Heirs of Eduardo Simon (Petitioner) vsElvin Chan and Court of Appeals (Respondent)GR. NO.

157547February 23, 2011Facts:In 11 July 1997 the City Prosecutor of Manila filed a criminal case in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila charging Eduardo Simon of violating BP22.Sometime in December 1996, Simon issued to Elvin Chan a Landbank check with a declared amount of P336,000. The accuse did not have sufficient fund in his account to fund the check he issued, contrary to the information he had given to the respondent. Despite notice insufficiency of his account s funds, the petitioner failed to pay the respondent the value of the check within 5 days after receiving the notice.Three years later on 3 August 2000, Elvin Chan commenced in the MTC in Pasay City a Civil Action for the collection of the principal amount of P 336,000.00.On 17 August 2000, Simon filed an urgent Motion to Dismiss with application to change plaintiff s attachmnent bond for damages on the ground of litis pendentia asa consequence of the pendency of another action between parties for the same cause.The plaintiff countered the argument of Simon by pointing out he did not make any allegation as to the exact amount of his claim in the criminal case, consitituting an implied right to initiate civil action. The Plaintiff also cited Rule 111 Section 2, exception to file separate civil action during the pendency of a criminal case under Art. 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the CCP. The case falls underArt. 33 of the CCP.On 23 October 2000, the MCTC in Pasay City granted Simon s urgent Motion to Dismiss with application to charge plaintiff s attachment bond for damages. On 31 July 2001, the RTC of Pasay City upheld MCTC s dismissal of Chan s initiated Civil Case.Chan appealed to the CA by petition for review with the following issue; Whetheror not the RTC erred in the dismissal of his case on the ground of litis pendetia.The CA overturened the decision of the RTC with following legal basis; Though the CA recognized that civil case cannot anymore initiated following the filling of a criminal case, the following case falls under the exception under Rule 111 sec. 2. The case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.Simon appealed to the Supreme Court for petition for review.Issue/Issues:1. Whether or not Chan s Civil action to recover the amount of the bounced check as an independent civil action.2. Whether or not new Supreme Court circular pertaining to BP22 can be applied retroactively.Ruling:The SC set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. Furthermore, the SC reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City. The SC applied new rule on BP22 specifically, The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separatelyshall be allowed or recognized.The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonethelessapplicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural lawsdoes not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor isit constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule,no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation,considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the ConstitutionFurthermore, for litis pendentia to

be successfully invoked as a bar toan action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a)there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity inthe two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect ofthe other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence ofthe third becomes nil.A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil CaseNo. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information inCriminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both allegedthat Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon thesame claim.It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.

SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 396 SCRA 443 Facts: Petitioner Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees and the legal counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Sometime 2000, petitioner received on its behalf a donation in the amount of Php 200M through Chavit Singson. Petitioner received the donation worth the Foundations account. In 2000, Chavit Singson publicly accused President Estrada and his family members and friends of engaging in several illegal activities which triggered the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the petitioner, Joseph Estrada and his son. On April 4, 2001, Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan Informations against the former president, one of which, for plunder. No bail was recommended for the provisional release of all the accused including the petitioner. The case was raffled to a special division which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. On 25 April 2001, Sandiganbayan issued a resolution finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused. Arraignment was set on 27 January 2001. In the meantime, petitioner filed with Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for bail, which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001. Petitioners co-accused Jinggoy Estrada filed a motion alleging that he was entitle to bail as a matter of right. During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27 schedule. However, Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be heard BEFORE petitioners arraignment on 27 June. On June 1, Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all the other accused during the hearing on the petitioner for bail considering that under Section 8, Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence adduced during the hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial. The people insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be commenced because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined. The people further

stress the it is only when an accused pleads not guilty may he filed a petition for bail and if he pleads guilty, then there would be no need for him to file said petition. It is also the contention of the people that it is only during arraignment that the accused is informed of the precise charge against him. He must then be arraign first prior to bail hearings to prevent him from late on assailing the validity of the bail hearings on the ground that he was not properly informed of the charge considering that under section 8 of Rule 114, evidence presented during bail hearings are reproduce in the trial. Arraignment before bail hearings also diminished the possibility of accuseds flight since trial in absentia may be had only if an accused escapes after he has been arraigned. However, the bail hearing again did not proceed because the petitioner filed with the information a motion to quash the amended information on the grounds that as against him, the amended information does not allege a combination of series of over or criminal acts constitutive of plunder. According to the prosecution, the motion to quash the amended information was antithetical to his petition for bail. Petitioner also prays for the issuance of habeas corpus. Issues: (a) W/N petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted. (b) W/N petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail. (c) W/N a joint hearing of petition for bail for all the accused is mandatory (d) W/N petitioner should instead be released through a writ of habeas corpus. Ruling: (a) Although the petitioner was already arraigned, no plea has yet been entered thereby rendering the issue of whether an arraignment is necessary before the conduct of bail hearings in the petitioners case moot. Nonetheless, the court held th at arraignment of an accused is not a pre-requisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. In Lavides vs. CA, the court ruled that in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. However, this pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of liberty even before a complaint or information is filed against him. The case of Lavides must be understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash. Hence, in that case, the court held that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he had to choose between filing a motion to quash and thus delay his petition for bail and forgoing the filing of the motion to quash so that he can be arraign at once ad therefore be released on bail. Such would undermine the constitutional right of the accused. When a bail is matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The Lavides case also implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Sandiganbayan therefore committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail. (b) Court dins no inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail, is the security given for the release of the person in custody of the law. A motion to quash on the other hand is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint filed against him for insufficiency on its fact in posit of law. These tow relied have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. However, it is true that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or information on the ground that the same does not

charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and academic. (c) Petitioner argues that a joint bail hearing would negate his right to have his petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said hearing might be converted into a full blown trial. Prosecution on the other hand claims that joint hearings will save the court form having to hear the same witnesses and the parties from presenting the same evidences. There is no provision in the Rules of Court governing the hearings of two or more petitioner for bail filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused. The matter should be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the convenience of the state, including the prosecution but also that of the petitioner and the witnesses. In the case of Ocampo vs. Bernabe, the court ruled that in a petition or bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is early to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter into the inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further such evidence as has reference to substantial matters. In the case at bar, the case against former President Estrada is an entirely different matter. For, with the participation of the former president in the hearing of petitioners petition for bail, the proceeding assumes completely different dimension. The proceeding will no longer be summary since the proceedings will be full blown which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. The joinder of the petitioners bail will be prejudicial to the petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from his court. The Sandiganbayn again committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioners petition for bail with the trial of the case against former president. (d) In the case at bar, bail is not matter of rights since the accused is charged with a capital offense, but discretionary upon the court. Under Section 8 of rule 114, there must be a showing that the evidence of guilt against a person charged with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him bail., thus, upon an application for bail, by the person charged with a capital offense, a hearing must be conducted where the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong. When the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of right, which is not so in the case at bar. In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted ny the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender. The writ may be issued where the deprivation of liberty while initially valid under the lad had not later become invalid. However, there is no basis fir the issuance of the writ in the case at bar. The general rule is that the writ does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issued the same applied, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest. Petitioner in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities. EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS; Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail. The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor and

underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, and support to research and advance studies of young Muslim educators and scientists. Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson through the latters assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner received the donation and turned over the said amount to the Foundations tr easurer who later deposited it in the Foundations account with the Equitable PCI Bank. . During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be heard before petitioners arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their respective petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioners petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted. HELD: The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender (Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCAD 369) . an accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail. In Lavides vs. CA, 324 SCRA 321, it was held that in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. This pronouncement should be understood in the light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against him. It was explained that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between: (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held; and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment . LAVIDES VS CAG.R. 129670February 1, 2000 FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for childabuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act providing for strongerdeterrence and special protection against child abuse,exploitation and discrimination, providing penalties for itsviolation, and other purposes). His arrest was made without awarrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant LorelieSan Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioners room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received reports of petitioners activities. When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him withLorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear,whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, whichwere submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art.III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed against petitioner.petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For JudicialDetermination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Releaseof the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful WarrantlessArrest; and (3 ) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as aMatter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged

.nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and bythree other minor childrenNo bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separateapplications for bail in the nine cases.TRIAL COURT: 2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the above-entitled case. He is hereby granted the right to post bail in theamount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 forall the cases under the following conditions:a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiverof appearance during the trial of these cases.He shall and must always be present at thehearings of these cases;b) In the event that he shall not be able todo so, his bail bonds shall be automaticallycancelled and forfeited, warrants for hisarrest shall be immediately issued and thecases shall proceed to trial in absentia ;c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; andd) Approval of the bail bonds shall be madeonly after the arraignment to enable thisCourt to immediately acquire jurisdictionover the accused ; Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him.Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court tosuspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997. He filed amotion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds bereduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be doneprior to his arraignment. the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioners motions toreduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspendarraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned during whichhe pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then orderedhim released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the May 16, 1997 orderand the "holddeparture" order of April 10, 1997. The pre-trialconference was set on June 7, 1997.The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of condition (d) on the groundthat the issue had become moot and academic. Petitioner takesissue with the Court of Appeals with respect to its treatment of condition (d) of the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which makes petitioner s arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void andthat his arraignment was also invalid because it was heldpursuant to such invalid condition.ISSUE: WON the condition is void and the arraignment invalid.HELD: CONDITION IS VOID.bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accusedmay be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if theinformation is quashed and the case is dismissed, there wouldthen be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the secondplace, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering hispresence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment.Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before theproper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules,"while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at thearraignment is requiredto condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choosebetween (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his releaseon bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, hisarraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of amotion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once andthereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accuseds constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient tocharge him with a crime and his right to bail. The condition imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is inaccordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail underRule 114, 2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at thetrial without justification despite due notice to him or hisbondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to bepresent on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shallproceed in absentia ." JjscArt. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certainstages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea,whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenevernecessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgationof sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case theaccused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stagesof the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot bewaived.IT

DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE ARRAIGNMENT OFPETITIONER ON MAY 23, 1997 WAS ALSO INVALID. Contrary to petitioners contention, the arraignment did not emanate fromthe invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall bemade only after the arraignment." Even without such a condition,the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum,although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid,his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him arevalid. Lily Lim v Kou Co Ping a.k.a Charlie CoGr. No. 175256 and Gr. No. 179160 August 23, 2012Principle: A single act or omission that cause damage to an offended party may gave rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of theoffender (1)civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised PenalCode and (2) independent civil liability, that is civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. Thein dependent civil liability may be based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as felony. It ma y alsobe based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action byspecific provision of the Article 33 of the Civil Code.Facts:FR Cement Corporation issued several withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement andTigerbilt. Each withdrawal authority contained provision that it is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked byFRCC Marketing Department.Filcement and Tigerbilt sold their withdrawal authorities to Co. On February Co then sold thesewithdrwal authorities to Lim. Using the withdrawal authorities Lim withdrew cement bags from FRCC on a staggred basis. Sometimein April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remianign bags covered by the withdrwal authorities. Lim clarified the matterwith Co and administrative manager of Fil-Cement, who explained that the plant implemented a price increase and would onlyrelease th goods once Lim pays the price diffrence or agrees to receive lesser quantity of cement.Lim filed case of Estafa throughMisappropriation or Conversion against Co. The Regional Trial Court acquitted Co.After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminalcase the court also found Co not civilly liable.Lim sought a reconsideration which the regional trial Court denied. On March 14, 2005 Lim filed her notice of appeal on the civilaspect of the criminal case.On April 19, 2005 Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before the RTC.Issue:Whether or not there is no forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for specific performance anddamages while appealing the judgement on the civil aspect of a criminal case for estafa?Ruling: A single act or omission that cause damage to an offended party may gave rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of theoffender (1)civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised PenalCode and (2) independent civil liability, that is civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. Theindependent civil l iability may be based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as felony. It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action byspecific provision of the Article 33 of the Civil Code.Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party maypursue two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cummulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentiaor res judicata.The criminal cases of estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual.The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been insituted together with criminal action. On the other hand, thesecond action, judging by the allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil action arising from contractual obligation and fortortious conduct.The Civil Case involves only the obligation arising from contratc and from

tort, whereas the appeal in the stafa case involves onlythe civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged.

FITZGERLAD AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; October 27, 2006 NATURE P e t i t i o n f o r R e v i e w o n C e r t i o r a r i a s s a i l i n g t h e resolution of CA which granted the Motion for bail of accused- appellant and herei n res pondent VictorKeith Fitzgerald. FACTS - A n i n f o r m a t i o n w a s f i l e d i n t h e R T C c h a r g i n g Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with the violation of Art.III Sec 5, par (a), subpar (5) of RA 7610 3 statingthat, said Fitzgerald, actuated by lust, and by the us e of drugs willf ully, unl awf ull y and f el oni ouslyi nduced compl ai nant AAA, a minor, 13 years of age, to engage in prostituti on by t hen and t hereshoweri ng s aid AAA wit h gifts, clothes and foodand ther eaft er having car nal knowl edge of her inviolation of the aforesaid law and to her damage andprejudice. RTC rendered a decision finding respondent Guiltyo f Sec 5, par (a), s u b p a r ( 5 ) o f R A 7 6 1 0 a n d sentenced to an indeterminate term of prision mayormi n ( 8Y 1D) to prision t empor al max ( 17Y 4M 1D).U p o n c o m p l e t i o n o f h i s s e n t e n c e , h e s h a l l b e deported immediately and forever barred from entryto the Phili ppi nes. He was acquitted on the case of r a p e . O n t h e b a s i s o f t h e e v i d e n c e a d d u c e d , t h e court considered the view that the the circumstancesof the accused indicate a probability of flight and thatther e is undue risk that the accused may commit a similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal.- On appeal, CA affi rmed the c onviction, modif ying the penalty to imprisonment of prision temporal (14Y8M 1D) to reclusion perpetua (20Y 1D)- Fitzger ald fil ed for a Motion f or a New Trial and as uppl ement al appeal t o the motion on t he groundt h a t n e w m a t e r i a l o f e v i d e n c e n o t p r e v i o u s l y avail able has surf aced. CA gr ant ed the motion f orn e w trial. The original r e c o r d s o f t h e c a s e w e r e remanded to t he RTC, which was also direct ed torecei ve new evi dence. The moti on to tr ansf er t herespondent to the National Penitentiary was denied.- T h e p e o p l e f i l e a M F R , w h i l e F i t z g e r a l d f i l e d a Motion to fi x bail wit h Manifestati on. Both motions were denied by CA. The bail application was deniedp u r s u a n t t o S e c . 7 R u l e 1 1 4 R O C . T h e m a x i m u m penalt y imposable in accor dance wit h RA 7610 i sr e c l u s i o n p e r p e t u a a n d t h e e v i d e n c e o f g u i l t i s strong.- The people filed a petition fro review on certiorari. Itwas dismissed which became final and executory.Fitzgerald filed with CA a Motion for Early T r a n s m i t t a l o f t h e R e c o r d s a n d f o r t h e R e - Examination of the Penalty Imposed and a Motion forBail. CA issued the assailed resolution granting bail.It stated that although the evidence of guilt is strong,Fitzgerald is of old age and not in the best of health.Bail was granted premised not on the grounds statedin the motion for bail, but on substantial justice andconsidering new trial was granted in the case.- RTC ordered Fit zgeral ds temporary re l eas e uponfiling a cash bond of P100 000.00. Petitioners Claim > People filed this petition to annul the CA Resolutionarguing that the CA erred in granting the Motion forBail des pit e the crime charged was punis habl e byr e c l u s i o n p e r p e t u a a n d t h e e v i d e n c e o f g u i l t i s strong. Plaintiffs Claim

> t h e g r a n t f o r n e w t r a i l n e g a t e d t h e p r e v i o u s findings of the existence of strong evidence of guilt. T h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p r o v i s i o n a l r e l e a s e i s o n humanitarian grounds, citing his deteriorating healthand old age. ISSUES 1. W ON CA had jurisdicti on over the moti on t o post bail after issuing the resolution granting new trial2. WON CA erred in allowing bail HELD 1. (the ruling on this matter is limited to this specificcase) W hen t he SC gr ants new trial, it vac ates the j u d g m e n t o f t h e T C c o n v i c t i n g t h e a c c u s e d a n d remands the case to the TC for reception of newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e a n d p r o m u l g a t i o n o f a n e w judgment.H o w e v e r , w h e n C A g r a n t s n e w t r i a l , notwithstanding Sec1 Rule 125 ROC providing for theuniformity of the procedure between the SC and CA,CA may decide questions of fact and of law. When itgrants a new trial pursuant to Sec14 Rule 124 ROC, itmay either a) receive the new evidence under Sec 12o r b ) r e f e r t h e c a s e t o t h e c o u r t o f o r i g i n f o r reception of such evi d enc e under Sec 15. in eithercase, it does not relinquish to the TC jurisdiction overthe case. It retains sufficient authority to resolve theincidents in the case and decide its merits.- Even when CA remanded the case t o t he TC, CAr e t a i n e d a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n . C A r e t a i n e d i t s authority to act on the respondents bail application.2. The ri ght t o bail emanates from the right t o bepresumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in thec u s t o d y o f l a w w h o m a y b y r e a s o n o f t h e pr esumpti on of innoc enc e he enjoys, be allowedp r o v i s i o n a l l i b e r t y u p o n f i l i n g o f a s e c u r i t y t o g u a r a n t e e h i s a p p e a r a n c e b e f o r e a n y c o u r t , a s required under specific conditions.- Bail is a matt er of right to an accused person inc u s t o d y f o r a n o f f e n s e n o t p u n i s h a b l e b y d e a t h , reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, but a matterof discretion on the part of the court, concerning onefaci ng an accusati on f or an offense punishabl e by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment whenevidence of guilt is strong. 4 - RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of theexistence of strong evidence of guilt. Under Sec 6(b)Rule 121, the grant of a new trial allows for receptiono f n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e , b u t m a i n t a i n s e v i d e n c e a l r e a d y p r e s e n t e d o r o n r e c o r d . I n t h e present case, no new evidence had been introducednegating the earlier findings of the RTC and CA. Bail 4 Sec 4 and 5 Rule 114 ROC, and Sec 13 Art III 1987 Consti was not a matter of right but a mere privilege subjectto the discretion of CA.- However, the CA admitted that the bail was basedon health reasons disregarding the substantive andprocedural requirements on bail.- CA made no s pecific findings t hat t he respondentsuffer ed from an ailment of such gravity t hat his continued confinement during trial will permanentlyimpair his health or put his life in danger.- Moreover, t her e is findi ng on the r ecord on thepot enti al r isk of respondent committing a similar offense. Dispositive p e t i t i o n i s g r a n t e d a n d t h e C A resolution annull ed and set aside. The bail bondp o s t e d i s c a n c e l l e d . L e t a n o r d e r o f a r r e s t i s s u e against the person of the accused.

PEOPLE v LAGON 185 SCRA 442FELICIANO.: May 18, 1990 LAGON: FACTS -On J uly 7 1976 a crimi nal action was fil ed wit h t heCity Court of Roxas char ging Lagon wit h estafa for allegedl y issui ng a P4, 232 c heck as payment f orgoods knowi ng she had i nsufficient funds. Howeveron Dec. 2, as the trial commenced, the City Courtdismissed the inf ormation on t he ground that thepenalty prescribed by law for estafa was beyond thec ourts aut horit y to impose. Hence t his petiti on for review. ISSUE WON the City Court had jurisdiction over the case HELD NO- It is settled doctrine that jurisdiction of a court incriminal law matters is deter mined by t he law ine f f e c t at the time of the c o m m e n c e m e n t o f t h e criminal action and not the law in effect at the timeof the commission of the offense charged.U n d e r S e c 8 7 o f t h e J u d i c i a r y A c t o f 1 9 4 8 , municipal judges in t he capitals of provi nces andsub -pr ovi nces and judges of city c ourts shal l havelike jurisdiction as the CFI to try parties charged withan off ense wit hin t heir respecti ve jurisdictions, inw h i c h p e n a l t i e s p r o v i d e d d o n o t e x c e e d p r i s i o n correccional or fines no exceeding P6,000 or both.- A t the time of the commission of the c r i m e , t h e imposable penalty under Art 315 of the RPC wasa r r e s t o m a y o r i n i t s m a x i m u m p e r i o d t o p r i s i o n correccional it is minimum period, falling well withint h e jurisdiction of the City Court. B u t w h e n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n w a s f i l e d , P D 8 1 8 h a d i n c r e a s e d t h e imposabl e penalty t o prision mayor i n its medi umperiod.-The real question raised by petitioner is whether thesaid doctrine disregards the rule against retroactivityof penal laws. It has been repeat edly hel d that incriminal prosecutions, jurisdiction is not determinedby what may be meted out t o t he off ender in aftertrial but by t he ext ent of t he penalty which t he lawimposes. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the Court inw h i c h t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s f i l e d , i t i s r e t a i n e d regar dless of whether t he evidence pr oves a lesser offense which carries a penalty that would otherwisefall within the jurisdiction of an inferior court.-In the instant case, should the information be refiledw i t h t h e RTC, the court may not i m p o s e a m o r e o n e r o u s p e n a l t y u p o n L a g o n . A l t h o u g h t h e R T C retains subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decidethe refiled case under PD 818, given the date of thecommission of the crime (before eff ectivit y of PD8 1 8 ) , t h e l o w e r p e n a l t y p r o v i d e d i n A r t 3 1 5 (otherwise wit hin the jurisdiction of t he City Court) should be imposed. Dispositive W H E R E F O R E , t h e C o u r t r e s o l v e d t o DENY the petition