to identify a suspect in the City Hall of Pontevedra. PROS. CARDINAL: Who was with you when you went to Pontevedra? WITNESS: My aunt and my uncle and the police investigators. .... PROS. CARDINAL: Upon arrival at Pontevedra, what happened? WITNESS: We waited for a while because they will find the suspect and I was there in the room of the police sitting. .... PROS. CARDINAL: So, you stayed behind and the policemen pick up the suspect?

WITNESS: I and my aunt waited in the police of the policemen, and then later the suspect arrived. PROS. CARDINAL: When that suspect arrived inside the room where you were, can you tell us what was the reaction of the suspect? WITNESS: When the suspect arrived, at first, he was not able to see me because I was behind the desk after the door, and then he was so fresh saying that he was a good man, but when he saw me he blushed and moving his head asking, Ano ang sala ko sa imo? (What did I do to you?), I did not do anything. But when I looked at his eyes and heard his voice, I was sure that he was the man. PROS. CARDINAL: When that person said, what did I do to you, I did not do anything, what was [your] reaction? WITNESS: I just looked at him and he was so fresh that he has not done anything, but the policeman said that his case is rape. Then, he was asked to take off his t-shirt and I just looked at him and then later, the policeman asked to borrow the man for investigation and while the policeman was recording, that suspect approached me and told me that, You do not know me., and asked, Do you know me? PROS. CARDINAL: What was your reaction? WITNESS: I just [kept] quiet but my aunt reacted by saying, You think you cannot be identified because you covered yourself? PROS. CARDINAL: And then what did he answer? WITNESS: He just stand outside while we went ahead to go back to our [60] home. A show-up, such as what was undertaken by the police in the identification of accused-appellant by Michelle Darunday, has been held to be an underhanded mode of identification for being pointedly suggestive, generat[ing] confidence where there was none, activat[ing] visual imagination, and, all told, subvert[ing] [61] their reliability as *an eyewitness+. In these cases, Michelle knew that she was

going to identify a suspect when she went to Pontevedra. Upon seeing accusedappellant escorted by Tancinco and his colleagues in the Bacolod police, she knew that he was the suspect she was supposed to identify. When accused-appellant was thus shown to her, there could be no doubt as to what was expected of her. Further aggravating the situation were the reply of the policeman to accusedappellants protestations of innocence that he was being held for rape and Michelles aunts obvious assumption of his guilt. Michelles immediate conclusion, therefore, that accused-appellant was her attacker was understandable. As has been explained: Social psychological influences. Various social psychological factors also increase the danger of suggestibility in a lineup confrontation. Witnesses, like other people, are motivated by a desire to be correct and to avoid looking foolish. By arranging a lineup, the police have evidenced their belief that they have caught the criminal; witnesses, realizing this, probably will feel foolish if they cannot identify anyone and therefore may choose someone despite residual uncertainty. Moreover, the need to reduce psychological discomfort often motivates the victim of a crime to find a likely target for feelings of hostility. Finally, witnesses are highly motivated to behave like those around them. This desire to conform produces an increased need to identify someone in order to show the police that they, too, feel that the criminal is in the lineup, and makes the witnesses particularly vulnerable to any clues conveyed by the police or other [62] witnesses as to whom they suspect of the crime. . . Coupled with the failure of Michelle to see the face of her assailant, the apparent suggestiveness of the show-up places in doubt her credibility concerning the identity of accused-appellant. The possibility that her identification of accusedappellant was merely planted in her mind both by the circumstances surrounding the show-up and her concomitant determination to seek justice cannot be disregarded by this Court. Michelles identification of accused -appellant is further rendered dubious by the disparity between her description of her attacker and the appearance of accused-appellant. In her affidavit, dated January 4, 1997, Michelle described her attacker as follows: P Sadtong tinion nga ginahimoslan ikaw sining suspetsado nakita m o bala ang iya hitsura? (At the time that you were abused by the suspect, did you see what he looked like?) Wala, kay tungod nga may tabon ang akon mata, apang matanda an ko guid ang iya tingog, mata, ang iya malaka nga biguti, ang struc

ture sang iya lawas, ang supat sang iya kamot, ang iya bibig, ang madam o nga kelloid sa iya lawas kag ang iya baho. (No, because I was blindfolded but I can remember his voice, his eyes, his thin mustache, his body structure, the smoothness of his hands, his [63] mouth, and the numerous keloids on his body, and his smell.) Michelles affidavit clearly indicated that she felt the keloids on the back of her assailant when the latter was raping her. But, when she testified in court, Michelle admitted that she did not see keloids on accused-appellant although she said that [64] his skin was rough. This is corroborated by the testimony of PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino who said that he did not see any lump on the back of accused[65] appellant when he tried to look for it. In fact, it would appear that accusedappellant had no such markings on his back but had only small patches which could [66] not even be readily seen. In dismissing the disparity between accused-appellants appearance and Michelles description of her attacker, the trial court dwelt on the apparent roughness of accused-appellants skin and the probability that Michelle might have [67] felt only the arch of the spinal cord of her assailant. However, mere speculations and probabilities cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt required [68] by law to be established by the prosecution. Michelle Darunday was a civil engineer in the City Engineers Office in Bacolod City. Considering her educational attainment and professional status, it is improbable that she was mistaken as to what she felt on her attackers back at the time she was raped. A mere protrusion on the back of the neck of the assailant could not possibly have been mistaken for keloids. Another circumstance casting doubt on the credibility of Michelles identification is her lack of reaction upon seeing accused-appellant at thePontevedra police headquarters. Defense witnesses PO2 [69] [70] [71] Rodolfo Gemarino, Ricardo Villaspen, and Nestor Dojillo testified that Michelle failed to see any identifying marks on accused-appellant and that she showed hesitation in pinpointing the latter as the culprit. WithGemarino being a policeman, Villaspen a barangay tanod, and Dojillo a barangay captain, these witnesses were all, in one form or another, connected with law enforcement. The prosecution having failed to ascribe any ill motive on the part of these defense witnesses, who are without doubt respectable members of the community, their testimonies that Michelle showed no reaction in seeing accused-appellant at the show-up inPontevedra police station deserve greater credence than the testimony of Tancinco that Michelle confirmed to him that accused-appellant was her attacker. The defense evidence established that Tancinco was an abusive policeman who had made up his mind as to accused-appellants guilt and who had no compunction in doing whatever means necessary, legal or illegal, to ensure his conviction. We note further that the testimonies of these defense witnesses

S-

coincide with Michelles testimony that she kept quiet when she saw accused appellant at thePontevedra police station on January 3, 1997. This being so, her reaction to the show-up at the Pontevedra police station upon seeing accusedappellant, the man who supposedly raped her twice in an ignominious manner, is [72] contrary to human nature. It may be that she was filled with rage so that upon seeing accused-appellant she was unable to show any emotion. But it is equally possible that, as defense witnessesGemarino, Villaspen, and Dojillo testified, Michelle did not immediately recognize accused-appellant as her attacker and only pointed to him as her assailant upon promptings by the police and her companions. *W+here the circumstances shown to exist yield two (2) or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence, while the other or others may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused: for the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to support [73] a judgment of conviction. For the foregoing reasons, we find both the out-of-court and in-court identification of Michelle Darunday to be insufficient to establish accused-appellant as the person who robbed and raped her and her companions on the night of December 27, 1996. 2. Erma Blanca testified that she saw through her blindfold the assailant when he was raping Michelle Darunday. She identified accused-appellant in open court as [74] the person whom she saw that night. Certain circumstances in these cases lead us to believe, however, that Erma Blanca did not really see the assailant and that her testimony otherwise was a mere afterthought. These are: First, the police blotter, dated December 28, 1996, prepared by PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, referred to an unknown suspect who allegedly entered the boarding house of Pacita Aguillon and robbed Ma. Teresa Gellaver and Michelle Darunday. This casts doubt on Ermas credibility because she testified that she had known accused-appellant for a long time prior to December 27, 1996. During her testimony, Erma claimed that accused-appellant approached her and Michelle sometime in September or October 1996 to ask for the name of the latter. In addition, Erma said she had seen accused-appellant whenever he passed [76] by their boarding house or stayed in her Tiyo Anongs store nearby. It would thus seem that Erma was familiar with accused-appellant. But, if she had actually seen him on that night of the robbery, why did she not report this to the police immediately? Being a victim herself, Erma had every motive to reveal the identity of the robber that same night the crime was committed. But she did not do so. We are therefore left with the conclusion that the police blotter referred to an unknown suspect because the identity of the assailant had not been determined at the time the crime was reported to the police. Second, Erma was not the one who accompanied the Bacolod police when the latter sought accused-appellant in Pontevedra, NegrosOccidental.
[75]

PO3 Tancinco testified that he took Michelle Darunday along with his other companions when they went to Pontevedra, NegrosOccidental so that she could identify if the suspect was the person who had raped her. But Michelle admitted that she did not see the face of the assailant. Erma Blanca, who claimed she recognized accused-appellant, was not taken along by the police to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. Why not? Why did they bring instead Michelle Darunday? Third, the affidavit of Erma Blanca was prepared on January 4, 1997, a day after the arrest of accused-appellant. This delay belies Ermas claim that she saw the assailant through her blindfold on the night of the incident. For the normal reaction of one who actually witnessed a crime and recognized the offender is to [78] reveal it to the authorities at the earliest opportunity. In these cases, the crime took place onDecember 27, 1996, but Erma Blanca executed her affidavit only on January 4, 1997, more than a week after the occurrence of the crime. Delay in reporting the crime or identifying the perpetrator thereof will not affect the [79] credibility of the witness if it is sufficiently explained. But here, no explanation was given by the prosecution why Erma Blanca executed her affidavit one week after the crime took place and one day after accused-appellants arrest. The most likely explanation for such lapse is that Erma Blanca was used merely to corroborate what would otherwise have been a weak claim on the part of Michelle Darunday. The same may be said of the testimonies of Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda. B. Accused-appellants testimony that he was at the cockpit in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental on December 27, 1996 is [80] [81] corroborated by Aaron Lavilla, Elias Sombito, and [82] Nestor Dojillo. Considering the improbabilities and uncertainties surrounding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the defense of alibi by accused-appellant [83] deserves credence. To summarize, we find that the prosecution failed to meet the degree of proof beyond reasonable doubt required in criminal cases. The acquittal of accusedappellant is thus in order. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City, finding accused-appellant guilty of robbery with rape and sentencing him to death, is hereby REVERSED and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant is ordered immediately released unless there are other legal grounds for his continued detention. The Director of Prisons is directed to implement this Decision and to report to the Court immediately the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof. SO ORDERED.
[77]

EN BANC [G.R. No. 141767. April 2, 2001] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HILARION CANTOR, accused-appellant. DECISION DE LEON, JR., J.:

TEVES

Before us on automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 9620-B convicting the appellant, Hilarion C. Teves, of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The lifeless body of Teresita Teves y Capuchino was found by a group of barangay tanods in Barangay Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna in the late evening of August 25, 1996. The body of the victim bore strangulation marks around the neck and a stab wound just below the left armpit. During the investigation of the case, the husband of the victim, herein appellant, Hilarion C. Teves, was identified as the driver of the passenger jeep that was allegedly met by the barangay tanods shortly before they chanced upon the dead body of the victim on that fateful evening of August 25, 1996. It was also gathered by the police that the spouses purportedly had misunderstanding prior to the incident. On December 3, 1996, Hilarion Teves y Cantor was charged with the crime of parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as [2] amended, in an Information that reads: That on or about August 25, 1996, in the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused HILARION TEVES y CANTOR, while conveniently armed with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill his wife TERESA CAPUCHINO y TEVES (sic) with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab and strangle the said TERESA CAPUCHINO TEVES with the aforesaid deadly weapon, stabbing the latter on the left side of her chest causing her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of her surviving heirs. CONTRARY TO LAW. Upon being arraigned on January 13, 1997, herein appellant, assisted by his counsel, entered the plea of Not guilty to the charge as contained in the Information. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that on August 25, 1996 at around 10:30 oclock in the evening four (4) barangay tanods, namely:

[1]

Milagros Tayawa, Jerry Pantilla, Angel Lapitan and Jose Bello, were patrolling on board a barangay patrol vehicle in Barangay Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna. Milagros was behind the steering wheel. From the old national highway, they entered the NIA road which was an isolated dirt road seldom used by commuters due to its narrow width. There were no houses and streetlights along the immediate vicinity as the road was bound by an irrigation canal on one side and a stretch of rice field on the other. Subsequently, they met a passenger jeep that was coming from the opposite direction. Milagros had to maneuver backward to [3] accommodate the other vehicle. As the patrol vehicle advanced, the barangay tanods saw a body of a woman lying on the left side of the NIA road. The womans white polo shirt was raised above the chest exposing her right breast and a small wound just below her armpit; while her black pants were lowered down to her knees. Upon ascertaining that the woman was dead, Milagros and her companions immediately informed their chief before proceeding to the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station to report the [4] incident. The police examined the cadaver, and then took the sworn [5] statement of Milagros Tayawa on the same evening of August 25, 1996. Dr. Erwin Escal, medico-legal officer, conducted the autopsy on the body of Teresa Teves upon the request of PO2 Tony Gangano. Dr. Escal identified in court [6] the Autopsy Report which shows the following findings: Post Mortem Examination: Fairly developed, fairly nourished female cadaver in rigor mortem with post mortem lividity at the dependent portion of the body. Palpabral conjunctive are pale. Lips and nail beds are cyanotic. There are petechial hemorrhages on the face and neck and subconjunctival hemorrhage on the left lateral conthal region. Head, Neck, Trunk and Extremeties: 1. Hematoma 0.5 x 0.5 cm. mid-pariento occipital area left. 2. Hematoma 0.5 x 0.5 cm. parieto occipital area right. 3. Contusion hematoma right lateral neck, measuring 6 cm. x 0.1 cm. 4. Punctured wound triangular in shape at the mid-axillary line, left pectoralis region measuring 1 x 0.5 x 0.5 cm., non-penetrating. 5. Contusion hematoma 12 x 4 cm. right lateral abdominal region. 6. Abrasion 4 x 2 cm. right lumbar region.

7. Area of contusion hematoma with abrasion right buttocks measuring 7 x 6 cm. On opening up: The scalp was deflicted to expose the skull and was sawing it off coronally. No skull fracture noted and the brain was grossly normal. Conclusion: The cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation. According to Dr. Escal, the victim could have been strangled (binigti) with the use of a constricting material which may be a wire, a rope or a nylon cord and that the victim may have been dead for not less than thirty-six (36) hours when it was brought to him for autopsy examination at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon on [7] August 26, 1996. On August 29, 1996 Milagros was invited to the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station by the PNP Provincial Director, Supt. Arthur Castillo, to identify a certain person and a passenger jeep in connection with the incident on August 25, 1996. She remembered the person, who turned out to be the husband of the victim, herein appellant Hilarion C. Teves, as the driver of the passenger jeep that they met on the NIA road in Barangay Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna shortly before they chanced upon the body of a dead woman later identified as Teresa C. Teves. She recognized the appellant when their respective vehicles momentarily stopped facing each other with their headlights switched on. She had also seen the appellant while the latter was sitting on a bench at the back of the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station when she came to verify the status of the case on August 27, 1996. Milagros likewise recognized the passenger jeep as the same vehicle being driven by the appellant when they met on the NIA road in the late evening of August 25, 1996. Milagros explained that she instructed her fellow barangay tanods to train their flashlight on its direction after the passenger jeep sped away and she read partly the plate number at the back as DJN 6 which she wrote on a cigarette [9] foil (palara). She also noted the distinguishing features of the passenger jeep such as: a) the maroon paint on the bumper; b) the small lights attached to the bumper; and c) the green reflectorized paints on the bumper. After identifying the appellant and the passenger jeep, Milagros executed another sworn [10] statement before the police. Upon his detention on the same date of August 29, 1996, the appellant allegedly requested the aunt of the victim, Maria Alulod, who was present at the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station, to send his Tata Enteng (Vicente Alulod) to the police station and to bring money for a certain barangay tanod of Barangay
[8]

Macabling so that his sentence for the commission of the crime would be [11] reduced. Vicente turned down the request as he noted during the wake of Teresa that Hilarion was not actually sorry for his wifes death although he appeared [12] worried (balisa). It also appears that before her untimely demise, Teresa was able to confide with an aunt, Paula Beato Dia, that she had a marital problem. Paula counseled her that it was natural for any husband and wife to have occasional problems. She even [13] suggested to Teresa to seek the advice of her Tata Felix. In July 1996 Teresa approached her uncle, Felix Padua, to seek the latters advice concerning her marital problem. Apparently, her husband, herein appellant Hilarion Teves, proposed that they live separately. He also wanted to secure an arrangement regarding the custody of their children and his wifes consent regarding the disposition of their house and lot. Teresa could not recall any serious reason for her husbands behavior but she surmised that the appellant resented her comment that his peers were all dalaga and binata. Since Felix was busy at that time, he advised Teresa to visit him on another occasion so that they could discuss [14] her problem thoroughly. In the same month of July, Teresa and the appellant went to the house of Felix Padua in Santa Rosa, Laguna. When asked about their problem, the appellant disclosed that he could no longer put up with Teresas jealousy that often caused him embarrassment before his friends. Felix tried to explain that it was common between any husband and wife to get jealous and that appellant should realize that his wife simply loved him very much. However, the appellant would not listen and [15] even imputed that his wife had a bad character. On July 20, 1996 Paula Beato Dia learned from Teresa that the couple had finally decided to live separately after conferring with their Tata Felix. On July 30, 1996 Teresa informed Paula that the appellant became violent (nagwala) over her refusal to sell their properties. Paula then, advised her niece to bring the matter to [16] the barangay officials. The evidence of the defense shows that the appellant stayed in their house during the day on August 25, 1996. He helped his wife, Teresa, washed their clothes. In the afternoon, he watched basketball game on the television and also helped his children with their school assignments. He started to ply the BinanCabuyao route with his passenger jeep at 6:30 oclock in the evening as it was his usual schedule. Before leaving however, he told his wife that he would spend the [17] night in the house of his uncle Caloy in Barangay Tagapo, Santa Rosa, Laguna. It appears that the daughter of his uncle Caloy celebrated her debut which the appellant and his children attended on August 24, 1996. When the party ended, he was requested by the family to help in returning some of the borrowed equipment on the following day.

Teresa also left the house at about 8:30 oclock in the evening on the same day allegedly to confer with somebody. She instructed her daughter, Leizel, not to lock the door when they go to sleep. Leizel saw her mother board a tricycle behind [18] the driver, inasmuch as there were already two passengers in its sidecar. Teresa was also seen by another tricycle driver, a certain Edwin Carapatan, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening while she was on board a tricycle behind the driver which was [19] bound for the town proper. Both even greeted each other. Meanwhile due to heavy traffic, the appellant managed to ply his route 2 times only after which he proceeded to the house of his Tiyo Caloy in Barangay Tagapo, Santa Rosa, Laguna. Upon arrival at exactly 8:30 oclock in the evening, the appellant ate his supper. Thereafter, they arranged the things for him to bring home on the following day. Before going to sleep, the appellant joined the family in watching basketball game on the television until the same was over at 10:00 oclock [20] in the evening. When the appellant arrived home in Barangay Sinalhan, Santa Rosa, Laguna on August 26, 1996, he was informed by his youngest child that his wife was not around. According to appellant, he thought that his wife left early on that day to look for a job. He learned that his wife left the house at 8:30 oclock in the previous evening upon arrival of his second eldest daughter, Lalaine, from school at 12:00 [21] oclock noon. The appellant and his neighbors searched for Teresita in the entire afternoon but in vain. At 10:00 oclock in the evening, he heard of talks that a body of a dead woman was found in Barangay Balibago, Santa Rosa, Laguna. He went to Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station together with a certain Lebong Dia and was instructed by the police to proceed to Funeraria Lim after hearing his description of his wife. At 11:30 in the evening, he saw the dead body of his wife at the funeral parlor [22] which he brought home after midnight. On August 27, 1996, the appellant went back to the police station in Santa Rosa, Laguna where he was initially informed by a certain police officer Laurel that his wife might be a victim of gang rape. However, he learned later that he was a suspect in the killing of his wife when he was investigated by the police. On August 29, 1996, he returned to the police station in Santa Rosa, Laguna upon being informed that Supt. Arthur Castillo would investigate the case. Three (3) barangay tanods, namely: Angel Lapitan, Milagros Tayawa and Gerry Pantilla were present in the police station. Castillo requested them to identify the appellant; however, none of the three (3) was able to recognize him. The appellant was asked to sit behind the steering wheel of his passenger jeep and was even ordered to wave his hand while pictures of him were being taken. Subsequently, Castillo urged the three (3) barangay tanods to take a good look at the appellant to refresh their memory after which he asked: Ano sa tingin niyo? When no response from the tanods was forthcoming, Castillo again asked: Hindi pa ba ninyo nakikilala yan?

After putting his hand on the shoulder of Barangay Tanod Milagros Tayawa, the latter remarked: Parang kahawig niya. Thereafter, Col. Castillo ordered the [23] appellants arrest. On December 7, 1999, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Hilarion Teves y Cantor, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, restored in R.A. No. 7659, Imposing Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, and there being present the aggravating circumstances the herein accused killed his wife (a) during nighttime; (b) in an uninhabited place; and (c) with the use of a motor vehicle (jeepney), hereby imposes upon him the DEATH PENALTY and orders him to indemnify the heirs of Teresa Teves the sum of P100,00.00, as moral damages. The Provincial Jail Warden of Santa Rosa, Laguna is hereby ordered to transfer accused Hilarion Teves y Cantor to the National Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt hereof. SO ORDERED. Aggrieved by the decision, Hilarion C. Teves appealed to this Court raising the following assignment of errors: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE AS CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9620-B DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE INCOHERENCE, INCREDIBILITY AND INADEQUACY IN WEIGHT AND VALUE OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RELIED UPON. III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACCUSED IS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF

MILAGROS TAYAWA AND MARIA ALULOD WHICH ARE INCREDIBLE BASED ON COMMON OBSERVATION AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE. IV THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE EQUIVOCAL TESTIMONY OF DR. EDWIN ESCAL IN FAVOR OF GUILT AND AGAINST THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED. V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI. VI THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE PRESENCE OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. In his brief, the appellant contends, in essence, that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Under the factual milieu of the case, Milagros could not have recognized the vehicle and its driver which she allegedly met on August 25, 1996. He also contends that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Felix Padua and Paula Beato Dia to the effect that the appellant and his wife had a misunderstanding were basically anchored on mere suspicion. Moreover, the alleged implied admission by the appellant of his alleged guilt before Maria Alulod, who is an aunt of the victim is incredible as it contradicts common human experience. Lastly, the testimony of Dr. Edwin Escal suggests that several malefactors may be responsible for the killing of the victim. The facts of this case clearly show that nobody had actually witnessed the killing of the victim, Teresita Teves, in the evening of August 25, 1996. To prove its case of parricide against the appellant, the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence. In order to convict an accused based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances [25] is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction where the multiple circumstances are proven and are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that the accused is innocent as well as incompatible with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt [26] on the part of the accused. In convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide based on circumstantial evidence, the trial court found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
[24]

were credible and sufficient. It is well-settled rule that the trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses testimonies is accorded great respect on [27] appeal. Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial courts since the latter are in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless it is found that the trial courts have overlooked certain facts of [28] substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. After thorough review, however, we find sufficient basis to warrant the reversal of the assailed judgment of conviction. The trial court relied on the identification made by Milagros Tayawa during the trial of this case in finding that the appellant was the person driving the passenger jeep that was allegedly met by the four (4) barangay tanods along the NIA road in Barangay Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna in the late evening of August 25, 1996 shortly before they accidentally found the dead body of Teresita Teves. We note, however, the irregular manner by which the pre-trial identification of the appellant and his passenger jeep during the custodial investigation on August 29, 1996 was made by Milagros. At that time, the appellant, who was already a suspect in his wifes murder, was alone inside the investigation room of the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station and without his counsel. He was also ordered by Supt. Castillo to board his passenger jeep, extend part of his body outside of the vehicle while waving his hand, as if doing some kind of a re-enactment, to be observed by Milagros and two (2) other barangay tanods namely: Jerry Pantilla and Angel Lapitan. We agree with the Solicitor Generals observation that the pre-trial identification in which the prosecution witness was made to identify the suspect (herein appellant) in a one-on-one confrontation, was pointedly suggestive, generated confidence where there was none, activated visual imagination and, all told, subverted the identification of the appellant by the witness. This method of identification is as tainted as an uncounseled confession and thus, falls within the [29] same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. Besides, there is reason to doubt the reliability of the said testimony of Milagros Tayawa. Milagros allegedly recognized the appellant when their respective vehicles momentarily stopped facing each other while their headlights were switched on. In the ocular inspection conducted during the trial on July 2, 1997, it was demonstrated that the two (2) vehicles were initially twenty and onehalf (20 ) feet apart when they stopped facing each other. When the barangay patrol vehicle backed off to accommodate the passenger jeep, the two (2) vehicles were thirty-six and one-half (36 ) feet apart, at which distance the trial court made the observation that the man behind the steering wheel was not cognizable in [30] broad daylight. If the man on the drivers seat was not cognizable in broad daylight, this court is not convinced that an accurate identification of the driver of the passenger jeep,

who was allegedly met by the barangay tanods at around 10:30 oclock in the evening on August 25, 1996, can be made even from a distance of twenty and onehalf (20 ) feet by the prosecution witness. It must be pointed out that the two (2) vehicles were then passing along an isolated dirt road where there were no houses and streetlights in the immediate vicinity. Under the circumstances, clear visibility was practically improbable, if not impossible, from a distance. There is more reason to doubt the reliability of the testimony of Milagros [31] Tayawa upon consideration of the sworn statement that she gave before the police authorities during the investigation of this case. Her sworn statement contains a narration of the circumstances leading to the discovery of Teresitas dead body. Significantly, no mention was made therein that she had seen the driver of the passenger jeep that they allegedly met in the late evening of August 25, 1996 on the NIA road, much less described his face or his other physical features. It is absurd to believe that Milagros forgot or the police investigators had been so negligent as to overlook this omission in her affidavit. In the first place, the purpose of the investigation was to elicit basic information about the killing, such as the identity of the perpetrator thereof. It was only during the custodial investigation on August 29, 1996 that Milagros claimed in her subsequent [32] affidavit that she had seen the driver of the same passenger jeep after the irregular one-on-one confrontation with the appellant and after unwarranted suggestions had been made to the said witness by the police officer. Notably, the prosecution failed to present the testimony of the other barangay tanods who were likewise present during the incident on August 25, 1996 to corroborate the testimony of Milagros. This is not difficult to understand considering that the statements elicited from Angel Lapitan during the investigation of the case run counter to the testimony that she gave during the trial, to wit: Tanong: Nakilala ba ninyo ang nagmamaneho at nakuha ba ninyo ang plaka nito? Sagot: Hindi namin nakilala ang driver dahil patay ang kanyang ilaw sa loob [33] at ng aming ilawan and kanyang likuran ay walang plaka. Due to the above statement of Angel Lapitan before the police investigator, even the testimony of Milagros Tayawa that she recognized the passenger jeep of the appellant as the same vehicle that they met along the NIA road shortly before having accidentally discovered the dead body of the victim, was also rendered doubtful. Besides, the passenger jeep of the appellant had been impounded at the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station since August 27, 1996 or two (2) days before the [34] pre-trial identification of the said vehicle. We also doubt the testimony of Maria Alulod for being contrary to common human experience. It would be highly unlikely and contrary to common sense for the appellant to admit his guilt before this witness, who is an aunt of the victim,

while vehemently denying to the police authorities any participation for the death of his wife. It is well-settled rule that evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not [35] only proceed from a credible source but must, in addition, be credible in itself. The motive that allegedly drove the appellant to kill his wife, as testified by prosecution witnesses Felix Padua and Paula Dia, is not convincing. Both prosecution witnesses simply stated in general terms that the appellant and his wife were having a family problem out of the latters jealous attitude and that they decided to separate. These prosecution witnesses failed to furnish any specific incident to the effect that Teresita had actually feared for her life or that appellant had become so desperate as to will the death of his wife. At the most, their testimonies simply manifest a suspicion of appellants responsibility for the crime. Needless to state, however, suspicion no matter how strong can not sway [36] judgment. On the other hand, the victims daughter, Leizel Teves, testified that her family was a normal and happy family. Leizels testimony was corroborated by the victims cousin, Minerva Diaz, who testified that the Teves family was a harmonious and [37] happy family. Additionally, Rosita Barreto, a friend of the Teves family and a neighbor for over seventeen (17) years, attested that the relations of the appellant [38] and his wife were generally smooth. Even if we would assume that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were true, it can not be reasonably inferred therefrom that the appellant is responsible for killing his wife in the absence of any other circumstance that could link him to the said killing. To be sure, motive is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be [39] adduced that the accused was the malefactor. In view of the foregoing, we cannot sustain the appealed judgment of the trial court in the case at bar. The prosecution miserably failed to establish the circumstantial evidence to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable [40] doubt. Consequently, we need not pass upon the merits of his defense of alibi. It is well-entrenched rule in criminal law that the conviction of an accused must be based on the strength of the prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness or [41] absence of evidence of the defense. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision in Criminal Case No. 9620-B is reversed and set aside. The appellant Hilarion Teves y Cantor is acquitted of the crime of parricide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Unless convicted for any other crime or detained for some lawful reason, appellant Hilarion Teves y Cantor is ordered released immediately. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 117202. February 13, 2002] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DEORITO RAPSING, accused-appellant. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

"Contusions: 4x1 cm over the left side of the neck; 2x1 cm over the anterior aspect of the neck; 2x1.5 cm over the left side of the inguinal area. PORIO y Breast: not yet developed. Genital Examination: No pubic hair, Labia majora-gaping, Labia Minora gaping. Feurchetelax with fresh lacerations at the median line, Vestibular mucosa, cyanotic with congestion. Hymen and vaginal walls with fresh lacerations at 1:00 oclock and 6:00 0clock positions. Hymenal orifice, originally annular admitted 2.5 cm in diameter bottle with marked resistance. Vaginal walls congested with bloody materials, scanty. Lungs: Voluminous, soggy, dark red in color. Petechial hemorrhages present at the subepicardial and subpleural areas. xxx Conclusion: Genital Findings are compatible with sexual intercourse with a man on or about the alleged date of commission, with violence. Cause of death: Neurogenic Shock and Asphyxia by Strangulation. (Emphasis ours) xxx

Once again, we hark back to the principle that as long as constitutional safeguards are adequately complied with, a confession constitutes evidence of the highest order for it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by [1] truth and his conscience. In an Information dated July 10, 1990 filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Olangapo City, accused Deorito Porio y Rapsing was charged with the complex crime of rape with homicide, committed in the following manner: That on or about the twenty-fifth (25 ) day of June, 1990, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously [3] have carnal knowledge of one Riza Cleodoro, an 11 year old girl, and by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and strangle the said Riza Cleodoro, which caused her death shortly thereafter. CONTRARY TO LAW. Accused entered a plea of "not guilty." During the hearing, the prosecution presented Dr. Richard Patilano, Atty. Juanito Atienza, Pfc. Roosevelt Menor, Cpl. Felipe Francia, and Pat. Marlon Agno as its witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, offered the sole testimony of accused Deorito Porio. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that: Shortly before midnight of June 25, 1990, the residents of New Cabalan found the lifeless body of Riza Cleodoro Flores near a creek at Purok I, Libas, New Cabalan, Olongapo City. She was 11 years old, and was survived by her mother [5] Trinidad Cleodoro. The Autopsy Report shows that the cause of Riza's death is strangulation. The genital examination discloses "sexual intercourse with a man." The pertinent portions of the said report issued by Dr. Richard Patilano, Medico-Legal Officer of Olongapo City, read:
[6] [4] th [2]

The day after Riza's exanimate body was found, Barangay Purok Leader Francisco Montes informed Cpl. Felipe Francia of the Olangapo Police Department that the accused attempted to rape Riza on three previous occasions. Montes got this information, as a Purok Leader, fromTrinidad, the victim's mother, who [7] confirmed its veracity. On January 26, 1990, Montes accompanied the accused to the Olongapo Police Department. Immediately, Pat. Marlon Agno and Cpl. Francia conducted a [8] cursory examination of the accused. The latter readily admitted to them that he raped and killed Riza and that he was bothered by his conscience. However, Pat. [9] Agno and Cpl. Francia did not reduce the accused's admission in writing. On January 27, 1990, the accused, together with Montes, returned to the Olongapo Police Station. Montes then informed Pfc. Roosevelt Menor that the accused admitted having committed the crime. Thereupon, Pfc. Menor verified

from the accused the truth of such statement. The latter answered positively. Communicating in the Tagalog language, Pfc. Menor informed the accused of his constitutional rights, among which are his rights to remain silent and to have a counsel of his own choice. Pfc. Menor also cautioned the accused that whatever statement he will give can be used against him in court. Pfc. Menor repeatedly explained these rights to the accused. He said he understood them. Since the accused could not mention any lawyer of his own choice, Pfc. [10] Menor requested Atty. Juanito Atienza to assist him. Atty. Atienza conferred with the accused, informing him of all his [11] constitutional rights. Atty. Atienza also reminded him of the gravity of his crime [12] and advised him of its consequences. Notwithstanding these warnings, accused, [13] assisted by Atty. Atienza signed the Pagpapatunay that he was informed of his constitutional rights which he understands; and that he is expressly waiving them. Immediately, he made the following confession in his Sinumpaang Salaysay: T: Ano ang masasabi mo sa nangyaring ito? S: Nagawa ko po iyon dahil gusto ko po at ako ay nakainom. T: Isalaysay mo nga sa akin ang mga pangyayari? S: Pagkatapos ko pong ayusin ang aking trabaho ay umalis na ako, bandang alas otso na po iyon at dumaan ako sa isang tindahan at bumili ng isang lapad na ESQ, tapos tuloy na ako sa bahay namin ni Trining at Teresa. T: Sino naman itong Trining? S: Ina po ni Teresa, na kinakasama ko. T: Ipagpatuloy mo ang iyong salaysay? S: Iyon po, pagdating ng bahay ay ininom namin ni Trining ang dala kong alak na ESQ, tapos itong bata naman na si Teresa ay nagpaalam sa kanyang ina na aakyat at magpapakilo ng plastic doon sa buyer, tapos nang magtagal siya ay sinundan siya ng ina niya at sinundan ko na rin at nakita ko si Teresa at nakita ko siya sa malapit sa puno ng mangga at sinabi ko sa kanya na samahan niya ako sa manga at doon ay nakatuwaan kong alisin ang kanyang short at hinawakan ko ang puki niya (affiant is referring to Teresa Florez, 11 years old, the victim) at hindi ako nakatiis ay inihiga ko siya sa damuhan.

S: Sabi ko sa kanya, sige na, hindi ko na matiis. T: Ipagpatuloy mo ang salaysay mo? S: Nang maihiga ko siya ay ibinaba ko ang pantalon ko hanggang tuhod tapos ipinasok ko ang ari ko sa kanyang pag-aari at kalahati lang ang naipasok ko dahil nasasaktan siya at umiiyak, at nawalan siya nang malay. T: Nang mawalan na si Teresa ng malay, ano ang sumunod na ginawa mo? S: Nabigla po ako at nahawakan ko ang leeg niya at nasakal ko na siya hanggang mamatay na siya, at nang iwan ko siya ay talagang hindi na humihinga at nagtuloy ako sa bahay na tinirhan namin ni Trining at nagpalipas ng oras doon at nang magkagulo doon sa bahay ni Bruan ay pumunta ako doon at nakita ko na nga itong si Teresa na kalong ng kanyang ina at patay na. T: Nang malaman mong nakamatay ka na nga, ano ang ginawa mo? S: Wala po, nagbantay pa ako doon at ako pa ang nagbuhat ng bangkay ni Teresa papuntang taas doon sa bahay ni SEVERO FLORES para maimbistigahan at tuloy madala dito sa Funeraria Fernandez. xxx xxx

T: Nakahiram ka ba ng pera kay Pineda pagkatapos ng insidenteng ito? S: Opo, dalawang daan lang para sana ibigay ko sa nanay ng bata. T: Naibigay mo naman? S: Opo. T: Nasaan na ngayon si Teresa? S: Nandoon po siya nakaburol sa simbahan ng Purok 1. T: May ipapakita akong isang short sa iyo, ano ang masasabi mo dito? S: Iyan po ang suot na short ni Teresa na hinubad ko (Affiant is pointing to a blue short pants allegedly wore by the victim during the incident) T: Sa kasalukuyan ay wala na akong itatanong pa sa iyo, may nais ka bang idagdag dito sa sinabi mo? S: Wala na po, maliban sa kaya ako nagtapat ay nakokonsensya ako. ASSISTED BY:

T: Anong sabi niya nang ihiga mo, hindi ba siya natakot o sumigaw? S: Ang sabi niya ay ano ang gagawin mo sa akin? T: Ano naman ang sinabi mo sa kanya?

(Sgd) ATTY. JUANITO C. ATIENZA

(Sgd) DEORITO PORIO [14] Affiant"

II THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT CONSIDERING THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION. III THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT AND CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN REJECTING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE. IV THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE COMPLEX [18] CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE." Appellant mainly contends that the taking of his Sinumpaang Salaysay was in violation of his constitutional rights and is, therefore, inadmissible. He claims that he was not assisted by an independent counsel and that he was "intimidated or practically forced to execute or sign" the same. He likewise maintains that the evidence against him is insufficient since all the prosecution witnesses are mere "witnesses after the fact." The Solicitor General maintains that the constitutional mandates on custodial investigation were complied with, hence, appellant's Sinumpaang Salaysay is admissible. Also, appellant's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt as his Sinumpaang Salaysay was corroborated by the corpus delicti. The primordial issue in this case is whether appellant's extra-judicial confession (Sinumpaang Salaysay) was taken in violation of his constitutional rights. Appellant's extra-judicial confession is not constitutionally infirmed. This Court, with its constant tryst with retracting confessants, has drawn the cardinal requirements for an extra-judicial confession to be admissible, to wit: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's choice; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in [19] writing. Measured against this yardstick, we are convinced that appellant's Sinumpaang Salaysay is admissible. I. The confession was made voluntarily.
[20]

The prosecution failed to present Purok Leader Montes as a witness because [15] he died during the hearing of this case. Meanwhile, the subpoena upon the victim's mother has remained unserved as she is no longer residing at her given address. The accused presented a different story during the trial. He testified that in the evening of June 25, 1990, he went home after his day's work in a junk shop. His common-law wife Trinidad and the victim were nowhere to be found. He searched for them in the highway. Later on, he found Trinidad holding the lifeless body of t he victim. They brought her to the barangay authorities, but they were advised to go to the morgue. The accused denied having raped and killed the victim. With respect to the execution of his Sinumpaang Salaysay, the accused testified that he did not read it. Although a certain Atty. Atienza was present during the investigation, he did not know the said lawyer, nor did he request him to [16] act as his counsel. According to him, the police "let" him sign the document. On July 20, 1994, the trial court, rendered a Decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide, thus: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds accused Deorito Porio y Rapsing guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of rape with homicide and sentences him to RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify the complainant Trinidad Cleodoro the amount of P50,000.00 as actual damages;P100,000.00 as moral damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.
[17]

Feeling aggrieved, the accused, now appellant, comes to us ascribing to the trial court the following errors: I THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN CHOICE.

A confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and [21] untrue. Appellant was unable to discharge this burden. He failed to present evidence that he was "intimidated or practically forced to execute or [22] sign" his Sinumpaang Salaysay. Initially, it must be stressed that appellant was not arrested by the police authorities. He voluntarily went to the Olongapo Police Station, accompanied by Montes, a Purok Leader, to whom he previously mentioned having committed the [23] crime. There, before Cpl. Francia and Pat. Agno, he admitted that he raped and [24] killed Riza. With such prior deliberate conduct, we are inclined to believe that the subsequent execution of his Sinumpaang Salaysay before Pfc. Menor was likewise voluntary on his part. Significantly, this Court has held that where the appellant did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on his person; where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on his body; and where he did not have himself examined by a reputable physician to buttress his claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of a [25] confession. In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was offered by appellant to show that he filed a complaint against the persons who allegedly intimidated or forced him even if he had the opportunity to do so. Neither did he submit to the trial court a medical report proving that his body was subjected to violence or torture. He even willfully signed a Pagpapatunay that he gave the statements freely, without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises, thus: "PAGPAPATUNAY Pagpapatunay po ito na naunawaan ko ang lahat ng nasasaad sa gawing itaas, pinawalang halaga o bisa ko ang mga ito sa harapan ni Atty. JUANITO C. ATIENZA.Kusa po akong nagbigay ng kusang salaysay at hindi ako pinilit o tinakot o pinangakuan ng ano pa man, lahat ng aking sasabihin ay buong katotohanan lamang. (Sgd.) DEORITO PORIO May salaysay
[26]

On its face, the Sinumpaang Salaysay has no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt on its integrity. Like in other cases where this Court upheld the admissibility of extra-judicial confessions, appellant's narration reflects spontaneity and coherence which, psychologically, cannot be associated with a mind to which force and intimidation have been applied. Appellant's response to each question contains details beyond what was being asked, thus indicating a mind free from exraneous restraints. As can be gleaned from the confession, the investigator did not propound questions answerable only by yes or no. He gave appellant sufficient latitude to elaborate by simply saying to him, " Ipagapatuloy mo ang iyong salaysay." All the above facts indicate that appellant executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay freely and voluntarily. To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction by appellant of his solemnly made statements at the mere allegations of force, [27] intimidation, violence or torture, without any proof whatsoever. Bare assertions [28] will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption of voluntariness. II. The confession was made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. Enshrined in Article III, Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution are the rights of the accused during custodial investigation, thus: "Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." The rights to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel may be waived by the accused provided that the constitutional requirements are complied with. It must appear clearly that the accused was beforehand accorded his right to be informed of such rights. In addition, the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. Appellant signed the Sinumpaang Salaysay which consists of two parts. The first part shows that he was informed he has a right to remain silent and not to give any statement; that he has a right to retain a counsel of his choice; and that any statement he gives can be used against him in court. After being thus informed, he said he was willing to give a statement and tell the truth. He even signed a Pagpapatunay that contains an express waiver of his constitutional rights in the presence of Atty. Atienza.

Notwithstanding such express waiver of his rights, Pfc. Menor still requested Atty. Atienza to act as counsel for appellant during the investigation. He interposed no objection to Atty. Atienza's assistance, thus: COURT: Q But you have no objection for Atty. Atienza to help you in that investigation? A No, sir.

information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an [31] abstract constitutional principle." Atty. Atienza testified that he was present and assisted appellant during the time that the latter waived his constitutional rights and gave his statement admitting that he committed the crime charged. As a matter of fact, he asked the investigator to give him an opportunity to talk to appellant alone. We quote Atty. Atienza's testimony, thus: PROSECUTOR MACABANGUN: Q I have here a document, it appears in that statement executed by the accused Deorito Porio that your signature appears at the bottom of the statement, and it is stated that you assisted the accused. Will you please look at this document and tell the Court if you can recognize your signature? A Yes, sir, I remember when my signature appears as said counsel during the custodial investigation of a certain Porio.

Q In fact you would prefer that you were assisted by a lawyer while being investigated in a very serious charge of rape with homicide? A Yes, sir.

Q And the fact that Atty. Atienza was there to help you, you consented to your having assisted while being investigated? A Yes, sir.

Q You understand Tagalog very well? A Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied)

[29]

It is now too late in the day for appellant to insist that he did not know Atty. Atienza and that the latter was only "picked up" by Pfc. Menor outside the police station. It must be emphasized that appellant did not object when Atty. Atienza, suggested by the police, acted as his own counsel. We have consistently ruled that while the initial choice of the lawyer, in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of the lawyer, is naturally lodged in the police investigator, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigator is deemed engaged by the accused where the latter never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the [30] swearing officer. We reiterate that appellant did not interpose any opposition when Atty. Atienza assisted him. We find that Atty. Atienza is a competent and independent counsel. To be considered competent and independent for the purpose of assisting an accused during a custodial investigation, it is only required for a lawyer to be: .willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individuals constitutional rights. In People v. Basay (219 SCRA 404, 418) this Court stressed that an accused right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful

Q Will you please tell the Court if at the time that certain Porio was investigated in the police department and his statement was being taken x x x will you please tell us whether you were present during the taking of this statement that you just identified? A I was present during the actual taking of the statement of this statement you have shown me, sir.

Q All the time that the accused was giving this statement you were always present during that investigation? A Yes, sir, I was all the time present. As a matter of fact, before the statement was taken by the police I requested for opportunity to talk with the suspect alone, before that giving of the statement. I told him the consequences of giving the statement; the gravity of the offense and also informed him about all his right, which if allowed I will quote the right I told him before giving his statement. I told him that he can remain silent if he wish to. I informed him that he can get the assistance of counsel of his own choice. He told me that it is not necessary because I was called upon by the police to assist in the investigation. I told him that it is a very grave offense. Because of the gravity of the offense I requested for interview of the suspect. And I explained to him like the statement that he will give can be used against him.

Q And after you interviewed the accused and informed him all about his rights and consequences of his intended giving of voluntary statement to the policemen, what did the accused tell you? A He said he is giving the statement just the same he was then, I feel during those date, he was in deep remorse because I understand that the victim is a daughter of his live-in-partner.

corroborated by the evidence of the corpus delicti. The existence of the corpus delicti and the legality of appellant's extra-judicial confession having been duly proven by the State, appellant's conviction is, therefore, in order. To reiterate, a confession constitutes evidence of the highest order as long as constitutional safeguards are adequately complied with, as in this case. The trial court correctly imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua inasmuch as the crime was committed in 1990 when the imposition of the death sentence was suspended. However, the trial court erred in awarding P50,000.00 as actual damages since there is no evidence to sustain the same. Instead, the civil indemnity of P100,000.00 must be awarded, this amount being properly commensurate with the seriousness of the complex crime of rape [36] with homicide. The amount of P100,000.00 for moral damages awarded by the trial court must be reduced to P50,000.00 in keeping with current [37] jurisprudence. And, the award of exemplary damages must be deleted. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be imposed only if the crime was [38] committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Here, the prosecution failed to establish any aggravating circumstance. WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of the trial court finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape with homicide is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the heirs of the victim, Riza Cleodoro Flores, shall be entitled to the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. SO ORDERED.

[35]

Q Now, in this statement that was given by the accused wherein you assisted the accused there was a signature over the typewritten name Atty. Juanito Atienza, whose signature is that? A This is my signature.
[32]

III. The confession is explicit and categorical. A confession is an acknowledgement in express words, by the accused in a criminal case, of the truth of the main fact charged, or some essential parts [33] thereof. Owing to its very definition, there is no such thing as an implied [34] confession. It is always a direct and positive acknowledgement of guilt. Considering that appellant is charged with the complex crime of rape with homicide, his statements that he inserted his penis in the victim's vagina and that he strangled her to death are express confessions or acknowledgement of guilt. IV. The confession is in writing. Appellant's Sinumpaang Salayasay is not only in writing, it also written in the language which appellant speaks and understands. In fine, we hold that appellant's Sinumpaang Salaysay adequately satisfies the constitutional requirements on pre-interrogation advisories. Appellant can no longer extricate himself from its necessary consequences. While the passage of time could easily bring a change of mind to a retracting confessant, courts, on the strength of settled principles, cannot undo for the confessant what he had deliberately done in the name of truth. We can not overlook the fact that appellant's Sinumpaang Salaysay is replete with details which only a perpetrator of the crime could have supplied and which could not have been concocted by someone who did not take part in its commission. Appellant's statement that he raped the victim and then strangled her to death cannot be taken lightly as it concurs with the findings of Dr. Patilano that the cause of death is strangulation and that the victim's genitalia shows "sexual intercourse with a manwith violence." This clearly signifies that appellant'sSinumpaang Salaysay is corroborated by the corpus delicti. In a criminal prosecution, in order to warrant a conviction, the State is required to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. An extrajudicial confession made by an accused is a sufficient ground for conviction if

EN BANC [G.R. No. 116437. March 3, 1997] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY,accused-appellant. DECISION PER CURIAM: Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide committed as follows: "That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of xxx, province of xxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one AAA against her will and without her consent; and the above-named accused in order to suppress evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity of the victim, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill the said AAA, attack, assault and hit said victim with concrete hollow blocks in her face and in different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her death. Contrary to Law."
[1]

silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence, dragged it [2] towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of AAA was discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin. The autopsy conducted by Dr. xxx revealed that AAA died of "traumatic injuries" sustained as follows: "1. Abrasions: 1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally oblique from right to left. 2. Abrasions/contusions: 2.1 temple, right. 2.2 cheek, right. 2.3 upper and lower jaws, right. 2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right. 2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left. 2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular, approximate 3 inches in width, from right MCL to left AAL. 2.7. elbow joint, posterior, bilateral. 3. Hematoma: 3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral. 3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right. 3.3 upper and lower jaws, right. 4. Lacerated wounds: 4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch. 4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower jaw, 4 inches. 5. Fractures: 5.1 maxillary bone, right. 5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and 2nd incisors. 6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes, right. 7. External genitalia 7.1 minimal blood present. 7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia, introitus and exposed vaginal wall.

The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in xxx, AAA, twenty years of age and a second-year student at the xxx, left her home for her school dormitory in xxx. She was to prepare for her final examinations on February 21, 1994. AAA wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more than P2,000.00 in cash. AAA was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. AAA agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there until dark. Night came and appellant pulled AAA, who was still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Appellant stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After

8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity showed negative for spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February 22, 1994, by Dr. Wilfredo S. de Vera). CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions due to [3] Traumatic Injuries, Face." AAA's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor xxx of xxx to form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where AAA's body was found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim [4] pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as AAA's. Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of appellant's wife, that accused-appellant also lived there but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry [5] hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to appellant. The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in xxx. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor xxx traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any knowledge of AAA's death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed AAA and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two [6] bags of AAA. Immediately, the police took appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as belonging to AAA. Thereafter, photographs were taken of appellant and the two [7] other suspects holding the bags. Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters. The following day, February 25, a physical examination was conducted on the [8] suspects by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. xxx. Appellant was found to sustain: "HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with abrasions (scratches at the back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound [9] along index finger 1.5 cm. in size Lt." By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor xxx arrived and

proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed AAA." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings [10] photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed AAA and volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he [11] falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and [12] tabloid he read almost everyday. After his confession, appellant hugged his wife [13] and son and asked the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on [14] videotape and covered by the media nationwide. Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters came. Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and [15] reenacted the crime. On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that in the afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in xxx attending the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked dinner while he watched their one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke up the next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to Manila to collect some debts while he and his son went to his parents' house where he helped his father cement the floor of the house. His wife joined them in the afternoon and they stayed there until February 24, 1994 when he was picked up [16] by the police. Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at xxx. In one of the rooms, the policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked him repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he raped and killed AAA. When he refused, they pushed his head into a toilet bowl and injected something into his buttocks. Weakened, appellant confessed to the crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he saw two of his neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go to the old toilet at the back of the house and get two bags from under [17] the flower pot. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told. In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court also ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages, thus:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" is found guilty by proof beyond a scintilla of doubt of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized in accordance with R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8, classifying this offense as one of the heinous crimes and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the family of AAA the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of AAA and P71,000.00 as actual burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages. After automatic review of this case and the decision becomes final and executory, the sentence be carried out. SO ORDERED."
[18]

cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) x x x (3)Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) x x x" Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights [20] cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in [21] evidence against him. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and [22] psychological, is forcefully apparent. The incommunicadocharacter of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what [23] really transpired. It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an [24] alleged offense. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police [25] agencies in our government." When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of AAA. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear from the testimony of SPO4 xxx, the police chief investigator of the crime, viz: "COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who did this act? WITNESS First, the place where AAA was last found is at the backyard of the house of the accused. Second, there were blood stains at the pigpen, and third, when we asked Romano Calma who were his other companions in the house, he said that, it was Pablito Andan who cannot be

This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant contends that: "I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS BASIS OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION; II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT; III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF CONVICTION WHEN THE EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY SHOWS THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE [19] GUILT OF THE ACCUSED." The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the three policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of xxx and four news reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also based on photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and reenactments of the commission of the crime. Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor and the news reporters because they were made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides: "SECTION 12.(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person

found at that time and whose whereabouts were unknown, sir. Q A Q A Q A So you had a possible suspect? Yes, sir. You went looking for Pablito Andan? Yes, sir. And then, what else did you do? We tried to find out where we can find him and from information we learned that his parents live in xxx. We went there, found him there and investigated him and in fact during the investigation he admitted that he was the [26] culprit."

The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the [29] police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor xxx visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor xxx testified, viz: "Mayor xxx: x x x. During the investigation when there were already many people from the media, Andan whispered something to me and requested that he be able to talk to me alone, so what I did was that, I brought him inside the office of the chief of police. Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the Chief of Police, mayor? A While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin mo ako,! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed AAA." So when he was telling this to me, I told him to wait a while, then I opened the door to allow the media to hear what he was going to say and I asked him again whether he was the one who did it, he admitted it, sir. This was even covered by a television [30] camera." xxx xxx

Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional [27] rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from appellant's house. SPO2 xxx, a member of the investigating team testified: "Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these bags marked as Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them, where did he point these bags? A At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags beneath the canal of the toilet. xxx

Q In other words, you were given information where these two (2) bags were located? A Yes, sir.

Q During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell you something and then you responded by bringing him inside the office of the Chief of Police and you stated that he admitted that he killed AAA . . . Court: He said to you the following words . . .

Q And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what did you do? A We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would know where the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.

Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! Ako ang pumatay kay AAA," was that the only admission that he told you? A The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were alone and the second one was before the media people, sir.

Q And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed to the place where the bags were located? A After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he really showed where the bags were hidden underneath the [28] canal, sir."

Q What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief of Police? A These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from making further admissions because I wanted the media people to [31] hear what he was going to say, sir."

Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has [32] "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was [33] not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not [34] violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner [35] whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him [36] from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court. Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are [37] deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview was recorded on video and showed that appellant made his confession willingly, openly [38] and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives. Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified that: "Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach the place where the body of AAA was found, where did you start your interview, in what particular place? Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview inside the police station of xxx and I identified myself to the accused as I have mentioned earlier, sir. At first, I asked him whether he was the one who raped and killed the victim and I also learned from him that the victim was his cousin. Q And what was the response of Pablito Andan?

His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was responsible for raping and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him whether his admission was voluntary or that there was a threat, intimidation or violence that was committed on his person because I knew that there were five other suspects in this case and he said that he was admitting it voluntarily to the policemen. I asked him whether he was under the influence of drugs but he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.

Q You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was the uncle beside him at the time that you asked the question? A The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I cannot recall anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I don't know if it is the place of the crime scene or in the place where AAA resides but . . . All throughout the scene inside the office of the Station Commander, there was no air of any force or any threatening nature of investigation that was being done on the suspect, that is why, I was able to talk to him freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me that he was the one who raped and killed, so we went to the next stage of accompanying me to the scene of the crime where the reenactment and everything that transpired during the killing of AAA.

Q Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission from the accused Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him? A xxx Q You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the xxx PNP, you also went to the scene of the crime? A Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Q Who accompanied you? A I was accompanied by some xxx policemen including Mayor xxx and some of the relatives of the accused.

Q At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan? A Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of AAA was recovered.

Q How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more or less?

There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping and crying at that time when he was already taken in the patrol jeep of the xxx police, sir.

Q Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in xxx, what transpired? A I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the crime was committed by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old house where I tried to accompany the accused and asked him to narrate to me and show me how he carried out the rape and killing of AAA, sir.

Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take some pictures of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard the group of Inday Badiday asking the same questions from the suspect and the suspect answered the same.

Q Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned? A The same group of people who were there, sir.

Q You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused answered you affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite? Court: A Use the vernacular.

Q Did he voluntarily comply? A Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.

Q It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP xxx up to the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped by you? A Yes, sir.
[39]

I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba talaga and gumawa ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay AAA? Ang sagot nya, "Oo." "Alam mo ba itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol, inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw ang gumawa sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay AAA?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."

xxx Q Did you ask him, why did you kill AAA? A I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil gripped his mind and because of that according to him, your Honor, were the pornographic magazines, pornographic tabloids which he, according to him, reads almost everyday before the crime.

Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered [40] the proceedings for three successive days. His testimony is as follows: "Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries? A We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own investigation so that we can have a direct interview with the suspect.

Q Were there people? A The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the deputy chief of police, several of the policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and several other persons. I asked the suspect after the mayor presented the suspect to us and after the suspect admitted that he was the one who killed AAA. I reiterated the question to the suspect. Are you aware that this offense which is murder with . . . rape with murder is a capital offense? And you could be sentenced to death of this? And he said, Yes. So do you really admit that you were the one who did it and he repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.

Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the court and the public what was the physical condition of accused Pablito Andan? A As I observed him that time there was no sign on his body that he was really down physically and I think he was in good condition. So he was not happy about the incident?

Court: A

He even admitted it, your Honor. He was happy?

Court: A

He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it. Was he crying?

Court: A

Q And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while ago?

As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was no tear that fell on his face.

Court: A x x x"

Was he feeling remorseful?

Q What was the next question? A I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim aboard a tricycle. He called her up. She entered the house and he boxed her on the stomach.

As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.

[41]

Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on [42] February 26, 1994. He also testified that: "Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give you the permission that you asked from him? A Yes, sir.

Q What was the next question that you asked him? A He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed the victim was because he was afraid that the incident might be discovered, sir.

Q And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present? A The first person that I saw there was Mayor xxx, policemen from xxx, the chief investigator, SPO4 xxx, and since xxx, the chief of police was suspended, it was the deputy who was there, sir.

Q Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news item on that? A Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.

Q Were there other questions propounded by you? A Yes, sir.

Q Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed the accused? A There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people. There were people from the PNP and people from xxx, sir.

Q "Ano iyon?" A He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.

Q How about the other representatives from the media? A Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there were people from the radio and from TV Channel 9.

Q Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of AAA to the other side of the fence? A I cannot remember the others, sir.

Q But can you produce the news item based on that interview? A x x x" I have a xerox copy here, sir.
[43]

Q How about Channel 7? A They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.

Q You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife also present? A Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was really the wife but they were hugging each other and she was crying and from the questions that I asked from the people there they told me that she is the wife, sir.

Q How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they around? A I do not know the others, sir, but there were many people there, sir.

Q Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May we know what question did you ask and the answer. A My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was "Yes."

Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news [44] reporters when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact [45] the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.

We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another [46] individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government [47] has the duty to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and [48] unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies. In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the medical evidence against him. Dr. xxx, a Medical Specialist with the Provincial Health Office, conducted the first autopsy and found no spermatozoa and no recent physical [49] injuries in the hymen. Allegedly, the minimal blood found in her vagina could [50] have been caused by her menstruation. We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994 by Dr. xxx, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. His findings affirmed the absence of spermatozoa but revealed that the victim's hymen had lacerations, thus: "Hymen -- contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3 [51] o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the clock." Dr. xxx testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have been caused by an object forcibly inserted into the vagina when the victim was still alive, [52] indicating the possibility of penetration. His testimony is as follows: "Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock position corresponding to the walls of the clock. x x x. Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.

Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy on the victim which was already dead, no amount of injury or no amount of lacerated wounds could produce blood because there is no more circulation, the circulation had already stopped. So, I presumed that when the doctor examined the victim with the use of forceps or retractor, vaginal retractor, then I assumed that the victim was already dead. So it is impossible that the lacerated wounds on the hymen were caused by those instruments because the victim was already dead and usually in a dead person we do not produce any bleeding.

Q What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the clock could have been inflicted or could have been sustained while the victim was alive? A Yes, sir.

Q This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the lacerated wounds, now will you kindly go over the sketch you have just drawn and indicate the edges of the lacerated wounds where you found the clotted blood? A This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the lacerated wound at 6 o'clock. I found the blood clot at this stage. The clotted blood are found on the edges of the lacerated wounds, sir.

Q What could have caused those lacerations? A Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly inserted into that small opening of the hymen causing lacerations on the edges of the hymen, sir.

Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges of the lacerations, I found blood clot, that is why I put it into writing as fresh. Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on the cadaver was merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the body was autopsied first before you did you re-autopsy? A Yes, sir.

Q If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those lacerations? A It is possible, sir.
[53]

Q Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina could have been sustained on account of the dilation of the previous autopsy?

We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina [54] does not negate the commission rape nor does the lack of complete penetration [55] or rupture of the hymen. What is essential is that there be penetration of the [56] female organ no matter how slight. Dr. xxx testified that the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations found in the victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh and could not have been caused by any injury in the first autopsy. Dr. xxx's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant are supported by other evidence, real and testimonial, obtained from an investigation of the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:

(1) The victim, AAA, was last seen walking along the subdivision road [57] near appellant's house; (2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother [58] were not in their house; (3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's house, a meter away from the wall. Bloodstains were also found on the grass nearby and at the pigpen at the back of [59] appellant's house; (4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had [60] been dragged over a flat rough surface. This supports the thesis that she was thrown over the fence and dragged to where her body was found; (5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry hamper in his house; (6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found positive for the presence of blood type "B," the probable blood [61] type of the victim. AAA's exact blood type was not determined but [62] her parents had type "A" and type "AB." The victim's pants had bloodstains which were found to be type "O," appellant's blood [63] type; (7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to [64] explain; (8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the [65] incident and were later found at his parents' house in xxx; In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other circumstantial evidence justify the conviction of appellant. Appellant's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His alibi cannot even stand the test of physical improbability at the time of the commission of the crime. Xxx is only a few kilometers away from xxx and can be [66] traversed in less than half an hour. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, AAA, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power. SO ORDERED.