Villanueva vs.

IAC 192 SCRA 21

Facts: Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of land in Capiz. After they died, their surviving children, Modesto and Federico Aranas adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition.

Ruling: Even if it be assumed that the husbands acquisition by succession of the lot in question took place during his marriage, the lot would nonetheless be his exclusive property because it was acquired by him during the marriage by lucrative title.

Certain it is that the land itself, which Modesto had inherited from his parents, Graciano and Nicolasa, is his exclusive and private property. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law. FIRST DIVISION

Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name from the Capiz Registry of Property. Modesto was married to Victoria Comorro but they had no children. After the death of Modesto, his two surviving illegitimate children named Dorothea and Teodoro borrowed P18,000 from Jesus Bernas. As a security they mortgaged to Bernas their fathers property. In the loan agreement executed between the parties, a relative Raymundo Aranas, signed the agreement as a witness.

[G.R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997]

ALFONSO TAN and ETERIA TEVES TAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES CELESTINO U. TAN and ROSARIO DY KUSHIN and SPOUSES MAXIMO U. TAN and TERESITA SY TAN, respondents.

Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest bidder. About a month later, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against spouses Bernas praying that the property entered in the loan agreement be cancelled and they be declared co-owners of the land. They ground their cause of action upon their alleged discovery on two wills executed by Modesto Aranas and his wife Victoria. Victorias will stated that her interests, rights and properties, real and personal as her share from the conjugal partnership be bequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo and also to Dorothea and Teodoro in equal shares. Modestos will, on the other hand, bequeathed to his two illegitimate children all his interest in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his own capital property brought by him to his marriage.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37224 dated June 20, 1994 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10, the decretal portion of which reads:

Issue: Whether or not the property mortgaged be a conjugal property of the spouses Modesto and Victoria.

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants-spouses Celestino U. Tan and Rosario Dy, and Maximo U. Tan and Teresita Sy to partition the house and lot covered by TCT No. 46249, deliver to plaintiff Eteria Teves Tan the one-third share of plaintiffs-spouses Alfonso U. Tan and Eteria Teves Tan; to pay Eteria Teves Tan P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[1]

The antecedents are as follows:

On April 17, 1989, a case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan against herein private respondents who are the Alfonsos brothers, Celestino and Maximo, and their respective wives, Rosario and Teresita. It was alleged in the complaint that the parties are co-owners of a 906square meter residential lot with improvements thereon situated at Banaue, Cebu City acquired sometime in 1970. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 494 of the New Civil Code, the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan, being co-owners to the extent of one-third (1/3) portion of the aforesaid lot, sought partition of the same. Anent the action for accounting, the spouses claimed that on August 15, 1963, the brothers together with other siblings put up a business which they registered as Bel Air Auto Supply Company and was engaged in the sale and distribution of auto spare parts. They alleged that they are entitled to the fruits, proceeds and profits of the said family business, so that, an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the partnership, as well as the interests and participation of each member, is proper in the premises.[2]

against his brothers insofar as the family business is concerned. He prayed that the case be dismissed.[4] The trial court, in its Order dated July 4, 1990, denied Alfonsos motion but recognized his reluctance to prosecute.[5]

Eteria Teves Tan testified that she is married to Alfonso U. Tan but they were now living separately by virtue of a decree of legal separation rendered by the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on August 31, 1977;[6] that during their marriage, they bought a residential lot consisting of 906 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 46249[7] and that the funds used in the construction of the house standing thereon were drawn from a loan she and her husband secured, although it was her husband and mother-inlaw who drew the loan.[8]

On October 16, 1989, private respondents filed their answer alleging that an accounting is not feasible because the company had long been dissolved by the partners on September 30, 1982 on account of financial losses and that whatever was due to each partner was already given him. It was further alleged that Alfonso mismanaged the business during his incumbency as manager and, as a consequence thereof, incurred advances and indebtedness from the partnership in the amount of P130,000.00. Finally, private respondents asserted that Alfonsos one-third (1/3) share of the subject property was mortgaged by him to his sister, Lolita Tan-Go, in order to secure a loan he obtained from her.[3]

Celestino and Maximo Tan and their spouses, on their part, tried to establish the following: (a) that the family business, Bel Air Auto Supply Company, was dissolved on September 25, 1982 on account of mismanagement brought about by Alfonsos incompetence; (b) that Alfonso had no more claim against the family business because he borrowed heavily on his equity in the family business and from his brothers and sisters; (c) that the subject property was inherited by them from their mother, Trinidad Uy; (d) that Alfonso borrowed money from their sister, Lolita, and as a consequence thereof, mortgaged his share of the disputed property to her; (e) that Alfonso failed to pay said loan; and (f) that the house on the lot in question was constructed using funds from a loan contracted by their mother from the Social Security System (SSS).[9] No documentary evidence, however was submitted during the trial with respect to the allegation that the property was inherited from their mother.

On January 16, 1990, Alfonso U. Tan filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss contending that the case was filed only at the instance of his estranged wife, Eteria, and that he had no claim whatsoever

As above-stated, a Decision[10] dated July 12, 1991 was rendered after trial finding that the 906-square meter lot with improvements was acquired by the three (3) brothers by sale through installments and so it should be partitioned equally among them and their respective wives. Consequently, since the lot was acquired during the marriage of petitioner and Alfonso, the former could not be deprived of her share of the one-third

portion which is the conjugal property of the spouses. However, with respect to the business dealing in auto spare parts, the same had been dissolved due to losses.

On September 19, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[11] of the decision contending that the 906-square meter lot, together with other properties, was actually inherited by the Tan brothers and their sisters from their mother who died intestate on December 15, 1968 but said lot was adjudicated to the three (3) brothers in a notarized "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and Adjudication of Properties" executed by the heirs on September 8, 1969, xerox copy of which was attached to the motion.[12] The lot was described in the document as:

x x x. It is true that under the New Civil Code, all properties of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains to the husband or to the wife (Art. 160, NCC). The provision of law on presumption of the conjugal nature of the property requires the party who invoked it to prove first that the property in controversy was acquired during marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership (Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, L-22300, May 22, 1960, 23 SCRA 637-644).

A parcel of land (lot 6448-C-5 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-21849 being a portion of Lot 6448-C with an area of 906 sq. meters and described on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 38759. Tax declaration No. 022318. Assessed at P2,800.00.

The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs which was the basis of private respondents' claim that they inherited the lot in question from their mother was not presented as part of their evidence during the trial.[13]

Aggrieved by the ruling, private respondents, the spouses Celestino and Rosario Tan and the spouses Maximo and Teresita Tan, interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, reversed and set aside the said judgment. Respondent court ruled that although the subject property was acquired during the marriage of the spouses Eteria and Alfonso, it was established by the Tan brothers that the same was inherited from their mother, hence, their exclusive property.

On the other hand, the herein appellants, thru Maximo Tan, insist that the property in dispute was acquired by inheritance from their late mother Trinidad Uy Tan, who died on 15 November 1968 (pp. 17-17-a, TSN; Dec. 21, 1990). There is documentary proof to support the testimony of Maximo Tan that indeed the property in dispute was inherited by Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo from their late mother, Trinidad Uy Tan. We note that the 906-square meter lot is registered in the name of: ALFONSO U. TAN, Filipino, of legal age, married to Eteria Teves of Bulacao, Pardo, Cebu City; CELESTINO U. TAN, Filipino, of legal age, married to Rosario Dy Kushin of Banawa, Hill No. 2; and MAXIMO U. TAN, Filipino, of legal age, single; of Banawa, Hill No. 2, of Cebu City, Philippines, with equal shares. From the very wording of the title, it can be deduced that 1/3 portion of the property solely belongs to Alfonso Tan. The property is registered in the names of the three brothers as married to their respective spouses. In this regard, the Supreme Court observed:

(H)ad the property been acquired by them (spouses) during coverture, it would have been registered in the name not of Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez' but the spouses 'Francisco Soriano and Tomasa Rodriguez' (Ponce de Leon vs. R.F.C., 36 SCRA 289, 312).

We quote the pertinent portion of the decision:

The title further states that the property is subject to the 'liabilities imposed by Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, for a period of two (2) years, from January 9, 1970, against the estate of the deceased Trinidad Uy'. (Exh. 'A') [underlines Ours]. This condition supports the

contention of the herein appellants that the lot was inherited by Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo from their late mother. It shows that the 1/3 portion of the property belongs exclusively to Alfonso U. Tan, and that it is not part of the conjugal partnership of gains.[14]

property belongs exclusively to one of the spouses and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.[20]

From this ruling, Eteria Teves Tan seeks a second assessment of the case in the present petition for review raising the following errors, to wit:

1. That since respondent Court of Appeals had already ruled that 1/3 portion of the lot in litigation was acquired by Alfonso Tan while said Alfonso Tan and his wife Eteria were still living together, the presumption of conjugality remains and it is not petitioner but private respondents who have the burden of proof to prove otherwise.

2. The ruling of respondent Court of Appeals that the 1/3 portion of the lot in question exclusively belongs to Alfonso Tan simply because the Certificate of Title states that the lot is registered in the name of ALFONSO U. TAN, xxx married to Eteria Teves xxx; CELESTINO U. TAN xxx married to Rosario Dy Kushin xxx and MAXIMO U. TAN is against well-settled jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.[15]

The petition is not impressed with merit.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.[16] It is not necessary, to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership.[17] So that when an immovable was acquired by purchase during the marriage, it is considered as conjugal property.[18] In fact, even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear, the presumption applies and it will be considered conjugal property.[19]

In the case at bar, conclusive evidence points to the fact that the undivided one-third (1/3) of the parcel of land in question is not the conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan and Eteria Teves Tan. It is the former's exclusive property which he had inherited from his mother, Trinidad Uy, the original owner of the property. The property is registered in the name of Alfonso U. Tan, married to Eteria Teves, Celestino U. Tan, married to Rosario Dy Kuchin and Maximo U. Tan, single, under TCT No. 46249. It is clear from TCT No. 46249 that the title was entered on January 9, 1970 and a transfer from TCT No. 38759, when the latter covered the 906-square meter lot which was one of the properties left by the late Trinidad Uy to her children when she died intestate and which property was adjudicated to her three sons as appearing in the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and Adjudication of Properties. While this document was not admitted as evidence because it was submitted only as an annex to private respondents' motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court, the source of the property can be reasonably and materially inferred from TCT No. 46249 which contains a provision that the property is subject to the "liabilities imposed by Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court for a period of two (2) years, from January 9, 1979 against the estate of the deceased Trinidad Uy."[21] Such imposition on property is for the benefit of the heirs who may have been deprived of their lawful participation of the estate of the decedent. The presence of the imposition in TCT No. 46249, which was carried over from its predecessor TCT No. 38759 presupposes the existence of summary settlement of an estate from where the property was derived, that of private respondents' deceased mother. There can be no doubt then, that although acquired during Alfonso's marriage to Eteria, the one-third portion of the property should be regarded as Alfonso's own exclusively, as a matter of law pursuant to Article 148 of the Civil Code which provides that:

Said presumption is, however, rebuttable with strong clear, categorical, and convincing evidence that the

Article 148: The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:

x x x.

OISES JOCSON, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO VASQUEZ, respondents Petition for Certiorari to review CA decision [February 16, 1989] Facts:

(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.

x x x.

In Villanueva v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[22] we ruled that the husband's acquisition by succession of a parcel of land during his marriage to his wife simply means that the lot is his exclusively property because it was acquired by him during the marriage by lucrative title pursuant to the provisions of Article 148 of the Civil Code.

Spouses Emilio Jocson & Alejandra Poblete had 2 children: Moises Jocson & Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Agustina is married to Ernesto Vasquez. Alejandradied intestate.

April 1, 1972 Emilio died intestate.

On the other hand, petitioner had adduced no evidence at all that the lot was acquired by her and her husband with their funds. Neither was her allegation that the house was constructed with the loan she and her husband obtained duly substantiated. From whom the loan was obtained was not even revealed.

The foregoing disquisitions adequately answer the second issue raised by petitioner.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 20, 1994 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

June 20, 1973: Moises filed complaint, assailing validity of 3 documentsexecuted by Emilio during his lifetime. He prays that the following be declarednull & void and that the properties involved be partitioned bet him & his sister:1.Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968 wherein Emilio sold to Agustina 6parcels of land in Naic, Cavite for P10,000.00. Deed included Emiliosmanifestation that the lands was sold at a low price because it was hisloving, helpful & thoughtful daughter who bought the property. He says hisson possesses such qualities too. He further claims that the sale did notviolate any law & that he did not touch his wifes properties. Heacknowledged receipt of payment.2.Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968, selling 2 rice mills & a camalig inNaic, Cavite to Agustina for P5,000.00. Emilio acknowledged receipt too.3.Deed of Extrajudicial Partition & Adjudication w/Sale executed March 9,1969 wherein Emilio & Agustina, excluding Moises, extrajudiciallypartitioned unsettled estate of Alejandra dividing such into 3. Emilio soldhis share to Agustina.

Bellosillo, Vitug, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Padilla, (Chairman), J., on leave.

All documents were executed before a notary public. Nos. 1 & 2 were registeredw/the Register of Deeds. Old certificates were cancelled & new certificatesissued in the name of Agustina.

Moises allegations:1.#1 is null & void because his fathers consent was obtained by fraud,deceit, undue

pressure, influence & other illegal machinations. He alsoalleges that property was sold for a simulated price considering that hissister had no work or livelihood of her own. Also, he claims that thecontract is fictitious, simulated & fabricated.2.Same allegations re #2 & #3 with additional allegation that he wasdeliberately excluded & they intended to defraud him of his legitimateshare. He also claims that defendants were employed in their parents business & they must have used business earnings or simulatedconsideration in order to purchase the properties.3.No real sale between dad & daughter living under same roof.4.Dad didnt need money since sold properties were all income-producitng.5.#1 & #2 are unliquidated conjugal properties that Emilio cant validly sell.6.#3: he only questions sale of dads share to sister but not extrajudicialpartition.

w/Register of Deeds (Gerona vs. De Guzman).If this was the only consideration, then it is barred by prescription. But he furtherassailed that sale was w/o consideration since amount paid were merely simulated.Contracts w/o cause or consideration produce no effect whatsoever (CC Art. 1352).A sale w/simulated price is void (CC Art. 1471 & 1409[3]) and action for declarationof its nullity does not prescribe (CC Art. 1410). 2. WON sales were w/o consideration. NO. Since Moises alleges such, it is incumbent upon him to prove his allegations,especially since documents show that his dad (vendor) acknowledged receipt of price & they are notarized. He failed to do so and thus he was not able to overcomethe presumption that a contract is with consideration (CC Art. 1354). Even his ownwitness contradicted his claim that his sister & her husband had no source of income. Witness Bagnas said that Agustina & Ernesto were into buy & sell of palay & rice. Even he himself said that he didnt know if his sister had other businesses.Agustina testified that she was into buy & sell even prior to her marriage. 3. WON prices were simulated NO. No proof of inadequacy of price. In fact, purchase price was higher thanassessed value (#1: P10k vs. P8920.00, #2 P5k vs. P3,500, and #3 P8k vs.P24,840.00). Besides difference bet market value & purchase price isunderstandable considering fathers filial love for his daughter. Gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect the contract except perhaps an indication of defect inconsent (CC Art. 1470). No proof of defective consent. 4. WON sale is improbable. NO. Improbability of sale is purely speculative. Not relevant considering that allessential requirements for contract are clearly present: consent, object & cause. 5. WON properties in #1 & #2 were conjugal properties of Emilio & wife. NO. CC Art. 160 provides that all property of marriage is presumed to belong to CPunless proven otherwise. Condition sine qua non (main thing) would be for partywho invokes this to prove that properties were indeed acquired during the marriage(Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin). Thus, Moises has to present proof that properties inquestion were indeed obtained during the

RTC: decided in favor of petitioner. Documents were simulated & fictitiousbecause: 1) no proof that Agustina did pay for the properties, 2) prices weregrossly inadequate tantamount to lack of consideration at all, 3) improbabilityof sale considering circumstances. Designed to exclude Moises. Declared #1 & #2 properties as conjugal by virtue of registration papers w/cdeclared: Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete. Orderedregistration of prop to 2 children.

CA: reversed. Nos. 1 & 2 barred by prescription because annulment of contractbased on fraud must be filed 4 yrs from discovery of such w/c begins on thedate of the registration w/the Register of Deeds. All documents actually & intended to be binding & effective against Emilio. Proof of such: issuance of newtitles. Partition w/sale in #3 is valid since it was done in accordance w/New CCArt. 996 on intestate succession & Moises 1/3 has not been prejudiced. ISSUES & RATIO:1. WON suit is solely based on fraud and as such is barred by prescription NO. Contract tainted by vitiated consent such as when consents obtained by fraudis voidable (CC Art. 1330) & action for annulment must be filed w/in 4 yrs from timeof discovery of fraud (CC Art. 1391 par.4). Discovery means the time when contractwas registered

marriage of their parents before he caninvoke the presumption. However, titles used by RTC in declaring properties as CP(see RTC decision in bold letters) are insufficient proof. Doesnt say when propertieswere obtained. Acquisition of title (actual owning of land) is different fromregistration. Possible that Emilio acquired properties when he was still a bachelor & only registered such after marriage. Married to phrase is a mere description of Emilios civil status at the time of registration (Litam v Rivera). It should be interpreted as Emilo is the owner,property registered in his name alone & that he is married. Consistent w/principlethat registration of property in name of only one spouse doesnt negate possibility of it being conjugal (Bucoy vs. Paulino). Both require sufficient, clear & convincing

and left the property to his paramour turned second wife (first marriage still subsisting). First wife petitioned.

HELD: The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.

proof to rebut the presumption. Moises should have presented sufficient proof toshow that properties were acquired during the marriage so that he may enjoy thepresumption under Art. 160. Due to lack of proof, presumption does not exist, thus,properties are considered exclusive to Emilio. HOLDING: Petition dismissed. CA affirmed

It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayos request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property unquestionably was acquired by Alayo it was just transferred to Josefa.

EMBRADO and TORREGIANI v. COURT OF APPEALS

September 25, 2012 Leave a Comment BELCODERO v. COURT OF APPEALS EMBRADO and TORREGIANI v. COURT OF APPEALS October 20, 1993 (227 SCRA 303) June 27, 1994 (233 SCRA 335) FACTS: This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of land acquired by a husband while living with a paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and children. The property had been bought by the husband on installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1950 but the final deed, as well as the questioned conveyance by him to his common law spouse, has ensued during the latter Codes regime. Now, of course, we have to likewise take note of the new Family Code which took effect on 03 August 1988. FACTS:

The prpoerty was acquired by Alayo then transferred title to the name of the second wife. Alayo Bosing died

Lucia Embrado, who was already married to petitioner Oreste Torregiani, bought LOT NO. 564 in her name alone. The document provided that even though the deed was prepared and signed on 2 July 1946, the effects of the document would retroact to the 15th day of April 1941, the date the lot and its improvements were actually sold to Lucia C. Embrado. Embrado sold the lot described as her own paraphernal property tp her adopted daughter, Eda Jimenez. Eda sold the lot to tohers. Torregianis instituted in the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Zamboanga del

Norte an action for declaration of nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and damages alleging that he did not consent to the sale, which consent was necessary because Lot 564 was conjugal property.

evidence on the source of funds used, it is presumed to be conjugal funds.

ISSUE: WON the property is exclusive of Embrado or conjugal property.

HELD:

The court agrees with respondent court that Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia, we cannot adopt its conclusion that because Lucia and the original owners agreed in 1941 for its purchase and sale, ownership was already acquired by Lucia at that moment. Under Art. 1496 of the Civil Code, ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee, and under Art. 1498, (w)hen the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.

The second paragraph of Art. 158 of the Civil Code provides that *b+uildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same. Under this article, the land becomes conjugal upon the construction of the building without awaiting reimbursement before or at the liquidation of the partnership upon the concurrence of two conditions, to wit: (a) the construction of the building at the expense of the partnership; and, (b) the ownership of the land by one of the spouses. The conditions have been fully met in the case at bench. Thus, even if Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia as evident from the Venta Definitiva, the same became conjugal upon the construction of the residential/commercial building in 1958.

MARIANO v. COURT OF APPEALS

September 26, 2012 Leave a Comment

MARIANO v. COURT OF APPEALS In the case at bar, the Venta Definitiva over Lot 564 in favor of Lucia Embrado was executed by the Carpitanoses on 2 July 1946 when her marriage to petitioner Oreste Torregiani was already subsisting. Although ownership was acquired during the marriage and hence presumed conjugal, the presumption of conjugality was successfully overcome by the terms of the Venta Definitiva which contains a positive assertion of exclusive ownership, which was duly supported by the testimony of Matias Carpitanos, one of the original sellers of the lot.\ June 7, 1989 (174 SCRA 335)

FACTS: The proceedings at bar concern (1) an attempt by a married man to prevent execution against conjugal property of a judgment rendered against his wife, for obligations incurred by the latter while engaged in a business that had admittedly redounded to the benefit of the family, and (2) the interference by a court with the proceedings on execution of a co-equal or coordinate court. Both acts being proscribed by law, correction is called for and will hereby be effected.

However, it is a fact that there is a construction in 1958 of a residential/commercial building on said lot a part of which was leased to third persons and another part serving as the conjugal dwelling. Although there is no

The proceedings originated from a suit filed by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano in the Court of First

Instance at Caloocan City, for recovery of the value of ladies ready made dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter.

Daniel Sanchez, Esthers husband, now made his move. He filed a complaint for annulment of the execution in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City in his capacity as administrator of the conjugal partnership. He alleged that the conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that, moreover, some of the personal property levied on, such as household appliances and utensils necessarily used in the conjugal dwelling, were exempt from execution.

ISSUE: WON the claim that property levied on in execution of a judgment is not property of the judgment debtor, Daniel Sanchezs wife, but of the conjugal partnership of the Sanchez Spouses

and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.

HELD: In the case at bar, the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a stranger to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. In any case, whether by intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by separate action, it is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to seek preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of possession against their conjugal assets. For it being established, as aforestated, that Esther had engaged in business with her husbands consent, and the income derived therefrom had been expended, in part at least, for the support of her family, the liability of the conjugal assets to respond for the wifes obligations in the premises cannot be disputed

ISSUE: What debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership?

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVT CORP. And ABELARDO MAGSAJO v. CA and SPOUSES CHING February 12, 1998 (286 SCRA 272)

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership

Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision?

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Chings acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

*We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms redounded to the benefit of or benefited from on the one hand; and for the benefit of on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term for the benefit of. On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. As can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably. GUIANG v. COURT OF APPEALS

September 26, 2012 Leave a Comment

GUIANG v. COURT OF APPEALS June 26, 1998 (291 SCRA 372)

FACTS: The petitioners claim that the benefits were: employment of Ching would be prolonged, his shares would appreciate, and it would enhance his career. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.

In the second assignment of error, the petitioner advances the view that acting as surety is part of the business or profession of the respondent-husband.

Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession . The court are likewise of the view that no matter how often an executive acted or was persuaded to act, as a surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he had thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty.

Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz and while she was in Manila seeking employment (with the consent of her husband), her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang one half of their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood. Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent gathered her children and went back to the subject property. Petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an amicable settlement between the parties. Feeling that she had the shorter end of the bargain, respondent filed an Amended Complaint against her husband and petitioners. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, null and void.

ISSUE: WON contract without the consent of wife is void

HELD: Yes. Art 124 of the FC rules that In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

Respondents consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondents consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar. A void contract cannot be ratified.

Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured an amicable settlement and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.