Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of vs. action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney- therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents. which is in his possession. Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner. De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent. Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void ROMERO, J.: marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage should petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus: On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a SCRA 316, 326) Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza. the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the merits. 1 annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total Consuegra v. GSIS 2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer. she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:

Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss. bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. 8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. 9 On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA 4 cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are the lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex instant case prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that: marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10 suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases 52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for course contemplates an action for that purpose." reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5 Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Hence, this petition. Government Service Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following. subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity." First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If In Tolentino v. Paras, 12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage. Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively. private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People v. Mendoza, 7 contends invalidity of a void marriage." that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to the Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed. such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel." On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on basis for the separation and distribution of the properties acquired during coverture. the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second

marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15 the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a made clear in the provision. marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed valid until Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed. a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might B. Article 39. result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as follows: for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say: defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a only . . . unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say: Article 39 be reworded as follows: The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .

Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows: proposed that the provision be modified to read: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of establishing The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno, Justice Puno later modified the above as follows: however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment. For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment Justice Caguioa suggested that they say: declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41. The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41. objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:

For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity except as provided in Article 41. of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a marriage void." subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio. That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party wording of the provision as follows: might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' provided in Article 41. 17 presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18 marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaring such previous marriage void. declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void? while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable? determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential." Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, 20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant the establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the dismissal of the same. family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of Article 40 of the Family Code provides: policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect and nothing more. void. (n) Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly everyone.

That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23 Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee. Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied) Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.

none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse; (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; (4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n) Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26 Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.

The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties." WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein AFFIRMED. shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their SO ORDERED. presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the Republic of the Philippines following: SUPREME COURT Manila Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx SECOND DIVISION (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986 in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,

vs. There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents. void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner. still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code). Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent. There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all PARAS, J.: legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony SO ORDERED. having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that Republic of the Philippines said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having SUPREME COURT been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue Manila agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely FIRST DIVISION voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996 first husband; and ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner, (2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married vs. to someone else. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents. Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent JudgeVITUG, J.:p (1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the (2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a present evidence in her favor. family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the contract. We find the petition devoid of merit. The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, 1 in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition, viz: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply. 3 (Emphasis supplied.) In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said:

Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of (1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez- petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership. Valdez is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since obligations; Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute (2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela community of property. 4 Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein October 1995. respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes. In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in Code should be held controlling: he argues that: the custody of the other. I (3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within psychologically incapacitated. thirty (30) days from notice of this decision. II Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of marriages. 2 (Emphasis ours.) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family spouses. Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the III children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner. Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification: with Article 129. Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that IV the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay. will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family 5 home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares.

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is (a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in cogoverned by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the ownership property, without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; 6 it provides: (b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or Art. 147.When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation 9 or declaration of and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be nullity of the marriage. 10 governed by the rules on co-ownership. When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute and maintenance of the family and of the household. community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. 11 property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the place upon the termination of the cohabitation. liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" 7 of the Code. applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of care and maintenance of the family household." 8 Unlike the conjugal partnership of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership. aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 15 and 42, Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified 16 of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac

vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on coownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.

deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag ibig, 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). 4

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs. received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag -ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to Republic of the Philippines declare her in default. SUPREME COURT Manila Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the FIRST DIVISION marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001 of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was vs. solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent. presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local DECISION Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives. subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married. 1wphi1.nt This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 legal purpose it may serve. 6 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632. On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows: During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten P5,000.00, and costs of suit. year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that: respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE. III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8 Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.

Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased. the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14 One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.

participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships and maintenance of the family and of the household. where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 xxx ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In proportion to their respective contributions ... case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by regime. 18 either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous other did not contribute thereto. 19 Confor mably, even if the disputed death benefits marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a copresumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is 148 is therefore in order. no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police his children with Susan Nicdao. officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal other half, to the second wife, holding that: heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them. ... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has of the Family Code reads an interest in the husbands share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to governed by the rules on co-ownership. recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together partnership of the first marriage. 21 shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent reason why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first with their existing property regime. obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an The Case all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as follows: than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, [the court hereby Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3) years, four (4) months the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, 23 to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus the Court explained: accessory penalties provided by law. [T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED. THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000] Costs against accused.[2] The Facts The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial courts judgment, as follows: From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute th at accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN, respondent. DECISION On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through PANGANIBAN, J.: counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the

institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993. The Issues On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues: Prosecutors Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, A 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void. Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner. Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on B June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the been legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family essential elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that the offender has been Code, negates the guilt of petitioner. previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to C the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basi s of reasonable doubt.[6] While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the The Courts Ruling defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused. The Petition is not meritorious. It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his first wife.[3] Ruling of the Court of Appeals The elements of this crime are as follows: Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated: 1. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity o f a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. But here, the final judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved.[4] Hence, this Petition.[5] That the offender has been legally married; Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.[7]

When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.

In Tolentino v. Paras,[14] however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that the second marriage t hat he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the beginning and Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. void marriage. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all.[8] Thus, In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,[15] the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that he concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to commentaries[9] of former Justice Luis Reyes that it is now settled that if the first Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that marriage is voidable, it is not a defense. her first husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: x x x There is likewise no need of Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time. respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x. We agree with the respondent. To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has been characterized as conflicting.[10] In People v. Mendoza,[11] a bigamy case involving an accused who married three times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon,[12] which involved substantially the same facts. Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,[16] the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no need for such declaration of nullity. In Domingo v. CA,[17] the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.[18]

Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v. GSIS,[13] Jose Consuegra married for the second time Family Code, which came into effect several years after the promulgation of Mendoza while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half and Aragon. of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage marriage. It held: And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observes Law), which provided: that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the declaration of such nullity. lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code. Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage (b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the was void, was bigamous and criminal in character. second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted petitioner, changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court." wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage:[22] The Court held in those two cases that the said provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial distinguished from mere annulable marriages.[19] declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous they should be allowed to marry again. x x x. marriage, as follows: In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal marriage void was necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier Code. ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed: That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. [Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. that. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him. validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033).[20] Damages In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon that there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can Appeals insofar as it denied her claim of damages and attorneys fees.[23] contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy. Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief from this Court.[24] In any event, we find no reason to The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,[21] which reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote involved an administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting hereunder: the lawyers argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: for purposes of determining whether a person is We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of the was null and void ab initio is essential. The Court further noted that the said rule was existence of the previous marriage when she contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado. (a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies. xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took the plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already living with another man. Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the consequences of her act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful making.[25] WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.