Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants

Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa

Edited by Wafula Okumu and

Augustine Ikelegbe

Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants

Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa

Edited by Wafula Okumu and

Augustine Ikelegbe

As a leading African human security research institution, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) works towards a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy, collaborative security and gender mainstreaming. The ISS realises this vision by:
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Contents
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iv About the book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vi About the editors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii About the contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .viii Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xii List of tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiv List of maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xv

Undertaking applied research, training and capacity building Working collaboratively with others Facilitating and supporting policy formulation Monitoring trends and policy implementation Collecting, interpreting and disseminating information Networking on national, regional and international levels

2010, Institute for Security Studies

Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of both the authors and the publishers. The opinions expressed do not necessarily re ect those of the Institute, its trustees, members of the Council or donors. Authors contribute to ISS publications in their personal capacity.

List of acronyms and abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xvi

Chapter 1

Introduction: towards conceptualisation and understanding of the threats of armed non-state groups to human security and the state in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Augustine Ikelegbe and Wafula Okumu

ISBN 978-1-920422-10-3 First published by the Institute for Security Studies, PO Box 1787, Brooklyn Square 0075 Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa

PART I: ISSUES AND DIMENSIONS

Chapter 2

Historical and cultural dimensions of militia and rebel groups in Africa . . .45
Anne Kubai
Chapter 3

www.issafrica.org
Cover photographs Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) soldiers. AP Photo/Jean-Marc Bouju. Hundreds of thousands of refugees stream out of Mugunga refugee camp and head toward the Rwanda border as Zairian rebels move in to occupy what was the largest refugee camp in the world. AP Photo/Enric Marti. Production, typesetting and layout Image Design + 27 11 469 3029 Cover design Janice Kuhler Printing Remata iNathi

Mapping the phenomenon of militias and rebels in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

Bettina Engels
Chapter 4

Armed non-state entities in international law: status and challenges of accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89
Godfrey Musila
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Chapter 5

PART III: RESPONSES

Chapter 14

Crises of the state and governance and armed non-state groups in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119
Augustine Ikelegbe

Local communities, militias and rebel movements: the case of the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .389
Krijn Peters
Chapter 15

PART II: CASE STUDIES

Chapter 6

Marginalisation and the rise of militia groups in Kenya: the Mungiki and the Sabaot Land Defence Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147
Adams Oloo
Chapter 7

State, regional and international responses to militia and rebel activities in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .417
Macharia Munene
Chapter 16

Rebels and militias in resource conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .183
Phillip Kasaija

Confronting the threats of armed non-state groups to human security and the state in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .437
Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe

Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .469
Chapter 8

Militias, pirates and oil in the Niger Delta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219

Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe
Chapter 9

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .481 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .524

Rebels, militias and governance in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .255

Samson S Wassara
Chapter 10

Regionalisation of rebel activities: the case of the Lords Resistance Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .287
Paul Omach
Chapter 11

Militant Islamist groups in northern Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .313

Muhammed Kabir Isa
Chapter 12

Armed Islamist groups in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .341

Eric George and Aleksi Ylnen
Chapter 13

From rebellion to opposition: UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .365

Justin Pearce ii
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Acknowledgements
Militias, r ebels a nd I slamist m ilitants has b een in t he w orks sin ce 2006 a nd i s a culmination of t he a uthors a ssiduousness, f ervour a nd fortitude t o make contributions t hat in crease un derstanding o f o ne o f A fricas m ost unf ortunate phenomena; that of armed non-state groups undermining human security and the state capacity to provide it. After Musa Abutudu had introduced us to each other, we t ook t he f irst s tep o f p reparing a co ncept n ote t hat wa s en dorsed b y t he Institute f or S ecurity S tudies (ISS) a nd s upported w ith f unds p rovided b y t he government o f Fin land. I n t his r egard, w e w ould li ke t o exp ress o ur de epest appreciation to the ISS E xecutive Director, Jakkie Cilliers, the ISS Pretoria Office Director, C heryl F rank, a nd t he A frican C onflict P revention P rogramme Head, Paul-Simon Handy. All continued to offer words of encouragement and useful tips on content, concepts and historical facts. This b ook i s a n exp ression o f o ur desir e t o un pack a p henomenon t hat h as become a prominent feature of African politics. It is also an outcome of hard work by all of the contributors who made many sacrifices to research and write superb chapters, as well as to review each others work. Bettina Engels, Eric George, Ibaba S Ib aba, M uhammad K abir, P hillip K asaija, A nne K ubai, M acharia M unene, Godfrey Musila, Adams O loo, Paul Om ach, Justin Pearce, K rijn Peters, Sa mson Wassara, and Aleksi Ylnen should also be thanked for providing us with a wealth of knowledge that we heavily relied on to compile and edit the volume. This b ook w ould n ot h ave b een co mpleted in t ime w ithout t he p rofessional support w e r eceived f rom t he ISS p ublications o ffice. Iolandi Pool, Pu blications Coordinator, and Tsakani Shipalana, Assistant Publications Coordinator, devoted immense en ergies t o en sure t hat w e h ad t he n ecessary m aps a nd co pyright permissions, typesetting and copy-editing. We w ere s upported a nd en couraged b y o ur co lleagues t hrough w ords a nd reviewing o f t he c hapters. I n p articular w e s hould ext end o ur s pecial t hanks t o Judy Smith-Hhn, Paula Roque, David Zounmenou, Martin Ewi, Musa Abutudu and Osumah Oarhe. We also owe a mountain of gratitude to Namhla Matshanda
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for providing research assistance, and Marinkie Maluleke for taking care of all the administrative matters. Last, but not least, we owe our families immeasurable gratitude for enduring our absences during the periods we sneaked out to libraries during weekends or stayed late at the office to work on the book. We will forever be indebted to our spouses, C aroline a nd On ovughe, f or co ntinually b eing t he s ources o f o ur intellectual curiosity and scholarly endeavours. Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe Pretoria October 2010

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About the book

Militias, rebels and Islamist militants: human insecurity and state cr ises in Africa explores h ow a rmed n on-state g roups h ave em erged a s k ey p layers in A frican politics a nd a rmed co nflicts sin ce t he 1990s. Th e b ook i s a cr itical, multidisciplinary and comprehensive study of the threats that militias, rebels and Islamist mi litants p ose to human s ecurity and t he state in A frica. Through c ase studies utilising multidisciplinary approaches and concepts, analytical frameworks and p erspectives c utting acr oss t he s ocial s ciences a nd h umanities, t he b ook conceptualises armed non-state groups in A frica through their links to the state. After contextualising these groups in history, culture, economics, politics, law and other fac tors, a sys tematic ef fort i s m ade t o lo cate t heir roots in g roup identity, social dep rivation, r esource co mpetition, e lite m anipulations, t he y outh problmatique, economic decline, poor political leadership and governance crisis. Differentiating mi litias f rom in surgents, r ebel g roups a nd ext remist r eligious movements, t he b ook i llustrates h ow s ome o f t he g roups h ave s ustained themselves, undermining both human security and the state capacity to provide it. The responses to their threats by local communities, states, regional mechanisms and ini tiatives, a nd t he in ternational co mmunities a re a nalysed. Th e f indings provide a co nceptual r eference f or s cholars a nd p ractical r ecommendations f or policymakers.

About the editors

Wafula Okumu holds a P hD from Atlanta University in t he US. H e is a S enior Research F ellow a t t he I nstitute f or S ecurity S tudies (ISS), w here h e h as a lso served a s t he H ead o f A frican S ecurity A nalysis P rogramme (A SAP). B efore joining t he ISS in 2006, Dr O kumu t aught at McMaster Universitys C entre for Peace Studies, Prescott College, Mississippi University for Women and Chapman University. He also served as a co nflict analyst for the African Union and as an Academic P rogramme A ssociate a t t he U nited N ations U niversity, Tokyo. H is research work and publications have been on a variety of topics ranging from the use of child soldiers to human rights, democracy, terrorism, the African Union, African boundaries, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. In addition to his many publications in refereed journals, Dr Okumu has also co-edited (with Paul Kaiser) Democratic t ransitions i n Eas t A frica and (w ith A nneli B otha) t he Understanding t errorism i n A frica series. H e i s t he a uthor (w ith P rofessor Sa m Makinda) o f African Union: c hallenges o f gl obalisation, s ecurity a nd go vernance and is currently working on two forthcoming titles on African boundaries and the African Unions peace and security architecture. Augustine O vuoronye I kelegbe obtained a P hD in P olitical S cience f rom t he University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He is a Professor of Comparative Politics and Public Policy a t t he University o f B enin a nd A djunct R esearch A ssociate P rofessor o f Conflict Studies at the C entre for Population and Environmental Development, Benin Ci ty, N igeria. H e wa s V isiting F ellow, U niversity o f W olverhampton, Wolverhampton 19992000; Visiting Fellow, the African Studies Centre, Leiden, 2004; a nd H ead o f t he D epartment o f P olitical S cience, U niversity o f B enin, 20062008. Dr Ik elegbe has researched, published and consulted extensively on resource conflicts and the roles of militias, youth and civil society in the conflicts and p olitics o f A frica. H is o ther w orks in clude Intergovernmental r elations i n Nigeria (PEFS co-authored); Oil, resource conflicts and the post conflict transition in the Niger Delta region: beyond the amnesty (CPED); and Oil, environment and resource conflicts in Nigeria (LIT Verlag forthcoming).
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About the contributors

Kasaija P hillip A puuli holds a do ctoral deg ree in I nternational L aw f rom t he University of Sussex in t he United Kingdom. He is a le cturer in t he Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Makerere University, Kampala in Uganda. He has done research for the Africa Peace Forum, the Conflict, Security and D evelopment G roup a t K ings C ollege in L ondon, a nd t he A frica S ecurity Sector N etwork o n sm all a rms a nd lig ht w eapons in U ganda, o n t he n orthern Uganda co nflict a nd o n s ecurity in t he G reat L akes r egion. H is w ork h as b een published a s b ook c hapters a nd in t he African J ournal o f I nternational A ffairs, Criminal L aw F orum, J ournal o f I nternational C riminal J ustice, Eas t A frican Journal of Human Rights and D emocracy, and Journal of Genocide Research. (Email: kasaijap@yahoo.com / pkasaija@ss.mak.ac.ug) Bettina Engels is a post-doctoral research associate at the research unit for peace and conflict studies at Freie Universitt in B erlin, Germany. She studied political science and rural development, and wrote her PhD thesis on the motives of nonstate violent actors, focusing on the Forces Nouvelles in Cte dIvoire. Her current research in terests a re en vironmental s ecurity, f ood cr ises a nd lo cal co nflict in Niger and Ethiopia. (E-mail: bettina.engels@fu-berlin.de) Eric George is the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace and lecturer in Peace, Conflict a nd D evelopment S tudies a t t he U niversidad J aume I in C astellon in Spain. H e r eceived hi s do ctorate in I nternational S tudies (P eace, C onflict a nd Development) from the Universidad Jaume I. His research focuses on peace and security issues such as piracy, private security companies and religious militancy in Africa. (E-mail: eric_george@hotmail.com) Ibaba Samuel Ibaba lectures in the Department of Political Science of the Niger Delta University on Wilberforce Island in Bayelsa State, Nigeria. He holds a PhD in Development Studies from the University of Port Harcourt. He has carried out extensive research on youth and armed non-state groups in the Niger Delta region
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of N igeria. H is w ork h as b een p ublished in t he Journal o f R esearch i n N ational Development, J ournal o f S ocial a nd P olicy I ssues, A frican J ournal o f C onflict Resolution, I nternational J ournal o f D evelopment I ssues, J ournal o f P eace a nd Conflict S tudies, a nd Nigerian J ournal o f O il a nd P olitics. (E-m ail: eminoaibaba@yahoo.com) Augustine I kelegbe lectures in t he D epartment o f P olitical S cience a nd Pu blic Administration a t t he U niversity o f B enin in B enin Ci ty in E do S tate, N igeria. (E-mail: austineikelegbe@gmail.com) Mohammed K abir I sa lectures in t he D epartment o f L ocal G overnment a nd Development Studies at Ahmadu Bello University in Z aria, Nigeria. He has more than a decades teaching and research experience in the fields of local government administration, youth studies, et hnic conflict and s ocial t ransformation. He is a member of the UNESCO-MOST Ethno-Net Africa at the University of Yaound in Cameroon and has published extensively. (E-mail: emkayisa@gmail.com) Anne K ubai is a n a ssociate p rofessor o f World C hristianity a nd I nterreligious Relations in t he D epartment of Th eology at Uppsala University in S weden. S he worked a s t he r esearch dir ector f or t he L ife a nd P eace I nstitute in U ppsala in Sweden, s enior s ocial s cientist a t t he D epartment o f Pu blic H ealth S ciences, Division o f I nternational H ealth C are R esearch (IH CAR) a t t he K arolinska Institutet in Stockholm in Sweden, and head of the Department of Religion at the Kigali I nstitute o f E ducation in R wanda. H er r esearch in terests in clude r eligion and conflict, religion and international migration, religion and health, and genderbased v iolence in p ost-conflict s ocieties a nd p ost-conflict s ocial r econstruction. (E-mail: anne.kubai@teol.uu.se) Macharia M unene is a p rofessor o f H istory a nd I nternational R elations a t t he United S tates I nternational U niversity (US IU) in N airobi. H e h as t aught a t universities in Kenya, the United States and Spain, and is a regular columnist for Business D aily in K enya a nd a m edia co mmentator o n t opical i ssues. P rofessor Munene has been consulted by Kenyas Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliamentary Committee o n D efence a nd F oreign R elations, a nd t he C onstitution o f K enya Review C ommission. H e h as p ublished w idely o n t opics r elated t o di plomatic history, African history and p olitics, p eace and conflict, Kenyan history, p olitics and foreign relations. (E-mail: gmmunene@usiu.ac.ke)
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Godfrey M M usila holds a P hD in I nternational Criminal Law and Justice from the U niversity o f t he W itwatersrand in J ohannesburg, S outh A frica. H e wa s a senior researcher at the International Crimes in Africa Programme of the Institute for Security Studies before taking up his current position as Director of Research with Kenyas Truth, Justice and R econciliation C ommission. He has w ritten and published w idely in t he f ields of international l aw, international cr iminal justice and transitional justice. (E-mail: musila79@gmail.com) Adams Oloo holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Delaware and is c urrently a s enior le cturer in t he D epartment o f Political S cience a nd Pu blic Administration at the University of Nairobi, Kenya. He has published articles on democratisation, leg islative a nd electoral p olitics, ci vil s ociety p olitics a nd devolution. H is c urrent r esearch in terests a re p arty p olitics, p olicy a nd s ecurity issues in Kenya. (E-mail: adams_oloo@yahoo.com) Wafula Okumu is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa. (E-mail: wafulao@hotmail.com) Paul Omach is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration a t M akerere U niversity in U ganda. H e h olds a P hD f rom t he University o f t he W itwatersrand in S outh A frica. H e wa s a N ational S ecurity Fellow a t t he I nstitute o n G lobal C onflict a nd C ooperation a t t he University o f California a nd a B arrat-Rotary V isiting R esearch F ellow a t t he S outh A frican Institute o f I nternational A ffairs in J ohannesburg. H is r esearch o n co nflict, security, t he s tate a nd in ternational r elations in A frica h as b een p ublished in t he International E ncyclopaedia o f t he S ocial S ciences, A frican A ffairs a nd South A frican Yearbook o f I nternational A ffairs, a nd a s b ook c hapters. (E-m ail: pomach@yahoo.com) Justin P earce is co mpleting hi s do ctoral s tudies in A frican S tudies a t O xford University in t he U nited K ingdom. H e i s a co ntributor t o Oxford A nalytica, a freelance j ournalist a nd co nsultant, a nd p reviously s erved a s t he B BCs Southern A frica co rrespondent. H e h as b een co nducting r esearch o n i ssues o f conflict a nd s ociety, h uman r ights a nd s ocial p olicy sin ce 2003. (E-m ail: justinpearce@yahoo.com)
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Krijn P eters is c urrently a le cturer a nd h ead o f t eaching a t t he C entre f or Development S tudies a t S wansea U niversity in W ales. H e h olds a P hD in Technology and Agrarian Development from the University of Wageningen in the Netherlands. He has been consulted by the World Bank, the European Union, the Royal I nstitute o f t he T ropics, t he S pecial C ourt f or S ierra L eone a nd n ongovernmental organisations such as Save the Children on issues related to armed conflict a nd p ost-war r econstruction. H is r esearch, f ocusing o n di sarmament, demobilisation a nd r eintegration o f ex-co mbatants, c hild s oldiers, t ransitional justice, a nd y outh m arginalisation a nd ex clusion, h as b een p ublished in b ooks, monographs a nd j ournals s uch a s International M igration, J ournal o f P eace, Conflict a nd D evelopment, a nd Cultural S urvival Q uarterly. (E-m ail: K.Peters@swansea.ac.uk) Samson S Wassara is the vice-chancellor of Western Equatoria University. He has served as the dean of the College of Social and Economic Studies and director of the C entre f or P eace a nd D evelopment S tudies a t t he U niversity o f J uba in Khartoum in S udan. H e h olds a D octorat en Dr oit, N ouveau R gime (P hD) in Public International Law (Hydro-politics and International Water Legal Regimes) from t he U niversity o f P aris XI. P rofessor W assara h as co nducted ext ensive research on peace, conflict, governance and development in Sudan. His work has been published as reports, book chapters and in t he Journal of Scientific Research of Science and Arts, Journal of Peace and Development Research, Dirasat Ifriqiyya, and African Journal of Political Science. (E-mail: samsonwassara@hotmail.com) Aleksi Y lnen is c urrently t eaching a t B ayreuth I nternational G raduate S chool of A frican S tudies. H e i s a do ctoral c andidate in t he I nternational R elations and A frican S tudies p rogramme a t t he A utonomous U niversity o f M adrid. His r esearch o n m arginalisation, ex clusion, in surgencies a nd co nflict h as been p ublished a s b ook c hapters a nd in j ournals s uch a s New P erspectives o n Political E conomy, a nd Revista d e R elaciones I nternacionales. (E-m ail: aeylonen@hotmail.com)

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Foreword
Although armed non-state groups have been major players in a lmost all African armed co nflicts sin ce 1960, a nalysis o f t heir p articipation in t hese co nflicts h as often b een limi ted t o fac tors s uch a s g reed a nd g rievance. G enerally, t here h as been a lack of a deeper analysis of the impact of these groups activities on human security and the capacity of the state to provide it. Militias, rebels and Islamist militants: human insecurity and state crises in Africa is b eing p ublished a t a cr itical m oment o f a ssessing t he cos ts o f t he ac tions o f armed n on-state g roups a nd exp loring a venues f or addr essing s ome o f t he longstanding co nflicts in w hich t hey a re in volved. I n a r eport r eleased in 2007 entitled Africas missing billions: international arms f lows and the cost of conflict, Oxfam International, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and Sa ferworld es timated t hat b etween 1990 a nd 2005, co nflicts cos t A frica US$300 billion. This is equivalent to the amount of international aid the continent received during the same period. The formation of the African Union in 2002 was influenced by the realisation that the scourge of conflicts in A frica constitutes a major impediment to the socioeconomic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability. Since then many concerted efforts have been made to minimise or eliminate these debilitating conflicts. This book is a timely contribution for a number of other reasons. First, i t i s b e b eing r eleased a t a t ime w hen a rmed n on-state g roups a re becoming increasingly involved in A frican politics, particularly during and after elections o r a s r epresentatives o f m arginalised a nd ex cluded g roups s eeking redress of their grievances. Even though militias, rebels and Islamist militants are key players in African armed conflicts, no previous studies had been conducted to determine how they directly threaten human security and the state, or to critically analyse t he va rious a pproaches t o p reventing a nd co mbating t he a ssociated threats. A rmed n on-state g roups in A frica a re q uite w idespread, m anifesting themselves in dif ferent f orms. Th e co ntributors t o t his v olume hig hlight t hese groups' different identities ranging from ethnic clan/community, religious, youth and cultural to political and economic. They also discuss the groups motivations. These va ry f rom et hnic, r eligious a nd r egional a ssertions t o co ntestations a nd
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struggles for political space and access to resources, power struggles, activities to combat crime and vigilantism. Second, the book proposes a new framework for understanding these groups. One of the intriguing findings is the fact that some of the groups have proliferated in reaction to poor state formations and stunted democratic transitions. In several instances, these groups have constituted themselves into major civil armed forces, alternative p olice o r a nti-crime f orces, s tanding et hnic, r eligious a nd r egional armies, a morphous b ands, a nd a rmed w ings o f p olitical p arties, in surgency movements and movements fighting for self-determination. In several ways, the groups are specific responses to the multiple and deep crises of the state and to the challenges of development, democratisation and governance in A frica as a r esult of centralised, patrimonial, privatised and hegemonised state power, exclusionary politics, co rruption, s tate m alformation, de-co nstitutionalism, t runcated transitions and successions, inequitable distribution and redistribution of public goods, inter-group tensions, poor leadership, and misuse and abuse of the state. Hence it is important for both researchers and practitioners to be conversant with the fact that remedies for addressing the threats of these groups do not lie solely in state responses such as military action or use of brute force by the police, but in building the capacity of states to govern well. Third, t he b ook w ill s erve a s a u seful r esource f or b oth ac ademics a nd practitioners in t he s ense t hat i t s eeks t o es tablish a t heoretical f ramework t hat links the formation and sustenance of armed non-state groups to how the state is governed and its capacity to guarantee human security. It also makes far-reaching proposals on how to effectively combat and prevent threats posed by these groups. Indeed, if A frica h as t o addr ess t he cr isis o f t he s tate a nd t he t hreats p osed t o human s ecurity b y a rmed n on-state g roups, i t w ill r equire w ell-researched information such as that contained in this volume. The ISS i s p roud t o b e a ssociated w ith t his p roject t hat a ims t o co ntribute knowledge t hat w ould b ring a bout a de eper un derstanding t o o ne o f t he m ost serious threats to human security on the continent, as it relates to its mission of generating knowledge that empowers Africa. Dr Jakkie Cilliers Executive Director Institute for Security Studies

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List of tables
Table 11: Types of militia in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Table 12: Types of rebel movements in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Table 13: Comparisons of militias, Islamist militants and rebel movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Table 61: Criminal gangs in Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .151

List of maps
Map 71: DRC's natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .189 Map 72: Natural resources in eastern DRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198 Map 73: Map of natural resources and conflict areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .201 Map 81: Niger Delta region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .234 Map 91: Oil exploration and conflict areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .261

Table 71: Rebel groups in the eastern DRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .194 Map 92: Rebel-controlled areas in south Sudan, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .268 Table 72: Natural resources in the DRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .197 Map 101: LRA activities, December 2008 April 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .302 Table 81: Trend of conflicts in the Niger Delta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224 Table 82: Changes in the derivation component of revenue allocation . .236 Table 83: Actors in Niger Delta conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .238 Table 91: Main rebel groups in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .263 Table 92: Main Darfur rebel factions after the Darfur Peace Agreement . .271 Table 93: Sample of militia groups according to the three regions of Southern Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .276 Map 111: Nigerian map of states with Shariah laws and principles . . . . . . .321

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

Allied Democratic Forces Alliance des Forces Dmocratiques pour la Libration du Congo-Zare Alliance of Eritrean National Forces Alliance de Forces Dmocratiques pour la Libration du Congo United States African Command Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Al-Ittihad al-Islami Acquired immunodeficiency Syndrome Arme Islamique du Salut Avtomat Kalashnikova 47 Arme pour la Libration du Rwanda Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia / A lliance for the Reliberation of Somalia AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan AMP Alliance pour la Majorit Prsidentielle ANR Arme Nationale de Rsistance ANC African National Congress ANSGs Armed non-state groups APC Arewa Peoples Congress APCP All Peoples Congress Party APRM African Peer Review Mechanism AQIM Al-Qaeda in t he Islamic M aghreb (Lorganisation A l-Qada a u Maghreb Islamique) APC All Peoples Congress APCLS Alliances des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain APRD Arme P opulaire p our l a R estauration d e l a R publique e t l a Dmocratie (Army f or t he R estoration o f t he R epublic a nd o f Democracy) ATNM Alliance Touareg du Niger et du Mali AU African Union BAMOSD Bakassi Movement for Self-Determination BOFF Biafran Organisation of Freedom Fighters
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CAR CDF CDU CNDD-FDD CNDP CNL CNT COMA CP CPA CSNPD CSOs DDR DDRR DIF/A DP DPA DRC EBA ECOMOG ECOWAS EIJ ELF EPRDF EPLF FAC FAN FARDC FARF FAR FARS FBI FDLR FDLR FDPC FERA
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ADF ADLF AENF AFD AFRICOM AFRC AIAI AIDS AIS AK-47 ALiR ALS/ARS

Central African Republic Civil Defence Force Civil Defence Unit Conseil National pour la Dfense de la Dmocratie / Forces pour la Dfense de la Dmocratie Congrs National pour la Dfense du Peuple Conseil Nationale de Libration (National Liberation Council) Concorde Nationale Tchadienne Coalition for Militant Action Conservative Party Comprehensive Peace Agreement Comit de Sursaut National de la Paix et de la Dmocratie Civil society organisations Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration Disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration Darfur Independence Front/Army Democratic Party Darfur Peace Agreement Democratic Republic of Congo Egbesu Boys of Africa Economic Community of West African States Monitoring and Observation Group Economic Community of West African States Egyptian Islamic Jihad Eritrean Liberation Front Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front Eritrea Peoples Liberation Front Forces dArmes Congolais Forces Armes du Nord Forces Armes de la Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo Forces Armes de la Rpublique Fdrale Forces Armes Rwandaises (Rwanda Armed Forces) Forces Armes Rvolutionnaires du Sahara Federal Bureau of Investigation Forces Dmocratique pour la Libration du Rwanda Forces Dmocratique pour la Libration du Rwanda Front Dmocratique du Peuple Centrafricain February 18 Revolutionary Army
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ACRONYMS

AND

ABBREVIATIONS

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FII FIPI FIS FLAA FLEC FLN FLNC FLGO FNDIC FNI FNL FNLA FPR FRELIMO FRF FROLINAT FRPI FUC G3 GIA GICM GLORIA GoSS GPP GSPC GWOT HIV HRW HSMF ICC ICG ICGLR ICJ ICL ICT ICTR
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Finnish Institute of International Affairs Front pour lIntgration et la Paix en Ituri Front Islamique du Salut Front pour la Libration de lAir et de lAzawad Frente de Libertao do Estado de Cabinda Front National de Libration (National Liberation Front) Front de Libration Nationale Congolais Forces de Libration du Grand Ouest (Forces for the Liberation of the Great West) Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities Front des Nationalistes et Intgrationnistes Forces Nationales de Libration Frente Nacional da Libertao de Angola Front Patriotique Rwandaise Frente de Libertao de Moambique Forces Rpublicaines Fdralistes Front de Libration Nationale du Tchad Forces de Rsistance Patriotique dIturi Front Uni pour le Changement Dmocratique Gewehr 3 rifle Groupes Islamiques Arms Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain Global Research in International Affairs Government of Southern Sudan Groupe Patriotique pour la Paix Groupe Salafiste pour la Prdication et le Combat Global War on Terror Human Immunodeficiency Virus Human Rights Watch Holy Spirit Mobile Forces International Criminal Court International Crisis Group International C onference o n P eace, S ecurity, D emocracy a nd Development in the Great Lakes region International Court of Justice International criminal law International Criminal Tribunals International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
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IDPs IDMC IGAD IHL IHRL IMF IMN IPF IRC JEM JIBWIS JIG JIUs KAIPTC KANU KNCHR KNYA KPA KPU LDUs LPC LRA LURD MAP MASSOB MDJT MEND MFDC MLC MK MNC MNJ MODEL MONUC MONUSCO MPCI
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Internally displaced persons Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Inter-governmental Authority on Development International Humanitarian Law International Human Rights Law International Monetary Fund Islamic Movement in Nigeria IGAD Partners Forum International Rescue Committee Justice and Equality Movement Jamaatul Izalatul Bidah Wa Ikamatus Sunnah Jihadi Islamic Group Joint integrated units Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Kenya African National Union Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Kenya National Youth Alliance Khartoum Peace Agreement Kenya Peoples Union Local defence units Liberia Peace Council Lords Resistance Army Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy Mass awareness and participation Movement for the Realisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra Mouvement pour la Dmocratie et la Justice au Tchad Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta Mouvement des Forces Dmocratiques de la Casamance Mouvement pour la Libration du Congo Umkhonto we Sizwe Mouvement National Congolais Mouvement des Nigriens pour la Justice Movement for Democracy in Liberia Mission d es N ations U nies en R publique D mocratique d u Congo Mission d e l Organisation d es N ations U nies p our l a S tabilisation en Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo Mouvement Patriotique de Cte dIvoire
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Mouvement P atriotique po ur la R estauration de la Rp ublique Centrafricaine MPRD Mouvement pour la Paix, la Reconstruction et le Dveloppement MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertao de Angola MRC Mouvement Rvolutionnaire Congolaise MSS Muslim Students Society of Nigeria Mouvement Touareg Nord Mali pour le Changement MTNMC NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Niger Delta Militant Force Squad NDMFS NDPSF Niger Delta Peoples Salvation Front NDPVF Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force NDVF Niger Delta Volunteer Force NDVS Niger Delta Volunteer Service NDV Niger Delta Vigilante NEPAD New Partnership for Africas Development NFDLF Northern Frontier District Liberation Front NGOs Non-governmental organisations NIF National Islamic Front NLMs National liberation movements NMRD National Movement for Reform and Development NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia NRA/M National Resistance Army/Movement OAU Organisation of African Unity ODM Orange Democratic Movement OLF Oromo Liberation Front ONGC Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front/Army OPC Oodua Peoples Congress PAC Pan-Africanist Congress PAIGC Partido Africano da Independncia da Guin e Cabo Verde PALIPEHUTU Parti pour la Libration du Peuple Hutu (Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People) PANAFU Pan-African Union PARECO Patriotes Rsistants Congolais PDF Popular Defence Force Peoples Democratic Party PDP PNU Party of National Unity Frente Popular de Liberacin de Segua el Hamra y Ro de Oro Polisario MPRC
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PRA PRISM PUSIC RCD RCD-ML RENAMO RFC RPF/A RPR RoC RSLMF RUD RUF SADR SAF SBU SCSL SCUD SLDF SLM/A SNA SNF SNM SPDC SPLM/A SPM SSDF SSDF SWAPO TJRC TNCs TPLF TSCTI UCDA UFDD UFDG
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Popular Resistance Army Project for the Research of Islamist Movements Parti pour lUnit et la Sauvegarde de lIntgrit du Congo Rassemblement C ongolais p our l a D mocratie (Congolese R ally for Democracy) Rassemblement C ongolais p our l a D mocratie M ouvement d e Libration Resistncia Nacional de Moambique Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement Rwanda Patriotic Front/Army (Front Patriotique Rwandais) Rassemblement Populaire Rwandaise Republic of Congo Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force Ralliement pour l`Unit et la Dmocratie Revolutionary United Front Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic Sudan Alliance Forces Small Boys Unit Special Court for Sierra Leone Socle pour le Changement, lUnit et la Dmocratie Sabaot Land Defence Force Sudan Liberation Movement/Army Somali National Alliance Somali National Front Somali National Movement Shell Petroleum Development Company Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army Somali Patriotic Movement Somali Salvation Democratic Front Southern Sudan Defence Force South West Africa Peoples Organisation Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Transnational corporations Tigray Peoples Liberation Front Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative Uganda Christian Democratic Army Union des Forces pour la Dmocratie et le Dveloppement Union des Forces Dmocratiques de Guine
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UFDN UFDR UFF UFR UIC ULIMO UNAMID UNDP UNESCO-MOST UNIMIS UNICEF UNITA UNLA UNRF UNSC UPC UPC UPDA UPDF UPLTCI UPM USGAO WKHRW WNBF WSB WSLF ZANU ZAPU ZIF ZSVS

Union des Forces pour une Guine Nouvelle Union des Forces Dmocratiques pour le Rassemblement Uganda Freedom Fighters Union des Forces Rpublicaines Union of Islamic Courts United Liberian Movement for Democracy United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur United Nations Development Programme United N ations E ducational, S cientific a nd C ultural Organisation - Management of Social Transformations United Nations Mission in the Sudan United Nations Childrens Fund Unio para a I ndependncia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) Uganda National Liberation Army Uganda National Rescue Front United Nations Security Council Uganda Peoples Congress Union des Patriotes Congolais Uganda Peoples Democratic Army Uganda Peoples Defence Force Union d es P atriotes p our l a L ibration T otale d e l a C te dIvoire Uganda Patriotic Movement United States Government Accountability Office Western Kenya Human Rights Watch West Nile Bank Front West Side Boys Western Somali Liberation Front Zimbabwe African National Union Zimbabwe African Peoples Union Zentrum fr Internationale Friedenseinstze Zamfara State Vigilante Service

C HAPTER 1

Introduction: towards conceptualisation and understanding of the threats of armed non-state groups to human security and the state in Africa
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INTRODUCTION
A m ajor p resence in t he A frican s tates i s t he m ultiplicity o f a rmed n on-state groups (ANSGs) t hat range from armed bands, vigilantes, cultist groups, private security companies, criminal bands, community/ethnic/religious/regional armies, armed wings of political parties and private armies to militias, Islamist militants and rebel groups. These groups have been key players in the political violence that has s everely un dermined h uman s ecurity a nd t he s tate c apacity n eeded t o guarantee it. Particularly militias, rebel groups and Islamist militant groups have been major actors in the ethnic, regional, religious and political conflicts, resource conflicts a nd in surgency m ovements in A lgeria, A ngola, B urundi, t he C entral African R epublic (CAR), C had, t he R epublic o f C ongo (R oC), t he D emocratic
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Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Apart from the 19 civil wars and one interstate war in 16 African countries between 1990 and 2000,1 there have been numerous internal conflicts in w hich militias, militant Islamist movements and sm aller r ebel g roups w ere in volved. Th ese a re s et o ut b y B ettina En gels (chapter 3 and appendix). The activities of these groups in national and regional conflicts have exerted a huge toll on the stability, development and security of Africa. Human insecurity has been a m ajor casualty in t erms of massive internal displacements, disruption of livelihoods, violations of human rights, heightened criminality, loss of lives and humanitarian crises. Although ANSGs h ave exi sted in A frica in t he p re-colonial, co lonial a nd immediate p ost-independence p eriods, t here h as b een a r esurgence sin ce t he 1990s, w ith g roups b eing f ormed f or di ssent, r esistance, ci vil def ence, a nd struggles f or s elf-determination, p olitical r eforms a nd r esource co ntrol. A lso notable has been the persistence and seeming entrenchment of this phenomenon in some countries such as the DRC, Somalia and Sudan. The increased incidence and activities of these ANSGs raise serious concerns about the institutionalisation of violence as a m eans of redressing grievances, its widespread u se a nd a buse b y s tate a nd n on-state ac tors, t he exp osure o f t he citizenry t o v icious v iolence, a nd t he los s o f s tate m onopoly o ver t he u se o f violence. Violence also weakens the capacity of the state to provide the res publica (particularly democracy, public security and general welfare), and an environment that a llows b asic n eeds t o b e m et. Th ese a nd t he p ossible lin kages w ith human insecurity, h umanitarian cr ises, de velopment a nd g overnance cr ises, in stability and co nflicts, a re a mong t he r easons f or a g rowing in terest in cr itically interrogating and understanding the phenomenon of ANSGs in Africa. A cr itical exa mination o f t he p henomenon o f ANSGs ra ises n umerous questions: How can we conceptualise militias, Islamic militants and rebel groups in Africa? Is it enough to regard them as groups arising from frustration, engaged in conflicts and that apply violence or merely as armed civil organisations with a high propensity for violence? From what perspectives can we seek explanations? How do g roup iden tities, s ocial dep rivation, r esource co mpetition, e lite manipulations, t he p roblem o f t he y outh, e conomic de cline, p oor p olitical leadership a nd g overnance cr ises co ntribute t o t he un derstanding o f t he phenomenon? H ow do w e dif ferentiate b etween mi litias a nd in surgents, r ebel
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groups and ext remist r eligious m ovements? How do t hese g roups sustain themselves? How do t hese groups undermine both human security and the state capacity to provide it? How are these groups dealt with at different levels, ranging from lo cal t o in ternational? Thi s b ook i s a n a ttempt t o a nswer s ome o f t hese questions. Particularly, the book seeks to analyse and understand ANSGs a s institutions of s truggle, o pposition, r esistance a nd v iolence in A frican p olitics; a s p art o f a broad and larger politics of the struggles by identity groups and counter-elite for power a nd r esources a nd h ow t hese s truggles a re m ediated b y t he s tate, r uling classes, p olitical e lite, ci vil s ociety, n eighbouring co untries, a nd in ternational organisations a nd ac tors. Th e b ook f urther in vestigates h ow ANSGs a re transformed from civil struggle groups into militant and violent movements and how t hey a re t ransformed in to n on-violent p olitical ac tors. Fin ally, t he b ook makes a concerted effort to provide knowledge that could inform policy related to ANSGs in Africa. This book is composed of case studies that utilise multidisciplinary approaches and co ncepts, a nalytical f rameworks a nd p erspectives dra wn m ainly f rom t he social s ciences a nd h umanities. Th e s pecific c ase s tudies dra w o n hi storical, cultural, s patial a nd r elated co ntexts, a nd o n co ntemporary de velopments (incidences a nd ac tual o ccurrences, p erceptions a nd a ttitudes). B eyond t he enunciated q uestions a nd co ncerns, t he w ork cr itically in terrogates t he phenomenon of ANSGs in Africa, particularly the narratives of grievances and the discourse of struggles, the philosophical and ideological platforms of mobilisation, and the interfaces with culture and religion as well as international law. The b ook hig hlights t he g rowing r ole o f ANSGs in t he p olitical a nd socioeconomic landscape and the conflicts in Africa and their growing use of arms and violence, which traditionally were the monopoly of the state. The work also identifies t he interfaces b etween t he state, t he nature of governance and p olitics with t he emergence, ac tivities and methods of ANSGs a s well as w ith how t hey impact on the multiple crises of the state, governance and development in Africa. Further, the impact of ANSGs activities and engagements is examined, as well as the effect of internal conflicts, insurgencies and civil wars on human security and progress in A frica. Th e b ook co ncludes w ith a cr itical lo ok a t t he n ature a nd effectiveness of responses at the local, state, regional and international levels to the ANSG ac tivities a nd p osits a s et o f p olicy p roposals t hat h ave im plications f or conflict resolution and peace-building efforts.
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This chapter captures the major findings of the contributors in nin e sections. The first section is an overview of the three types of ANSGs militias, rebels and Islamist mi litants t hat f orm t he m ain t opic o f t his s tudy. Th e s econd s ection contextualises ANSGs in Africa. The third to fifth sections explore the social bases of militias and rebel movements, the causality and sustainment of armed conflicts and ANSGs a nd the nexuses between ANSGs, p ower, politics and violence. The sixth a nd s eventh s ections a re exp oss o f h ow ANSGs t hreaten human s ecurity and undermine the state in A frica. The last two s ections focus on the emerging regional d ynamics a nd ra mifications o f ANSG ac tivities, a nd dra w s ome conclusions.

MILITIAS, REBEL MOVEMENTS AND ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS IN AFRICA: CONCEPTS AND TYPES Militias
A mi litia i s a n a rmed f orce o f o rdinary p ersons o r, a s Z ahar p uts i t, an a rmed faction engaged in combat or fighting or that resorts to violence to attain certain objectives.2 This presupposes f irst t hat it i s a ci vil f orce or a p rivately organised group of armed persons and second that it is largely an informally organised force whose s tructures, hiera rchies, co mmands, p rocedures a nd p rocesses a re u sually not fixed and rigid. Third, it is generally mobilised voluntarily on the basis of some common identity challenges or general concerns and threats. Drawing o n c haracterisation b y Z ahar, o ne c an iden tify t he es sential characteristics o f mi litias a s ir regular f orces (o utside r egular mi litary f orces), informal (n ot u sually f ormal s tate mi litaries o r p aramilitaries), p rivate f orces (established and commanded by private persons), illegal (not sanctioned by law), illegitimate (e ven t hough t hey m ay b e adjuncts of or connected t o regimes a nd recognised p olitical g roups) a nd c landestine (s upport, f unding, a rms a nd management are often secret and outside the public view).3 The purpose or goals of militias usually relate to projecting or protecting, and fighting for and defending certain private, g roup, communal, et hnic, religious, s ectional, regional, national, regime o r r elated in terests t hat m ay co ncern p ower a nd r esource s truggles, security and safety. Historically, t he mi litia i s a n o rganisation o f lo cal def ence s ervice o r d uty, which acts in response to challenges of war, disaster and security. In the advanced
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Western countries, the militia was either a reserve army or an emergency force of the p aramilitary t ype t hat wa s es tablished b y a g overnment o r co mmunities. Militias of the resistance, rebellion, liberation and self-defence persuasion existed in Europe and America until the mid-20th century in co untries such as France, during the World War II German occupation, and Austria, after World War I. The reserve, special duty or emergency paramilitary type is the quintessential militia identified b y G odfrey M usila (c hapter 4), w ho ado pts a s tate-centrist a nd lega l conception of militia as an extension, and volunteer corps, of a regular army that conforms to the law. The m ore co ntemporary f orm, p articularly in A frica, i s t hat o f sm all a nd mobile bands, usually youths, who are voluntarily and selectively recruited, poorly trained and moderately armed, and organised to respond to immediate challenges that may be national, regional, sectional, ethnic, religious and communal and that may relate to issues of power, resources, self-determination, freedom, insurgency or co unterinsurgency. Th ey m ay b e f ormed b y r etired o r c urrent s ecurity personnel o r b y t hose w ith t he r elevant t raining a nd exp erience, a nd u sually revolve a round cer tain p rominent co mmanders o r wa rlords. Th ey a re o ften militant w ings o r e ven a rmed w ings o f s ome ci vil a gitation o r s truggles, s elfdetermination movements, political parties, or informal armed wings of factions of the ruling class and political elite. There are essentially two forms of militias in history: statist and non-statist or private militias. State militias are paramilitary formations that organise in defence of the political order and proxies set up or cultivated as adjuncts of state power and w hich f ight f or, o n b ehalf o f o r a t t he b ehest o f t he s tate a nd s tate functionaries.4 Each o f t hese c an b e c ategorised in to o ne o f t hree t ypes: quasimilitary o r p aramilitary mi litias, g overnment mi litias a nd s tate-patronised militias.5 The quasimilitary or paramilitary militia is constructed as the populist, largescale, p eriodic, s hort-term co mplement t o a s tanding a rmy in n eighbourhoods, communities and provinces of countries w here t he standard army i s n ot w idely present a nd ac tive. I t i s a p art-time, a uxiliary a nd r eserve mi litary f orce w ith occasional d uties t hat i s es tablished f or p articular p ublic p urposes a nd p eculiar circumstances s uch a s em ergencies, di sasters, in ternal co nflicts a nd wa r a nd consists of those who are by law available for call-up or service. As a public force
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constituted by law, its mobilisation, organisation, training, discipline, equipment, funding and deployment are regulated by the state. The reserve militia and the less formally organised state militias and alternative forces that existed in Europe and America b etween t he 17t h a nd 19t h cen turies f it in to t his m ould. Th e m odern version is the reserve army and standby forces of some states.6 State or regime militias are civil armed groups constituted by governments to combat cer tain t hreats o r s ecurity si tuations. Th e mi litia m ay b e a f ormal quasimilitary organisation or a privately armed group of a top government leader. The former may be remunerated and equipped with public funds but its existence and sustainment is tied to a particular regime rather than constitutional provisions and en actments. P residential, p alace o r p rivate s ecurity gu ards a re exa mples o f non-military armed forces.7 There a re g overnment m obilised, p atronised, s upported a nd gu aranteed private mi litias o f co mmunities, et hnic g roups, wa rlords, y ouths a nd p olitical movements. Here governments may directly or surreptitiously make use of militias on the basis of utility and expedience and may discreetly fund, equip and protect a mi litia g roup for purposes of cr ime control and counterinsurgency. In Sudan, Liberia, Cte dIvoire and the DRC, governments have legitimised, supported or patronised some militia groups.8 In Sudan, the el-Bashir government has used the Janjaweed militias to fight rebel groups in the Darfur region. In Cte dIvoire the government has used the Jeunes Patriotes (Young Patriots) in the civil war to target northerners, immigrants and the French.9 Non-state mi litias a re p rivately o rganised a rmed ci tizen g roups, u sually constituted b y v olunteers r ecruited f rom lo cal a reas, n eighbourhoods, communities and provinces. Such militias sometimes support the state and state causes and wars, but more often are engaged in s ectional and primordial causes. The non-state militias may take the form of political, community, ethnic, regional and youth militias. Political militias are private armies of pro-regime strongmen or armed wings of political parties, sociopolitical movements and sometimes civil groups, that are sometimes m obilised t o m aintain in ternal o rder, co mbat o pposing g roups a nd perform cer tain c landestine p olitical r oles s uch a s co mmitting o r co untering electoral a nd p olitical v iolence.10 Examples a re t he Mambas, C obras, Z olou and Ninja militias in the civil strife and power struggles in the RoC during the 1990s.
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Community, et hnic a nd r egional mi litias a re a rmed g roups m obilised a long identity lin es a nd co nstitute iden tity-based lo cal a rmies o r f oot s oldiers o f primordial co ncerns. I n co nflict-ridden, cr ime-infested a nd in secure environments, citizens are sometimes constituted into local armed organisations, usually b y co mmunity, et hnic a nd r egional c hieftains o r en trepreneurs, in response to certain common threats and enemies. In the eastern DRC there are a multiplicity o f et hnic mi litias s uch a s t he Mouvement R volutionnaire C ongolais (Congolese Revolutionary Movement, MRC) in the Ituri region, the Mai-Mai, the Interahamwe, t he Union d es P atriotes C ongolais (Union o f C ongolese P atriots, UPC) a nd t he L endu. I n K enya, et hnic mi litias in clude t he Rift Valley K alenjin Warriors, M ungiki, Ch inkororo, A machuma, J eshi l a K ayole and Sa baot L and Defence Force (SLDF). Youth mi litias a re a rmed g roups t hat m ay c ut acr oss co mmunities, et hnic groups and regions, but are composed mainly of youths driven by opposition to, rebellion a nd resistance a gainst s tate p olicies a nd practices, e lite b ehaviour, a nd national a nd r egional p roblems a nd co nditions. Warlord mi litias a re sm all-arm bands a nd c ult g roups t hat a re co nstructed a round in dividual mi litant le aders. They may be part of larger groups, but usually tend to freelance and are available for diverse commercial violence and may be involved in resource plundering and criminal violence. Apart f rom t he a bove c ategories, mi litias c an a lso b e c lassified u sing o ther variables. F or exa mple, t he co re r easons f or t he mi litia g roup f ormation co uld underpin i ts s tructure, r oles, d ynamics a nd m ethods a nd t herefore o ne co uld categorise mi litias in t erms o f o bjectives o r p urposes. Th us t here a re p olitical militias, in surgent mi litias, v igilante mi litias a nd s elf-determination mi litias. Insurgent mi litias a re f ormed t o r esist s tate p olitics, p olicies a nd p ractices a nd particularly i ssues o f m arginality, co rruption a nd r epression t hrough a rmed insurrection. G overnments o r r uling e lites m ay a lso f orm o r s ponsor counterinsurgent militias to silence or intimidate opponents of governments in the form of individuals, groups, political parties or insurgent rebels. Vigilante militias can em erge f rom a rmed a nti-crime a nd s ecurity co ntrol ef forts, a nd t hen sometimes t ransform t hemselves in to in surgent o r co unterinsurgent g roups. Criminal mi litia g roups a re a rmed b andits t hat en gage in cr iminal ac ts s uch a s piracy, extortion, kidnapping and political intimidation. One c an f urther dif ferentiate mi litias b y t heir s ocial b ase, a ge a nd iden tity (ethnic, regional and religious). In terms of the breadth or extent of mobilisation
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Table 11: Types of militia in Africa

Types State militias Reserve army / auxiliaries of national armies Governmentsupported/ -patronised Goals Complement state militaries Counterinsurgency Cases National Guard (Nigeria)

community-, et hnic- a nd y outh-based. Th e Kamajor militias in S ierra L eone, though ini tially f ormed a nd s upervised b y g overnment o fficials, b ecame a grassroots p opular co mmunity m ovement o rganised, s upported a nd e ven sponsored by community leaders and members.11 The Interahamwe in Rwanda was both a state militia and an ethnic militia.

Popular Defence Force / Janjaweed (Sudan) Kamajor (Sierra Leone) Fifth Brigade (Zimbabwe) Arrow Group (Uganda) Jeunes Patriotes (Cte dIvoire) Mambas, Cobras and Ninjas (RoC)

Rebel movements
Rebel m ovements a re o rganisations t hat es sentially en gage in a rmed o pposition and resistance, and p articularly insurrection or insurgency against governments and ruling regimes. It is the latter that defines the movement as rebel or creates the rebel t ag. A s H arbom a nd W allensteen n ote, r ebel m ovements a re a rmed opposition o r in surgent o rganisations t hat a re in compatible w ith, di sagree w ith and c hallenge exi sting n ational g overnments.12 The cen tral g oal o f a r ebel movement i s c hange in t erms o f di splacement a nd r eplacement o f exi sting governments, the change of existing f rameworks to enable their participation in and p ossibly co ntrol o f g overnments, t he de volution o f a uthority t o g rant autonomy t o r egional g overnments o r t he r edesign o r r edrawing o f n ational boundaries to grant separate existence to some regional or ethnic homeland. The co ncepts o f r ebel a nd r ebellion a re ac tually r elative a s t hey a re m erely labels that are based on perceptions and opinion. Further, the designations ignore the other side that is being violently challenged, usually the government or regime, in terms of character, legality and legitimacy. There are different types of rebel movements.13 The liberation rebel movement resists co lonisation a nd f oreign r ule a nd s eeks in dependence, w hereas t he insurgent r ebel m ovement s eeks p olitical c hange a nd p olitical p ower. A s Thompson n otes, in surgent m ovements a re co mmitted t o t he n ation-state, b ut seek to overthrow the existing state and replace it with a new political order and to build alternative political authority.14 The separatist, secessionist or irredentist rebel m ovement s eeks a s eparate exi stence f rom a n exi sting co untry o r h as secessionist o bjectives. Th e r eformist r ebel m ovement s eeks t o es tablish a n ew political system based on an ideology such as communism. Warlord insurgencies are closely knit groups built around leaders that seek to overthrow regimes/regime leaders but create personal territorial fiefdoms.15 Rebel m ovements t hat h ave b een en gaged in li beration s truggles a gainst colonial a nd f oreign do mination in clude t he Mau Ma u (Kenya), Front d e Libration N ationale (National L iberation F ront, FLN A lgeria), Movimento
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Nonstate/ private militias

Political militias

Political objectives Struggle for political domination Identity rights Struggle for inclusion, resources and justice

Community/ ethnic militias

Egbesu/Oduduwa Peoples Congress (Nigeria) Mungiki (Kenya) Militias under Southern Defence Force (Sudan) Interahamwe (Rwanda) Niger Delta Volunteer Force / Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (Nigeria) Bakassi Boys (Nigeria) Armed bands and cult groups in the Niger Delta (Nigeria)

Youth militias

Identity Resource access Insurgency Security Crime control Struggle for power and resources Commercial violence

Vigilante militias Warlord militias

Source: compiled by authors.

and recruitment, there can also be social movement or broad-based militias and warlord-based militias. There i s co nsiderable f luidity in co louration a nd r oles a nd in fac t mi litias could, and do, wear different tags at different times. Community, ethnic and youth militias, for example, could b e insurgent or counterinsurgent, p olitical and progovernment o r e ven v igilante mi litias. Vigilante mi litias co uld b ecome p olitical and p ro-government mi litias a nd cr iminal mi litias co uld h ave p olitical o r e ven insurgent m otives. C ounter-insurgent a nd s tatist mi litias co uld a lso b e
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Table 12: Types of rebel movements in Africa

Rebel movements Purpose Liberation movements Decolonisation Independence from foreign government Oppression Exploitative foreign rule Insurgent rebel movements Resistance Reform struggles Overthrow of regimes/ governments Marginalisation Exclusion Ethnic and regional hegemony Misgovernance Armed wing of political movement Separatist rebel movements Autonomy Self-existence Islamist rebel movements Islamic law/rule

Grievance narrative

Ethnic/regional marginalisation

Unbelief Corruption of Islamic practices and rules of governance Fundamentalist Puritan Reform

Organisation

Popular movements driven by militant nationalist organisations Nationalist and liberation ideals

Ethnoregional movements

Ideology

Political programmes/ arrangements of inclusion/reform Excluded politicians/youths/ opposition Guerrilla warfare Pitched battles from controlled territories National Redemption Front/Army (Sudan) Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone) Lords Resistance Army (Uganda) Militant ethnoregional leaders Guerrilla warfare Pitched battles from controlled territories Rebel groups in Sudan, Mali, Nigeria (1967 1970), Senegal, Ethiopia

Political Islam

Leadership

Militant nationalist leaders Guerrilla warfare Pitched battles from controlled territories Mau Mau (Kenya) African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (GuineaBissau) African National Congress (South Africa)

Militant Islamic leaders Bloody protest Riots Terror attacks Guerrilla warfare Armed religious groups in Algeria, Somalia

Dominant methods of engagement Examples

Source: Compiled by authors.

Popular de Liberteo de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA A ngola), Frente de L ibertao de M oambique (Liberation F ront o f Mozambique, FRELIM O M ozambique), S outh W est A frica P eoples Organisation (SWAPO N amibia), Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Z imbabwe A frican P eoples U nion (Z APU) (Z imbabwe), Partido A fricano para a Independncia da Guin e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of G uinea a nd C ape V erde, P AIGC C ape V erde) a nd t he A frican N ational Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC South Africa). Some of the liberation movements, for example t he Unio para a I ndependncia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA), as Pearce notes in c hapter 13, s tarted a s li beration m ovements a nd t hen b ecame r eform insurgencies, w hile t he Resistncia N acional d e M oambique (Mozambican National Resistance, RENAMO) was a r eform insurgency. B oth had elements of warlordism, however. A di stinguishing f eature o f t he li beration m ovement a s di scussed b y Musila (chapter 4), i s t hat i t i s r ecognised in in ternational l aw a nd s ubject t o i t. S ome insurgent rebel movements grew out of grievances and agitation associated with identity-based ex clusion a nd a lienation b y co rrupt a nd a utocratic r egimes t hat abused a nd r epressed t he o pposition a nd m arginalised g roups. A ccording t o Clapham the earliest versions of this group are anti-colonial insurgencies that grew out o f g rievances a gainst r epressive a nd exp loitative co lonial p olicies a nd practices.16 Anti-colonial g rievances un derpinned in surgency m ovements in Ethiopia (Er itrea P eoples L iberation F ront, EPLF) a nd A lgeria (t he Front d e Libration Nationale, FLN). Post-colonial insurgencies have occurred in, among others, Uganda (National Resistance A rmy, NR A), C had (Forces A rmes d u N ord / A rmed F orces o f t he North, F AN), E thiopia (E thiopian P eoples R evolutionary D emocratic F ront, EPRDF) a nd t he D RC ( Alliance d es Forces D mocratiques p our l a L ibration d u Congo-Zare / A lliance of D emocratic Forces for t he L iberation of C ongo/Zaire, ADLF).17 In Burundi, rebel groups such as the Conseil National pour la Dfense de la Dmocratie / Forces pour la Dfense de la Dmocratie (National Council for the Defence of Democracy / Forces for the Defence of Democracy, CNDD-FDD) and the Forces Nationales de Libration (National Forces of Liberation, FNL), formerly known as the Parti pour la Libration du Peuple Hutu (Party for the Liberation of the H utu P eople, P ALIPEHUTU), h ave f ought a gainst m arginalisation b y t he Tutsis in t he government and military for over a de cade. In Chad, the Union d es Forces p our l a D mocratie e t l e D veloppement (Union of Forces for D emocracy
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and D evelopment, UFDD) has b een f ighting government forces in t he e ast in a struggle to topple the government of Idriss Deby. Ugandas Lords Resistance Army (LRA) i s p erhaps o ne o f t he o ldest r ebel m ovements in A frica a nd t he m ost regionalised. It has been fighting the Museveni government for over two decades. Bad g overnance b ased o n et hnic a nd r egional h egemonic r ule, m arginalisation and exclusion, fermented separatist rebel movements such as the Sudan Peoples Liberation M ovement/Army (S PLM/A) in S outhern S udan a nd t he EP LF in Ethiopia. Th e Tuareg r ebellion in t he n orthern p arts o f M ali, N iger a nd S outh Algeria seeks an Azawad independent state. In the Casamance region of Senegal, the Mouvement d es F orces D mocratiques d e l a C asamance (Movement o f Democratic Forces of Casamance, MFDC) has been waging a s elf-determination struggle sin ce t he 1980s. I n E thiopia, a s eparatist g roup, t he Ogaden N ational Liberation Front (ONLF), is fighting the Ethiopian government for the control of the oil- and gas-rich Ogaden region.

Table 13: Comparisons of militias, Islamist militants and rebel movements

Militias Goals Limited sociopolitical goals and more specific local/community/ethnic issues Armed religious groups Rebel movements Clear religious objectives such as Islamic basis and reform of the state/ government Religious and sociopolitical grievances Clear and larger sociopolitical goals such as change of governments and secession Larger political grievances and struggles for power and access to resources

Motivation Identity-based sociopolitical grievances and challenges with a mix of opportunism Scope and Small groups constructed size around commanders/ leaders Operate in limited geographic space in dispersed small enclaves Generally do not hold territories Methods Armed protests, violent attacks and guerrilla warfare, but often may not hold territory Low-intensity conflicts Engage security agents, rival militias and perceived enemies/ enemy groups

Larger groups founded on Islamic leaderships and cells that operate among the population

Larger groups constructed as fighting units that operate in or seek extensive territorial control

Militant Islamist groups

Militant Islamist groups are a reflection of the resurgence of political Islam, radical Islamism a nd t he g lobal jihad. Th e g roups, acco rding t o K abir (c hapter 11) manifest t hemselves in p olitically ext remist f orms o f v iolent r esistance a nd dissidence against regimes, policies and society branded as impious, unIslamic, or tainted by modernising and Western influences. George and Ylnen (chapter 12) as w ell a s K abir (c hapter 11) iden tify s everal o f t hese g roups in E gypt, A lgeria, Morocco a nd N igeria, s uch a s al-Jihad, t he Arme I slamique du S alut (AIS), Groupe Salafiste pour la Prdication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC),19 Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Boko Haram and Taleban. In Somalia, religious militias such as the Al-Ittihad al-Islami (Union of Islamic Courts, UIC), Al-Shabaab and ahlu Sun na, which co ntrol m ost o f t he co untryside, h ave f or several years made the country ungovernable.20 The strategy of militant Islamist groups to target Westerners, Western allies and Western interests has earned them membership on the terrorist list compiled by the US State Department. Because of their perceived links to the global jihad, al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, these groups h ave dra wn k een in terest f rom W estern s ecurity in stitutions s uch a s AFRICOM. The chapters by Kubai, Kabir, George and Ylonen provide an African perspective for understanding these groups and propose far-reaching measures of addressing the threats that they pose to the state and human security.
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Violent protests and attacks

Larger-scale organised fighting through guerrilla and conventional warfare from controlled territories Intensive conflicts against the government/progovernment groups and military over extensive territory Full-scale war Larger social basis, which may comprise identity/ non-identity and youths May conscript child soldiers and women Extensive toll collections Imposed levies Extensive resource exploitation/plundering/ trading

Engagements/ targets

Violent attacks against civil population and security agencies, perceived infidels and deviant religious groups

Social base Community and ethnic groups and youths Rarely spread beyond identity territorial base Rarely conscript Funding Local extortions/levies/ tolls Low-level resource plundering Local and ethnic elite funding

Religious and youth volunteers

Tolls/levies/taxes Elite funding External support

Source: compiled by authors.

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The nature and character of ANSGs in Africa

Most ANSGs a re ei ther un structured o r lo osely s tructured hiera rchical organisations, whose members, usually between a h undred and some thousands, are trained in the use of modern light weapons by retired and disengaged military, police a nd o ther s ecurity a gencies. Th eir a rsenal u sually co mprises t raditional weapons, assault rifles (the most popular being the AK-47), machine guns, rocketpropelled grenades, bazookas, hand grenades and explosives. ANSGs have a variety of characteristics and peculiarities. Some have been well organised, co hesive a nd di sciplined, w ith a c lear hiera rchy a nd co mmand a nd control s tructures, c losely k nit ce lls, w ell-coordinated sys tems, s trict r ules a nd decentralised o perations. S ome h ave c lear o bjectives, a s trong ide ological foundation, p olitical e ducation a nd a f ramework o f r ules a nd r egulations t hat guides operations and behaviour of followers as well as visionary, clear-headed and effective leaderships who weld the groups together, and inspire and sustain them. Among these are the NRA in Uganda and the EPLF in Eritrea. Clapham has noted that groups exhibiting these organisational and leadership characteristics were able to achieve success in the battlefield, a fair level of governance in the territories they controlled, p ositive r elations w ith co mmunities a nd lo cal p eople a nd e ventually attained their objectives.21 However, the majority of ANSGs are disorganised and undisciplined with loose control over operations a nd ac tivities, p oor le adership, organisational problems, control and co mmand p roblems and factional fighting, a nd are p rone t o fragmentation o r f racturing in to di verse a rmed b ands. Th ese p roblems o ften manifest in cr iminal ac tivities, v iolent inf ighting, in discriminate a nd g ratuitous violence, exp loitation a nd a buse o f lo cal co mmunities, f orceful co nscription o f children, abuse of drugs and plundering of community resources. In A frica m any ANSGs des cend f rom in surgency a nd o ther r esistance a nd sociopolitical o bjectives into cr iminal and s everely des tructive m ovements. Thi s has been evident in ANSG ac tivities in L iberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC, the RoC, Uganda, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and Nigeria. A critical question then is, how and why has this transformation taken place? The internal dynamics and behaviour of ANSGs could be explained by factors such as the levels of training, ideological leanings, dedication to goals, the quality of leadership, the nature of relations with host communities, the nature of threats faced and the nature of the environment.22 Zahar asserts that militia membership, objectives, s tructures a nd r esource b ase det ermine t he n ature o f mi litia-civil
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relations, t reatment of communities and civilians and b ehaviour.23 Militias t hat are well-structured and organised with regard to chains of command and control, sanctions p rocesses a nd di scipline a re a ble t o enf orce s tandards o f co nduct, attribute r esponsibility, de velop enf orcement a nd r etribution m echanisms a nd ensure co mpliance w ith r ules. Th ese c haracteristics en sure di sciplined f orces, reasonable conduct, control of operations and better relations with communities.24 Peters (c hapter 14) n otes t hat ANSG r elations w ith co mmunities a nd t o s ome extent t heir le vel o f s uccess in a ttaining a ims, dep end o n t he exi stence o f a meaningful ideology that attracts combatants and non-combatants, a lo w risk to communities because of the conduct of fighters and a low level of predation on or exploitation of communities. Exemplary le adership a nd t he le vel o f e ducation, a nd t hus k nowledge a nd personal c apacity o f t he le adership, a re a lso cr ucial. C lapham n otes t hat uneducated insurgent leaders such as Foday Sankoh of the Revolutionary United Front (R UF) a nd J oseph K ony o f t he LR A w ere un able t o create di sciplined movements with clearly defined political projects.25 The environment in which ANSGs operate determines specific organisational structures, strategies, operations and behaviours of members. For example, there exist more brutal methods of social control and more disjuncture in a spirations, values a nd g oals in a symmetrical en vironments. P eters (c hapter 14) p oints o ut that ANSGs that are challenged by unfavourable environments, such as restriction to jungle camps in in accessible forests as in t he case of the RUF in S ierra Leone, and s parsely p opulated v illages a s in t he c ase o f t he LR A in U ganda, r esort t o forced conscriptions, abductions, forced labour, harsh punishments for escapees, confiscation o f m aterials a nd de adly r eprisals. ANSGs t hat h ave in dependent economic r esources o r t hat h ave sy mbiotic ra ther t han p arasitic o r p redatory economic relations with locals and who depend on locals for critical support, tend to show greater concern for and sensitivity to locals.26 Insurgent movements that operate in unfamiliar areas and among unfriendly communities usually use brutal methods t o p revent co nspiracy a nd b etrayal.27 Groups t hat s eek in clusion, acceptance, recognition and legitimacy from national, regional and international audiences and actors tend towards more moderate behaviour and relations with inhabitants of the controlled territories.28

The social bases of militias and rebel movements

The p articipation in ANSGs i s do minated b y f oot s oldiers w ho a re m ale a nd young, un employed a nd un deremployed, s chool dr opouts o r p oorly e ducated,
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apprentices, artisans, street urchins and the urban and rural poor. They are largely marginalised, a lienated a nd f rustrated y ouths, w hose a spirations h ave b een blocked a nd w ho a re o ften s ubmerged in m oral cr ises, s ocially di slocated a nd suffer material hardship and misery. George and Ylnen (chapter 12) a nd Kabir (chapter 11) a rgue t hat a lienated, f rustrated a nd di senchanted y ouths, w ho a re mostly urban and unemployed, together with poverty, are at the root of militant Islamist groups. Adams Oloo (chapter 6) lo cates the social base of the militias in Kenya in t he lower class, among the unemployed youths, artisans, small traders, landless squatters, street children, hawkers, urban poor and slum dwellers. Marginalised and alienated youths such as the Moryham youths in Somalia, the Raray boys in Sierra Leone, Bayaye in Kenya and Uganda, Machicha in Tanzania, Hittiste in Algeria, Tsotsis in S outh Africa, Area Boys in L agos and Yan D aba in Kano, Nigeria, have made up the core membership of several ANSGs.29 In Nigeria, the O odua P eoples C ongress (O PC) a ttracted a rtisans, t raders, un employed, peasants and the underclass in the densely populated areas of Lagos. However, at the t op e chelons o f m any mi litias a nd r ebel m ovements a re a s prinkling o f educated and partly educated elements and activists who provide intellectual and general le adership, r elate t o o r li aise w ith t he o utside w orld a nd, in p articular, speak for the groups. This has been especially the case with the ethnic militias in Nigeria.30 The p lace o f w omen in ANSGs h as b een n eglected in t he li terature. Furthermore, w omen h ave o n t he w hole b een p resented m erely a s v ictims. B ut they perform important roles, such as carrying fetish items, ferrying arms, acting as spies or informants and providing such services as cooking, social welfare and health care. Women also act as local moderators of behaviour and peace-builders. They also act as a moderating influence, and in the Niger Delta resource conflicts, for exa mple, co mmunity w omen g roups h ave s ought t o r estrain y outh v iolence and h ave p rotested t he ef fects o f v iolence o n t heir co mmunities, li velihoods, children and local economies.31 Although Alice Lakwena remains the most famous rebel leader in recent times, rebel groups such as ONLF, EPLF and RPF are known to have women in their rank and file. As far as identity is concerned, ANSGs t end to share identity commonalities such as community, ethnicity, region and religion. Even when ANSGs have broad membership o r a p an-identity s pread, t hey b egin w ith a co re iden tity a nd m ay have identity-based structures at a subgroup and cell level. As Peters notes (chapter 14), the point of entry and initial base of mobilisation and recruitment in ANSGs and insurgencies are often marginalised and oppressed ethnic groups, such as the
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Mano a nd G io g roups in C harles T aylors N ational P atriotic F ront o f L iberia (NPFL), and the Mende ethnic group in Foday Sankohs RUF in Sierra Leone. At the early stages of development, membership is mainly voluntary and based on identity patriotism, mobilisation and solidarity and particularly the depth of feelings about perceived identity-based grievances.32 In some cases recruitment is restrained by space, arms and maintenance resources. However, as engagements broaden a nd co nfrontations b ecome m ore ext ensive a nd s tressful, a nd a s t hey begin t o los e co ntact w ith co mmunities, ANSGs m ay t urn t o co nscription a nd forced recruitment from within and outside their identity base. Juveniles, young girls and children are sometimes captured, conscripted and used as fighters, spies, ordnance carriers, sex slaves and cannon fodder. In Sierra Leone, drugs were used to psy chologically p repare m embers f or ac tion.33 Examples o f c hild r ebel subgroups in clude C harles Taylors Small B oys Unit (SBU), t he Gronna B oys in Liberia, Musevenis Kidogos in Uganda,34 and the Green Bombers in Zimbabwe.35 The u se o f c hild r ebels i s q uite p revalent in A frica. I n A ngola f or exa mple, about 8 000 children registered for demobilisation in 2002, while in Mozambique there w ere a bout 300 000 c hildren u sed d uring t he wa r.36 The r ecruitment a nd circulation o f y ouths a nd c hild r ebels acr oss b orders w ere m ain f eatures o f t he conflict in t he M ano R iver a nd C te d Ivoire. Th ey w ere r ecruited f rom C te dIvoire into Liberia, from Liberia into Sierra Leone and Cte dIvoire, and from Guinea into Cte dIvoire.37 In northern Uganda, the LRA abducted or forcefully conscripted more than 60 000 y ouths, mainly young adolescents between 13 and 15 years of age. The LRA, like other rebel groups, prefers child rebels because of their n et b enefits in t erms o f in doctrination a nd ef fectiveness.38 Children a nd youths also form almost half of the militias and rebels in the DRC. As at February 2007, a bout 54 000 c hildren h ad b een di sarmed a nd dem obilised co mpared t o 115 000 adult combatants, while an estimated 15 000 20 000 children compared to 85 000 adults were awaiting demobilisation.39 ANSGs also draw members from migrants and fighters across borders. Bettina Engels (c hapter 3) in troduces t he co ncepts o f r egional r ecruits (mig rants) a nd regional warriors (recruited fighters) to explore this phenomenon and asserts that most ANSGs are regionally embedded. In West Africa, there has been a high level of m obility o f f ighters acr oss b orders b etween co untries s uch a s L iberia, S ierra Leone and Cte dIvoire.
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CAUSALITY AND SUSTAINMENT OF ARMED CONFLICTS AND ANSG s

Several explanatory perspectives and findings can be used to decipher the issues of causality and sustainment of armed conflicts and ANSGs in A frica. The point of dep arture f or a n a nalysis i s a n exa mination o f a nalytical p erspectives t hat provide exp lanations f or co nflict, b ecause ANSGs g row o ut o f m obilisations, collective actions and engagements in intense conflict situations.

Between grievances and opportunism

Perhaps t he m ost p opular exp lanation in r ecent t imes i s t he grievance v ersus greed discourse. The former predicates causality or conflict initiation or onset on grievances and the drive for redress or justice around issues.40 The latter predicates incentives for conflicts and rebellion on struggles over resource appropriation and control o pportunities a nd s pecifically t he s truggle f or lo otable r esources. Thi s discourse is highlighted in t he chapters by Kasaija, Wassara, Ibaba and Ikelegbe, and Kabir. According to Collier and Hoeffler, most rebellions are either pure loot-seeking or combine justice-seeking and loot-seeking.41 In the latter, grievances could be a start-up m otivation f or v iable m obilisation, b ut g roups t urn t o lo oting f or sustainment and p redation. Thus g rievance i s m erely a starting p oint, a justificatory a nd leg itimising n arrative a nd a s upport-building a nd -m obilising platform for conflicts and ANSGs. Though grievances exist and are articulated as a platform for agitation, it is merely a short-term smokescreen for larger and longterm interests and objectives of resource appropriation.42 The later works of C ollier and Sambanis push t he issue of t he availability of lootable resources or extortable economic rents beyond mere motivation to that of opportunities that make rebellion profitable.43 As Elbadawi and Sambanis have found, there is a positive and significant association between natural resources and violent co nflicts a nd ci vil wa rs, w ith r esources p roviding o pportunities a nd convenient sources of support for rebels.44 Resources are not only strongly linked to b oth g rievance and g reed-based conflicts, but are more dif ficult to terminate and tend to have shorter term post conflict peace durations.45 Thus grievance and greed tend to have a symbiotic relationship with rebellion. To get started, rebellion needs grievance, whereas to be sustained, it needs greed.46
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The thesis is based on evidence of the association between mineral wealth and the o ccurrence a nd d uration o f co nflicts; t he exi stence o f v iolent s crambles f or resources in conflict regions; the concentration of conflicts in resource-rich zones of co nflict r egions; t he p rofiteering f rom wa r a nd co nflicts b y r ulers, wa rlords, traders a nd f ighters; t he hig h le vels o f e conomic cr imes a nd un derground economies; t he involvement of m ercantilists, sy ndicates a nd b lack m arketeering companies in r esource-rich zo nes o f co nflict r egions, a nd t he in terference o f neighbouring co untries t hat t end t o b e m otivated b y s truggles f or p rivileged resource access. However, in spite of some evidence from the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone and the D RC, t he g reed t hesis i s sim plistic, o ne-sided a nd w eak in s everal r espects. First, the larger issues such as the character of the state, regimes and governance, hegemonic struggles, the roles of politics and state failures and economic decline on which the causation and dynamics of civil wars are situated, are neglected in this t hesis. S econd, a s em erging e vidence s uggests, t he en gagement in ANSG activities, violence and terrorism is not simply the result of the motives of people with a low level of education and low market opportunities, but a complex matrix of issues such as ideology, identity, localised and mundane reasons and personal motivations s uch a s h ate, v engeance a nd p restige.47 Third, t he t hesis ig nores conflict histories and exonerates regimes and governments from greed. Alao and Olonisakin h ave n oted t hat t he g reed a nalysis t ends t o a pply a broad b rush explanation t hat ig nores co mplex s ociopolitical i ssues a nd p olitical m otivations that are at the root of many contemporary civil wars.48 For example, while focusing only o n t he r ebel-based c auses o f co nflict a nd v iolence, t he t hesis ig nores t he corruption, n eo-patrimony, ex clusion a nd m arginalisation t hat c haracterise distributive politics, as well as the repression, abuses and legitimacy problems of regimes. Besides, t o a rgue t hat g rievances a re m ere s hort-term, j ustificatory a nd mobilisation p latforms t hat a re a p relude t o o pportunism a nd lo oting i s n ot realistic. I n s everal co untries in A frica, g rievances a re g enuine a nd do s erve t o mobilise g roups in o rder t o ac tualise iden tity g oals. Th e Egbesu militias in t he Niger D elta, f or exa mple, hin ge o n g rievances a bout a n et hnic min ority s tatus associated w ith m arginalisation, n egative ext ernalities o f o il exp loitation, developmental n eglect, e conomic dep rivation, in equitable r esource f low, un just laws and repression.49 Ikelegbe has noted that greed or economic opportunism in this instance is not causal to the conflict and the militias, but is an aspect that arose almost two decades later and unfortunately hijacked some of the militia groups.50
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In fact, Guichaoua has noted that the greed-based analysis is ahistorical and not co mprehensive.51 Mkandawire h as f urther p ointed o ut t hat in s pite o f t he catalogue of cases usually packaged as evidence of greed in Africas resource wars, nowhere in A frica h as a b and o f cr iminals g rown in to a r ebel m ovement.52 Therefore a m ore co mprehensive a nalytical p erspective h as t o b e s ought a nd applied in the analysis of conflict and ANSG causality.

a decisive factor in the creation and use of tribal militias. In chapter 8, Ibaba and Ikelegbe state that oil theft syndicates in the Niger Delta armed, funded and used militias as guards and were instrumental in turning the militias into opportunistic, criminal and resource-theft elements.

Identity crisis
Identity a nd iden tity-based di visions a nd m obilisations a long et hnic lin es, a s Elbadawi and Sambanis have noted, is positively, robustly and non-monotonically associated w ith t he p robability o f wa r.56 Many A frican co untries a re de eply divided, p olarised a nd f ractionalised a long et hnic, lin guistic, r eligious, r egional and s ectional lin es. A s n oted in m any o f t he c hapters, s truggles a gainst marginality, ex clusion a nd r epression h ave p rovided p latforms f or ANSG emergence and activities in s uch countries as Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, Mali, Ethiopia and Cte dIvoire. Often a sieg e m entality i s co nstructed a round t he iden tity g roup, w hich becomes t he basis of ac tions for survival and other struggles. Militants t hen are fighters o f t he identity c ause a nd interests a nd gu arantors o f t he identity g roup survival in the face of perceived threats. This is why ANSGs are often the informal, protection, defending or offensive agent of sub-national groups. In Burundi, rebels based in t he m ajority et hnic Hutu f ought ex clusion a nd m arginalisation b y t he Tutsis, w ho co nstitute a bout 15 p er cent o f t he p opulation. I n n orthern M ali, a Tuareg r ebellion dr iven b y et hnic a nd I slamic in surgents a nd b ased o n et hnic marginalisation a nd de velopmental n eglect, p ursued r egional a utonomy a nd a n Azawad in dependent s tate f or t he Tuareg p opulation t hrough h ostilities a gainst the Malian government. Indeed, the issues of marginalisation and discrimination against ethnic, religious and regional groups resonate in m ost of the case studies and particularly those on Kenya, Nigeria and Sudan.

The struggle for resources

The r esource co mpetition m odel si tuates co nflicts in t he m obilisation, organisation and collective actions in pursuance of valued resources, particularly where iden tity i s a ssociated w ith c lear ad vantages in r esource di stribution a nd benefits.53 However, though the politics and competition for resources are present in iden tity-based m obilisation a nd t hus co uld es calate di sputes in to co nflicts,54 conflicts are not pervasively and proportionally related to inequalities of resource endowment and distribution.55 Rather, co nflicts a nd ANSG ac tivities a re r ooted in t he cr isis o f r esource management and distribution, and especially the issues of who owns, controls and benefits f rom t he e conomy o f n atural r esources. P articularly, g rievances a nd rebellion are fermented in the struggles for access to resources by diverse claimants t he s tate, et hnic g roups, r egions, co mmunities, p olitical e lites, fac tions o f t he ruling c lass, n eighbouring co untries a nd in ternational b usiness g roups a nd syndicates. It is therefore not surprising that most of the resource-rich regions in Africa, s uch a s A ngola, L iberia, S ierra L eone, N igeria, t he D RC, t he R oC, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Mali, the CAR, Sudan and Ethiopia have been embroiled in conflicts and ANSG activities. In m ost o f t hese r egions, r ebels, mi litias, r enegade s oldiers a nd in tervening countries h ave exp loited a nd t raded in min erals t hrough minin g o perations, extortion, taxes and sharing schemes with miners and traders. A co mbination of forces, w hich in cludes t ransnational co mpanies, in ternational b lack m arket a nd underground syndicates, states in the region and even host governments, supports and sustains regimes and the ANSGs and accordingly conflicts in resource plunder and t rading in A fricas r esource-rich r egions. Wassara (c hapter 9) n otes t hat in Sudan, tribal militias and Sudanese military forces burned villages and killed or forced in digenous p opulations a way f rom o il-rich l and, t o m ake wa y f or o il companies and oil exploration. He notes that the desire to control oilfields became
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The state and governance crises

The state-centred thesis places causality in the nature, character and behaviour of the s tate, t he u se t o w hich i t i s p ut a nd t he n ature o f i ts p olitics. B eing l arge, bloated, authoritarian, repressive, v iolent and r un by neo-patrimonial networks, the post-colonial state is an instrument of domination, exploitation, subordination and exclusion. Y et, its poor c apacity, leg itimacy and g overnance r ender i t ineffective, irrelevant and susceptible to challenge. The post-colonial state spawns
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politics that make violence a prime means of engagement and resistance, just as its proneness to excessive coercion and abusive violence constructs a v icious terrain for v iolent c hallenges.57 Further, t he p ost-colonial s tates p rovoke w hat C lapham calls reactive des peration b y b locking a ll a venues o f ci vil a nd p eaceful engagements a nd c hange, a nd t he political a spirations o f m arginalised g roups, alienated elite and opposition groups.58 As Norlen has found, political variables especially political marginalisation are important in inf luencing the probability of observing a wa r event and inevitably engender secessionist ethno-territorial conflicts.59 This is particularly true where differences in m odernisation a nd de velopment, en suing di sparities a nd inequalities a nd co nsequent t ensions a nd di sagreements a mong g roups a re reinforced by ethnic and regional hegemony.60 Ikelegbe (chapter 5) a sserts that profound, extensive and prolonged state and governance cr ises, a nd p articularly t he in cidence o f w eak a nd f ragile s tates in Africa, have generated growing inequalities, mass social discontent and alienation, violent a nd mi litarised p olitics, e conomic de cline, de epening iden tity di visions, social service and governance vacuums, extra-constitutional actions, challenges of state authority, conflicts and the phenomenon of the ANSG. Paradoxically, while creating a f ertile g round for ANSGs, t he A frican states and governance systems have become a major casualty of ANSG activities. George and Ylnen (chapter 12) and Kabir (chapter 11) have also found that corrupt and impious regimes, despised government a nd p olitical e lites, s tate fa ilures t o p rovide cr itical n eeds a nd opportunities, a nd s tate w ithdrawal f rom im poverished n eighbourhoods a nd slums, h ave lef t vac ant s paces t hat h ave p rovided o pportunities f or mi litant Islamist groups to mobilise poor, marginalised and vulnerable groups.

The elites further hijack conflict situations for personal interests. Chabal and Daloz h ave n oted t hat politicians b ent o n a sserting t hemselves, l atch o n t o legitimate p opular g rievances a nd di ssatisfaction a nd s ometimes cr iminalise political conflicts and deploy criminal terror.64 In chapter 6, O loo asserts that the militia p henomenon in K enya c an b e p artly attributed t o t he m anipulation a nd mobilisation o f y ouths b elonging t o p olitical p arties a nd o f urb an y ouths in general b y p olitical e lites. I n t he N iger D elta, mi litancy a nd t he h eightening o f militia ac tivities h ave b een p artly f ounded on p olitical e lite p ower s truggles. As Ibaba and Ikelegbe note in chapter 8, the political elite hire, arm and use militant youths and militias to intimidate opponents and perpetuate electoral abuses and violence.

Economic decline and social ferment

In their chapters, Ikelegbe, Ibaba and Ikelegbe, Oloo, Omach, Kabir and Wassara highlight t he r elationship b etween t he p henomenon o f ANSGs a nd e conomic decline, de epening p overty, un employment, j ob los ses, s ocial de cay, co llapse o f social services, urban congestion and decay, decline of social welfare, rising school dropout le vels, w idespread s ocial h ardships a nd mi sery, de clining r eal in comes and r ising cos ts. Th ese co nditions h ave f ermented a s ocial di scontent in m any African countries since the 1980s that has radicalised the youth and turned them into a massive youth and urban under-class that is available for mobilisation and recruitment for diverse projects. In these circumstances violence and involvement in ANSG ac tivities a re in s ome wa ys a s trong p rotest a gainst s ociety, a v iable survival alternative and a form of employment.65 As many of the case studies show, unemployment, p overty, co llapsed inf rastructure a nd s ervices, co llapsed aspirations, lack of opportunities, social crises and scarcity created by economic decline have created a l arge population of frustrated and vulnerable youths who are a menable t o di verse m obilisations a nd recruitment by t he ANSGs a nd e ven government counterinsurgency forces.

Elite construction
Elite m anipulation i s a m ajor fac tor in co mmunity and et hnic conflicts and t he funding, r ecruitment, a rming a nd co ntrol o f mi litant m ovements.61 In s everal instances, a s p ointed o ut in t he c hapters b y O loo (c hapter 6) a nd Ib aba a nd Ikelegbe (c hapter 8), ANSGs a re f ormed f or in tra-elite p ower a nd r esource struggles a nd t o in timidate p olitical r ivals a nd o pponents. I n N igeria, et hnic, regional a nd p olitical e lites h ave b een m ajor fac tors in t he f ormation, f unding, arming, protection and use of diverse armed bands, ethnic and political militias and cult groups.62 In examining political militias in Kenya, Oloo came to the same conclusion as Reno, namely that there are numerous informal linkages between armed opposition groups and elite political networks.63
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The youth problem

Another k ey f inding b y En gels, K ubai, O loo, K abir, Ib aba a nd Ik elegbe i s t hat youths have been the dominant base of recruitment and participation in ANSGs. This f inding mir rors t hat of Abdullah and Muana, w ho p oint out t hat in S ierra
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Leone, youths who were unemployed, poorly educated, school dropouts, or drug addicts who exhibited antisocial behaviour, social disaffection and rebelliousness, were cr itical p articipants in ANSGs. 66 It i s not dif ficult to understand t he youth dominance in conflicts and ANSG activities, because of the youth bulge and the ease with which they can be recruited, indoctrinated and utilised for violence, as well as manipulated and mobilised for diverse purposes. This is actually a question of s ocial vu lnerability. E conomically dimini shed employment opportunities a nd rising impoverishment create disaffection, a lienation and unr uliness, w hich f uel crime, violence and rebellion. As Ikelegbe notes, these conditions have turned the youth o n s ociety in o utrage, def iance, s ubversion a nd r esistance a nd cr eated a youth culture with elements of nihilism, fatalism, deviance, populism, resentment, impunity and violence.67 To t he y outh, p articipation in co nflicts a nd v iolence ac tually r epresents a n expression o f p ower a nd s earch f or r ecognition a nd iden tity, a m eans o f registering dissent and frustration, and of challenging the practices and conduct of state officials and local elites.68 Reno has also noted that some youths in ANSGs seek p ersonal opportunity and s afety with insurgents.69 The youth has t herefore been victims and agents, or rather objects and subjects, of the diverse conflicts in Africa.

Conflicts and ANSGs activities have largely contributed to the smuggling and proliferation of and the propensity to use guns in p olitical violence and criminal activities. Africa has become a d umping ground for light weapons manufactured in Western and Eastern Europe and purchased from former conflict regions across the world. It was estimated that in 2004, o f the 500 mi llion illicit weapons in t he world, 100 million were in sub-Saharan Africa and 8 10 million in West Africa.73 Indeed, t he p roliferation o f lig ht w eapons, a s t he EC OWAS C onvention o n Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons74 of October 1998 has rightly stated, is a major destabilising factor and a major threat to the peace and security in Africa.75

Religion, culture and traditions

While historical and cultural orientations as well as heritage and religious deities and practices do n ot per se generate conflicts and violence, they could constitute the f ramework o f di sposition a nd j udgement a nd w hat i s accep table a nd sanctioned o r r ejected a nd v ilified, a s w ell a s s ome un derlying p rinciples o f organisation and strength. In chapter 2, Anne Kubai argues that there are histories of violent resistance to oppressive and exploitative rule in certain societies, which have been used to mobilise modern resistance to state domination and exclusion. The heroic past of rebellion has become a predisposition to armed resistance. This, according to Kabir (chapter 11) and Ibaba and Ikelegbe (chapter 8), is manifest in Islamist mi litancy in n orthern Nigeria and among s ome minority g roups of t he Niger D elta, w here a hi story o f v iolent wa rs a gainst co lonial m ercantilist displacement in the palm oil trade and gun boat diplomacy predisposed the people to r esistance a gainst s tate a ppropriation o f t heir o il a nd ga s r esources a nd marginalisation in the oil economy. Some r itualistic a nd r eligious-cultural p ractices h ave t ended t o s upport ANSGs activities. Several ANSGs in S ierra Leone, Nigeria and Kenya have been associated w ith fetish items, initiation into c ults, t he worship or consultation of deities of war and justice, the invocation of invincibility, wearing of amulets and related symbols and practices, which are used to identify, motivate and strengthen the w ill o f t he f ighters. K ubai (c hapter 2) a sserts t hat t he o ath t akings, r ituals, sacrifices, in ductions in to s ecret s ocieties a nd ac ts o f t raditional w orship t hat symbolise a r eturn t o A frican c ulture a nd a r e-traditionalisation o f s ociety a re
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Globalisation and arms proliferation

Another key factor fuelling ANSG activities is the ready availability of weapons. It is quite common to see in African armed conflicts images of young men proudly brandishing AK-47 r ifles a nd o ther s ophisticated w eapons. A ccording t o Ib aba and Ikelegbe, the easy access to and supply of arms to ANSGs a re critical to the onset and sustainment of violent conflicts. Furthermore, Michael Klare argues that small a rms a vailability faci litates co nflict ini tiation a nd in tensification.70 Small arms can further be a status symbol and means of expressing power that attract the youth t o r esistance m ovements a nd cr ime.71 Small a rms p roliferation h as b een linked directly to violence in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria.72 In many of the conflict regions there is a sizeable arms flow from other conflict regions and arms smuggling and trafficking across borders and along the coast, as well as on the high seas and in international waters. The theft, smuggling and sale of minerals and o il r esources h ave p rovided a bundant f unds f or t he acq uisition o f a rms in resource-rich regions.
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actually n ot o nly f orms o f exp ression o f di ssent b ut p rovide ide ological a nd structural platforms for mobilisation and legitimisation. Oloo, in c hapter 6, add s that in the case of the SLDF, charms and oaths bound members to a common cause and were said to give them mystic protection that imbued them with supernatural powers and made them invincible. In a m ore co ntemporary s ense, t here h as em erged in A frica n ew, g lobalised perceptions and conceptions of living, livelihoods, lifestyles and s ocial relations, particularly among the youth, in which domination, control, impunity, perversion, abuse, cr ime and violence are associated with p eer acceptance, p ower, inf luence and s ocial m obility. I t i s t hese n ew c ultures t hat p rize t he p hysical ex ercise o f power, machismo, nihilism and narratives of suppression and abuse, and promote and acco mmodate t he s ocial a nd cr iminal v iolence, s treet cr ime, b anditry a nd cultism to which many youths have been drawn and which constitute some broad framework for recruitment to ANSGs.

POWER POLITICS, VIOLENCE AND THE PHENOMENON OF ANSGs The struggles for power
A key f inding of t his b ook is t hat t he ANSG p henomenon c an b e lin ked to t he struggles for power through the groups affiliations to some larger political groups, in b oth t he g overnment a nd o pposition, o n b ehalf o f w hich t hey ac t.80 The phenomenon s ometimes r eflects t he co nstruction o f a lternative p aths t o t he acquisition of power and means to claim political and economic rights. This is why there i s a l arge p articipation in ANSGs ac tivities b y p ersons w ho h ave los t confidence in p ublic institutions, are disgruntled and discontented with existing power configurations and patrimonial networks, and who feel disadvantaged and precluded from existing pathways to power.81 According to Ikelegbe (chapter 5), ANSGs flow from the nature of politics, the dynamics of power and its challenges, and particularly the politics of violence and the v iolence in p olitics t hat do minate t he A frican p olitical l andscape. Th e phenomenon is further rooted in t he politics of the zero-sum game, and the cutthroat pursuit for control of t he s tate t hat utilises a ll m eans available, in cluding fanning co mmunity, c lan, et hnic, r eligious a nd r egional acr imony. Thi s i s w hy some o f t he ANSGs in s everal co untries de veloped f rom t he y outh w ings o f political p arties, s upport g roups o f e lectoral c andidates, a nd o utfits f ormed t o intimidate opponents during election campaigns. With time, as Oloo (chapter 6) and Ib aba and Ik elegbe (c hapter 8) point o ut, t he g roups b ecame m ore autonomous agents of violence and mayhem. This is what happened in the case of some cult and militia groups in the Niger Delta in Nigeria since the 2003 elections and of the community bands and political militias in Kenya since the multiparty elections of 1992. The ANSG p henomenon is also a r esponse from below, albeit a mi litant and violent one. It represents an extreme response to and challenge of persisting group inequality a nd m arginality, a s w ell a s di ssent, r evolt a nd r esistance t o exi sting structures and systems of power and governance. It is a p latform constructed by marginalised persons who are deeply aggrieved and desperate enough to engage in armed en gagements a s ei ther a r esistance o r co unterforce. I t m ay t herefore b e viewed a s t he only in strument available t o t he f rustrated, en dangered, ex cluded and repressed victims of state power and identity hegemony. According to Justin Pearce (chapter 13), quoting Vines, this is indeed what happened in Mozambique,
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Motivations and sustaining factors

With regard to what motivates the ANSGs and what keeps them fighting, Herbst has iden tified e conomic in centives, p olitical in doctrination, et hnic m obilisation and co ercion.76 On t heir own and in co mbination, t hese variables constitute t he nucleus o f t he r ecruitment p latforms o f m ost ANSGs. A s C ollier, H oeffler a nd Sderbom note, while greed fuels onset and initiation, the prolonged conflicts and wars t end t o b e un derpinned b y et hnic, r eligious a nd r egional h eterogeneity o r diversity and particularly identity polarisation and fractionalisation.77 Beyond the ethnic basis, in the cases of political rebellion and conflicts and particularly those that h ave a n ide ological le aning, i s p olitical in doctrination. Th e s truggles f or independence by movements in Z imbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Equatorial Guinea, and to some extent the rebel movements in Uganda and Sierra Leone, contained elements of political indoctrination that were sometimes tinged with s ocialism. H owever, m ost r ebel m ovements in A frica h ave n ot b een ideologically oriented, and some claims to this effect were merely disjointed and haphazard thoughts provided by half-baked ideologues.78 The existence of a positive perception of rebellion, or predisposing conditions for successful rebellion, is f urthermore cr ucial for achievement of its objectives. These co nditions in clude t he p resence o f c harismatic le aders, t he a vailability o f funds and the weakness of state military and security agencies.79
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where RENAMO drew its support from the aggrieved and discontented who saw it as an alternative method of taking power. In fact, Osaghae et al, drawing on Tarrow and Medearis, posit that conflict and the ANSG p henomenon em erge f rom a nd a re f ounded o n s ocial m ovements engaged in contentious collective action.82 These movements, which are the main channels o f exp ression o f di sadvantaged, m arginal a nd o pposition g roups a nd ordinary p eople in co untries w ith do minant p ower s tructures a nd p owerful regimes a nd s tates, b ecome radic alised a nd mi litant b ecause of t he s tates proneness to repressive violence, constriction of the opportunities and space for effective p olitical ac tion a nd s tructuring of t heir s trategies t owards v iolent contentions. A n ANSG m ay t hen b e a f orm o f s truggle o f a b road m ovement rooted in s ociopolitical t ensions a nd di visions a nd co nstructed a round p opular grievances a nd a spirations, a nd t he m obilisation a nd co ntestation f or p olitical space, r esources, s tate r eforms a nd c hange. I n N igeria, f or exa mple, t he E gbesu militia g roups a re a nchored in a y outh m ovement, w hile t he O PC mi litia i s a n armed, o rganised a nd et hnically b ased m ass m ovement dem anding s elf determination.83

The dialectics of violence

Ikelegbe (c hapter 5), O loo (c hapter 6) a nd K abir (c hapter 11) a rgue t hat t he activities o f s ome r egimes, p olitical e lites a nd ANSGs h ave ra ised v iolence in Africa to a new level, by making it the main vehicle for furthering the objectives of acquiring p ower, acc umulating r esources a nd m aking r esource c laims. Violence has been reconstructed as a highly prized commodity that is associated with power and resources. Regime, political elite and ANSGs activities have raised the profile of violence, the importance and need to acquire, own, control and use it as well as its centrality to the diverse power, political, economic and sociocultural struggles of African societies. Neo-patrimony, which is dominant in African politics, particularly constructs and reinforces the politics of violence. As also noted by Chabal and Daloz, patrons can access or restrain official v iolence as t hey c an count on t he lo cal p olice or military co mmander, t o p rotect t heir c lients, a nd t o t hreaten coercion a gainst competitors. Th ey f urther m aintain their o wn co rps o f a rmed m en a nd can unleash un seen mi litias t o protect c lients, counter t he v iolence o f co mpetitive networks or to enforce compliance.84
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More importantly, violence has become a commodity that is sold and bought. The utility of violence as a political tool has created conflict entrepreneurs who are patronised by state officials and opposition political parties and candidates. These entrepreneurs p refer si tuations o f co nflict a nd s ocial di sorder t o o ffer t heir services in t he m uddled p olitical m arket. W hat h as b een cr eated, t hen, i s a n expansion o f t he t errain o f t error, v iolence a nd cr iminality a nd a n em ergent culture o f v iolence t hat i s em powering, e conomically p rospering a nd p olitically influential.85 It i s t he n ature of t he A frican s tate a nd le adership t hat h as m ade v iolence a factor in t he p olitical t errain. M ost p ost-colonial s tates co nstrict acces s a nd opportunities f or di alogue a nd w hen c hallenged, r eact w ith m assive f orce t hat strengthens cycles of violence when their victims react in a similar manner. Using the historical claim to monopoly of violence by state bodies, African states usually overreact to vanquish and deter future opposition challenges to their legitimacy. The terrain of politics (even legitimate struggles) has inescapably become a theatre in w hich t hose w ho w ield s tate p ower u se s tate in stitutions t o co erce t heir opponents. What h as h appened t hen i s t he em ergence o f co unter-violence a nd institutionalisation of violence as a m eans of controlling and seeking power and economic opportunities. While the ruling elite uses instruments of state violence, its r ivals a nd t hose w ho h ave b een ex cluded a nd m arginalised cr eate t heir o wn institutions o f co unter-violence. ANSGs a re p roducts o f t his c ulture o f p olitical violence, and are the instruments and platforms of counter-violence. In t he en d, A frican p olitical a rena h as g enerally b ecome a t heatre o f s tate violence versus private violence; violence of state officials and political elite versus violence o f t he a ggrieved, m arginalised a nd ex cluded; s tate-sanctioned v iolence versus v iolence o f co ntenders, c laimants, co unter-elites a nd p owerless p ersons; violence of state institutions and regime officials versus non-state institutions of violence; a nd v iolence in p ursuance o f s tate g overnance v ersus p rivate, s elfinterested and commercialised violence. Further, while ANSGs have been considerably castigated for their horrendous and a trocious v iolence, t he do minant m ainstream s cholarship, in ternational community a nd lega l sys tems h ave t rivialised n ot o nly t he s tate-orchestrated politics of violence, which conditioned ANSG methods and responses, but also the brutal counter-violence that the states have unleashed against them.
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In some instances, it was the states extreme brutality and excessive force that gave rise to the extreme counter-violence of militants and rebels. Indiscriminate and retaliatory violence, whether by the state or ANSGs, have compelled youths in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mozambique, the DRC and other countries to join militant and r ebel g roups a s a m eans o f s urvival, p rotection o f r elations a nd f ellow members of ethnic and other identity groups on the one hand, and as a means of revenge a gainst a buses a nd atrocities o n t he o ther. A s Kwesi A ning a nd A ngela McIntyre h ave n oted, g overnments li ke r ebel f orces h ave u sed f orceful recruitment strategies (including terror and abduction) in civil wars in for example Sierra Leone.86 Peters (chapter 14), Oloo (chapter 6) and Wassara (chapter 9) also note t hat s tate co unterinsurgency t actics a re s ometimes b rutal, in cluding summary ex ecutions o f f ighters a nd e ven r elatives, s acking o f co mmunities, indiscriminate killings, torture and detentions, and destruction of property.

Between functionality and dysfunctionality

ANSGs a re often dem onised a nd branded by g overnments a s b unches o f criminals, mi screants, va gabonds a nd o pportunists. Th e m ain p urpose o f s uch branding is to delegitimise the groups and deprive them of sympathy. However, we would mi ss cer tain fac ts a nd in sights if w e side line t he o rigin, o bjectives, narratives a nd d ynamics o f t he g roups a nd if w e a ssume t hat t hey a re p urely a symptom o f t he m alfunctioning o f (a nd t hreats t o) A frican s tates. Th erefore questions need to be asked about the functionality of the phenomenon. ANSGs usually seek to attain certain goals, which often pertain to a change in the status quo with regard to equity, justice, sociopolitical rights, citizenship rights and inclusion, and the issues of the national question, restructuring arrangements and s tate r eforms s uch a s de centralisation. I t o ften a lso co ncerns i ssues o f governance s uch a s corruption, collapse of s ocial s ervices and l ack of di scipline among the regime elite. Some of the issues at stake are critical to eventual progress, stability, integration and development of the African state in question. ANSGs are therefore in a s ense a form of social action defiance, opposition, challenge, resistance and protest against the form and nature of the state and how it is governed. In fact, in some ways, though regime-based labels often play down this dim ension, t he p henomenon i s a n ext reme f orm o f o pposition t o a nd challenge o f c urrent r egimes t hat r esults f rom b locked a venues f or g enuine participation and influence, the deprivation of citizenship rights and the abuse by
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state officials and institutions. According to Pearce (chapter 13), q uoting Cohen, RENAMO wa s, f or exa mple a v oice f or a va riety o f s ocial e lements a nd communities, a sort o f co alition o f m arginals, w hich h ave b een ex cluded politically a nd s ocially f rom t he s tate, f rom t he m arket a nd f rom de velopment during and even before FRELIMO came to power. In cer tain si tuations ANSGs ac tivities co uld b e s een a s t he l ast r esort f or necessary p olitical c hange, j ust a s v iolence s ometimes b ecomes accep ted a s t he only means to reform a political order with which they are dissatisfied. As Chabal and Daloz have noted, the war by the NRA against the Obote regime in Uganda and by t he attack of L aurent Kabilas forces against t he Mobutu regime in Z aire was, t o a l arge ext ent, w elcomed a s a leg itimate m eans o f p olitical c hange b y citizens.87 ANSGs may also be part of the search for alternatives; discourse or spaces for governance, and expressions of identity. It is, in a wa y, a s earch for meaning, self worth and empowerment by ordinary people. The phenomenon may therefore be at o nce b e a s uccour f or t he a lienated a nd f rustrated; a h ope f or t he p oor, underclass, deprived, unemployed and idle; an opportunity for the marginalised and ex cluded; a nd a n a venue f or t he a bused, s uppressed a nd r epressed. I t i s, further, a form of empowerment to those who have been alienated, disempowered and disenfranchised by a l ack of political and citizenship rights, political choices and actual participation.

ANSGs AND HUMAN INSECURITY IN AFRICA

The incidence of rebellions, insurrections, secessionist attempts, insurgencies and wars in e ach o f t he co nflict c lusters in w est, cen tral a nd n ortheastern/eastern Africa h as b een a ssociated w ith w idespread h uman in security a nd c atastrophic humanitarian crises. The crises in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions are currently the most serious on the continent. The culture of political violence and the p revalence o f ANSGs h ave im pacted n egatively o n m ost p olitical a nd economic sys tems in A frica, a s i llustrated b y t heir lo w ra nkings o n t he United Nations D evelopment P rogrammes (UND P) T ransparency I nternational a nd Foreign Policy indexes.88 The core areas of impact are the construction of a terrain of l awlessness, in discriminate v iolence, ext ortion, p lundering a nd cr ime; t he disruption of economies and the deepening of poverty; the generation of internal displacements, refugees and humanitarian crises; and the accentuation of state and governance crises.
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Regime of indiscriminate violence, crime and terror

In several countries the activities of ANSGs a nd government counterinsurgency organisations as well as the conduct of conflicts have caused a s evere breakdown in public law and order. There is often a r eign of harassment, intimidation, fear and terror, leading to general uncertainty. Civilians and local communities live in fear of attacks, punishments and retaliations. In the CAR, there have been reprisal attacks and m ass punishments against civilians and communities.89 Most ANSG and counterinsurgency ac tivities h ave b een c haracterised by ext ensive, arbitrary and h orrendous v iolence, p hysical a buses a nd a trocities, t orture, in discriminate killings a nd ex ecutions. R ebel m ovements li ke t he LR A a nd R UF h ave u sed brutalities such as mutilations (amputations of arms and legs, s licing off of ears, chopping off of fingers), and indiscriminate killings of civilians by hanging them from t rees a nd b urying v ictims a live in t he p resence o f h orrified cr owds, a s strategies to intimidate the population and compel governments to negotiate with them.90 With r egard t o S ierra L eone, P eters (c hapter 14) n otes t hat RUF r ebels a nd renegade soldiers raped, mutilated and burned alive hundreds, if not thousands, in their failed attempt to capture Freetown in 1998. Territories where groups such as the LRA operate are highly insecure and also prone to criminal activities such as armed robberies, assassinations, murders and rape. It is this terrible toll that makes wars in A frica s eem li ke wa rs o n ci vilians, a s t hey s uffer dir ect a nd in direct violence and loss of livelihood.91

poverty. H uman mi sery de epens w ith s oaring li ving cos ts a nd un employment. Using t he c ase o f K enya t o i llustrate hi s a rguments, A dams O loo (c hapter 6) asserts t hat t he ac tivities o f ANSGs h ave s tunted e conomic g rowth, des troyed livelihoods a nd c aused f ood in security t hrough t he c losure o f b usinesses a nd markets and the abandonment of farms.

A regime of extortion and plundering

ANSGs in co nflict situations in m ost cases engage in ac tivities such as extortion and plundering to generate resources that are used to profit their leaders and to sustain the groups activities. Usually, conflict and war economies are constructed through illegal taxes, levies and forceful contributions by workers, traders, shop owners, transporters, miners and farmers, who are forced to pay a s urcharge fee based on a n a rbitrary c alculation of t heir e arnings. L ocals a re a lso s ubjected t o forced p ayments a nd le vies f or s ervices s uch a s p rotection a nd s ecurity o f economic production, trade routes and markets. In some cases, local people are forced to pay a tax, compelled to hand over their produce or used as labourers and carriers of equipment. According to Oloo (chapter 6), mi litias in K enya have an elaborate m achinery a nd sys tem o f t ax co llection a nd ext ortion t hat in clude a route or t ransporters le vy, protection fees and le vies on shops, farms and small businesses. I n c hapter 7, K asaija a lso p rovides exa mples o f h ow g overnment soldiers, r ebels a nd mi litias in t he D RC h ave u sed methods s uch a s dir ect extraction, extortion/confiscation, taxation, and coercion of the local population to extract the minerals. In co nflict en vironments, t he g roups sim ply h elp t hemselves t o lo otable resources. Ib aba a nd Ik elegbe p oint o ut t hat s ome mi litias in t he N iger D elta region o f N igeria de veloped f rom s ecurity gu ards t o o il-theft sy ndicates t o autonomous o perators, e ach w ith a desig nated t erritory f or o perations a nd t oll collections. Rebel movements in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola and the DRC have been involved in exploitation, trading and export of resources and some have had arrangements with extractive industry companies, syndicates and smugglers. At the individual level, members of ANSGs h ave accepted violence as a f orm of employment and survival. Oloo and Kabir point out that the youth in povertystricken areas are attracted to ANSGs, w hich can support distorted lifestyles that are sustained through looting, extortion, smuggling and other illegal activities.
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Socio-economic disruptions and deepening poverty

ANSG activities mainly disrupt socioeconomic systems, and destroy property and food stores through looting and burning. This strategy to undermine the state also aims at disrupting commerce and agriculture, creating unemployment and causing food in security. I n g eneral, h uman in security i s exp erienced t hrough s piralling living cos ts, s evere s carcities, w idespread h unger a nd mi sery in m ost co nflict regions. The di sruption o f p roductive ac tivities a nd co mmerce, t he f orceful appropriation of private properties and the resultant effects on living conditions, availability o f g oods a nd s ervices a nd in comes p roduce de ep a nd w idespread
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Internal displacement, refugee and humanitarian crises

Overall, ANSG a nd co unterinsurgency ac tivities h ave c aused c atastrophic humanitarian crises through widespread infrastructural devastation, and massive dislocations and losses of human life. ANSGs activities and government responses have f orced lo cal p eople t o f lee t heir h omes w ith f ew p ersonal b elongings t o forests, g overnment- o r r ebel-held a reas, a nd b order r egions o f n eighbouring countries. In Sierra Leone, about half of the population was displaced within six years of t he RUF rebellion.92 All over t he conflict zones in A frica, huge internal displacements a nd r efugee c amps do t t he b order r egions o f co untries c lose t o conflict epicentres. LRA activities in Uganda, Sudan, the CAR and the DRC have resulted in a h umanitarian cr isis in t he r egion b y di splacing o ver t wo mi llion people. P eters co nfirms in c hapter 14 t hat b oth ANSG a nd g overnment counterinsurgency activities have caused huge humanitarian crises. He notes that in U ganda, f or exa mple, ci vilians h ave b een f orced in to in ternally di splaced persons c amps b y t he g overnment o r f orced t o f lee v illages b ecause o f LR A o r government attacks and confrontations. These camps have also been attacked by both ANSGs and government troops or government-supported militias. In Rwanda, the ANSGs are held partly responsible for triggering violence that claimed about 800 000 persons in 1994. In Sierra Leone, about 300 000 people died in t he f irst six y ears o f t he co nflict t hat s tarted in 1991. 93 In A ngolas r enewed fighting between the government and UNITA rebels in 1992, about 400 000 people were killed, 1,5 mi llion were displaced and 330 000 b ecame refugees. In the 16year ci vil wa r in M ozambique, a bout t hree mi llion p eople w ere in ternally displaced a nd o ver 1 mi llion t ook r efuge in M alawi a nd o ther n eighbouring countries, w hile in t he Er itreaEthiopia wa r, a bout 1,5 mi llion p eople w ere displaced.94 Kabir (c hapter 11) p oints o ut t hat in n ortheastern N igeria, confrontations b etween s ecurity a gencies a nd t he Boko H aram in July 2009 lef t over 750 p eople de ad a nd o ver 5 000 di splaced. I n c hapter 6, O loo c laims t hat SLDF ac tivities in K enya r esulted in a bout 615 de aths a nd 66 000 in ternally displaced persons. In general, armed conflicts in A frica have claimed millions of lives and destroyed properties worth billions of dollars over the past 40 years.

ANSGs, STATE WEAKNESS AND COLLAPSE

Ikelegbe (c hapter 5) a nd W assara (c hapter 9) p oint o ut t hat o ne o f t he e arly casualties in conflict situations plagued by ANSG activities is the weakening of the
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state capacity to provide public safety and security to the population. As conflict intensifies, the state becomes incapable of providing security as a public good due to t he dep loyment o f t he s ecurity r esources t o p rotect t he in terests o f t he governing e lite, u sually co ncentrated in t he c apital ci ty. Th e v iolent m ethods employed t o c lamp do wn o n ANSG ac tivities a lso w eaken i ts r elations w ith civilians, some of whom sympathise with ANSGs or provide them with food and intelligence (s ee c hapter 14). M ilitias a nd r ebels u sually r eact t o g overnments heavy-handed responses by targeting infrastructure that serves the public, which further w eakens t he g overnment a nd a lienates i t f rom t he p opulation. A s government officials flee, government facilities and services such as schools and health care are abandoned and a power vacuum is created that attracts militias and rebels t o f ill i t. Th e un governed o r mi sgoverned s paces t hat em erge a re characterised b y a H obbesian s tate o f n ature: b rutality, in solence, impunity a nd mayhem. While s tate g overnments h ave t o s ome ext ent co ntributed t o t he g rowth o f ANSG ac tivities in A frica, t hey h ave a lso b een o ne o f t he m ajor v ictims o f t he conflicts that accompany these activities. Many governments in countries such as the CAR, Chad, Cte dIvoire, the DRC and Sudan have been seriously weakened and r endered in capable o f m anaging co nflicts, p roviding s ocial s ervices a nd asserting t heir s overeignty o ver t heir t erritories. K asaija (c hapter 7), Ib aba a nd Ikelegbe (chapter 8) a nd Kabir (chapter 11) a rgue that ANSGs t ake advantage of weak and fragile states such as the DRC and Nigeria. Others that collapsed at some point, through the activities of ANSGs, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia, became havens in which ANSGs and anarchical conditions flourished. In countries such as the DRC, ANSG ac tivities have accelerated state decline and exposed its weaknesses with regard to the provision of human security. State fragility i s u sually dem onstrated in i ts s ecurity a pparatuses l ack o f di scipline, tendency t o lo oting, ex cessive u se o f f orce, in discriminate v iolence a nd retaliations, operational deficiencies and combat failures vis--vis ANSG t hreats. The behaviour of state security apparatuses has contributed to regime collapses in Uganda (M ilton O bote / T ito O kello), S ierra L eone ( Joseph M omoh), L iberia (Samuel Doe), the DRC (Mobutu Sese Seko), Rwanda (Juvnal Habyarimana), and Ethiopia (Mengistu Haile Mariam). Some rebel movements that gained more legitimacy due to effective leadership and o rganisation accen tuated t he co llapses o f r egimes. I nstability a nd p olitical crises have also dogged countries such as Burundi, the CAR, Chad, the RoC, Cte dIvoire, t he D RC, N igeria, U ganda, S omalia a nd S udan t hat h ave h ad ac tive
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militia and rebel groups, some operating for decades without being vanquished by government forces.

Impact and ramifications of ANSGs on regional and international dynamics

The impact of ANSG ac tivities is felt far beyond the borders of the states within which t hey o riginated. ANSGs h ave r egionalised h uman in security a nd p ose serious challenges to regional mechanisms for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. Regional trends that dovetail with ANSG activities include humanitarian crises, human rights violations and use of violence as a tool for conflict resolution. As M unene (c hapter 15) a nd O kumu a nd Ik elegbe (c hapter 16) p oint o ut, addressing ANSGs r equires a pproaches t hat in clude r egional m echanisms, a s national measures are constricted by international boundaries. Using the concept of a r egional co nflict co mplex, P aul Om ach (c hapter 10) iden tifies t he cen tral characteristics o f r egionalisation in t he G reat L akes r egion a s, a mong o thers, military, economic, social and political linkages and networks, the movement of ANSGs acr oss b orders, t he ext ensions o f t he f rontiers o f f ighting, in ter-state, multinational a nd in ternational in terventions t hrough, a mong o thers, mi litary support and brokerage of agreements, and security interdependence. There is a growing regionalisation of ANSG activities and operations in terms of cross-border operations, the recruitment of personnel/members across borders, counterinsurgency o perations acr oss b orders, mi litary in terventions a nd operations w ithin o ther s tates a nd co llaborative a nd j oint mi litary o perations between states to contain ANSGs. 95 ANSGs are increasingly t ransforming into a major source of interstate conflicts. In fact, the major difference in t he activities and operations of ANSGs in t he last two decades has been their transborder and transnational o perations. ANSG-o rchestrated in trastate co nflicts a re c hanging into interstate di sputes o r r egional co nflicts. For exa mple, t he ac tivities o f r ebel groups struggling for independence in Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa attracted the involvement not only of states in the region but also of the apartheid regime in S outh Africa, which carried out transborder raids and destabilisation ac tivities in t he s tates t hat p rovided s anctuary t o t he f reedom fighters.96 ANSG ac tivities a nd s tate r esponses in t he D RC, U ganda a nd S udan h ave resulted in mi litary operations across the borders by, among others, Uganda into Sudan; joint military operations between Uganda, the DRC and Sudan to contain
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the LRA; incursions of Uganda, Rwanda and Angola into Zaire, and interventions of Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Angola in t he DRC (see chapters by Kasaija, Omach a nd W assara). S ome g overnments h ave u sed r ebels a s in struments o f foreign policy, as in the case of Sudan, which has supported the LRA in retaliation of the Museveni governments backing of the SPLA. The Rwandan and Ugandan governments have supported rebel groups in t he DRC, apart from sending their forces to pursue rebel g roups using t he DRC as operational b ases. According to Kasaija (chapter 7), these countries have had a hand in the founding, arming and assisting rebel groups such as the MLC (Uganda) and the CNDP (Rwanda) in the DRC. Regionalisation o f ANSGs a nd mi litary in trusions o r in terventions s uch a s Rwandas, Burundis and Ugandas support of rebels in the DRC and Angolas and Zimbabwes support of the DRC government were often resource motivated. These interventions h ave b een acco mpanied b y r esource exp loitation b y a gents a nd government-authorised companies from Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe.97 Kasaija co rroborates t his in c hapter 7, n oting t hat t he co untries involved in supporting either rebels or government have helped themselves to the countrys mineral resources, while Munene (chapter 15) states that countries that intervened in the DRC became large exporters of minerals that were not produced in their countries. In other situations, too, neighbouring countries have benefited from t he i llegal exploitation and t heft of and t rading in r esources. In t he S ierra Leone a nd L iberian ci vil wa rs, n eighbouring co untries s uch a s C te d Ivoire, Guinea and Liberia benefited from illegal trading and commercial networks.98 In Nigeria, stolen crude oil and refined products are smuggled and marketed along the coastal regions of West Africa.99 Ibaba and Ikelegbe point out that the cross-border activities of ANSGs are fast spreading in W est A frica. I n F ebruary 2009, E quatorial G uinea a lleged t hat t he Movement f or t he Em ancipation o f t he N iger D elta (MEND) mi litants h ad mounted a s eaborne t errorist a ttack o n t he p residential p alace in M alabo.100 Although the attack was repulsed by the countrys armed forces, it posed a serious security t hreat, a s c an b e de duced f rom t he p ost-attack mi litary a nd p olice deployments, er ection o f r oadblocks a nd c hecks, c losure o f b anks, o ffices a nd shops, a nd des ertion o f t he ci ty cen tre. I n C ameroon, a rmed g roups a llegedly linked t o t he N iger D elta h ave b een in volved in a s eries o f a ttacks o n v essels, military posts and military personnel in the Nigerian border regions.101
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In their chapters, Engels, Omach and Peters all note that it is not only ANSGs activities and state responses in terms of cross-border activities that have become characterised by em erging r egionalisation, b ut a lso t he f ighters, p articularly t he youth a nd c hildren. Th us T aylors NP FL r ecruited y oung f ighters f rom S ierra Leone a nd C te d Ivoire, w hile C te d Ivoire a ssisted t he M ovement f or Democracy in L iberia (MODEL) w ith recruiting youths and child f ighters f rom the r efugee c amps in t he r egion. C te d Ivoire f urther b enefited f rom y outh recruitments in to t he Forces d e L ibration d u G rand O uest (Forces f or t he Liberation o f t he G reat W est, FL GO), w hich f ought a longside g overnment forces.102 The LR A i s a lso k nown t o h ave f orcefully r ecruited a nd co nscripted children from Sudan, the CAR and the DRC. As t he co nflict a reas exp and acr oss b orders, s o do t he co mplexities a nd changing dynamics of alliances, pacts and support across borders, between states, between s tates a nd ANSGs, a nd b etween t he in ternational co mmunity a nd t he states. I n t he M ano R iver co nflict co mplex, B urkina F aso a nd C te d Ivoire supported rebels in L iberia, which in t urn supported rebels in S ierra L eone and government forces in C te dIvoire. In Rwanda, Uganda supported the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF, Front Patriotique Rwandais), and later fought with it to oust Zaires M obutu f rom p ower f or b acking R wandan r ebels. I nterestingly, R wanda and Uganda turned against Laurent Kabila, whom they had installed in power, and supported a r ebellion a gainst hi s g overnment t hat wa s t hen p ropped u p b y t he Angolan, N amibian a nd Z imbabwean g overnments. U ganda a nd R wanda l ater turned against each other and used rebels as proxies to enhance their interests in the DRC. Apart from using the LRA as a proxy against the Ugandan government, Sudan also supported rebels in Chad and the CAR, which in turn supported rebels in Darfur. Some rebel groups have formed the governments of post-independence, postwar and post-conflict states or shared power by participating in g overnments or transforming in to p olitical p arties. I n A ngola, M ozambique, N amibia, U ganda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, the DRC, Cte dIvoire and Liberia, rebel movements have been incorporated into governments of national unity or been transformed into political p arties f or s uch p urposes. I n t he D RC, B urundi, S ierra L eone, C te dIvoire and Sudan, rebel movements have participated in g overnments through various p ower s haring, p eace a greement a nd t ransitional a rrangements. I n Burundi, following a s eries of ceasefire and power-sharing arrangements, largely brokered b y S outh A frica, m ajor r ebel g roups h ave b ecome p art o f t he government. Th e m ajor r ebel g roup, CND D-FDD, w on p arliamentary e lections
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and the presidency in 2005 and successfully negotiated with other rebel groups to end the countrys armed conflict. In chapter 13, the question of how former rebel groups fa red in p ost-conflict p olitics i s de alt w ith b y P earce u sing UNITA a nd RENAMO as case studies.

CONCLUSION
An un derstanding o f t he p henomenon o f mi litias, r ebel g roups a nd mi litant Islamist g roups i s cr itical n ot o nly b ecause t he i ssues o f c ausality, s ustainment, social b asis a nd in ternal d ynamics a re cen tral t o t he ef forts f or m anaging a nd resolving conflicts, but because they pose huge threats to the states capabilities to be governed well and to provide their populations with security. Underlying some aspects o f s tate f ragility a nd co llapse, a nd t he ac ute h uman in security a nd humanitarian cr ises in A frica t oday, i s t he p henomenon o f ANSGs a nd t heir engagement in v iolent co nflicts. H owever, s uch a n un derstanding h as t o b e embedded in a broad analysis, in which the phenomenon is situated and interfaced with t he n ature o f p olitics, t he d ynamics o f p ower s truggles, t he s truggles f or resources and the dialectics of violence as an instrument of politics. The armed conflicts and the political violence, in which ANSGs are key players, are closely correlated with the nature, character and governance of African states and t heir p olicies. P aradoxically, t he s tates w hose p rimary r esponsibility i s t he provision of human security, contributes to the emergence of ANSGs which then threatens and accentuates insecurity. The ANSG phenomenon not only poses the greatest threat to statehood in A frica by accelerating its decline and collapse but has also contributed to some of the greatest human tragedies in the world. But t he p henomenon i tself i s co mplex b oth in co louration, ac tivities, engagements and effects. It has a complex relationship with community, ethnic and regional elites, political elites, state officials and state institutions, the opposition and r esource-based co mpanies a nd sy ndicates. E lements o f i ts m otivation a re based o n g rievances a nd t he fa ilure o f t he s tate t o addr ess s ocioeconomic problems, y et i t a lso co ntains m any cr iminal e lements a nd i s dr iven b y opportunism. I t i s t o s ome ext ent a n a malgam o f f orces t hat a re p opular, grassroots-based and oppositional, yet some also work for the elite and prey on the people. It is these complexities that complicate any attempt at analysis. Therefore it is not surprising that the phenomenon can best be understood by detailed, in-depth
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studies of specific cases while bearing in mind the general characteristics, internal dynamics, driving forces, linkages with local and external forces, its politics and economics a nd t he co mplex r elations w ith lo cal p opulations, y ouths, communities, t he p olitical e lites a nd t he di aspora, a nd t he et hnic lin ks acr oss borders. Out of these, some general, systematic and analytically based conclusions can b e dra wn t hat w ould a id f irst in a n un derstanding a nd s econd in t he management of ANSGs.

NOTES
1 See T ony A ddison, Africas r ecovery f rom c onflicts: m aking p eace w ork f or t he p oor, Helsinki: United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2003, 1. Marie-Joelle Z ahar, Protgs, clients, canon fodders: civilians in t he calculus of militias, in Adekeye Adebayo and Chandra Lekha (eds), Managing armed conflicts in the 21st century, London: Frank Cass, 2006, 108. Zahar, Protgs, clients, canon fodders, 108. Ibid, 108109. Gani J Yoroms, Militias as a social phenomenon: towards a theoretical construction, in David J F rancis (e d), Civil m ilitia; Africas i ntractable s ecurity m enace? Aldershot: A shgate, 2005, 3150. Ibid, 4142. The National Guards during the Nigerian military regimes of the 1990s is an example. In Liberia, there was Charlies Angels, a private force of President Charles Taylor. See William Reno, The politics of insurgency in collapsing states, Development and Change 33(5) (2002), 837858. Boas Morten, E conomic indicators and et hno-national rebellion. The c ase for s ecessionist and n on-secessionist g roups, P aper p resented a t t he a nnual m eeting o f t he I nternational Studies Association, 48th annual convention, Chicago, Illinois, 28 February 2007. Zahar, Protgs, clients, canon fodders, 108. Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra L eone: a revolt of the Lumpen-proletariat, in C hristopher Clapham (ed), African guerrillas, Oxford: James Currey, 1998, 185. Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, Patterns of major armed conflicts 19972006, in Lofta Harbom (e d), States i n a rmed c onflict 2006, Uppsala: U ppsala U niversity, D epartment o f Peace and Conflict Research, 2006. Christopher C lapham, I ntroduction: a nalysing A frican in surgencies, in C hristopher Clapham (e d), African g uerrillas, Oxford: J ames C urrey, 1998, 118; A lex Th ompson, An introduction to African politics, London: Routledge, 2000, 198. Thompson, An introduction to African politics, 198. Clapham, Introduction: analysing African insurgencies, 7. Ibid, 118. Ibid.
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18 The m ost do minant r ebel g roup i s t he Alliance T ouareg d u N iger e t d u M ali (Tuareg Alliance of Niger and Mali, ATNM) 19 This g roup h as n ow r enamed i tself LOrganisation A l-Qada a u M aghreb I slamique (A lQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM). 20 For details on goals, motivations, methods, social bases, funding and other characteristics of Islamist militants, see chapters 11 and 12. 21 Clapham, Introduction: analysing African insurgencies, 118. 22 Ibid; T Mkandawire, The terrible toll of post-colonial rebel movements in Africa: toward an explanation of t he v iolence against t he p easantry, Journal of Modern African Studies 40(2) (2002), 181121. 23 Zahar, Protgs, clients, canon fodders, 110128. 24 Ibid, 120121. 25 Clapham, Introduction: analysing African insurgencies, 9. 26 Zahar, Protgs, clients, canon fodders, 110128. 27 Mkandawire, The terrible toll of post-colonial rebel movements in Africa, 181215. 28 Zahar, Protgs, clients, canon fodders, 119. 29 Augustine Ik elegbe a nd D auda Ga ruba, Youth c onflicts i n W est A frica: r egional s ecurity threats a nd p otentials, Research r eport o f t he C onsortium f or D evelopment P artnership Project 6 on ECOWAS and Conflict and Peace Building in West Africa, 2007, 124147. 30 Augustine Ikelegbe, Beyond the threshold of civil struggle: youth militancy and the militiaisation o f t he r esource co nflict in t he N iger D elta R egion o f N igeria, African S tudy Monographs 27(3) (2006), 87122; Y Guichaoua, The making of an ethnic militia: the Oodua Peoples Congress in Nigeria, CRISE Working Paper 26, 2006. 31 Augustine Ikelegbe, Engendering civil society: oil, women groups and the resource conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, Journal of Modern Africa Studies 43(2). 32 Ikelegbe, Beyond the threshold of civil struggle, 9095. 33 Abdullah and Muana, The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 180. 34 Ikelegbe and Garuba, Youth conflicts in West Africa, 124147. 35 Angela McIntyre, Giving back the future: a di scourse on the dilemma of child s oldiers, in Festus B A boagye (e d), Complex emergencies in the 21st century: challenges of new Africas strategic peace and security policy issues, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007, 22. 36 McIntyre, Giving back the future, 13, 18. 37 Ikelegbe and Garuba, Youth conflicts in W est A frica, 124147; M cIntyre, Giving b ack t he future, 23. 38 Christopher Blattman, The causes of child soldiering: evidence from northern Nigeria, Paper presented at the 48th annual convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, 28 February 2007. 39 Monika Thakur, Demilitarising militias in the Kivus (eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, African Security Review 17(1) (2008), 5262. 40 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, On economic causes of war, Oxford Economic Papers, October, 563573. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid; Paul C ollier, D oing w ell out of war: a n e conomy p erspective, in M B erdal and D M Malone (eds), Economic agenda in civil wars, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2000, 91111; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and grievance in civil war, World Bank Working Paper
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2355, May 2000; I de Soysa, The resource curse: are civil wars driven by rapacity or paucity? in M B erdal and D M M alone (eds), Economic agenda in civil wars, B oulder, C olo: Lynne Rienner, 2000, 113135; W illiam R eno, Th e p olitics o f in surgency in co llapsing s tates, Development and Change 33(5) (2003). Paul C ollier a nd N icholas Sa mbanis, U nderstanding ci vil wa r: a n ew a genda, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(3) (2002), 3. Ibrahim E lbadawi a nd N icholas Sa mbanis, How m uch w ar w ill w e s ee? E stimating t he incidence of civil war in 161 countries, World Bank Policy Research Paper 2533, January 2001, 132. Helga Malmin Binningsb and Siri Rustad, R esource conflicts, resource m anagement and post-conflict p eace, P aper p resented a t t he a nnual m eeting o f t he I nternational S tudies Association 48t h A nnual C onvention, C hicago, Il linois, 28 F ebruary 2007, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p178653_index.html (accessed 3 August 2010). Paul Collier, Doing well out of war, World Bank Working Paper, April 1999, 8. Guichaoua, The making of an ethnic militia. Abiodun Alao and Funmi Olonisakin, Economic fragility and political f luidity: explaining natural r esources a nd co nflicts, in A dekeye A debayo a nd C handra L ekha S riram (e ds), Managing armed conflicts in the 21st century, London: Frank Cass, 2001, 27. Eghosa O saghae, A ugustine Ik elegbe, Om obolaji O larinmoye a nd S teven O khonmina, Youth militias, self determination and resource control struggles in the Niger Delta, Research report, C onsortium f or D evelopment P artnerships P roject 5 o n L ocal C ontexts a nd Dynamics of Conflicts in West Africa, 2007, 187. Augustine Ikelegbe, The economy of conflict in t he oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria, Nordic J ournal of A frican St udies 14(2) (2005), h ttp://www.njas.helsinki.fi/pdf-files/ vol14num2/ikelegbe.pdf (accessed 26 July 2010). Guichaoua, The making of an ethnic militia. Mkandawire, The terrible toll of post-colonial rebel movements in Africa, 187. Augustine Ik elegbe, S tate, et hnic mi litias a nd co nflict in N igeria, Canadian J ournal o f African Studies 39(3) (2005), 490516. Kay B W arren, The v iolence w ithin: cu ltural a nd p olitical o pposition i n d ivided n ations, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, 6. Ikelegbe, State, ethnic militias and conflict in Nigeria, 490516. Elbadawi and Sambanis, How much war will we see? C A llen, Warfare, en demic v iolence a nd s tate co llapse, Review o f Africa Political Ec onomy 81 (1999), 381; Ikelegbe, State, ethnic militias and conflict in Nigeria, 151181. Clapham, Introduction: analysing African insurgencies, 5. Tova Norlen, Economic indicators and ethno-national rebellion: the case for secessionist and non-secessionist groups, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 48th annual convention, Chicago, Illinois, 28 February 2007. Ikelegbe, State, ethnic militias and conflict in Nigeria, 151181. D Ogac hi, E conomic r eform, p olitical li beralisation a nd et hnic co nflict in K enya, Africa Development 24(1&2) (1999); John Muella, The banality of ethnic war, International Security 25(1) (2000). Osaghae et a l, Youth m ilitias, s elf-determination a nd r esource c ontrol s truggles i n t he Niger Delta, 187.
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63 Reno, The politics of insurgency in collapsing states, 845. 64 Patrick C habal a nd J ean-Pascal D aloz, Africa w orks: d isorder as p olitical i nstrument, Oxford, B loomington a nd Indianapolis: Th e International A frican Institute, James Currey and Indiana University Press, 1999, 29. 65 Abdullah and Muana, The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 172. 66 Ibid, 173185. 67 Ikelegbe, Beyond the threshold of civil struggle, 8990. 68 Ikelegbe and Garuba, Youth conflicts in West Africa, 124147. 69 Reno, The politics of insurgency in collapsing states, 843. 70 Michael T Klare, The international trade in light weapons: what have we learned? In Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T Klare (eds), Light weapons and civil conflict, Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999. 71 Georges N zongola-Ntalaja, E thnicity and s tate p olitics in A frica, African J ournal o f International Affairs 2(1) (1999), 3059. 72 Osita Agbu, Ethnic militias and the threat to democracy in post-transition Nigeria, Research Report 127, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2004, 12. 73 Alhaji B ah, Micro-disarmament in West Africa: t he EC OWAS moratorium on small arms and light weapons, African Security Review 13(3) (2004), 33. 74 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Declaration of a moratorium on importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in West Africa, signed at the 21st ordinary session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 3031 October 1998, http://www.grip.org/bdg/g1649.html (accessed 11 October 2009). 75 Bah, Micro-disarmament in West Africa, 33. 76 J Herbst, E conomic incentives, natural resources and conflict in A frica, Journal of African Economies 9 (2000), 270294. 77 P C ollier, A H oeffler a nd M S derbom, On t he d uration o f ci vil wa r, Journal o f P eace Research 41(3) (2004), 253273. 78 Clapham, Introduction: analysing African insurgencies, 118. 79 Collier a nd Sa mbanis, U nderstanding ci vil wa r; J eremy Weinstein, Inside r ebellion t he politics of insurgent violence, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 6195. 80 See in particular the chapters by Kubai, Ikelegbe, Oloo, Ibaba and Ikelegbe, and Wassara. 81 Kabirs chapter deals specifically with this aspect. 82 Osaghae et a l, Youth m ilitias, s elf d etermination a nd r esource c ontrol s truggles i n t he Niger Delta, 1137; Sydney Tarrow, Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics, Cambridge: C ambridge U niversity P ress, 1999, 132; J M edearis, S ocial m ovements a nd deliberative democratic theory, British Journal of Political Science 35 (2005), 5375, 54. 83 Guichaoua, The making of an ethnic militia, 2006. 84 Chabal and Daloz, Africa works, 8081. 85 For an in-depth analysis of violence committed in ci vil wars, see Stathis Kalyvas, The logic of violence in civil war, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 86 Kwesi Aning and Angela McIntyre, From youth to rebellion to abduction: t he anatomy of recruitment in Sierra Leone, in Angela McIntyre (ed), Invisible stakeholders: children and war in Africa, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005, 71. 87 Chabal and Daloz, Africa works, 83.
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88 See U nited N ations D evelopment P rogramme (UND P), Human D evelopment R eports, http://hdr.undp.org/en/ (acces sed 23 J une 2010), T ransparency I nternational, Global Corruption R eports, http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications (acces sed 23 June 2010), F ailed s tates in dexes, Foreign P olicy, h ttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ 2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings (acces sed 23 J une 2010). 89 Alain-Guy T Sipowo, Peace and security in central Africa: the role of international justice, in Chrysantus A yangafac (e d), The p olitical e conomy o f r egionalisation i n C entral A frica, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008. 90 Wafula Okumu, Domestic terrorism in Uganda, in Wafula Okumu and Anneli Botha (eds), Domestic t errorism i n A frica: d efining, a ddressing a nd u nderstanding i ts i mpact o n h uman security, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007, 7980. 91 McIntyre, Giving back the future, 13. 92 Abdullah and Muana, The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 172. 93 Ibid. 94 Addison, Africas recovery from conflicts: making peace work for the poor, 2. 95 See a lso I dean Sa lehyan, Rebels w ithout b orders t ransnational i nsurgencies i n w orld politics, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009, 2654. 96 See G Cawthra, Brutal force: the apartheid war machine, London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1986; and William Minter, Apartheids contras: an inquiry into the roots of war in Angola a nd M ozambique, J ohannesburg: W itwatersrand U niversity P ress, 1994; P hyllis Johnson a nd D avid M artin, Destructive en gagement: S outhern A frica a t w ar, H arare: Zimbabwe Publishing House for the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, 1986. 97 R D oom a nd K V lassenroot, V iolent c ulture o r c ulture o f v iolence? Th e c ase o f E astern Congo, in F Columbus (ed), Politics and conflict in Africa, New York: Nova, 2001, 5782. 98 Stephen Ellis, Liberias warlord insurgency, in Christopher Clapham (ed), African guerrillas, Oxford: James Currey, 1998, 164. 99 Ibid. 100 Ikelegbe, The economy of conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 101 The Punch, 18 February 2009. 102 International Crisis Group, Nigeria: seizing the moment in t he Niger Delta, Policy briefing (Africa) 60, 30 April 2009, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/ B060-nigeria-seizing-the-moment-in-the-niger-delta.aspx (accessed 15 April 2010). 103 Ikelegbe and Dauda, Youth conflicts in West Africa, 124146.

Part I Issues and dimensions

C HAPTER 2

Historical and cultural dimensions of militia and rebel groups in Africa

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The African continent is vast and the militia and rebel groups are numerous and varied, and therefore I have set pragmatic limits on the scope of this chapter. This is a g eneral o verview o f t he hi storical a nd c ultural dim ensions t o h elp r eaders better understand the case studies treated in subsequent chapters. With over 250 wars1 around the world, the last century may have been the most brutal in human history, measured not only in t erms of the number of casualties but also in t erms of the changing nature of warfare, where 8590 p er cent of the casualties were civilians. Admittedly, the magnitude of this violence is staggering2 and A frica i s b y fa r t he co ntinent m ost a ffected b y co llective v iolence.3 It i s indisputable t hat most of t his v iolence has b een p erpetrated by various fac tions and g roups, t hat c hallenge t he a uthority o f t he c haracteristically o ppressive regimes and resist the legitimate exercise of authority by governments, including those that are democratically elected across the continent. This has generated lowand high-intensity intrastate conflicts, which have become one of the hallmarks of our time.
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Wars and conflicts raging in Africa are complex and need to be understood in the light of historical and globalisation processes, which have unleashed competition over an unequal sharing of resources.4 These conflicts, supported by small arms and light weapons,5 have utilised cultural resources especially for the recruitment into and mobilisation of mi litia and rebel g roups. Cultural explanations include the A frican co nceptions o f a uthority a nd t he r ole o f r eligious n arratives a nd symbols. In a n a ttempt t o s ketch t he hi story o f r esistance in A frica, o ne c an iden tify several phases:
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establish g ood g overnance a nd eradic ate p overty. H owever, e ven a fter t hey established themselves in power, the political ills of their predecessors did not evaporate. I f a nything, t hey b ecame j ust a s o ppressive a nd co rrupt a nd t he citizens sank deeper into poverty and despair. It is this situation that has largely contributed to t he emergence of mi litia and rebel movements in t he c urrent phase. There are contrasting opinions on how to deal with the challenge of militia and rebel groups on the continent. Some attribute this phenomenon to the aggregate effect of colonialism that is manifest in the dysfunctional states. The process of the establishment o f n ation-states in A frica b y t he co lonial a uthorities wa s accompanied by violence6 and it has been blamed partly for the current woes of the continent. It has been suggested that the colonial social and political institutions that w ere bequeathed t o the in dependent A frican le aders w ere weak a nd underdeveloped, which did not auger well for future political stability of the newly created African states.7 The way power was transferred to the new African leaders at in dependence wa s t o s hape t he f uture ide ological t rends a nd u ltimately t he political and economic development of the citizenry of these new states. They had high exp ectations f or de velopment, b ut w ere c hallenged b y a va riety o f vulnerabilities. I nstability wa s a n in herent p art o f t he n ew s tate sys tems, w hich soon b ecame m anifest in in security a nd v iolence. Thi s b ackground p artially shaped the environment that became a f ertile breeding ground for the growth of militia and rebel groups within a few decades after independence in many African countries. Thi s lin ks m y a nalysis t o t he t heory o f t he failed s tates, w hich i s presented by its proponents as the major factor for the proliferation of militia and rebel groups. But obviously there are other important historical factors, such as the Cold War and its aftermath w hich changed the nature of conflict appreciably as well as an increased population and the degradation of the environment, both of which have put tremendous pressure on African political regimes and generated the n eed f or a lternative s ources o f s upport t o mi tigate t he p revailing circumstances. In the African traditional world view(s), most basic authority was vested in the head of the family, who enjoyed undisputed power as the family head and was the mediator with the world in matters of the family. The elders also were accorded high s ocial s tatus a nd i ts attendant respect a nd p ower. Next in t his hiera rchical order of power were the clans and finally the chiefs, who held their positions for life. Despite the dynamic influences of other cultures, particularly the process that
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The f irst p hase i s t he p eriod b efore co lonialism w hen r eformers m obilised resistance a gainst o ppressive t raditional r ulers in s ocieties w ith cen tralised sources of authority. The s econd p hase i s t he p eriod o f t he s cramble f or A frica w hen co lonial powers moved into Africa to annex their spheres of influence. Resistance to the imposition o f E uropean co lonialism in A frica wa s in m any c ases r uthlessly crushed and many lives were lost, since African warriors were no match for European armies with modern weaponry. This violence, one can argue, set the stage f or t he b loody r esistance t hat wa s t o b ecome t he h allmark o f A fricas history. The third phase is the liberation struggle, which pitted Africans against their colonial masters who they were determined to drive out of newly created states so t hat t hey co uld r eclaim t he l and a nd, m ore im portantly, t he dig nity a nd freedom that the colonised peoples believed would be the products of self-rule and political independence. The f ourth p hase f ollowed t he r ealisation t hat t he m uch-sought-after independence did not fulfil the expectations of the masses. Resentment began to b uild u p a s t he ci tizens o f t he n ewly in dependent n ations wa tched t heir former f reedom f ighter-presidents t urn in to dic tators, p lundering n ational resources. Th e s ense o f f rustration w ith o ppressive g overnments d uring t his period gave r ise to t he phenomenon of revolutionaries w ho le d armed rebel movements. Of course, many of them were influenced by the ideologies of the time, p articularly Marxism and s ocialism. R esistance during t his p eriod was seen as the second liberation struggle, and therefore the idea of going back to the bush as had been the case in t he first liberation struggle often gained the s upport o f t he p eople. S ome r evolutionaries acr oss A frica s uccessfully fought t heir wa y t o p ower a nd f ormed n ew g overnments w ith a p romise t o
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bears s uch co ntested l abels a s Westernisation a nd modernisation, t here i s n o doubt that elements of African cultures are still vibrant and continue to shape the way p eople p erceive a nd a ppropriate n ew ide as a nd in terpret t heir d aily experiences, in b oth t he urb an a nd r ural a reas. Particularly m atters s uch a s t he meaning o f lif e, in dividual a nd co mmunal iden tity, a nd t he ga mut o f h uman relations, d uties a nd obligations, a re un derstood within t he framework of traditional social norms. However, fa r les s a ttention h as b een p aid t o t he c ultural dim ension o f militarism in A frica. A ccording t o F alola it i s im possible t o un derstand contemporary p olitics w ithout un derstanding p ast a nd p resent c ultures in s uch areas a s beliefs a nd conventions of A fricans, t heir religions, p hilosophy, established p ractices f or p ower r elations, s ocial s tratifications a nd co ncepts o f power and the big man.8 The r ole o f t he big m an in t he c ase o f p residents in in dependent A frica i s informed by precolonial centralised political systems where the old African kings and c hiefs w ielded imm ense p ower a nd a uthority, a nd co ntrolled t he m eans o f government. H ere contradictions a rise when m odern s tates, w ith e lected governments based upon written constitutions, function more or less like the old chiefdoms. Thi s, I a rgue, i s o ne o f t he fac tors t hat h as co ntributed t o t he emergence of militia groups in Africa. Therefore cultural factors, whether latent or manifest, lie beneath the emergence of rebel and militia groups in Africa. In t he in troduction t o hi s b ook o n t he ci vil mi litia, F rancis di scusses t he various fac tors t hat co ntribute t o t he em ergence o f mi litias acr oss A frica. H e emphasises t hat t he w eakness o f t he Africa s tate a s a cr eation o f E uropean colonialism a nd w hat h e c alls complex p olitical em ergencies cr eates t he conditions that produce militias.9 However, there are other dimensions that should be acco rded sig nificance in t he p rocess o f a nalysing t he fac tors b ehind t he mobilisation of the youth into militia groups. At the collective level, militias need to gather together for their activities and they need to overcome opposition and logistical b arriers t o t heir o rganisation. Th e q uestion i s w hat ex cites t hem a nd provides sufficient motivation for recruitment and mobilisation? More precisely with regard t o t his c hapter, f rom w hat hi storical a nd c ultural resources do t hey draw inspiration? How can the confounding nature of violence be explained from a c ultural p erspective? I n e valuating t he r ole o f c ultural o r o ther m otives f or violent political mobilisation, what needs to be investigated is why some cultural practices, particularly the use of religious rituals and teachings from Christianity,
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Islam and African traditional religion, have become so prominent in many militia and rebel groups. This chapter will address these questions.

HISTORIES OF REBELLION AND RESISTANCE TO OPPRESSION AND FOREIGN INTRUSION

In t his s ection, I w ill cite exa mples of resistance a gainst oppression a nd f oreign intrusion t o i llustrate t hat v iolent r esistance h as b een exp erienced in A frica in varying degrees in the last two centuries. Thus I agree with Kastfelt that to explain the brutal wars that Africa has experienced in recent years, one has to look at the long hi story o f co lonial v iolence a nd a lso a t t he co nflicts in a w ider g lobal context, though they have African local context.10 In t he 19t h cen tury a nd t he e arlier p art o f t he 20t h cen tury, m any A frican societies put up strong resistance to European intrusion in Africa. A number of the rebellions w ere in spired b y A frican t raditional r eligion a nd c ulture, s uch a s t he practice o f u sing p rotective m agic p otions a nd s pells t o m ake t he f ighters invincible to bullets. In West and Central Africa, the 19th century was expected to mark I slams v ictory o ver t he n on-Muslim w orld. Thi s wa s t o b e t he a ge t he Mujaddid, the reformer, who comes once every century.11 It is not surprising that this coincided with the advent of colonialism and its attendant violence. Since Islamic di scourse i s a lso a bove a ll a m eans o f r esisting t he s tate,12 the Islamic jihad provided a rallying call for resistance and rebellion against oppressive and co rrupt lo cal r ulers a s w ell a s f oreign in trusion, p articularly b y Europeans. During the 19th century, Muslims in a number of states in West Africa had various grievances a gainst t he a ristocracy, s uch a s co nscription in to t he a rmies t o f ight fellow Muslims, slavery, upholding traditional religious practices, heavy taxation and o ther in justices, a ll o f w hich w ere co nsidered unI slamic. M ilitant jihad movements u sed t hese g rievances t o m obilise r esistance b y b oth M uslims a nd non-Muslims. The best known of these was the jihad of Uthman dan Fodio who, inspired by his deep knowledge of Islamic law and mystical visions, declared war against t he co rrupt a nd un just g overnment o f G obir in 1804. 13 The lo ng-term impact of the jihad was to shape the future of the West African societies. In 1881 M uhammad A hmad, b elieving t hat G od h ad c alled him, de clared himself the Mahdi or the guided one who would come during the troubled times at the end of the world and accepted an oath of allegiance from local communities, gathering a l arge f ollowing t hat wa s m obilised a gainst t he T urko-EgyptianEuropean in trusion in S udan. H e b ased hi s r ebellion o n I slam, c alling t he
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intruders apostates and therefore worse than unbelievers. From his position as the Mahdi he attacked t he oppressors and won t he support of t he Sudanese p eople, who resented the Turko-Egyptian administration.14 Not only did the Mahdi put up a fo rmidable r esistance t o t he B ritish, b ut t he hi story o f t he Mahadiyya had a n enormous influence upon the geopolitics of present-day Sudan. East African countries such as Kenya have a hi story of resistance dating back to t he s truggle a gainst t he es tablishment o f co lonial r ule. Th e N andi r ebellion, which s tarted in 1890 a nd l asted f or 11 y ears, wa s o ne o f t he e arliest r ebel movements in Kenya to oppose foreign intrusion. By 1900, the Nandi warriors had destroyed an important telegraph communications centre at Kitoto, in t he Nandi valley, t hus c utting o ff co mmunications b etween t he B ritish g overnment in London and its soldiers and the railway workers in Kenya and Uganda. Even after the British soldiers had mounted a massive attack on the Nandi fighters, the Nandi leaders de clined t o sig n a p eace a greement. Fi ve de cades l ater, t he Mau Ma u freedom f ighters m obilised w idespread r esistance a gainst t he B ritains co lonial administration. The Mau Mau was the most serious crisis British colonial rule had to face in A frica.15 The Mau Ma u mobilised p eople a t g rassroots le vel a nd administered t raditional o aths t o s ecure lo yalty t o t he m ovement a nd t hus a commitment t o t he li beration s truggle. Th ose w ho w ere co nsidered t o b e unsympathetic or traitors to the Mau Mau, especially if their reluctance was based on their adherence to the Christian faith (the white mans religion as it was being portrayed), were subjected to cruel torture and even death. The repressive German regime in what is now Tanzania bred discontent among the p eople and by 1905, a ntipathy to oppression, coupled w ith a dr ought in t he region, reached breaking point. A p rophet named Kinjikitile Ngwale said he had sacred wa ter, c alled maji, w hich co uld m ake t he wa rriors invincible t o G erman bullets. This helped start the Mai-Mai rebellion, which spread rapidly throughout the colony and eventually involved 20 dif ferent ethnic groups, all of which were united b y t he desir e t o dr ive o ut t he G ermans. Th e Mai-Mai rebellion f orced Kaiser Wilhelms government in Berlin to consider the implementation of reforms in German African colonies. It is worth noting that both the Mai-Mai and Mau Mau stand out in their use of traditional African religious rituals not only to bind the rebels together, but also to appeal to the familiar cultural realm to inspire them to stand up against colonial rule. These historical examples of organised and violent resistance to oppressive rule and foreign intrusion make it possible to situate the phenomenon of militia and rebel groups within the history of resistance in Africa. This is particularly evident
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if o ne t akes in to acco unt t hat t he co untries w here t here w ere m ovements t hat could b e c alled precursors of t he present rebel movements, are now haunted by their past histories. One can say that the current militia and rebel movements are an embodiment of the indigenous resistance to oppression and the imposition of colonial rule. There is no historical or scientific evidence to suggest that African societies are violent by nature, which means that the long experience of violence should b e a scribed t o ext raneous fac tors. Thi s m eans t hat t he s lave t rade, t he establishment o f co lonial r ule, t he C old W ar, w hich wa s f ought p artly b y sustaining African dictatorships as buffer zones, and effects of globalisation such as structural adjustment programmes, which further weakened and impoverished African s tates, provide t he hi storical context f or t he p olitical t rends a nd e vents, particularly those of the 20th century the most bloody in human history.

THE POST-COLONIAL SITUATION: THE STATE, GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT

At independence the status quo was maintained, particularly because the change entailed substitution of a European authority holder with an African, but both the core structure and the underpinning ideology of the system were retained. Gordon and Gordon summed it up thus:
The r eal p olitical in heritances o f A frican s tates a t in dependence w ere t he authoritarian structures of the colonial state, an accompanying political culture and an environment of p olitically relevant circumstances tied heavily to the nature of colonial rule.16

Though the implications of the nature of this change may have been lost on the people in t he eu phoric ce lebration o f v ictories o f in dependence, i t did n ot t ake long f or t he f laws in herent in t his c hangeover t o b ecome c lear. Within t he f irst decade, many of the leaders proved to be dictators and resentment of the system was beginning to develop among the general population in t he newly liberated countries. What could have gone wrong with the heroes of the liberation struggle, who had been hailed as the saviours of their people? The answer is simple: they were heirs to the colonial heritage at the dawn of a new era the post-colonial era. Some of them succeeded in es tablishing regimes and others failed. However, even t hose t hat p roclaimed t hemselves t o b e h arbingers o f c hange w ere s oon
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fitting in to t he s hoes o f t hose t hat t hey h ad r eplaced. F ollowing t his hi storical trajectory, the next scene of African politics was to be dominated by the emergence of all manner of civil groups in many of the countries, which claimed to be acting on b ehalf of t he p eople. S ome of t hese g roups were s elf-help women and youth groups, w elfare g roups a nd c hurch o rganisations w orking o utside a nd b eyond government inf luence a nd co ntrol. G radually t hese cr ystallised in to w hat h as become generally known as civil society, but for the purpose of my discussion this is one of the processes that served as a midwife for the birth of, among others, the civil militia. Many of those that developed into militia did not have a clear agenda to begin with, and as mentioned earlier on, they emerged as well-intentioned village and neighbourhood vigilante groups and youth clubs. In due course, the character of the g roups e volved a nd g radually s ome o f t hem m etamorphosed in to v iolent armed g roups, made up l argely of young p eople w ho were w illing to offer t heir services f or hir e t o p owerful in dividuals f or p ersonal p rotection o r a ny o ther services. The question is w hy t his situation arose. The answer lies in t he fac t t hat t he independent leaders who took over power failed to forge strong states out of the diverse co mmunities t hat w ere b rought t ogether, s ometimes h urriedly, w ithin national b orders o f t he n ewly cr eated s tates. M cCalpins s tatement a bout t he Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which could apply to many other countries on the continent, serves as a useful illustration:
The co nfiguration o f t he co ntemporary C ongolese p olity i s n ot t o b e v iewed a s simply the general disorder that has come to characterise African states but rather as a dir ect r esult o f cr osscutting inf luences in i ts p articular hi story. Th e c urrent situation r epresents t he s uperimposition o f a n o verdeveloped, ext ractive a nd predatory state upon the vestiges of traditional societies and the ethnic mosaic.17

Adjustment policies and neo-liberal reforms in general are so severe in their impact that t hey have tended to undermine t he b asis of t he nation-state project in p ostcolonial Africa, compounding the weakness of the state, engendering mass hostility to it and underpinning its legitimacy.18

As t he C ommission o n H uman S ecurity p ut i t, p overty a nd the ex clusion a nd deprivation o f w hole co mmunities o f p eople f rom t he b enefits o f de velopment, naturally co ntributes t o t he t ensions, v iolence a nd co nflict w ithin co untries19 and there can be no doubt that deprivation contributes to conflicts and violence in Africa. Th e si tuation t hat h as p roved t o b e f ertile g round f or t he em ergence o f militia and rebel movements in Africa is summed up as follows by Abutudu:
Over the last two decades, various forms of communal and religious violence have been the hallmark of many an African country. Civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda etc, have been the more extreme expressions of a process that h as s een e conomic cr isis a nd IMF/W orld B ank r eforms p itching t he s tate against its citizens and community against community, in shooting wars.20

Another important factor should be borne in mind, namely the nexus between an economic cr isis a nd s ecurity. A s a lluded t o a bove, n ation b uilding r emained a mirage a s le aders spent n ational r esources o n n on-viable in stitutions that continued t o de bilitate t he s ocial a nd e conomic de velopment o f t hese s tates, making p overty a p ersistent t hreat f or A frican s ocieties. P overty wa s f urther entrenched b y t he in troduction o f s tructural ad justment b y m eans o f t he International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for, as Abutudu observes:
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When people are deprived and are struggling to fulfil basic needs, they tend to be more prone to violence and crime rates increase and the youth tend to be drawn to delinquency. In such cases there is no peace and security for the individual or the society. Inextricably linked with the issue of peace and security, is the question of j ustice. I t i s co mmon k nowledge t hat a s ense o f f rustration a nd des pair, injustice, in equality a nd di scrimination in s ociety c an a nd o ften do es le ad t o disgruntlement among the population. Apparently these ills are prevalent in those countries that are characterised by misgovernance and human rights abuses. It is the g rotesque in justices in m any A frican s ocieties t oday t hat h ave co ntributed largely t o t he im poverishment o f t he g reater m ajority o f t he p eople a nd t he emergence of militia and rebel movements all over the continent. Furthermore, fa ilure t o m eet t he a spirations o f t he s ociety u sually le ads t o social upheavals, which in turn threaten the state. Where the national elites are not accountable t o t he p eople, t he p attern i s t hat w hen p eople b egin t o in terrogate their r elationship w ith t he s tate, a s ocial t ime b omb b egins t o t ick a way a nd eventually explodes. Hence I s tate that the emergence of militias in A frica could well be characterised as one form of social explosion.
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TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF AUTHORITY AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

For t he purpose of t his chapter, I es pouse t he v iew of c ulture a s dynamic, aptly summed up as the meanings, changing over time, that are generally attributed in a g iven community to repertoires of ac tion by E llis.21 A more exp anded v iew is provided by Ali A Mazrui, who posits seven functions of culture in society, namely that it provides lenses of perception and cognition, motives for human behaviour, criteria o f e valuation, a b asis o f iden tity, a m ode o f co mmunication, a b asis o f stratification a nd t he sys tem o f p roduction a nd co nsumption.22 From t his perspective both the emergence and actions (behaviour) of the rebel groups and militia can be situated within a cultural context. Needless t o s ay, t raditional a nd m odern p olitical ide als h ave in teracted t o contribute t o t he s haping o f p olitical s cenes in A frica. On t he o ne h and t he colonial sys tem a nd t he Westphalian s tate p roject, w hich i s s aid t o h ave b een imposed on Africans, can be blamed for laying the foundations for the structures and the political culture that ultimately nurtured the growth of militia and rebel groups.23 On t he o ther h and, h owever, i t i s un deniable t hat t he A frican contribution h as b een s haped t o a l arge ext ent by its p eoples w orldview(s) a nd particularly c ultural va lues a nd n orms. W ithout en tering in to a de bate o n t he persistence of African culture in m odern times, one can agree with Gordon and Gordon that:
African cultures remain vibrant and are playing a leading role in the efforts to cope with t he f orces a ffecting A frican s ocieties. Q uestions o f p ersonal a nd co llective identity and meaning frequently come to the fore as well as discontent with political oppression, foreign exploitation, and economic inequality and poverty.24

were attained through various rites of passage, particularly in communities where councils o f e lders f unctioned a s s ources o f a uthority. A lthough in s ome communities, political organisation was based on kinship and clan and therefore segmented, in o thers a uthority wa s cen tralised a nd t he hiera rchical o rder wa s clearly defined for the various office holders, from the highest to the lowest level. Social control was exercised through the notions of shame and guilt. A code of rules a nd t aboos r egulated b oth t he in dividual a nd g roup p olitical ac tivities, a s Magesa reports:
Social co ntrol t hrough s hame a nd f ear o f t ransgressing t aboos o r u pholding o f dignity i s a lso t he r eason b ehind t he f ormation a nd m aintenance o f t he va rious sodalities blood friendships, secret societies, age grades and joking relationships play a conspicuous political role, each one at its own level in African societies.26

The appropriation of the African concept of authority serves well to illustrate the cultural dim ension. I n t he t raditional A frican co mmunal lif e, a uthority f igures beyond t he fa mily le vel w ere political le aders t oo a nd t here wa s n o p olitical structure that was distinct from the social religious structures of the society.25 The chief was closest to God and the ancestors. The political and ritual offices of the leaders reinforced e ach other t o s afeguard t heir p ower and t he w ellbeing of t he community. B ut le adership a nd p olitical p atterns w ere n ot t he s ame in a ll t he communities: s ome p ositions o f a uthority w ere h ereditary, w hile o thers w ere acquired through individual merit or attributes such as wisdom and integrity or
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The p oint h ere i s t hat in dif ferent t ypes o f p olitical a nd admini strative organisations across the African continent, authority was generally concentrated in the person of the head of family at the family level, the king where kingdoms existed, or chief at community level. Magesa uses the case of Bunyoro to illustrate the role of the traditional ruler, who was the pinnacle of power and all authority [flowed] f rom him .27 He co uld t ake a way c hieftainships e ven f rom h ereditary holders and give them to persons loyal to him, a nd therefore more deserving of those p ositions. H owever, m y a im i s n ot t o p rovide a det ailed acco unt o f t he traditional political systems, but to illustrate how the cultural values and political ethos c ame t o inf luence p olitical p ractice in co ntemporary A frica, a nd h ence posed a challenge to the Western character of the state. In line with this point of departure, I suggest that the personalised rule, with a high concentration of power and the practice of patronage relationships w hich were soon to become the defining characteristics of the new African leaders were informed by the traditional concept of authority based on ethnicity and kinship. The authority and power of the father in a family are reproduced in the role of the founding fa ther o f t he n ation, w hich wa s f illed b y le aders s uch a s K wame Nkrumah o f G hana, Jomo Kenyatta o f Kenya, Mobutu S ese S eko o f t he f ormer Zaire, Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and even more r ecently, R obert Mugabe o f Z imbabwe. Th ese le aders b ecame, a s wa s t he case with the traditional kings and chiefs, invested with absolute power over their parliaments and citizens. They became the ubiquitous presidents as heads of the
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military, uni versity c hancellors a nd watukufu (Swahili t erm m eaning g lorious, exalted) f igures a fter w hom in stitutions o f hig her le arning, r oads, s chools, hospitals and key intuitions in t heir states were named. Hence, not only does the traditional m odel f or t he ex ercise o f a uthority b ecome in compatible w ith t he Western n orms o f dem ocratic g overnance, b ut i t a lso r einforces mi litarism a nd promotes primordial loyalties, which are the fodder for militiarism in A frica. In Somalia, for instance, a warlord is viewed in terms of traditional leadership based on the clan system. He (it is usually a m an) not only receives, but also deserves allegiance and support from members of his clan. The contrivance of the public sphere for social expression and political action could not be more explicit than in the practice of sacking government ministers at will and expelling non-conformist and disloyal members from the ruling parties. These actions reflect the traditional exercise of authority and control of political organisation b y a k ing o r c hief. Thi s s tyle o f le adership b ecame en trenched in post-colonial Africa, too, and has l argely shaped t he c urrent p olitical and s ocial trends in m any African countries. It has become practice to quell the dissenting voices, often by using violence through the arms of government such as the police and paramilitary forces. The unintended outcome of this practice is to strengthen the r esolve o f t hose w ho h old di ssenting o pinions a nd t hose w ho f eel t hey a re being strangled by the hold on power of the all-powerful president. Hence this is one of the factors that has engendered dissention, which has in turn nurtured the growth o f r ebel g roups a nd mi litia t heirs i s a r eaction, o ne c an s ay, t o t he unyielding a nd un accommodating p olitical s tructures p erpetuated b y a nd personified in the contemporary African leaders. Hence, as Bs and Dunn rightly observe:
[A]lmost a ll co ntemporary a rmed m ovements o n t he A frican co ntinent s hare commonalities w hich a re r ooted in exp eriences a nd n arratives a bout co rruption, violence (p olitical a nd e conomic) a nd p overty. Th ese co mmon exp eriences h ave over time contributed to the creation of deeply entrenched sentiments about social exclusion and marginality, especially among the young A s hared experience of brutalisation, abuse and maginalisation informs the worldview of those fighting for these movements.28

Nigerian s tate d uring t he B abanginda a nd Abacha mi litary r egimes, cr eated a n environment co nducive t o t he em ergence o f et hnic mi litia a nd o ther mi litant groups.29 These in clude t he E gbesu B oys o f A frica, I jaw Youths M ovement, a movement f or t he ac tualisation o f a s overeign s tate o f B iafra, O odua P eoples Congress, Niger D elta Peoples Volunteer Force, C hicoco Movement a nd A rewa Peoples C ongress. L ike t he o thers, t he B akassi B oys in t he A nambra a nd A bia states emerged as a resistance army in response to insecurity emanating from the threat of armed robbers with the financial support of the traders who had been targeted by the robbers.30

IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY
Perceived or real s ocial dif ferences in t he et hnic, co mmunal a nd religious dimensions are responsible for shaping a p eoples world view. Hence, in t he past, African c ultural n orms a nd va lues h ave inf ormed a nd, t o s ome ext ent, s till continue to shape the formation and maintenance of social and political structures that h ave cr eated t he c limate f or t he em ergence a nd p roliferation o f mi litia. African cultural norms and values have been turned into a useful resource, aiding the formation of and recruitment for militia groups and rebel movements. Culture is the basis of identity, both individual and communal.
[It] s hapes p erception o f s elf a nd t he in teraction b etween p eople a nd t heir environment. I t exp lains h abits s uch a s w hy p eople r espect o ld a ge, h ave m any children, take care of their children, work hard, take to polygamy and support male dominance ... i t def ines n orms of b ehaviour, s uch a s inter- and intragenerational relations, co des o f co nduct f or h olders o f p olitical o ffices a nd t he dif ference between gift-giving and corruption.31

To ci te N igeria a s a n exa mple, t he p olitical c limate a nd t he g eneral s ocial conditions, s ummed u p b y A dejumobi a s t he contradictions a nd cr isis o f t he
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Normally young people are concerned about their identity, who they are and what they w ill b ecome in t he f uture. For a nswers t o t hese q uestions t hey t urn t o t he society: p eers a nd le aders w ho a re n ot o nly v ested w ith a cer tain a mount o f authority, but also considered to be knowledgeable. In the traditional social set-up, this process was facilitated by agents of socialisation functioning within a socially controlled framework founded on age-old institutions. Thus the society was able to p rovide a s afety n et f or in dividuals a nd m embers o f co mmunities. H owever, with the social changes that the African societies have undergone in t he last five
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decades, there is a p lethora of agents that compete for influence and the choices the y ouths face a re ra ther b ewildering a nd fa r b eyond t he limi ts o f t he conventional social checks and balances. The cultural turbulence of our times is reflected in the behaviour and activities of the youth. In the midst of these social changes, young people cannot easily resolve their attendant iden tity cr ises. Thi s i s f urther co mplicated b y t he fac t t hat et hnic identities in Africa have been manipulated by leaders to serve selfish ends, with the result that they have become one of the causes of conflict. There is no doubt that questions of identity are related to both the history and culture of a group. A belief in a shared historical origin provides a heritage of values, norms and symbols and confirms t he dic hotomies b etween t hose w ho b elong a nd t hose w ho do n ot belong. This link is the essence of the myths of origin, which aim at explaining the origins and history of a p eople, and at answering questions on who are they and where t hey co me f rom. Th e t rend i s t hat in p olitical si tuations w here t here a re contested histories and identities, the aggrieved groups are inclined to defend their cause, be it the right to citizenship or land, and they will be willing to fight for it. The ideological underpinnings of the conflict are established by identity groups, many of which consider the historical and cultural aspect to be the most important of all. The point is that this background is the precursor to the militarisation of groups that can be classified as part of the civil society in its broadest sense, which gradually distinguish themselves as militias. Thakur identifies three factors leading to the emergence of various militias in the case of the Kivu region of the DRC, namely personal enrichment; the power and security vacuum that generates the need to provide security for their people, reinforced b y t he et hnic co nfiguration; a nd t he c urrent p ost-transition p olitical climate that makes it possible for militant groups to emerge and thrive in this part of the country.32 However, in the case of the Kinyarwanda-speaking communities of the eastern DRC, the question of identity and citizenship came to the fore quite early d uring M obutus r egime a nd l ater b ecame t he cen tral i ssue o f t he s econd Congolese war. Their Tutsi origin was configured by espousing a version of history that is based on HutuTutsi primordial dichotomy, and the gravity of the situation was exacerb ated by t he presence and ac tivities of t he Hutu mi litia in t he region after the Rwandan genocide of 1994. This situation, which is characterised by two stances, namely an ethnic reading of the political situation and recourse to the use of force both to interrogate their relationship with the state and to claim what they consider t o b e t heir leg itimate s ocial-political s pace, i s ra ther co mplex. W hen
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Laurent Nkunda, leader of the National Congress for the Defence of the People, a rebel group, was interviewed by the BBC in 2008 and asked why he was fighting a democratically elected government, his response was that we are protecting our people. This statement implies that the people that he was purporting to protect are identifiable as a particular group that feels either threatened or insecure. From statements such as these, it is clear that the rise of some rebel groups is associated with a perceived or real threat to security, and takes place to secure the self-preservation of the group. At present the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda a g roup f ighting a gainst t he K inshasa g overnment i s o ne o f t he prominent mi litant r ebel g roups t hat p oses a s erious t hreat t o t he p eace a nd security in Africas Great Lakes region. Though there are several factors, including ineffective government, impunity and the struggle for the vast natural resources in this part of the country, which triggered the current crisis in the DRC, the cultural and hi storical q uestions o f iden tity a re a pparently s ome o f t he co ntentious underlying issues of the crisis.

USE OF RELIGION
One of the salient characteristics of militia and rebel groups is the use of religion in the recruitment and initiation of members, and as a m eans of sustaining their activities. R eligious do ctrines, r ituals a nd sy mbols f rom I slam, C hristianity a nd African traditional religion are used by these groups. As Kastfelt notes:
In some cases, such as northern Uganda, established religious traditions are applied to n ew s ocial co nditions r esulting in inn ovations b eing cr eated o n t he b asis o f existing t raditions. I n o ther c ases, a s in t he S outhern S udan, wa rs p roduce fundamental changes, which in turn erode the whole social context of religion and lead p eople t o a bandon t heir es tablished r eligion a nd t urn t o n ew b eliefs a nd rituals.33

Innovative use of religious rituals and interpretations of scriptures and doctrines create a s ense o f n ovelty, o f c hange in t he s tatus q uo a nd h ence p rovide s ome credibility t o t he r ebel g roups in t he e yes o f s ociety. B y a ttacking t he exi sting corrupt g overnments o r unI slamic p ractices, t he mi litants p rovide n ot o nly a n alternative, but also a sense of legitimacy to their cause.
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In hi s b rief o verview o f w hat h e c alls an im portant f eature o f mi litiarism, Francis posits that there is a link between the activities and modus operandi of the militias and the belief in supernatural powers and occult practice The hallmark and driving force for the putative efficacy of civil militias in s ecurity provision is their claim to supernatural powers through the use of oracular deities and secret societies and also their claims of invincibility or being inoculated against bullets and light weapons.34 His analysis leads him t o the conclusion that the use of oracular deities, juju warriors a nd t he s pirit w orld b y co ntemporary ci vil mi litias s hould a lso b e understood from the perspective of the military and the psychological dimension of asymmetrical warfare.35 However, Franciss perspective has one notable drawback in that he sees merely a link between the way the militias operate and the belief in supernatural powers. His f ramework o f a nalysis o f t he a ppropriation o f r eligious r esources b y t he militias does not take into consideration the centrality of religion in t he African public space. This idea is aptly summed up by Kalu:
In Africa, t he p olitical realm is s acralised or enchanted and p olitics is a r eligious matter precisely b ecause it is a m oral p erformance Th e world view in A frican communities i s c harismatic a s g ods o perate in t he s ky, l and, wa ter a nd a ncestral world. Th ey des troy t he b oundaries b etween t he p rofane a nd s acred: s acralise reality a nd g ives r eligious va lue t o e veryday ac tivities. R eligion, c ulture a nd t he modern p ublic s pace a re co nstantly v illagised t hrough t he u se o f c ultic e lements acquired f rom t he p rimal s ector o f c ulture a nd et hnicity b ecome t he o rganising frameworks of human lives.36

Therefore, a s F alola a rgues, t he im portance o f r eligion in a ny a ttempt t o understand African life in a ll its social, economic and political aspects cannot be overestimated.37 Many militia groups use some or other form of ritual and many draw u pon c ultural p ractices t o leg itimise w hat t hey do . I n addi tion, t here a re those w ho t arget cer tain s ocial in structions a nd t herefore a ssume a c ultural approach for their activities. To understand the function of ritual, particularly in the recruitment into mi litia g roups and t he role of s ecret s ocieties in s ustaining them, t here i s acco rdingly a n eed t o exa mine t he a ppropriation o f r eligious resources b y s ome mi litia f or, a s K astfelt p ut i t: There i s a dir ect co rrelation between peoples access to state power and the political significance of religion: the
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more acces s t o s tate p ower, t he les s p olitical im portance o f r eligion a nd v ice versa.38 It i s n ot o nly t rue t hat for A frica in g eneral, c hange, es pecially a brupt transition, is mediated through that aspect of culture known as religion, but also faith-based loyalties have an unchallenged ability to mobilise energies and tap into human spiritual and material resources.39 Among faith loyalties I include African traditional religious, Islamic and Christian spiritual resources. The militias in the Horn o f A frica a nd t he D RC s erve w ell a s i llustrations: t he n otorious L ords Resistance A rmy (LR A), w hich b egan in n orthern U ganda, t he va rious clan/lineage a nd r eligious-based S omali mi litias a nd t he Mungiki of K enya appropriate religious-cultural resources in different ways and in different political circumstances. Alice L akwenas Holy Spirit Movement (w hich b ecame t he LR A) initially b orrowed f rom b oth t raditional a nd C hristian r eligious p ractices a nd appropriated the rituals of purification for the soldiers (as was the custom among the A choli, t o w hich A lice b elonged) a s w ell a s C hristian ide as a bout t he H oly Spirit. R ecently sm all b ands o f LR A mi litia h ave s tarted t o m ove in to t he m ost southerly p art of S outhern Sudan, t he C entral A frican R epublic (CAR) a nd t he bordering areas of the DRC.40 Al S habaab (which m eans y outh) i s a n I slamic mi litant g roup t hat p oses a serious challenge to the fragile transitional government in S omalia. According to De Waal, Islamic ide ology c an b e im portant in m obilising f orces a nd in stilling discipline in t he context of a w eak state41 and in t he present lawless situation in Somalia, Al Shabaab initially used the notion of the Islamic jihad to mobilise the support o f t he lo cal p eople. However, i t s oon b egan t o u se ext reme v iolence t o secure co nformity t o i ts b rand o f I slam: Al S habaab, among o thers, im posed a burdensome co de o f dr ess a nd b ehaviour a nd t ightened i ts g rip o n t he p eople living in the areas under its control. Failure to conform is punished by beheading and o ther cr uel f orms o f ex ecution. It a lso p erpetrates o ther a trocities, s uch a s abduction and rape of women and girls, to intimidate the population. Unlike t he Al S habaab movement, t he Mungiki is a les s o rganised a nd clandestine g roup t hat m akes u se o f A frican t raditional r eligious r esources b y presenting itself a s ad vocate f or t he return t o A frican c ulture. R itual o ccupies a central place in i ts tenets and new members are initiated through rituals that are inspired b y A frican t raditional r eligion. Th e o ath-taking cer emony in ducts t he members into a secret society and other practices, such as circumcision of women and the use of certain traditional symbols and items, are considered to symbolise
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a return to African culture or a re-traditionalisation of modern society. It is also known to offer sacrifices and perform acts of traditional worship. This particular militia g roup h as di stinguished itself a s a r eligious m ovement, t hough t here are social, political and economic reasons for its emergence. It uses culture as a means of expression of political dissent. However, it should be noted that one of the latest developments is the conversion of the Mungiki leader and a group of his followers to C hristianity. Th ey j oined t he J esus i s A live M inistry in O ctober 2009. Th e implications of this conversion and identification with a Christian church for the Mungiki are not yet clear. In t he c ase o f Al S habaab, t he LR A a nd t he Mungiki, r eligion (I slam, Christianity a nd A frican t raditional religion) p rovided b oth t he ide ological a nd structural framework for their activities.

but t hrough t he r egional a nd s ubregional di sputes w hose o rigins a re in t he complexities of local political history and cultural practices.43

UNDERSTANDING MILITIA VIOLENCE AND ATROCITIES

Various explanations have been offered for the atrocious violence perpetrated by militias and rebels. Sall, for example, states that whereas some explanations focus on:
structural factors, others, of a more or less essentialist kind, [invoke] the cultural peculiarities of African societies. Others still relate the violence to the collapse of the very mechanisms or ide ologies t hat constituted p art of t he cement t hat, until then, kept the nations together and societies in conflict together. In some strands of literature, i t i s e ven a rgued t hat t he p erpetration o f v iolence i s a m ode o f development, a way of producing modernity.42

At issue here is the link between violence and culture. Whether any culture, or the African cultures in particular, are especially more inclined toward violence is not the first question that needs to be asked, but rather the urgent issue is to establish the hi storical and c ultural dimensions of t he v iolence t hat i s p erpetrated by t he groups under scrutiny. Elliss endorsement of Neils suggestion is instructive here:
it is persuasive to argue as Neil Whitehead does, that thinking of violence as a cultural form reveals that violence is often engendered not simply by adherence to globalised ideologies such as Christianity, liberal democracy, communism or Islam, 62
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A t wofold argument i s offered, w hich presupposes t he n otion of continuity and change in the cultural arena in which the communities today are confronted by the challenge o f h armonising a nd b lending t he o ld a nd t he em erging c ultural practices. Th e m ost s alient a spect acr oss t he b road s pectrum o f t he mi litias in Africa i s t he o rgy o f v iolence t hat i s v isited u pon inn ocent w omen, m en a nd children. I f t he mi litia g roups, a s wa s s uggested a bove, a re r eacting t o p olitical oppression, m arginalisation o r ex clusion, w hy do t hey t urn t heir w rath o n ordinary people who are in n o way responsible for the state of affairs? Why is it that o ne o f t he def ining c haracteristics o f mi litia g roups i s p lunder, w reaking havoc on societies of which they are members? Antony Block provides an astute response t o t his q uestion w ith hi s s uggestion t hat v iolence c an b e s een as a changing form of meaningful action.44 He advocates for the study of violence as a historically developed cultural form or construction.45 In recent decades the world has witnessed unprecedented rapid social changes, the effects and ambiguities of which have been felt by African societies, too. The competing influences are vast and the choices that the youth of today have to face are bewildering. In the past African societies were bound together by adherence to such n orms a s r espect f or t he e lderly a nd a s ense o f co mmunity t hat en sured strong affinity for ones relatives, clan and community. A sense of shame and fear of transgressing taboos served as means of social control. However, in the presentday world, these values are used selectively to initiate youths into militia groups and the values are manipulated and the rites extended to include the commission of atrocities against even their own kin. Child soldiers who have either been reintegrated in to t heir co mmunities o r w ho h ave es caped f rom mi litia g roups in Liberia, S udan, t he D RC a nd Mozambique a nd m any o ther co untries h ave t old stories of these cruel experiences. On the one hand, this would seem to signify not only a loss of respect for age and kin, but ultimately loss of value for human life. It was a taboo, a curse, to hurt ones parents, brothers and sisters and even those who were related through lineage and clan, let alone to shed their blood. On the other hand, while violence can be a mode o f co mmunication, i t c an b e s uggested t hat sin ce c ulture i s n ot s tatic, globalisation is changing other world views46 and hence shaping the appropriation of t he o ld c ultural va lues t o p roduce a n ew c ultural un derstanding o f v iolence. After all, the militia is as much a social as a political and economic phenomenon.
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If o ne a grees w ith M azruis t hesis, c ulture i s a lso a m ode o f p roduction a nd consumption, n ot o nly o f g oods b ut a lso o f ide as. Th erefore, if t he s ocial safeguards a s def ined b y t he o lder c ultural n orms h ave los t t heir ef ficacy, i t i s perhaps b ecause n ew o nes a re em erging t hat b lend a nd co ntinue t o s hape n ew attitudes. The question i s, h ow c an gender v iolence, w hich i s t he t rademark of mi litia violence, b e o therwise un derstood? W hile wa rs a nd co nflicts in A frica a re complex a nd exhi bit a m ultiplicity o f hi storical a nd g lobal fac tors, in cluding sharing o f r esources, t he g ender v iolence a gainst a nd ra pe o f w omen h ave a cultural dimension. My argument is that it is a reflection of the prevailing gender power di sparities w ithin f eminine a nd m asculine co nstructions, a s w ell a s r oles allocated to and expectations of women and men. The purpose of the widespread infliction of physical harm on the members of the other group or enemies such as m ass ra pe o f w omen a nd g irls a nd t he a mputation o f lim bs, w hich wa s f irst applied in L iberia i s t o h umiliate, in timidate a nd t raumatise, a nd u ltimately destroy, entire communities. Apparently, women and girls are raped not only to humiliate t heir m ale fa mily m embers, o f w hom t he t raditional m asculine expectation is that they should protect their womenfolk, but also because women are p erceived t o b e t he gu ardians of c ulture. From t his p erspective t he v iolence that targets women is logical, because in this way the very core of the community, which is its cultural identity, is attacked. Furthermore, in the age of AIDS and HIV, rape (w hich h as b een c lassified a s a w eapon of wa r by t he United Nations) i s a lethal weapon, as it spreads the virus to thousands of women. In this way, rape is total and long term in its effect. And that is the objective. As s uggested a bove, t he co nstructs o f m asculinity a nd p ower r elations in traditional societies determine the gender role distribution at both the family and community levels. At the family level, children are socialised and raised to be brave men o r wa rriors t o p rotect t heir w omen a nd c hildren. A n exa mple o f t he economic and social practices associated with warrior mentality is raiding other communities t o bring h ome c attle. C attle w ere a nd s till a re f or m any communities, such as the Murle of Southern Sudan, the Karamajong of northern Uganda a nd t he M aasai o f K enya a nd Tanzania, a va luable e conomic r esource, acquisition of which was not only an economic imperative, but also an important cultural practice. It was an expression of masculinity and courage, virtues all men should p ossess. Th e e asy acces s t o t he u ser-friendly AK-47 r ifle h as n ot o nly revolutionised this age-old practice, but also provided a means of venting pent-up
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frustration of the youth who are exploited by both the elite and the elders at the community level. This is illustrated in t he December 2007 g eneral elections and the subsequent p ost-election violence in K enya, in w hich militia groups, among others, r eceived s upport f rom t he p olitical e lite w ho m obilised t hem a s supporters. A nother exa mple i s t he e lders in t he R ift Valley, w ho e levated t he youth t o t he r ole o f def enders o f t heir co mmunity in terests. F or s ome o f t he communities a lso, i t s eems a s if t he p ractice o f t raditional c attle ra iding o r t he warrior c ulture m ay h ave b een r eincarnated in mi litia ac tivities, t hough t he difference is that in t raditional societies the practice was subject to well-defined rules t hat en sured ci vility d uring ra ids. T oday mi litia g roups s eize e very opportunity to raid villages and visit untold suffering and abominable atrocities on the ci vilian p opulations ac ts t hat p reviously w ould h ave b een co nsidered a breach of taboos and punishable through prescribed social and political sanctions.

CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have traced the current militia and rebel movement phenomena to the resistance to corrupt and oppressive local rulers and violent resistance to the establishment of colonial rule. I h ave argued that as a r esult of a lo ng history of fighting f or f reedom, t he c ulture o f r esistance t ook r oot in s ociety a nd in subsequent years manifested itself in r esistance to misrule in m any countries of post-independence Africa. It has been argued that the failed state in Africa has largely contributed to the emergence of rebel movements and militia groups in Africa. The seed of violence was sown by leaders who built their leadership upon ethnic and regional support, and ex cluded t hose w ho did n ot f ind fa vour w ith t he g overnment. Thi s s eed sprouted in the form of tribalism during the first decade after independence and soon b ecame t he v ehicle f or exp ressing di scontent f or t hose ex cluded f rom t he system. Thi s p rovided t he c limate f or t he em ergence o f g roups a nd t he establishment o f in stitutions o utside t he leg itimate s tate a uthority. A s h as b een seen in W est a nd C entral A frica a nd in t he H orn o f A frica, t here i s s ufficient evidence to suggest t hat t he emergence of militia and militant rebel movements can b e p artly a ttributed t o a b reakdown o f l aw a nd o rder in m any A frican countries. This c hapter h as drawn o n exa mples f rom s everal co untries t o i llustrate t he historical and cultural dimensions of the phenomenon of militia and rebel groups
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on the continent. It has been argued that resistance to oppression and intrusion has become embedded in African societies and that it is usually buttressed by the use of cultural resources. The argument was further made that the emergence of the militia and rebel movements must be understood in the context of the dynamic historical processes and events of the last 150 years.

NOTES
1 2 3 4 M Donohoe, War, rape, and genocide: never again? Medscape Ob/Gyn and Womens Health 9(2), 2004, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/491147 (accessed 25 March 2009). M Mamdani, Good Muslim, bad Muslim, New York, Pantheon Books, 2004, 3. L Harbom (ed), States in armed conflict 2003, Report 70, Uppsala University: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2004. K Mbugua, Kenyas crisis: elite and factional conflict in historical context, Conflict trends, 1, 2008; A M ama a nd M O kazawa-Rey, M ilitarism, co nflict a nd w omens ac tivism, Feminist Africa 10, August 2008. J L eatherman, M ilitarized m asculinity a nd r unaway n orms: 1325 a nd t he c hallenge o f overcoming ext reme v iolence, Paper p resented at t he a nnual m eeting o f t he International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, 5 March 2005. Mamdani, Good Muslim, bad Muslim. David Francis (ed), Civil militia, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. Toyin Falola, The power of African cultures, Suffolk: Rochester University Press, 2003, 99. Francis, Civil militia, 14. N Kastfelt (ed), Religion and Africas civil wars, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. I M Lapidus, A history of Islamic societies, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. F Burgat and W D owell, The Islamic movement in North Africa, Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1993, 77. D R obinson, Muslim s ocieties i n A frican h istory, N ew York: C ambridge U niversity P ress, 2004. Ibid. R B Edgerton, Mau Mau: an African crucible, London: Collier Macmillan, 1989. A Gordon and D G ordon (eds), Understanding contemporary Africa, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2001, 60. J O M cCalpin, Historicity of a cr isis: t he origins of t he C ongo war, in J F C lark (e d), The African stakes of the Congo war, New York: Palgrave, 2002, 33. M I M A butudu, Human s ecurity in A frica: c hallenges a nd p rospects, in A B oron a nd G Lechini (e ds), Politics and s ocial movements in an hegemonic w orld, Buenos A ires: C lacso, 2005, 207. Commission on Human Security (CHS), Human security now: protecting and empowering people, New York: United Nations, 2003, 5. Abutudu, Human security in Africa, 212. S Ellis, Violence and history: a r esponse to Mkandawire, Journal of Modern African Studies 41(3) (2003), 457475.
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A Ali Mazrui, Cultural forces in world politics, London: James Carrey, 1990, 8. Francis, Civil militia. Gordon and Gordon, Understanding contemporary Africa, 4. L Magesa, African religion, Nairobi: Paulines Publications, 1997, 216. Ibid, 231. Ibid, 222. Bs and Dunn (eds), African guerrillas, 1415. S A dejumobi, E thnic mi litia g roups a nd t he n ational q uestion in N igeria, S ocial S cience Research C ouncil, h ttp://programs.ssrc.org/gsc/gsc_quarterly/newsletter8/content/ adejumobi/printable (accessed 12 August 2009). See chapters 8 and 11 for details on how the state created conditions conducive to the emergence of militant groups in Nigeria. Tunde Babawale, The rise of ethnic militias, de-legitimisation of the state, and the threat to Nigerian f ederalism, West A frica R eview 3(1 (2001), 6, h ttp://www.westafricareview.com/ vol3.1/babawale.html (accessed 28 M arch 2008). S ee chapter 6 f or another example of how the Sabaot Land Defence Force in K enya emerged in r eaction to both marginalisation and deprivation. Toyin Falola, The power of African cultures, 5051. M Th akur, D emilitarising mi litias in t he K ivus (e astern D emocratic R epublic o f C ongo), African Security Review 17(1), 5267. Kastfelt, Religion and Africas civil wars, 12. Francis, Civil militia, 17. Ibid, 18. Ogbu O K alu, F aith a nd p olitics in A frica: em ergent p olitical t heology o f en gagement in Nigeria, P aul B H enry le cture, 2003, 12, p resented a t t he P aul H enry I nstitute, C alvin College, M ichigan, h ttp://www.calvin.edu/henry/archives/lectures/kalu.pdf (acces sed 28 March 2009). Falola, The power of African cultures, 299. Kastfelt, Religion and Africas civil wars, 6. B K nighton, M ultireligious r esponses t o g lobalization in E ast A frica: K aramajong a nd Agikuyu compares, Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies 23(2) (2006), 71. Heike Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1999. A de W aal (e d), I ntroduction, in Islamism a nd i ts en emies i n t he Horn o f Africa, I ndiana: Indiana University Press, 2004, 9. E Sall, The perpetration and survival of violence: with examples from Sierra Leone, Identity, Culture and Politics 5(1&2) (2004), 87104, 89. Ellis, Violence and history, 470. Antony Block, cited by Ellis, Violence and history, 464. Ibid. Kalu, Faith and politics in Africa, 4.

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C HAPTER 3

Mapping the phenomenon of militias and rebels in Africa

BETTINA ENGELS

INTRODUCTION
Rebel m ovements, in surgencies, wa rlord o rganisations, African guer rillas, ci vil, religious o r et hnic mi litia t hese a re s ome o f t he t erms u sed t o r efer t o contemporary armed non-state groups in Africa.1 Frequently, these terms are used in a n ormative way, having descriptive, rather t han analytic, va lue.2 There is no doubt that armed non-state groups are not a new phenomenon, yet it is difficult to determine to what extent intrastate armed conflicts (that is, conflict where armed non-state groups take part in a relevant manner) in Africa have changed since the end of the Cold War. There are two hotspots of armed conflict in western and Central Africa. The former includes Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia and Cte dIvoire, while the latter includes Chad, Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR) as well as the Great Lakes region of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Owing to insufficient data on non-state armed actors, and perhaps definitional vagueness, i t i s dif ficult t o p rovide r eliable n umbers o f co ntemporary a rmed groups in Africa, and how many members each one has.
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The a im o f t his c hapter i s n ot t o o ffer f urther def initions a nd t ypologies o f armed n on-state g roups. S ome b lind s pots in t he c urrent li terature3 on a rmed groups seem to emerge from the fact that different strands of research (for example on war e conomies, identity, or t he privatisation of s ecurity a nd v iolence) f ocus exclusively on specific types of actors without locating them in the broader scenery of state and non-state violence in Africa. However, this chapter emphasises some factors t hat a re cr ucial if w e wa nt t o ac hieve t he a im o f un derstanding t he phenomenon o f co ntemporary a rmed n on-state g roups in A frica in a comprehensive way. Taking Christopher Claphams work on African guerrillas as a s tarting point, this c hapter a rgues t hat a m apping o f v iolent ac tors c annot b e co nducted in a historical manner but it has to be linked to historical conditions on the national and international level. Furthermore, the analysis of the overall political aims of rebellion as liberation, secession or the change of government has to be completed by inquiry into the motives and recruitment of armed groups. These encompass four k ey f eatures, n amely ide ology, iden tity, r esources a nd s ocial r elationships. Without doubt, aims and motives are also highly relevant for analysis and policy recommendations, b ut t hey fa il t o f unction a s a c ategory o f def inition a nd classification of armed non-state groups. Therefore, I suggest building a comprehensive framework of analysis of armed non-state groups upon their relationship vis--vis the state and society based on two dim ensions: a rmed g roups r elationship w ith t he g overnment a nd a ttitude towards s tate m onopoly o f v iolence. I s ubsequently a rgue t hat n ational a rmies occupy a crucial role in the emergence of armed non-state groups. With regard to an a rmed g roups r elationship w ith s ociety, i t i s in structive t o co nsider w hich populations t hey c laim t o f ight f or a nd w ho a re t he p eople j oining t hem. With regard to the level of social structures, two categories of social inequality entangled with each other are critical for explaining why people, in p articular young men, join militia and rebel groups: generation and class. The chapter concludes by emphasising that comprehensive analysis demands comprehensive p olitical s olutions: mi litia a nd r ebel ac tivities in A frica a re a complex phenomenon and cannot be countered with blueprint programmes.

THE HISTORICITY OF NON-STATE VIOLENT ACTORS

Christopher Claphams work on African guerrillas is ground breaking as it is not only the first but still among the very few attempts to elaborate a broad typology
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of armed non-state groups specifically for the African context.4 Clapham suggests four c ategories f or dif ferentiating A frican in surgencies b y t heir g oals. Th ese categories reflect more or less a chronology of rebellion in Africa since the 1950s. The first category comprises liberation movements against colonial and white minority rule, encompassing in p articular the de-colonialisation era in t he 1950s up to the mid-1970s, s uch as armed insurgencies in Kenya and Cameroon in t he 1950s, liberation movements in S outh Africa, Guinea-Bissau and Namibia since the first half of 1960s, and in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in the late 1960s and 1970s. The second category covers revolts of territorial liberation and secession such as in Eritrea from the early 1960s onwards, the Shifta guerrillas in northern Kenya in t he mid-1960s, t he B iafran wa r (Nigeria) in 19671970, a nd t he s truggle f or autonomy in C asamance (S enegal) a nd S outhern S udan in t he 1960s a nd e arly 1980s. Claphams t hird c ategory, t he reform in surgencies, den otes m ovements t o which t he co mmon def inition o f a r ebel o rganisation a pplies. Th ey a im a t overthrowing a g overnment and creating a dif ferent k ind of state, but challenge neither territorial borders nor the state as an ordering principle in g eneral. Such groups in clude t he T igray P eoples L iberation F ront f rom t he mid-1970s, t he Ugandan National Resistance Army in the early 1980s, and the Alliance des Forces Dmocratiques pour la Libration du Congo established in 1996. Claphams l ast g roup, t he warlord in surgencies, i s something o f a r esidual category in to w hich t o l ump t hose m ovements t hat fa iled t o f it in to a ny o f t he other t hree.5 Warlord in surgencies l ack di scipline a nd ide ology a nd f eature a highly personalised leadership. Often drawing on spiritual or religious beliefs or on et hnic lo yalty, t hese in surgencies m ostly b enefit a sm all g roup o f p olitical entrepreneurs or an individual. They include C harles Taylors National Patriotic Front of Liberia established in 1989, F oday Sankohs Revolutionary United Front in S ierra L eone (1991) a nd M ohamed F arah A idids S omali N ational A lliance (1992). Th ey em erged a t t he en d o f t he C old War, w hile m ovements f ollowing relatively coherent Marxist ideology, like the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front or the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front, declined. Claphams t ypology hig hlights t wo a spects t hat a re cr ucial t o m apping contemporary rebels and militias in Africa. His chronological approach shows that a m apping o f v iolent ac tors c annot b e co nducted in a hi storical m anner a nd i s incomplete if it is restricted to the overall aims of rebellion.
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The p anorama o f a rmed in surgencies h as c hanged un der t he inf luence o f international political and economic conditions. This is not to say that while in the 1960s a nd 1970s a rmed m ovements h ad f ought f or t he (leg itimate) c ause o f national li beration, co ntemporary in surgencies w ere barbaric, p rofit-orientated criminals as suggested by the new wars discourse.6 Rather, one may observe shifts in t he wa y a rmed n on-state g roups r hetorically f rame t heir ac tions a nd in t he nature o f t heir ad versaries. A lthough co lonial a nd w hite min ority r egimes h ave lost t heir r ole a s t he m ain o pponents o f a rmed in surgencies in A frica, s ome governments that emerged from former liberation movements became targets of armed n on-state g roups t hemselves (s uch a s t he Partido A fricano p ara a Independncia da Guin e Cabo Verde in Guinea-Bissau). With n eo-liberal c apitalist g lobalisation ga ining g round a t t he exp ense o f broad sections of impoverished rural populations and urban sub-classes since the 1980s, multinational corporations in creasingly b ecame t argets of a rmed g roups. National liberation is no longer the dominant rhetoric frame for fighting against a regime o r g overnment, b ut h as b een r eplaced b y r eferences t hat a re s uitable t o contemporary international discourses (such as human rights, minority rights and environmental p rotection, o f f or in stance t he N iger D elta). A ctors in volved in armed conflict (state and non-state alike) have always framed their activities into a broader international context in order to achieve military, diplomatic or financial support.7 Whereas in t he 1970s a nd 1980s t his context was def ined by t he C old War, in recent times some state actors rhetorically refer to the war against terror to o btain s upport (s uch a s U gandas P resident Yoweri M useveni in hi s co mbat against t he L ords R esistance A rmy o r t he E thiopian g overnment f ighting t he Oromo opposition).8 The emergence of non-state armed actors and their activities are closely linked to local and international conditions. Therefore, a m apping of these actors has to refer to specific historical contexts.

MOTIVES, MOBILISATION AND RECRUITMENT

Claphams residual c ategory s hows t hat t he f ocus o f o verall p olitical a ims (liberation, secession, overthrowing a g overnment or regime) fails to capture the range o f r ebel a nd mi litia ac tivity in A frica. H e hig hlights t hree a spects t hat a comprehensive a pproach s hould addi tionally co ver: t he r ole o f r eligion a nd ethnicity, ide ology, a nd le adership. R eligion, et hnicity a nd ide ology a re c losely linked t o t he q uestion o f m otives, m obilisation a nd r ecruitment. Th e r ole o f
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leaders affects the level of individuals within armed groups and is discussed in the last s ection of t his c hapter. Four i ssues a re f undamental in o rder t o c apture t he motives a nd m obilisation o f n on-state a rmed ac tors, n amely ide ology, iden tity, resources and social relationships. Armed groups declaring their aim to be a coherent Marxist state project have declined a fter t he en d o f t he C old W ar, a nd s ome o bservers t herefore h ave concluded a loss of ideological motives of rebellion in general.9 But a restriction of ideological m otives t o t he C old War im plies t oo n arrow a n un derstanding o f ideology as such. If we define ideology as a s et of beliefs and norms shared by a large group of people, fulfilling a p olitical function and implying action-oriented political t houghts,10 ideological m otives m ay a lso der ive f rom n ationalism o r religion. F rom t his p erspective, ide ological m otives s till p lay a cen tral r ole f or armed non-state groups in Africa. Ideology particularly affects the cohesion of an armed g roup. I f m embers a re b ound b y co mmon ide ologies a nd a ims, t he organisation is less likely to break up when leaders are killed or arrested.11 Most militia and rebel groups are identity based in o ne way or another, with ethnicity a nd r eligion b eing t he m ost co mmon iden tity f eatures (f or in stance, ethnic militias in the Niger Delta or the Beti militia at the University of Yaound in C ameroon). S ome g roups a re b asically co nstituted b ecause o f t heir co mmon religious iden tity a nd p urposes (mi litant r eligious g roups). O thers m obilise around r eligious e lements, b ut a t t he s ame t ime b ecome et hnic mi litia o r r ebel groups (such as the Egbesu Boys in Nigeria or the Holy Spirit Movement and the Lords R esistance A rmy in U ganda).12 Many s piritually b ased a rmed g roups originate in t raditions f rom p re-colonial t imes, f or exa mple t he traditional hunters (the Kamajores in Sierra Leone and the Dozo in Cte dIvoire).13 Ethnicity i s t he m ost co mmon r eference o f iden tity-based m obilisation. I n several conflicts, it has become a resource for elites in order to stabilise their power claims and a f rame for distributive struggles. Such distributive struggles emerge from discords on the allocation of economic resources (for example oil revenues in Nigeria and Sudan) or land entitlements (such as in the DRC and Cte dIvoire). Ethnic militias recruit strictly from one ethnic group and claim a common identity based on tradition and history. They often emerge f rom ethnic youth groups or local vigilantes. In other cases, rebel groups refer to ethnicity when they complain about a part of the population being excluded from social, political and economic participation (f or exa mple in t he c ase o f t he Mouvement P atriotique d e C te dIvoire and the Tuareg rebellions in Mali and Niger).
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Obviously, a ll a rmed g roups h ave t o g enerate s ome e conomic r esources t o sustain t heir ac tivities a nd b asic exi stence. F or s ome o f t hem in a ny c ase f or mercenaries a nd s ecurity co ntractors g enerating p rofit i s t he co re p urpose o f their activities. Mercenaries and security contractors are not a n ew phenomenon on t he A frican continent, but hig hlight t he continuity of profit-oriented private military a nd s ecurity f irms b eing en gaged in t he exp loitation o f r esources in Africa.14 Nevertheless, t he s pread o f p rivate s ecurity co ntractors h as c learly increased in n umbers a nd s cales sin ce t he e arly 1990s. Th e p rivatisation a nd commercialisation of s ecurity are p art of t he general process of privatising state authority in t he co urse o f g lobalisation a nd n eo-liberalism.15 Economic m otives have b een w idely de bated, a lso b eyond exp licitly co mmercial ac tors s uch a s mercenaries a nd p rivate s ecurity co mpanies. A part f rom t he de bate o n p rofit orientation (greed) as a cause of rebellion,16 a wide range of economic motives can be identified. The existence or non-existence of natural resources is not a motive for violence. But grievances emerge from the way resources are distributed and the question o f w ho h as acces s t o t hem.17 Economic o pportunity s tructures do n ot explain a rmed co nflicts in r esource-rich a reas. B ut t he ext raction a nd transformation o f n atural r esources p roduce p olitical co nflicts o n o wnership, distribution of revenues, organisation of work and bearing the costs of ecological destruction and damages to health.18 In addi tion t o ideology, et hnic lo yalty a nd economic in centives, s ocial relationships and peer pressure are crucial factors for explaining the recruitment of a rmed g roups. I n a s tudy b y Yvan G uichaoua, m ore t han 80 p er cen t o f t he interviewed members of the Oodua Peoples Congress in Nigeria said they joined the g roup v ia fa mily o r p eer co ntacts.19 Relations o f p atronage a re li kewise influential. Furthermore, people feel pressured by family members or peers to join a mi litia o r r ebel g roup.20 Empirically, w e c an h ardly di stinguish t o w hat ext ent families and peer groups function as entryways to armed groups or put pressure on potential recruits to join. The idea of joining a rebel group rarely arises out of the b lue, b ut s ocialisation i s cr ucial f or p articipation in a rmed g roups. S ome people ci te family t raditions o f r esistance,21 others b ecome s ocialised w ithin radical student groups during their studies (that is, the pro-government militias in Sudan a nd C te d Ivoire).22 Students a ssociations in g eneral a re o ne o f t he elemental milieus from which militia and rebel groups originate. While most members of militia and rebel groups join more or less voluntarily, others are abducted and recruited forcefully. Armed groups vary vastly with regard
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to t he p ractice o f f orced r ecruitment. H igh n umbers o f f orced r ecruitments a re known to occur in armed non-state groups in Mozambique,23 Uganda24 and Sierra Leone.25 A t hird o f L iberian f ormer mi litia m embers in terviewed f or a s tudy conducted by Morton B s and A nne Hatly s tated t hey h ad b een abducted or forcefully recruited.26

THE STATE, THE MILITARY, AND NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

The dic hotomy o f t he c ategories state v ersus non-state i s f undamental in contemporary r esearch o n a rmed co nflict. T ypologies o f wa r b uild o n t he differentiation of the warring actors societal status.27 Although peace and conflict research l acks a w idely accep ted def inition a nd co nceptual f ramework f or t he analysis o f n on-state a rmed ac tors, t wo dif ferent a pproaches c an g enerally b e identified: concepts that build upon aims and motives, and others that focus on armed groups relationships vis--vis the state and society. While the question of aims and motives is highly relevant for analysis and policy likewise, it is less helpful as a category of definition and classification of armed groups. Definitions of armed non-state groups frequently build upon the characteristic of the use of violence for specifically p olitical en ds in co ntrast t o the desir e f or p rivate ga in.28 As a consequence, t ypologies o f a rmed n on-state g roups s tate t hat wa rlords a nd criminals h ad e conomic o bjectives, w hereas r ebels a nd t errorists h ad p olitical ones.29 This m otive-based a pproach i s n ormatively lo aded a nd t ends t o (re)produce a rebels v ersus b andits dic hotomy h aving a nalytical a nd p olitical consequences. Assuming armed non-state groups to be either politically motivated rebels or loot-seeking bandits, analytically we fail to acknowledge the diversity of non-state armed actors, their genealogy and their social base. Politically, labelling non-state a rmed ac tors t o b e e conomically m otivated bandits s erves a s a knockout a rgument: criminal wa rlords a nd t heir mi litias a re n ot accep table a s political o r s ocial ac tors w ith w hom t o n egotiate o r li sten t o. C onsequently, governments ado pt mi litary f orce a s t he o ne a nd o nly a ppropriate r esponse t o rebel activities.30 In contrast, def ining and mapping armed groups based on their relationship vis--vis t he s tate a nd s ociety a void t hese co nceptual p roblems a nd p rovide a promising b ase f rom w hich t o e laborate o n a co mprehensive f ramework o f analysis of violent actors. As a working definition, armed non-state groups can be
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described a s challengers t o t he s tates m onopoly o f leg itimate co ercive f orce.31 Being a theoretical point of reference, this does not assume that the state possesses a de facto monopoly of violence or that the majority of the population sees it as legitimate. R ather, w e c an di stinguish a rmed n on-state g roups a s r eplacing t he states monopoly of violence (as a w hole or in cer tain regions) or coexisting with it.32 In numerous cases, warlords wield authority and thereby do n ot simply take over s tate p ower b ut s ubstitute i t.33 Similarly, mi litia a nd v igilantes m ay b e established to protect the population in a certain region (or village, quarter etc) or specific population groups when the states security forces are not able or willing to guarantee security or become a threat to citizens.34 This is not to say vigilantes are sim ply s ubstituting p ublic s ecurity f orces w here t he l atter a re a bsent o r ineffective:
Vigilantism is a category of non-state or self-policing. It not only acts independently of national police agencies, but often does not co-operate with them and is prepared to break national law to achieve its goals of protection and investigation (or even trials a nd s entencing). I t i s c haracterised b y r eactive, ad h oc a nd o ften v iolent methods of control.35

example in S udan a nd t he Ga mbia). W hen g overnments es tablish mi litia a nd make use of them to threaten and fight civil opposition, oppositional groups (in particular s tudent a nd y outh g roups) w ill p ossibly s tart t aking u p a rms o r collaborating w ith exi sting a rmed g roups. Th ese d ynamics m ay q uickly s tart a vicious cir cle o f v iolent ac tion a nd r eaction. In o ther c ases p oliticians p ay lo cal armed groups to act as personal protectors as well as to commit attacks on their adversaries (f or exa mple d uring t he 2003 e lections in N igeria).38 Misleadingly, armed non-state groups frequently are presented as if they were all directed against the state or a government. With r egard t o a rmed n on-state g roups r elationships w ith t he s tate, t wo dimensions c an b e identified: t heir relationship t owards t he s tates m onopoly of violence (r eplacement v ersus co existence) a nd t heir r elationship t owards t he government of the state where they operate (support versus overthrow). Figure 31: The relationship of armed non-state groups to the state and the government
Coexist with monopoly on violence

Nonetheless, a uthorities s ometimes en courage t he es tablishment o f v igilante groups. W hen t he m arket in Oni tsha (lo cated in A nambra s tate in s outheast Nigeria) s uffered f rom ext ensive v iolent r obberies in 2000, t raders ur ged t he governor to invite the Bakassi Boys to intervene and protect the market and local population f rom t he a ttacks.36 The Bakassi B oys thus p artly r eplaced t he s tates monopoly o n v iolence (n otably t he p olice). Th e P eoples M ilitia in T anzania i s formally regulated by national law and recognised as an integral part of Tanzanian security g overnance. Th e I vorian g overnment a lso t ried t o r egulate n on-state security p roviders b ut a imed a t co ntaining t hem. Th e Dozo became p opular fighting against crime and reconstructing public order in t he 1990s. Fearing the hunters may become a paramilitary force similar to the Kamajores in Sierra Leone, Ivorian p resident H enri K onan B di a nd hi s mini ster o f t he in terior l aunched several ac tions t o s eize co ntrol o ver t he Dozo in 1999. 37 These co ntainment measures were among the reasons why several hundred hunters joined the 2002 rebellion in Cte dIvoire. Numerous a rmed n on-state g roups in A frica a re e laborated, co ntrolled o r sponsored b y g overnments t o f ight a gainst o pposition a nd radic al g roups (f or
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Support government

Overthrow government

Replace monopoly on violence

In a q uest to determine w ho t he state and n on-state ac tors are t hat are f ighting against each other in co ntemporary Africa, one cannot but focus the analysis on the military, which usually is the main state actor of violence. National armies have been a main source of insecurity and armed conflict, taking into consideration the fact t hat b etween 1956 a nd 2001, 80 s uccessful coups d tat, 108 fa iled co up attempts and 139 reported coup plots were documented in sub-Saharan Africa.39 A high n umber o f in trastate wa rs in A frica b egan a s mi litary co ups. R ebel
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movements that originated from military coups might start with a relatively small group of (former) militaries and grow as people who did not belong to the military previously j oin t hem a s volunteers (t his h appened in, f or example, C had, C te dIvoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone). (Former) members of the national armies who participate in armed non-state groups range from demobilised soldiers from other states to the phenomenon of sobels. The central role national armies play in t he formation a nd ad vancement o f n on-state a rmed ac tors i s p lausible, b ecause t he latter need weapons and military know-how that the former can provide. The m ain r eason w hy s oldiers (n otably lo wer ra nks) l aunch w hat J immy Kandeh40 calls coups from below or subaltern coups, is based in the relationship between the military and the political powers. Whereas some armies, as in the case of Togo, were ethnically based from the start, others have been instrumentalised and split up in t he course of political power struggles. Soldiers launch rebellions because t hey f eel t hey a re ex cluded, dem obilised o r denie d p romotion, o ften because members of the presidents ethnic group, region or clan are favoured. This has b een t he c ase in, f or instance, t he Kivu provinces of t he DRC41 and in C te dIvoire.42 On the individual level, being a military is at the same time a category of identity and profession. The division of the national armed forces may signify for t hose co ncerned a t hreat t o t heir iden tity a nd s ocial s tatus, t heir m aterial livelihood, a nd in s ome c ases t o t heir p hysical li velihood, t oo. F rom t his perspective, t he (p erceived) di vision o f t he a rmed f orces i s a s trong m otive f or rebellion f or p eople w ho f eel t hey a re b eing m arginalised w ithin t he mi litary. Furthermore, within the military hierarchy of a r ebel group, former members of the national armed forces may occupy a higher rank than the one they held before. Therefore joining a r ebellion could often be equivalent to receiving a p romotion (that may have been withheld from them previously).

SOCIAL EMBEDDINGS, IDENTITY AND MIGRATION

Armed groups do not emerge from or operate in a social vacuum: they mostly are socially embedded in o ne way or another. They f requently make use of c ultural symbols and traditions (such as traditional initiation rituals, religious and spiritual practices and symbols). And they replace not only the state functions of security, protection a nd v iolence b ut a lso t ake o ver o ther g overnance f unctions t hat t he state do es n ot f ulfil in t he f ields o f, a mong o thers, inf rastructure (f or in stance
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transport), medical supplies and education. Militias in t he Niger Delta have, for example, provided scholarships for local youths to study in Ghana. All armed groups refer to societal bases in that they claim to fight for a specific population defined by markers like region, ethnicity or religion. They accuse the government o f ex cluding cer tain s ocial g roups p olitically, c ulturally a nd economically, o r t hey c laim a s hare o f r evenue r esources f or t he g roups t hey represent. It is instructive to note to what extent a rebel group or militia relies on the support of those populations for whom they claim to fight. In many cases, the social base for rebellion is located in dif ferent nation-states. This is unsurprising in view of the fact that borders (all over the world, not only in Africa) are artificial. Furthermore, diasporas play a central role for several armed groups as a means of mobilising resources and as a r ecruitment base.43 Although some members come from fa r-off di aspora co mmunities, t he va st m ajority o f f ighters co me f rom t he country in conflict itself or from the region, notably from neighbouring countries. People migrating across territorial borders to another state to join an armed group are sometimes presented as having a p rofit motive and not attracted by the rebel groups p olitical a ims. Th ey a re m ore li kely t o ac t w ith cr uelty a gainst lo cal populations.44 One c an di stinguish dif ferent c ategories o f p eople w ho mig rate t o j oin a n armed group based on their reasons. Regional recruits are persons who did n ot belong to armed non-state groups previously but migrated to a conflict area for the purpose of joining such a group. Regional warriors are combatants who have not yet been socialised within a non-state armed group and who migrate individually or as a group within a sub-region from one armed conflict to another. At least in their own view, participating in armed conflicts seems to offer them their best and possibly only chance of survival.45 Conflict-induced migration is not only a humanitarian catastrophe but also a two-way process. Some people flee areas of armed conflict, but at the same time some migrate into a conflict zone to join the warring factions. They may likewise come f rom w ithin t he co untry in co nflict o r f rom o ther, m ostly n eighbouring countries. The analysis of w hich lo cal youths and w hich regional recruits j oin a militia or rebel movement sheds light on how ethnic and religious identities are mobilised by armed groups. The mobilisation of collective identity constructions is without doubt an important factor explaining the recruitment, mobilisation and cohesion o f a rmed g roups. B ut a s s cholars, o ne s hould r emain c areful n ot t o reproduce existing and seemingly reliable categories just because it is simple and
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easy to do. The construction of identity in African armed conflicts is not restricted to colonially shaped categories of ethnicity and religion. By focusing an analysis exclusively on t hese categories, one would b e prone to systematic blind spots in research on armed groups. Neither a lleged et hnic lo yalties n or s ocioeconomic fac tors s uffice t o exp lain where t he regional recruits come f rom. Most often, p eople w ho mig rate across territorial borders to join a mi litia or rebel group come from countries that have multiple a nd co mplex r elationships o f mig ration a nd co lonial hi story. F or t he regional wa rriors (s uch a s t he S ierra L eonean f ighters in C te d Ivoire) s ocial, cultural and hi storical relationships are les s relevant. Th ey t hemselves s tate t hat poverty and lack of opportunities are their motives for joining a militia group.46 In West A frica, m ost r egional wa rriors b egan t heir careers a s f orcefully r ecruited children or youths in S ierra Leone or Liberia. Several hundred fighters were, for example, recruited in Liberia for the warring factions in C te dIvoire, rebels and armed groups loyal to the government alike.47 Some did not even know for which side they were fighting.48 When fighting in Cte dIvoire stopped, some moved on to Niger and joined the Mouvement des Nigriens pour la Justice. There is a dearth in reliable data on regional warriors, which could possibly be ascribed to the fact that this category forms a sm all minority of the total militia and rebel fighters in Africa even though it has received relatively major attention from the media and non-governmental organisation (NGO) observers. It is furthermore important to note that regional warriors are hardly those who start an armed conflict but will join it only temporarily.49 The occurrence of regional recruits and regional warriors indicate that there is a regional fac tor t hat plays an important role in t he em ergence of armed n onstate groups and intrastate conflict (for example in Uganda, Sudan and the DRC).50 Most militia and rebel groups are regionally embedded. The war in Liberia started with fighters crossing the border from Cte dIvoire; ten years later, Liberian and Sierra Leonean combatants went to Cte dIvoire to join both the government and the r ebel f orces. R ebellion i s le arnt, t oo: t he s uccess o f mi litary r ebellion in a nearby area seems to make violence an attractive option in another state or region. Armed conflicts in a sub-region facilitate recruitment even in countries that have been relatively stable for a long time, like Kenya or Cte dIvoire. Once a rebellion has started, there is a need for fighters: the most common and efficient way of recruiting is through word of mouth. Refugee flows increase the risk of conflict in host and origin countries as population movements expand rebel
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social n etworks a nd r efugee/internally di splaced p ersons (ID P) c amps m ay become p laces o f r ecruitment, t oo. Flig ht a nd di splacement a re p ossible fac tors explaining why some regions in the world experience more violent conflicts than others.51 The r egional fac tor en compassing g eneral r egional em beddings, t he experience of conflict and refugee dynamics may also explain the occurrence of conflict c lusters in A frica (t he M ano R iver r egion, t he G reat L akes r egion, t he Horn of Africa, as well as Chad, Sudan and the CAR).

THE YOUTH CRISIS AND MILITANCY IN AFRICA

The question of why so many people and especially young men are willing to join militia and rebel groups is crucial for academic analysis, peace and development policy. Cr iticising t he ide as o f lo ose m olecules52 and lumpen youth,53 social anthropologists in r ecent y ears h ave f ocused o n t he youth cr isis in A frica. Economic crises and increasing poverty contribute to the growth of armed groups recruitment potential. But assuming a causal relationship between marginalisation and militia membership seems too simple: rank and file members of militia and rebel groups are indeed frequently marginalised in multiple ways, but usually they are no more marginalised t han t heir p eers.54 The introduction of t he concept of youth as a social category closes this analytical gap.55 Generational categories are neither fixed nor stable but continuously produced and reproduced in s ocial and cultural n egotiation a nd c hange.56 Therefore, y outh c annot b e def ined b ased o n chronological age or as a fixed demographic cohort:
The concept youth is, to adopt Durhams phrase, a social shifter: it is a relational concept si tuated in a d ynamic co ntext, a s ocial l andscape o f p ower, k nowledge, rights, and cultural notions of agency and personhood Such social and cultural variables as gender, religion, class, responsibilities, expectations, race and ethnicity play im portant p arts in def ining w ho a re r egarded o r co nsider t hemselves a s children or youth a nd the ways young persons are perceived do n ot necessarily coincide with their self-definitions.57

In A frican co ntexts, b eing y oung o ften im plies p otentially b eing ex cluded, exploited and marginalised. Consequently, youth is not desirable but a social status one tries to escape.58 Resulting from the socioeconomic crisis, low levels of formal education, and lack of access to land and other sufficient means to earn a li ving,
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young men are excluded f rom t he s ocial status of adulthood. They blame t hose who h ave r eached s ocial ad ulthood t hemselves f or t his ex clusion: Many y oung men locate their inability to ensure a f uture for themselves in t he greed of their elders.59 Generation is a category of social cleavages and conflicts. Originating from the material conditions of life, it is closely linked to the category of class: class-based social inequalities induce the gap between youth and elders (see Richards on the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone).60 In the generation conflict, youth feels less threatened by physical than by social death.61 Typical wa ys f or t he y outh t o es cape a re mig ration o r t he s earch f or a patron (wa rlords c an b e p atrons, t oo). F rom t his p erspective, j oining a n a rmed group is a b alancing act between social death and violent life chances, as Henrik Vigh put it,62 and an opportunity to es cape t he s ocial status of youth. Non-state armed g roups create s ome s ort of order and s ocial organisation in co nflict torn societies, and they offer a basis for social identity, integration and mobility. Being a rebel i s a p ossible entrance t o s ocial adulthood: le aving t he p arental h ouse or village, becoming economically independent and able to build up an own family.63 In t his r egard i t i s h ardly s urprising t hat h ouses, w omen a nd c ars a re cen tral symbols in t he narratives of the youth when describing the social status of rebel group members. As Morten Bs has shown, using the biography of Sam Bockarie as an example, being a rebel can represent a desirable social identity:
For m any a ngry a nd m arginalised y oung m en, h e n o do ubt h ad b ecome a r ole model as well. The full tragedy of the situation is exposed only when we take into consideration that by Sierra Leonean standards, Bockarie lived a s uccessful life whereas t he o rdinary S ierra L eonean dies a s a p oor m an w hom n obody k nows about or pays much attention to, Bockarie died as a rich and famous man.64

They are frequently supported and sometimes even controlled by outside actors, no least of which are the governments and militaries from neighbouring countries. The mi lieu le aders, t he hig her a nd lo wer ra nks f rom w hich a rmed n on-state groups o riginate, a lso r eflect t he wa y mi litia a nd r ebel g roups a re em bedded within s ociety. L eaders a nd hig her-ranking o fficers h ave b een a ffiliated m ainly with the military and student organisations, whereas lower ranks originate from the s tudent a nd t he r ural mi lieu.66 The l atter o bservation r ejects Mka ndawires thesis o f p ost-colonial A frican r ebels h aving li ttle in co mmon w ith t he peasantry.67 The f ormer s upports t he a ssumption t hat n ational a rmies p lay a crucial r ole in t he f ormation o f a rmed n on-state g roups (a s in t he c ase o f, f or instance, Chad, Cte dIvoire, Niger and Sierra Leone).

CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I identified four key factors in order to construct a comprehensive framework of analysis of militia and rebel movements in Africa. The first referred to motives, mobilisation and recruitment of armed non-state groups. I have argued that four types of motives and entryways play a role: ideology, identity, resources and social relationships. Arguing that motives are essential but not sufficient for the analysis of armed groups, I n ext suggested mapping militia and rebel groups along t heir r elationship t o t he s tate. Th e r elationship t o t he s tate h as t wo dimensions: a n a rmed g roups r elationship w ith t he g overnment (a lliance o r opposition) and with the monopoly of violence (replacement or coexistence). The relationship b etween r ebel g roups a nd t he s tate i s a lso s haped b y t he fac t t hat national armies play a cr ucial role in t he emergence of armed non-state groups. With r egard t o t he r elationship b etween a rmed g roups a nd t he s ociety t hey operate in, emphasis is put on the social embeddings of militia and rebel groups. These em beddings a re n ot s o m uch t erritorially def ined a s t hat t hey r ely o n sociocultural a nd s ocio-spatial s ettings. M ost a rmed g roups c laim t o f ight f or specific social groups. These social groups are not bound by territorial borders, for membership is based rather on cultural and social bonds. This is not surprising, taking in to co nsideration co lonially im posed co nstructions o f n ationality a nd statehood as well as artificial borders. Finally, the fourth factor comprised social structures of inequality, notably class and generation. Complex s ocial p henomena s uch a s a rmed non-state groups dem and comprehensive p olitical s olutions. I t herefore co nclude b y s tressing t he importance of mapping rebel groups in conflict resolution and management. The
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The function of the leaders of armed groups as role models is crucial. Most rebel leaders are less Webers charismatic leaders than they are a basis for young mens aspirations t o w ealth a nd s ocial r ecognition. E ven if le aders a nd hig h-ranking rebels have academic or military training,65 they do not necessarily originate from social or political elites. They are rather small men in big offices for whom the role as a r ebel le ader i s an option for a p ersonal c areer (for example C harles Taylor, Foday Sa nkoh o r G uillaume S oro). C ertainly, t hey p lay a n es sential r ole in t he inner dynamics of most armed groups, but they mostly do not act autonomously.
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features o f a rmed n on-state g roups a nalysed in t his c hapter t herefore p resent specific challenges. However, co nflict m anagement s hould n ot b uild o n o verall a ims o f a rmed groups alone. The relationship with the state and society and the different social contexts of the different members of armed groups are also highly relevant for a comprehensive approach to conflict management. An armed groups relationship with t he m onopoly o f v iolence (r eplacement o r co existence) i s o f p articular importance d uring t he f irst s tage o f p eace b uilding, w hen s ecurity h as t o b e restored in a country of conflict. The relationship between an armed group and the government (a lliance o r opposition) i s es pecially r elevant w ith r egard t o determining mediation and negotiation strategies. In order to be sustainable in the long run, conflict management must address social inequality, in p articular generational and class structures. Accordingly, the resolution of the youth crisis is currently one of the most urgent tasks of crisis prevention in Africa.

NOTES
1 M Bs and K C D unn (eds), African guerrillas: raging against the machine, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2007; C C lapham (ed), African guerrillas, Oxford: James Currey, 1998; D J Francis, Civil militia: Africas intractable security menace? Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. A Hills, Warlords, militia and conflict in co ntemporary Africa: a r e-examination of terms, Small Wars a nd I nsurgencies 8(1) (1997), 3551, 48; M V B hatia (e d), Terrorism a nd t he politics of naming, London: Routledge, 2008. Bs and Dunn, African guerrillas; T Mka ndawire, The terrible toll of post-colonial rebel movements in A frica: t owards a n exp lanation o f t he v iolence a gainst t he p easantry, The Journal of Modern African Studies 40(2) (2002), 181215; J M Weinstein, Resources and the information p roblem in r ebel r ecruitment, Journal o f C onflict R esolution 49(4) (2005), 598624. C C lapham, I ntroduction: a nalysing A frican in surgencies, in C C lapham (e d), African guerrillas, Oxford: James Currey, 1998, 118; Bs and Dunn, African guerrillas. C Clapham, African guerrillas revisited, in Bs and Dunn (eds), African guerrillas. H Mnkler, The new wars, Cambridge, Mass: Polity, 2005; for a criticism of these ideas, see S N K alyvas, New a nd old ci vil wa rs: a va lid di stinction? World P olitics 54(1) (2001), 99118. Bhatia, Terrorism and the politics of naming; C B ob, The marketing of rebellion: insurgents, media, and international activism, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. M B s and C K D unn, African guerrilla politics: raging against the machine? In B s and Dunn (eds), African guerrillas, 20. S M air, Th e n ew w orld o f p rivatised v iolence, Internationale P olitik u nd G esellschaft 2 (2003), 128; Mnkler, The new wars.
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10 W C arlsnaes, Ideology a nd f oreign p olicy: p roblems o f c omparative c onceptualization, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, 150154. 11 Clapham, Introduction: analysing African insurgencies, 9. 12 H Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits: war in northern Uganda, 198597, O xford: J Currey, 1999; A Sesay, C Ukeje, O Aina and A Odebiyi (eds), Ethnic militias and the future of democracy in Nigeria, Ile-Ife, Nigeria: Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 2003. 13 T J Bassett, Containing the Donzow: the politics of scale in Cte dIvoire, Africa Today 50(4) (2004), 3149; C Ero, Vigilantes, civil defence forces and militia groups: the other side of the privatisation of security in Africa, Conflict Trends 1 (2000), 2529, 27. 14 B Muthien a nd I T aylor, Th e r eturn o f t he D ogs o f War? Th e p rivatization o f s ecurity in Africa, in T J H B iersteker and Bruce Rodney (eds), The emergence of private authority in global governance, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 189, 194. 15 Ibid, 183. 16 Cf P C ollier, Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for politics, World Bank Papers, Washington, DC: World Bank; P Collier and A Hoeffler, On the incidence of civil war in Africa, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(1) (2002), 1328, 13. 17 M M amdani, A frican s tates, ci tizenship a nd wa r: a c ase s tudy, International A ffairs 78(3) (2002), 493506, 505. 18 D K een, The e conomic f unction o f v iolence i n ci vil w ars, A delphi P aper 320, O xford/New York: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998, 41. 19 Y G uichaoua, Who jo ins e thnic m ilitias? A s urvey o f t he O odua P eoples C ongress i n southwestern N igeria, CRISE W orking P aper 44, 2007, O xford: C entre f or R esearch o n Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, 2007, 23. 20 T M M cKenna, Muslim r ulers a nd r ebels: e veryday p olitics a nd a rmed s eparatism i n t he southern Philippines, Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1998, 24, 189190. 21 K K ampwirth, Women a nd g uerrilla m ovements: N icaragua, E l S alvador, Ch iapas, C uba, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002, 11. 22 Y K onat, L es enfa nts de l a b alle: de l a F esci a ux m ouvements de p atriotes, Politique Africaine 89 (2003), 5070, 50. 23 Weinstein, Resources and the information problem in rebel recruitment, 621. 24 J B evan, Th e m yth o f m adness: co ld ra tionality a nd resource p lunder b y t he L ords Resistance Army, Civil Wars 9(4) (2007), 343358, 343. 25 L Stovel, Theres no bad bush to throw away a bad child: tradition-inspired reintegration in post-war Sierra Leone, The Journal of Modern African Studies 46(2) (2008), 305324, 310. 26 M B s a nd A H atly, Getting in, g etting o ut: mi litia m embership a nd p rospects f or r eintegration in post-war Liberia, The Journal of Modern African Studies 46(1) (2008), 3355, 45. 27 N P G leditsch, P W allensteen, M Er iksson, M S ollenberg a nd H S trand, A rmed co nflict 19452001: a new dataset, Journal of Peace Research 39(5) (2002), 615637, 619; L H arbom and P Wallensteen, Armed conflict and its international dimensions, 19462004, Journal of Peace Research 42(5) (2005), 623635, 624. 28 P P oliczer, Neither t errorists n or f reedom f ighters: a rmed g roups, W orking P aper 5, University of Calgary: The Armed Groups Project, March 2005, 6. 29 See f or exa mple M air, Th e n ew w orld o f p rivatised v iolence; U M enzel, F rom t he r ent economy to the violence economy, Development and Cooperation 1 (2003), 3133, 32.
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30 M Bhatia, Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors, Third World Quarterly 26(1) (2005), 522, 5; Policzer, Neither terrorists nor freedom fighters, 8. 31 Policzer, Neither terrorists nor freedom fighters, 8. 32 Mair, The new world of privatised violence, 12. 33 P Jackson, Warlords as alternative forms of governance, Small Wars and Insurgencies 14(2) (2003), 131150, 144. 34 Sesay et al, Ethnic militias and the future of democracy in Nigeria, 2324. 35 B B aker, W hen t he B akassi B oys c ame: e astern N igeria co nfronts v igilantism, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 20(2) (2002), 223244, 223. 36 Ibid, 226. 37 Bassett, Containing the Donzow, 43, 41; cf J H ellweg, Encompassing the state: sacrifice and security in the Hunters Movement in Cte dIvoire, Africa Today 50(4) (2004), 328. 38 Human R ights W atch (HR W), Rivers a nd b lood: g uns, o il a nd p ower i n N igerias R ivers State, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Human Rights Watch, 2005, 17. 39 P J McGowan, African military coups dtat, 19562001: frequency, trends and distribution, The Journal of Modern African Studies 41(3), (2003), 339370, 339. 40 J D Kandeh, Coups from below: armed sulbalterns and state power in West Africa, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 41 K Vlassenroot, A societal view on violence and war: conflict and militia formation in eastern Congo, in P K aarsholm (ed), States of failure, societies in collapse? Understandings of violent conflicts in Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 2006, 49. 42 A L anger, Horizontal i nequalities a nd v iolent c onflict: t he c ase o f C te d Ivoire, CRIS E Working P aper 13, O xford: C entre f or R esearch o n I nequality, H uman S ecurity a nd Ethnicity, 2004, 32. 43 K Om eje, Th e di aspora a nd do mestic in surgencies in A frica, African S ociological R eview 11(2) (2007), 94197. 44 Human Rights Watch, Youth, poverty and blood: the lethal legacy of West Africas regional warriors, Report 17(5), 2005, 1, New York: Human Rights Watch. 45 Human R ights W atch, Y outh, p overty a nd b lood, 2; I nternal Di splacement M onitoring Centre (IDMC), Cte dIvoire: IDPs face deepening protection crisis as p olitical tensions rise again, Geneva: IDMC, 27 46 IDMC, Cte dIvoire, 27. 47 C Ero and A Marshall, Louest de la Cte dIvoire: un conflit librien? Politique Africaine (89) (2003), 88101, 99100; L Gb erie and P A ddo, Challenges of peace implementation in Cte dIvoire: r eport o f a n exp ert w orkshop b y K AIPTC a nd ZIF , ISS M onograph 105, P retoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004, 16. 48 HRW, Youth, poverty and blood, 41f. 49 Cf Bs and Dunn, African guerrilla politics, 3031. 50 G P runier, R ebel m ovements a nd p roxy wa rfare: Uganda, S udan a nd t he C ongo, African Affairs 103(412) (2004), 359383, 359. 51 I Sa lehyan a nd K S G leditsch, R efugees a nd t he s pread o f ci vil wa r, International Organization 60(2) (2006), 335366, 355.

52 Robert D K aplan, The coming anarchy: how scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism and disease a re ra pidly des troying t he s ocial fa bric o f o ur p lanet, Atlantic M onthly, Fe bruary 1994, 4476, 44, h ttp://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-cominganarchy/4670/ (accessed 3 August 2010). 53 I Abdullah, Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone, The Journal of Modern African Studies 36(2) (1998), 203235, 207208. 54 Bs and Hatly, Getting in, getting out, 34. 55 M Bs, Marginalised youth, in Bs and Dunn (eds), African guerrillas, 39; C Christiansen, M Utas and H Vigh, Youth (e)scapes, in C Christiansen, M Utas and H Vigh (eds), Navigating youth gen erating a dulthood: s ocial b ecoming i n a n A frican c ontext, U ppsala: N ordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006. 56 C C hristiansen, M U tas a nd H V igh, I ntroduction, in C hristiansen, Utas a nd Vigh (e ds), Navigating youth generating adulthood, 10. 57 F de Boeck and A Honwana, Children and youth in Africa: agency, identity and place, in A Honwana a nd F de B oeck (e ds), Makers a nd b reakers: c hildren a nd y outh i n p ostcolonial Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 2005. 58 J C omaroff and J L C omaroff, R eflections on youth f rom t he p ast to t he p ostcolony, in A Honwana a nd F de B oeck (e ds), Makers a nd b reakers: c hildren a nd y outh i n p ostcolonial Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 2005, 1930, 22; H Vigh, Social death and violent life chances, in Christiansen, Utas and Vigh (eds), Navigating youth generating adulthood, 36. 59 Vigh, S ocial de ath a nd v iolent lif e c hances, 38; cf J C omaroff, a nd J L C omaroff, O ccult economies a nd t he v iolence o f a bstraction: n otes f rom t he S outh A frican p ostcolony, American Ethnologist 26(2) (1999), 297303, 289. 60 P Richards, Forced labour and civil war: agrarian underpinnings of the Sierra Leone conflict, in P Kaarsholm (ed), States of failure, societies in collapse? Understandings of violent conflicts in Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 2006. 61 Vigh, Social death and violent life chances, 31. 62 Ibid. 63 Cf B s, M arginalised y outh, 39; P R ichards, Fighting f or t he r ain f orest: w ar, y outh a nd resources in Sierra Leone, Oxford: James Currey, 1996; Richards, Forced labour and civil war. 64 Bs, Marginalised youth, 52. 65 K Schlichte, In the shadow of violence: the politics of armed groups, Frankfurt am Main / New York: Campus, 2009, 3536. 66 Ibid. 67 Mkandawire, The terrible toll of post-colonial rebel movements in Africa, 181.

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C HAPTER 4

Armed non-state entities in international law: status and challenges of accountability

GODFREY MUSILA

INTRODUCTION
From Western Sa hara in t he n orth t o S outh A frica a t t he s outhern t ip o f t he continent and f rom t he Gulf of Guinea in t he west t o t he Horn in t he e ast, t he recent hi story o f t he co ntinent s eems in separable f rom t hat o f a rmed n on-state groups. I n S outh A frica, t he a rmed s truggle wa ged b y Umkhonto w e S izwe, t he military wing of the African National Congress (ANC), and other groups put paid to t he o ppressive a partheid r egime w ith t he in auguration o f dem ocracy in t hat country. In many other African countries, independence was won on the edge of the sw ord w ielded b y simi lar g roups: t he Frente de L ibertao de M oambique (FRELIMO) in M ozambique, t he Mau Ma u in K enya, t he S outh W est A frica Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia, and the Front de Libration Nationale in Algeria among others. Current African experience demonstrates that the activities of armed non-state groups did n ot ce ase w ith t he h oisting o f in dependence f lags. F or va rious historical reasons, new struggles emerged in m any countries not long after these celebrations h ad en ded. S ome o f t hese co nflicts c an b e exp lained b y o ppressive dictatorships, ethnic and religious struggles for power and resources and abortive
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attempts at democratisation. There are quite a f ew countries on t his list, among them t he D emocratic R epublic o f C ongo (D RC) (t hen Z aire), M ozambique, Angola, Sudan, t he C omoros a nd Nigeria. W hile t he ac tivities o f s ome o f t hese movements h ave n ot y ielded q uick s uccess, t hus p rovoking en dless s pirals o f violence, elsewhere they have resulted in de cisive conclusions. In some countries the endeavours of t hese non-state g roups have resulted in a t ake-over of p ower, thus catapulting them into government: Ugandas National Resistance Movement (NRM), the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) a re g ood exa mples. I n o ther co untries, r ebel ac tivities h ave r esulted in fragmentation a nd s ecession, a s wa s t he c ase o f Er itrea, a nd p ossibly S outhern Sudan. Experience from some African countries also shows that some armed nonstate groups may not necessarily have grand political objectives, as in t he case of national liberation movements and rebel movements whose ultimate goal is either to take power or reach an accommodation for a new political dispensation. While this category may be appropriated by political organisations for their own ends, it remains founded in either criminal (petty or organised and mafia-like) motives or espouses pseudo-religious messages. The Mungiki in Kenya and similar criminal gangs and sects are a good example (see chapter 6). The fact that the activities of armed non-state actors in general have invariably been r egarded a s cr iminal (o r t errorist) in t he va rious n ational sys tems h as coloured responses by the relevant authorities. The question here is whether it also influenced, o r wa s inf luenced b y, in ternational l aw. W hat i s t he p lace o f t hese groups under the various branches of international law? It is true that by their very existence, t hese en tities r ebel m ovements, mi litias a nd o ther a rmed g roups operate against or threaten to overturn existing social, economic and legal orders, not least the international legal order. For instance, as shown later in this chapter, some o f t he m ost eg regious cr imes co mmitted d uring t he co ntinents m any conflicts have been attributed to these armed groups. As noted already, activities of such entities have in a number of cases resulted in redrawing the boundaries of states, touching on a central pillar of the international legal order. Further, armed conflicts in va rious p arts of t he continent h ave h ad far-reaching s ocioeconomic effects o n in dividuals a nd en tire co mmunities. F or a t le ast t hese r easons, a nd because t heir ac tions o ften h ave international ra mifications, international l aw hitherto unresponsive to non-state entities has attempted to deal with these new actors. S ince t he va rious n on-state ac tors des cribed a bove m ay f orm s eparate
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categories, the response of international law and its various branches has not been uniform. This c hapter h as f our m ain o bjectives. Fir st, i t a ttempts t o di stinguish t he various categories of actors national liberation movements, rebels and militia as well as other relevant groups in legal context. Second, it reviews international law and the branches that are relevant to these groups in particular rebel movements and militia groups. Third, it outlines the legislative responses by the African Union and United Nations to rebels and militia activities win the African context. Fourth, it provides an overview of the breaches of international law committed by these groups a nd h ow in ternational a nd n ational lega l r egimes h ave h eld t hem accountable, a nd s ome o f t he c hallenges o f h olding p erpetrators acco untable under international law. The chapter has three parts. The first part provides the theoretical framework and c larifies s ome o f t he b asic co ncepts. I t a lso o utlines t he p lace o f n on-state actors in international law generally. The second part deals with issues related to legal responses by states and the international community of states to rebels and militia un der va rious b ranches o f in ternational l aw. I t t hen addr esses t he modalities and challenges related to establishing the accountability of members of these g roups. Th e l ast p art co ncludes t he c hapter w ith f indings a nd recommendations.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND BASIC CONCEPTS Locating non-state actors in international law
The Peace o f Westphalia o f 1648 i s o ften p inpointed a s t he s tarting d ate o f t he modern s overeign s tate a nd t he f oundation o f a n in ternational co mmunity o f states in a h orizontal, co-e qual r elationship w ith e ach o ther.1 The ne w international legal order so created t he Westphalian model of international law established the state as the central actor and sole subject of international law. The establishment of the League of Nations and later the United Nations in 1945 did not c hange t he p osition o f t he s tate a s t he do minant ac tor in in ternational lif e. Today, while there are some exceptions due to developments in the last 60 years as discussed in the following sections, contemporary international law is still built on this b asic p remise. Th e in ternational co mmunitys co nstitutive s et-up i s dominated by it.2
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There are many instances where the state-centric structure of international law is w ell i llustrated. Th e c lassical s ources o f in ternational l aw dep end o n t he interaction of states in the form of treaties and other agreements of a similar nature as well as customary law as the practice of states. In other words, only states can conclude treaties with each other. While churches, international organisations and other en tities m ay s end envoys t o o ther t erritories, di plomatic r elations a re conducted only between states.3 Emphasising further that the state is still the main actor in the international sphere, official forums such as international courts and international organisations are largely reserved for states. However, international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are routinely granted special or observer status at state and intergovernmental forums such as the AU and the UN.4 International law, too, has yielded in a number of areas, in particular in the realm of human rights, to allow non-state entities in dividuals t o stand before international courts and commissions either as beneficiaries of procedures of petition against states5 or as subjects of punishment for crimes committed.6 While these recent developments in international law have altered the notion of sovereignty by limiting states freedom of lawful action, these have been slight and h ave lef t t he b asic s tructure o f in ternational l aw un changed.7 Although individuals c an enf orce h uman r ights a gainst t heir s tate o f n ationality b efore international tribunals such as the African C ourt as well as the C ommission on Human and Peoples Rights, the protection of individual rights for the most part still depends on diplomatic protection through state representatives when rights of a n ational a re v iolated b y a nother s tate. A s K oskenniemi h as n oted, cen tral concepts in in ternational l aw s uch a s s overeignty, t erritorial in tegrity, n onintervention, self-defence or permanent sovereignty over natural resources all still rely on the exclusive or dominant role of the state.8 For p urposes o f t his c hapter, i t i s cr ucial t o co mprehend t his s tate-centric structure of international law for at least three reasons to be expounded upon later:
I

Crowding out the state? A variety of non-state actors

This section contextualises rebel movements and militias within international law, particularly African international law. In particular, it explores whether and how rebel movements and militias are recognised and defined by law and under what legal circumstances they can be justified. It is crucial to understand the meaning of and distinguish various terms used w ith reference to armed non-state ac tors, which commentators are apt to confuse, namely national liberation movements, rebel movements, insurgents, belligerents and militias.

Militias
A militia group is in essence a group of armed citizens recruited often on an ad hoc basis to supplement the regular armed force engaged in active hostilities. The militia, a lthough co mposed o f m embers w ho m ay n ot r eceive a r egular remuneration, i s a n ext ension o f t he r egular a rmy. I n t erms o f Th e H ague Regulations o f 1907, t he r ights a nd d uties o f t he r egular a rmy a lso a pply t o members of militia and volunteer corps associated with such army. In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the denomination of army.9 As a category in international law, this is the strict sense in which the term militia is used in international humanitarian law (IHL). The Janjaweed fighters in Darfur, who are suspected of having links to regular Sudanese armed forces, fit the tag of militia group active in one of the main armed co nflicts in A frica.10 The Interahamwe, w ho f ought a longside R wandan armed f orces ( Forces A rmes R wandaises, F AR) d uring t he 1994 g enocide, i s another g ood exa mple o f a mi litia g roup. IHL r equires t hat s uch a mi litia f ulfil certain co nditions: t o b e co mmanded b y a p erson r esponsible f or hi s/her subordinates; t o h ave a f ixed di stinctive em blem r ecognisable a t a di stance; t o carry arms openly; and to conduct its operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.11 The term militia is not always used in t his strict s ense, but tends to b e used loosely t o r efer t o a ny g roup o f f ighters o perating a longside t he m ain wa rring parties in an intrastate conflict governmental and rebel forces whether such a group of fighters is affiliated with the government forces or not. In the DRC, for instance, groups such as the Mai-Mai are consistently referred to in li terature as the Mai-Mai militia.12 With respect t o Al S habaab fighters in S omalia13 and t he Lords R esistance A rmy (LR A) in U ganda,14 which a re b oth a rmed o pposition
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This s tructure o f in ternational l aw s erves n ot o nly a s a t heoretical a nd intellectual framework for discussion but also explains the place of the relevant non-state en tities un der g eneral in ternational l aw w ith t he ef fect t hat e ven where such non-state actors are recognised, they have limited rights only It ra tionalises r esponses t o t hese a rmed groups b y s tates a nd r egional organisations such as the AU It s heds lig ht o n t he c hallenges o f es tablishing acco untability f or cr imes committed by these entities or their members
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groups involved in a rmed conflict a gainst government forces in t heir respective countries, references to t hem as militia are not consistent. While t here is proof that t he Mai-Mai and o ther simi lar g roups h ave f rom t ime t o t ime f ought alongside government forces, the Forces Armes de la Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo (FARDC) o r a ffiliated t hemselves w ith i ts o bjectives, t he Mai-Mai has generally o perated in dependently. F urther, t here i s n o e vidence t hat o ther t han arms a nd log istical a ssistance, t he Mai-Mai fighters h ad r eceived a ny f inancial recompense or salaries from the government. The Mai-Mai does therefore not fit into the strict category of militia recognised under IHL. As w ill b e s een l ater, t he dif ficulty in fac tually es tablishing t he iden tity o r category o f a g roup en gaged in a rmed co nflict p oses s erious c hallenges f or establishing the accountability of perpetrators of crimes. In general, the ease with which individuals can be held accountable depends on what set of rules applies, which in t urn may depend on the category of the group to which the individual belongs w hether t o a r egular a rmed f orce a nd a ssociated mi litia o r t o a r ebel group.15 For o ur p urposes ex cept w hen di scussing s pecific r ules a pplying t o recognised categories of fighters under international law the term militia is used in t he s econd co lloquial s ense t o r efer t o a ny n on-governmental a rmed g roup, whether affiliated to a regular army or opposed to such an army.

National liberation movements

While national liberation movements (NLMs) are not the focus of this study, one cannot f ully g rasp t he p osition o f r elevant n on-state ac tors, in p articular r ebel movements, w ithout lo oking t o NLMs, in a s ense a n a ntecedent o f l atter-day rebels, and the first non-state entities with which the hitherto heavily state-centric model of international law had to grapple. Unlike the fairly problematic position relating t o r ebel m ovements di scussed a bove, in ternational l aw t hen transforming itself in the years following World War II and the founding of the UN in 1945 responded to the new phenomenon of NLMs by recognising them when the wa rs o f de colonisation er upted.16 This r ecognition o f NLMs c ame co mplete with pre-existing rights and duties that were not conditional on recognition by the relevant state. Clapham has pointed out the paradox of referring to NLMs as nonstate actors. NLMs are in essence state-like entities that many times end up taking over the state.17 There are several examples of such NLMs in Africa in recent times, including FRELIM O (M ozambique), t he Movimento P opular d e L ibertao d e Angola (MPLA) (Angola), SWAPO (Namibia) and the ANC (South Africa). After
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long armed struggles, these NLMs installed themselves as legitimate governments. In cer tain c ases a n NLM m ay a lready b e r ecognised a s a s tate in wa iting b y regional b odies.18 As n oted, a n NLM m ay b e a ble t o c laim r ights, a nd w ill b e subject to international obligations, even in t he absence of control of territory or express recognition by its adversary (two conditions applicable to rebels).19 This is one m ain dif ference b etween NLMs a nd t he r ecognised b elligerents a nd insurgents discussed in the next section. Until 1977 w hen t wo A dditional P rotocols20 were adde d t o t he G eneva Conventions of 1949, 21 only interstate conflicts w ere recognised in in ternational law, w ith wa rring s tates g ranted cer tain r ights.22 A co nflict t hat p itted a s tate against another was an international armed conflict. Non-state entities, even those engaged in the wars of liberation during the days of decolonisation in Africa, were systematically ignored or generally labelled as criminals and terrorists by the states concerned. Additional Protocol I t o t he G eneva C onventions changed t he lega l p osition relating t o NLMs. I t a pplied t he l aw o f a rmed co nflict r elevant t o in terstate conflicts to armed conflicts between a state and an NLM. In other words, an armed conflict between a state and an NLM would from that time onward be considered to be an international conflict to which the rules of IHL (Geneva Conventions of 1949, Additional Protocol I t o t he G eneva C onventions) apply. For in stance, an NLM fighter who was captured was to be regarded as a prisoner of war and could thus not be prosecuted merely for taking up arms, but only for breaching the laws of war by for example targeting civilians. More specifically, article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I classifies three types of wars o f n ational li beration a s in ternational a rmed co nflict: a rmed co nflicts in which p eoples are f ighting against colonial domination (t he m ajority of wars of decolonisation in A frica, Latin America and Asia); alien occupation (such as the Popular d e L iberacin d e S agua e l Hamra y R o d e O ro [POLISARIO] F ront in Western Sahara and Hamas and Fatah in Palestine); and against racist regimes (the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress in apartheid South Africa) in t he exercise of t heir r ight t o s elf-determination.23 Further, un der a rticle 96(3) o f A dditional Protocol I, the leadership or authority representing the people struggling against a colonial, alien or racist state that is a party to the Protocol can undertake to apply the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol by making a de claration to the depository (the Swiss Federal Council). In Africa, the ANC, SWAPO and the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front are known to have made declarations to uphold
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the relevant provisions of IHL during their armed struggles in South Africa, South West A frica (N amibia) a nd E thiopia r espectively.24 These NLMs a re t herefore bound b y IHL b y v irtue o f in ternational t reaties t hat g rant t hem r ights w hile imposing duties normally due and applicable to states.25

General responses to rebels and militias by states and communities of states

At the UN, AU and state levels, responses have been both legal (new norms and legislation, enf orcement ac tion) a nd p olitical, m anifesting in va rious wa ys: diplomatic demarches, boycotts and informal embargoes. These are examined in turn.

Belligerents, insurgents and rebels

Belligerents a re p arties in volved in wa r o r a rmed co nflict. B efore g ranting t he status t o cer tain n on-state ac tors in IHL, b elligerents w ere in variably s tates. However, rebels engaged in war with a state could be regarded as belligerents and thus have rights and duties under international law if they received recognition. It i s n oteworthy t hat in co ntemporary international l aw, a ll p arties to an armed conflict are bound by the laws of war irrespective of whether they are recognised or n ot.26 This i s p articularly im portant in v iew o f t he fac t t hat s tates ra rely acknowledge that there is a group waging a legitimate armed struggle against them and a re k nown t o c haracterise s uch a g roup(s) a s criminals a nd terrorists, suggesting that the conflict is regulated by national rather than international law. Insurgents are armed elements t hat r ise up in r ebellion against a co nstituted authority, but are not recognised as belligerents. Where there is no recognition of insurgency o r b elligerency, a nd t he g roup in q uestion i s n ot a NLM t hat h as successfully triggered the application of the rules of international armed conflict, one is left with an internal armed conflict involving rebels.27 In common parlance rebels are sometimes referred to as armed opposition groups. As will become clear in the next section, it does not matter whether an armed group is recognised or not. Neither does it matter to what category of non-state actors t he g roup b elongs. Th e l aws o f wa r b ind a ll w ithout ex ception w here a n armed conflict exi sts. There are a lso cer tain human r ights obligations, a lthough different rules may apply to different groups.

Norm generation, legislation and enforcement action

When faced with new phenomena, society has often come up with ways to adapt and respond to them. In a society of laws, the response is often to promulgate new laws, if those in existence are found to be inadequate. With the state established as the m ain ac tor in t he in ternational s phere, t he em ergence o f a rmed n on-state actors d uring t he wars o f li beration a nd b eyond p osed a c hallenge f or t he international legal order. By 1949, o nly wars between states were recognised and regulated b y in ternational l aw. Th e f our G eneva C onventions, w hich p rovided extensive r ules on t he conduct of p arties during armed conflict and m eans and methods of waging war, reflect this reality. Only a sin gular identical article in a ll the f our co nventions r elates t o conflicts n ot o f a n in ternational c haracter o r internal armed conflicts (civil wars).28 With the emergence of new actors, the international community responded by generating n ew n orms. A r ecently exp anded co mmunity o f s tates w ith n ewly independent states adopted, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, two new instruments in 1977. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions o f 1949 exp anded t he s cope o f in ternational a rmed co nflicts f rom interstate wars to cover conflicts in which NLMs were involved. As noted already in the discussion on NLMs, armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial do mination, a lien o ccupation o r raci st r egimes in t he ex ercise o f t heir right to self-determination were now to be governed by international law.29 NLMs would have rights and duties under this new regime, a fa r cr y from the position held by authorities at the national level (such as Israel and South Africa) that what they faced at home was not a g roup bearing such rights but a g roup of common criminals and terrorists. After this point, the position of the UN and the then OAU with respect to these territories was guided by this new dispensation. Additional Protocol II t o the Geneva Conventions effectively recognised that rebels f ighting g overnments in va rious in ternal a rmed co nflicts h ad r ights a nd
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LEGAL RESPONSES AND ISSUES OF ACCOUNTABILITY

In t his p art I w ill f irst exa mine t he g eneral (lega l) r esponses b y s tates (w ithin states) a nd co mmunities o f s tates (un der t he r elevant b ranches o f in ternational law) to rebel movements and militia phenomena in A frica; second, consider the acts of rebel movements and militias that violate international and national laws; and t hird, co nsider t he a ppropriateness o f lega l r esponses a nd c hallenges t o establishing accountability under national and international legal regimes.
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duties. However, there was reluctance on the part of states to grant any status to groups fighting established governmental authorities. Clapham has noted that at the t ime o f t he dra fting o f A dditional P rotocol II, s everal s tates s tated t heir conviction that insurgents engaged in a ci vil war were simply criminals, and that the protocol conferred no international legal personality on them.30 This stance has not c hanged among s tates face d w ith armed g roups. However, t he fac t t hat t his treaty contains obligations for rebels, even when not recognised by the states, is no longer in doubt. This is discussed further below. At n ational le vel, s tates h ave responded by leg islating a gainst a rmed g roups. Almost invariably, states in Africa and elsewhere have refused to recognise armed groups even when their struggle is based on well-articulated political objectives. The r esult h as b een p roliferation o f s ecurity l aws t hat r egard t hose in volved a s criminals and terrorists.31 Such action at the national level has been coupled with a refusal to ratify or apply international treaties that grant status to, or are in any way favourable to, armed non-state actors.32

Enforcement action at international (UN), continental (AU) and national levels

To reinforce its stance on non-state ac tors (NLMs a nd rebels), t he international community in t he f orm o f t he UN a nd A U h as o ften t aken va rious enforcement actions to reiterate its stand. The support by international players for NLMs h as b een m ore o vert t han t hat f or r ebels/armed o pposition g roups. International bodies are known to have imposed embargoes and other sanctions on states in which or against which NLMs are fighting (for example on apartheid South Africa) to express disapproval of actions taken by those states. Support for rebels in certain cases has been forthcoming, but has been less overt. For example, certain countries supported the Rwandan Patriotic Front rebels before and during the genocide in 1994. 33 Similarly, Uganda, Cyrus Reed points out, supported the Sudan Peoples L iberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in S outhern Sudan, w ith Khartoum backing the LRA in return.34 More often than not, rebel activity is met with o pen co ndemnation, em bargoes a nd o ther s anctions. Th e UN S ecurity Council (UNSC) r esolutions, w hich im posed t ravel b ans a nd a sset f reezes o n certain rebel leaders in t he DRC (including Thomas Lubanga, Germain Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui), is a case in point.35 In some cases, states or a collection of states have adopted the judicial route to enforce lega l n orms a nd p ositions in fa vour o f r ebels a nd NLMs. Th e ad visory
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opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Western Sahara in 1975 is a good African example. In this case the UN General Assembly had approached the ICJ to determine the status of claims by Morocco and Mauritania over the Western Sahara a nd w hether s uch c laims co uld b e es tablished w ithout a r eferendum o f Western Saharans. The ICJ confirmed the view held by many members of the UN that t hese c laims w ere t enuous a t b est a nd t hat in a ny c ase, a r eferendum wa s necessary in view of the Saharans right to self-determination. Another recent case, in which the General Assembly acted like this, though beyond African shores, is the advisory opinion it requested f rom t he ICJ relating to a wa ll constructed by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territories.36 Although selective in i ts approach, the UNSC h as acted to create tribunals to punish p erpetrators o f in ternational cr imes f rom, a mong o thers, t he ra nks o f rebels a nd mi litia g roups. Th e S pecial C ourt f or S ierra L eone (SCS L) h as prosecuted in dividuals b earing t he g reatest r esponsibility, in cluding f rom r ebel groups, for cr imes committed during t he war in S ierra L eone.37 For its p art, t he International Cr iminal T ribunal f or R wanda (I CTR) h as s o fa r p rosecuted members of the Rwandan government in 1994 or those associated with it and none from the rebel RPF.38 This shortcoming has been one of the main criticisms of the international j udicial r esponse t o t he R wandan g enocide.39 The I nternational Criminal C ourt (I CC) i s a lready p rosecuting va rious in dividuals w ho le d r ebel groups in the eastern part of the DRC for war crimes and crimes against humanity. ICC arrest warrants have been issued against LRA leaders in Uganda. In lin e w ith t he s tance ado pted b y s tates t hat o pposing a rmed g roups a re terrorists a nd co mmon cr iminals, t he g eneral t rend a t t he n ational le vel i s t o exclude, dem onise, p rosecute un der s ecurity a nd t errorism l aws a nd o therwise eliminate r ebels/armed o pposition g roups w henever p ossible. M any o f t hese armed co nflicts h ave, h owever, en ded o utside t he j udicial p rocess t hrough negotiated peace agreements. Some of these agreements in t urn provided for the establishment o f t ribunals o r a f oundation f or p rosecutions o f in dividuals (f or example the Lom Peace Agreement for Sierra Leone and ANC-National Party in South Africa), while other agreements operate effectively as blanket amnesties (for example FRELIM O-RENAMO in M ozambique a nd t he C omprehensive P eace Agreement for Southern Sudan). However, the starting point is always denial and demonisation of armed opposition groups followed by some form of compromise and accommodation.
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Political responses of international (UN) and continental (AU) actors

Apart f rom t he lega l r esponses di scussed a bove, o ther m ore sig nificant wa ys in which states have supported or opposed the activities of non-state actors are for the most part political. Legal responses cannot be delinked entirely from political responses. L egal a pproaches n ecessarily in volve p olitical a nd di plomatic demarches a t t he UN, A U a nd n ational le vels. S ome co untries h ave o penly o r secretly s upported di plomatically a nd m aterially t he c ause o f r ebels a nd o ther armed opposition groups. Examples abound on the continent: Algeria has openly supported the POLISARIO Front for many years, while Morocco withdrew from the OAU in protest following the OAUs decision to admit the exiled Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a m ember state.40 Several African countries are said t o h ave s upported t he AN C a nd o thers in t heir s truggle a gainst a partheid South Africa.41 In Sudan, support for the SPLM/A struggle against Khartoum by Libya, Uganda and Kenya has been documented.42 More recently, Eritrea has been linked with the Oromo Liberation Front rebels in Ethiopia43 and Somalia.44 For its part, Sudan has been mentioned in connection with Sudanese and Chadian rebels in C had a s w ell a s t he LR A in U ganda,45 while C had i s s aid t o h ave s upported rebels in Darfur.46 While the UN a nd AU have been guided generally by UN C harter principles on s overeignty and n on-intervention a s well a s resolutions on f riendly relations between states and non-fragmentation of territory,47 the two bodies have not shied away from positions that have proved to be controversial. With respect to Western Sahara, the UN and OAU championed the elaboration of the 1970 Settlement Plan that wa s accep ted b y b oth M auritania a nd M orocco.48 Later in 1975, t he UN General A ssembly r equested t he I CJ ad visory o pinion di scussed a bove, c learly taking a stand on the issue after Morocco appeared to go back on its commitments. For the most part, however, there are many examples where states choose not to take a s tand o n co ntentious i ssues, p referring t o let m atters p lay o ut w ithout interference. S ome r esolutions ado pted b y t he A U h ave b een p re-emptive o f opposition ac tivity, s uch a s i ts c harter o n dem ocracy, w hich p rohibits t he unconstitutional seizure of power on the continent and urges states to take all legal and regulatory measures to deal with individuals involved.49 This indicates a firm position against rebel or armed opposition group activity. It is noteworthy that irrespective of firm normative positions by both the UN and AU, political or diplomatic responses to rebels, militia and armed opposition
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groups have been as varied as the existing political priorities and interests of the two in ternational o rganisations a s o f t he m ajor g lobal a nd r egional p owers. However, a n o utline o f r elevant c ases in t his r egard i s b eyond t he s cope o f t his chapter.

Establishing accountability for acts of rebels and militias

It was noted above that one of the main legal responses by both the international community a nd n ational a uthorities t o r ebels, mi litias a nd a rmed o pposition groups has been to establish tribunals to try perpetrators of international crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, establishing accountability f or t he ac ts o f r ebels a nd mi litias un der va rious b ranches o f international law has posed and will continue to pose serious challenges. The co mplexity o f co nflicts h as r endered t he a pplication o f t hese o ftenunknown rules even more difficult. While understanding and applying these rules are today more important than ever, with conflicts in places like the DRC, Darfur and Uganda, various factors have resulted in mi sapprehension and confusion in the de bate o n acco untability o f t hese en tities. Th ese in clude t he m ultiplicity o f wrongful ac ts t hat m ay b e co mmitted b y mi litias a nd r ebel m ovements, t he complexity of relationships these entities may have with states and multinational companies, and the differences in rules of responsibility under various branches of international l aw (h uman r ights, h umanitarian l aw a nd in ternational cr iminal law). With r ecourse t o exa mples f rom t he co ntinent, t his p art iden tifies a nd discusses s ome o f t he p roblems t hat h ave b een exp erienced in a pplying t hese current regimes, and identifies and discusses the gaps in t hese legal responses to militias a nd r ebel m ovements a t n ational a nd in ternational le vels. Fir st, t he following section provides a broad overview of the nature and scope of some of the breaches attributable to rebels and militia.

Sampling the wrongs: breaches of international law by rebels and militia

Within t he co ntext o f in ternational l aw, w rongs o r a trocities co mmitted b y militias, rebels and armed opposition groups can be categorised as human rights violations (under human rights law, irrespective of the debate on whether or not rebel m ovements a re b ound b y h uman r ights t reaties); b reaches un der IHL,
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including war crimes, where the wrongs are committed within an armed conflict (war) a s p rohibited b y t he G eneva C onventions a nd A dditional P rotocols; a nd international cr imes s uch a s cr imes a gainst humanity, war cr imes and g enocide under va rious in ternational in struments in cluding t he Torture C onvention, t he Genocide C onvention, t he G eneva C onventions a nd P rotocols a nd t he R ome Statute o f t he I CC. I ssues o f acco untability w ill b e di scussed in t erms o f t hese instruments a s w ell a s va rious m echanisms (t ribunals) es tablished t o p unish perpetrators. The li st o f atrocities co mmitted d uring m any o f A fricas co nflicts i s en dless. This section, therefore, gives only a sn apshot of some of these. In Rwanda, while the s laughter o f c lose t o a mi llion p eople in t hat co untrys g enocide h as b een attributed largely to the government and Interahamwe, a militia group affiliated to the government, the RPF was active during that period, too.50 In northern Uganda, abductions o f c hildren, en slavement o f g irls, m urder, t orture, m utilation a nd destruction of property by the LRA are well documented.51 In the DRC, atrocities have b een co mmitted b y va rious a rmed g roups, in cluding t he Mai-Mai, F orces Dmocratiques d e L ibration d u R wanda, C ongrs N ational p our l a D fense d u Peuple and other groups active in t he eastern part of the country.52 Murder, rape and o ther f orms o f s exual v iolence s tand o ut a s s ome o f t he m ost co mmon crimes.53 Apart f rom v iolations a gainst in dividuals a nd private property, reports have linked a number of armed groups to the plunder of Congos natural wealth, which has in t urn o ccasioned numerous atrocities.54 Many companies and s ome regional governments have been linked to what has been aptly termed Congos war economy.55 Comprehensive acco untability m ust addr ess a ll t hese dim ensions o f the conflict.

Accountability under international human rights law

International human rights law (IHRL) contained in numerous treaties adopted since 1945, at both the global and regional level confers upon individuals certain rights a nd im poses o bligations o n s tates in t hat r egard. Th e s pectrum o f individual, a nd t o a limi ted ext ent co llective, r ights in cludes ci vil a nd p olitical rights as well as socioeconomic and cultural rights. Conceptually, IHRL en gages state responsibility at the international plane such that final responsibility for the respect and fulfilment of human rights obligations lies with the state. Accordingly, apart from refraining from infringing on these rights and taking positive measures to promote the enjoyment of rights, states are required to protect their citizens and
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all others on their territories from violations by private entities. Within this state responsibility framework, responsibility for human rights violations by non-state entities such as rebels and militia ultimately lies with the state. It is, therefore, up to the state to ensure that these rights are not violated or when violated, individuals have acces s t o ef fective r emedies. W hen a n in dividual b rings a p etition t o a n international tribunal such as the African Commission or Court on Human and Peoples Rights, complaining of human rights violations, it will be against the state and not a rebel formation or militia. It i s c lear, t herefore, t hat t he co nceptual f ramework w ithin w hich IHRL operates i s t he f irst c hallenge o r o bstacle in a ny a ttempt t o enf orce h uman rights a gainst a rmed n on-state ac tors. W hile i t s eems p aradoxical t hat s tates weakened by war or those unable to exercise practical sovereignty over territory under r ebel co ntrol s hould b e r equired t o b ear r esponsibility f or v iolations b y rebels or militia, conceptually, the international human rights framework admits only s tate r esponsibility.56 The Forces N ouvelles in C te d Ivoire, w hich h ave controlled virtually the entire northern half of that country for several years now, have n o in ternational r esponsibility f or h uman r ights, b ut c an b e b rought t o account in national courts. Some commentators57 have suggested that certain non-state actors have human rights o bligations, w hether t hey h ave co nsented t o t hem o r n ot. T omuschat suggests t hat NLMs a n es sentially government-like formation a re b ound by IHRL, noting that a movement struggling to become the legitimate government of the nation concerned is treated by the international community as an actor who, already a t hi s em bryonic s tage, is s ubject t o t he es sential o bligations a nd responsibilities e very s tate m ust s houlder in t he in terest o f a ci vilised s tate o f affairs a mong n ations.58 However, t he ide a t hat n on-state en tities h ave h uman rights obligations through international law has no universal appeal.59 Apart from the state-centric conceptual framework in terms of which only states have human rights obligations, even when rebels or militias have control of some territory, they often lack the capacity to fulfil the human rights obligations in question. Another c hallenge in es tablishing acco untability o f r ebels a nd mi litia a rises from the involvement of multinational/transnational companies in the theatres of war. Within the human rights framework states have the ultimate responsibility for protecting citizens and others from violations attributable to such companies. The fact that action against them could jeopardise investment, coupled with the fact that some of these companies are stronger and richer than the states from which they o perate, p ose s erious c hallenges f or acco untability. S uch s tates l ack t he
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capacity t o enf orce t heir o wn l aws, in p articular in a co nflict si tuation. Th e merging of multinational/transnational company interests w ith t hose of a rmed non-state ac tors co mpounds t he p roblem f urther. I n a n utshell, IHRL i s n ot sufficiently adapted to deal with some of the more difficult issues alluded to here. Attempts to deal with accountability for multinational/transnational companies in such cir cumstances h ave s o fa r y ielded o nly n on-binding n orms a nd inf ormal commitments.60

Accountability under international humanitarian law

It has already been noted that IHL or the laws of war regulate the conduct of armed conflict: the means of waging war, protection of certain groups of people and what forms leg itimate o bjects f or a ttack. N on-state ac tors w ho m ay n ot b e h eld accountable under IHRL do not escape responsibility entirely because IHL, unlike IHRL, r ecognises cer tain n on-state ac tors. F urther, sin ce r ebels a nd mi litias a re most active in t imes of armed conflict, IHL i s perhaps the most relevant body of law. The activities of militia in terms of IHL (that is civilian fighters and volunteers forming p art o f g overnmental f orces) a s des cribed in t he in troductory s ection above, are governed by rules of IHL applicable to the regular armed forces, which in turn dep end on w hether t he conflict is international or internal in c haracter. Additional P rotocol I a nd o ther s pecialised r ules g overn NLMs o r in surgents operating w ithin t he context of a n international a rmed conflict, w hile common article 3 o f t he G eneva C onventions a nd A dditional P rotocol II g overn t he activities of rebels and militia active in an internal armed conflict (civil war).

Challenges to establishing accountability under international humanitarian law

There a re a n umber o f c hallenges t o es tablishing acco untability f or b reaches o f IHL. First, since IHL applies only in times of conflict, initial problems arise from the c haracterisation o f a si tuation w here a rmed f orce i s u sed. A rticle 1(2) o f Additional Protocol II excludes internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature from the definition of internal armed conflict. The refusal of states to accept that there is a problem in their territory, or that an existing conflict situation involving the use of arms between state security forces and rebels does not meet the threshold for the application of IHL, means that these rules do not apply to non-state actors. It was
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noted t hat in t erms o f IHL, internal di sturbances a nd t ensions, s uch a s r iots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature fall below the threshold for the application of the laws of war. However, once an international tribunal i s es tablished, t he fac t t hat t he exi stence o f a n a rmed co nflict wa s n ot recognised is irrelevant. Second, there is no independent international tribunal established under IHL treaties t hat relies on states to prosecute s erious (g rave) breaches of t he G eneva Conventions.61 Not many states, having denied that there is an armed conflict on their territory, have in practice prosecuted perpetrators. Neither has the principle of uni versal j urisdiction p rovided f or in t he G eneva C onvention b een r egularly used t o t his en d. P rosecutions o f p erpetrators in A frican co nflicts h ave, f or t he most p art, b een c arried o ut b y E uropean a nd N orth A merican co urts62 or international tribunals such as the ICTR and SCSL. Third, co nflicts m ay n ot a ttain t hresholds f or a pplication o f IHL, a lthough there may be serious violations going on. Under Additional Protocol II, it must be shown that the armed group is under responsible command and exercises control over a p art of its territory, which enables it to carry out sustained and concerted military operations, and to enforce the rules of IHL. This is a very high threshold, although common article 3 does not seem to require these conditions to be met. Fourth, the command structures of rebel movements, militia and other armed groups a re s ometimes f luid a nd p ose p roblems in p inpointing r esponsible commanders, hence issues for enforcement of laws of war. Fifth, prosecutions before international criminal tribunals such as the ICTR in Rwanda and SCSL and national courts have proven to give inadequate responses in v iew o f l arge n umbers o f p erpetrators, limi ted r esources t o co nduct t rials a t international a nd n ational le vel, t he in ability t o addr ess i ssues o f v ictims a nd reparations and broader reconciliation. Sixth, criminal sanction against commanders of rebel movements and militia in international courts cannot extend to corporations that finance the activities of such non-state actors, leaving one with many impunity gaps.

Accountability under international criminal law

International criminal law (ICL) is the branch of public international law that is concerned w ith t he p rohibition a nd p rocesses o f p unishment o f in ternational crimes. Cassese observes that it is the body of international rules that proscribes international crimes, requires states to prosecute and punish at least some of those
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crimes a nd r egulates in ternational p roceedings r elated t o t his.63 In a s ense, t he history o f I CL i s o ne o f in ternational cr iminal t ribunals, s tarting w ith t he International M ilitary T ribunal a t N uremberg in 1945 t hrough t he ad ho c international tribunals in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone, to the ICC of 2002. ICL draws heavily from IHL and IHRL in terms of both the conduct prohibited (war cr imes, cr imes against humanity and genocide) and protections guaranteed for suspected perpetrators (that is, fair trial guarantees) and victims. By r equiring t hat cer tain cr imes b e p unished ei ther in do mestic o r international courts, ICL established benchmark principles for dealing with rebels and militia. Peace negotiations must be built on this understanding. The granting of a n a bsolute a nd un conditional a mnesty b y t he L om Peace Accord t o F oday Sankoh (t he R UF le ader), o ther R UF m embers a nd co mbatants f rom va rious groups such as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and civil defence forces, elicited strenuous opposition from the UN, v ictims and human rights activists.64 The UN Secretary-General intervened in the Lom Peace Accord to insist that no amnesty could apply for war cr imes and cr imes a gainst humanity. Th e warning opened t he p ossibility f or t he e ventual in dictment a nd t rial o f va rious r ebel leaders, including Foday Sankoh, by the SCSL. The foundation of ICL is the principle of individual criminal responsibility. A suspect m ay b e a h ead o f s tate, o r t he le ader o f a r ebel m ovement, b ut responsibility f or cr imes i s b orne only in in dividual c apacity a nd n ot a s organisations or state agencies. While national law may provide for some form of criminal responsibility for corporate entities and organisations, ICL does not do so. It wa s n oted e arlier t hat o ne o f t he m ain r esponses o f t he UNSC t o cr imes committed by armed non-state actors has been to create ad hoc tribunals, as in the case of Sierra Leone where the RUF is said to have been responsible for the largest number crimes and human rights violations in the conflict.65 On their part, states decided to create the ICC that has already indicted or is trying rebels and militia leaders f rom U ganda, t he D RC a nd S udan. Th ese t ribunals face n umerous challenges in their quest to establish accountability for international crimes.

with states and multinationals and the fluidity of command structures, render this body of law inadequate in dealing with militias and rebel movements. It is further inadequate f or de aling w ith r esponsibility o f t he g roups, o rganisations a nd corporations that have been active in Africas war theatres. The q uestion o f s electivity co ntinues t o dog t he o peration o f I CL. To b egin with, t he UNSC de cisions t o es tablish t ribunals s uch a s t he I CTR h ave b een selective, and not entirely driven by a principled and consistent pursuit of justice. As a result, militia and other armed actors in a n umber of African conflicts have escaped justice for some of the most egregious crimes. At the operational level of the t ribunals, va rious fac tors h ave co nspired t o en sure t hat s ome ac tors a re n ot brought to account. The role of the RPF during the genocide and the failure by the ICTR to prosecute any member of the RPF remain highly contested and have cast doubt on the impartiality of the tribunal. In the absence of ready and effective domestic justice mechanisms, action by international tribunals more often than not arrives late and is often caught in the trap of international politics. The current work of the ICC in A frica is a c ase in point. Politicisation of the work of international tribunals affects efforts by such courts to establish accountability for crimes committed by armed groups. If establishment of accountability must include restorative justice for victims, ICL is handicapped. Until the establishment of the ICC, ICL has for the most part excluded victims of international crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against h umanity, r eserving f or t hem o nly t he r ole o f w itnesses.66 Although t he ICC now provides for the possibility that victims may participate in t he process and have a right to reparations, victims still face serious challenges in their pursuit of j ustice.67 Even w hen a n o pportunity t o c laim r eparations i s p resented, t he indigence of those accused ensures that victims cannot claim reparations directly from them. In the DRC all the rebel leaders facing prosecution Thomas Lubanga, Matheu Ngudjolo and Germain Katanga have claimed indigence and are in need of lega l a id t hemselves.68 Further, r eluctance b y s tates t o co ntribute t o compensation funds produces the same result incomplete justice for victims.

Measures of accountability under national law Challenges related to applying international criminal law to rebels, militias and armed groups
While the rule on individual criminal responsibility as the basis of action is settled, various dynamics, s uch a s t he composition of armed g roups, t heir relationships
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The t ypical r esponse b y s tates in A frica a s e lsewhere w hen face d b y a rmed threats or opposition from within has been to deny the armed groups existence or to refuse totally to recognise such groups by labelling their members as common criminals, s ubversive e lements o r t errorists. Th e l ast l abel h as ga ined p articular
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currency in r ecent y ears, in tensifying w ith t he m uch-reviled a nd co ntroversial war on terror. In fact, it seems the labelling of even legitimate political opponents and other di ssidents a s terrorists i s one of t he m ost p otent weapons w ielded by challenged African regimes. The reason is not difficult to find. This strategy tends to secure international partners for the regimes cause more readily than accepting some o f t hese g roups f or w hat t hey r eally a re leg itimate o pposition t rying i ts hand at what seems a m ore persuasive method. Governments have reacted in a n almost knee-jerk fashion to deny and refuse to recognise these armed opposition groups. Experience shows that even when recognition, rights and duties are accorded unequivocally b y in ternational l aw t o s uch a g roup a s di scussed a bove,69 no government would admit that it is a co lonial or racist outfit or that it is in a lien occupation of territory.70 In recent times, it was no surprise that apartheid South Africa consistently labelled the ANC and other armed groups in S outh Africa as criminals, s aboteurs, co mmunists (co nnoting s ubversives) a nd t errorists. W hile this l abel h ad no sig nificance w hatsoever in t erms of international l aw (IHL, in particular Additional Protocol I, as set out above), which by application of the law recognised t he AN C a nd SW APO fighters in S outh A frica and N amibia respectively a s co mbatants a nd t hus p risoners o f wa r w hen c aptured, a partheid South Africa treated them as terrorists and prosecuted them under state security laws.71 The recent prosecution and sentencing to death of numerous members of the J ustice a nd E quality M ovement in K hartoum a nd t he M ahamat N ouri-led United Force for Democracy and Development rebels in Chad72 (some in absentia) is consistent with this approach.73 This refusal to acknowledge and recognise armed opposition by states has had a far-reaching effect with respect to rebels and other opposition groups, towards whom IHL i s les s g enerous a nd m ore s tringent in i ts p rescriptions, b earing in mind the requirement that rebels must control territory and that the violence must be o f p articular in tensity (n ot m erely r iots o r s poradic a nd s hort-lived ac ts o f violence).74 This means that IHL, and the protections that come with it, will apply only if a cer tain threshold of violence is reached and that in t he absence of these conditions national law applies, which often affords more leeway to states in their dealings with rebels. Denying lega l s tatus t o r ebels a nd o ther a rmed o pposition, e ven w hen t hey represent a legitimate cause, has been coupled with the belief mostly misguided t hat t he r ebels c an b e o bliterated w ith mi litary p ower. Th e fa ilure b y t he Ugandan government to defeat the LRA, despite affirmations to the contrary, is the
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starkest i llustration in c urrent A frican exp erience. Yet s tates s uch a s Sudan a nd others continue to rely on the military approach. Even when states, as the case of Uganda illustrates, come to the realisation that the mi litary a pproach c annot w ork a nd t hat a n accep table lega l a pproach i s a necessity, they have for the most part taken half-hearted and incoherent measures. Incoherence a nd l ack o f unif ormity i tself inf ormed b y t he mi sguided y et ineffective over-reliance on military options is clear in t he sense that the threat and n on-state a rmed g roup do n ot m atch t he p rescriptions f or r esponse. I n Uganda, f or in stance, w hile t he g overnment h as m aintained t hat t he LR A i s a terrorist entity (that should be treated and dealt with as a cr iminal outfit), it has acceded through the Juba Peace Agreement to a position that seems at odds with the t errorist l abel. Th e p rosecution r esponse f or wa r cr imes w ould in herently accept that IHL a pplies and that the LRA is entitled to fight and thus its fighters have co mbatant o r co mbatant-like s tatus a nd c annot b e p rosecuted m erely f or taking up arms but only for committing international crimes.75

CONCLUSION
This chapter showed that while international law h uman rights, humanitarian and cr iminal l aw h as c lear def initions o n n ational li beration m ovements, insurgents, rebels and militias and their status, this is not always so in co mmon parlance, w here r eferences t o va rious a rmed n on-state ac tors a re s omewhat confused. It wa s n oted t hat w hile in co mmon u sage r ebel o r a rmed o pposition group i s s ometimes u sed in terchangeably w ith mi litia, t he l atter h as a s pecific meaning in IHL. Th e distinctions are important in v iew of the fact that different rules apply to the conduct of different armed groups and this has implications for accountability issues. Legal a nd, b y ext ension, p olitical r esponses b y s tates a nd in ternational organisations to the activities of armed non-state actors have been varied. Political responses range from covert support to outright condemnation and sanction, and are o ften co loured b y co ntextual co nsiderations, in p articular t he in terests o f regional and global hegemons. The apparent confusion in references to various armed non-state actors is not problematic f rom t he p oint o f v iew o f a pplicable r ules o f in ternational l aw a nd their implementation. However, the bundling of various groups in the media and other non-academic literature complicates a g eneral understanding of the nature of t hese g roups a nd va rious r ules a pplicable t o t hem un der h uman r ights l aw,
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humanitarian law and ICL. There is merit in clarity, not only in nomenclature but also in t erms o f a pplicable r ules, p articularly if t he p ublic a nd v ictims wa nt t o pursue remedies for violations attributable to a specific group. In v iew o f s hortcomings in t he va rious lega l r egimes, es tablishing accountability for wrongs committed by armed non-state actors such as rebels and militia requires the use of a co mbination of approaches at the national as well as international level. However, there is lack of coherence among the multiplicity of actors w ho h ave a ttempted t o g rapple w ith t he ac tivities o f a rmed n on-state entities at the international and national levels. Where the UN and the AU do adopt a legal response, attention should be paid to h ow t hese approaches f it in w ith approaches at t he n ational le vel in o rder t o ensure t hat a ll t he im portant a spects a re addr essed. I n p articular, n ational tribunals and other mechanisms at that level, which have an important role but are rarely well considered, should be integrated in the response. Governments, w hich b ear t he p rimary a nd p erhaps ex clusive r esponsibility under human rights treaties, should ensure that mechanisms exist at the national level un der cr iminal a nd ci vil l aw t o addr ess t he ac tivities o f a rmed n on-state actors that violate human rights. While the record of African countries in ratifying and acce ding t o in ternational h uman r ights t reaties i s hig h, co mpliance in t his regard as well as with rulings of international oversight bodies remains rather low. For in stance, a lthough m any co untries h ave ra tified t he C ovenant o n Ci vil a nd Political Rights as well as the Torture Convention, few have effective implementing legislation. Th e s ame a pplies t o IHL t reaties a nd t he R ome S tatute o f t he I CC. Moreover, African states have shown themselves even less willing to comply with decisions of oversight bodies.76 In general, compliance is an area that needs work from states, otherwise they make a mockery of international commitments. IHL r egulates t he co nduct o f a rmed n on-state ac tors. H owever, t his fac t i s often lost to these actors. The fact that states often deny that a particular situation is an armed conflict, and the debate over particular crimes being committed, does not h elp. I nternational ac tors a nd o thers en gaged in r esolving co nflicts n eed t o communicate t o b elligerents t hat t he co nflict in w hich t hey a re in volved i s n ot unregulated by international law, and that they will be individually accountable for crimes committed. The fac t t hat IHL t he l aws o f wa r i s un known t o m any n eeds t o b e remedied. Th e G eneva C onventions a nd A dditional P rotocols co ntain a n obligation f or s tates t o di sseminate t he inf ormation a nd en sure t hat t hose w ho may need to apply it, are informed. Apart from incorporation in the security forces
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curricula, i t m akes s ense t hat t he ci tizenry s hould b e inf ormed o n a co ntinent accustomed to armed conflict. Incorporating relevant aspects of IHL in schools, in particular in vulnerable societies, should be encouraged. The possibility exists that knowledge o f t he r ules a nd co nsequences o f b reaching t hem co uld h ave a favourable effect on the behaviour of non-state actors. States also undertake to respect and ensure respect for the rules of IHL. Thi s would be in lin e with the requirements of ICL, in p articular the Rome Statute of the I CC, t hat s tates s hould t ake m easures t o do mesticate t he s tatute a nd t o investigate a nd prosecute p erpetrators. States h ave t he primary responsibility in this r egard.77 Questions c an b e ra ised w ith r espect t o t he w illingness o f va rious African g overnments t o p rosecute p erpetrators o f cr imes b y b oth r ebels a nd government forces. However, t he w illingness o f g overnments t o ac t de cisively in p rosecuting perpetrators may depend on an assessment of their ability to do so, which in turn depends on the availability of necessary criminal justice infrastructure. In debates around the contested role of the ICC in Africa, the AU has conceded as much.78 For instance, in co untries s uch a s t he D RC a nd K enya, t he in dependence o f t he judiciary and capacity of existing systems have raised concerns.79 To address these problems, a mini sterial m eeting of A frican s tates p arty t o t he R ome Statute h as recommended that the capacity of African states to prosecute international crimes by themselves should be improved.80

NOTES
1 See C hristoph S chreuer, W aning o f t he s overeign s tate: t owards a n ew p aradigm o f international law?, European Journal of International Law 4 (1993), 447471, 447; R Falk, The interplay of Westphalia and charter conceptions of international legal order, in R Falk and C Black (eds), The Future of the International Legal Order, 1, 1969, 43. See Martti Koskenniemi, The future of statehood, Harvard International Law Journal 32(2) (1991), 397410, 406. Schreuer, Waning of the sovereign state, 448. See African Union, Decision AHG Dec 160 (XXXII), taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Lusaka in July 2001. The African Union made history on 29 March 2005 when i t l aunched t he in terim E conomic, S ocial a nd C ultural C ouncil in A ddis A bba, Ethiopia. The Council is an advisory organ of the AU consisting of a variety of civil society organisations from member states. Individuals can bring petitions concerning human rights violations against states for redress. Examples a t r egional le vel in clude t he A frican C ommission (a nd C ourt) o n H uman a nd Peoples R ights, E uropean C ourt o f H uman R ights a nd I nter-American C ourt (a nd

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Commission) on Human Rights. At the United Nations level it includes the Human Rights Committee. Individuals are subject to punishment before international tribunals for the commission of international cr imes. C urrent t ribunals in clude t he I nternational Cr iminal T ribunal f or Rwanda, I nternational M ilitary Tribunal f or t he f ormer Yugoslavia, t he S pecial C ourt f or Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court. Scheuer, Waning of the sovereign state, 448. See Martti Koskenniemi, The future of statehood, 406. The Hague Convention, (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, article 1 of the regulations annexed to the Convention, 18 October 1907. See f or in stance A lhagi M arong, Outlaws o n c amelback: s tate a nd i ndividual r esponsibility for serious violations of international law in Darfur, ISS Occasional Paper 136, Pretoria: ISS, 2007. Ibid. Noel K ing, C ongos a rmy v ows t o di sarm Mai-Mai militia, 22 O ctober 2007, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/10/mil-071022-voa04.htm (accessed 10 F ebruary 2010). S ee a lso H uman R ights W atch, M ilitia le ader gui lty in landmark trial, 10 M arch 2009, h ttp://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/10/dr-congo-militialeader-guilty-landmark-trial (accessed 10 February 2010). See f or in stance A bdulkarim J imale, Al-shabaab militia s eized s trategic t own in cen tral Somalia, The P alestine T elegraph, 22 J anuary 2010, h ttp://www.paltelegraph.com/ world/africa/3726-al-shabab-militias-seized-strategic-town-in-central-somalia (acces sed 9 February 2010). Some commentators refer to the LRA as militia while others prefer the label rebel group. See for in stance H uman R ights W atch, Th ere i s n o p rotection, 12 O ctober 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/02/12/there-no-protection (acces sed 1 M arch 2010); SPLA s oldiers dep loyed in W estern E quatoria t o f ight LR A mi litia, 9 S eptember 2009, http://pachodo.org/General-News-South-Sudan-News/spla-soldiers-deployed-to-westernequatoria-to-fight-lra-militia.html (accessed 1 March 2010). See discussion under the section on accountability. Under IHRL the identity of a perpetrator may m atter in t erms o f w ho p ays co mpensation t he s tate o r t he in dividual un der domestic l aw. I n t erms o f in ternational cr iminal l aw, dif ferent r ules (f or exa mple o n command responsibility) may apply to a government army (and affiliate militia) to those that apply to rebel movements. On NLMs g enerally, s ee G eorges A bi-Saab, W ars o f n ational li beration in t he G eneva Conventions and Protocols, Recueil des Cours de lAcadmie de Droit International de la Haye 165 (1979), 357455; Antonio Cassese, Wars of national liberation, in Christophe Swinarski (ed), Studies and essays in international humanitarian law and Red Cross principles: essays in honour o f J ean P ictet, Th e H ague: M artinus N ijhoff, 1984, 314324; L iesbeth Z egveld, Accountability of armed opposition groups in international law, Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Andrew C lapham, H uman r ights o bligations o f n on-state ac tors in co nflict si tuations, International Review of the Red Cross, 88(863) (2006), 491523.
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18 At t he le vel o f t he Or ganisation o f A frican U nity (O AU), g roups s uch a s t he AN C, POLISARIO Front (Western Sahara), SWAPO, FRELIMO, and Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (Zimbabwe) were recognised. 19 Clapham, Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations. 20 Additional Protocol I, P rotocol Additional to the Geneva C onventions of 12 A ugust 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977; and Additional Protocol II, P rotocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and R elating t o t he P rotection o f V ictims o f N on-International A rmed C onflicts, 8 J une 1977. 21 Geneva Convention (I) f or the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in t he Field; Geneva Convention (II) f or the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection to Civilian Persons in Time of War [including in occupied territory]. 22 The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols (I and II) are international treaties that co ntain t he m ost im portant r ules t hat r egulate t he co nduct o f a rmed co nflict. Th ey protect people who do not take part in the fighting (civilians, medics, aid workers) and those who c an n o lo nger f ight (w ounded, sic k a nd s hipwrecked t roops, p risoners o f wa r). A ll available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions (accessed 18 December 2009). 23 See also United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 3103 (X XVIII): Basic principles of the legal status of the combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and racist rgimes, 12 D ecember 1973. Thi s r esolution p receded t he ado ption o f t he A partheid Convention that declared the crime of apartheid to be a crime against humanity. 24 See C lapham, Human r ights obligations of non-state ac tors in co nflict situations, 494; s ee also t he o ther exa mples g iven b y M ichel Veuthey, Guerrilla e t dr oit h umanitaire, G eneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1983, xxvi. 25 Note that even in t his case, the traditional state-centric structure of international law is left intact. NLMs a re regarded as states for purposes of imposing duties and bestowing rights. One could thus say that international law does not create a new category of actors but rather accords state-like attributes to NLMs for those purposes. 26 See G eneva C onventions, a rticles 1 a nd 3; A dditional P rotocol I, a rticles 3 a nd 4; a nd Additional Protocol II, article 1. 27 Clapham, Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations, 495. 28 See Geneva Conventions, common article 3. 29 See a lso UN R esolution 3103. Thi s r esolution p receded t he ado ption o f t he A partheid Convention that declared the crime of apartheid a crime against humanity. 30 Clapham, Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations, 498. 31 See in the case of South Africa various security and pass laws (totalling 150 different statutes that co nstituted t he lega l inf rastructure o f a partheid). F or a di scussion o f t hese l aws s ee Roger Beck, The history of South Africa, Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 2000, 127129. 32 For instance, apartheid South Africa rejected Additional Protocol I in t erms of which those fighting the regime would qualify as prisoners of war who could not be prosecuted merely because t hey t ook u p a rms a gainst t he g overnment. B y r ejecting IHL r ules, t he apartheid
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government was able to apply security laws and to prosecute Nelson Mandela and others for treason. See generally Cyrus Reed, Exile, reform and the rise of the Rwanda Patriotic Front, Journal of Modern African Studies 34(3) (1996), 479501. Ibid. On 1 November 2005 a UNSC committee imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on a number of rebel leaders in the DRC for violating an arms embargo. See UNSC committee established pursuant t o R esolution 1533 (2004) co ncerning t he D emocratic R epublic of t he C ongo, 7 November 2007; UNSC, L ist of individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 13 and 15 of Security Council Resolution 1596, 2005. See UN, General Assembly, Resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the legal consequences arising from Israels construction of a barrier separating part of the West Bank from Israel, Resolution ES-10/14, 8 December 2003. The Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone has tried or is trying the following: Moinina Fofana and A llieu K ondewa (a lleged le aders o f Ci vil D efence F orce); I ssa H assan S esay, M orris Kallon a nd A ugustine Gb ao (R evolutionary U nited F ront); A lex Tamba B rima, Ib rahim Bazzy K amara a nd Sa ntigie B orbor K anu (A rmed F orces R evolutionary C ouncil); a nd Charles Taylor. Since i t b ecame o perational, t he I CTR Of fice o f t he P rosecutor h as i ssued s ome 96 indictments. Of that number, 80 have been arrested. As of February 2010, 35 convictions had been s ecured o ut o f 46 co mpleted c ases. S ee h ttp://www.ictr.org (acces sed 15 N ovember 2009). R L emarchand, Genocide i n t he G reat L akes: W hich gen ocide? W hose gen ocide? Working Paper GS 03, Y ale C enter f or I nternational a nd A reas S tudies, 1998, h ttp://se2.isn.ch/ serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=10&fileid=F84E3402-2312-087C-BA8D-7E93D19E CC20&lng=en (acces sed 29 A pril 2009); P C lark a nd Z D K aufman, After gen ocide, in P Clark and Z D Kaufman (eds), After genocide: transitional justice, post-conflict reconciliation in Rwanda and beyond, London: Hurst, 2008, 67, 1. Issaka K S ouar, A bdelhamid E l O uali a nd Mh amed K hadad, Western S ahara: understanding the roots of the conflict and suggesting a way out, ISS Situation Report, Pretoria: ISS, 17 December 2008, 2. ANC cadres are known to have received refugee, military, financial material assistance and training from several African countries such as Algeria, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania. See generally Mac Maharaj, The ANC and South Africas negotiated transition to democracy a nd p eace, in V eronique D udouet a nd D avid B loomfield (e ds), Berghof transitions s eries: r esistance/liberation m ovements a nd t ransition t o p olitics, 2008, 138, http://www.berghof-center.org/uploads/download/transitions_anc.pdf (acces sed 27 February 2010). See also The ANC, Strategy and tactics of the ANC, adopted in 1969 at the Morogoro Conference in Tanzania in 1969. The document acknowledges the importance of the Southern African region, then still largely under colonial rule and alien occupation, as crucial to t he s truggle waged b y the ANC a gainst apartheid, h ttp://www.anc.org.za/ ancdocs/history/stratact.html (accessed 3 March 2010). While Ethiopia was the first country of refuge for defecting Southern Sudanese soldiers who later f ormed t he S PLA, L ibya a nd U ganda a lso p rovided s upport. S ee g enerally P hilippa Scott, Th e S udan P eoples L iberation M ovement (S PLM) a nd L iberation A rmy (S PLA),
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Review of African Political Economy 33 (1985); Babiker Khalifa, Sudan: recent developments, Africa Today 36(3/4) (1989), 510. See K atharine M urison, Africa s outh o f t he S ahara, 33r d e d, L ondon: E uropa Pu blishing, 2004, 410412. The UN a nd U nited S tates o f A merica h ave in t he p ast wa rned Er itrea a bout i ts a lleged support of Islamic fighters opposed to the Transitional Federal Government of Somali. See for in stance UN wa rns Er itrea o n a iding I slamists, R euters, 9 J uly 2009, h ttp://www. nytimes.com/2009/07/10/world/africa/10somalia.html?_r=1 (accessed 3 March 2010). See f or in stance M artin P laut, B ehind t he LR As t error t actics, B BC, 17 F ebruary 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7885885.stm (accessed 4 March 2010), quoting the deputy governor o f t he S outhern S udan s tate o f Western E quatoria in w hich C ol J oseph N gere alleged t hat K hartoum wa s co ntinuing t o g ive c landestine s upport t o t he LR A, a lthough Khartoum s trenuously denies t his. However, in LR A rebels s eek refuge in S udans D arfur, New Vision, 11 March 2010, http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/10/10/712559 (accessed 4 March 2010), it is noted that Sudans support for LRA ended in 2002. African N ews A gency, Er itrea, C had acc used o f a iding D arfur r ebels, 9 S eptember 2009, http://www.afrol.com/articles/13898 (accessed 4 March 2010). See UN, G eneral A ssembly, R esolution r elating t o t he Declaration on P rinciples o f International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970. Souar, Ouali and Khadad, Western Sahara, 2. See African Union, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted by the eighth ordinary session of the Assembly, held in A ddis Ababa, Ethiopia on 30 J anuary 2007, articles 2(4), 3(10) and 14(2). On crimes allegedly committed by the RPF during and after the genocide, see R Degni-Segui, Special rapporteur, Final report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, Final report S/1994/1405, August 1996. I n 1994, t he United Nations Impartial C ommission of E xperts that p receded t he es tablishment o f t he I CTR co ncluded (in i ts p reliminary r eport [S/1994/1125] and final report [S/1994/1405]) that individuals from both sides to the armed conflict in Rwanda during the period from 6 April 1994 to 15 July 1994 perpetrated serious breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity. See various reports on LR A atrocities: Human R ights Watch, The s cars of de ath: children abducted b y t he L ords R esistance A rmy in U ganda, N ew Y ork: H uman R ights W atch, September 1997, h ttp://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/c/crd/uganda979.pdf (accessed 4 M arch 2010); Human R ights Watch, The state of p ain: torture in U ganda, 16(4(A)), M arch 2004, http://hrw.org/reports/2004/uganda0404/index.htm (acces sed 4 M arch 2010); H uman Rights Watch, Abducted and abused: renewed conflict in northern Uganda, 15(12(A)), July 2003, h ttp://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0703/ (acces sed 4 M arch 2010); A mnesty International, U ganda: breaking G ods co mmands: t he des truction o f c hildhood b y t he Lords R esistance A rmy, AFR 59/001/1997, 18 S eptember 1997, h ttp://www.amnesty.org/ en/library/info/AFR59/001/1997 (accessed 1 2 M arch 2010); Amnesty I nternational, Breaking the circle: protecting human rights in the northern war zone, AFR 59/001/1999, 17 March 1999, h ttp://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR590011999? open&of=ENGUGA (accessed 12 March 2010).
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52 P Vinck, P Pham and S B Shigekane, Living with fear, New York: Human Rights Center, UCBerkeley Payson C enter a nd International C enter f or Transitional Justice, 2008; T T urner, The Congo wars: conflict, myth and reality, London: Zed Books, 2007. 53 See g enerally L B Mb ombo a nd C H B ayolo, Conflicts a rms en RD C: v iolences s exuelles contre les femmes, crimes sans chtiment, 20012004, Kinshasa: Editions Concordia, 2004. 54 See va rious r eports o n t he war e conomy in t he D RC b y IP IS R esearch, http://www.ipisresearch.be (acces sed 8 M arch 2010). S ee a lso H uman R ights Watch, The curse o f go ld: D emocratic R epublic o f t he C ongo, h ttp://www.hrw.org/en/node/11733/ section/1 (accessed 11 March 2010). 55 See UN, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other F orms o f W ealth o f t he D RC, h ttp://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp? m= S/2003/1027 (accessed 1 July 2009). 56 Dinah S helton, Remedies i n i nternational h uman r ights l aw, L ondon: O xford U niversity Press, 1999, 55. 57 Christian Tomuschat, Th e a pplicability o f h uman r ights l aw t o in surgent m ovements, in Horst Fi scher, U lrika F roissart, Wolff H eintschel v on H einegg a nd C hristian R aap (e ds), Krisensicherung und Humanitrer Schutz Crisis Management and Humanitarian Protection, Festschrift fr Dieter Fleck, Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2004, 586. 58 Ibid. 59 See C lapham, H uman r ights o bligations o f n on-state ac tors in co nflict si tuations, 502; Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of armed opposition groups in international law, Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 4951, 152. 60 See for instance UN, ECOSOC, Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 August 2003. 61 Common article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions provides that undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances. 62 Belgium, Canada, Switzerland and Spain are good examples of countries that have held trials related t o t he R wandan g enocide. S ee in t his r egard I di Ga parayi, R wanda: G enocide prosecutions a t t he do mestic le vel, in G odfrey M M usila, Domestic p rosecutions of international crimes and the role of African regional bodies in international criminal justice: some African case studies, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, forthcoming in 2010. S ee also the recent prosecution of Charles McArthur Emmanuel Taylor, the son of the former president of Liberia, who was convicted of torture and sentenced to 97 years in prison by a United States federal court for crimes committed during his fathers bloody reign in Liberia. 63 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 15. 64 The Lom Peace Accord, article IX(1)-(3) granted absolute and free pardon to combatants. 65 See also Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report, volume 2, c hapter 2, paragraphs 106 and 107, where the commission found that the RUF was the primary violator of human rights in the conflict and responsible for 60,5 per cent of the violations. 66 See with respect to ICTR and ICTY: J R W D Jones, The practice of the international criminal tribunals f or t he f ormer Y ugoslavia a nd R wanda, A rdsley, N ew Y ork: T ransnational Publishers, 1998; A R ydberg Victims in t he International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in H K aptein and M M alsch, Crime victims and justice: essays on principles and justice, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, 126140, 131.

67 See generally Godfrey M Musila, Restorative justice in international criminal law: the rights of v ictims in t he I nternational Cr iminal C ourt, U npublished P hD t hesis, J ohannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, 2009. 68 See the ICC case in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga; and in the DRC, Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Matheu Ngudjolo Chui. 69 See section on definitions above. 70 Clapham, Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations, 495. 71 South Africa, Internal Security Act 1950 (Act 44 of 1950); Christina Murray, The status of the ANC and SWAPO in international humanitarian law, South African Law Journal 100 (1983), 402. 72 The t wo other g roups a re t he Rally o f Forces f or Ch ange led by Timane Erdimi, P resident Debys uncle and former chief of staff, and Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) Fondamentale, a splinter group of UFDD, headed by Abdelwahid Aboud. 73 Beyond t he A frican s hores, I srael co ntinues t o u se simi lar a rguments w ith r espect t o Palestinian fighters. See Clapham, Human rights obligations of non-state actors in co nflict situations, 495, w ho n otes t hat arguments b efore S outh A frican a nd I sraeli j udges t hat liberation movements are entitled to privileges under international law have not met with success. 74 Additional Protocol II, article 1. 75 See J uba P eace A greement P rocess, A greement o n A ccountability a nd R econciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lords Resistance Army, 29 June 2007. 76 See F rans V iljoen a nd L irette L ouw, S tate co mpliance w ith t he r ecommendations o f t he African C ommission o n H uman a nd P eoples R ights, 19932004, American J ournal o f International Law 101 (2007), 134. 77 According to article 17 of the Rome Statute on the complementarity framework of the ICC, the ICC prosecutes only if the state is unable or unwilling to do so. 78 See AU, Concept note, Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute, Addis Ababa, June 2009, r ecommendations 6 a nd 7, h ttp://www.africa-union.org (acces sed 13 M arch 2010). 79 See G odfrey M M usila, Between r hetoric a nd a ction: t he p olitics, p rocesses a nd p ractice o f the ICCs work in the DRC, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2009, 3536. 80 See AU, Concept, recommendation 7.

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C HAPTER 5

Crises of the state and governance and armed non-state groups in Africa
AUGUSTINE IKELEGBE

INTRODUCTION
The image of Africa that is beamed to the world is that of vicious radical youths marauding the streets of Mogadishu, miserable victims of the devastating civil war in the western Sudan region of Darfur, genocide and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and B urundi, b rutal r esource wa rs in L iberia a nd S ierra L eone, mi litants interrupting o il s upplies t o Western m arkets in N igeria, prolonged ci vil wa rs in Uganda, A ngola, M ozambique, t he D emocratic R epublic o f C ongo (D RC) a nd Cte dIvoire, sporadic clan, religious and ethnic wars in Nigeria and Kenya, deep and ext ensive p olitical co nflicts a nd v iolence in t he R epublic o f C ongo (Brazzaville), Zimbabwe, Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR) and GuineaBissau, and notorious personal and authoritarian rules in Z aire (now the DRC), Equatorial Guinea and the CAR. In all these conflict situations there are a number of common denominators: weak or failing states, bad governance and armed nonstate groups (ANSGs), mainly rebel and militia groups. Conflicts a nd ANSGs h ave co mbined t o de epen t he co ntinents s ocial a nd identity di visions a nd in equalities, a nd h ave h eightened s ociocultural disintegration, s ocial u pheavals, ra mpant cr iminality, in security a nd s ocial
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disorder. Internal rebellion, resistance or outright civil wars conducted by militias, Islamist militant groups and rebel groups have occurred or still exist in Ethiopia, Senegal, Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, Uganda, the DRC, the CAR, Chad, Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cte dIvoire, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Kenya, Somalia and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). It is obvious that as the dominant social force and power formation in Africa, the structure, conduct and operation of post-colonial states, and their governance systems are strongly linked to the Africa condition and human insecurity. These are t herefore cr itical va riables in t he a ttempt t o un derstand a nd exp lain t he conflicts, cr ises, v iolence, ci vil s trife a nd wa rs a s w ell a s h uman in security, humanitarian cr ises a nd t he p roliferation a nd p ervasive ac tivities o f ANSGs in Africa. The c hapter b egins b y e laborating t he cen tral co ncepts a nd exa mining s tate formation, s tate cr isis a nd t he cr ises o f g overnance a nd de velopment in A frica. Then t he c hapter investigates t he lin ks b etween t he s tate a nd g overnance cr ises and the phenomenon of ANSGs a nd violence. It also looks at the reverse side o f the coin, namely how the state and governance in Africa have been victims of the non-state institutions of violence. Finally, the chapter concludes by recommending that the best approaches to containing the threats of ANSGs to human security will entail extensive reconstruction, rehabilitation and reform of state and governance institutions.

THE NATURE OF THE STATE

The state is a set of interconnected and coordinated institutions that are concerned with t he o rganisation o f p ower a nd t he s tructured do mination a nd o rdering o f society.1 Essentially, a s tate m onopolises cer tain p owers a nd r oles, n amely t he making and execution of binding rules, the control and utilisation of institutions of o rganised v iolence, t he leg itimate u se o f p hysical f orce, t he ext raction o f resources, including taxation of citizens, the right to political allegiance of citizens, the right of adjudication and mediation in disputes between citizens and the right of representation in the international community.2 The state also performs certain core or critical functions and responsibilities, such as the control of territory and population, t he guarantee of s afety, s ecurity, public and s ocial order and justice, the p rovision o f p ublic g oods, s ocial s ervices, inf rastructure a nd e conomic progress, and the promotion of the wellbeing and welfare of citizens.3
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A state has legal or juridical and functional or substantive dimensions. With regard to the first, the state is a legal entity that is recognised de jure as a sovereign authority w hile w ith regard t o t he s econd, t he s tate i s def ined by its de fa cto or empirical attributes, that is, the actual exercise of powers, occupation of roles, and performance o f f unctions o f s tatehood.4 Further, a s tate h as in stitutional a nd functional a ttributes a nd dim ensions.5 The f ormer r elates t o t he s tructural apparatus o f g overnance a nd t he ex ercise o f p ublic a uthority, w hile t he l atter relates to the critical roles, needs and expectations that are performed or fulfilled. The a bility a nd p otential f or t he ac hievement o f iden tified cr itical s tate functions is dependent on capacity. State power and capacity can be measured in terms of t he ef fectiveness of s ecured control of t erritory, t he s upremacy of l aws over society, the operational capabilities to extract revenues, make and implement binding rules and regulate society, and the effectiveness of control over resources and p eople.6 Brutigam iden tifies ext ractive, r egulatory, admini strative a nd technical capacities as critical to state execution of its essential roles.7 These relate to the ability to raise revenue, establish and enforce guiding rules in economy and society, manage manpower, resources and services efficiently and accountably, and acquire a nd dep loy k nowledge a nd exp ertise r equired t o co nduct i ts a ffairs. Grindle iden tifies f our t ypes o f c apacity es sential t o s tate f unctioning, n amely political capacity (responsiveness to demands and social pressures, accountability, effectiveness of conflict resolution), institutional capacity (the ability to construct effective n ational r egulatory a gencies), t echnical c apacity (a bility t o s et a nd manage m acro p olicies) a nd admini strative c apacity (ef fective m anagement o f basic public functions).8 States can b e strong or weak, f ragile, in de cline or decadent, failing or failed and co llapsing o r co llapsed. Th ese de lineations a re f luid a nd o verlapping. F or example, weak and failing states may be fragile, just as fragile states are often weak and fa iling. I n fac t, s cholars h ave n ot m arked o ut a ny exac t p oints o r s tages a t which one type progresses into the other. However, as Milliken and Krause have noted, s tate fa ilure (f unctional fa ilure) p recedes s tate co llapse (in stitutional collapse) a nd s tate co llapse m ay b e t he ext reme en d o f a co ntinuum o f t he weakening of state governance capacity.9 State w eakness i s in dicated by p oor c apacity t o p erform cr itical s tate r oles.10 This occurs because the institutional framework of statehood and governance is weak, n on-viable a nd in effective, b ecause v ital in stitutions a re s ubverted b y hegemony, p ersonalisation, inf ormalisation a nd co rruption o r b ecause p ublic
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institutions are manipulated by privileged groups to perpetuate inequity, injustice, perversion and oppression.11 State fragility is characterised by susceptibility and vulnerability to internal and external shocks and strains, a t endency towards violent conflicts, civil strife and violent cr imes, t he p roliferation o f n on-state in stitutions o f v iolence a nd sm all arms, a nd in stability t hat m ay s pill o ver in to n eighbouring co untries.12 The vulnerabilities em anate f rom, a mong o thers, f ractious a nd fac tionalised e lites; unequal, di scriminatory a nd co ntested ci tizenship; co nflict-ridden a nd v iolent contestations of state p ower; p erennial challenges to the validity and viability of the s tate, a nd de clining a uthority a nd co ercive p owers. Th ere m ay a lso b e collapsing p ublic s ervices a nd inf rastructure, de clining e conomies a nd l ack o f fiscal capacity to discharge basic functions of statehood.13 Most f ragile states are low in come, p oor a nd co rrupt a nd a re c haracterised b y lo w li teracy ra tes, p oor access to health care and other social services, high infant mortality rates and food shortages.14 State failure has to do with functional dimensions of statehood.15 It denotes that a s tate h as los t cer tain p owers a nd p rivileges a nd b ecome un able t o p erform certain r oles.16 The cr itical i ssue i s t he co llapse o f t he ext ractive, a llocative, regulatory, social service, security and developmental state functions. A failed state is un able t o t ransform s ociety into a m odern in dustrial one, improve e conomic performance, prevent or alleviate poverty and create prosperity.17 State collapse relates to the institutional dimensions of statehood. It refers to a situation w here t here i s b reakdown o f t he in stitutions o f g overnance, disintegration of public authority and collapse of public authority over territory and people.18 State institutions, authority and powers fall apart and leave a vacuum of a uthority a nd r oles.19 Government m ay ef fectively ce ase t o exi st a nd t he functions that define statehood can no longer be performed.20 Public services and security roles shrink or collapse entirely.21 There is a los s of formal controls over territory, the citizenry, resources, a lack of economic regulation and internal order, and the reach of the state is severely limited.22 The co llapsing s tate i s m ore j uridical t han s ubstantive b ecause o f t he disintegration of the apparatus of governmental institutions and loss of the power and authority of statehood. However, collapse may not equate to the cessation of existence, b ecause a s B aker h as n oted, j uridical exi stence a nd in ternational recognition may continue and the state may subsist through informal, militia and community structures, as had happened in Somalia.23
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Whatever the case may be, it is obvious that many states are in crisis, although it s hould b e n oted t hat s tate w eakness o r f unctional p roblems o f s tatehood a re more pervasive while incidences of state collapse are rare. As Milliken and Krause have noted, whether in weak or even decadent forms, maintenance of the state is the norm.24

Governance and development

Governance represents the processes entailed in t he exercise and management of the collective will of a people.25 It refers to the exercise of political, economic and administrative a uthority t o m anage a n ations a ffairs26 or m ore s pecifically, t he manner in w hich a g overnment ex ercises p olitical p ower.27 However, t he components, processes and relations of governance lack specificity with regard to the measurement and standards of its goodness and effectiveness.28 Good governance, for example, has b een a p opular concept in de velopment, aid a nd do nor v ocabulary a nd s cholarly t reatment sin ce t he 1980s, a nd h as remained so in the local and international development agenda.29 It is often taken to mean certain qualities and characteristics of rulership, and certain norms that are held to be ideal, appropriate and acceptable.30 There are, however, more specific attributes that characterise good governance. These are, among others, the legitimacy of the government; the existence of the rule of law or systems of constitutional politics; systems of broad participation and accommodation; the accountability to the governed; the existence of defined and predictable systems of rules, procedures and processes; open, clear and transparent ways of management of government affairs; collective de cision-making, and t he recognition of in dividual and co llective r ights and f reedoms.31 This li st i s by n o means exhaustive. There a re c learly t wo dim ensions h ere: t he p olitical a nd t he in stitutional o r bureaucratic dimensions. The political dimensions are underscored in the political liberalisation a nd r eforms in A frica. I n lin e w ith t his, t he U nited N ations Development P rogramme (UND P) def ines g ood g overnance a s t hat w hich i s participatory, transparent, accountable, effective, equitable and promotes the rule of l aw.32 The b ureaucratic a nd in stitutional dim ension r elates t o ra tional a nd impersonal management based on rules and procedures and efficient and effective systems of public management.
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The n ature o f g overnance a nd g overnance sys tems i s cr itically im portant t o growth, de velopment a nd p olitical s tability. I t det ermines t he c apacity a nd effectiveness o f s tate p ower a nd m anagement a nd t he co nditions t hat f oster investments, e conomic g rowth a nd de velopment.33 Some sys tems o f g overnance can b e growth en hancing a nd de velopmental.34 In fac t, t echnical s upport f or Africas g overnance sys tems h as hin ged o n t he b elief t hat g ood g overnance facilitates effective management of overall progress and specifically achieves direct and quick improvements of macroeconomic and overall development.35

... p ut in p roper co ntext a nd d ue p roportion do n ot wa rrant t he in tellectual fatalism and pathologisation of African politics which have been expressed in Afropessimism a nd t he acco mpanying do omsday s cenarios f requently p ainted o f Africa.50

The crisis of the state in Africa

The s tate in A frica h as b een t he s ubject o f di verse, di sparaging a nd n egative descriptions a nd c haracterisations. I t h as b een des cribed a s a uthoritarian, repressive, exploitative and predatory; weak, frail, verging on collapse, in a state of flux, in di sarray, un stable a nd in p rofound de cay;36 neo-patrimonial, co rrupt, poorly bureaucratised and institutionalised, informalised, not emancipated from society and immersed in p articularistic or ascriptive grounds;37 non-autonomous and in f ormation;38 wicked, h ostile a nd co ercive b ut ir relevant;39 overdeveloped and a ppropriated f or c lientelist, p rebendal a nd p rimordial p urposes,40 and unproductive a nd p oorly m anaged.41 Many A frican s tates h ave b een branded a s shadowy,42 pseudo or quasi,43 juridical,44 weak or failed45 and collapsed.46 Some of these characterisations were actually inherited from the colonial state. Others are based on nebulous, ambiguous and over-generalised notions. Besides, the descriptions pertain to a very small proportion of the total and a v ery small minority o f A frican lif e.47 For exa mple, t he c haracterisation o f s hadow s tates i s over-generalised a s i t i s b ased o nly o n S ierra L eone, L iberia a nd Z aire, w here circumstances a nd p eculiar co nditions o f s tate fa ilure r esulted in le aders maintaining t hemselves a nd s tatehood t hrough co ntrol o f t erritorial r esources, commercial n etworks a nd co ntracting o ut s ecurity.48 Olukoshi, in t urn, h as described t he c haracterisation of A frican countries a s n eo-patrimonial and rent seeking a s o ver-generalised, vac uous, d ubious a nd u biquitous va riables t hat ultimately explain nothing,49 while Nnoli asserts that these characterisations and variables when:
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Whatever t he des criptions a nd c haracterisations, t he fac t i s t hat A frican s tates have abundant legal and juridical forms but are weak and failing with regard to the character, substance, content and empirical existence of statehood. There is more external r ecognition t han in ternal s upport o r a ny de ep s ense o f p olitical community and national identity. Furthermore, the post-colonial state in Africa is typical a s fa r a s cer tain a ttributes a re co ncerned. S tate p ower i s co ncentrated, centralised and monopolistic, just as the political process is monopolised by the executive, p residential p ower a nd r uling c liques. Th e g overnance a pparatus i s statist, bureaucratised and politicised. The states are converted into a primordial favouring political arrangement and fountain of privilege, wealth and power.51 The states are actually paradoxical for being powerful but weak, repressive but feeble, a bsolutist b ut f ragile, exp ansive b ut co llapsing.52 On t he o ne h and, t he states are prominent, conspicuous and project upward,53 but on the other hand are weak and suspended above society.54 In trying to do t oo much, the state ends up doing too little and being soft or disengaged.55 Though seemingly powerful, state institutions are weak, fragile and ineffective. The states do not have enough power to compel the key elements of society to act as they should.56 Despite its power and prominence, the state is irrelevant for failing to meet needs and aspirations and not being s ensitive t o, a nd s upportive a nd p rotective o f i ts p eople.57 Though s tate power i s co ncentrated a nd co nsolidated in t he h ands o f a f ew e lite m embers o f ruling p arties, i ts ac tual h old o n p ower i s t enuous, w ith w eak a uthority a nd legitimacy, w hich i t m aintains b y p ushing o ut o r m arginalising s ocial g roups, communities and individuals.58 Though monopolistic, it has only a t enuous hold on power and very little authority and though intensely hegemonic, many groups are excluded and outside its control.59 The de velopment of t he s tate cr isis relates t o precolonial, co lonial and p ostcolonial experiences. Significantly, it was created by the nature of the struggles for the acq uisition a nd co nsolidation o f s tate p ower a nd t he acco mpanying transformations t hat s tate le aders b rought a bout in p olitical in stitutions, governance apparatus and the public arena.
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In fact, the immediate post-independence period was characterised by a statist expansion, p enetration a nd do mination o f s ociety, t he co nstruction o f developmental states with enormous socioeconomic roles, bureaucratic expansion particularly t hrough t he g rowth of public corporations and enterprises, and t he expansion o f a nd g rowing r eliance o n s ecurity a gencies f or t he m aintenance o f public order. The struggles for power and its consolidation led to a concentration of p ower in t he s tate, cen tralisation o f p olitical le adership in t he ex ecutive, personalised ex ecutive p ower, cr eation o f m onopolistic p olitical p arties a nd dismantling of multiparty systems, harassment and weakening of the opposition, constriction o f inter-elite co mpetition, di smantling o f co nstitutional p rotections and guarantees, curtailment of personal liberties and suppression of disagreement and di ssent.60 There wa s f urthermore a p olitical, p artisan a nd ex ecutive penetration of key governance institutional apparatus and the politicisation of the bureaucracy and security agencies; the circumscription, manipulation, defiance or interference w ith j udicial in stitutions, a nd t he ex clusion o f m ost s ocial g roups from participation in public affairs. Within a few years after independence, single-party systems were instituted in Ghana, G uinea, Tanzania, K enya, Tunisia, Z aire, C ameroon a nd C te d Ivoire. Elections became farcical and ritualistic as citizens lost any real right to choice. By the mid-1960s, t here h ad b een mi litary interventions in a n umber of states and some, such as the CAR, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea, were subjected to extreme forms o f mi litary-based o r -s upported dic tatorships. D emocracy wa s a c asualty between the mid-1960s a nd early 1980s, w ith Botswana and Mauritius being the only s table dem ocracies. P ersonal a utocracy, sustained by p ersonality c ults, patronage sys tems a nd a n ext ensive a rray o f f ormal a nd inf ormal a gencies o f coercion, violence and repression, dominated m any countries until t he wave of democratisation in t he 1990s, a lthough t here a re s till s ome v estiges o f t hese tendencies in Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe and the CAR. As Decalo notes with respect to the CAR, the personal autocracy and control was so extensive that the president/presidency was the state and public policy and there was little distinction between the president, the state and government,61 as is the case acco rding t o F rancis Ik ome o f C ameroon, w here P aul B iya s till sin glehandedly determines the nature, structure and direction of politics.62 Personal a nd a rbitrary r ule w eakened t he in stitutional a nd co nstitutional order, er oded lega l a nd co nstitutional in tegrity a nd m ade t he l aw a nd t he constitution ir relevant t o p olitical p ractice a s t hey w ere l argely ig nored b y s tate
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leaders.63 Further, there was a steady degeneration of the structures and practice of power a nd a uthority f rom f ederalism a nd de volution o f p owers t o uni tarism, legislative enactments for rulership to ex ecutive decrees and fiats, constitutional limitations o f t enure t o lif e p residency a nd le adership p erpetuation a nd f rom multiparty to one-party systems. There w ere g rowing in equalities, n arrowing o f t he s ociopolitical b ase o f governance, t he et hnicisation a nd r egionalisation o f p ower a nd g rowing corruption a nd in sensitivity t o ci tizen in terests. L egitimacy s hifted f rom t he people t o p atronage a nd p rimordial n etworks. G overnance b ecame in creasingly arbitrary, w eak, di sorderly a nd co nflict r idden. W hile s ervice de livery deteriorated, the states acquired more strength in the number and funding of state military a nd s ecurity a gencies, a nd in t he ex ercise o f ex cessive, a busive a nd repressive force. State leaders have readily visited excessive and atrocious violence on their own people.64 Because t he s tate em erged a s t he m ain v ehicle o f c apital f ormation a nd accumulation, t he s truggle f or p ower h as b een in tense a nd wa rlike. Th ere h ave been uncertain and conflict-ridden political successions, and flawed and contested elections in countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and Nigeria, which have resulted in large-scale violence, killings and destruction. The constriction or even blocking of ci vil p athways t o p ower h as le d t o t he de velopment o f v iolent a lternatives. Military co ups, in surgencies a nd v iolent fac tional co nflicts h ave b ecome t he instruments b y m eans o f w hich r ival c laimants, co ntenders a nd t he o pposition fight their way to power. Because politics has been a zero-sum game and the capture of state power a matter of life and death, violence which has been pervasive, extensive, punitive, brutal, horrendous and destructive has become a major instrument of politics.65 In some states, violence has become instrumental and a resource for the creation of an environment in w hich arbitrariness, excessive force, abuse, corruption, and accumulation and resource capture flourishes.66 The nature of politics has been inimical and subversive and has undermined development. Patronage politics in the context of economic decline has tended to exacerbate co rruption a nd v iolence. R ent-seeking p olitics h as un dermined productive activities and created a b ogus, consumptive and ostentatious lifestyle and import dependence.67 The centralisation, concentration and personalisation of power and the politicisation of governance apparatuses and state institutions have delegitimised the state, obstructed collective decision-making, constricted citizen
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participation, encouraged corruption and arbitrariness, destroyed the integrity of state in stitutions a nd w eakened t he ef ficient o peration o f t he e conomy a nd t he social sector. The n ature o f s tatehood t hat h as b een co nstructed wa s t herefore w eak, inappropriate a nd in effective. Th e A frican s tates fa iled t o cr eate p olitical institutions t hat en gendered s upport.68 The r uling a nd g overning e lites w ere unable to achieve a coherent ideology for development, social reform, political and social m obilisation, co mpetitive p olitical ac tion, et hnic, r eligious a nd r egional integration, a nd ef fective guid ance o f s ocial a nd e conomic p olicy a nd commitment to the future.69 The consequences of the nature and exercise of power and i ts co nsolidation w ere e vident e ven b y t he mid-1960s, in t he f orm o f legitimacy cr ises, s ocial unr est a nd t ensions, o ccurrences o f mi litary m utinies, insurrections, military coups and civil wars.

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State weakness, fragility and collapse in Africa

Apart from Botswana and Mauritius, which have had sustained democracies and a semblance of stability and prosperity, African states have generally been weak or in decline, fragile or collapsing. In fact, Osaghaes observation that many states in Africa are fragile and distressed70 was reiterated in the World Bank report of 2006 that listed 26 fragile states, of which 14 were in sub-Saharan Africa.71 Sub-Saharan African countries also dominated the lowest rungs of the United Nations Human Development Index in 2006. 72 Foreign Policys Failed States Index of 2008 listed 11 African states (Chad, Cte dIvoire, the CAR, the DRC, Guinea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Z imbabwe) among t he 20 s tates it desig nated a s weak and failing.73 These c lassifications w ere b ased o n cr itical in dicators o f w eakness, f ragility, failure and collapse, such as the state of stability, security and legitimisation, the levels o f g roup g rievances, fac tionalisation o f t he e lite a nd e venness o f development, t he s tate o f t he e conomy, p ublic s ervices a nd h uman r ights observances, and the levels of external intervention and displacement of persons. The m ajor in dications o f w eakness, de cline, f ragility a nd co llapse o f t he African states include the following:
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Citizen and group disengagement or exit from the state Closed or narrow constitutional and legal channels of regime change, political succession or political regeneration76 An in ability t o ef fectively r egulate a nd co ntrol s ociety a s m anifested in t he prevalence o f sm uggling, c urrency t rafficking, m oney l aundering a nd proliferation of illegal arms and private armies77 A failing capacity to enforce law and order, the rule of law and security The co llapse o f p ublic s ervices, b asic s tate f unctions, r esponsibilities a nd obligations An inability to effectively implement public policies78 A growing incapacity to monopolise and control institutions of violence A decline in the strength, discipline and cohesion of coercive agencies A dep endence o n p rivate mi litary co mpanies, m etropolitan cen tres, neighbouring countries and others for security and troop support79 An inability to prevent and manage insurgents and external threats80 Military intrusions and retaliations from neighbouring countries

Declining respect for and loss of state authority Difficulties in the maintenance of authority over territory and people74 and the inability to secure borders75
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A m ajor in dication o f s tate mi sgovernance a nd w eakness i s t he p revalence o f a politics o f v iolence a nd o f v iolence in p olitics. Th ere a re s trong lin ks b etween politics, p oliticians, p olitical e lites, t he r uling c lasses a nd t he co nstitution o f irregular and clandestine private armies, task forces and armed bands. Politicians and g overnment o fficials hir e a rmed b ands t o f ight en emies, a rm o ne g roup t o rout a nother o r u se a rmed p roxy f orces t o cr eate co nflict w ithin a nd b etween communities and g roups. Access to institutions of violence creates a p osition of strength for which politicians compete either to protect their own positions or to intimidate political opponents.81 There is thus a mi litarisation of politics or the domination of armed politics, with v iolence b eing t he m ain m ethod f or de aling w ith p olitical a nd fac tional conflicts a nd e lections. Violence i s a r esource in A frican p olitics, w hich le aders offer in the struggles for recognition, resources, inclusion, claims and concessions, and w hich p olitical co ntenders p urchase in ex change f or f unds, p rotection a nd positions. Violence has b een an ef fective tool for s elf-enrichment, the guarantee for political positions, access to strong political leaders and patrons, recognition in the political landscape and expansion of political power and political victories in factional and electoral struggles.
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The crisis of governance and development in Africa

Post-independence regimes were primarily concerned with two projects, namely nation-building a nd e conomic de velopment. Th e in dependence h opes a nd aspirations a nd t herefore t he p ost-colonial s tate-citizenry p act r evolved a round social w elfare a nd e conomic p rogress. Th erefore, s tates em barked o n s tate-led socioeconomic m odernisation p rogrammes.82 Initially, t here wa s m oderate economic growth, which translated into better social welfare and socioeconomic progress, w ith t he p ublic s ector s howing r emarkable g rowth in t he 1960s a nd 1970s in line with ambitious socioeconomic programmes. However, b y t he l ate 1970s, economic de cline h ad s et in, le ading t o catastrophic economic failure by the 1980s. 83 By the 1990s, economic decline had almost wiped out initial progress, manifesting in a co llapse of export commodity prices, an oil price crisis, exceptionally poor performance and losses in the public enterprise s ectors, a nd co rruption a nd mi smanagement t hat co nsumed t he f ew resources that remained.84 States became debt-ridden and had to depend on credit for the acquisition of essential goods. Industrial capacity utilisation declined and states b egan t o fa il in p roviding ci tizen n eeds, w elfare, w ellbeing a nd p rogress, culminating in a di sintegration o f t he s ocial co ntract b etween s tates a nd t heir citizens. The fa llout of t he s truggles for p ower and its consolidation and t he ensuing economic downturn was the decline in the leverage of the people, genuine political participation and political representation. These, in addition to the broken social contract, began to translate into crises of legitimacy. The citizens began to react to the g rowing t ensions b y m eans o f p rotests, s trikes a nd r iots. W ith t he los s o f internal leg itimacy, a nd w ith en suing t hreats t o r egime p ower, A frican s tates sought and became dependent on and were sustained by the external support from Cold War powers.85 However, the end of the Cold War and globalisation reduced the support for corrupt, authoritarian and violent regimes, leading to the collapse of regimes such as that of Mobutu in Z aire and in g eneral forced economic and later political reforms on African states.86 As a r esult of the economic crisis, African countries had to solicit credit and assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The structural ad justment p rogrammes f orced o n t he co untries w ere h arsh a nd prescribed, a mong o ther t hings, j ob c uts, de valuation, p rivatisation, commercialisation, the institution of market forces and import liberalisation. The implementation of these programmes led to unemployment, deteriorating living
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standards, socioeconomic hardships, the collapse of the social service and welfare systems a nd f urther e conomic de cline. Th ese co nditions g enerated p olitical resignation and social apathy, but also heightened ethnic consciousness, religious fanaticism a nd s ocial di slocation a nd f ragmentation, w hich w ere exp ressed in conflicts, crises and incidences of unrest.87 There was a second wave of democratisation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which s aw multiparty elections in G hana, Nigeria, S enegal and Burkina Faso. A third wave of democratisation, which was widespread and profound, began in the late 1980s a nd e arly 1990s a nd wa s dr iven b y ci tizen g roups a nd p rotesters. I t generated s o m uch h ope a nd exp ectations t hat s ome c hristened i t t he second independence. D uring t his p eriod, m any A frican co untries em braced p olitical reforms and opened up t heir p olitical s paces t o p luralism by conducting multiparty elections. However, apart from Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa, where democracy and democratic governance have been fairly successful, democracy has remained tenuous a nd un stable a nd dem ocratic co nsolidation h as b een s low. F ragile a nd failing democracies are still found in Burundi, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Angola, Mali, R wanda, A lgeria, C ongo-Brazzaville, N igeria, T ogo, Z imbabwe, K enya, Equatorial Guinea, the CAR and So Tom and Prncipe. Pseudodemocracies with election t ags exi st in T ogo, C ameroon, Ga bon a nd Uganda. D emocratisation in Niger a nd G uinea h as fa iled b ecause o f mi litary in terventions, w hile t hat o f Madagascar, C te dIvoire and Guinea-Bissau has fa llen prey to p oor le adership under t he c hokehold o f g reedy e lites. L ibya a nd E gypt h ave a utocratic, a nd Morocco and Swaziland, monarchical regimes. Africas g overnance cr isis h as r emained p rofound, ext ensive a nd p rolonged. Governments have been insensitive to the interests and aspirations of the citizens, eroding t heir p articipation a nd acco mmodation, di sconnecting t hem f rom t he state a nd g overnmental co ncerns a nd a lienating t hem.88 Further, g overnments have b een c haracterised b y in effective admini stration, in effective co ntrol a nd command o f r esources, in consistent a nd p oor m anagement o f e conomies a nd development.89 In t he f inal analysis one could s ay t hat human s ecurity has b een sacrificed for regime survival and security. The s tates a re n ot h eld acco untable a nd in fac t, a s B aker n otes, unaccountability is extensively institutionalised in Africa, largely because of feeble legislative oversight, opaque business dealings and corrupt elections and electoral systems, exacerb ated b y t he in ability o f t he j udiciary, ci vil s ociety a nd a ntiMIILITIAS, R EBELS
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corruption a gencies t o c all p ublic a uthorities t o acco unt.90 Corruption h as increased the cost of governance, starved and devastated public services, inflated recurrent a nd o perating cos ts, m ade admini stration p erverse a nd c umbersome, undermined de velopment ef forts, di verted c apital t o f oreign b anks a nd s cared away investments.91 The nature of African politics and the public arena it created simply did n ot facilitate g ood g overnance a nd de velopment. R ather, a s C hazan et a l n ote, i t prevented any real representation and participation, popular engagement in public policy formulation and direction, meaningful access to government, meaningful deliberations and consultation and consideration of public interests in t he public agenda.92 There wa s n o p ublic co nsent, co nstitutional a nd p opular c hecks a nd restrains were weakened, decision-making power was limited to a few persons or groups, diversity of opinion, criticism and dissent were constrained and popular influence and pressure on governments were limited. In addition, governmental capacity and effectiveness were undermined. Larger bureaucracies r emained in efficient, in competent a nd w eak, b ut le d t o l arger governance cos ts, w hich lef t f ew r esources f or de velopment. Th e p olitics o f accumulation made entrepreneurial endeavours unnecessary for leaders, patrons and c lients a nd f utile f or o thers a nd t herefore di sassociated w ealth f rom entrepreneurial activity.93 The expansion and politicisation of the security agencies generated a mbitions, in creased exp enditure, in troduced di visions a nd co nflicts and t urned t he mi litary in to a n in tervention f orce in p olitics, g overnment a nd society. A s a co nsequence o f t he a bove, m ost s tates in A frica fa iled t o ac hieve economic progress and wealth or guarantee citizens wellbeing and security.

Case analysis: state, governance, development and human security crises in Nigeria
The mi sfortunes a nd s orry si tuation o f A frican s tates, a nd t he g overnance a nd development crises can be illustrated with reference to Nigeria. With a population of a bout 150 mi llion a nd va st h uman a nd n atural r esources in a rable l and, minerals and particularly oil and gas, Nigeria is regarded variously as a s leeping, crippled, prostrated or dying African giant.94 Nigeria is about the seventh largest producer of crude oil in t he Organisation of Petroleum Producing Countries (OPEC) and the largest in Africa. It has earned over US$400 b illion f rom o il exp orts. A s o il a nd ga s r evenues in creased,
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agriculture and the production and export of other minerals declined, leaving the country with an economy, in which oil and gas account for more than 95 per cent of export earnings and 80 p er cent of federal government revenues. In the mid1960s, Nigeria was on a p ar with or better than most of the Asian countries, but typical of most African countries, it is very far behind them today. It now occupies the unenviable position as one of the poorest and most fragile states of the world. The economy has b een in de cline since the early 1980s, a nd has grown only marginally since the late 1990s. Th e non-oil s ector, particularly agricultural and solid min eral p roduction a nd exp orts, h as s uffered a h uge de cline. I ndustrial capacity utilisation is less than 30 p er cent and the country remains very import dependent. Pu blic u tilities a nd s ocial s ervices a re in adequate, in efficient a nd shoddy a nd p ublic inf rastructure i s co llapsing. Th e c urrency h as b een fa lling against m ajor w orld c urrencies sin ce t he l ate 1980s. P overty h as de epened a nd living co nditions a nd m aterial w ellbeing h ave de clined s teeply. Th e p er c apita income in 2002 wa s about a quarter of that in t he mid-1970s, 95 while the poverty rate has increased from about 46 p er cent in 1976 t o about 76 p er cent in 2009. 96 Infant and maternal mortality rates are among the highest in the world. The le adership h as b een ext remely s elf-interested a nd s elf-seeking, uncommitted, exploitative, corrupt and oppressive. State officials are some of the best p aid in t he w orld, a nd y et lo ot t he t reasury. P olitical le aders p oliticise identities a nd cr eate di visive p latforms t o acq uire p ower a nd r esources t hat lubricate p atronage sys tems. Cr itical n ational a nd de velopment i ssues a re addressed through the prism of ethnic interests. Rarely do public institutions work effectively o r a re o fficials im partial a nd fa ir, f or e lite g roup in terests t ake precedence and create an environment of arbitrariness and abuse of power.97 Public offices and resources are privatised for personal and primordial benefit. The nations vast resources have been wasted and mismanaged or stolen and laundered b y m eans o f a h ost o f s elf-interested, in consistent, in appropriate a nd misplaced policies and corruption. Public officials and public sector management are wa ntonly p rofligate, wa steful a nd os tentatious. Pu blic in stitutions, s ocial services, t he e ducational a nd h ealth c are sys tems a nd m ost p ublic a gencies a re seeking medical treatment abroad (particularly in India and South Africa), while many N igerians n ow a ttend uni versities a nd p ostgraduate s chools in E urope, South Africa and Ghana. As the state has failed to p erform its critical roles, citizens and communities have r esigned t hemselves t o p roviding b asic s ocial s ervices s uch a s wa ter a nd
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electricity for themselves, at least most of the time. There is huge insecurity of lives and p roperty b ecause o f hig h v iolent cr ime ra tes. N eighbourhoods a nd communities provide t heir own s ecurity a nd s afety, s ometimes by hir ing et hnic militia g roup m embers. D eepening p overty a nd l ack o f s tate s upport h ave frustrated ci tizens a nd dr iven s ome t o cr ime. M any h ave a lso j oined s ocial enclaves b ased o n r eligious f undamentalism, c ultism a nd b anditry, p rimordial enclaves s uch a s co mmunal, et hnic, r eligious a nd r egional g roups, a nd p olitical enclaves such as patronage and violent networks in s earch of platforms for social assistance. The nation has been devastated by deep ethnic, regional and religious divisions and conflicts.98 The violent and deadly contests for power have produced a regime of assassinations, unresolved murders, electoral violence and violent clashes. Interand in tra-communal a nd et hnic co nflicts, a nd in ter- a nd in tramilitia, c ult a nd religious g roup c lashes, h ave le d t o a co ndition o f p ervasive s ocial s trife, s ocial unrest a nd y outh r estiveness, w hich h ave c aused n umerous de aths a nd displacements. About 30 000 people are estimated to have died in community and political violence between 1999 and 2009, while about 3 million were displaced.99 The politics of exclusion and the use of the state mainly to dominate and deprive excluded g roups o f p olitical p articipation a nd b enefits h ave h eightened et hnic nationalism, s elf-determination s truggles a nd iden tity co nflicts, a nd p roduced ethnic militias in almost all regions, as well as violent and militia-based insurgency in the Niger Delta region since the late 1990s.100 The Nigerian military struggled to contain the insurgency in the Niger Delta until a disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation programme was accepted by the militias in October 2009. The n ation-state p roject i s s till c hallenged b y t he f orces o f r egionalism, ethnicism, religious fundamentalism and struggles for control of state resources. Apart from the 19671970 s ecessionist civil war, there are still forces fighting for self-determination and separatism in deep south, southeast and southwest Nigeria.

Responses of citizens and popular groups

The decolonisation and immediate post-independence eras in Africa were years of activism a nd h ope f or t he o rdinary ci tizens a s t hey j oined t he p rotests a gainst colonial rule, responded to the nationalist sentiments and joined the struggle for decolonisation. There were huge aspirations that indigenous rule would accelerate development and social wellbeing. After independence the citizens sought avenues
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for more engagement, for state intervention to alleviate their social problems and for s tate-directed de velopment. Th ese h opes b egan t o t urn t o d ust w hen t he citizenry was ditched and its p articipation, relevance and interests r ubbished by the r uling c lass in t he s truggle f or co nsolidation o f s tate p ower. I n fac t, t he ordinary people were marginalised and excluded from the mainstream of political power and patronage.101 As rights were progressively eroded, power became more exclusive and based on et hnic, r egional a nd r eligious in terests, a nd a s e lections b ecame les s competitive, co urtesy o f t he m onopoly o f p olitical in stitutions b y e litist g roups, and the state became predatory, courtesy of authoritarianism and repression, the citizens b ecame f rustrated, a lienated a nd a pathetic. Th e exp ectations o f development began to fizzle out by the early 1970s as economic decline and crises set in a mong t he p oor a nd p easant c lasses a longside t he g rowing m ass o f unemployed. A s t he e conomic cr ises w orsened in to t he 1990s, t he vu lnerable groups w ere n eglected a nd b attered b y in ternal a nd im posed ad justment a nd reform policies. Frustration ga ve b irth t o m ass s ocial di scontent a nd t he r esponse o f t he citizenry was to exit f rom engagements with the state and direct their activities, assistance, p articipation and loyalties to informal and non-state enclaves. When the ci tizens los t t heir fa ith in t he s tate, t hey f irst w ithdrew t heir s upport a nd commitment and t hen b egan to s abotage and subvert it.102 Thus r eactions were first c haracterised b y a voidance, es cape, p rotective m echanisms a nd t hen circumvention of t he state and its authority, laws, regulations and t axes. L ater it took the form of emigration or the creation of informal parallel systems such as black markets, smuggling and illegal trading.103 Another response was to search for and create alternative support, assistance and s ecurity in stitutions. Thi s le d t o t he em ergence o f co mmunity, et hnic a nd religious g roups, s elf-help a nd de velopment a ssociations, n eighbourhood a nd community security groups, and vigilantes. As struggles for power by the ruling class a nd ex cluded e lites h eightened a nd ci tizen s truggles f or s urvival a nd livelihoods intensified, opportunities to profit from crime and violence began to emerge, leading to a regime of pervasive crime, violence and violent engagements and to the proliferation of arms and emergence of ANSGs. By t he l ate 1980s, t he p ersistence o f t he e conomic cr ises, acco mpanied b y pervasive in ternal co nflicts, co rruption a nd v iolence a nd de epening impoverishment a nd h uman mi sery, b egan t o g enerate r eactions o f a nger a nd
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social r estiveness. G oaded b y in creased s tate a uthoritarianism a nd de clining fortunes un der ad justment p olicies a nd m otivated b y t he exa mples o f democratisation in Latin America and Eastern Europe, ordinary Africans began to challenge t he s tate, w hich le d t o t he a wakening o f ci vil s ociety in t he f orm o f protest movements, struggles against adjustment policies and for political rights, political liberalisation and democratisation. What swept across A frica and most state c apitals a nd m ajor ci ties a nd t owns wa s a n un precedented wa ve o f urb an riots, street protests and popular violence that forced substantial changes in several countries and opened up the African states to liberalisation in the public arena. However, because corruption, self-interested government, abuse of power and civil r ights, a uthoritarianism a nd s tate v iolence h ave p ersisted, s everal ci tizens have remained outside the state and in informal and underground economies and primordial h avens. Thi s wa s n ot h elped b y t he fac t t hat m any o f t he t ransition programmes were t runcated, t he elections were f lawed or annulled, and t he old constructions o f p rimordial a nd p oliticised iden tity-based p ower s truggles a nd violent p olitics w ere s ustained. Th ese h ave s oured t he h opes o f t he p ostdemocratisation wa ve. To s ome ext ent, t he s tate, g overnance a nd de velopment crises have persisted. The citizens have remained poor and vulnerable and a new culture o f di senchantment a nd m ass s ocial di scontent h as em erged in s everal countries. Thi s i s e videnced b y t he p ersisting emig ration, f requent r ecourse t o violent protests, urban and religious riots, the proliferation of arms and ANSGs, recurring identity wars and persisting insurrections, insurgencies and rebellions. But African citizens are still engaging the states through struggles for relevance and p olitical p articipation. Th e ci tizens r emain r estive a nd ci vil s ociety a nd ANSGs r emain p articularly r elevant in t he a reas o f ci tizen en gagements a nd empowerments, communal and individual safety and security as misgovernance, poverty, cr ime, v iolence, in security a nd iden tity-based t ensions a nd co nflicts persist.

The phenomenon of armed non-state groups

Non-state in stitutions o f v iolence r epresent t he m ost p owerful, exp licit a nd compelling challenge to state structures, state authority, state monopoly and state existence in A frica, a nd a re t he m ost p otent in struments o r v ehicles o f s tate collapse today.104
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There a re t wo i ssues h ere. Th e f irst i s h ow t he n ature o f t he s tate a nd governance constructed a political and public terrain or sphere in which violence and u ltimately ANSGs t hrive. Th e s econd i s h ow t he cr ises o f t he s tate a nd governance have led to the construction of diverse ANSGs. The n ature a nd p rocesses f or t he co nsolidation o f p ower a fter t he p ostindependence elections were structured in ways that promoted a zer o-sum game in p olitics. Thi s in t urn h eightened t he s truggle f or p ower a nd t urned i t in to warfare, deepened and politicised divisiveness, cast inter-elite power struggles in ethnic, r eligious a nd r egional m oulds, a nd p ersonalised p ower. Th e in evitable outcome o f t his p olitical r eality wa s v iolence, w hich b ecame a t ool f or ei ther perpetuating the power of one group or appropriating it for other groups. Elite group struggles for consolidating power turned the state into a rapacious and predatory force. The security agencies became abusive, brutal, suppressive and repressive instruments that were used against the opposition, activists, protesters and ci tizens. I ndividuals a nd g roups t hat d ared t o cr iticise, v ote a gainst t he government o r s upport o pposition e lements w ere v isited w ith ex cessive a nd indiscriminate f orce. P articularly, a s s tate o fficials los t s upport a s a r esult o f increasing co rruption, in effective g overnance a nd e conomic de cline a nd face d growing leg itimacy cr ises, s tate v iolence b ecame t he in strument t o s uppress dissent, c hallenges a nd r esistance. A part f rom t he s ecurity a gencies, s tate e lites began t o u se t hugs a nd a rmed b ands, cr eate mi litant y outh w ings o f p olitical parties, es tablish s tate p aramilitary uni ts a nd mi litias a nd s upport a nd u tilise private militias. The s tate t hus co nstructed a t errain o f v iolent p olitics, m ade v iolence a k ey resource f or acq uiring a nd acc umulating p ower, cr eated a nd m ade u se o f entrepreneurs o f v iolence, in stitutionalised v iolence in p olitics, a nd cr eated a public s phere in w hich n on-state ac tors w ere f orced in to co unter-violence a s a mode of defence and resistance. ANSGs then emerged from support of state elites, the mobilisation of opposition elements against state brutality and repression, the construction of alternative paths to power and resources and as the last resort of excluded, marginalised and discontented elements. State weakness, failure and irrelevance are clearly indicated in t he militia and rebel m ovement p henomenon. Fir st, s tate w eakness cr eates t he in capability t o maintain a m onopoly of in stitutions of co ercion, provide s ecurity and m aintain
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public and social order and peace. Second, the decline of state resources, roles and capacity le ads t o a n in ability t o p rovide e conomic o pportunities, s ocial s ervices and faci lities, em ployment a nd g ood li ving co nditions. Thir d, s tate w eakness creates a g rowing s tate ir relevance a nd t he p romotion o f iden tity g roups a nd movements t o f ill t he vac uum. F ourth, s tate w eakness h eightens t he q uest f or identity solidarity, assertion and mobilisation, and creates a fertile environment in which non-state actors can thrive. Typically, in w eak states the non-state actors, groups and individuals take on state roles and f ill t he vac uum of s ocial a ssistance, welfare and s ecurity and t he maintenance of social order, but are not moderated, regulated or organised. In the absence o f s tate co ntrol, r egulation a nd a ny f orm o f l awful det errence, i t i s n ot surprising t hat t he b ehaviour and practices of t hese g roups b ecome l awless and disorderly. Th ese em ergent ac tors in g overnance a nd s ecurity t hus in cubate criminality, excessive and abusive force and violence. Further, t he p olitical a nd co nstitutional en vironment a nd w eaknesses o f t he African states are fertile breeding grounds for extraconstitutional actions, violent politics, c hallenges o f s tate a uthority, p olitical co nflicts a nd h ostilities, a nd deepening identity-based divisions. Even the reforms since the 1980s, in the form of structural adjustment programmes, political liberalisation, state roll-back and privatisation, f urther weakened t he states and prevented t hem f rom p erforming basic and critical functions. The state and governance crises generated political alienation and discontent, which cr eated t he s ocial b ases f or o pposition, c hallenge a nd r esistance t o s tate authority a nd in stability, s ocial t urmoil a nd s ocial di sorder co nditions f or organised cr ime, sm uggling, ci vil s trife, urb an r iots, b anditry a nd in security in which non-state institutions operate and thrive. Vulnerable and dominated groups also used and mobilised ethnic identity and non-state institutions to challenge the state. Thus the state has been more susceptible to challenge. Weak and deteriorating social services, mass unemployment, poor education systems, economic decline, stagnation and regression, de-industrialisation, urban decay, de epening p overty, co llapsing a nd corrupt l aw enf orcement a gencies a nd widespread in security, un controlled a nd un governed s paces a nd w eak, un stable and v iolent t errains a re t he co nditions in w hich t he mi litias, I slamist mi litant groups and rebel movements are bred. As Clapham put it, misgovernance in states such as Liberia and Uganda destroyed not only the existing basis of statehood but was sufficient to induce resistance.105
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The state and governance as victims of ANSGs

State a nd g overnance cr ises did n ot j ust g enerate ANSGs o r b ecame m anifest through t he p henomenon o f ANSGs, n or did t he l atter p rove a nd dem onstrate only s tate a nd g overnance cr ises. R ather, s tate a nd g overnance cr ises a re, in a sense, victims of ANSGs. In m any A frican co untries t he p henomenon o f ANSGs h as r evealed de ep divisions, lack of discipline, organisational and infrastructure challenges, the poor condition of the military and security agencies, the tortuous hold on power by the political e lite, t he p oor co nnect o r a ttachment b etween t he p eople a nd t he state/regimes, t he f ragility o f s tate in stitutions a nd t he p orosity o f b orders. Th e ease w ith w hich t hese ANSGs o perate o r h ave o perated a nd t he dif ficulties o f containing them are clear demonstrations of the weakness and fragility of African states. However, w hile s tate w eakness a nd de cline h ave r esulted in a g rowth in ANSGs, state fragility and collapse have been accelerated by their activities. ANSG participation in in surrection, in surgency a nd r ebellion h as cr eated un governed and ungovernable areas from which states have retreated, leaving behind a power vacuum. With time, ANSGs b ecome de facto governments in t hese communities and zo nes, cr eating p arallel o r a lternate s tates, w ith o rganised s tructures o f policing, cr ime m anagement, r evenue co llection a nd e ven lega l a nd p olicy frameworks. It could in fac t b e s aid t hat s ome h ave created s tates w ithin s tates. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cte dIvoire, Somalia, Rwanda, the DRC, Angola, the CAR and others have all at various times and to a va rying extent been victims of state decline and failure, and ANSGs. The worst case has been Somalia, which has been immersed in wa r, in ternecine co nflicts, p ervasive v iolence, a b reakdown o f l aw and order and territorial struggles that continue to this day. Specifically, ANSGs contribute to state collapse through the following:
I

Accelerating t he de cline o f s tate c apacity, co llapse o f s tate in stitutions a nd failure of state authority Facilitating t he los s o f s tate-controlled t erritory a nd s overeignty a nd t he emergence of ungoverned and ungovernable territorial spaces Filling the institutional and governance vacuum left by fragile and collapsing states a nd co nstructing a lternative p olitical in stitutions a nd a uthority in regions outside state control106
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Contributing t o t he p roliferation o f a rms a nd a mmunition a nd t he commercialisation of violence Participating in r esource o pportunism b y t he exp loitation, p lundering a nd marketing o f n atural r esources a nd s truggles f or co ntrol o f r esource a nd trading sites and routes Exacerbating h uman in security a nd h umanitarian cr ises t hrough in ternal displacements, sw elling r efugee c amps, los s o f p roperty a nd li velihoods a nd horrendous violence against civil populations Accentuating t he co llapse o f f ormal e conomies b y g rowing un derground, informal and illegal economies Engaging in violent confrontations with state military forces and other ANSGs and causing insurrections and civil wars Facilitating t he di sintegration o f s tate mi litary f orces, t he co llapse o f governments, and the takeover of territories and even state capitals Facilitating t he emergence of diverse enclaves, held either by states or rebels and of multiple political authorities and governance systems

ANSGs t hus accen tuate t he in dicators a nd co nsequences o f fa iling a nd f ragile states. Th eir ac tions a nd ac tivities a re dir ectly r elated t o t he em ergence o r heightening o f t he a bove co nditions, w hich r eflect n ot o nly f ragility a nd deterioration, but the steady decline to total collapse.

CONCLUSION
ANSGs have been closely linked to the nature of African states and how they are governed. Thi s c hapter h as a ttempted t o lin k t he r ise o f t he p henomenon o f ANSGs to the struggles for power and its consolidation and the nature of politics and governance in Africa. I have shown that both are linked to deficits in leadership, administrative and institutional c apability, in ternal a nd p olitical leg itimacy a nd in equitable distribution o f n ational r esources. Th ese h ave t aken t heir t oll o n t he e conomy, social and public order and political stability of states and have weakened the very fabric of African society its social existence, social realities and livelihoods, social coherence a nd h armony, s ocial co nfidence a nd t rust. W ith li ttle c apacity, dwindling resources and declining legitimacy, the state could no longer guarantee socioeconomic p rogress, ci vil, in dividual a nd g roup r ights, o r s ecurity. Th ese
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created a q uest f or p rimordial iden tities t hrough w hich ci tizens co uld a ssert themselves, and opportunities for non-state actors in t he form of diverse groups and even ANSGs to challenge state power and roles. In view of the connection between ANSGs and the state and governance crises, the b est a pproach t o co ntaining t heir t hreats t o h uman s ecurity w ill en tail extensive r econstruction, r ehabilitation a nd r eform o f s tate a nd g overnance institutions. This should be the task mainly of African leaders who should put the African people at the centre of the states existence. While external interventions could m ake a p ositive co ntribution, t heir a im i s p rimarily t o p romote Western interests. E ven g overnance p rescriptions b y in ternational f inancial in stitutions have g enerally b een mi sguided a nd ext ernally im posed, a nd in m ost c ases compounded t he s tate a nd e conomic cr ises. Th ough co mmendable, ext ernal support i s a t p resent b eggarly, s elf-interested a nd p roselytising. A utochthonous effort i s s uperior, r eflects ac tual c hallenges a nd a spirations a nd i s fa r m ore sustainable. Africans should therefore reconstruct African states and governance systems by themselves in line with their hopes, needs, realities and existence. The challenge is to rebuild the kind of states that the people actually yearn for: states t hat a re r esponsive a nd s ensitive t o ci tizen p ressures, gu arantee h uman security a nd m anage s tate a ffairs in a t ransparent a nd acco untable m anner. African le aders, p opular g roups and ac tivists h ave t o form s tate-citizenry p acts, build state and institutional legitimacy and credibility, establish new platforms for mobilising t he ci tizenry a nd b uild n ew co mmitments a nd f ollowership t owards the new Africa envisioned at independence. African s tates w ould h ave t o do m ore in t erms o f b uilding in clusive a nd integrated political communities, mediating between groups, divesting themselves of ex cessive f orce a nd a uthoritarian t endencies, b uilding sys tems o f di alogue, negotiating a nd r eaching co nsensus w ith g roups a nd o pposition e lements, constructing s ecure a nd s afe t errains de void o f t he p rofits o f v iolence, b uilding platforms for mobilisation of common commitments and productive engagements and building capacity for conflict resolution and the promotion of peace. But the most im portant a nd d aunting c hallenge i s t o b uild q uality le aderships t hat c an move A frica f orward. Th e p resent cr op o f le aders i s s till co rrupt a nd s elfinterested; a nd n ational, v isionary, cr edible, s elfless, co mmitted a nd t ransparent leaders clearly remain in s hort supply. Present-day African leaders have played a major role in weakening the state capacity to govern democratically and justly, and instead h ave cr eated co nditions le ading t o t he f ormation a nd co ntinuation o f ANSGs.
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NOTES
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Ake, The state in contemporary Africa, 6162. E E Osaghae, Crippled giant: Nigeria since independence, London: Hurst, 1998. Fagbadebo, Nigeria and the perennial problem of governance, 7 O Ezigbo, Nigeria: MDGs poverty rate rises to 76 per cent, This Day, 27 February 2009. Reuben Abati, The sad story of Nigeria, 21 January 2007, http://www.guardiannewsngr.com (accessed 20 March 2007). 98 Augustine Ik elegbe, S tate, et hnic mi litias a nd co nflict in N igeria, Canadian J ournal o f African Studies 39(3) (2005), 490516. 99 United N ations H uman R ights C ouncil (UNHR C), World R eport 2009 N igeria, http://www.un.org/apps/news (accessed 21 April 2009). 100 Ikelegbe, State, ethnic militias and conflict in Nigeria, 87122; Augustine Ikelegbe, Popular and criminal violence as instruments of struggle: the case of youth militias in the Niger Delta region, P aper p resented a t t he I nternational Workshop o n V iolent C onflict in t he N iger Delta, organised by Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, Sweden, and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway, held in Oslo, Norway, on 1819 August 2008, 124146. 101 Laakso and Olukoshi, The crisis of the post-colonial nation-state project in Africa. 102 Ihonvbere, The irrelevant state, ethnicity and the quest for nationhood. 103 Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, Disengagement from the state in Africa: reflections on the experience of Ghana and Guinea, in Peter Lewis (ed), Africa: dilemmas of development and change, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1998, 119130. 104 Christopher C lapham, I ntroduction: a nalysing A frican in surgencies, in C hristopher Clapham (ed), African guerrillas, Oxford: James Currey, 811. 105 Clapham, Introduction: analysing African insurgencies, 17. 106 Thompson, An introduction to African politics, 203.

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Part II Case studies

C HAPTER 6

Marginalisation and the rise of militia groups in Kenya: the Mungiki and the Sabaot Land Defence Force
ADAMS OLOO

INTRODUCTION
In the last four decades there have been increased incidences around the world of the emergence and activities of militias, as well as armed opposition and Islamist militant groups. In Africa, many countries are hosts to such groups, with the most affected b eing S omalia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of C ongo (DRC), and Sudan. In Kenya, militias emerged as a result of bad governance, which has led to the marginalisation of communities, economic disparities, a rise in poverty levels, and the inequitable distribution of national resources and services. In this chapter two, militia groups in Kenya are studied, namely the Mungiki and the Sabaot Land Defence F orce (S LDF), a nd t he f ormation, a gendas, le adership, o rganisation, activities, im pact a nd s tate r esponses t o t hese t wo mi litia g roups in K enya a re addressed.

THE STATE, ETHNICITY AND MILITIAS IN KENYA

State policies in Kenya since independence have resulted in horizontal inequalities or sys temic in equalities b etween g roups. Th e in equality b etween g roups h as
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generated powerful grievances that leaders exploit to mobilise people to political protest by calling on cultural markers (a co mmon history, language or religion), thus exploiting the masses at group level. Mobilisation is particularly likely where there is political as well as economic inequality, not only because group leaders are being excluded from political power but also because most members of the group are economically deprived and consequently harbour significant grievances. Studies suggest t hat in K enya, t he c apture of state p ower by t he Kikuyu and kindred g roups (t he M eru a nd Em bu) sys tematically im proved t he c hances o f access t o de velopment resources of t hese g roups, a s w ell a s t o employment a nd education. All of this created a feeling of marginalisation among other competing ethnic groups. This was especially true of large ethnic groups such as the Luo and Luhya, and later the Kalenjin.1 Subsequent regimes have attempted to rectify this state of affairs, but the end result h as b een t hat p olicies h ave en ded u p b eing m erely a j ustification f or preferential treatment of groups hitherto excluded from such access. Upon coming to power in 1978, the new president, Daniel arap Moi, slowly but surely introduced a r ectification p rocess t hat w ould, b y t he c lose o f t he cen tury, s ee t he K alenjin become the successors of the Kikuyu as far as control of the structure of privilege was concerned. The Moi regime, while it lasted, put in p lace mechanisms that it hoped w ould en sure t hat i t w ould n ot b e o usted f rom p ower in a ny f uture elections.2 However, t his was not to b e, as t he manoeuvres by t he regime in t he run-up to the third multiparty general elections in 2002 succeeded in galvanising the p olitical o pposition a gainst t he r egime, f inally le ading t o t he exi t o f t he Moi/Kenya African National Union (KANU) regime on 29 D ecember 2002. Th e national m ulti-ethnic b acking t hat le d t o K ibakis a ssent t o p ower in 2002 h as dissipated, h owever w ith K ibaki b eing acc used o f fa vouring t he M ount K enya region in b oth p ublic a ppointments a nd e conomic en dowments. Thi s h as contributed to anti-Kikuyu feelings in t he country, as demonstrated in t he 2005 referendum on the constitution as well as the 2007 general elections. Politicisation o f et hnicity o ften c haracterises a n in equitable acces s t o p ower. Such a structure gives rise to the emergence of an in group and an out group, with the out group attempting to break the structure of inequality. The response of the in group is to build barriers to ensure the continuation of its privileged position. At t he cen tre o f t his s cenario a re t he e lites w ho, b ecause t hey f eel ex cluded o r threatened w ith ex clusion, b egin t o in voke et hnic ide ology in t he h ope o f establishing a reliable b ase of s upport t o f ight w hat are purely p ersonal and/or elite interests. Accordingly, the conflicts in Kenya can take the shape of dominated groups t rying t o li berate t hemselves f rom o ppressive sys tems w hile do minant
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groups a ttempt t o m aintain t he s tatus q uo. S uch co nflicts a re n ormally characterised by inequalities in the distribution of power and resources. In K enya t his s tate o f a ffairs h as r esulted in va rious et hnic g roups cr eating political parties headed by one of their own in the hope that if they capture power, they will b enefit f rom access to state resources.3 Electoral p olitics in K enya t hus consists of highly cohesive bloc-voting ethnic groups. Kenyans generally vote for the same party as their ethnic kin, and particularly so if a co ntending party has a representative f rom t heir o wn co mmunity a s a p residential c andidate. Consistently, p arties h ave b een f ormed a t t he b ehest o f a sin gle le ader w ho provides f inancial p atronage a nd w ho draws a co re o f f ounders lin ked m ore by personal t ies f orged in t he et hnic a rena t han b y ide ological co mmitment. E ven where co alitions h ave b een f ormed, t hey h ave b een co alitions o f et hnic g roups rather than coalitions of parties that share the same ideological commitment. The formation of political parties along ethnic lines has been accompanied by the f ormation o f mi litant g roups t hat c laim t o s afeguard t he in terests o f t heir specific communities. These groups have been manipulated by the political elites to f ight a gainst t heir m arginalisation b y v iolent m eans. I ndeed, t hese ex cluded groups a re g enerally s everely e conomically dep rived a nd l ack acces s t o p olitical power. B ecause o f t heir e conomic si tuation, t hey h ave li ttle t o los e b y t aking violent action in fact, some gain from it by obtaining some form of employment in rebel armies, which are likely to sanction looting and other illicit gains.4 While the mi litia g roups ini tially g rew o ut o f t he n eed t o c hampion t he c ause o f a particular et hnic g roup, t hese mi litias h ave o ver t ime t urned a gainst t heir o wn communities. This trend has mostly b een inf luenced by t he need to survive t he harsh economic disparities prevailing in the country. This rise in mi litia groups in Kenya has also been linked to the governments inability to provide security and deal with criminal gangs. An inadequate security and j ustice sys tem a nd w eak s tate p enetration h ave le d t o t he em ergence o f ungovernable a reas in s ome p arts o f K enya, n otably urb an s lums. Thi s h as facilitated the expansion of militia and vigilante groups. These outfits draw from a pool of young, unemployed men and are p articularly mobilised by lo cal le aders during pre- and post-election years.

THE ORIGIN AND RISE OF MILITIA GR OUPS IN KENYA

The history of militias in Kenya can be traced to the war waged by the Mau Mau against the British in the 1950s. The Mau Mau was an armed group of Africans
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predominantly Kikuyus t hat rose up in p rotest against w hite r ule. Among t he grievances t hat le d t o t his r evolt w ere l and s carcity, f orced l abour a nd m eagre wages. Th e m ovement wa s, h owever, s uppressed a fter a s tate o f em ergency wa s declared. A lthough t he m ovement wa s e ventually s ubdued, i ts co ntribution towards accelerating the pace to independence was immense. In p ost-independence K enya, t he p henomenon o f t he mi litia g roup h as i ts roots in t he cr eation o f a y outh w ing b y t he f ormer r uling p arty, K ANU. Th e KANU regime f irst u sed its youth w ing t o h arass t he f irst opposition p arty, t he Kenya A frican D emocratic U nion, w hich exi sted f or o nly o ne y ear a fter t he attainment of independence. However, youth-wingers were used more forcefully after a s plit in K ANU s aw t he f ormation o f t he K enya P eoples U nion (KPU). KANU on various occasions deployed the members of its youth wing to intimidate and harass KPU s upporters. The presence of these youth-wingers persisted even after the proscription of the KPU in 1969. Thereafter, all elections during the oneparty era w itnessed v iolence m eted o ut b y y outh-wingers, w ith p rominent politicians hiring them to harass and disrupt their opponents rallies. The youthwingers s erved a s a b reeding g round f or t he r ise of cr iminal ga ngs a nd mi litias after the country returned to multipartyism. More specifically, the youth-wingers were instrumental in t he formation and rise o f t he Mungiki in t he p ost-1992 e lection p eriod. Th ey ini tiated mi litant resistance against groups that had been unleashed on the Kikuyus in well thought out violent attacks to rid the Rift Valley of outsiders. The Mungiki was forced to use a similar tactic to save its own. During t he m ultiparty p eriod a nd p articularly d uring t he r eign o f M oi a nd KANU, these groups transformed themselves into criminal gangs and militias and through their violent acts intimidated and disenfranchised opposition supporters, especially in a reas t hat were desig nated a s KANU zones. In 1992, t hese g roups were o perating m ainly f rom M ois p olitical b ase in t he R ift V alley, w here t he Kalenjin Warriors and Maasai Morans attacked rival ethnic groups. In 1997, these groups were b eing trained and armed in t he C oast province (Kaya B ombo) and recruited, trained and organised in t he Shimba hills, Kaya Waa and the Similani caves in the Kwale district, at the instigation of prominent politicians and with the support of the government and the military. They were subsequently deployed to foment ethnic violence in the run-up to the 1997 elections at the Coast.5 As opposition groups became increasingly vulnerable to these state-sponsored militias, t hey resorted t o creating t heir own mi litia g roups t o counter t he s tate150
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sponsored militias and to provide protection for opposition parties during election campaigns. S ome of t he opposition-sponsored cr iminal gangs and mi litias w ere the Jeshi la Embakasi, Baghdad Boys and Amachuma. The r esult h as b een a g rowth o f s elf-styled mi litias, v igilante g roups a nd organised cr iminal ga ngs in b oth urb an a nd r ural a reas t hat h ave s prouted in almost e very p art o f t he co untry, p osing a n in creasing c hallenge t o a p oorly trained and ill-equipped police force. The most notorious of these gangs were the Mungiki (Nairobi/Rift Valley/Central), SLDF (Mount Elgon), Kaya Bombo Youth (Mombasa/Kwale), Sungu Sun gu, C hinkororo and Amachuma (Kisii/Nyamira/ Gucha/Transmara) and Taleban, Jeshi la Mzee and Jeshi la Embakasi (Nairobi). Table 6-1 shows the criminal gangs that are in operation in Kenya and the areas in which they operate. Table 61: Criminal gangs in Kenya
Criminal gang Amachuma Angola Musumbiji Baghdad Boys Banyamulenge Charo Shutu Chinkororo Dallas Muslim Youth Ndombolo ya Yesu 42 Brothers Jeshi la Embakasi Jeshi la Kingole Jeshi la Mzee Kalenjin Warrriors Kamjesh Kaya Bombo Youth Kosovo Boys Kuzacha Boys Maasai Morans Area(s) of operation Kisii/Nyamira/Gucha Western/Nairobi Nyanza/Nairobi (Kibera) Nairobi Mombasa/Kwale Kisii/Gucha/Transmara Nairobi Nairobi (Kibera) Nairobi (Kibera) Nairobi (Embakasi) Machakos/Makueni/Kitui/Mwingi Nairobi Rift Valley Nairobi (Embakasi/Kasarani) Mombasa/Kwale Nairobi Nairobi (Kibera) Rift Valley/Nairobi

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Mungiki Runyenjes Football Club Sabaot Land Defence Force Sakina Youth Sri Lanka Sungu Sungu Taleban Source: authors compilation.

Nairobi/Rift Valley/Central Embu Mount Elgon Mombasa Kuria/Transmara Nairobi (Kibera/Kasarani) Nairobi

Most of these groups share a number of characteristics, the most common being their ethnic orientation. All the militias operating in t he country have an ethnic composition as a result of the manner in which the regions in Kenya are populated. Each r egion i s a ssociated w ith a cer tain et hnic g roup, a nd co nsequently m ost militias and criminal gangs are formed around a certain ethnic group. Most of the criminal gangs and militias that emerged with the re-introduction of multiparty politics were accordingly mobilised around ethnic identities, just like the political parties that were formed. These gangs often operate on the basis of local political concerns a nd f orms o f m obilisation, w hich m ay in clude l anguage, fa ith a nd traditional practices. Thus, t he Mungiki is a ssociated w ith t he K ikuyu, t he Baghdad B oys and Taleban with the Luo, the Chinkororo with the Kisii, the Angola-Musumbiji with the Luhya, the Kalenjin Warriors with the Kalenjin, the Maasai Morans with the Maasai, the Kaya Bombo with the Coastal tribes, and the SLDF with the Sabaot. Another co mmon f eature o f t hese g roups i s t hat m ost a re co mposed o f marginalised groups in society, especially the urban and rural poor. Driven by the sheer need to survive, thousands of marginalised youths in N airobi have drifted into t hese mi litant ga ngs. Th e g roups a re o n n umerous o ccasions hir ed b y politicians f or a round 250 K enya s hillings a t ime t o un leash v iolence o n t heir opponents. S ome p rovide v igilante s ecurity in w orking c lass es tates.6 This underscores the fact that the genesis of these militias and criminal gangs is tied to the inability of the government to address its basic welfare responsibilities.

their h omes in R ift V alley p rovince o wing t o t he p olitical t ensions t hat accompanied the re-introduction of pluralism in t he early 1990s. I nitial disciples were young people who had lost land that had been their only means of livelihood in p arts o f t he L aikipia a nd N akuru di stricts. F rom t his s tart a s a q uasi sociocultural r eligious entity, t he Mungiki has g rown into a f ormidable mi litant group in Nairobi, Central and parts of Rift Valley provinces. This group espouses pseudo-communist ide als (s uch a s p ooling r esources a nd h olding l and in communal trust) clothed in sociocultural epithets of communal justice and equity. This has enabled it to appeal to many l andless, homeless and j obless youths. Its members s ometimes u se v iolence a nd t hreats o f f orce t o ext ort m oney f rom farmers and traders in a reas where it is active.7 By March 2009, t he Mungiki had become w hat t he t hen P olice C ommissioner, M ajor G eneral H ussein A li, described as the most serious internal security threat to Kenya.8

Origin and composition

The term Mungiki is derived from the Gikuyu word muing, meaning masses or people.9 There is consensus among scholars that the Mungiki movement started in 1987.10 According to its founding leaders, the Mungiki traces its birth to dreams experienced by two schoolboys, Maina Njenga and Ndura Waruinge, in t he Rift Valley Province. In these dreams, they claim to have heard Gods voice telling them to go and liberate my people. They accordingly decided to form the Mungiki after consultations w ith e lders, in cluding f ormer le aders o f t he Mau Ma u movement from o ne o f w hich N dura W aruinge i s des cended.11 The Mungiki ranks w ere swelled by members of the Kikuyu population who were affected by the clashes in Molo, E lburgon, R ongai, N arok a nd E ldoret in 1991 t o 1993 a nd N joro a nd Laikipia in 1998. Th e Mungiki traces its roots to this particular period because of the m arginalisation o f t he K ikuyu p opulation a nd t he s ufferings t hat em anated from t he et hnic c lashes in t he co untdown t o t he 1992 g eneral e lections t hat primarily targeted the Kikuyu population in t he Rift Valley. The Kikuyu saw the Mungiki as the saviour of its ethnic group in t imes of adversity as it repulsed its attackers. While the movement seemed not to have a clearly spelled out programme and agenda, i ts p lan in t he e arly 1990s wa s t o m obilise i ts m embers a gainst t he government, which it accused of starting and fuelling ethnic clashes. Reminiscent of the Mau Mau style of mobilisation of the 1950s, the Mungiki reportedly began administering o aths a s a wa y o f uni ting i ts m embers. Th e Mungiki has s everal
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THE MUNGIKI
At its inception the Mungiki was basically an outfit whose main agenda was the economic em ancipation o f K ikuyu fa milies t hat h ad b een f orcibly e victed f rom
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faces: t he s ocial c ultural face (a sn uff-sniffing, dreadlocked variety t hat is dying off), a n e conomic face (m ainly s een in t he matatu industry) a nd t he s ecurity criminal face.12 Recruitment t akes p lace in f our wa ys: p eople w ho j ust s troll in to o ne o f i ts religious meetings out of curiosity, are inspired by its teachings and join the group; those who have heard about the movement from colleagues and friends or in the media and decide to join; those who have been recruited through forceful oathtaking that binds them to the ideals of the militia; and those who join because they have b een en deared t o t he s uccessful s ocial ac tivities o f t he g roup. Th e l atter activities include restoring security in the slums or along matatu routes.13 Recently, the gang has resorted to brutal methods, w hich include blackmail, v iolence and death threats, to force young men to join its outfit. In one case it sawed off the arm of a man in Nyeri when he declined to join, but there are indications that hundreds of others have enlisted for fear of being killed. The brutal tactics resemble those of the S LDF, w hich s lashed o ff p eoples e ars a nd f ingers t o f orce t hem in to submission.14 The Mungiki maintains co ntrol o ver i ts f ollowers t hough a s eries o f o aths, starting with the oath of initiation, called kuhagira. Other oaths include an oath for repentance, c alled horohio; o ne t o p repare f or co mbat, c alled mbitika; a nd a continuous o ath c alled exodus, w hich sig nifies t he s ect i s n earing C anaan, o r victory.15 Its membership cuts across all ages and sexes but draws the bulk of its followers from t he lo wer c lasses, m ostly f ormer s treet c hildren, un employed y ouths, hawkers, a rtisans, sm all t raders in t he Jua K ali (the inf ormal s ector), a nd t he alarmingly growing number of urban poor from Nairobis slum areas of Githurai, Kayole, D andora, K orogocho, K ariobangi, K awangware, K ibera, M athare a nd Kangemi. I t a lso h as a s trong co nstituency a mong t he l andless, s quatters a nd internally displaced p ersons (IDPs) in a reas in t he R ift Valley such as L ondiani, Eldoret, M olo, O lenguruone, E lburgon, S ubukia, N arok, N akuru, L aikipia a nd Nyahururu. It is estimated that the Mungiki has between 1,5 a nd 2 mi llion duepaying members, of whom at least 400 000 are women.16 The Mungiki does not have a highly centralised organisational structure but its leaders h ead va rious ef ficient uni ts. Th ere i s a n o perational uni t co nsisting o f spiritual enf orcers w ho fa n t he m ysticism a nd c ultural r omanticism t hat g lue members t ogether. Th e uni t a nnounces t he de claration o f o aths, di stributes t he oath-taking p araphernalia, a nd co llects m oney f rom ce lls t o im plement t he
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spiritual le aders p rojects. Th e def ence uni t i s t he a rmy t hat h as b ases in t he Nyandarua district, in U moja, Dandora and Ngara in N airobi, and in K itengela. The m ovement u ses a rms in r obberies a nd ex ecutions. Th ere i s a lso a p ublic relations uni t, w hich i ssues s tatements, a f oreign r elations uni t, a co ordination unit, a nd a n admini stration w ing. Th e g roup i s di vided in to s ub-organisations similar to a cell structure called matura, or village units, with each cell composed of 50 m embers who are further subdivided into five platoons. A co mmittee is in charge of each unit and carries out all sect functions, including oath-taking and recruiting. The organisation reportedly has tens of thousands of foot soldiers. The Mungikis organisational structure is replicated everywhere, especially in C entral Province. In Maragua, for instance, the sect was said to have had more than 200 platoons spread across ten branches and 33 s ub-branches manned by more than 2 000 militiamen by the year 2000. A platoon comprises ten militiamen, each with a p ersonal r egistration n umber.17 There a re c urrently a n es timated 2 000 s uch units. The Mungiki operates with a chilling set of rules and a strict code of conduct. Mungiki operatives stick to the 48 rules of the gang, which call for unpredictability and in visibility. M ost o f t hese r ules r evolve a round p ersonal s urvival, a lertness, courage a nd co nquering t actics. Th e r ules ur ge m embers t o s py o n o thers a nd always be aware of what is happening around then and to be open to possibilities for extortion.18

Religious roots
The Mungiki rejects Western customs and has, since its inception, sought to bring about the renaissance of the Gikuyu culture as a first step towards the liberation of the people. It advocated the return to traditional beliefs and practices and stressed the los t g lory a nd dig nity of t he Agikuyu, w hich it s ought t o re-establish in t he Kirinyaga Kingdom. The fundamental principles of the Mungiki are cultural selfdetermination, self-pride and self-reliance. To this end, it has utilised traditional methods s uch a s p rayers, s ongs, p rophetic u tterances a nd o ath-taking a nd initiation rites to censor the forces of neo-colonialism. These have b een used to protect a nd u phold s uch b asic va lues a s a b elief in G od ( Ngai), r everence o f ancestors, belief in the sacredness of land, and respect for moral values. According to Mungiki tenets, the cultural re-engineering of the Agikuyu should apply to the whole country irrespective of differences in culture. The meshing of political and
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religious t hemes i s e vident in Mungiki hymns a nd p rayers. M ount K enya (Kirinyaga) is believed to be the holy dwelling place of Ngai and members look for signs f rom t he g od, t urning t heir faces t owards t he m ountain in p rayers a nd hymns.19 Experts a re s till di vided a s t o w hether t he Mungiki is a r eligiocultural o r a political entity. Those who see it as a r eligious entity include Grace Wamue and Kwamchetsi M akokha.20 Wamues in sightful acco unt r elates t o t he s piritual a nd cultural philosophy surrounding the Mungikis activities. The Mungiki calls for a return t o A frican t raditions a nd s pirituality a s a m eans o f r esolving s ocial problems. I t r ejects C hristianity, s tating t hat i t co rrupts A frican va lues. Th e Mungikis main objective, Wamue argues, is to mobilise Kenyan masses to f ight against t he y oke o f m ental s lavery.21 The Mungiki sees t he B ible a s a t ool o f confusion, r eferring t o i t in G ikuyu a s gikunyo (m eaning b inding o r imprisoning). Th e m ovement h as ado pted G ikuyu r eligious r ituals a nd c ultural symbols, including the use of tobacco snuff. Members of the movement refer to themselves as warriors in keeping with ancient Gikuyu social structure.22 Makokha argues that the Mungiki has grown out of the mysterious and little understood ideology and theology of the group. Its members have a god on Mount Kenya whom they worship and to whom they pray. In his opinion, the movement could ac tually b e r eligious a nd m ay j ust b e un certain a bout w hat do ctrine t o follow.23 However, t he Mungikis ad herence t o t raditional K ikuyu r eligion h as b een questioned, particularly because its leaders keep shifting their religious affiliations. For instance, the conversion of its leaders to Islam and Christianity creates more doubt given their stance against the latter. At some point in mid-2000, the Mungiki started to gravitate towards Islam. Eventually, on 2 September 2000, at a ceremony held in M ombasas Sa kina M osque, 13 o f i ts le aders (a mong t hem N dura Waruinge, r enamed Ib rahim), co nverted t o I slam. O thers in cluded f ormer member M ohamed N jenga a nd p rovincial co ordinators H assan W aithaka Wagacha, Mohamed Kamau Mwathi (Nairobi), Kimani Ruo Hussein (Rift Valley), and K hadija W angari r epresenting w omen.24 In t he m onths t hat f ollowed, hundreds of ordinary Mungiki members, especially from Nakuru in the Rift Valley, converted t o I slam, enr olled in I slamic c lasses, a nd r eceived b ooks a nd o ther materials on Islamic doctrine from Kenyas Muslim community.25 This move was seen largely as a means of camouflage in the face of repression, as most members of t he s ect t ended t o em phasise t he p olitical ra ther t han t he c ultural/religious
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motive b ehind t he Mungikis I slamisation. Thi s dem onstrated Mungikis tactical use of religion to promote its objectives. After b eing exp osed a s a co llaborator w ith t he s tate, N dura Waruinge, t he Mungikis n ational co ordinator, a nnounced t hat h e h ad lef t t he m ovement. H e staged a nother co nversion, t his t ime t o C hristianity, a nd c hanged hi s n ame t o Ezekiel Waruinge. Maina Njenga found himself at odds with the new government and was subsequently arrested on murder charges in 2004, but later acquitted. He was re-arrested in February 2006 and held in prison on charges of administering an illegal oath and possession of weapons. In February 2006, w hile in c ustody at Kamiti Maximum Prison in Nairobi and awaiting trial, Njenga announced that he had converted to C hristianity and was b aptised in a p ublicised ceremony at t he prison. In June, he was sentenced to five years imprisonment for illegal possession of a gun and marijuana.26 Evidence collected by Ruteere shows that the characterisation of the Mungiki as a religious movement is a deliberate tactic on its part. This strategy has served the m ovement w ell, f or i t h as h elped t o a ttract sy mpathy f rom h uman r ights organisations. After the governments initial crackdown on the movement in t he early 1990s, the Mungikis leaders sought protection from human rights groups. In fact, for several years, Mungiki members provided reliable information on prison conditions a nd ga ve det ailed des criptions o f t he in humane ac tivities in K enyas prisons t o t he K enyan H uman R ights C ommission.27 This o verture h elped t he movement p opularise i ts c ase w ith in ternational h uman r ights g roups s uch a s Amnesty I nternational a nd H uman R ights Watch. I n i ts a nnual h uman r ights reports, the US State Department regularly mentioned the Mungiki as an example of r eligious p ersecution b y t he s tate.28 The t reatment o f t he g roup a s o ne b eing persecuted, as reported by the UN Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston, can also be seen in this light. In t he lig ht o f t hese ac tivities, t he Mungiki could b e r egarded a s h aving a political rather t han a r eligious mi ssion. Thi s s chool o f t hought a rgues t hat t he Mungikis politics reflects a k een sense of frustration with the political system in which its followers voices are barely heard. Mungiki members claim to represent the unf ulfilled a spirations o f t he Mau Ma u, f or a n a lternative p olitical dispensation.29 Like the Mau Mau, the land question is central to their politics. The movement is built on dissatisfaction w ith marginalisation and deprivation of its constituency. This explains why the movement has been successful in r ecruiting
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members f rom a mong t he s quatters a nd s lum d wellers.30 Thus, a lthough t he Mungiki is depicted as a religious organisation or as a religio-cultural organisation, it r emains t o a l arge ext ent a n en tity s earching f or p ower, p articularly p olitical power.

The quest for a living: tactics and strategies

The Mungiki is the most lethal militia group currently operating in Kenya. To meet its objectives, it has adopted the use of cells similar to those used by Al-Qaeda to spread its influence and control over ethnic enclaves in primary market areas.31 In these communities, the Mungiki has taken over the provision of services such as supplying wa ter a nd e lectricity, m anagement o f t ransport, le vying i llegal t axes and extorting protection money. Organised crimes tool of choice for infiltrating and t aking o ver co mmunities a nd n eighbourhoods i s f ear: in stilling i t a nd exploiting it. People are mugged and brutalised, and businesses vandalised. Then victims are offered a gu arantee of s afety for t hemselves, t heir families and t heir premises, in exchange for a fee. Those who resist are killed or maimed to serve as an exa mple f or o thers a nd t o c lose t he cir cle o f f ear. Th ose w ho co mply r esign themselves to a life of servitude and exploitation. Working in a t ight, di sciplined m anner, t he Mungiki has t aken o ver t he provision o f s uch services in C entral P rovince a nd p arts o f N airobi ci ty, a nd replaced administrative chiefs and assistant chiefs who dealt with matters such as the a rbitration o f fa mily di sputes.32 In s ome p arts o f C entral P rovince, Mungiki gangs have taken over control of villages. The Mungiki has managed to set up what can only be described as a parallel government, a so-called Mungiki government, complete with its own elaborate tax collection machinery and a judicial system to boot.33 In parts of Nyeri and Kirinyaga, vigilantes have taken on the Mungiki, but in Muranga, and especially t he S outh Di strict, b ands of organised Mungiki youths man the feeder roads, beginning from the main MurangaMakutano road. Every vehicle le aving t he m ain r oad a nd en tering t he in terior i s s topped a t m akeshift roadblocks and the driver has to pay 50 Kenyan shillings. In this area villagers are charged for any commercial venture, however minimal.34 The Mungiki obtains f unds f rom m embership d ues, ga rbage co llection, extortion money from residents for protection against theft and property damage, fees for the use of public toilets, income from control of matatu (a form of public
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transport) routes, charges to small businesses, and donations from politicians and businesspeople. Each Mungiki member pays 3 Kenyan shillings per month, which according to the t hen n ational co ordinator, N dura W aruinge, adde d u p t o a t otal m onthly income of 4,5 mi llion Kenyan shillings by the mid-1990s. 35 However, the precise income from membership remain as controversial as its operations, with figures mentioned by its leaders ranging from 1,5 million to 2 and lately (December 2009) 4 million. In reality the figure could be as low as a couple of thousand, particularly given t he demographic p attern of Kenya. The Kikuyu constitutes 22 p er cent of Kenyas close to 37 million people. For Mungiki to reach a figure of 4 million, close to a h alf t he Kikuyu p opulation would have to b e members, and t hat is not t he case. Collection from the matatu industry is also a major source of funding. Before the O ctober 2003 r eforms, t he Mungiki controlled matatu operations o n b usy routes t o K ayole, D andora, H uruma a nd K ariobangi in N airobi, w hile i t a lso controlled a nd co llected le vies f rom r outes o utside N airobi.36 At t he p eak o f i ts influence, the Mungiki is said to have collected at least 10 000 Kenyan shillings per day p er r oute, a mounting t o n early 200 000 K enyan s hillings p er d ay f rom a ll routes un der i ts co ntrol.37 The ga ngs co llect 200 K enyan s hillings p er d ay f rom each 14-seater matatu and 250 Kenyan shillings from 25-seater minibuses. Matatu crews a lso p ay a f ee t o b e a llowed t o o perate, w ith dr ivers p arting w ith 1 000 Kenyan shillings and conductors paying 400 Kenyan shillings. The control of t he transport le vy has le d to constant violent confrontations between the Mungiki and other gangs.38 After the collapse of constitutional reforms in 2005, the Mungiki reclaimed its control of the matatu industry and tightened its grip on the lucrative matatu industry and the low-income residential areas of the city and other urban areas. It a lso co llects p rotection f ees f rom s lum r esidents. H ouseholds in Ml ango Kubwa of Eastleigh, Mathare, Huruma, Huruma Ngei, Kariobangi, Dandora, Baba Dogo a nd o ther es tates h ave t o p ay b etween 30 a nd 50 K enyan s hillings e ach month, s hopkeepers p ay 300 K enyan s hillings, k iosk a nd v egetable v endors 150 Kenyan shillings. Changaa brewers pay 300 Kenyan shillings a week and vehicles that de liver v egetables t o K orogocho a nd K ariobangi 400 K enyan s hillings p er delivery. T rucks t hat de liver s and, b allast, cem ent, s tones a nd o ther b uilding materials to sites in Eastlands also pay a fee. Workers such as masons, electricians and casual labourers at construction sites have to pay an access fee to be allowed
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into the yards. The gangs also run illegal water collection points where they charge between 10 a nd 20 Kenyan shillings for a 20-litre jerry can of water tapped from city council pipes.39 In parts of Central Province, the Mungiki has been able to set up a formidable motorcycle taxi enterprise whose proceeds are used to bankroll its illegal activities. This, co mbined w ith ext ortion r ings o perated b y t he Mungiki, h as t urned t he underground gang into a w ell-moneyed outfit w hose k itty r uns into mi llions of shillings. W ealthy p oliticians a nd s hrewd b usinesspeople in t he p rovince h ave been f inancing t he p urchase o f m otorbikes a nd exp ect p olitical s upport a nd protection in return.40 Because o f Mungiki activities, b usinesses h ave co llapsed in m ost o f t he shopping centres in Central Province, as traders have been forced to give up their business b ecause t hey w ere un able t o p ay t he p rotection f ees (ra nging f rom 20 000 t o 150 000 K enyan shillings) demanded by the Mungiki. Rural areas have suffered too, and tea and coffee farms have been left unattended, for farmers have also fled their homes.41 Another source of funds for the Mungiki is the Kikuyu political and business elite. Thi s wa s e vident during t he 2002 g eneral e lections, w hen Mungiki leaders suddenly started driving cars and owning plots and houses in upmarket areas, all without having a p ermanent source of income. During these elections, members of the group frequently met with KANU politicians and also received money and other items in return for getting members to vote for KANU in the elections.42 This also happened in t he 2005 r eferendum and 2007 e lections, when politicians paid the group to advance their cause. During the post-election crisis, the Kikuyu elites are reported to have paid the group for the reprisals of the killing of Kikuyus.

The Mungiki and politics

The Mungikis involvement in p olitics d uring t he M oi a nd K ibaki r egimes wa s based on a love-hate relationship. Both regimes tried to seek the Mungikis support during c ampaign p eriods s uch a s t he 2002 e lections a nd 2005 co nstitutional referendum. H owever, b oth r egimes w ere h ostile t o t he g roup in n on-election years and prescribed it. Before 2002, p olice constantly broke up Mungiki meetings, but in t he run-up to the 2002 e lections the group was allowed to hold rallies in Nairobi, Thika and other t owns. S ome K ANU o fficials e ven p articipated in t hese m eetings a nd
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donated money. The movements link to the government became evident when its two k nown le aders a ttempted t o r un f or e lections o n t he r uling p artys t icket. However, at the last minute, the ruling party succumbed to popular pressure and barred the Mungiki leaders from participation. During t he M oi r egime, t he g roup wa s a llowed t o dem onstrate t o s how i ts support f or t he r uling p arty w hile a t t he s ame t ime cr iticising t he-then o fficial leader o f t he o pposition, M wai K ibaki. A t o ne p residential ra lly, f ormer M olo member o f p arliament (MP) K ihika K imani p araded dr eadlocked y ouths in Nakuru town, introducing them as repentant Mungiki followers. The Mungiki entered t he p olitical f ray in t he r un-up t o t he 2002 e lections, when i ts n ational co ordinator, N dura Waruinge, a nd t he m ovements s piritual leader, J ohn M aina K amunya a lias M aina N jenga, j oined t he F orum f or t he Restoration of Democracy Kenya (FORD-K) political party and unsuccessfully vied for positions as secretary-general and vice-chairman of the party respectively. As t he b attle for Mois successor heated up, t he Moi regime s ought to bring t he group in to i ts f old in o rder t o g et t he K ikuyu y ouths s upport. Th e Mungiki supported K ANUs p residential c andidate, U huru Kenyatta, a nd o n n omination day, h undreds o f t housands o f Mungiki youths m arched t hrough t he s treets wielding machetes, c lubs o r s ticks in hi s s upport. K enyatta wa s l ater f orced t o disown the sect as a result of intense public criticism.43 In addition, two legislators (who were staunch Uhuru supporters then), Kihika Kimani and Stephen Ndicho, threatened to unleash Mungiki on those opposed to Uhuru. The Kibaki regimes interaction with the Mungiki has been double-sided. On the one hand, there have been groups that have been sympathetic to the politics of the Mungiki leadership in the Kibaki government and used the Mungiki when the need arose. On t he other hand, there are those of the opinion that the group is a threat t o s tate s ecurity and ought t o b e eradic ated. For instance, w hen t he s tate engaged the gang with the aim of curtailing its operations, it used the Mungiki to support i ts p roposals. F or exa mple, d uring t he r eferendum c ampaign, t he t hen special p rogramme mini ster, N jenga K arume, a nd t he f ormer Mungiki coordinator, Ndura Waruinge, met in Nairobi to discuss how the youth could be mobilised t o s upport t he p roposed co nstitution.44 Subsequently, t he Mungiki openly came out in s upport of the government position, holding rallies attended by well-known p oliticians.45 This again happened in t he countdown to t he 2007 elections. During the post-2007 crisis, with the other ethnic militias in t urmoil and the Mungiki in disarray after a crac kdown on its activities, it took some time for the
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militia to regroup. The Mungiki acquired the tag of defender of the beleaguered Kikuyu in t he R ift Valley a nd w ith p olitical a nd f inancial s upport f rom s enior members of the Kikuyu elite, swung into action and attacked members of the Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin groups in N aivasha and Nakuru. The post-election violence may have had the unintended effect of rehabilitating the Mungiki in the eyes of the Kikuyu p opulation, a s i ts m embers w ere s een t o b e b etter p rotectors o f t he community than the Kibaki government in face of attacks by ethnic militias.46 In April 2008, t he group paralysed public transport and forced businesses in parts of Central and Rift Valley provinces to close for four days running; during the unrest 14 people were killed. It was only when the prime minister extended an olive branch to the sect members that they halted their riots.47 After rejuvenating its image among the Kikuyus in the reprisals after the first round of the post-2007 election violence, the gang has slowly regained its foothold in C entral Province, and b etween O ctober a nd D ecember 2008 h ad a lready s et u p t he n ecessary mechanism for charging illegal fees on business premises as well as matatus and boda boda s. D uring t his p eriod t he ga ng ex ecuted t en p eople in t he p residents Othaya constituency, to prove it would maim and intimidate those who attempted to defy it.48 The Mungiki has a lso a ttracted sy mpathy f rom p oliticians. I n A pril 2008 a group o f p oliticians c alling t hemselves elders f rom C entral P rovince a nd comprising N jenga K arume (f ormer mini ster o f def ence), J oseph K amotho (former M athioya MP), E lias Mb au (M aragua MP) a nd J ane K ihara (f ormer Naivasha MP), dem anded t he r elease o f Mungiki leaders a nd t he ini tiation o f dialogue between the sect and the government. During this period, the Mungiki founded a p olitical w ing c alled t he K enya N ational Youth A lliance un der t he chairmanship o f o ne G itau M wangi. I t wa s l ater r enamed t he P rogress P arty Alliance.49 In F ebruary a nd M arch 2009, t he Mungiki, on a n umber o f o ccasions, paralysed transport in C entral, Nairobi and Rift Valley provinces. On 10 M arch, emboldened b y t he r eport o f t he UN S pecial R apporteur o n E xtrajudicial, Arbitrary or Summary Execution, Phillip Alston, which called for the resignation of the attorney-general and the commissioner of police over extra-judicial killings of its m embers, t he Mungiki held w idespread protests, p aralysing t ransport a nd shutting do wn s ome t owns f or lo ng p eriods d uring t he co urse o f t he d ay. S ect members blocked roads using hijacked long-haul trucks, erected barricades, and
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stoned a nd f orced p ublic t ransport o perators o ff t he r oad. Th ey a lso f orced businesses to close in many parts. The worst-affected towns were Nairobi, Kiambu, Nyahururu, Nyeri, Naivasha, Embu, Nakuru and Molo. To d ate t he Mungiki continues t o t hrive, a s t hose w ho h ave s poken o penly against them in the recent past are yet to turn rhetoric into action, even as violence is escalating. In Central Province, politicians appear uncertain over how to contain the Mungiki monster. Unable to find the exact cause for Mungiki lawlessness, MPs say it is difficult to eradicate the deep-rooted gang. At grassroots level, leaders who have s poken a gainst t he g roup a sking r esidents t o r eport i t t o t he p olice, h ave received de ath t hreats. On t he o ther h and, r esidents h ave acc used s enior politicians in t he region of supporting Mungiki activities for political advantage. Some s ay t he s upport Mungiki adherents h ave b een r eceiving f rom p oliticians since the run-up to the 2002 general elections has in fact strengthened the gang.50

State response to the Mungiki

Right f rom t he t ime t he Mungiki was formed, relations b etween it and t he state have os cillated b etween outright repression and p eriods of cohabitation. On t he one hand, the state has persecuted, intimidated and jailed Mungiki followers: the state has always considered the Mungiki a clandestine movement that is bent on destabilising the government. On the other hand, government functionaries have made use of the group during elections. During t he M oi r egime, t he s tate m ade va rious a ttempts t o co ntain t he Mungiki, but with little success. The first attempted crackdown by the government took place in December 1994 and resulted in the arrest of 63 suspected members in L aikipia. S ubsequently, ra ids a nd a rrests a gainst Mungiki adherents b ecame quite frequent as the government sought to stamp out the group before eventually deciding to collaborate with it in t he run-up to the 2002 e lections. In fact, from early 2000, Mungiki organisers a nd p olitical le aders h ad s uggested t hat government s ecurity s ervices w ere inf iltrating t he s ect a nd s etting u p ps eudoMungiki to monitor its activities. As a r esult of intermittent state harassment, Mungiki became confrontational from early 2000. F or example, in April 2000, n early 3 000 Mungiki men staged a raid on Nyahururu police station to free three of their colleagues.51 As a r esult of
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continuous a trocities p erpetrated b y t he Mungiki and o ther mi litias, t he government b anned a ll mi litias in 2002 a nd t hen P resident M oi o rdered a crackdown on all illegal organisations. In October 2002, 26 m embers of Mungiki were jailed for three months, each for criminal activities in N airobi. However, as the 2002 e lections a pproached, t he M oi r egime r elaxed i ts c lampdown o n t he Mungiki, ostensibly to win its support for the KANU candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta. However, Uhuru lost to Mwai Kibaki, who inherited the Mungiki problem. Under t he K ibaki r egime, Mungiki adherents w ere h arassed, in timidated, persecuted, arrested and killed outside t he lega l system. As s oon as Kibaki took power, t he g overnment ini tiated a crac kdown o f t he g roup. I n e arly 2003, t he police destroyed t he movements headquarters in N garua in L aikipia, w here t he group had two shrines, at Sheria and Mwenje.52 In reaction and hard on the heels of t he t ransport r eforms, o n 8 M arch 2004, t he p ress, ci ting p olice s ources, announced that a special terror unit known as the bagation squad, a contraction of the words no bargain over death, had been formed by the Mungiki. The squad has sin ce t ransformed in to t he Mungiki Defence C ouncil, o ne o f t he m ost influential organs in t he movements hierarchy.53 Police s ources disclosed t hat at least 50 young people joined the hit squad between January and March 2004. The number rose meteorically in the following months.54 The formation of an execution squad was part of a grand effort by the Mungiki to reorganise itself to defend its turf. This armed wing was charged with revenge killings o f f ormer m embers a nd m ay h ave b een r esponsible f or t he t rademark beheadings conducted by t he g roup. Th ese b eheadings n ormally t argeted either those w ho des erted o r p rominent b usinessmen w ho h ad n ot f ulfilled t heir promises to the group.55 There i s e vidence t hat t he m ovement ado pted a ce ll sys tem o f m obilisation akin t o t hat o f a n in ternational t errorist g roup. I t s et u p a n e laborate n etwork covering all Nairobis shanty areas, with platoons operating in t he Nairobi slums and hideouts in Mombasa, Muranga, Nakuru, Nyeri and Laikipia. Once celebrated as a s howpiece of efforts by displaced and disinherited Mungiki followers to eke out a leg itimate living through agriculture,56 the movements farm in t he Laikipia district became a state house from which the training of its fighters out of sight of security forces was coordinated.57 In 2006, t his s tate o f a ffairs f orced t he p olice t o f orm Kwekwe, a hi t s quad comprising 14 o fficers who were sometimes reinforced by colleagues from other
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units, t o f ight t he s ect. R eports b y t he Kenya National C ommission o n Human Rights (KNCHR), Phillip Alston and civil society organisations have accused this police unit of killing between 100 and 500 Mungiki adherents. In November 2007, the KNCHR released a report suggesting that the police may have executed about 500 s uspected Mungiki adherents b etween J une a nd O ctober 2007. 58 The s tates brutal c lampdown o n t he Mungiki was a r esponse t o a s eries o f b eheadings in Central Province and the killing by the group of three policemen in t he Kosovo area of Mathare. In t he p eriod 20022008, t he g overnment o n n umerous o ccasions, a nd especially in 2003, 2006 a nd 2007, ini tiated crackdowns on the group. However, these initiatives resulted mostly in the group going underground only to resurface a little l ater. D uring t hese p eriods of repression, t he g roup kept on changing its modus o perandi so a s t o e lude t he p olice crac kdowns. Th e ga ngs c apacity t o mutate when faced with danger has made it very difficult for the state to destroy it. Initially, Mungiki members used to be the snuff-sniffing, dreadlocked variety. When i t b ecame a pparent t hat t his wa s a n e asy wa y f or t he s ecurity f orces t o identify and track them down, they changed their image to decently dressed young men and women. Recent attempts by the government to curb the matatu extortion wing have forced them to dress as modern teens, vendors etc. It is this ability to camouflage and change tactics and styles that has made it almost impossible to pin down the gang.

THE SABAOT LAND DEFENCE FORCE

The SLDF operates in t he Mount Elgon and neighbouring Trans-Nzoia districts, which lie close to the border with Uganda on the slopes of Mount Elgon. Members of the Sabaot community primarily inhabit the area, but other inhabitants include the Og iek, B ukusu, T eso, S ebei a nd va rious K alenjin s ubgroups. Th e S LDF, a militia g roup, c ame t o t he f ore in 2006 a nd p ortrays i tself a s a n o rganisation fighting a gainst injustice and a lleged di scrimination in t he a llocation of l and. It lunched attacks against the Luhya, Kikuyu and other tribes, resulting in 600 deaths and close to 60 000 di splaced p ersons.59 Its hit-and-run attacks f rom t he Mount Elgon forest were a major challenge for the authorities, who were forced in 2008 to resort to the army to contain the operations of the group. Before this operation, the SLDF was the most powerful and best-armed militia group operating in w estern Kenya.
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Origin and composition

The Mount Elgon clashes are a r esult of the Sabaot displacements dating back to the colonial era and the skewed resettlement programmes since independence in 1963. The conflict was heightened by irregular allocation and grabbing of land in the s ettlement s chemes, i llegal r esettlement, un healthy co mpetitive p olitics, unresolved land claims, and the 2006 evictions by the government. The government has repeatedly failed to effectively resettle the affected groups in a m anner de emed t o b e e quitable t o a ll t he p arties. F ollowing lo bbying b y community leaders, the government moved people from Chepkitale in 1971/72 to Chebyuk, where it had opened up the Chebyuk Phase I s ettlement scheme. The scheme consisted of 1 489 p arcels of five acres of land. In 1974, t he government further i ssued a n otice t o de-gazet te p ortions o f t he f orest r eserve co nsisting o f 3 600 acres for resettlement. Unfortunately, this degazettement was never finalised. Instead, in the same year the landless Soy sub-tribe was added to the scheme and occupied w hat i s n ow k nown a s t he T eremi s ub-location, w hile t he M osop occupied the Emiya sub-location.60 In 1979, a g roup o f Sa baot le aders s ent a de legation t o t hen P resident M oi asking him t o r esettle t he l andless Sa baots. Thi s r esulted in C hebyuk P hase II, known as Cheptoror, consisting of 2 516 parcels of land. The beneficiaries were to be t he M osop s ub-tribe t hat h ad f ormerly in habited C hepkitale. P art o f t he Chebyuk was already inhabited by sections of the Sabaot community from the Soy sub-tribe. In 1989, the government settled people in the area, but the exercise was not completed. S ome of t he p eople were lef t landless and t hose w ho were lucky enough to get land lacked full legal ownership as the government failed to issue them w ith t itle de eds. H owever, t his did n ot det er t he p eople f rom t aking a nd cultivating the land. They further started subdividing, leasing and selling it among themselves and to outsiders.61 Chebyuk I a nd II w ere n ever co mpleted a nd co nsequently t he g overnment cancelled the existing settlement schemes and embarked on the creation of a third scheme, C hebyuk III, in 2002. B y 2006, w hen t he g overnment f inalised l and allocation in C hebyuk III, p eople h ad a lready de veloped t hese fa rming p arcels, while o thers h ad s old o r le ased o ut t he l and t o f ellow Sa baots a s w ell a s t o migrants. F urthermore, t he p opulation in t he a rea h ad g rown s ubstantially. Because t he s cheme h ad ini tially b een cr eated f or t he S oy, a mid g reat p olitical fanfare, the Soy, who had already settled in t he area, believed that the process of surveying and a llocation would b e a m ere formalisation of t heir ownership and
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therefore did not expect the land boundaries existing at the time to be substantially altered.62 The b elated in clusion of t he Mosop a s a wa y of p unishing t he S oy f or voting against the draft constitution in t he 2005 r eferendum and the subsequent allocation to mostly Mosop members, resulted in the Soy mobilising young people to defend their land and resist any evictions, culminated in t he formation of the SLDF.63 The SLDF is a non-state armed group mostly drawn from the Soy sub-clan of the Sa baot t hat f irst em erged imm ediately a fter t he 2002 e lections. Th e recruitment and training of fighters began in March 2003, though violent attacks did not begin in earnest until 2006, in the wake of the implementation of the phase III resettlement programme. At that time, the SLDF actively resisted attempts to reallocate land. Violent clashes erupted when the Soy, who had settled in the area since 1971, were ordered to make way for new allottees who were mostly from the Mosop sub-clan. The Mosops were the SLDFs initial target, as they were perceived to be favoured by the government in the land allocations. Consequently the SLDF started launching attacks, mainly against the Mosop clan.64 The co nflict, w hich s tarted a s a n in ter-clan co nflict b etween t he S oy a nd Mosop c lans, s oon s pread a s t he S LDF b egan t argeting m embers o f o ther communities w ho h ad p urchased l and in t he a rea. I n fac t, o ver t ime i t ac ted against all immigrants who were allocated land in the area. It also targeted corrupt officials who had presided over the allocation process.

Organisational form
The hi story, o rganisation a nd f unding o f S LDF s hows t hat l and g rievances, ethnicity, a nd v iolence, w hich w ere m anipulated f or p olitical en ds, a re de eprooted, w ith lo ngstanding ef fect o n t he K enyan p olitical p rocess. F rom 2006 t o 2008, the SLDF was in effective control of the whole of the Mount Elgon district. There was virtually no government presence in the area and the militia, as a result, made its own laws that inhabitants were forced to obey. The militia established its own administrative system, complete with a m echanism for levying illegal taxes, and informal courts. The SLDF judicial system was used to punish those suspected to have corruptly acquired land, discipline wrangling couples, go after bad debts and punish thieves and drunks.65 The mi litia h as a c lear o rganisational s tructure a nd c hain o f co mmand. I t consists o f t hree s eparate di visions, n amely a mi litary, s piritual a nd a p olitical wing. Wycliffe M atakwei (S LDF dep uty le ader) le d t he mi litia w ing a nd D avid
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Siche, a f ormer p olice officer, was in c harge of t raining t he mi litiamen w ith t he assistance of retired and serving army and police officers. The militia has used hitech w eapons in i ts o perations, in cluding m achine gun s, r ocket-propelled grenades, hand grenades, land mines and rocket launchers. The SLDFs weapons of choice were AK-47 and G3 rifles. By August 2008, the military had recovered a total of 95 guns and more than 700 rounds of ammunition from the SLDF.66 Other weapons, w hich t he mi litia u sed t o a sig nificant ext ent, in cluded t raditional weapons such as pangas (machetes), knives, and bows and arrows. The spiritual wing was central to the SLDF military strategy. Jason Psongoywo Manyiror, the spiritual leader/prophet also referred to as laibon, led this wing. He administered the oath to all combatants and gave them special charms, ostensibly to bind them to the SLDF cause and imbue them with supernatural powers that would protect them from authorities and make them invincible to enemy bullets during co mbat. Th e s piritual w ing p layed a cen tral r ole in S LDF o perations, encouraging young men to enrol in the militia and assuring them that they would enjoy m ystic p rotection a nd b e in vincible. I t a lso h ad t he d uty o f ra llying t he community and politicians to the SLDF cause.67 The t hird w ing of t he SLDF i s t he p olitical w ing. B elieved t o b e t he dr iving force behind the insurgency, this wing is at the same time the most elusive as it keeps on changing, whether by default or design. Apart from its self-proclaimed spokesman, John Kanai, many politicians have been linked to the militia, but there is no hard evidence as to which politicians or ideologues are behind the SLDF.68 From a sm all group of fewer than a h undred fighters at the beginning of the conflict, t he S LDF h as g rown t o a f ormidable f orce. I n M arch 2008, W ycliffe Matakwei c laimed t o b e co mmanding a f orce o f 35 000 m en, a f igure t hat wa s obviously o verstated.69 Nevertheless, t he W estern K enya H uman R ights W atch (WKHRW) has estimated the militia to be 3 000 men, by no means a small outfit.70 Initially, r ecruitment wa s v oluntary, b ut l ater S LDF dem anded t hat e very S oy family make at least one son available for training and duty. The SLDF has at least 30 cells of about 100 people each. Most of the cells are manned by retired security officers, foreign mercenaries and child soldiers.71 In 2006, the WKHRW estimated that 650 c hildren of schoolgoing age (under 18) h ad been forcefully recruited by the SLDF. It stated that parents either had to pay a fee of Ksh10 000 (US$150) o r give up a child to the cause.72
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The SLDFs mode of operation has made it difficult for the police to combat it. Most of its members mix freely with civilians during the day or when not part of a co mbat s quad. On ly t he mi litias co mmanders, t rainers a nd e lite f ighters h ave specific hidin g p laces in M ount E lgon f orest, w here t hey m eet t o r eview t he situation a nd r estrategise. Thi s en ables t he g roup t o co ngregate q uickly in t he forest, identify t argets and disperse into t he civilian p opulation. Furthermore, it makes u se o f c amouflaged anti-personnel c arriers t o m ove w eapons, w hich i t delivers to operation squads at designated points near its targets and who, after the operation again meet the carriers and return the weapons to designated points.73 Members of the SLDF have also established kangaroo courts where they handle disputes and impose fines on victims. They are the self-appointed judges in cases ranging f rom p etty t heft and family conflicts to simple disputes. Perpetrators of domestic violence are punished by public flogging. In one incident, a villager who had im pregnated a g irl a nd r efused t o m arry h er wa s f orced t o p ay a f ine o f 500 000 Kenyan shillings, half of which went to the militia.74 For their own security, government administrative officers (chiefs and their assistants) also refer cases and disputes t o t he S LDF a s w ell a s co llect t axes f or t he mi litia a s a sig n o f t heir submission to the militias authority. Those who do not comply are either killed or forced to flee the area. It is instructive to note that one chief Bramwell Kiso Kiboi of Chepkube location was abducted and held by SLDF militiamen for three days. He did n ot report the matter to the police upon his release for fear of reprisal by the militia.75

Source of funds
The methods that the militia uses to sustain and finance its activities are akin to those used by the Mungiki in fact it seems to have borrowed most of its modus operandi from t he Mungiki. Th e S LDF co llects taxes f rom t he p opulation a nd effectively runs a p arallel administration. These illegal taxes are imposed on the residents o f t he a rea, es pecially t hose w ith s ome s ource o f in come. I nitially t he group dem anded 1 000 K enyan s hillings f rom e very h ousehold a s a o nce-off payment, but later it demanded individual monthly payments levied according to an in dividuals le vel o f in come. Teachers a nd ci vil s ervants w ere f orced t o p art with a p ortion of their salaries (between 2 000 a nd 5 000 K enyan shillings) as a protection levy, while farmers were forced to remit part of the proceeds from sales
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of produce like livestock, milk and crops to the group. The militia also collected a certain amount of food produce for every unit area harvested, for example, each household wa s r equired t o s urrender a 90 kg b ag o f m aize f or e very acr e harvested.76 The t ransport s ector, t oo, wa s n ot s pared. I ndeed, p ublic s ervice vehicles remit part of their daily income to the militia. Apart from the taxes, the group wa s s aid t o h ave b een b ankrolled b y s ome p oliticians a s w ell a s s ome wealthy fa milies in t he r egion. Th e S LDF a lso p unished ci vilians b y c utting o ff their ears and sewing up their mouths if they defied it. The military established that SLDF was financially stable and had enough food supplies t o l ast i t f or m onths. Thi s em ergent insurgency e conomy b ecame a critical fac tor in ext ending t he conflict by s ustaining t he mi litia f ighters a nd by making t he S LDF a ttractive t o un employed lo wer-class y ouths. Th e s upport o f powerful individuals for the SLDF, however, may have had a m oral and political rather than a financial dimension.77

population, b ut m ost o f t hem o perate f rom t heir h omes. Th ey a ssemble o nly whenever there is a job to be done such as attacking a specific target at a specific time a fter which they merge with the civilian population again. This has made the security personnels hunt for them in the forest futile. When the SLDF attacks, it o rganises i tself in sm all g roups o f 10 t o 12 p eople t hat m ake i ts m ovements difficult to detect. It is only a small group mainly the commanders and strategists t hat h ave s pecific b ases a nd hidin g p laces (s uch a s c aves o n t he f orested mountain slopes).81

The SLDF and politics

Since its formation, the militias activities have expanded and become more violent and m ore o vertly p olitical. I n t he r un-up t o a nd f ollowing t he 2007 g eneral elections, t he SLDF s upported cer tain p olitical c andidates and t argeted p olitical opponents and their supporters. The conflict in Mount Elgon escalated and took on overt political and ethnonationalist dim ensions. Th e S LDF a llied i tself w ith t he o pposition p arty, t he Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), and was fiercely intolerant of leaders and supporters o f o ther p arties, es pecially t hose f rom t he r uling co alition t hat l ater became known as the Party of National Unity (PNU). The SLDF went so far as to intimidate a nd e ven ex ecute P NU s upporters. A s a r esult, t wo O DM ci vic aspirants, Moses Makoit of C heptais wa rd a nd Nathan Warsama of Sa sur wa rd, were elected unopposed. At parliamentary level, the SLDF targeted the sitting KANU MP, John Serut, who, although a Soy, was seen as acting against Soy interests. It targeted him and his family because it claimed he had used his position to secure the inclusion of the members o f t he Mosop c lan in t he t hird p hase o f t he r esettlement p rogramme, although t hey w ere n ot s upposed t o b e p art o f i t. M embers o f t he B ukusu community w ere a lso t argeted, a s t hey w ere s een a s li kely t o v ote f or t he P NU coalition in t he g eneral e lections.82 The S LDF a lso t argeted s upporters o f S erut. Serut survived an assassination attempt when SLDF gunmen opened fire at him as he gave a speech outside the district commissioners office in Kapsokwony in May 2007. He did, however, lose two brothers and a niece later on.83 The SLDF promoted its favoured candidates in the 2007 elections in a v icious campaign that, according to local residents, amounted to a campaign of terror. The candidates favoured by the SLDF were all contesting on an ODM ticket. A c hief
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The quest for land: tactics and strategies

The SLDF seeks to evict non-indigenous people because it considers the region to belong to Sabaots and the Kamatusa78 a coalition of largely pastoralist tribes from the R ift V alley t hat s hare a co mmon lin guistic a nd c ultural h eritage. Sa baot militants b elieve a f uture R ift V alley s tate w ithin a f ederal K enya w ould b e incomplete w ithout M ount E lgon. Th e S LDFs m ain a mbition i s t o det ach t he agriculturally important Mount Elgon from the Western Province and annex it to the R ift Valley. I ts v iolent c ampaign s eeks t o c ause m ass di splacement o f n onSabaots a nd n on-Kalenjins in t he h ope t hat a f riendly cen tral g overnment w ill eventually legitimise facts on the ground.79 The SLDF has employed a number of strategies to achieve its ends, including killings, kidnappings and torture. The SLDF has not only killed persons who they perceived a s b eing o pposed t o i t a nd i ts o bjectives b ut h as a lso t ortured a nd maimed inhabitants who break its code (by breaking its taboo against the drinking of a lcohol, for example). It a lso attacks individuals w ho have land disputes with other landowners sympathetic to the SLDF or who hire the SLDF to intimidate. By the c lose o f A pril 2008, S LDF ac tivities h ad r esulted in 615 de aths a nd a bout 66 000 internally displaced persons.80 Contrary t o t he w idely h eld b elief t hat S LDF r ebels li ved in t he f orest, t he military a ssault r evealed t hat n ot o nly do t hey ac tually li ve a mong t he lo cal
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from t he a rea t old a m ember o f H uman R ights W atch t hat t he in cumbent councillor for Emi a ward, Nickson Manyu, has b een warned at gunpoint not to contest against the ODM candidate. He also reported widespread intimidation and electoral violence.84

State response to the SLDF

The government was initially reluctant to tackle the SLDF menace as it considered the group to be simply a rag-tag unit that would cease to exist with time. It was in 2007, w hen t he g roup acq uired m ore p ower, t hat t he g overnment t ook a m ore serious s tance a nd dep loyed t he p olice, t he G eneral S ervice U nit a nd t he A nti Stock-Theft Unit against the SLDF. However, these operations were sporadic and not s ustained, a nd h ence fa iled t o e liminate t he g roup. Th e a rmy f irst b ecame involved in J uly 2007, b ut t he mi litary p resence wa s a t a lo w le vel. Th e ini tial security response failed to contain the rapidly evolving armed group as it wreaked havoc in Mount Elgon and parts of Trans-Nzoia district. Furthermore, during one police operation in the middle of 2007 at the Kabero, Kabkwes and Bukweno locations, 1 877 h ouses were burnt down and property of an undisclosed value was destroyed as a result of the operation. The police officers were also accused of being involved in arbitrary killings.85 After r epeated a ttempts t o co ntain t he g roup fa iled, t he g overnment acknowledged that the militia was bigger and better organised than it realised and then dep loyed t he K enya a rmy in a j oint o peration w ith t he p olice. I t wa s codenamed Operation Okoa Maisha (Operation Save Lives) and was launched in March 2008, a fter the December 2007 e lection, in a b id to regain state control of the Mount Elgon district. However, once again the military was accused of gross human r ights a buses a gainst n ot o nly t he S LDF, b ut m ostly t he lo cals. Th e accusations in cluded m aiming a nd t orture, ra ping o f w omen a nd y oung g irls, indiscriminate burning of houses and food stores, and killing of suspected SLDF adherents without recourse to judicial processes.86 Because of this operation the activities of the SLDF militia almost ground to a halt, as most of its leaders had either been arrested or killed while a majority of its members h ad ei ther b een k illed o r det ained. Human r ights g roups s uch a s t he KNCHR a nd Human R ights Watch put t he number of p eople k illed during t he operation a t a bout 2 000. B y J une 2008, s ome 758 S LDF s uspects h ad b een arraigned in court on charges of promoting warlike activities.87
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However, since the withdrawal of the military from the area, there have been reports88 that the ousted members of the gang are returning, as the re-emergence of violent incidences attest. There have also been reports of fresh recruitments in parts of Mount Elgon. One of the men who is believed to be a major force behind the militia, former police constable John Sichei, has also resurfaced. Just like its counterpart, the Mungiki, the group seems to have learned how to survive g overnment crac kdowns. Towards t he en d o f 2008, t he g roup h ad o nce again started charging illegal taxes and attacking and maiming those who refused to comply.89 Nevertheless, the killing of core members of the SLDF has resulted in the g roup b ecoming a m uch les s p otent f orce a nd un able t o inf lict t he k ind o f terror and hold it had over the residents of the area. The net effect of this has been the near disappearance of the organisation.

THE MUNGIKI AND THE SLDF: A COMPARISON

There are a number of similarities and differences between the Mungiki and SLDF, which t o s ome ext ent dem onstrate t he dif ference in im pact t hat t heir ac tivities have h ad o n t he s ocieties in w hich t hey o perate. To s tart w ith, b oth t he mi litia groups reflect a keen sense of frustration with the political system, in which their members voices have marginal impact. Mungiki members claim to represent the unfulfilled a spirations o f t he Mau Ma u as a n a lternative p olitical di spensation, while t he SLDF s eeks to amend t he historical injustices related to l and t hat was disinherited from the Sabaot. As with many armed groups in the country, the two militias have twin purposes, on the one hand land-related objectives, and on the other, furthering the political aims of certain leaders. The two militia groups also subscribe to cultural and religious modes in their operations. Th e mi litias et hnic a ffiliation i s b est un derstood a s a t ool f or mobilisation. One tactic employed by both groups is the administration of oaths and spiritual guidance. The spiritual leaders of the two groups administer oaths to members ostensibly to bind t hem to t he aims and objectives of t he g roups. The SLDFs s piritual w ing h as p layed a cen tral role in i ts operations by en couraging young m en t o enr ol in to t he mi litia. Th e y oung m en a re a ssured t hat t hey w ill enjoy m ystic p rotection a nd b e in vincible. Th e Mungiki, on i ts p art, c alls f or a return t o A frican t raditions a nd s piritualism a s t he m eans o f r esolving s ocial problems a fflicting i t. Th e m ovement h as a lso ado pted t raditional G ikuyu religious rituals and cultural symbols in its activities and operations. Culture and religion are thus used by the Mungiki to bind its members together.
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However, the Mungiki differs from the SLDF when it comes to adaptation to other r eligions. Th e Mungiki shifts f rom o ne r eligion t o a nother in t imes o f repression by the state. Its leaders have thus at various times converted to Islam and Christianity to escape state persecution. As Ruteere has argued, the Mungiki appears t o h ave em braced a n in strumental v iew o f r eligion a nd c ulture. Thi s change of religion when under attack is part of its arsenal for political survival as well as a protest at what it sees as the failure of Christianity to provide a s olution to the countrys problems.90 The modes of operation of the Mungiki and SLDF are similar. They both use terrorist organisations classic methods of asymmetric warfare, in w hich they do not engage directly with the states instruments and war machinery, but strike and then leave the scene. Of t he two militias, the Mungiki has the most elaborate cell structure, which allows it to expand its influence, while restricting the possibility of exposure of an entire network of gang members to law enforcement infiltration. This is one of the main reasons why the government has been unable to dismantle its n etwork. B oth g roups a lso a ssemble o nly w hen t here i s a j ob t o b e do ne, although the SLDF is more adept at this tactic. Their weapons are also similar, for both u se m ainly cr ude w eapons s uch a s machetes, c lubs, a nd b ows a nd a rrows. They do o ccasionally u se gun s in t heir o perations, a lthough t he S LDF i s m ore likely to do so. Furthermore, both militias have instilled fear into the communities in which they operate, forcing them to give in to the demands of the militia groups. Both k ill o r m aim t hose w ho r esist t hem, t o s erve a s exa mples t o o thers, w hile those who comply resign themselves to a life of servitude and exploitation. The activities of the two militia groups have also endangered human security in their areas of operation: economic security is under threat as trade, economic growth and development have been stunted and the socioeconomic infrastructure destroyed. Most residents of Trans-Nzoia and Central provinces have been forced to close their businesses as they cannot afford to pay the extortions demanded by the militias. Markets have shut down and residents and farmers are unable to make a living as they cannot till their lands and carry on their businesses. The end result has been food insecurity in the areas where the two militia groups are most active. The militia groups have both recruited children of schoolgoing age into their ranks w illing or unwillingly h ence interfering w ith t heir e ducation. Poverty and t he b enefits a ssociated w ith j oining t hese mi litia g roups h ave co mbined t o force t he y outh o ut o f s chool. A ccording t o t he 2007 g lobal r eport o n h uman settlements, many boys are abandoning school and joining criminal gangs.91 The
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report points out that whereas education has been a m ajor form of social capital investment, i ts va lue h as b een minimi sed in t he e yes o f y ouths li ving in a bject poverty. During its heyday, the SLDF was reported to have recruited around 650 schoolgoing children. The Mungiki has had an even more ambitious recruitment programme with regard to school children and teenagers since February 2009. The areas most affected are the Kirinyaga, Muranga, Nyeri, Nyandarua, Kiambu, Thika and Laikipia districts in C entral Province and the slums of Mathare, Korogocho, Kayole and Dandora in Nairobi.92 The co mmunities t hat s uffer f rom t he v iolence co mmitted b y t hese t wo militias have petitioned the government to come to their rescue. The activities of the two militias have left a t rail of destruction, death and displacement that have decimated peoples livelihoods and destroyed their lives. This has led to a situation where the populations in the affected areas detest those same militias whose initial objective was to safeguard their interests. The SLDF originally defined its goals in terms of protecting the land rights of the Sabaot, while the Mungikis objective was, apart f rom r eturning t he K ikuyu co mmunity t o i ts t raditional r oots, t o f ight poverty. H owever, b oth g roups h ave en ded u p inf licting s uffering t o t he v ery people t hey had initially s ought to b enefit. B oth ef fectively employed t he use of violence t o o btain compliance of lo cal p opulations, in s ome areas s ubjugating a whole district. Both t he Mungiki and t he S LDF h ave b een s ubjected t o m assive crac kdown operations b y t he g overnment, w ith va rying r esults. I n 2007, t he Mungiki was suppressed by means of extra-judicial killings that whittled down its members and forced it t o g o un derground, w hile t he SLDF wa s a lmost ext erminated in 2008. However, both militias have since regained lost ground with the Mungiki being the most effective in this regard. The latest atrocities associated with the Mungiki took place o n 20 A pril 2009 w hen t hey a ttacked Ga thaithi v illage in t he N yeri E ast district of Central Province and killed some 30 people in retaliation for the killing of 14 of its members. The SLDF is yet to regain its powerful position. The SLDF crackdown was easy to implement since it was in a rural set-up that made i t p ossible f or t he mi litary t o inf iltrate a nd c arry o ut i ts o perations a s opposed to the crackdown against the Mungiki, which operates mostly in urb an surroundings and whose members could easily go underground. Other v igilante/militias, s uch a s t he Taleban in Nairobi a nd t he Bantu, h ave challenged the Mungiki. The Bantu militia is estimated to have between 2 000 and 3 000 members and has to date killed about 20 Mungiki gang members.93 Although
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these groups have countered and slowed down the activities of the Mungiki, they have b een un able t o des troy i t co mpletely. I n m ore r ecent t imes, a m ore emboldened g roup h as em erged in p arts of t he C entral Province, k nown a s t he Kengakenga, which has dealt with the Mungiki in the same manner that the militia deals w ith g roups opposed to it. It h as formed an execution centre (a ka ngaroo court) k nown a s The H ague, w here Mungiki adherents a re ex ecuted t hrough hanging, h acking o r b eing s et a blaze. The H ague i s si tuated a t a n a bandoned cattle dip at Kamuiru village, about 3 kilometres from Kagumo town in Kirinyaga district. Close to 20 people have so far been executed here.94 The SLDF has faced similar challenges from the Moorland Defence Force and the Political R evenge Movements f ormed b y t he Mosop t o def end i tself a gainst SLDF attacks. These two groups helped the military during its operations against the SLDF. The main differences between the two militia groups can be attributed to the fact that Mungiki is better organised and has a g reater following than the SLDF, even though both of them have organisational structures that consist of military, spiritual a nd p olitical w ings. Th e S LDF o perates m ostly in t he M ount E lgon region, w ith a f ew s poradic a ttacks in p arts o f t he T rans-Nzoia di strict. Th e Mungiki is dominant in t he Central, parts of Nairobi and parts of the Rift Valley provinces.

CONCLUSION
The g rand co alition de al t hat h ad b een b rokered b y t he f ormer UN s ecretarygeneral, Kofi Annan, includes a co mmitment to disband and demobilise Kenyas militia g roups, m any o f w hich w ere b lamed f or t he v iolence t hat f ollowed t he disputed 2007 presidential elections. The instruments to set in motion this process are yet to be put in place more than a year since the deal was signed and most of the ga ngs s till r emain ac tive. Th e Mungiki and S LDF, in p articular, a re s lowly regaining their hold on Central and Western provinces respectively. The p ersistence o f t he Mungiki and S LDF i s a n in dicator o f h ow de ep t he culture of impunity has been ingrained in the Kenyan socioeconomic and political set-up. The Mungiki and SLDF have developed a parallel revenue collection system in their areas of jurisdiction. They have also developed a policing system distinct from t hat m anaged b y t he s tate. Th ey h ave k illed, intimidated, co nscripted a nd harassed their victims into submission. At the peak of their operations, these two groups appeared to have overwhelmed even the police.
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The states response has been a mixt ure of sluggishness and brute force. With regard to the former, the police force has time and again failed to stop the violence committed by the two groups. With regard to the brute force, the police have been accused of extra-judicial killings in t he case of the Mungiki, while the army was accused of torturing residents in its operation to contain the SLDF. In both cases the force used did not eliminate the groups. The question that should be asked is why the two groups persist despite the efforts by the state to stop or at least contain them. Ever since mi litia g roups de veloped with t he return to multiparty p olitics in the run-up to the 1992 elections, the states reaction has been one of indifference. The government has t aken an unsystematic approach to de al with i llegal armed groups. The governments response to atrocities committed by these militias has to date been largely rhetorical. In the majority of cases, the government has failed to act decisively. The proliferation of armed militias can be attributed partly to the failure b y t he g overnment t o a rrest, p rosecute a nd p unish m embers o f t hese militias a nd t heir s ponsors. I t c an a lso b e a ttributed t o t he a bject p overty experienced by many unemployed youth in different communities. It is evident that the rise of the Mungiki and SLDF is to some extent the result of t he m arginalisation o f t he g roups, e conomically a nd a lso p olitically. Th ere i s also no doubt that the two groups are linked with elites and politicians from their areas of operation. A crackdown on the groups must thus address this connection. But m ore im portantly, t he s tate m ust addr ess t he fac tors t hat co ntribute t o t he marginalisation o f t hese g roups, f or if t his i s n ot t ackled, t hey w ill n ever b e eradicated.

NOTES
1 C L eys, Underdevelopment i n K enya: t he p olitical e conomy o f n eo-colonialism, L ondon: Heinemann, 1975; W O yugi, Ethnicity and the electoral process: the 1992 general elections in Kenya, African Journal of Political Science, New Series 2(1) (1997), 491569. J Osamba, Violence and the dynamics of transition: state, ethnicity and governance in Kenya, African Affairs 26(1&2) (2001); K Kibwana, Constitutionalism and political issues surrounding regionalism i n K enya, Th ought o n D emocracy S eries, N airobi: K enya H uman R ights Commission, 1994. S Ndegwa, Citizenship and ethnicity: an examination of two transition moments in Kenyan politics, American Political Science Review 91(3) (1997).
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8 9 10

11 12 13 14 15 16

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20 21 22 23 24 25

F S tewart, Th e r oot c auses o f h umanitarian em ergencies, in W ayne E N afziger, F rances Stewart a nd V yrynen R aimo (e ds), War, h unger a nd d isplacement: t he o rigins o f humanitarian emergencies, Volume 1: Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. A Mazrui, Ethnic voices and transethnic voting: the 1997 elections at the Kenya Coast, in M Rutten, A M azrui a nd F G rignon (e ds), Out f or t he c ount: t he 1997 gen eral e lection a nd prospects for democracy in Kenya, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001. M K atumanga w ith L C liffe, Nairobi a ci ty b esieged: t he i mpact o f a rmed v iolence o n poverty a nd d evelopment, W est Y orkshire: B radford U niversity, C entre f or I nternational Cooperation and Security, Department of Peace Studies, 2005. Collins W anderi, Mungiki: leg itimate o r cr iminal? The A frican E xecutive, 2008, http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=3160 (accessed 12 October 2009). J N girachu a nd C W aithaka, H ow Mungiki became m ost s erious in ternal s ecurity t hreat, Daily Nation, 12 March 2009. G Wamue, Revisiting our indigenous shrines through Mungiki, African Af fairs 100 (2001), 453467. Ibid; P K agwanja, P olitics o f m arionettes: ext ra-legal v iolence a nd t he 1997 e lections in Kenya, in M R utten, A M azrui, and F G rignon (e ds), Out f or t he c ount: Th e 1997 gen eral election a nd p rospects f or d emocracy i n K enya, K ampala: F ountain Pu blishers, 2001; D Anderson, Vigilantes, violence and the politics of public order in Kenya, African Affairs, 101, (2002); M R uteere, Dilemmas of crime, human rights and the politics of Mungiki violence in Kenya, Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Institute, 2008. Ruteere, Dilemmas of crime. K Kanyinga, quoted in the Sunday Nation, 4 February 2007. P Mutahi, Violence and politics of militias in Kenya, Journal of the Africa Peace Forum 2(1) (2006), 6694; Wamue, Revisiting our indigenous shrines through Mungiki. Standard team, Gang uses force to get new recruits, East African Standard, 18 May 2009. Ngirachu and Waithaka, How Mungiki became most serious internal security threat. P Kagwanja, Warlord democracy: the proliferation of militia and pre-election violence in Kenya, 19992002, K enya H uman R ights C ommission, U npublished r eport, 2003; Anderson, Vigilantes, violence and the politics of public order in Kenya. The First Post, 9 July 2007; East African Standard, Kenya: Mungiki runs deep and wide, 27 April 2008; N girachu a nd Waithaka, How Mungiki became m ost s erious in ternal s ecurity threat. Standard team, Gang uses force to get new recruits, East African Standard, 18 May 2009. M G ecaga, R eligious m ovements a nd dem ocratisation in K enya: b etween t he s acred a nd profane, in G Murunga and S Nasongo (eds), Kenya: the struggle for democracy, London: Zed Books, 2007. K Makokha, The Mungiki mystique just shattered to pieces, Daily Nation, 27 October 2000; Wamue, Revisiting our indigenous shrines through Mungiki. Wamue, Revisiting our indigenous shrines through Mungiki, 459. Wamue, Revisiting our indigenous shrines through Mungiki. Makokha, The Mungiki mystique just shattered to pieces. Daily Nation, 3 September 2000. Kagwanja, Warlord democracy.
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26 Ruteere, Dilemmas of crime; Sunday Nation, 3 December 2006. 27 US D epartment o f S tate, A nnual r eport o n I nternational r eligious f reedom f or 2004 Kenya, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/450fb0b228.html (accessed 4 May 2009). 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ruteere, Dilemmas of crime. 31 Sunday Nation, 4 February 2007. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Standard reporter, Mungiki tax system for business, use of roads, East African Standard, 20 May 2009. 35 Kagwanja, Politics of marionettes; Katumanga, Nairobi a city besieged. 36 Daily Nation, 5 April 2004. 37 P K agwanja, P ower t o u huru: y outh iden tity a nd g enerational p olitics in K enyas 2002 elections, African Affairs, 105(418), (2005), 5175. 38 Daily Nation, 11 November 2006. 39 Ibid. 40 Standard reporter, Gangs operate thriving taxi business, East African Standard, 19 May 2009. 41 G Munene, Protection fee demands drove away traders, Daily Nation, 3 M ay 2009; N ation correspondent, Traders who fled after Mungiki threats return, Daily Nation, 23 April 2009. 42 Mutahi, Violence and politics of militias in Kenya. 43 East African Standard, 26 August 2002. 44 Daily Nation, 10 November 2005. 45 Daily Nation, 2 June 2007. 46 International Cr isis G roup, 2008, K enya in cr isis, A frica R eport N o 137, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/137_kenya_in_crisis_ web.pdf (accessed 9 September 2009). 47 N Mburu, L eaders must t ackle youth problems to stop mi litias, East African Standard, 23 April 2009. 48 P M athagani, K ibaki p ledges t ough ac tion t o r ein in Mungiki, East A frican S tandard, 5 December 2008. 49 S Kilonzo, Terror, religion, or socialism? The faces of Mungiki sect in the Kenya public space, CODESRIA Conference held in Yaound, Cameroon, 711 December 2008. 50 Standard team, Love-hate relations between politicians, gang, East African Standard, 20 May 2009. 51 Anderson, Vigilantes, violence and the politics of public order in Kenya. 52 East African Standard, Kenya: Mungiki runs deep and wide, 27 April 2008. 53 East African Standard, 8 March 2004. 54 East African Standard, 9 March 2004. 55 East African Standard, Kenya: Mungiki runs deep and wide. 56 Daily Nation, 5 April 2004. 57 Ibid. 58 Kenya N ational C ommission o n H uman R ights (KN CHR), Preliminary r eport o n a lleged executions and disappearances of persons between June and October 2007, Nairobi: KNCHR, 2007; Kagwanja, Power to uhuru.
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59 ICG, Kenya crisis, Africa Report 137 (2008). 60 Otsieno N amwaya, W hy t he Sa baot mi litia h as b een a h ard n ut t o crac k, East A frican Standard, 27 July 2007. 61 International Crisis Group, Kenya crisis; Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone: war crimes in Kenyas Mt Elgon conflict, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008. 62 R R Simiyu, Militianisation of resource conflicts: the case of land-based conflict in the Mount Elgon region of Western Kenya, Monograph No 152, P retoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008. 63 Saturday N ation, 7 A pril 2007; Daily N ation, 6 J anuary 2007; S imiyu, Militianisation o f resource conflicts. 64 Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone. 65 Ibid. 66 Allan Kisia, Military finally opens up Mt Elgon, East African Standard, 29 June 2008. 67 Namwaya, Why the Sabaot militia has been a h ard nut to crack; Simiyu, Militianisation of resource conflicts. 68 Ibid. 69 Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone; Simiyu, Militianisation of resource conflicts. 70 Ken Opala, Felled SLDF boss a m ere pawn in E lgon problem, Daily Nation, 20 M ay 2008; Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone. 71 Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone. 72 Namwaya, Why the Sabaot militia has been a hard nut to crack. 73 Ibid. 74 N N gaina, Th e d ay Janjaweed came f or m y n eck o ver a b asin, East A frican S tandard, 31 January 2009. 75 Namwaya, Why the Sabaot militia has been a hard nut to crack. 76 R Wanyonyi, Vigilante demand fee from teachers, East African Standard, 15 January 2008; Simiyu, Militianisation of resource conflicts. 77 International Crisis Group, Kenya crisis. 78 Kamatusa is an abbreviation of Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu tribes. 79 International Crisis Group, Kenya crisis. 80 Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone. 81 Namwaya, Why the Sabaot militia has been a hard nut to crack. 82 Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone. 83 Daily Nation, 14 November 2007; East African Standard, 1 July 2007. 84 Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone. 85 Kenya National C ommission on Human Rights, On the brink of the precipice: the KNHCR report on the post-election violence, Nairobi: KNHCR, 2008. 86 Human Rights Watch, All the men have gone. 87 Ibid. 88 R Wanyonyi, Terror returns to Mt Elgon, East African Standard, 25 November 2008. 89 Ibid. 90 Ruteere, Dilemmas of crime. 91 UN Habitat, Global reports on human settlements, 2007, Vol 1: R educing urban crime and violence: policy directions, Nairobi: UN Centre for Human Settlements, 2007.

92 W K igotho a nd M M uiruri, C hild l abour a nd Mungiki sect push b oys out of s chool, East African Standard, 23 April 2009. 93 J Mugambi, Kenya: massive Mungiki manhunt in Central, Nairobi Star, April 21, 2009. 94 Standard team, Vigilantes who kill with equal force, East African Standard, May 18, 2009.

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Rebels and militias in resource conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
PHILLIP KASAIJA

INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Rwanda genocide and entry into the Democratic Republic of Congo ( DRC)1 of t he def eated Interahamwe and t he Forces A rmes R wandaises (Rwanda Armed Forces, FAR) in 1994, t he DRC in general, and the eastern DRC in p articular, h ave n ever k nown p eace. R ebels a nd mi litia g roups h ave s prung up in t he co untry t o t he p oint t hat o ne c annot k eep t rack o f w ho i s w ho. Th e availability of mineral and other forms of natural wealth in t he country has been one reason for the continued instability in the region. In fact, the rebel and militia groups (and at one time the neighbouring countries of Rwanda and Uganda) have transformed t heir mi litary o perations a nd p resence in t he co untry in to s elfsustaining ac tivities, t hrough t he ext raction a nd s ale o f n atural r esources. Th e instability occasioned by these groups has resulted in mass deaths, displacements and human rights violations. This c hapter di scusses t he c urrent s tate o f t he co nflict in t he e astern D RC, paying due attention to the rebel and militia groups operating there. It sequentially
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presents a s hort hi story o f t he co nflict in t he D RC f rom t he t ime i t b ecame a personal possession of King Lopold II to the present, showing how the presence of natural resources in the country has led to it becoming a geological scandal.2 It then p resents t he s truggle f or co ntrol o f C ongolese r esources in t he 1960s a nd 1970s, during which Mobutu inter alia adopted the strategy of Zairenising foreign companies s et u p b y t he B elgians t o ext ract t he r esources. Th e c hapter n ext discusses the different rebel and militia groups that have existed and continue to exist in the eastern DRC, with a key observation that although the majority of the rebel groups in the eastern DRC were established by the neighbouring countries of Uganda and Rwanda, other non-Congolese groups have also taken advantage of the fluid situation to enter the fray. The next section of the chapter deals with the relationship between the different rebel and militia groups in the eastern DRC and the states of the region, with an observation that the relationship between the rebel and militia groups and the states of the region follows the maxim of the enemy of my enemy is my f riend.3 The following s ection de als w ith t he international and regional responses to the conflict in the eastern DRC, with a key conclusion that it is difficult to hold non-state actors accountable in a n ongoing conflict situation. The chapter closes with a co nclusion and recommends that the main strategy to defeat the numerous rebel and militia groups should involve three key trajectories: first, t he g roups s hould b e co nfronted mi litarily; s econd, t he D RC g overnment should be supported to build strong institutions in the eastern DRC to ensure law and order; and third, the DRC should normalise relations with neighbours to the east, particularly Rwanda and Uganda, so that they do n ot support the rebel and militia g roups in t he e astern D RC a nd c an m ove t owards j oint ac tions a gainst these groups to eliminate them.

export t o B elgium.6 Lopold f ondly r eferred t o t he C ongo a s hi s p rivate es tate which he ran as a magnificent African cake.7 His brutal r ule b ecame associated with t he im age o f red r ubber, den oting t hat i t wa s s tained b y t he b lood o f t he Africans w ho w ere f orced t o ga ther i t, a nd in 1908, a n in ternational r eform movement led by E D Morel forced Lopold to transfer the Congo to the Belgian state.8 The t ransformation o f t he C ongo f rom L opolds p ersonal p ossession t o a Belgian colony did n ot represent a m ajor advance for t he C ongolese p eople, for Lopolds r ule wa s r eplaced b y a co lonial r egime t hat wa s j ust a s o ppressive.9 According to Anstey:
[The B elgian C ongo wa s] a va st t erritory w hich h ad n ot b een p roperly administered; a system of direct economic exploitation an unfettered variant of abuse and atrocity. [This] legacy meant that Belgium had no relevant tradition of policy to invoke, [and] no positive aims regarding it.10

Belgiums colonial r ule in t he C ongo relied on t he t riple objectives of e conomic exploitation and political and cultural repression. Nevertheless, resistance by the Congo natives was fierce and included army mutinies, strikes, and work stoppages by minin g, in dustrial, t ransportation a nd p ublic s ector w orkers.11 On 4 J anuary 1959, the Congolese working class staged a rebellion against the Belgians, resulting in the decision to grant independence to the Congo. In his New Years address in 1960, King Baudouin (the grandson of Lopold IIs nephew and successor, Albert I), a nnounced t hat Belgium w ould g ive i ts co lony t he g ift o f in dependence without undue haste.12

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT IN THE DRC: FROM KING LOPOLD II TO JOSEPH KABILA From King Lopold II to independence
In 1885 the DRC, which is more than 80 times the size of Belgium, was ceded by the major world powers to King Lopold II of Belgium as a personal possession.4 Lopolds p rivate es tate t he C ongo wa s t hen b aptised ltat Indpendant d u Congo (Congo Free State) and Lopolds colonial representatives embarked on the dual campaign of military pacification and economic exploitation of the region.5 The exp loitation r evolved p rimarily a round t he h arvesting o f w ild r ubber f or
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From independence to 1997

The in dependence o f t he C ongo o n 30 J une 1960 did n ot r esult in t he transformation o f t he s tate in to a p eaceful o ne, a s t he co untry s ubsequently lurched f rom o ne cr isis t o t he n ext. B elgian co lonisation h ad b locked p olitical development, s o w hen t he C ongo wa s s uddenly pitched into in dependence, t he African elite was tiny, inexperienced and angry, which was a recipe for chaos.13 On 5 J uly 1960, s everal uni ts in t he C ongolese a rmy, t he Force P ublique, mutinied and demanded promotions, pay rises and the removal of white officers.14 As r ioting a nd unr est s pread, P rime M inister P atrice L umumba a ttempted t o control t he r evolt b y p romoting a ll A frican s oldiers a t o nce, r emoving s ome Belgian o fficers, a nd a ppointing a C ongolese, J oseph M obutu, a s t he q uasiMIILITIAS, R EBELS
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political o verseer o ver t he mi litary s tructure.15 The B elgians r eacted b y s ending more troops, which intensified the violence. By September 1960, President Joseph Kasavubu announced the dismissal of Lumumba as prime minister, who in t urn fired the president. This crisis precipitated a takeover by Mobutu Sese Seko on 14 September 1960. Between 1960 and 1965, t he Congo experienced one crisis after the other, for example, attempts by some parts of the country like Katanga to secede. Lumumba, the p opularly e lected in dependence p rime mini ster, wa s a rrested, t ortured a nd finally killed early in 1961. On 24 D ecember 1965, Mobutu, then chief of staff of the Congolese army, staged a second coup dtat and successfully captured power. Mobutu r uled t he C ongo r enamed Z aire in 1971 un der a sys tem o f government c haracterised b y co rruption, p ersonal enr ichment a nd et hnic favouritism.16 Just li ke L opold m any y ears b efore, h e lo oted t he w ealth o f t he country w ith a bandon. Thi s p rompted a F rench mini ster t o des cribe him a s a walking b ank va ult in a le opard s kin c ap.17 Whilst en dowed w ith g reat n atural wealth in the form of, inter alia, copper, gold, diamonds, oil and silver, at the time of hi s de ath in S eptember 1997, M obutu lef t a n im poverished p opulation a nd country indebted to the level of 200 per cent of the gross domestic product.18

Laurent Kabila to Joseph Kabila

On 17 May 1997, rebels of the Alliance des Forces Dmocratique pour la Libration du C ongo (Alliance o f D emocratic Forces f or t he L iberation o f C ongo, AFD L)19 with the support of the neighbouring countries of Angola, Rwanda and Uganda, among others, captured Kinshasa, thus ending the Mobutu dictatorship in Z aire. At the head of the AFDL was Laurent-Dsir Kabila, who was derided for various kinds o f t rafficking in w hich h e h ad en gaged o ver a p eriod o f 30 y ears.20 He declared him self t he n ew p resident o f Z aire a nd r enamed t he co untry t he Democratic Republic of Congo, with a n ew f lag and national anthem.21 The war that brought him t o p ower had started in t he e ast of t he country, mainly in t he provinces of North and South Kivu. Following the end of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, over a million (mainly Hutu) Rwandan refugees took refuge in Z aire, w here they established camps along the border b etween R wanda a nd t he D RC. S ome o f t hem h ad p articipated in t he genocide a nd s tarted l aunching a ttacks in to R wanda, t hus p rovoking t he n ew rulers o f R wanda, t he Rwanda P atriotic F ront/Army (RP F/A), t o l aunch counterinsurgency o perations a gainst t hem, inter a lia in t he D RC. I n 1996, t he
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RPA a gain en tered t he D RC t o p ursue in surgents a nd a t t he s ame t ime a lso dismantled the refugee camps. The Rwandans recruited and trained Congolese Tutsis to help them fight the Hutu ext remists a nd t heir C ongolese b ackers.22 Kabila, w ho h ad f ought a gainst Mobutu and failed to make any headway, saw his chance to finally deal with his nemesis. According to t he International Cr isis Group, t he AFDL was formed to help the Rwandan, Ugandan, Congolese and, later on, Angolan military forces that were f ighting a gainst Mobutu t o s upport t heir ef forts. Th e AFD L t hus gave t he whole campaign a revolutionary or civil war character.23 Sharing Mobutus weakness for p olitical control, p atrimonialism and et hniccentred politics, Kabila was able to restore the functioning of the state only to a modest level.24 He found himself in c harge of a co untry whose national debt was US$9,6 b illion, w hose in ternal c urrency wa s w orthless, a nd w hose g overnment was n on-existent.25 Furthermore, K abila did n ot li ve u p t o t he exp ectations o f Rwanda and Uganda, which had expected him to wipe out the Hutu Interahamwe and the Ugandan rebels (the Allied Democratic Forces) and the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (which was based in the eastern DRC at the time).26 Because t he C ongolese A rmed F orces (Forces A rmes de la R publique Dmocratique du Congo, FARDC) were weak organisationally, Kabila appointed a Rwandese o fficer, G eneral James K abarebe, a s c hief o f s taff t o r eorganise t hem. Rwanda a nd U ganda, l ater o n j oined b y B urundi, t ook ad vantage o f t he disintegration of the Congolese state and armed forces to create territorial spheres of interest from which they could plunder the Congos riches.27 Since Kabila had not lived up to their expectations, Uganda and Rwanda had to f ind a n ew C ongolese p uppet. Th e o pportunity p resented i tself w hen K abila decided to send the Rwanda troops home at the end of July 1998. Th e rebellion against t he K abila g overnment t hat b egan o n 2 A ugust 1998 wa s dep icted b y Uganda and Rwanda as a civil war in which they were simply providing support to Congolese rebels to ensure security along their own borders. Clearly this was not true, as fighting initially occurred between Rwanda troops supporting mutinous Congolese troops against Kabilas loyalists. As soon as the war broke out, Kabila convinced his e ventual a llies (Z imbabwe, Angola, Namibia and l ater C had) t hat the DRC had been invaded by her eastern neighbours, so the former entered the fray to prop up Kabilas government. At t he t ime of t he outbreak of t he rebellion, Rwanda h ad h elped t o found a movement c alled t he Rassemblement C ongolais p our l a D mocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy, RCD) led by Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba from the
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University of Dar es Salaam. In mid-1999, the RCD disintegrated into factions and the war was stalemated when neither side wa s able to marshal enough power to impose a mi litary v ictory o ver t he o ther. W ith w eak do mestic e conomies, t he countries in volved a nd t heir C ongolese r ebel a llies r elied o n t he D RCs n atural wealth to fund their continued involvement in t he conflict. It must b e observed that this policy of exploiting the DRCs natural resources to support the war effort had been initiated by the AFDL, for even before coming to power Kabila signed mining concessions with private investors from all over the world to finance the war against Mobutu. Prunier gives the example of the one billion dollar contract Kabila sig ned w ith A merican M ineral F ields I nternational o n 16 A pril 1997, setting a p recedent t hat was subsequently copied by numerous rebel and militia groups as well as the regional states of the DRC.28 With t he wa r h aving g round t o a s talemate, t he exh austed p arties w ent t o Lusaka in Zambia, where a ceasefire agreement was negotiated and signed in July 1999. The agreement provided for, among others, a ce asefire, disarmament of all the n on-government f orces, t he w ithdrawal o f a ll f oreign f orces f rom t he D RC territory and the holding of an Inter-Congolese Dialogue to find a n ew political dispensation for the country. On 16 January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards. He was succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila.

Congo inherited at independence. In order to assert sovereignty over their natural resource exp loitation, b oth t he L umumba a nd M obutu g overnments b egan t he process o f di smantling t he s tranglehold t he f oreign co mpanies h ad o ver t he countrys resources. The attempted secession of Katanga right after independence was s upported b y B elgium, b ecause t his w ould h ave en abled i t t o co ntinue exploiting Congolese minerals located in the area. According to Lemarchand, the mineral reserves of Katanga province are so easy to access that they could be called a geological scandal.34 Map 71: DRC's natural resources

STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE DRCS NATURAL RESOURCES

Since the late 1800s, t he C ongolese people have suffered at the hands of foreign and indigenous businessmen and political leaders intent on exploiting the DRCs rubber, ivory, diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt, timber and other resources.29 Under Lopolds r ule, b rute f orce wa s u sed t o en sure lo cal co mmunities s atisfied hig h rubber q uotas s et b y t he lo cal Force P ublique commanders a nd t heir b usiness associates.30 If a v illage refused to submit to the rubber regime, everyone in sig ht was shot so that other villagers would get the message,31 or the right hands of locals were cut off after they had been killed by local chiefs to show the [colonial] state how many [had been] killed.32 After a s teep fa ll in r ubber prices, B elgium s et up companies s uch a s Union Minire du Haut-Katanga and Compagnie du Katanga (later renamed the Comit Spcial d u K atanga) t o exp loit min eral r esources lo cated b y g eological s urveys conducted in the late 1890s.33 These were the companies that the new rulers of the
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Sources: Jeune Afrique and United Nations.

Between 1964 a nd 1980, a n umber of rebellions were launched to dismantle the Congolese neo-colonial state. The Mulele rebellion began in 1964 but by 1968 had fizzled o ut a fter t he a ssassination o f i ts le ader, P ierre M ulele.35 The Conseil Nationale de L ibration (National L iberation C ouncil, CNL), 36 which wa s established by Lumumbas followers after his assassination to liberate the country, did n ot l ast lo ng ei ther. I ts e astern f ront le aders, s uch a s O lenga, Gb enye a nd Kanza, were lured out of the rebellion by Mobutu in 1965.37 Laurent Kabila was the
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only p arty m ember w ho continued t o wa ge a lo w-intensity s truggle in t he FiziBaraka area until the early 1980s, when he, too, retired to the world of business in the form of crossborder trading, particularly in gold and ivory. By the time of the formation of the AFDL, Kabila was living in Tanzania on the profits from mineral smuggling and extortion. In a n ef fort t o w rest co ntrol o f min eral exp loitation f rom f oreign-owned mining companies, the Mobutu government enacted the Bakajika Law in 1966, in terms of which the state established its rightful claim to all land and mineral rights in the country.38 He also nationalised the giant company Union Minire du HautKatanga in 1967, t ransforming i t in to a s tate en terprise c alled t he Gnrale d es Carrires e t d es M ines. Thi s wa s f ollowed in 1973 b y t he Zairenisation o f a ll foreign-owned co mmercial, in dustrial a nd a gricultural en terprises.39 Mobutu encouraged co mpetition b etween r ival en trepreneurs a nd mi litary uni ts b y allowing them to guard their own territories and develop their own commercial interests r evolving a round di amonds, g old, co ffee, t imber, co balt a nd a rms. However, Mobutus strategies all fostered disorder, insecurity and a general state of impunity, which in turn led to the formation of new and militarised networks for the extraction of economic benefits from the country.40

FARDC and General Laurent Nkundas Congrs National pour la Dfense du Peuple (National Congress for the Defence of the People, CNDP), which he established in 2006 t o f ight a gainst t he r ebel g roup Forces D mocratiques d e L ibration d u Rwanda (Democratic F orces f or t he L iberation o f R wanda, FD LR), w hich i s composed mainly of former Interahamwe and ex-FAR and whose aim is to topple the government of Paul Kagame in Rwanda. After s everal r ounds o f t alks in N airobi a nd G oma, t he CND P a nd t he Congolese government signed a peace agreement on 23 March 2009. 42 Earlier on, in January 2008, 22 armed groups and the DRC government signed the Goma Acts of En gagement, w hich, inter a lia, provided f or t hose g roups t o un dergo a programme o f di sarmament, dem obilisation, r esettlement a nd r eintegration. Despite this undertaking and the various peace agreements, the armed non-state groups co ntinue t o p lunder t he r egions n atural r esources, w hile simultaneously committing a va riety of m ass human r ights v iolations t hat range f rom pillaging and b urning o f h omes a nd s tores t o t orture, a bduction o f c hildren in to mi litia groups, displacement of populations and murder.43

CURRENT STATUS OF THE CONFLICT

The Inter-Congolese Di alogue wa s concluded in 2002 a nd a ll t he foreign forces withdrew from the DRC in 2003. A t ransitional government incorporating most of the former rebel groups was established at the end of 2003, with Joseph Kabila as president. In 2006, g eneral elections were held and Kabila won the presidency and hi s p arty, t he Alliance po ur la M ajorit P rsidentielle (Alliance o f t he Presidential M ajority, AMP) r eceived t he m ajority in P arliament. H owever, t he provinces of North and South Kivu, and Ituri continued to experience insecurity and instability. The main source of the insecurity may be attributed to the presence of n umerous r ebel g roups a nd mi litias t hat co ntinued t o exp loit t he exi sting mineral and other natural wealth to fund their activities. The conflict in Ituri Province intensified between 1999 and 2003 as a result of clashes over land between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. The situation was exacerbated by the presence of Ugandan soldiers who used the conflict between the t wo g roups a s a sm okescreen f or t he un bridled exp loitation o f r esources.41 Although the situation in Ituri has since stabilised, North and South Kivu continue to s uffer f rom in security. I n A ugust 2008, r enewed co nflict b roke o ut b etween
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THE ROLE OF MILITIAS AND REBEL MOVEMENTS IN THE DRC CONFLICTS

It can be argued that armed non-state groups first gained prominence in the DRC during t he wa r t hat overthrew Mobutu a nd t hat n eighbouring countries subsequently s tarted u sing t hese g roups t o f ight t heir p roxy wa rs. W hile t he majority of the rebel and militia groups had been established as a result of external forces, o thers (li ke t he L ords R esistance A rmy, LR A) en tered t he co untry f rom outside because of the absence of a functioning state.

Structure, agenda and functioning of the various groups

Apart f rom t he AFD L, w hich wa s es tablished w ith t he h elp o f R wanda a nd Uganda, t he s econd m ost im portant r ebel m ovement t o b e es tablished wa s t he RCD, w hich wa s f ormed in 1998 in R wanda b y C ongolese p oliticians a nd intellectuals in cluding r emnants o f M obutus r egime a nd f ormer K abila supporters. The RCD styled itself as a government in exile, as it was hoped that it would be jetted into Kinshasa to take over power after the overthrow of Laurent Kabila. Having failed to overthrow Kabila, the RCD disintegrated in May 1999 into two factions: the RCD-Goma, supported by Rwanda, was based at Goma and was
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active in North and South Kivu provinces, while the RCD-Kisangani (also called RCD-ML), supported by Uganda, was based at Kisangani and controlled parts of Ituri and Orientale provinces. The di sintegration o f t he R CD wa s o ccasioned b y, inter a lia, the le adership style of Wamba and different views on how to pursue the war against the Kabila government.44 Although a s ection o f t he RD C-Goma fac tion (w hich in cluded members such as Emile Ilunga, Bizima Karaha, Moise Nyarugabo, Lunda Bululu and Alexis Tambwe) favoured a lightening strike on Kinshasa to capture power, the RCD-Kisangani faction (which was led by Wamba) favoured a warlike approach. Between August 1999 a nd May 2000, U gandan and Rwandan troops clashed on three occasions in t he town of Kisangani for control of taxes or gratuities related to di amonds.45 Later o n t he R CD-Kisangani di sintegrated in to o ther fac tions, including R CD-Nationale le d b y R oger L umbala a nd b ased a t t he t own o f Bafwasende. As t he war stalled, Uganda s aw t he need to create a n ew g roup and f ront to fight t he K abila g overnment. S ince U ganda co ntrolled l arge swa thes o f D RC territory t o t he e ast a nd n ortheast, t he mi litary s trategy t hat U ganda ado pted involved empowering the Congolese people politically and militarily in t he hope that they would overthrow Kabila themselves. Uganda therefore helped to found the Mouvement p our l a L ibration d u C ongo (Movement f or t he L iberation o f Congo, MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba. Bemba, a former businessman from Brussels, was introduced to Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni by his Ugandan friends in the mi litary a nd t hereafter un derwent mi litary t raining at a U gandan faci lity at Kyankwazi, after w hich he was put in a h elicopter by t he Ugandan military and flown t o t he e astern D RC.46 There h e wa s in troduced t o t he p opulation a s a liberator by hi s Ugandan h andlers, and t o buttress hi s li berator credentials, wa s given a uniform and gun and told to start recruiting supporters, thus giving birth to the MLC.47 With the help of Uganda, the MLC was able to raise a force of between 15 000 and 20 000 m embers who operated in a reas controlled by the Ugandan military. When President Museveni was asked why he was supporting many rebel groups, including RCD-Kisangani and the MLC, he replied that a good hunter sends out several dogs because he cannot know in advance which one will be the best.48 MLC rebels a nd t he Ugandan s oldiers exp loited min erals a nd other n atural resources such a s t imber in t he a reas t hey co ntrolled. P resident M useveni e ven a llowed Bemba and his group to use the military airport at Entebbe in Uganda to transport their goods to and from the DRC cheaply. Young men from 12 t o 18 y ears were
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reportedly recruited into the MLC and sent to mines to dig for gold on behalf of the Ugandans and Bemba.49 After the start of the war in t he east in A ugust 1998, t he Kabila government started supporting the Mai-Mai militias based in North and South Kivu provinces to f ight t he R wanda o ccupation. Th e Mai-Mai militias considered t hemselves traditional warriors and believed that the use of magic made them invisible.50 The name Mai-Mai cuts across various ethnic groups in North and South Kivu. These warriors f irst came to prominence in t he 1960s w hen t hey allied with the leftist Mulelist rebellion that tried to topple President Mobutu.51 Mai-Mai groups t end t o s hift a lliances t o ac hieve t heir p arochial in terests. During t he 19961997 wa r, f or exa mple, t hey f ought w ith K abila, b ut a fter t he AFDL came to p ower, t hey des erted and returned to t heir b ases in N orth Kivu, from where they have been able to sow terror among soft civilian targets. Different actors h ave a lso u sed t hem t o exp loit t he r egions va st min eral a nd t imber resources. The most ac tive Mai-Mai groups today include Mai-Mai-Yakutumba and Mai-Mai-Zabuloni, named after the areas in the two Kivu provinces in which they are based. The Parti pour lUnit et la Sauvegarde de lIntgrit du Congo (Party for Unity and Safeguarding of the Integrity of Congo, PUSIC) was founded in 2002 by Chief Kaahwa Mandro Kango, who broke away from the Union des Patriotes Congolais (Union of Congolese Patriots, UPC) of Thomas Lubanga, who had, in turn, broken away from RCD-ML. When Lubanga started collaborating with Rwanda, Kaahwa decided it was time to break ranks with him a nd allied with Uganda to fight the UPC. H owever, e ventually, w ith t he p acification o f I turi P rovince, a ll mi litia groups operating there (including PUSIC) fell apart and disappeared. The Patriotes Rsistants Congolais (Congolese Resistance Patriots, PARECO) is one of the numerous militia groups that have sprung up in the eastern DRC. It is loosely allied to the Forces Dmocratiques de Libration du Rwanda and sometimes operates with FARDC to fight the UNDP. It was formed in 2007 from former MaiMai elements and is based at Kibua near the FDLR high command.52 The Lords Resistance Army (LRA) first entered the DRC in O ctober 2005 in Orientale Province.53 In March 2002, t he Uganda army launched Operation Iron Fist to rout the LRA from its bases in Southern Sudan. This, inter alia, resulted in the r ebels cr ossing t he b order f rom S udan in to Ga ramba N ational P ark in t he DRC. Reports indicate that the LRA was present in the DRC as late as December 2008, when FARDC, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Uganda
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Peoples D efence F orces (UP DF) l aunched a j oint o peration c alled Operation Lightning Th under to r out t he LR A f rom i ts b ase in Ga ramba N ational P ark. According to reports, the LRA attacks have resulted in a 32 per cent increase in the number o f in ternally di splaced p ersons in Or ientale P rovince.54 Mop-up operations named Rudia II against the group were carried out by the UPDF and FARDC but have not resulted in its complete eradication. As can be seen from the above, many rebel and militia groups operating in the eastern DRC are connected either to each other or to the DRC government and the neighbouring countries. It should be noted that the impact of their activities on human s ecurity h as b een imm ensely n egative. Of t he m ore t han f our mi llion deaths that have been recorded since the start of the conflict in 1996, the majority have o ccurred in t he e astern D RC. I n t heir b road s truggle t o s eize e conomic, political a nd mi litary p ower, t he mi litias, r ebel m ovements a nd g overnment soldiers (both national and foreign) have been guilty of the most horrific human rights abuses, including widespread killings of unarmed civilians, rape, torture and looting, a nd r ecruitment o f c hild s oldiers t o f ight in t heir ra nks, le ading t o t he forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.55 The following figures will i llustrate t his p oint: b etween J anuary a nd S eptember 2007, P anzi H ospital in S outh K ivu r ecorded 2 0773 c ases o f ra pe, o f w hich 2 0447 w ere a ttributed t o members o f t he FD LR o r Interahamwe.56 In E quator P rovince, f ighting in a nd around the areas of Dongo in late 2009 caused the displacement of approximately 60 000 people, while another 15 000 sought refuge in the Central African Republic (CAR).57 Table 71 s hows k nown C ongolese a nd n on-Congolese r ebel a nd mi litia groups and their alliances with states of the region. Table 71: Rebel groups in the eastern DRC
Rebel group Alliance des Forces Dmocratique pour la Libration du Congo (AFDL) Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dmocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy, RCD) Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dmocratie Goma (RCD-Goma) Nationality, founding date Congolese, October 1996 Congolese, August 1998 Alliances Uganda, Rwanda, Angola

Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dmocratie Kisangani (RCD-Kisangani) Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dmocratie Mouvement de Libration (RCD-ML) Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dmocratie Nationale (RCD-Nationale) Mouvement pour la Libration du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of Congo, MLC) Union des Patriotes Congolais (Union of Congolese Patriots, UPC) Parti pour lUnit et la Sauvegarde de lIntgrit du Congo (Party for Unity and Safeguarding of the Integrity of Congo, PUSIC) Front de Libration du Congo (Congolese Liberation Front, FLC) Mouvement des Patriotes Rsistants Congolais (Patriots in the Congolese Resistance, PARECO) Congres National pour la Dfense du Peuple (National Congress for the Defence of the People, CNDP) Forces Dmocratiques de Libration du Rwanda Forcs Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA): previously called Arme pour la Libration du Rwanda (Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, ALiR) Lords Resistance Army (LRA)

Congolese, May 1999 Congolese, September 1999

Uganda

Uganda

Congolese, June 2000 Congolese, October 1998

Uganda

Uganda

Congolese, June 2002 Congolese, February 2003

Uganda, Rwanda

Uganda

Congolese, January 2001 Congolese, Date not available

Uganda

FDLR

Congolese, December 2006

Rwanda

Rwandan, 1999

DRC, PARECO

Rwanda, Uganda

Ugandan, 1988/89 Ugandan, 1988

Sudan

Congolese, August 1998

Rwanda

National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU)

Allegedly receives support from the DRC government

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Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)

Ugandan, 1998 Congolese, Date not available Congolese, Date not available

Allegedly receives support from the DRC government DRC government, FDLR

Natural resource wealth: blessing or curse?

The DRC in general, and the eastern part of the country in particular, is incredibly rich in t erms of natural resources, but t his has long b een des cribed as a c urse.58 Throughout t he p ast cen tury, ir respective o f t he g overning sys tem o r p olitical personalities in power, the natural resources have been systematically exploited for the economic benefit of a few at the expense of the vast majority of the Congolese people.59 The conflict in the eastern DRC is mainly about access, control and trade in minerals such as coltan, gold, cassiterite, diamonds, copper and cobalt, as well as timber. The eastern DRC also has deposits of cadmium, silver, zinc, uranium, coal, lead, iron ore and manganese.60 Table 72, a nd maps 72 a nd 73 s how the location of these minerals in the DRC. Table 72: Natural resources in the DRC
Type of mineral Location (provinces) South Kivu Katanga North and South Kivu, Katanga, Maniema North and South Kivu, Maniema Katanga Kasai, Orientale, Equator, Maniema, Bas-Congo South Kivu, Orientale, Katanga Equator, Katanga Katanga Katanga North Kivu Katanga South Kivu Katanga North and South Kivu Katanga

Mai-Mai

Alliances des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (Patriotic Alliance for a Free and Sovereign Congo, APCLS) Ralliement pour l`Unite et la Dmocratie (Rally for Unity and Democracy Urunana, RUD-Urunana) Front National de Libration (National Liberation Front, FLN) Forces Rpublicaines Fdralistes (FRF)

FDLR

Rwandan, Date not available

Mai-Mai

Burundian, Date not available Congolese, Date not available Congolese, 2003

DRC government

DRC government

Front pour lIntgration et la Paix en Ituri (Front for Integration and Peace in Ituri, FIPI) Front Rvolutionnaire pour lIturi (Revolutionary Front for Ituri, FRPI) Front des Nationalistes et Intgrationnistes (Nationalist and Integrationist Front, FNI) Forces Populaires pour la Dmocratie au Congo (Popular Force for Democracy in Congo, FPDC) Peoples Redemption Army (PRA)

Uganda

Amethyst Cadmium Cassiterite (tin)

Congolese, Date not available Congolese, Date not available Congolese, Date not available

RCD-ML, DRC government

Coltan (columbite-tantalite) Copper and cobalt

Uganda

Diamonds Gold

Uganda

Iron Lead Manganese

Ugandan, Date not available Rwandan, Date not available Rwandan, Date not available Rwandan, Date not available

Rwanda

Pyrochlore Silver

Rassemblement Populaire Rwandaise (Popular Rwandese Assembly, RPR) Rassemblement Populaire Rwandaise Inkeragutabara (RPR- Inkeragutabara) Congres National pour la Dfense (National Congress for Defence, CND)

RPR-Inkeragutabara

Tourmaline Uranium

RPR

Wolframite Zinc

RPR-Inkeragutabara, RPR; RUD

Source: compiled by the author from various sources. Note that some of these groups no longer exist.

Sources: Global Witness, Same old story: a background study on natural resources in the DRC, June 2004; Global Witness, Faced with a gun, what can you do? War and the militarisation of mining in eastern Congo, July 2009.

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In t he e astern D RC, min erals a re o ften min ed b y unr egulated a rtisans w ho a re susceptible t o exp loitation b y w hoever w ields t he p ower o f t he gun, b e i t government s oldiers, r ebels o r mi litias. Th e l atter u se m ethods s uch a s dir ect extraction, extortion/confiscation, taxation and coercion of the local population to obtain minerals. Map 72: Natural resources in the eastern DRC

During their occupation of large parts of the eastern DRC, Rwanda and Uganda created rebel and militia groups to help them exploit the natural resources in t he areas under their control. The government of Rwanda reportedly created a special Congo D esk in t he mini stry o f def ence t hat co ordinated t he exp loitation.61 In Uganda, hig h-ranking government and mi litary officials created companies and proxy rebel groups to carry out exploitation on their behalf.62 The withdrawal of these co untries f rom t he D RC did n ot en d t he exp loitation, a s n ew g roups emerged to take their place. Because there are numerous rebel and militia groups operating in t he eastern DRC n ow,63 the ac tivities of only a f ew w ith regard t o t he i llegal exp loitation of natural resources are discussed below.

Collaboration between the DRC government and FDLR and PARECO

As n oted a bove, t he FD LR i s co mposed m ainly o f t he Interahamwe and fo rmer FAR s oldiers w ho f led Rwanda a fter t he 1994 g enocide. It h as b een n amed t he most powerful and harmful politico-military rebel organisation in Congo64 and is known f or co mmitting s erious h uman r ights a buses a gainst t he Congolese population and engaging in t he i llegal exploitation of n atural resources in a reas under its control. The group has changed names a number of times, starting as the Rassemblement Dmocratique pour le Rwanda (Rwanda Democratic Rally, RDR), and t hen t he Arme po ur la L ibration d u Rwanda (Army f or t he L iberation o f Rwanda, ALiR). It changed its name to FDLR in 1999 a fter the US listed ALiR as a terrorist organisation.65 One o f t he r easons w hy R wanda s ought t o t opple K abila in 1998 wa s hi s putative support to the people who allegedly carried out the Rwanda genocide. By November 1997, a llegations h ad s tarted t o em erge t hat K abila h ad begun t o negotiate with and to help the Hutu.66 These allegations proved to be true when the Interahamwe and ex-FAR f ought o n t he side o f K abila w hen wa r b roke o ut in August 1998.67 Following t he w ithdrawal o f f oreign f orces a nd t he es tablishment o f t he transitional g overnment, t he FD LR f lourished in t he K ivu p rovinces, w ith t he tolerance, collaboration and e ven ac tive complicity of cer tain FARDC officers.68 The relationship between the FDLR and FARDC is rooted in t he earlier years of the war when the two groups collaborated against the common enemy of Rwanda and its surrogate, RCD-Goma. Through mutual agreement, FARDC and the FDLR
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Source: Yamba Kantu/Institute for Environmental Security.

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have operated side by side, granting each other freedom of movement through the others t erritory, a llowing e ach o ther t o t rade w ithout interference, a nd FARDC even supplying the FDLR with arms, ammunition and uniforms and referring to their members as our brothers.69 Both FARDC and the FDLR have engaged in t he exploitation of resources in the areas they control. FARDC was formed from the integration of various rebel force e lements (a mong o thers t he R CD-Goma, ML C a nd Mai-Mai) w ith t he government force then known as the Forces dArme Congolais (Congolese Armed Forces, F AC), w hich wa s es tablished a fter L aurent K abila c ame t o p ower. Th e demobilisation of t he various rebel and mi litia g roups, such as t he CNDP, MaiMai, PARECO and PUSIC has resulted in some of their elements being integrated into the FARDC through a process called brassage.70 It is reported that elements of FARDC started exploiting minerals since it was deployed in the eastern Congo in 2006 after the election of Kabila.71 Two of the most lucrative mining sites, namely Bisie min e in W alikale t erritory a nd minin g-rich zo nes in K alehe t erritory, a re controlled b y F ARDC.72 In m ost c ases, F ARDC s oldiers min e t he min erals themselves, although they often use the civilian population to do t he digging for them.73 According to reports, elements of FARDC have seized the entire production of minerals f rom min ers in s ome lo cations, b ut m ore t ypically t hey h ave t aken a share as a form of payment while allowing the miners to keep the rest.74 In many mines under FARDC control, specific mineshafts or areas are known to belong to particular local military officials. The yield from these mineshafts is collected and sold by agents acting on behalf of FARDC officials. FARDC soldiers also routinely extort minerals and money from civilians at military checkpoints along roads, in addition to imposing taxes on miners. The FDLR has diversified its sources of income by taking control of both legal and i llicit co mmercial ac tivities in a reas i t co ntrols. Thi s hig hly r emunerative predatory economic tactic has enabled the rebel movement hierarchy to sink deep and comfortable roots in the eastern DRC. The FDLR controls cassiterite mines at Lulingu a nd L emera in S outh K ivu a nd a t N yabondo in N orth K ivu, a nd g old deposits in K ilembwe in S outh K ivu. I n addi tion, i t s ets u p r oadblocks (f or example, there are six roadblocks along the Shabunda-Bukavu road) to tax trade passing along roads under its control.75
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Map 73: Map of natural resources and conflict areas

Source: Swisspeace.

Other activities engaged in by the FDLR and its civilian associates include taxing markets in K ibua a nd N yabondo in N orth K ivu a nd in K ahumgwe, Sa nge a nd Kilembwe in S outh K ivu, p roducing a w ide ra nge o f a gricultural g oods (e ven cannabis), exp loiting t imber in P inga t erritory, p oaching hi ppopotamuses a nd elephants for meat and ivory in areas under its control along Lake Albert in Lubero and trade in charcoal produced from wood cut in Virunga National Park.76 PARECO i s a llied t o t he FD LR a nd t hus b y ext ension co llaborates w ith FARDC. However, this group is less homogeneous and thus has a less well-defined political o r e conomic a genda. I t w ould s eem t o b e in volved in minin g in a n opportunistic way rather than as a well-organised strategy.

Rwanda and the CNDP

The CNDP was established on 30 D ecember 2006 b y Brigadier-General Laurent Nkunda, who had fought with the RPA to oust the Hutu government, which had
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carried out the genocide. He then joined the RCD-Goma faction and by 1998 had become o ne o f i ts m ain o fficers.77 In 2009 h e wa s in dicted b y t he K inshasa government for war crimes and a warrant for his arrest was issued. The CNDP is an armed non-state group although Nkunda has tried to present it a s a p olitical t ool t o c lean u p C ongolese p olitics.78 The g roup h as n amed t he FDLR as its main enemy and in t his way attracted active Rwandan support.79 In fact, t here i s e vidence t hat t he Rwandan a uthorities h ave b een co mplicit in t he recruitment of soldiers (including children), have facilitated the supply of military equipment and have sent officers and units from the Forces Rwandaises de Dfense (Rwanda Defence Forces, RDF) to the DRC in support of the CNDP.80 The group relies on the civilian population to dig for minerals and takes a proportion of the production.81 It controls coltan mines at Bibatama, a wolframite mine at Bishasha and cassiterite mines throughout North Kivu. It is also involved in min eral trade through extortion and imposition of taxes along roads in Sake, Mushake, Kilolirwe and Kitchanga, and at border crossings at Bunagana on the Uganda/DRC border, and co llects sig nificant s ums f rom t he c harcoal t rade f rom V irunga N ational Park.82 The CND P c harges t rucks t ransitting K itchanga b etween US$100 a nd US$150 at illegal roadblocks, while pedestrians are charged 500 Congolese francs those who attempt to evade the tax and are caught are charged triple the usual amount.83 In J anuary 2009, t he CND P s plit w hen G eneral B osco N taganda dep osed Nkunda a s i ts le ader a nd a nnounced t he t ransformation o f t he g roup in to a political m ovement a nd in tegration o f i ts f ighters w ith F ARDC. Th e c lose relationship between the group and Kigali was clear at a press conference at which Ntaganda appeared in the company of General Kabarebe and other high-ranking Rwandan o fficials.84 During f ighting in a nd a round G oma in 2009, t he RD F captured N kunda a nd p laced him un der h ouse a rrest in R wanda, w here h e h as been ever since. The fighting that erupted in North Kivu in late 2008 and continued into 2009 between the forces of FARDC and the CNDP has been presented as an attempt by FARCD t o f orce t he CND P t o dem obilise a nd integrate into t he n ational f orce. However, t his f ighting wa s ac tually a n a ttempt b y t he K inshasa g overnment t o assert its authority over the eastern DRC. In fact, the CNDP had created a s tate within a s tate in t he areas it controlled w here it exploited natural resources and exercised military, political and administrative influence in Masisi and some parts of Rutshuru. The arrest of Nkunda has not stopped the CNDPs de facto control of North Kivu and to a lesser extent South Kivu. The above taxation on commercial
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routes continues, despite a co mmuniqu issued on 31 M arch 2010 in w hich t he lifting of all illegal barriers and taxes was announced.85

UgandaMLC collaboration
From the above it is clear that Uganda had a hand in the creation of the MLC and the mutual r elationship wa s m aintained t hroughout t he wa r. Th e f ollowing t wo examples further illustrate the support Uganda gave to the MLC. First, when the Sun City I talks, as part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, ended inconclusively in April 2002 a nd B emba wa s n amed t he t ransition p rime mini ster, P resident Museveni imm ediately co ngratulated him t o s how s upport.86 Second, w hen differences cr opped u p b etween W amba a nd hi s lieu tenants, N yamwisi a nd Tibasiima, the Ugandan authorities brought them to Kampala for peace talks and succeeded in b rokering a m erger of t he ML C a nd R CD-ML w ith B emba a s t he leader o f t he n ew g roup c alled Front d e L ibration d u C ongo (Front f or t he Liberation o f C ongo, FL C).87 This co llaboration did n ot l ast, h owever, b ecause Nyamwisi attempted to break away from the alliance to form his own group and because clashes erupted between former members of the MLC and RCD-ML over the ext raction o f g old a nd t he h arvesting o f t imber a nd co ffee in Or ientale Province when the RCD-ML attempted to challenge the MLCs monopoly over the production and trade in commodities, including diamonds, gold and coffee, in its territory.88

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL RESPONSES TO THE CONFLICT

Because state and non-state actors have generally coerced civilians to help with the illegal exp loitation o f t he D RCs n atural w ealth, i t h as r esulted in h uman r ights violations. Th ese a re, in t urn, v iolations o f in ternational a nd r egional h uman rights in struments s uch a s t he I nternational C ovenant o n Ci vil a nd P olitical Rights89 and t he A frican C harter o n H uman a nd P eoples R ights.90 In t he c ase concerning a rmed ac tivities o n t he T erritory o f C ongo ( DRC v U ganda)91 the International C ourt o f J ustice f ound, f or exa mple, t hat U ganda h ad v iolated various p rovisions o f in ternational h umanitarian l aw a nd in ternational h uman rights law instruments. 92 The court also found that the actions of various parties to t he co mplex co nflict in t he D RC h ave co ntributed t o t he imm ense s uffering faced by the Congolese population.93 The human rights violations have included
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deliberate k illing o f ci vilians, ra pe, lo oting a nd s ome ac ts o f c annibalism.94 The violations in p articular a nd t he co nflict in g eneral h ave e licited r egional a nd international responses, which are discussed next.

Regional responses
In 2004, un der t he a uspices o f t he U nited N ations a nd t he A frican U nion, t he states of the region established the International C onference on the Great L akes region (I CGLR)95 as a f orum f or r esolving a rmed co nflict, m aintaining p eace, security and stability, and laying the foundation for post-conflict reconstruction. In December 2006, in N airobi, Kenya, the states concluded the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes region,96 which, inter alia, provides for t he co nclusion o f t wo p rotocols t hat a re v ery g ermane t o t his di scussion, namely the Protocol on Non-aggression and Mutual Defence in t he Great Lakes region (a rticle 5), 97 and t he P rotocol a gainst t he Il legal E xploitation o f N atural Resources (a rticle 9). 98 The P rotocol o n N on-aggression a nd M utual D efence declares t hat ac ts o f a ggression in clude the p rovision o f a ny s upport t o a rmed groups which might carry out hostile acts against a member state (article 3(h)), while it defines armed groups as any armed group that does not belong to, or is not officially incorporated into, the defence and security forces of member states (article 3(4)). Under the protocol, member states propose several measures to deal with t he a rmed g roups in cluding n ot t o g ive a ny h elp, dir ectly o r in directly, actively o r p assively, t o a rmed g roups o perating a gainst a ny m ember s tate; t o apprehend and disarm members of armed groups who use or attempt to use their territories to prepare or mount armed attacks and/or conduct subversive activities against o ther s tates; t o in tercept a nd di sarm m embers o f a rmed g roups f leeing across t heir co mmon b orders, a nd t o acco rd e ach o ther m utual a ssistance in prosecuting armed groups throughout the Great Lakes region (article 8). The P rotocol a gainst Il legal E xploitation o f N atural R esources a ims a t promoting a nd s trengthening m echanisms t o p revent, c urb a nd eradic ate t he illegal exploitation of natural resources; intensifying and revitalising cooperation among member states to achieve more efficient and sustainable measures against the i llegal exp loitation o f n atural r esources, a nd p romoting p olicies a nd procedures a gainst t he i llegal exp loitation o f n atural r esources (a rticle 2). Th e protocol declares that the illegal exploitation of natural resources is a violation of the rights of member states to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources, and commits member states to end impunity for persons responsible for exploiting
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natural r esources i llegally. Th e p rotocol a lso c alls u pon e very m ember s tate t o ensure that all acts of illegal exploitation of natural resources are offences under its criminal law. Finally, the protocol calls on each member state to impose effective and deterrent sanctions commensurate with the offence of illegal exploitation of natural r esources co mmitted, in cluding im prisonment f or in dividual p ersons convicted of such offences. The I CGLR h as dra wn u p a n ac tion p rogramme f or t he di sarmament a nd repatriation o f a ll a rmed g roups in t he e astern D RC.99 The f our iden tified categories of groups are:
I I

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Genocidal forces of the FDLR operating from the DRC territory The LR A, P eoples R edemption A rmy, A llied D emocratic F orces a nd t he National Army for the Liberation of Uganda Any group or militia that threatens the security and stability of the region, and Local defence militias opposed to central authority and armed dissident groups

Little is known about the implementation of this programme. The AU, t hrough i ts P eace a nd S ecurity C ouncil, h as co mmitted i tself t o a forceful disarmament of the negative forces in t he eastern DRC. At its Libreville meeting in January 2005, it expressed serious concerns over the security situation in t he e astern D RC, es pecially t he p resence o f a rmed n egative f orces.100 It accordingly called for the forceful disarmament of the ex-FAR, the Interahamwe and other armed groups. Between February and March 2005, it sent a preliminary evaluation t eam t o m ake r ecommendations o n h ow t he di sarmament w ould b e carried out. This was followed in April 2005 by a meeting of the AU and military experts f rom B urundi, R wanda a nd U ganda w here co nsensus wa s r eached regarding p olitical a nd mi litary s upport a s w ell a s s ources o f s upplies t o t hese negative forces. This meeting also discussed the modalities of implementing the Peace a nd S ecurity C ouncil de cision r eached a t t he L ibreville m eeting o n forcefully disarming the negative forces, including a possible timeline and size and mandate of the envisaged African force to undertake the task. As a r esult o f t he f ighting t hat er upted in t he e astern D RC l ate in 2008, a n extraordinary r egional s ummit o f t he I CGLR wa s h eld in K enya, a t w hich t he former Tanzanian p resident, B enjamin Mkapa (t he co-faci litator o f t he AU a nd ICGLR), a nd G eneral O lusegun O basanjo (t he S pecial En voy o f t he S ecretary General for the Great Lakes region) were tasked with mediating between the DRC government and the CNDP. The mediation efforts in Nairobi and Goma resulted
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in the conclusion of the peace agreement between the government and the CNDP on 23 March 2009. The AUs Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy and Decision recognises t hat n atural r esource g overnance lies a t t he n exus o f p eace, s ecurity, stability and s ustainable de velopment. In addition, t he AU-New Partnership for Africas Development (NEPAD) peace and security agenda, which was developed in 2003, iden tified t he n eed t o g enerate s tandards f or a pplication in t he exploitation and management of Africas natural resources in situations of conflict, as one of the continents eight peace and security priorities.101 As a result, apropos the DRC, t he Policy and D ecision, inter alia, called on t he DRC government to regulate a rtisanal minin g t o im prove l abour co nditions, p revent h uman r ights violations and ensure that artisanal mining contributes to poverty reduction and sustainable development.102

International responses
United Nations Security Council, MONUC and sanctions
The United Nations S ecurity C ouncil (UNSC) h as declared that the situation in the eastern DRC in p articular and the DRC in g eneral constitutes a t hreat to the maintenance o f in ternational p eace a nd s ecurity, a nd a s a r esult h as p assed numerous r esolutions t o de al w ith t he si tuation. I n addi tion, t he C ouncil h as recognised the linkages between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in such resources and the proliferation of and trafficking in arms as factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Thus, in Resolution 1493 (2003), i t im posed a n a rms em bargo o n a ll f oreign a nd C ongolese a rmed groups and militias operating in the territories of North and South Kivu and Ituri, and o n g roups n ot p arties t o t he G lobal a nd A ll I nclusive A greement o n t he Transition in t he D RC.103 It f ollowed t his b y es tablishing a s anctions co mmittee and a g roup o f exp erts t o m onitor t he implementation o f t he a rms em bargo in Resolution 1533 (2004). 104 In Resolution 1596 (2005), t he UNSC further imposed travel restrictions and a freeze on the assets of individuals and entities violating the arms embargo105 and, in Resolution 1649 (2005), it extended the applicability of the travel and financial restrictions to political and military leaders of foreign armed groups o perating in t he D RC a nd C ongolese mi litias r eceiving s upport f rom abroad t hat co ntinue t o im pede t he p articipation o f t heir co mbatants in t he disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes.
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The Council, in R esolution 1807 (2008), ext ended the asset freeze and travel ban t o in dividuals o perating in t he D RC a nd co mmitting s erious v iolations o f international law involving the targeting of women in situations of armed conflict, including k illing a nd m aiming, s exual v iolence, a bduction a nd f orced displacement.106 In addition, it sanctioned individuals obstructing the access to or the di stribution o f h umanitarian a ssistance in t he e astern D RC, a s w ell a s individuals o r en tities s upporting t he i llegal a rmed g roups in t he e astern D RC through the illicit trade in natural resources.107 While extending the mandate of the Mission des Nations Unies en R publique Dmocratique du Congo (MONUC), the Group o f E xperts a nd t he Sa nctions C ommittee, t he C ouncil a lso r enewed t he sanctions listed in various resolutions.108 Sanctions in t he f orm o f t ravel b ans a nd a sset f reezes a s en visaged in, f or example, Resolution 1857 (2008) have been imposed on, among others, four FDLR leaders, n amely C allixte Mb arushimana, S tanislas N zeyimana, P acifique Ntawunguka and Lopold Mujyambere. Although the FDLR military commander, Major-General Sylvestre Mudacumura, was placed on the sanctions list in 2005, this remains an essentially symbolic gesture because, like most of the sanctioned persons, he lives in K ivu province and has no bank account or any possibility of travel.109 Although Mission d es N ations U nies en R publique D mocratique d u C ongo (MONUC) (n ow c alled Mission d e l Organisation d es N ations U nies p our l a Stabilisation en R publique Dmocratique du Congo [ MONUSCO]) is the biggest UN p eacekeeping mission in t he world, w ith a C hapter VII m andate, it has not lived u p t o exp ectations f or a n umber o f r easons. Fir st, b oth t he C ongolese government and general population view the force with suspicion as a result of the history of the UN in t he Congo. According to Prunier, the suspicion stems from, among o thers, t he r ole p layed b y t he UN in L umumbas m urder in t he e arly 1960s.110 Second, troop numbers are small compared to the area that it is supposed to police. Third, when fighting has broken out between the different militias/rebel groups and/or between the militias/rebel groups and FARDC, as happened in 2004 in Bukavu between Nkundas troops and the FDLR, MONUC troops seemed to be demoralised and rudderless.111 This is attributed to a l ack of skills, resources and military e quipment s uited t o co unterinsurgency o perations.112 Finally, w hile t he UNSC h as dir ected i t t o w ork h and in h and w ith FARDC in t he p rotection o f civilians a nd in c arrying o ut D DR,113 the co llaboration h as b een f raught w ith difficulties, as FARDC violates human rights, collaborates with rebel/militias (that
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MONUSCO i s s upposed t o dem obilise) a nd en gages in i llegal exp loitation o f natural resources and illicit trade in those resources.114 UNSC R esolution 1925 (2010) 115 is t he l atest t o c hange t he m andate o f MONUC a nd a lso r enames M ONUC t he U nited N ations Or ganisation Stabilisation M ission in t he D RC (M ONUSCO). I n t he r esolution t he C ouncil authorises M ONUSCO t o u se a ll n ecessary m eans t o c arry o ut i ts p rotection mandate, in cluding p rotection o f ci vilians, h umanitarian p ersonnel a nd h uman rights def enders un der immin ent t hreat o f p hysical v iolence, a s w ell a s t he protection o f t he UN p ersonnel, faci lities, in stallations a nd e quipment. Th e mission must a lso support government ef forts to f ight impunity and ensure t he protection o f ci vilians a gainst v iolations o f in ternational h uman r ights a nd humanitarian law, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence. During 2008,M ONUC, in co llaboration w ith F ARDC, p lanned a nd b egan implementing a n o peration in N orth a nd S outh K ivu c alled Kimia t hat wa s intended to increase military pressure on the FDLR. However, the operation was called off after the resumption of fighting between FARDC and CNDP in August 2008. I n 2009, M ONUC a nd FARDC l aunched Operation K imia II against t he FDLR and other Congolese groups that still resisted integration of their forces into FARDC. I n t he o peration M ONUC p rovided ra tions, f uel s upplies, m edical evacuation o f w ounded p ersonnel a nd s upporting a ir a nd a rtillery f ire u pon request b y FARDC.116 During t he o peration, w hich en ded in D ecember 2009, a total o f 1 564 FD LR co mbatants, in cluding 42 c hildren a nd 2 187 dep endants, joined the disarmament, demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRR) process. The strength of the FDLR is also estimated to have been reduced by half due t o t his o peration.117 Since J anuary 2010, F ARDC a nd M ONUSCO h ave conducted joint planned operations known as Amani Leo, which targeted FDLR strongholds. W hat t hese o perations h ave s hown i s t hat mi litary p ressure i s essential t o b reak do wn FD LRs co mmand a nd s upport s tructures, c ut o ff t he groups sources of revenue and encourage a collapse in morale. In all, efforts by the FARDC and MONUSCO to demobilise and integrate Congolese armed non-state groups have resulted in the demobilisation of nearly 1 000 combatants during the first quarter of 2010.118 In m y o pinion, h owever, t he s uggested w ithdrawal o f 2 000 UN mi litary personnel b y 30 J une 2010 from a reas w here t he si tuation p ermits h as s ent a wrong sig nal in a s fa r a s co nfronting t he m enace o f t he FD LR a nd o ther rebel/militia g roups i s co ncerned.119 What i s r equired i s f or M ONUSCO t o concentrate its forces in the eastern DRC to once-and-for-all deal with and end the phenomenon of rebel and militia groups in the region.
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The Kimberley Process

The K imberley P rocess C ertification S cheme f or R ough Di amonds120 was established to f ind a s olution to t he international problem of conflict di amonds that are used to finance armed conflicts and the activities of rebel movements that aim t o un dermine o r o verthrow leg itimate g overnments. U nder t he s cheme, conflict di amonds a re def ined a s rough di amonds u sed by rebel m ovements or their a llies t o f inance co nflict a imed a t un dermining leg itimate g overnments (section I). Th e K imberley P rocess es tablishes a n in ternational cer tification scheme for rough diamonds based on national laws and practices. Each participant is, inter a lia, called o n t o es tablish a sys tem o f in ternal co ntrols desig ned t o eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds imported into and exported from its territory (section IV). The DRC is a m ember of the Kimberley Process and has been involved since the negotiations stage.121 However, the country has found it difficult to implement the K imberley P rocess r equirements b ecause, f irst, t he g overnment do es n ot control the trade in di amonds from rebel-held areas in t he eastern DRC; second, the government itself faces enormous challenges in ending endemic corruption,122 third, even when the government has deployed its forces in the eastern DRC, they have en gaged in t he sm uggling o f di amonds j ust li ke t he n umerous r ebel a nd militia groups who pervade the region.

The International Criminal Court

The D RC sig ned t he R ome S tatute o n 8 S eptember 2000 a nd dep osited i ts ratification o n 11 A pril 2002. I n July 2003, t he Of fice o f t he P rosecutor s tarted investigating cr imes w ithin t he j urisdiction o f t he I CC t hat w ere b eing committed in t he Ituri region. In March 2004, t he DRC government de cided to refer t he D RC si tuation t o t he I CC a nd a sked t he P rosecutor t o investigate in order to determine if o ne or more p ersons should b e charged w ith such cr imes (falling within the jurisdiction of the Court that may have been committed).123 As a result of the Prosecutors investigations, arrest warrants were issued for Thomas Lubanga, M athieu N gudjolo C hui, G ermaine K atanga a nd B osco N taganda. Lubanga, Chui and Katanga were arrested and transferred to the ICC jurisdiction, but N taganda i s s till a t l arge. Th e P rosecutor h as n ow s et hi s sig hts o n K ivu provinces, where hopefully new indictments and warrants of arrest will be issued soon.124
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On 28 May 2008, Jean-Pierre Bemba was arrested in Belgium on four counts of war cr imes a nd t wo o f cr imes a gainst h umanity.125 According t o t he wa rrant o f arrest issued by the ICC, Bemba and his MLC had intervened in the conflict in the CAR in 20022003 a nd pursued a p lan o f t errorising a nd b rutalising inn ocent civilians, in p articular d uring a c ampaign o f m ass ra pes a nd lo oting.126 It i s unfortunate that the ICC has indicted Bemba as a result of its investigations into events in the CAR and not on any crimes he may have committed during the long war in t he DRC. Also, there are no charges relating to the plunder of Congolese natural r esources, w hich t he ML C c arried o ut d uring i ts o ccupation o f l arge swathes of territory in Orientale and Equator provinces. The failure to indict Bemba on crimes he may have committed during the DRC war has not gone unnoticed and the ICC has been criticised for allowing the rebel leader to get away too lightly, particularly in v iew of the prosecution of Thomas Lubanga w ith cr imes r elating t o r ecruitment o f c hildren.127 This s eeming contradiction highlights the problem the ICC has experienced in t he DRC, as in other countries, of not having t he c apacity to arrest t he p eople for w hom arrest warrants have been issued. The LRAs Joseph Kony and his top commanders, for whom wa rrants w ere i ssued in 2005, a re s till a t l arge, w hile t hat i ssued a gainst Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir is unlikely to be executed as long as he remains in power. This clearly shows that the ICC will face great difficulty in dealing with the numerous rebel and militia groups in the eastern DRC. It may indict rebel and militia leaders (for example Ntaganda), but it will be next-to-impossible to take the indicted persons into custody without the support of the relevant state.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The co untries ini tially in volved in t he D RC co nflict, p articularly U ganda a nd Rwanda, had hoped to find Laurent Kabila and the AFDL a useful cover for their strategic objective of creating a buffer economic and political security zone in the eastern C ongo. H owever, K abila di sappointed t hem b y fa iling t o s erve t heir interests. As a result, the two countries started a policy of creating and supporting rebel g roups t o un seat t he K inshasa g overnment. Th e g roups s ubsequently disintegrated in to s plinter g roups a nd w ere n ot h elpful a t a ll a s t hey s tarted fighting among themselves and also gave raise to new movements that sprung up to challenge the foreign-created groups. This happened all over the eastern DRC. Although some of the rebel and militia groups, such as RCD-Goma, RCD-ML and RCD-Nationale, ce ased t o exi st w hen t hey j oined t he t ransitional g overnment,
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others such as the Mai-Mai, continue to sow terror in the eastern DRC. In o rder t o s ustain t heir ac tivities, t he r ebel a nd mi litia g roups s tarted exploiting t he r ich n atural r esources in t he a reas t hey c ame t o co ntrol. Thi s practice of exploiting t he DRCs natural resources to support t he war ef fort was started by the AFDL, when Kabila began signing mining concessions with private investors from all over the world to finance the war against Mobutu even before he came t o p ower. Th us K abila s et a p recedent t hat wa s s ubsequently f ollowed b y numerous rebel and militia groups in the DRC. The question remains, what should be done about the various rebel and militia groups t hat continue to exploit t he f luid situation to p erpetuate t heir existence? My recommendation is that the strategy to defeat these groups should be based on short- and long-term timelines. In the short term, the capacity of the MONUSCO and FARDC f orces s hould b e im proved t o en able t hem t o def eat t hese g roups militarily. Experience has shown that military pressure could lead to the demise of these rebel and militia groups in the eastern DRC. The military operations against the FDLR (Operation Kimia II and Operation Amani Leo), for example, resulted in the rebel elements abandoning their bases, pulling out of their positions in villages and losing access to markets, communication routes and some mining areas. Thus, as the results of these operations exemplify, military operations against the rebel and militia groups should be intensified and sustained. In the long run, however, there is a need to rebuild the state institutions of the DRC s o t hat t hey b ecome c apable o f m aintaining l aw a nd o rder. A ny f oreign intervention is simply a temporary measure that does not address the basic causes of the conflict and so cannot redress the situation on a permanent basis. The rebel and mi litia g roups h ave b een f ishing in t roubled wa ters sim ply b ecause t he Congolese state is not strong in the east. In this regard, Reyntjens has, for example, observed that in t he eastern DRC, possession of a gun i s a sufficient excuse128 for the imposition of taxes by the rebels and militias. Security sector reforms are thus needed t o b uild t he c apacity o f t he C ongolese N ational P olice a nd FARDC t o ensure the maintenance of law and order. Furthermore, the countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC need to normalise t heir r elations s o t hat t hey s top s upporting a nd co unter-supporting rebel and militia groups in each others territories. From the above, it is clear that the majority of t he rebel and mi litia g roups in t he e astern DRC have lin ks with other states in t he region. The establishment of regional frameworks such as the ICGLR a nd its va rious p rotocols on n onaggression a nd combating illegal exploitation o f n atural r esources o f t he r egion w ill g o a lo ng wa y t owards
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promoting peace and security in the Great Lakes region and the elimination of the negative rebel and militia group elements. The normalisation of relations among the states of the region will eliminate suspicion(s) and promote cooperation and joint ac tion t o e liminate t hese g roups a nd p romote p eace. Thi s i s in deed w hat happened in t he c ase of t he j oint ac tion t aken by t he DRC and Rwanda, w hich resulted in t he a rrest o f N kunda a nd t he in tegration o f m ost o f hi s f orce in to FARDC. Clearly, collaboration among the states of the region would be a powerful weapon for eliminating once-and-for-all the various rebel and militia groups that continue to sow unrest in the eastern DRC.

NOTES
1 The D emocratic R epublic o f C ongo h as c hanged n ames a n umber o f t imes sin ce 1885: Congo F ree S tate (18851908); B elgian C ongo (19081960); R epublic o f t he C ongo Lopoldville (19601964); D emocratic Republic of the Congo L opoldville (19641966); Democratic Republic of the Congo Kinshasa (19661971); Republic of Zaire (19711997); and, since 1997, the Democratic Republic of Congo. Throughout this chapter I use the latter name. G N zongola-Ntalaja, The C ongo f rom L opold t o K abila: a p eoples h istory, L ondon: Z ed Books, 2002, 235. F Reyntjens, The privatisation and criminalisation of public space in t he geopolitics of the Great Lakes region, The Journal of Modern African Studies 43(4) (2005), 598607, 588. Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Lopold to Kabila, 1. K C D unn, Imagining the Congo: the international relations of identity, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 22. Ibid. H W F rench, A continent for the taking: the tragedy and hope of Africa, New York: Vintage Books, 2005, 52. Dunn, Imagining the Congo, 22. Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Lopold to Kabila, 26. R Anstey, King Lopolds legacy: the Congo under Belgian rule, 19081960, London: Oxford University Press for Institute of Race Relations, 1966, 261. Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Lopold to Kabila, 52. Dunn, Imagining the Congo, 62. R Dowden, Africa: Altered states, ordinary miracles, London: Portobello Books, 2008, 366. Dunn, Imagining the Congo, 63. Ibid. M van Leeuwen, Imagining the Great Lakes region: discourses and practices of civil society regional approaches for peace-building in Rwanda, Burundi and DR Congo, The Journal of Modern African Studies 46(3) (2008), 393425, 401. French, A c ontinent f or t he t aking, 54; M M cNulty, Th e co llapse o f Z are: im plosion, revolution o r ext ernal a ggression? The J ournal o f M odern A frican S tudies 37(1) (1999), 5382, 59.
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18 Howard A delman a nd G ovind C R ao, Th e Z airian wa r a nd r efugee cr isis, 19961997: creating a culture of conflict prevention, in Howard Adelman and Govind C Rao (eds), War and p eace i n Z aire/Congo: a nalysing a nd e valuating i ntervention 19961997, T renton: Africa World Press, 2004, 129, 4. 19 It wa s co mposed o f f our g roups, n amely t he Parti de la R volution P opulaire (Peoples Revolutionary Party, PRP), which was founded in 1968 b y Laurent Kabila; Conseil National de Rsistance pour la Dmocratie (National Resistance Council for Democracy, CNRD), le d by Andre Kisasu Ngandu with a Lumumbist association; Mouvement Rvolutionnaire pour la Libration d u Z are (Revolutionary Movement f or t he L iberation o f Z aire, MRLZ), le d b y Masasu N indanga; a nd Alliance D mocratique d es P euples (Democratic P eoples A lliance, ADP), le d b y D eogratias B ugera w ith C ongolese Tutsi a ssociates. K abila wa s n amed t he spokesperson of the group, Bugera secretary-general and Ngandu army commander. Ngandu was assassinated in January 1997. 20 J-P C hrtien, The G reat L akes o f A frica: tw o t housand y ears o f h istory, N ew York: Z one Books, 2003, 344. 21 G N zongola-Ntalaja, Th e r ole o f in tellectual in t he s truggle f or dem ocracy, p eace a nd reconstruction in Africa, Africa Journal of Political Science 2(2) (1997), 114, 2. 22 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Lopold to Kabila, 224. 23 International Cr isis G roup (I CG), D emocratic R epublic o f C ongo: a n a nalysis o f t he agreement and prospects for peace, Africa Report 5, Brussels, 20 August 1999, 1. 24 M Ward, Rebels and militias in resource conflict in e astern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mimeograph, on file with author, 2010. 25 Ibid. 26 Apropos Uganda, the government of Kabila and that of Museveni signed a memorandum of understanding for the Uganda army (in effect comprising the Uganda Peoples Defence Force and the Congolese Armed Forces) to conduct joint operations against Ugandan rebel groups operating in the DRC. In fact, at the start of the Second Congo War in August 1998, Ugandan soldiers were stationed on the DRC side of the slopes of Mount Rwenzori. 27 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Lopold to Kabila, 227. 28 G P runier, From gen ocide t o c ontinental w ar: t he Congolese c onflict a nd t he cr isis o f contemporary Africa, London: Hurst, 2009, 137. 29 Global Witness, Same old story: a b ackground study on natural resources in the DRC, June 2004, 5, h ttp://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/118/en/same_old_story (accessed 30 July 2010). 30 Ibid, 6. 31 A Hochschild, King Lopolds ghost: a story of greed, terror and heroism in colonial Africa, London: Macmillan, 1998, 165. 32 Ibid, 164. 33 Global Witness, Same old story, 6. 34 R L emarchand, Political a wakening i n t he B elgian C ongo, L os A ngeles: U niversity o f California Press, 1964, 234. 35 For a f ull di scussion o n t his s ee G N zongola-Ntalaja, The C ongo f rom L opold t o K abila, 128131. 36 For a full discussion see ibid, 121135.
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Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Lopold to Kabila, 135. Ibid, 147; Global Witness, Same old story, 8. Global Witness, Same old story, 8. K Vlassenroot and Hans Romkema, The emergence of a n ew order? Resources and war in eastern Congo, http://www.jha.ac/articles/a111.htm (accessed 11 June 2010). International Crisis Group (ICG), Congo crisis: military intervention in Ituri, Africa Report 64, Nairobi, 13 June 2003, 4. Peace agreement between the government and the CNDP, Goma, 23 March 2009. Ward, Rebels and militias in resource conflict. K P A puuli, Th e im plications o f t he a rrest o f J ean-Pierre B emba b y t he I nternational Criminal Court, East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 14(2) (2008), 247265, 249. R Herbert, De facto partition in t he Congo, South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2000/1, Pretoria: GCIS, 2000, 277283, 280. Prunier, From gen ocide t o c ontinental w ar, 205; A puuli, Th e im plications o f t he a rrest o f Jean-Pierre Bemba, 250. Apuuli, The implications of the arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba, 250. K P Apuuli, The politics of conflict resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): the I nter-Congolese Di alogue p rocess, African J ournal on C onflict R esolution 4(1) (2004), 6584, 75. Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC, Final report (S/2003/1027), 2002, 36, 71. International Cr isis G roup (I CG), Congo a t w ar: a b riefing o n t he i nternal a nd ext ernal players in the Central African conflict, Report 2, Brussels, 17 November 1998, 4. Ibid. UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Final report (S/2008/43), 13 February 2008. K P A puuli, Th e I CC a rrest wa rrants f or t he L ords R esistance A rmy le aders a nd p eace prospects for northern Uganda, Journal of International Criminal Justice 4(3), 2006, 179187, 186. UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Interim report, 29 April 2010, 6. (C onfidential on file with author.) Global Witness, Faced w ith a g un, w hat c an y ou d o? War and t he militarisation o f mining in eastern Congo, July 2009, 4, h ttp://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/786/ en/global_ witness_report_faced_with_a_gun_what_can_yo (accessed 15 May 2010). International Cr isis G roup (I CG), Congo: a c omprehensive s trategy t o d isarm t he FD LR, Africa Report 151, Nairobi/Brussels, 9 July 2009, 17. UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Interim report, 7. Global Witness, Same old story, 4. Ibid, 6. For an overview of the locations of these resources, see Global Witness, Same old story. M Meredith, The state of Africa: a history of fifty years of independence, London: Free Press, 2005, 540. S ee a lso UN S ecurity C ouncil, P anel o f E xperts o n t he Il legal E xploitation o f Natural R esources a nd O ther F orms o f Wealth o f t he D RC, R eport (S/2000/796), 31 J uly 2000, paragraph 126; UN S ecurity C ouncil, Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC, UN Security Council, Addendum to the report (S/2001/1072), 13 November 2001; and UN Security Council, Panel of Experts
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68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

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on t he Il legal E xploitation o f Natural R esources a nd O ther Forms o f Wealth o f t he D RC, Final report (S/2002/1146), 16 October 2002. Ibid. With t he es tablishment o f t he t ransitional g overnment in 2003, m any o f t he g roups t hen operating in the eastern DRC became part of the government. I concentrate on the current groups as they are the main focus of this chapter. ICG, Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, 1. Ibid, 2. ICG, Democratic Republic of Congo, 19. See for example Prunier, From genocide to continental w ar, 206, w ho n otes t hat in K indu, many of the 5 000-strong Congolese garrison was actually made up of Rwandese ex-FAR and Interahamwe, who w ere f iercely lo yal b ecause t hey co uld s ee n o h ope f or t heir si tuation unless Kabila won. ICG, Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, 24. Global Witness, Faced with a gun, what can you do?, 43. A p rocess t hrough w hich p reviously h ostile a rmed g roups a re in tegrated a nd t rained t o become part of a unified national army. Global Witness, Faced with a gun, what can you do?, 26. UN Group of Experts on the DRC re-established pursuant to Resolution 1857, Final report (S/2008/773), 2008, 36; Global Witness, Faced with a gun, what can you do?, 27. Global Witness, Faced with a gun, what can you do?, 26. Ibid, 27. UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Final report, 13 February 2008. Ibid, 11. Prunier, From genocide to continental war, 322. Ibid, 323. ICG, Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, 2. UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Final report (S/2008/773), 12 December 2008, 15. Global Witness, Faced with a gun, what can you do?, 48. Ibid, 49; UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Interim report, 7. UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Interim report, 7. ICG, Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, 4. UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Interim report, 7. Apuuli, The politics of conflict resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 76. Apuuli, The implications of the arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba, 251. Global Witness, Same old story, 13, 18. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16) a t 52, UN D oc A/6316 (1966); 99 UNT S 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967), ado pted o n 16 December 1966 a nd entered into force on 23 M arch 1976, h ttp://www.umn.edu/humanrts/ insfree/b3ccpr.htm (accessed 20 J uly 2010). S ee especially article 6(1): E very human b eing has a right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life; Article 7: N o one shall b e subjected to torture, or to cr uel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ... Organisation o f A frican U nity, A frican C harter o n H uman a nd P eoples R ights (B anjul Charter), OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982), ado pted on 27 June 1981 and
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entered in to f orce o n 21 O ctober 1986, h ttp://www.hrcr.org/docs/Banjul/afrhr.html, (accessed 19 July 2010). See especially article 4: Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this life; article 5: Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exp loitation a nd deg radation o f m an, p articularly s lavery, s lave t rade, t orture, cr uel, inhuman o r deg rading p unishment a nd t reatment, s hall b e p rohibited; a rticle 21 (1): A ll people shall be free to dispose of their wealth and natural resources ... 91 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Case concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo ( Democratic R epublic o f t he C ongo v U ganda), J udgment o f 19 D ecember 2005, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf (accessed 19 July 2010). 92 Ibid, paragraph 219. 93 Ibid, paragraph 221. 94 Apuuli, The implications of the arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba, 258. 95 The member states are Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Sudan, Uganda and Zambia. 96 International Conference on the Great Lakes region (ICGLR), Pact on Peace, Stability and Development in t he G reat L akes r egion, ado pted o n 15 D ecember 2006 b y t he H eads o f State a nd G overnment o f t he I CGLR a nd en tered in to f orce o n 21 J une 2008, http://www.icglr.org/icglr-pacte.php (accessed 19 July 2010). 97 International Conference on the Great Lakes region (ICGLR), Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes region, Adopted at the second summit of the ICGLR on 30 N ovember 2006, h ttp://www.icglr.org/key-documents/peace-security/Protocol%20on %20Non-aggression%20and%20Mutual%20Defence%20in%20the%20Great%20Lakes%20 Region.pdf (accessed 19 July 2010). 98 International C onference o n t he G reat L akes r egion (I CGLR), P rotocol a gainst t he Il legal Exploitation o f N atural R esources, ado pted a t t he s econd s ummit o f t he I CGLR o n 30 November 2006, h ttp://www.icglr.org/key-documents/democracy-good-gov/Protocol%20 against%20the%20Illegal%20Exploitation%20of%20Natural%20Resources.pdf (acces sed 19 July 2010). 99 International C onference o n t he G reat L akes r egion (I CGLR), R egional P rogramme o f Action f or P eace a nd S ecurity: Di sarmament a nd R epatriation o f a ll A rmed G roups in Eastern D RC, 21 S eptember 2006, h ttp://www.icglr.org/key-documents/peace-security/ Regional%20Programme%20of%20Action%20for%20Peace%20and%20Security.pdf (accessed 19 July 2010). 100 African Union, 23rd meeting of the Peace and Security Council, Libreville, 10 January 2005 (PSC/AHG/COMM [XXIII]). 101 Priority 7 s tates: Generating minim um s tandards f or a pplication in t he exp loitation a nd management of Africas resources (including non-renewable resources) in a reas affected by conflict. 102 Pax A frica, F rom t he g round u p: n atural r esource g overnance f or r econstruction a nd sustainable de velopment, P aper p resented a t t he A U S takeholders W orkshop o n Implementation o f t he A U P olicy o n P ost-Conflict R econstruction a nd D evelopment in Africa, Lusaka, Zambia, 1719 July 2007.

103 United N ations S ecurity C ouncil (UNSC), R esolution 1493 (S/RES/1493 [2003]), 28 J uly 2003, paragraph 20. 104 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 1533 (S/RES/1533 [2004]), 12 M arch 2004, paragraph 10. 105 United N ations S ecurity C ouncil (UNSC), R esolution 1596 (S/RES/1596 [2005]), 3 M ay 2005, paragraphs 13 and 15. 106 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 1807 (S/RES/1807 [2008]), 31 M arch 2008, paragraph 13. 107 United N ations S ecurity C ouncil (UNSC), R esolution 1857 (S/RES/1857 [2008]), 22 December 2008, paragraph 4. 108 See United Nations Security Council (UNSC), R esolutions 1698 (2006); 1771 (2007); 1799 (2008); 1856 (2008) and 1896 (2009). 109 ICG, Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, 10. 110 Prunier, From genocide to continental war, 246. 111 Ibid, 298. 112 ICG, Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, 25. 113 UNSC, Resolution 1856 (S/RES/1856 [2008[), 22 D ecember 2008. The resolution mandates MONUC to use its monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision of support to i llegal a rmed g roups t hat der ive in come f rom t he i llicit t rade in n atural r esources. However, the resolution does not cover FARDC. 114 See, generally, Global Witness, Faced with a gun, what can you do? 115 UNSC, Resolution 1925 (S/RES/1925 [2010]), 28 May 2010. 116 ICG, Congo: a comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR, 10. 117 UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Interim report. 118 Ibid, 6. 119 Ibid. 120 Kimberley P rocess C ertification S cheme f or R ough Di amonds, ado pted a t a mini sterial meeting in Interlaken on 5 November 2002, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (accessed 19 July 2010). 121 Global Witness, Same old story, 28. 122 Ibid. 123 ICC, P rosecutor r eceives r eferral o f t he si tuation in t he D RC, Th e H ague, 19 A pril 2004, (ICC-OTP-20040419-50-En), h ttp://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=19&1=en.html (accessed 15 May 2010). 124 Ward, Rebels and militias in resource conflict. 125 Apuuli, The implications of the arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba, 248. 126 Ibid. 127 Ward, Rebels and militias in resource conflict. 128 Reyntjens, The privatisation and criminalisation of public space, 597.

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Militias, pirates and oil in the Niger Delta

Ibaba Samuel Ibaba and Augustine Ikelegbe

INTRODUCTION
Although t he N iger D elta p roduces t he b ulk o f N igerias o il a nd ga s w ealth, i t remains o ne o f t he le ast-developed p arts o f t he co untry. Thi s p aradox h as triggered a conflict that has lingered on for five decades. This conflict has recently been m anifested t hrough h uge mi litarisation o f t he r egion, mi litia in surgency, hostilities between youth militias and the Nigerian military, militia attacks on the oil industry and consequent huge disruptions, the theft of oil by syndicates, and militias and intra- and inter-ethnic, community and militia conflicts. Since the late 1990s, mi litia g roups such as t he Niger D elta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement f or t he E mancipation o f t he N iger D elta (MEND), a nd Niger D elta Peoples S alvation F ront (NDPSF) h ave b een co nducting h ostilities a gainst t he military and transnational oil companies. Fundamentally, g rievances a gainst de velopment n eglect, a lienation f rom t he nations oil wealth, and oil-based environmental degradation are at the root of this militancy,1 but greed and the resultant commercialisation of violence have led to what Ik elegbe2 calls deviant in surgent mi litias. S pecifically, t he em ergence o f diverse mi litia ac tivities (un derpinned b y o pportunism a nd cr ime w hich disconnect s uch ac tivities f rom t he in surgency) h as r esulted in t he b randing o f militias as criminals. More co nfusing a re in terconnections among mi litias,
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pirates, cults, oil theft syndicates, syndicates that kidnap for ransom, armed gangs, thugs and bouncers. The interconnections denote a confused agenda and activities that tend towards self-destruction. In addition, there is an increasing presence of militias in p olitics a nd t hey a re em erging a s ps eudo-governments in r ural communities. These matters, among others, raise pertinent questions:
I I I I

I I

What i s t he n ature a nd es sence o f mi litia g roups in t he N iger D elta? Can militias be separated from pirates? What are the critical factors and conditions that sustain militia groups? What a re t he r oles o f s tate a nd n on-state ac tors in t he em ergence o f mi litia groups? What is the impact of militia activities on the national economy and security? How have the state and transnational oil companies responded to the conflict?

In this chapter, we attempt to answer these questions and give a systematic analysis of the phenomenon of militias and pirates in the Niger Delta. The chapter begins with an introduction that raises questions to be addressed. It then reviews the literature on resources and conflict, particularly how the greed and grievance thesis applies to the Niger Delta; maps the violence and crises in the region and the activities and engagements of the militias with the Nigerian state and the transnational oil companies, and examines the factors and developments that un derlie t he em ergence o f t he mi litia p henomenon. Th e c hapter a lso examines the diverse actors that are engaged in the conflict other than the militias, how t he mi litias in terface w ith p olitics a nd g overnance, t he im pact o f mi litia activities, mi litia a nd mi litary en gagements, a nd t he v iolent co nflicts o n t he economy a nd human s ecurity. Furthermore, i t interrogates t he r esponses o f t he Nigerian s tate, t he t ransnational o il co mpanies, r egional o rganisations a nd t he international co mmunity to t he co nflict. The c hapter co ncludes with the examination o f c urrent ef forts a imed a t r esolving t he co nflict a nd ra ises i ssues needing further consideration.

Resources and conflict: the dilemma between greed and grievance

The current literature locates the causes of violence in the Niger Delta in the greed and grievance perspectives of Collier and Hoeffler.3 Although grievances resulting
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from t he s ocioeconomic a nd p olitical m arginalisation o f t he min ority et hnic groups in the Niger Delta by the major ethnic groups in Nigeria are seen to be the fundamental c auses o f t he co nflict,4 looting o f o il w ealth f or s elfish p urposes i s now seen to be driving and sustaining the conflict.5 However, according to Ukiwo, greed is held out as the main cause only because it exonerates the Nigerian state from c ulpability in t he n eglect, un derdevelopment a nd m arginalisation o f t he region.6 Greed, corruption and grievance appear to be interconnected, and Billon has highlighted t hree p oints o f co ntact.7 First, co rruption c an in crease g rievance. Second, co rruption in g overnance in duces g reed t hat m otivates m arginalised political and mi litary g roups to ac t for change. Thus marginalised g roups could seek political power for personal aggrandisement. Third, political institutions such as conflict resolution mechanisms are usually undermined by political corruption. Thus, though Collier and Hoefflers greed thesis may not aptly capture the Niger Delta co ndition, n eglecting i t co uld r ob u s o f a c learer un derstanding o f t he conflicts in the region.8 In t he context of t he grievance v ersus g reed t hesis, t wo broad c ategories of actors are involved in t he conflict t hose driven or motivated by grievance and those motivated by greed. But if we agree that corruption is a product of greed, and that it induces marginalisation and inequality, we may conclude that greed also can be a source of grievance. It i s t rue t hat o il w ealth h as b een t ransferred o ut o f t he Niger D elta f or t he benefit of the ethnic majorities that control the Nigerian state. But how much of this wealth has benefited the ordinary citizens of the majority ethnic groups? Is the scenario different in the Niger Delta where the leadership lives in affluence while the vast majority of the citizens live in abject and deepening poverty? It is evident therefore t hat t he et hnic a nd r egional p olitics o f h egemony, ex clusion a nd prebendalism that underpin the grievances in the Niger Delta are a product of the greed of the ruling class. In t he Niger D elta, t he p olitical le aders w ho c hampion t he grievance t hesis have a lso often embezzled de velopment f unds t hrough mi suse of public offices. Following the implementation of the 13 p er cent derivation funds in 2000, h uge revenues have flowed into the Niger Delta. In comparison, the region has received far more revenue than the other geopolitical zones, but this has had little impact on t he ci tizens. F or exa mple, t he six N iger D elta s tates w ere a llocated a bout
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US$4 billion out of US$11 billion meant for the 36 states of the federation from the federation account in 2007. 9 Because o f co rruption a nd p oor p lanning, o nly a sm all p roportion o f t hese funds trickled down to the masses. Thus there has been little improvement in the standard o f li ving. Th e U nited N ations D evelopment P rogramme (UND P) reported in 2006 that people still suffer extreme deprivation despite the huge flow of o il r evenue in to t he r egion.10 It n otes, f or exa mple, t hat o ne p rimary h ealth facility s erves 43 s ettlements, or a t otal of 9 805 p eople, in a n area of 44 s quare kilometres. Similarly, only 2024 p er cent of the population have access to clean water. A wareness o f t he lo oting o f de velopment f unds b y p olitical le aders a nd public o fficials h as a lso b ecome a s ource o f g rievance. Th e r esulting disillusionment over corruption and failed access to de velopment and resources have fuelled class, ethnic and social tensions that turn violent as each group lays claim to a fair share of the oil wealth.11 Explaining t he co nflicts f rom t he p erspectives o f g reed o r g rievance w ill b e more meaningful when located in the context of the conflict system. For example, whereas the grievance thesis may reasonably capture the essence of the agitations against the Nigerian state, it does not adequately explain intra- and inter-ethnic, community, militia/cult and related conflicts. It is noteworthy t hat access to resources has b een a s ource of g rievance t hat underlies in ter- a nd in tra-community a nd in ter-ethnic co nflicts in t he N iger Delta. F urther, y ouths have o verthrown co mmunity leadership structures primarily a s p art o f a s truggle f or acces s t o co mmunity a nd t ransnational o il company r esources. On t he o ther h and, i t i s p ossible t hat in c ases w here t he political leadership supports youth movements, it is to further their ambition to embezzle state funds. Therefore, the struggle for resources b orn f rom a g enuine need f or de velopment a nd co mpensation f or r esources o n t he o ne h and a nd opportunistic desires and greed for accumulation on the other is at the centre of the conflicts. Murshed a nd Tadjoeddin a lso dra w a ttention t o t he fac t t hat t he g reed a nd grievance variables are not sufficient to explain the outbreak of violence and point out that the weakening of the social contract underlies conflict:
e ven if r ents f rom c apturable r esources do co nstitute a size able p rize, v iolent conflict is unlikely to take hold if a country has a framework of widely agreed rules, both f ormal a nd inf ormal, t hat g overns t he a llocation o f r esources, in cluding 222
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resource rents, and the peaceful settlement of grievances Viable social contract can be sufficient to restrain, if not eliminate, opportunistic behaviour such as largescale theft of resource rents, and the violent expression of grievance.12

Murshed a nd Tadjoeddin f urther m ention in equitable di stribution o f r esources, unstable polity and declining economic growth as capable of weakening the social contract.13 Clearly, this perspective provides a u seful explanation for the conflicts in the Niger Delta. The issues of the national question and dissatisfaction with the countrys admini strative a nd p olitical s tructure a nd mi sgovernance a re o ther factors t hat a re c learly in dicated.14 The n ature a nd c haracter o f t he s tate a nd corporate r esource g overnance h ave b een s o in equitable a nd unfa ir t hat v iolent appropriation of resources has become the norm. Corruption and misgovernance have er oded co nfidence in t he s tate a nd t ransnational o il co mpanies. E lectoral fraud has diminished the essence of the social contract and the general population has lost faith in governmental institutions at the three tiers of governance (federal, state a nd lo cal). F rustration w ith t he fa ilure o f g overnance exp lains t o a l arge extent the diverse forms and dimensions of violent conflicts that plague the region. But apart from the issues of resource management and governance, there has been a breakdown of societys social fabric. Social disorganisation has led to the collapse of s ocietal control and t raditional norms, and has resulted in de viant b ehaviour and crime.15

Violence and crisis in the Niger Delta

The conflict has taken several turns and dimensions that have to be presented for a clearer appreciation of the violence.

Mapping the Niger Delta conflict: from agitation to resistance

The neglect, marginalisation and underdevelopment that generated activism and fomented unr est in t he N iger D elta b egan d uring t he co lonial admini stration.16 Indeed, the recent events defined by oil politics constitute merely the tipping point in a co nflict d ating b ack to t he colonial era. Th us, conflicts in t he D elta c an b e categorised a s p re- a nd p ost-oil co nflicts, w ith dif ferent s trands o f en gagement characterising the post-oil conflicts. The conflict can be mapped by means of the six phases in table 81.
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Table 81: Trend of conflics in the Niger Delta

Phase Period 1 19501965 Agitation
I

Civil agitation for special developmental attention because of unique ecological difficulties and for separate regions because of marginalisation by ethnic majority groups Militant insurgent engagement by Adaka Boro and the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) Separation or autonomy as the goal of engagement Agitations by host communities against transnational oil companies Demands for basic social infrastructure and amenities, and payment of compensation for damages to land and property Conflict between host communities and transnational oil companies over payment of adequate compensation for damages to land, water and property, and for development projects Litigation and peaceful obstructions and protests as the instruments of engagement Emergence of civil, community, ethnic and regional groups in response to state and transnational oil companies insensitivity and repression Peaceful demonstrations by host communities and occupation of oil production facilities, demanding adequate compensation for damages and development attention Militant and militia actions against transnational oil companies Demand for resource ownership and control by civil, political and militia groups Violent confrontations and low-intensity war between militia groups and the military

23 February to 6 March 1966 19701982

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There was a loss of faith in the government and its institutions as well as in the oil companies. This resulted in the mobilisation of the people, particularly the youth and civil society, against the state and oil companies17 State repression and excessive use of force turned peaceful civil disturbances into v iolent en gagements, a s y outh a nd mi litant ac tivists ado pted a rmed confrontation both as a defence mechanism and as an effective instrument in the pursuit of their goals18

Militias, pirates and cults in the Niger Delta

The insurgency in t he Delta involves a w elter of different groups19 civil society organisations, mi litias a nd cults. M emberships a nd roles o verlap because individuals and groups who identify themselves as, for example, militias may also be members of cult groups and be engaged in p iracy. Radical ethnic, pan-ethnic and youth-based civil society organisations have been so militant that they have been erroneously listed as militias. Civil society groups in the Niger Delta include the Ijaw National Congress, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, the Egbema National Congress and the Isoko Community Oil Producing Forum. Cult groups include the Greenlanders, Deegbam, B ush B oys, B lack B raziers, I celanders, Vikings, Vultures, G ermans and Mafia Lords. Militia groups include the NDPVF, MEND, NDPSF, the Niger Delta Militant Force Squad (NDMFS), and the Egbesu Boys of Africa.20 Whereas the civil society and militia groups are pan-ethnic and are therefore found in a ll states of the Niger Delta, the cult groups are based in particular localities. For example, the Deegbam is based in Port Harcourt in Rivers State. It is noteworthy, however, that because s ome o f t hem (s uch a s t he Vikings and Black B raziers) o riginated a s campus cults, they are found at nearly all tertiary institutions in the country. The f irst m anifestation o f t he mi litia p henomenon in t he N iger D elta wa s between F ebruary a nd M arch 1966, w hen A daka B oros Niger D elta V olunteer Service (NDVS), co mprising a rmed mi litant I jaw y ouths, s eized s ome communities a nd o il faci lities, de clared a N iger D elta P eoples R epublic, a nd engaged t he N igerian mi litary un til i t wa s def eated a nd i ts m embers t ried f or treason. There was a ces sation of militant activities until 1997 w hen the current manifestation began. The present militia groups, comprising mostly Ijaw militants, first em erged in t he W arri r egion t o f ight t heir I tsekiri n eighbours, t he o il companies and the Nigerian military deployed to protect the oil infrastructure and to co ntain t he co nflict a rising f rom p olitical a nd r esource m arginalisation. Th e
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Sources: compiled from L Owugah, Local resistance and the state, Paper presented at the Oil Watch African General Assembly, Port Harcourt, 914 February 1999, 58; and A Ikelegbe, Beyond the threshold of civil struggle: youth militancy and the militiaisation of the resource conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, African Study Monographs 27(3) (2006), 87122, 104106.

A number of issues are inextricably linked to the conflict:

I

Deprivation, neglect, underdevelopment and associated alienation have been at the base of the agitations and conflict since the 1950s The in sensitivity o f t he g overnment a nd t he fa ilure o f g overnmental institutions to address the issues effectively meant that the issues that caused the conflict remained unresolved
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most p rominent mi litant g roup, t he Federated N iger D elta I jaw C ommunities (FNDIC), s upported m ainly Ijaw c auses a nd mi litant ac tivities e lsewhere (a part from violent clashes during the Warri crisis between 1997 and 2004). Following t he K aiama D eclaration21 of D ecember 1998 w hich h ad b een signed b y s everal t housand I jaw y ouths a nd m arked t he s tarting p oint o f v ery radical demands and subsequent military operations against youth protests that followed, mi litant g roups en gaged in co unterattacks a nd r esistance. P rominent militia groups that emerged during this period were the Egbesu Boys of Africa, the Niger D elta R esistance M ovement, the Niger D elta O il P roducing C ommunities Development O rganisation, t he ND PVF, t he ND VS a nd t he Supreme E gbesu Assembly. Between 2003 and 2005, the NDPVF and the NDVS were prominent in the eastern part of the Niger Delta. Currently, the most prominent militia groups are MEND, the Coalition for Militant Action (COMA), and the Martyrs Brigade. Youth militias in t he Niger Delta are actually a lo ose confederation of militia groups, bands, cults, and freelance, volunteer and hired fighters. They are based in numerous camps in t he remote corners of the swamps, estuaries and creeks. The diffuseness of the overall militia organisation is further complicated by sometimes multiple and overlapping memberships, shared p articipation in b attles c alled by other g roups, a nd e ven b road m obilisations f or c auses o f di verse g roups a nd communities, sometimes across state borders and the eastern and western axis of the Delta.22 As Okonta notes, the constituent groups within MEND take their own decisions and plan their attacks separately, but are able to coordinate with other units in joint expeditions where necessary.23 The militias are organised on the basis of military hierarchy and formations. MEND, f or exa mple, w hich i s t he m ost p rominent g roup, h as a co mmand a nd platoon structure in a ll states of the Niger Delta, each headed by a co mmander, with a central command in t he Ijaw territory of Delta State. The intelligence unit undertakes strategic studies and provides tactics that underlie its operations. The leadership h ave fa lse n ames a nd iden tities, a nd t o a l arge ext ent a re un known, particularly to the Nigerian security forces and operatives. Other groups that are based in p articular lo cations a re o rganised in to a rea co mmands, t oo. I t i s noteworthy t hat t hese co mmands a ll h ave a s emblance o f mi litary f ormations, command s tructure a nd di scipline. Th e mi litias h ave p redominantly y outh members. The militia groups along the eastern axis of the Delta interface with cult groups that usually serve as fertile grounds for recruitment.
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The militias use essentially speedboats and guerrilla tactics when attacking oil and mi litary in stallations. A lthough t hey h ave o perated in t he o il ci ties o f Port Harcourt and Warri as well as other towns, their main targets are along the creeks, swamps, es tuaries a nd waterways o f t he D elta. Th eir m ain s trategy h as b een t o disrupt oil production and compel government t o n egotiate w ith t hem on t heir demands. Th ey h ave ac hieved t his t hrough i ssuing p ress r eleases, de livering threats and ultimatums to oil companies, attacking personnel and facilities of oil companies, di srupting a nd e ven s hutting do wn o il p roduction, k idnapping o il workers o r t aking t hem h ostage, a nd c arrying o ut a rmed a ttacks a nd counterattacks a gainst s ecurity f orces gu arding o il in stallations a nd p atrolling waterways. Th e o bjectives o f t he mi litias in clude en ding in justice a nd n eglect, achieving ethnic emancipation and survival, true federalism, obtaining a g reater share of the oil revenue, redressing marginalisation and underdevelopment caused by the Nigerian state and oil companies, acquiring ownership in t he oil industry, promoting em ployment a nd e conomic em powerment, ac hieving s elfdetermination and increasing their political representation.24 The mi litias c an b e c ategorised o n t he b asis o f o bjectives o r et hnic composition. There are private militias (NDPVF, Adaka Marines, Martyrs Brigade, Niger Delta Vigilante, NDMFS and Niger Delta Coastal Guerrillas), ethnic militias (the Meinbutus, A rugbo F reedom F ighters, I duwini V olunteer F orce and Egbesu Boys) and pan-ethnic militias (MEND, COMA and the NDPSF). Pirates are armed bands and gangs that attack boats and passengers along the coast and waterways. They often block and obstruct traffic on river routes, attack and seize boats, hold passengers hostage (demanding huge sums as ransom) and steal passengers possessions. Attacks on some of the waterway routes in B ayelsa and Delta states have been so frequent and violent that the state governments have created s ecurity outfits to contain t he menace. In B ayelsa State, t he government created t he Bayelsa Volunteers consisting of about 5 000 y ouths, w hile t he D elta State government created the Waterways Security Committee. The Joint Military Task Force has been patrolling and policing the waterways since the late 1990s to curtail, among others, the threat posed by pirates. These p irates a re cr iminal a nd de viant e lements in t he mi litia g roups o r opportunistic e lements t hat m asquerade a s mi litias. W ith sm all a rms a nd opportunities to extort, these groups have turned the waterways into territories for profiteering. That the pirates and militias are closely related is clear from the fact that the militias dominate and control the creeks. The phenomenon has also been associated with increased militancy and militia activities along the creeks.
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Ikelegbe25 succinctly des cribes t he in terconnection b etween mi litias a nd pirates:

There is a strong linkage between the militias, armed gangs and cultists, the pirates and the bunkerers. The boundaries between them may be fluid as one group could easily m erge in to t he o ther. Th e p irates f or exa mple a re lin ked t o t he dir ect waterways robbery, are agents of larger bunkerers, guards to oil theft operations and guides to the boats, barges and ships of bunkers. They may be part of larger militias and armed bands that may be involved in popular violence.

Ukiwo s tates t hat t o s eparate p irates f rom mi litias w ould b e li ke s eparating Siamese t wins rather t han s eparating sheep f rom goats.26 The fac t is t hat pirates have b ecome mi litias, j ust a s mi litias en gage in p iracy t o m obilise r esources t o sustain insurgency or for personal enrichment. Piracy has thrived because of the loose control, lack of discipline and loss of focus among the militia groups. Cults started out as violent secret campus fraternities that moved beyond the campuses in terms of membership, organisation and operations. Once outside the campuses, the fraternities became more extensive, armed, criminalised and brutal. More importantly, in Rivers and Bayelsa states they became extensions of, or were affiliated with or worked in collaboration with and under the control and direction of, the militia groups, from which they also received arms and funding. The cult groups, particularly, formed alliances with the NDPVF and NDV in their intensive internecine wars over territorial and resource control in Rivers State between 2004 and 2007.27

Militias and military engagements

The region has been militarised since the early 1990s following the Ogoni protests and in creased a gitation a nd p rotests. E xtensive mi litary dep loyments a nd operations h ave t urned t he en tire r egion in to a l arge ga rrisoned co mmand, particularly since the late 1990s. The forces of occupation and military action have included the Internal Security Force in Ogoniland, Operation Hakuri I and II and Operation F lush O ut. A j oint mi litary t ask f orce co denamed Operation R estore Hope now operates in the region. Military dep loyments in tensified sin ce D ecember 1998 a fter t he K aiama Declaration a nd t he I jaw y outh p rotests t hat f ollowed. Th e dep loyments,
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operations a nd b rutalities w ere c hallenged f or t he f irst t ime b y a rmed y ouths, resulting in c lashes a nd b loody b attles a t K aiama, E keki Y enagoa, Y enagoa, Oliobiri, Opia, Ikemya and Ogbia. Youth militias subsequently emerged as a major force o f co unter-violence a nd a rmed en gagement. M ilitia a nd mi litary confrontations h ave co ntinued in s everal co mmunities a nd o il in stallations, waterways, mi litia c amps and e ven mi litary b arracks and faci lities. The mi litary has h ad t o p atrol t he wa terways a nd cr eeks, gu ard v essels, t ankers a nd s hips, protect oil in stallations and p ersonnel, and intervene in ci ties and communities with militia presence and activities. In the process, the military deployed several thousand m en w ith s ophisticated w eaponry s uch a s n aval wa rships, fa st amphibious cra fts, h elicopter gun boats, a rmoured p ersonnel c arriers a nd t anks. The mi litias a re a lso fa irly w ell a rmed w ith r ocket l aunchers, m achine gun s, rocket-propelled g renades, b ombs, a utomatic a nd a ssault r ifles, AK-47s a nd bazookas. The ensuing cycle of violence has been sustained by the availability of arms in t he r egion, f unds f rom f orceful a ppropriations o f r esources f rom o il companies, t he un derground e conomy a nd p ersistent s tate mi litary ac tions a nd repression. Attacks a nd co unterattacks h ave t aken p lace in t he o il in stallations, lo cal communities, militia camps, military posts and along the waterways. The militias have attacked numerous oil facilities such as pipelines, gas facilities, flow stations, oil platforms and terminals, offshore oil facilities, vessels and even towns such as the m ain o il ci ties o f Warri a nd Port H arcourt. Th ey h ave s eized v essels, c argo ships, boats, barges, helicopters, equipment and oil facilities, and kidnapped and abducted h undreds o f f oreign o il w orkers. I t i s n oteworthy t hat i t t ook t he combined effort of the Nigerian navy, army and air force, and the use of military hardware such as helicopter gunships, to subdue one militant camp in Delta State in May 2009, during a counterinsurgency operation.28 Militia activities and attacks have been quite intense since 2006. Between 2003 and 2005 t here w ere s everal in cidents, in cluding eig ht a ttacks o n t he s ecurity forces/police in w hich 36 p eople were killed and two injured; f ive attacks on oil companies t hat le d t o t he k illing o f eig ht p eople (f ive exp atriates), w hile 18 expatriates were taken hostage.29 There were a f urther 39 mi litia attacks between January a nd A ugust 2006, w hich le d t o t he de aths o f 36 p eople (in cluding 21 soldiers and six n aval personnel). Perhaps more significant was the bomb attack on Bori Camp, the headquarters of the amphibious brigade of the Nigerian army in Port Harcourt in Rivers State on 19 April 2006 and the 29 April 2006 attack on
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the Joint Military Task Force headquarters in Warri in Delta State.30 About 130 oil workers were taken hostage in 33 a ttacks with nine deaths between January and July 2007. 31 The February 2008 attack on Equatorial Guinea drew attention to the threat that Niger Delta militias could pose to regional stability and security in the Gulf of Guinea.

The genesis of militias and pirates

The em ergence o f mi litias in t he N iger D elta c an b e t raced t o hi storical a nd contemporary forces at five levels.34

The militarisation of politics

State p ower, in stitutions, resources a nd public office in N igeria often h ave b een privatised and manipulated for personal gain.35 Because of the states centrality to the politics of distribution, accumulation, welfare and development, it is an object of in tense h egemonic s truggle. Thi s h as s pawned in tense, l awless a nd a moral struggles for p ower, le ading to corruption, violence and conflicts. The nature of the state and state politics underlies and undermines electoral processes and has turned e lections in to f raudulent, v iolent a nd f lawed ex ercises. Th e in tense struggles f or s tate p ower exp lain w hy ext ensive e lectoral ir regularities a nd electoral v iolence h ave b een p erpetrated b y a rmed t hugs a nd b ands, a p oint highlighted by Human Rights Watch:36
The transition to democracy in 1999 exacerbated youth militancy as unscrupulous politicians u sed hir ed thugs t o c arry o ut v iolence t o en sure t heir v ictory a t t he polls. Prior to t he 1999 a nd 2003 f ederal state and lo cal elections, a ll p arties, but most effectively the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), recruited and armed members of youth groups to intimidate opposing politicians and their supporters.

The militias, opportunism and crime

The co re g roups o f mi litias s uch a s MEND a re c learly r evolutionist a nd t hey pursue p olitical objectives as well as de velopment of t he region. However, s ome militia groups have been criminalised and are driven by opportunism and greed, as evidenced by their participation in oil theft, kidnapping and hostage taking, and extortion f rom in dividuals, v essels, g overnments a nd o il co mpanies. T o t hese elements, v iolence h as sim ply b een co mmercialised in t he co ntext o f l ucrative opportunities. I nitially, o pportunistic mi litia e lements w ere gu ards, es corts a nd agents of oil theft syndicates or bunkerers. However, such militias soon came into their own, in terms of the control of territory for bunkering, the crude refining or production o f p etroleum p roducts a nd t he co llection o f t olls f rom o ther o il bunkerers and vessels. In stealing oil, the militias do not act alone but in collusion with high-ranking serving and retired military, security, government and oil company officials and merchants and syndicates.32 The oil theft syndicates fund and arm the militias and armed gangs. The syndicates also benefit from the instability and insecurity that result f rom co nflicts a nd c lashes b etween t he mi litias a nd t he mi litary. Th e involvement of such corrupt officials of oil companies and military and security units dem onstrates t he co mplex w eb in w hich mi litia ac tivities a nd e ven t he conflicts are enmeshed and how these webs endanger national security. At the core of t his complex web are conflict b eneficiaries w ho profit f rom t he conflicts and therefore h ave interests in co nflict p erpetuation f or g reater o r s ustained p rofits. However, we should note that militia engagements in oil theft are sometimes not simply for profit but to sustain and finance militia operations.33 Militia criminality has been manifested in participation in piracy, kidnapping, extortion, p olitical in timidation, t huggery, e lectoral v iolence, b ank r obberies, armed robberies and other crimes. Criminality is mostly engaged in by the small armed bands, cults, private militias and freelance militias, which are less under the control of the core and more insurgent ethnic and pan-ethnic militia groups.
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In t he N iger D elta, e lections h ave b een v iolent a nd f lawed b ecause o f t he hig h stakes. Political parties and leaders have used youth groups to engage in electoral violence, b uying t hem a rms a nd p aying t hem t o u se v iolence t o in timidate opponents. This happened in Rivers State where the NDV and NDPVF were used in electoral violence.37 Cults, confraternities and armed bands have also been used in struggles and contestations for political power in the Niger Delta. This has had two broad effects. First, because of social disorganisation induced by increasing anonymity, poor social relationships and increasing competition for resources, p oliticians in o r o utside p ower los e co ntrol o f t he ac tions o f y outh groups.38Second, youth groups are often abandoned after the elections. There are three reasons for this:
I

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Patrons of the youth groups fail to meet the needs and aspirations of the youths because o f t heir unr ealistic dem ands. Thi s b reaks t heir s ocial co ntract a nd results in t he withdrawal of support/allegiance on the part of the groups and abandonment by the principal Losing politicians also abandon the youth groups almost immediately after the elections because they cannot maintain these groups

However, the arms bought for youth groups by their patrons are not retrieved, and arms for mobilisation and operations are therefore easily obtained. This explains why incidences of militancy and militia operations and even violent crimes tended to increase significantly after the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections.

However, the crucial point here concerns the character of the violence. Ethnic identity wa s t he ra llying p oint f or m obilisation, a nd et hnic mi litias w hose members w ere p redominantly y ouths w ere r esponsible f or t he v iolent co nflicts. Small arms and dynamite and other explosives were used freely and the elite and opinion le aders o n b oth sides en sured t hat t he y ouths did n ot l ack w eapons. However, these arms were not surrendered when the hostilities ended, and neither were the fighters rehabilitated and reintegrated into their communities. This was also the case with other inter-community and ethnic conflicts in the region. This underlies the intensification of piracy, violent crimes and opportunism when these armed youths had to struggle for survival and relevance.

Inter-ethnic struggles and antagonisms

One of the most significant outcomes of several decades of colonisation in Nigeria is ethnic consciousness and identity politics.39 Perceived domination and exclusion among the different ethnic groups in the country have engendered suspicion, and even palpable hatred, that have sowed the seeds of ethnic antagonism and violence. Inter-ethnic and inter-community conflicts have been quite pervasive in Nigeria. The defining aspect of these conflicts is the use of ethnic militias to carry out such conflicts. In the Niger Delta, there have been several inter-ethnic conflicts, for example between the Ijaw and Itsekiri in Delta State; the Ogoni-Okrika and Ogoni against the Andoni in Rivers State; and between the Ilaje and Arogbo Ijaw in Ondo State. The violence between the Itsekiri and Ijaw appears to be the most prominent and can b e t raced t o co lonial co nquests, in tegration, t rade r elations a nd t he institutionalisation of Itsekiri dominance through the paramount status acquired by the Itsekiri monarch.40 Antagonism r eached a c limax in 1997 w hen t he h eadquarters o f t he Warri South local government area was relocated from Ogbe-Ijoh (an Ijaw community) to Og idigben (a n I tsekiri co mmunity). Th e I jaw r esponse a nd t he co unterresponse by the Itsekiri led to intermittent violence between 1997 and 2004.41 The revenue allocation criteria in Nigeria used among others the local government to determine a groups share of federal revenue. More importantly, the location of the headquarters b enefits f rom t he provision of s ocial inf rastructure and amenities. The struggle over the location of the headquarters was therefore a s truggle over resources and development inputs.
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Inter- and intra-community struggles over oil resources

Inter- and intra-community conflicts in t he Niger D elta over oil resources h ave provided a fertile ground for militia activities and piracy. It is not that there were no conflicts between communities prior to the regional conflict, but the number and in tensity o f co nflicts h ave a ssumed a larming p roportions d ue t o militarisation, a rms p roliferation a nd t he p reponderance o f a rmed g roups o r bands. R ecent exa mples o f in ter-community co nflicts in clude t hose b etween Emadike/Epebu and Ogb olomabiri/Bassambiri (B ayelsa State), b etween Bille/Ice and E kunuga/Okolomade, b etween A lesa/Eleme a nd O krika (R ivers S tate) a nd between Odimodi/Ogulagha and Isama/Gbarigolo (Delta State).42 A number of factors have triggered these conflicts. The first is the divide-andrule t actics t hat o il co mpanies u se t o fac tionalise co mmunities a nd t urn o ne community against another through partisan and partial patronage. The second are land disputes arising from the high value placed on land precisely because of the o il i t mig ht co ntain. Th e t hird co ncern c hieftaincy di sputes, t he co llapsing authority of traditional governance systems and the erosion of the roles of elders in t he m oderation o f s ocial a nd co mmunity lif e. Th e f ourth i s t he g eneralised lawlessness a rising f rom t he co llapse o f s ocial a nd m oral va lues a nd s ocial disorganisation. These have facilitated the tendencies towards the militarisation of inter- and intra-community feuds and the ready use of armed confrontations and violent conflicts to settle disputes.43 As a result, factions and communities now generally use violent confrontations to deal with disagreements. The mobilisation, recruitment, training and arming of youths were common factors in all these conflicts. In Rivers State, cult groups were
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Map 81: Niger Delta region

may regard them as much more beneficial than employment. The result is that there may develop a g roup of individuals reluctant to work even if o ffered employment opportunities. Such in dividuals, often t han n ot, b ecome s ocietal rejects. Th e b oy soldier who is introduced to violence at an early age may become unemployable and in most cases not willing to be educated.45

Oil politics and the criminalisation of insurgency

Fundamentally, in surgency in t he N iger D elta c an b e b lamed o n de cades o f neglect, mi litarism a nd in justice.46 Furthermore, o il p olitics i s o ne o f t he underlying c auses. A aron, Ib eanu, O koko et a l, Ik ein, Ik porukpo, O pukiri a nd Ibaba, Naanen and Nna47 have all noted that inequitable oil wealth distribution and allocation are the most critical factors in the crisis. Besides majority ethnic group domination, the centralised nature of federalism and revenue allocation, the abuse of h uman r ights, o il-based en vironmental deg radation a nd fa ilure o f co rporate social responsibility on the part of oil companies lie at the root of the oil politics. The fact is that the rapacious tendencies of government and oil companies have given birth to ethnic nationalism in the Niger Delta.48 Although in come f rom o il a nd ga s acco unt f or a bout 90 p er cen t o f exp ort earnings, 40 per cent of the gross national product, and 84 per cent of government revenues,49 the N iger D elta t hat acco unts f or o ver 90 p er cen t o f o il a nd ga s production in the country suffers from neglect, underdevelopment and poverty.50 The dominant view is that the drastic reduction in the derivation share of revenue allocation, particularly between 1980 a nd 2000, m ay be attributed to the shift in revenue en dowment a nd g eneration f rom t he m ajority g roups t hat co ntrol t he state to the minority groups that lack power.51 The federal government under the hegemony o f t he n orthern r egion s eized co ntrol o f o il a nd ga s r evenues a nd diverted the dominant bases of revenue allocation from derivation to population, land mass and equality of states. This disadvantaged the Niger Delta and reduced the benefits from oil and gas to this area to a trickle. The Niger Delta people attribute the situation to the politics of marginalisation of minority groups and Nigerias perverted federalism. The main source of friction is thus the reduction in the derivation share of revenue allocation, which is set out in table 82.
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Source: Yiruo Zhao (http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2009/world/war-on-water/).

recruited b ecause o f t heir f ire-power a nd p aid h eavily f or t heir s ervices in t he conflicts.44 Ikporukpo captures part of these effects:
The militarisation of people, particularly the youths, has a number of implications. Many o f t hese warriors b elieve t hat t here a re e conomic ga ins in t he p lunder o f another community. Such gains mean a lo t to many unemployed individuals who 234
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Table 82: Changes in the derivation component of revenue allocation

Period 19601970 19701975 19751980 19801983 19841992 19922000 2000 to date Share of derivation 50 per cent 45 per cent 20 per cent 2 per cent 1,5 per cent 3 per cent 13 per cent Sources: Compiled from A M Jega, Democracy, good governance and development in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2007, 203245; S I Ibaba, Understanding the Niger Delta crisis, Port Harcourt: Amethyst and Colleagues, 2005, 9899; G I Mbanefoh and F O Egwaikhide, Revenue allocation in Nigeria: derivation principle revisited, in A Kunle, R Suberu, A Agbaje and G Herault (eds), Federalism and political restructuring in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1998, 213231.

that t he cr iminalisation of insurgency has b ecome a m eans of sharing in t he oil wealth.

The youth movement

As we noted earlier, militias in the Niger Delta are made up largely of youths, a fact attributable t o t he central r ole o f y ouths in t he co nflicts p laguing t he r egion. A number of factors have been identified as the reasons for this:
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This awareness has radicalised political actions and agitations for greater access to the oil wealth, and has resulted in t he formation and proliferation of civil society groups a nd mi litant y outh m ovements. Th e en suing mi litancy a nd in surgency were criminalised by the commercialisation of violence. A n umber of incentives led t o t his. F irst, t he o il co mpanies m ade i t co rporate p ractice t o a ward surveillance contracts to youth groups to protect their facilities.52 The huge sums paid f or s uch s ecurity co ntracts n ot o nly en sured g reater acces s t o a rms a nd firepower, but also led to the formation of splinter groups and violent competition among youth groups. Another factor is that chiefs, elites and politicians used youth groups to further their a gendas o f acc umulation o f w ealth. Thi s i s lin ked t o t he s abotage o f o il installations, o il t heft a nd k idnapping o f o il w orkers f or ra nsom. On t he o ther hand, state governments in the region pay huge sums of money to steer militants away from violence. For example, the leader of the NDPVF has noted that at one time t he R ivers S tate g overnment wa s p aying mi litants 100 mi llion n aira p er month to refrain from violence.53 These payoffs were intended to ensure that oil production continued and to secure the revenue allocations based on derivation. The b acklash, h owever, i s t hat t he y ouths w ho r eceived t hese l arge s ums o f money w ere un willing t o t ake o n o ther w ork. E ven w orse, t he h uge r evenue inflows in to t he N iger D elta h ave n ot b een ade quately in vested in t he p eople, thereby creating an environment for grievance and conflicts. It is noteworthy that corruption in g overnance in t he Niger Delta has created bad role models for the youths. There is a general feeling that the current 13 per cent derivation in revenue allocation wa s ac hieved t hrough t he y ouths s truggles, b ut t hat t he y ouths h ave been alienated from the wealth through corruption. Therefore, it is not surprising
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Youths are the most active segment of the population Youths (including women) are worst affected by the widespread poverty in the region A g rowing a wareness o f t he r egions p redicament a nd t he radic alisation o f unrest infected t he youth, w ho b egan to s ee it as t heir role to champion t he struggle The b ehaviour o f t he N igerian f ederal g overnment and o il co mpanies, particularly their insensitivity towards the regions protests against repression, angered t he y outh, w ho b egan t o o rganise t hemselves in to g roups a t t he community and ethnic levels. A significant outcome of this was the emergence of numerous youth g roups such as t he Ijaw Youth C ouncil and t he National Youth C ouncil of Ogoni People, w hich among others, demanded justice and that attention be given to development

A dominant engagement strategy of youths in t he Niger Delta from 1997 wa s to convene summits and conferences to draw attention to the plight of the region and m ore im portantly t o de clare t heir s tand o n t hese i ssues. P erhaps t he m ost famous of such meetings was the All Ijaw Youths Summit in Kaiama, Bayelsa State, in December 1998. The Kaiama Declaration included the following:
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The Ijaws own all land and natural resources including mineral resources in their land All leg islation (L and U se A ct, P etroleum D ecree et c) t hat dep rives a nd alienates the people from their natural resources stand abrogated All s ecurity f orces o f o ppression o n I jaw l and s hould b e w ithdrawn immediately
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All o il co mpanies exp loiting o il in I jawland s hould ce ase exp loitation a nd withdraw immediately until the issues being contested have been resolved

The activities began as peaceful protests, but soon transformed into militant and violent confrontations. Significantly, it was the violent and repressive nature of the federal g overnments r esponse t o t he dem ands a nd p eaceful y outh p rotests t hat forced the youth to fight back in organised armed groups. They drew inspiration from the Adaka B oro revolt, which lasted for 12 d ays, in 1967. A s noted earlier, Adaka Boro, an Ijaw from Kaiama in Bayelsa State, formed the NDVS and declared the Niger Delta Republic. The youth movements identified with the popular and heroic m ovement o f A daka B oro in t heir q uest f or f reedom. W hereas N igerias government considered him to be a criminal, he is revered and celebrated as a hero in Ijawland.

Youths versus youths Youths versus community Claims agents versus community Youths versus chiefs

Youths: Overthrow of community leadership and usurpation of power Community: Inequitable distribution of resources that shortchanges the youths Claims agents: Short-changing of community members Community: Refusal to pay agreed fees, rejection of double dealings Youths: Dethronement of chiefs, attacks on chiefs Chiefs: Fractionalisation of youth bodies through partisan support and patronage, kidnapping, encroachment on land and fishing grounds, attack of community member(s) Community: Attacks on rival community members and property

Actors in the conflict

Individuals, groups, security operatives and oil companies are central actors in the conflict. The actors differ in their roles in the conflict, their perceptions and goals, and the nature of their engagement. The conflicts in the region can be categorised Table 83: Actors in Niger Delta conflicts
Type of conflict Intracommunity conflict Source of conflict Struggles between groups, local governance organs/ sub-structures and local elite for access to and distribution of oil-based resources Actors in conflict Community factions: I Urban elites versus local elites Instruments/mode Urban elites: Hijacking of community resources, disregard for local elites Local elites: Inciting youths and chiefs against the urban elites Community versus transnational oil companies Intercommunity conflicts Inter-community struggles for location and ownership of oilbased resources, access to oil resources and struggles for favoured distribution Community struggles for transnational oil company attention, community development projects, compensation for oil spillages and memorandum of understanding with transnational oil companies Struggles against repression, inequitable share of benefits from oil Youths, chiefs and elites of the communities

Youths, chiefs, elites, transnational oil companies security operatives and communities

Youths versus elites

Youths: Destruction of property owned by the elites, harassment of their relatives Elites: Fractionalisation of youth bodies through partisan support and patronage, attacks on rival groups

Transnational oil companies: Fractionalisation of community leaders, refusal to pay compensation, breach of memorandum of understanding, payment of inadequate compensation Community: Attacks on oil installations, disruption of production, seizure of equipment, kidnapping of personnel Community: Disruption of oil production, attack on security operatives State: Militarisation/military occupation, attacks, arrests

Community versus state

Community youths and security operatives

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Inter-ethnic

Struggles for greater access and favoured allocation of oil-based resources

Youths, elites and chiefs

Encroachment on land and water resources, attacks on communities

the federal and state governments in the Niger Delta. The first is the choice to act decisively in the common interest and end militia activities. The second option is to protect selfish and parochial interests, which in s ome instances are in t andem with the interests of the militant youth.

Intramilitia/cult/ confraternity groups

Leadership succession Youths versus youths crises, conflicts over resources, methods and targets of engagement, struggles for territory, influence and access to oil resources, transnational oil company payments and patronage

Violent engagements, encroachment on area of control or oil theft zone

Militias in government
We n oted e arlier t hat t he u se b y p oliticians o f a rmed p olitical t hugs d uring elections partly laid the foundation for the formation of militia groups. It is also true that militia groups have provided support, or even sponsored candidates for elections. The involvement of militia groups in t he electoral process has resulted in their leaders and members gaining political prominence.55 In Rivers State, for example, t he ND PVF a nd t he ND V w ere dra wn in to t he e lectoral p rocess b y opposing politicians.56 Their leadership and members were thus favoured by the government with regard to political appointments, contracts awards and monetary payments. The r ole o f t he mi litia g roups in p olitics, t he e lectoral p rocess a nd t heir relevance t o p oliticians c an b e a ttributed t o s everal fac tors. Fir st, sin ce 1999, elections in N igeria and particularly in t he Niger Delta have almost always been rigged. For this reason, politicians relied heavily on armed youths to win elections through violent actions. Second, election rigging in the Niger Delta is particularly pervasive in t he rural communities in t he creeks and swamps that are under the control o f t he mi litia g roups. Th e mi litant y outh a re p articularly u seful f or campaigning in s uch dif ficult t errain a nd f or r igging e lections t here. Thir d, governments in t he Niger Delta use militia and cult group leaders to secure the release of hostages, a process that benefits both sides through the payment of huge sums of money as ransom in which some public officials also share. Fourth, state and lo cal g overnments p ay t he mi litia g roups t o m aintain t he p eace o r ce ase disruptive violent activities.

Sources: S I Ibaba, The environment and sustainable development in the Niger Delta: the Bayelsa State experience, Unpublished PhD thesis, Port Harcourt: University of Port Harcourt, 2004, 194199; K Okoko, The Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) Host community relations survey, Unpublished report submitted to the SPDC Western Operations, Warri, Nigeria, 1998, 14.

as in ter-ethnic, in tra-community, in ter-community, co mmunity-oil co mpany, community-state, in ter-militia/cult/confraternity g roups a nd in tra-militia/cult/ confraternity g roups, a nd mi litia/cult-oil co mpanies/Nigerian s tate. Th e ac tors have h ad di verse o bjectives, p layed n umerous r oles a nd u tilised di verse engagement methods. It is clear that youths are key actors in the conflicts. Ikelegbe has noted that the current p hase o f a gitations in t he r egion h as b een t aken o ver b y t he y ouths. However, i t i s sig nificant t hat t he y outh m ovement i s un coordinated, a nd t he associated di sorderliness h as cr eated do ubts a bout t he dir ection, co ntent a nd sincerity of the struggle.54

Militias and interfaces with civil society, politics and governance

The analysis so far suggests that militia activities in the Niger Delta endanger the national e conomy, s ecurity a nd de velopment a spirations o f t he N iger D elta people. But the militia groups have continued to gain ground in numbers, camps, profile and activities, and the Nigerian state has found the suppression or defeat of the militias difficult. This section of the chapter examines the dilemma faced by
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Militias as pseudo-government
Universally, a g overnment p erforms t hree b asic f unctions, n amely t he maintenance of law and order, the facilitation of development and social progress and, s omewhat m ore s pecifically, t he p romotion o f s ocial w elfare a nd li ving conditions.57 However, t he fa ilure o f t he s ocial co ntract in t he N iger D elta, indicated b y t he fa ilure o f t he va rious g overnments t o sig nificantly f ulfil t hese functions, p articularly in t he co astal a nd swa mpy a reas, h as r esulted in mi litia
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groups a nd p irates t aking o ver t hese f unctions in lo cal co mmunities.58 Some militia g roups en gage in t he f ollowing g overnmental f unctions in h ost communities:
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Procurement of drugs for health centres or hospitals Payment o f s tipends t o m edical p ersonnel t o en courage t hem t o b e a t t heir posts Payment of stipends to teachers to enhance their dedication Provision o f p ower g enerators a nd/or s upply o f p etrol/diesel t o p ower generators Payment o f exa mination a nd s chool f ees f or s tudents in p rimary a nd secondary schools Scholarship a wards t o uni versity un dergraduates, in cluding t hose a t foreign universities (particularly in Ghana) Sponsorship of individuals to acquire vocational skills Provision of potable water Financial grants to traders, entrepreneurs and artisans

society h ave t ended t o sy mpathise w ith v iolent en gagements b ecause o f government r epression. I n fac t, s everal ci vil g roups in t he N iger D elta a re p romilitia, either declaring their support for militia activities or actually taking part in their mobilisation. This may b e one of t he reasons w hy s ome CSOs such as t he Ijaw Youth Council are sometimes listed as militia groups.

Impact of militia activities and the conflicts

Militia attacks have led to the seizure, occupation, destruction, vandalisation and disruption o f n umerous o il f low s tations, p ipelines a nd t erminals, a s w ell a s equipment, h elicopters a nd s hips sin ce 1998. Th e ac tivities o f t he mi litias h ave caused co nsiderable di sruption t o o il p roduction, des truction o f o il p roduction facilities a nd in security t o o il co mpany o perations, e quipment a nd s taff. Th ese activities have at various times led to a s evere decline in o il production, with oil production along the eastern and western axis of the region being cut by 17 to 50 per cent.59 In the first quarter of 2009, the countrys daily oil production dropped to 1,6 million barrels from an earlier 2,029 million barrels per day, mainly because of di sruptions in o il production c aused by mi litia ac tivities.60 Oil t heft, w hich i s aided b y a nd f uels t he co nflict, h as c aused h eavy los ses t o t he o il in dustry, particularly in terms of oil revenues. Between January and September 2008 alone, the country lost about US$20,7 billion to oil theft.61 The lo cal e conomy of t he region has b een de vastated, too. Farming, f ishing, trading, co mmerce, s chooling a nd r elated ac tivities h ave b een a bandoned in several communities due to hostilities and attacks. Pervasive insecurity and threats have exacerbated already precarious living conditions and livelihoods and raised living cos ts. Th e l ack o f s ecurity in t he r egion h as a lso le d t o a l ack o f infrastructural development and discouraged investment and capital inflow. The backlash i s t hat i t h as s trengthened t he co nditions o f un derdevelopment a nd poverty that contributed to the conflicts in the first place. The conflicts have also disarticulated the people from the social values, order and fa bric t hat h old co mmunities t ogether. Th e s ame i s t rue o f t raditional governance sys tems a nd in stitutions. A s a co nsequence, t here i s p ervasive lawlessness, mi litarisation o f s ocial r elations, v iolence a nd acr imony b etween groups and disunity. Among the youths there has emerged an aggressive, violent, lawless, criminal and lazy culture.62
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The militia groups perform these functions because governments at all levels are either un able o r r eluctant t o f ulfil t hese d uties. Th us mi litant le aders w ho s ee themselves a s p atriots, f eel o bliged t o u se p art o f t heir r esources t o s upport community development. This practice is common among militants based in the Ijaw co mmunities o f B ayelsa a nd D elta s tates a nd h as r esulted in s ome communities and local people identifying with the militia groups. These activities garner support for t he mi litias, as t hey are s een by community members as not only benefactors but also an alternative to government.

Militias as members of civil society

Militias and civil society organisations (CSOs) in t he Niger Delta have common origins a nd o bjectives, ex cept t hat t heir m ethods o f en gagement dif fer. Th e paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty provided the context for the emergence of militias. It is noteworthy that the youth movement that gave birth to ethnic and panethnic youth associations emerged as part of a n ew social movement that started as a result of the agitation in the region, and that the youth groups were part of civil society. Some of these groups, such as the NDVF and the FNDIC, were militant and m etamorphosed in to mi litia g roups. F urthermore, s ome s egments o f ci vil
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Resource conflicts and the human security crisis in the Niger Delta
The protests, militia activities and military operations in the region have combined to en shrine a sys tem o f in discriminate k illings, m aiming, ra pe, lo oting a nd destruction of property and homes. On t he roads, along the waterways, in t heir communities a nd et hnic r egions, t he p eople h ave b een ext ensively h arassed, flogged, beaten, detained and abused. Numerous settlements have been sacked or destroyed in t he f ighting b etween mi litias a nd t he mi litary a nd b etween t he militias, et hnic g roups, co mmunities a nd y outh g roups o r in t he s earches f or militants in the communities by the military.63 Mobile p olice a nd mi litary o perations a gainst p rotesting co mmunities h ave caused s evere de vastation a nd de aths in U muechem, Og oniland, Ik o, C hoba, Ikenya a nd Il aje. C ommunities s uch a s t he O di a nd O dioma w ere li terally destroyed. In 2003, military and militia confrontations led to the destruction of the Obumkiran, Kuntie, Setorubor and Okerenkoko communities. The cult wars and later mi litary ac tions a gainst mi litias in R ivers S tate c aused de vastation a nd killings a nd t urned s everal t owns a nd co mmunities s uch a s Tombia, B uguma, Bukuma, Ogbakiri, Amadi-Awa and Okirika and parts of Port Harcourt into ghost towns between 2003 and 2004, as most residents fled. The streets of Warri and Port Harcourt h ave n ot b een s pared mi litia a ttacks a nd mi litary o perations. H omes have b een b urnt o r des troyed, a s h ave s chools, c hurches, s tores, b usinesses a nd social faci lities. L ocal p eople, r esidents, b ystanders a nd co mmunity m embers, particularly y ouths, t he a ged, w omen a nd c hildren h ave b een k illed in t he fighting.64 Another co nsequence o f mi litary o perations a nd mi litia ac tivities h as b een internal di splacements. Th ousands o f in digenes h ave b een di splaced f rom t he communities a nd c lans t hat h ave b een s cenes o f in termilitia wa rs, mi litary a nd militia co nfrontations a nd mi litary a ttacks. S ome sim ply di sappeared in to t he forests, o thers h ave t aken s helter in n eighbouring co mmunities a nd s ome migrated to t he cities. R efugee c amps were established and in t he 2009 mi litary operations in Gb aramatu k ingdom in D elta S tate s ome di splaced p ersons t ook refuge in schools, hospitals and other public facilities.

West African States (ECOWAS) has not significantly intervened. This is perhaps due to Nigerias prominence in the regional organisation. However, there has been considerable in ternational in terest a s a r esult o f t he h eavy in ternational investments in t he Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea oil. It is noteworthy that Nigeria accounts for over 60 p er cent of t he oil in t he Gulf of Guinea, and it i s strategic in terms of being a secure source of future petroleum needs of the United States.65 Furthermore, the effect of the insecurity and attacks in the Niger Delta on the volatility of oil supply and prices have raised international concerns and led to interventions t o p rovide a s ecure a nd s table en vironment f or s ustained o il production and supplies. S econd, countries w hose citizens h ave b een v ictims of kidnapping h ave t ended t o p rovide s upport t o t he N igerian s ecurity a gencies. Third, t here have b een attempts to support t he Nigerian state or e ven intervene directly in t he m anagement o f t he co nflict. Th e US a nd B ritain h ave p rovided equipment and training support and the US has donated refurbished coast guard ships to the Nigerian navy.66 Fourth, there have been deployments and exercises in the Gulf of Guinea by the US Africa Command, which has become more active in the region as part of US government efforts to protect oil investments, offshore oil installations and shipments from the Gulf of Guinea.

Responses to the militias and conflicts by the Nigerian state and transnational oil companies
Response of the federal government
The central s trategy o f t he Nigerian f ederal g overnment h as b een t o p rotect o il installations, pacify the region in t erms of militarisation, repress conflict groups and cr eate a n en abling en vironment f or co ntinued o il p roduction. Thi s wa s evident in t he s uppression o f t he p eaceful p rotests b y t he Og oni a nd t he en tire region since the early 1990s. However, state repression turned the peaceful protests into violent confrontations as youth activists adopted armed confrontation as the mechanism for the pursuit of their goals.67 Apart from the military and repressive response, the government has tried to build p eace t hrough de velopment en gineering. N otable ef forts in clude t he establishment o f t he N iger D elta D evelopment B oard in 1961, t he P residential Committee on the 1,5 p er cent Oil Derivation Fund for the Oil Producing States in 1981, the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission in 1992, and the N iger D elta D evelopment C ommission in 2001. H owever, t hese ext raministerial agencies failed to achieve much development of the region due to overt
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Resource conflicts and regional and international interventions

In spite of the intensity of the conflict and regional and international ramifications for security and stability in the West African region, the Economic Community of
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centralisation, co rruption, p atron-client/prebendial p olitics, a nd t he l ack o f political will. While these intervention efforts raised expectations, their failure and the co ntinued a bsence o f co ncrete de velopment in creased r esentment a nd resistance.68 In 2009, o wing t o a b alance o f p ower a nd t error b etween t he mi litary a nd militias, particularly after the failure of a major military operation in the western Delta r egion, w hich wa s m et by ext ensive mi litia co unterattacks o n o il faci lities that saw daily productive decline to its lowest level ever, the federal government reached o ut t o mi litia le aders a nd p roclaimed a n a mnesty p rogramme. Th e programme t ook ef fect in O ctober 2009 a nd en tailed a di sarmament, demobilisation, r ehabilitation a nd r eintegration f or mi litia m embers. Th e programme wa s em braced by t he m ain mi litia g roups a nd a n es timated 17 000 members s urrendered a rms a nd en tered r ehabilitation c amps. Th e m ain mi litia groups declared a uni lateral ceasefire. However, there have been huge challenges of in adequate c amp s paces, p oor p lanning a nd im plementation, in adequate funding, poor management of the camps and poor political will and commitment. As a result, there has been mounting disenchantment, which has manifested in the suspension o f uni lateral ce asefire b y MEND a nd a lo w-scale r esumption o f hostilities.

position t hem f or p atronage f rom t he o il co mpanies. Th ese s truggles t riggered intra-community co nflicts t hat a ggravated t he v iolence in t he r egion. S uch conflicts h ave o ccurred in E vreni (D elta S tate) a nd N embe, Ogb olomabiri, a nd Peremabiri (Bayelsa State). Oil companies have been instrumental in the repression of protest activities in the r egion. Th ey o ften u se s ecurity o peratives t o b reak u p dem onstrations b y communities o r t o p rotect t hem a gainst a ngry co mmunities. Th e b rute f orce employed by these operatives has sometimes resulted in deaths and destruction of property, as occurred in, for example, the Umuechem case. This has incensed the people who perceive the oil companies to be allies of the federal government. To make matters worse, oil companies do n ot only guard their premises and area of operations w ith h eavily a rmed s oldiers a nd p olicemen, b ut a lso a rmed a nd motivated them and thereby made them overzealous in harassing the local people. Armed youths have also been hired to protect oil installations, which aggravated inter- and intra-youth group squabbles and arms proliferation. However, in s pite of operating under security shields, their facilities have been perennial objects of militia attacks.

CONCLUSION: ENDING THE VIOLENCE

The current discourse and opinion on the Niger Delta agree that military might is unlikely t o p rovide a s olution t o t he N iger D elta cr isis.71 As M ichael W atts emphatically states:
In the Niger Delta militarisation cannot guarantee stability Naked force, even with the best of American technical advisers and electronic gadgets, is doomed to failure and risks sliding more deeply into a low grade civil war with the prospects of massive escalation of violence and attacks on oil installations.72

Oil company responses

Just li ke t he g overnment, o il co mpanies h ave r esponded t o t he co nflicts w ith interventions in t he form of community development projects. For example, the Shell P etroleum D evelopment C ompany s pent US$32 mi llion o n co mmunity development in 1997, US$42,6 mi llion in 1998, US$60,23 mi llion in 2000, a nd US$68 mi llion in 2007. 69 However, b ecause o f t he a bsence o f co mmunity participation a nd in put in t he co mmunity de velopment p rocess, t hese interventions h ave l argely fa iled t o ac hieve t he desir ed g oals o f p roviding infrastructure a nd s ocial s ervices. B ecause co mpany in terventions w ere o ften compelled b y v iolent co mmunity p rotests, t here h ave em erged c ascades o f conflicts that have led to a vicious circle of violence as more conflicts meant more development attention.70 Significantly, oil companies have been buying peace with phoney contracts and payments t o co mmunity m embers in o rder t o en sure unin terrupted o il production. B ut t his h as c aused ext ensive di vision a nd f ractionalisation in t he communities as diverse community groups struggled for community leadership to
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Clearly, v iolent s uppression o f t he co nflict w ill accen tuate in security. Th e experience o f Yugoslavia h as s hown t hat r epression o nly sw eeps t he c auses o f agitation and dissent under the carpet for a m oment, but that they then flare up again, often with disastrous consequences.73 On the other hand, some participation in r esource o wnership a nd co ntrol, in creases in t he der ivation f und a nd abrogation of repressive oil laws will certainly return large development funds to the region and improve the situation, even though it may not immediately ensure development.
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One n eglected acco unt o f t he fa ilure o f t he W illink R eport74 to en gineer development in t he N iger D elta i s t he a bsence o f dem ocratic in put. Th e r eport predicated the success of its recommendations on the establishment of democratic institutions, w hich suggests t hat t he many years of authoritarian r ule in N igeria may have aggravated the crisis in the region. The ado ption o f dem ocratic p rinciples s uch a s t he r ule o f l aw, f undamental human rights, rule by consent and public interest-based political participation will enhance acco untability a nd t ransparency, w hich a re f undamental t o p eace building in t he N iger D elta. L ack o f p olitical p articipation co uld in duce a nd sustain poverty,75 just as self-interested participation promotes corruption, which, in turn, deepens the inequalities that trigger conflicts. We contend, therefore, that the de epening o f t he dem ocratic co ntent o f g overnance i s t he b est o ption f or securing peace in the Niger Delta. Furthermore, it should be noted that democratic methods and democratically based negotiations are yet to be adopted as a mechanism for resolving the conflict. The p rocesses o f b road co nsultation, p articipation, di alogue, n egotiations w ith critical ac tors and t he building of compromises and a greements h ave b een very poor. It should be noted that conflict resolution mechanisms, among others, are more effective in a democratic environment than violent confrontation. Thus, the democratisation o f t he co nflict m anagement p rocess w ould b e cr itical f or t he resolution of the conflict. In N igeria, e lections w hich a re a m ost cr itical a spect o f dem ocratic governance h ave b een a bused t hrough r igging o f v otes. Thi s m eans t hat t he leadership h ave n ot b een c hosen b y t he p eople a nd t hat n o s ocial co ntract o r compact h ave b een es tablished b etween t he p eople a nd t hose w ho g overn. Th e implication is that the needs and aspirations of citizens are not at the forefront of the governments agenda and activities. The result is frustrated expectations that have led to violence. Ike Okonta sums up the role of democratic, governance and rights deficits in the crisis as follows:
MEND properly understood, is the violent child of the deliberate and long running constriction of the public space in t he Niger Delta in w hich the ordinary citizens, now reduced to penurious citizens, can exercise their civil and political rights in the legitimate pursuit of material and social wellbeing. Behind the mask of the MEND militant is a p olitical subject forced to pick up an AK-47 t o restore his rights as a citizen.76 248
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Finally, t he ide a o f dem obilising, r ehabilitating a nd in tegrating mi litant y ouths through projects such as the arms surrender for cash payment in R ivers State in 20042005 and amnesty for militias that repudiate violence and surrender arms by the federal government in 20092010, has had some weaknesses. To have maximal conflict resolution effects, these projects should be carried out within a framework of peace agreements based on inclusive dialogue and in a comprehensive, planned, funded and effective programme that provides sufficient incentives for voluntary mass dem obilisation, p roductive e conomic en gagements a nd ef fective reintegration in to s ociety. E xisting p rogrammes o f s kills de velopment a nd economic em powerment b y g overnments, in ternational o rganisations, international donor agencies and non governmental organisations (NGOs) are still feeble, p articularly in t he lig ht o f t he h uge m ass un employment si tuation a nd economic decline. Besides, s omething concrete has to b e done to provide temporary e conomic support to militia members and leaders who have b een receiving huge amounts from o il t heft, k idnapping a nd ext ortion f rom o il co mpanies, p ayments f rom governments and commissions from vessels and oil theft syndicates. Apart from efforts aimed at a mi litia amnesty, development and political reform goals would be f utile w ithout a f undamental a nd co mprehensive r esolution o f t he r egions development and p olitical p roblems. T ackling t hese c hallenges i s f urther predicated o n t he w illingness o f t he p olitical le adership t o co mmit symbolic suicide,77 for dem ocracy w ill b e ac hieved o nly w hen t he p olitical le adership abandons its pursuit of parochial interests.78

NOTES
1 U U kiwo, F rom pirates t o militants: a hi storical p erspective o n a nti-state a nd a nti-oil company m obilisation a mong t he I jaw o f W arri, w estern N iger D elta, African Af fairs 106(425) (2007), 587610. A Ik elegbe, P opular a nd cr iminal v iolence a s in struments o f s truggle: t he c ase o f y outh militias in t he N iger D elta r egion, P aper p resented a t t he N ordic A frican I nstitute International Workshop on Violent Conflict in the Niger Delta, Oslo, 1819 August 2008. P C ollier and A H oeffler, On e conomic c auses of civil war, Oxford Economic Papers 50(4) (1998), 563573; P Collier and A Hoeffler, On the incidence of civil war in Africa, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(1) (2002), 1328. Ukiwo, From pirates to militants; U Ukiwo, Horizontal inequalities and insurgency in the Niger D elta, P aper p resented a t t he I nternational C onference o n t he N igerian S tate, Oi l Industry and the Niger Delta, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 1113 March 2008; A Ikelegbe, Beyond
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the threshold of civil struggle: youth militancy and the militiaisation of the resource conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, African Study Monographs 27(3) (2006), 87122. A Ikelegbe, The economy of conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria, African and Asian Studies 5(1) (2006), 155. Ukiwo, Horizontal inequalities and insurgency in the Niger Delta. Philippe B illon, B uying p eace o r f uelling wa r: t he r ole o f co rruption in a rmed co nflicts, Journal of International Development 15 (2003), 413426. Collier and Hoeffler, On economic causes of civil war; Collier and Hoeffler, On the incidence of civil war in Africa. The Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), Overview of SPDC Operations, Paper presented at SPDC seminar for academics, Port Harcourt, 56 November 2008. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Niger Delta human development report, Abuja: UNDP, 2006. Michael Watts, Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate? Conflict and violence in t he Niger Delta, Review of African Political Economy 114 (2007), 637660. S M M urshed a nd M Z T adjoeddin, R evisiting t he g reed a nd g rievance exp lanations f or violent in ternal co nflict, Journal o f I nternational D evelopment 21(1) (2008), 87111, 102, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/search/allsearch?mode=quicksearch&WISindexid1=W ISall&WISsearch1=revisiting+the+greed+and+grievance (accessed 14 January 2009). Murshed and Tadjoeddin, Revisiting the greed and grievance explanations, 104. B B B N aanen, Oil producing minorities and the restructuring of Nigerian federalism: the case of the Ogoni people, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 33(1) (1995), 4678. C O Ikporukpo, The oil industry and communal self-destruction in the Niger Delta region, Paper p resented a t t he Fir st P an I jaw C onference, 2003, R ivers S tate: I jaw C ongress Publications, 2126. Naanen, Oi l-producing min orities a nd t he r estructuring o f N igerian f ederalism; C harles Ukeje a nd W ale A debanwi, E thno-nationalist c laims in s outhern N igeria: in sights f rom Yoruba a nd I jaw n ationalisms sin ce t he 1990s, Ethnic a nd R acial S tudies 31(3) (2008), 563591; K O koko a nd N J Nna, F ederalism and r esource allocation: t he N igerian experience, Nigerian Journal of Oil and Politics 1(1) (1997), 1635. Lemmy O wugah, Th e N iger D elta co nflict: r esource co ntrol a nd r evolutionary v iolence, Paper presented at the International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 1113 March 2008, 715. Owugah, Local resistance and the state, 58. Watts, Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate?, 656. Ibid, 656; Osita Agbu, Ethnic militias and the threat to democracy in post-transition Nigeria, Research r eport 127, N ordiska A frika I nstitute, 2004, 2932; S J oab-Peterside, On t he militarisation of Nigerias Niger Delta: the genesis of ethnic militia in R ivers State, African Conflict Profile 1(2) (2005), 4045; Ike Okonta, Behind the mask: Niger Delta economies of violence, Working P aper 11, O xford: S t P eters C ollege, O xford U niversity, 2006; H uman Rights Watch, Violence in Nigerias oil rich Rivers State in 2004, Briefing Paper, 2005, 4. Kaiama Declaration, Resolutions of the All Ijaw Youths Conference, Kaiama, Bayelsa State, 11 December 1998. Ukiwo, Horizontal inequalities and insurgency in the Niger Delta.
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Okonta, Behind the mask. Ikelegbe, Beyond the threshold of civil struggle. Ibid, 47. Ukiwo, Horizontal inequalities and insurgency in the Niger Delta, 1175. Human Rights Watch, Violence in Nigerias oil-rich Rivers State, 3. The Punch, 18 May 2009; This Day, 18 May 2009; The Nation, 18 May 2009. Ikelegbe, Popular and criminal violence as instruments of struggle, 1718. Ibid, 1819. S I Ibaba, Alienation and militancy in the Niger Delta: hostage taking and the dilemma of the Nigerian state, African Journal on Conflict Resolution 8(2) 2008, 1134, 22. Watts, Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate?, 653. Ibid. Agbu, Ethnic militias and the threat to democracy, 29. Claude Ake, The political question, in H E A lapiki (ed), The Nigerian political process, Port Harcourt: Emhai Printing and Publishing, 2001; E Ekekwe, Class and state in Nigeria, Lagos: Longman, N igeria, 1986; S O yovbaire, Th e N igerian s tate a s a co nceptual va riable, in C Edogun (ed), Nigeria: politics, administration and development, Port Harcourt: The Nigeria Political Science Association, University of Port Harcourt, 1980; K K Aaron, Can a privatised state p rivatise? I nsights a nd exp eriences f rom N igerias p rivatisation p rogramme, THED I Monograph 1, Port Harcourt: Kemuela Publications, 2006. Human Rights Watch, Violence in Nigerias oil-rich Rivers State, 3. Agbu, Ethnic m ilitias a nd t he t hreat t o d emocracy; H uman R ights W atch, V iolence in Nigerias o il r ich R ivers S tate; P M L ubeck, M J W atts a nd R onnie L ipschutz, Convergent interest: US en ergy security and the securing of Nigerian democracy, Internal policy report, Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, 2007; Ib aba, Alienation and militancy in the Niger Delta; Joab-Peterside, On the militarisation of Nigerias Niger Delta. Ikporukpo, The oil industry and communal self-destruction in the Niger Delta region, 21. O Nnoli, Ethnic politics in Nigeria, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers 1978; J S Coleman, Nigeria: background to nationalism, B enin City: Brosburg and Winstrom, 1986; A ugustine Ikelegbe, S tate, mi litias a nd co nflict in N igeria, Canadian Journal o f African S tudies 39(3) (2005), 490516. Ukiwo, From pirates to militants. C O O pukri a nd I S Ib aba, I nter-ethnic co nflicts in N igeria a nd t he n ational q uestion, Development Studies Round Table 2(2) (2006), 3547 Ikporukpo, The oil industry and communal self-destruction in the Niger Delta region. Ibid; S I Ib aba, Understanding t he N iger D elta crisis, P ort H arcourt: A methyst a nd Colleagues Publishers, 2005. Joab-Peterside, On the militarisation of Nigerias Niger Delta. Ikporukpo, The oil industry and communal self-destruction in the Niger Delta region, 26. Cyril O bi, En ter t he dra gon? C hinese o il co mpanies a nd r esistance in t he N iger D elta, Review o f A frican P olitical Ec onomy 35(3) (2008), 417434, 423, h ttp://www.informaworld.com (accessed 14 January 2009). Aaron, C an a p rivatised s tate p rivatise? ; O Ib eanu, T wo r ights m ake a w rong: b ringing human r ights b ack in to N iger D elta di scourse, P aper p resented a t t he I nternational Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State,
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1113 M arch 2008, 96106; K O koko, J N na a nd S I Ib aba, The p olitics o f o il a nd t he development o f u nderdevelopment i n t he N iger D elta, P ort H arcourt, U niversity o f P ort Harcourt Press, 2006; A Ikein The impact of oil on a developing country: the case of Nigeria, Ibadan: E vans B rothers (N igeria Pu blishers), 1991; C O Ik porukpo, F ederalism, p olitical power and the economic power game: conflict over access to petroleum resource in Nigeria, Environment P lanning, G overnment a nd P olicy 14 (1996), 159177; C O O pukri a nd S I Ibaba, Oi l-induced en vironmental deg radation a nd in ternal p opulation di splacement in Nigerias Niger D elta, Journal of Sustainable D evelopment in Africa 10(1) (2008), 173193, http://www.jsd-africa.com/Jsda/V10N1_Spring2008/PDF/OilInducedEnvDegr.pdf (accessed 13 M arch 2008); N aanen, Oi l p roducing min orities a nd t he r estructuring o f Nigerian federalism; N J Nna, The Niger Delta: state legislation and disempowerment, Owerri: Springfield, 2001. Ukeje and Adebanwi, Ethno-nationalist claims in southern Nigeria, 581. SPDC, Overview of SPDC operations. Ibaba, Understanding the Niger Delta crisis. Mbanefoh a nd E gwaikhide, R evenue a llocation in N igeria: der ivation p rinciple r evisited, 226. Watts, Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate?, 653. National Standard, 15 November 2007, 20. Ikelegbe, Beyond the threshold of civil struggle Joab-Peterside, On the militarisation of Nigerias Niger Delta, 4647. Human Rights Watch, Violence in Nigerias oil rich Rivers State, 46. S I Ibaba, The environment and sustainable development in the Niger Delta: the Bayelsa State experience, Unpublished PhD thesis, Port Harcourt: University of Port Harcourt, 2004. Murshed a nd T adjoeddin, R evisiting t he g reed a nd g rievance exp lanations f or v iolent internal conflict. Ikelegbe, The economy of conflict, 117. The Punch, 13 March 2009. Report of the Niger Delta Technical C ommittee 2008, 120. Thi s committee was s et up in September 2008 by the federal government to collate and review all past reports on the Niger Delta, appraise the recommendations, and make other proposals that will assist in co nflict resolution a nd p eace b uilding in t he N iger D elta. Th e co mmittee s ubmitted i ts r eport in November 2008. E Osaghae, A Ik elegbe, O O larinmoye and S O khomina, Youth militias, s elf-determination and resource control struggles in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, 2007. Ikelegbe, Beyond the threshold of civil struggle. Human Rights Watch, Violence in Nigerias oil-rich Rivers State, 9. P M L ubeck, M J W atts and R L ipschutz, C onvergent interests: US energy security and the securing of Nigerian democracy, International Policy Report, Center for International Policy, Washington, DC, 2007, 4. Ikelegbe, The economy of conflict, 4748. Joab-Peterside, On the militarisation of Nigerias Niger Delta, 48. Oil M inerals P roducing A reas D evelopment C ommssion (O MPADEC), Quarterly R eport (1) 1993, 15; Owugah, Local resistance and the state.
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69 I S Ib aba, Understanding t he N iger D elta cr isis, P ort H arcourt: A methyst a nd C olleagues Publishers, 2005. 70 K O koko, Th e S hell P etroleum D evelopment C ompany (S PDC) H ost C ommunity Relations Survey, Unpublished report, 1998. 71 The Nation, 18 May 2009; Watts, Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate?, 20. 72 Watts, Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate?, 20. 73 Gregory En egwea a nd Ga briel U moden, NYSC: tw enty y ears o f n ational s ervice, L agos: Gabumo Publishing, 1993, 1. 74 The W illink C ommission, Report o f t he c ommission a ppointed t o en quire i nto t he f ears o f minorities and the means of allaying them, London: Her Majestys Stationery Office, 1958. 75 Okonta, Behind the mask. 76 Ibid, 23. 77 P Patrick Wilmot, Apartheid and African liberation, Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1982, 148. 78 I A B aamus, E thnic mi litia m ovements a nd t he cr isis o f p olitical o rder in p ost-military Nigeria, Journal of Social Science 13(3) (2006), 191198, 197.

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C HAPTER 9

Rebels, militias and governance in Sudan

Samson S Wassara

INTRODUCTION
Understanding t he n ature o f rebellions a nd ci vil wa rs in S udan requires a c lose look a t t he i ssues t hat co ntribute t o s uspicion, l ack o f co nfidence a nd m utual distrust in its heterogeneous society. The primary actors in the armed violence are the g overnment, r ebels a nd mi litia g roups. Th eir co mmitment t o t he u se o f violence in addr essing problems could b e examined f rom t he p erspective of t he economic and social structures of the country, ideologies, the quest for power at different le vels, a nd t he s truggle f or co ntrol o f r esources. I t i s dif ficult t o disassociate t he p henomenon o f a rmed v iolence f rom t he r ole o f o ther fac tors influencing do mestic co nflicts. H uman s ecurity i s t hreatened b y r esponses o f governments, r ebels a nd t he mi litias t hat a re dir ectly in volved in t he dif ferent violent conflicts in Sudan. The purpose of this chapter is to identify militia and rebel groups and review their roles and those of other actors in the Sudanese conflict situation. The chapter also examines factors of violence and the strategies actors adopt during the armed conflict. Hence, t here a re r elated co ncepts t hat s hould b e exp lained in o rder t o understand t he n ature o f r ebels a nd o ther a rmed S udanese g roups t hat o perate across international boundaries.
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The history of political instability in in dependent Sudan can be attributed to the co lonial legac y t hat i solated S outhern S udan f rom n orthern S udan. Furthermore, the causes of rebellions and armed violence are rooted in the ethnic composition o f S udan, in hi storical g rievances a nd in e conomic di sparities. Incompatible p ublic p olicies a nd p roblems o f m arginalisation o f t he co untrys regions in terms of wealth and power-sharing are at the heart of centre-periphery disputes in the country. Nearly all rebel groups in the country claim that they are fighting because their regions have been neglected by Khartoum-based oligarchies since in dependence in 1956. G iven t he r ise in t he n umber o f r ebellions, p ostindependent r egimes h ave u sed s everal s trategies t o un dermine r ebel g roups in Sudan. The cheapest and most effective strategy to contain rebellions was to enlist civilians in mi litia groups. This chapter therefore attempts to provide an analysis of t he S udanese r ebel g roups, t ogether w ith t he g overnment r esponses a nd t he manner in w hich t hey m anipulate et hnicity, s ocial s tructure a nd ide ologies t o control p ower a nd e conomic r esources. I t a lso f ocuses o n r esponses o f t he international community to the problems related to the violence in Sudan.

Historical grievances
The conflict in Sudan can be said to be partly a product of history and the colonial legacy. The slave trade during the Turko-Egyptian period and the Mahdist regime at the en d o f t he 19t h cen tury lef t i ts m ark o n et hnic r elationships in S udan. Reference t o n ative S udanese b y s ome n ortherners a s s laves (abd) perpetuates distrust and indignation. These ancient hatreds revive identity differentiations and violent rivalries, contributing to prolonged conflict in Sudan. With regard to Sudans colonial legacy, scholars such as Mohamed O Beshir, Sir James Robertson, Oliver B Albino, Robert O Collins and Severino Fuli argue that the British S outhern p olicy was p artly responsible for t he north-south divide in Sudanese p olitics.2 The S outhern p olicy f ormulated b y t he B ritish co lonial administration in the 1920s advocated separate development for Southern Sudan. This co nsisted o f c losing S outhern S udan t o a ll I slamic a nd A rab inf luences in terms o f t rade, e ducation a nd r eligion. Thi s p olicy c hanged o nly a fter a n administrative co nference o n 12 A pril 1946 r ecommended t hat t he f uture o f Southern Sudan should be linked to a united Sudan. It is against this background that the colonial administration implemented a n ew policy of merging Southern Sudan and northern Sudan as an administrative unit after the Juba Conference on 1215 June 1947. Thi s wa s f ollowed b y t he n omination o f s outherners in to t he Legislative Assembly in 1948. A ll t hese de velopments le d t o t he involvement o f Southern Sudanese in the political system tuned to self-determination of Sudan. However, t he im plementation o f t he S udanisation p rogramme r esulted in a public o utcry in S outhern S udan b ecause t he ci vil s ervice wa s do minated b y northerners. S outherners w ere di sappointed b y t he ac tion o f t he t ransitional government b ecause t hey h eld o nly six j unior admini strative p ositions. Thi s development was regarded by Southern politicians as deceit and another effort at Northern internal colonialism. Southern m embers o f p arliament c alled f or a co nference t o di scuss a constitution that would embody a f ederal status for Southern Sudan. On 13 M ay 1955, Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari issued a stern warning against holding such a co nference, b ut i t n evertheless t ook p lace o n 56 J uly 1955. 3 Conference participants dem anded, a mong o thers, a f ederal sys tem o f g overnment. Th e political co nfrontations t hat en sued le d t o r iots o f w orkers in J uly 1955 a t t he
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THE NATURE OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY IN SUDAN

Sudan i s a co untry s ubject t o et hnic f usion over mi llennia. Its e arly hi story h as revolved l argely a round exp ansion o f E gyptian inf luences s outhwards t hrough trade a nd co nquests. A ncient in digenous k ingdoms in t he N ile va lley, s uch a s Meroe, Alwa, Makuria and Soba, were infiltrated by the Arabs over centuries. The present Sudan is the product of the Turko-Egyptian military campaigns in search of gold and slaves led by Mohamed Ali from Egypt in 1821. The expansion of the invasion into the Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains, and later to the southern part of Sudan, b rought t ogether p opulations w ith dif ferent o rigins. Th e et hnic composition of contemporary Sudan includes Arabs, Nubians, Beja and Fur in the north, N ilotics (Din ka, N uer S hilluk et c), a nd n on-Nilotic g roups s uch a s t he Azande who live on the Nile-Congo divide plateau.1 The domination of power by ethnic g roups t hat c laim A rab des cent h as b een p artially r esponsible f or t he conflicts and rebellions in Sudan. Indeed, the perception of the Sudanese conflicts as A rabs v ersus b lack A fricans f inds i ts o rigins in t he et hnic s tructure o f t he society.
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Nzara a groindustrial co mplex. Th e de ath o f ci vilians a t t he h ands o f n orthern troops during the riots accelerated the Torit mutiny (which started on 18 August 1955) and marked the beginning of rebellions in Sudan before independence was attained.4

The quest for cultural and ideological domination

Issues o f n ational iden tity, et hnicity, l anguage a nd r eligion a re un derpinned b y debates about the contradictory nature of Sudanese politics that drives the society into r ebellion. S udan i s di verse in t erms o f g eography, c ulture a nd t he p eople. Lesch des cribes in det ail t he di verse et hnic co mposition o f t he s ociety a nd t he contested n ational iden tity o f S udan.7 The ide ological f oundations o f S udanese politics were constructed on the platform of uniformities. It means the nationalist movements t hat s tepped in to t he s hoes o f co lonial p owers a t in dependence formulated exclusive national policies based on race and religion. Ethnic co mplex a nd e conomic m arginalisation w ere im portant fac tors in subsequent rebellions against the political regimes in K hartoum. Lesch8 and Jok9 demonstrate that the military government of General Ibrahim Abboud took over power f rom ci vilians in 1958 t o im pose t he p olicies o f A rabisation a nd Islamisation t hat p revious ci vilian p ost-independent g overnments co uld n ot enforce. The military regime took repressive measures such as forced Islamisation of chiefs, changing weekends from Sunday to Friday (that is, observing Friday as the weekly day off for government, public and business offices instead of Sunday) and f orcing p arents t o s end c hildren t o K oranic s chools ( khalwas) t o enf orce cultural domination on Southern Sudan. Although the regime was brought down by popular demonstrations in 1964, the successive central governments continued similar p olicies until t he C omprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was sig ned in 2005.

Power and political rivalry

Policy in congruities ado pted b y the p ost-colonial g overnments o f S udan contributed to the political violence and the emergence of rebel movements and militia groups on the political scene. The roots of the divisive policies and political rivalry could be traced back to the vision and subsequent split of the Graduates Congress in to r ival p olitical a ssociations in t he 1940s. Thi s o rganisation wa s created in 1938 b y Sudanese civil servants to advocate self-determination during the colonial period. The Graduates Congress later fragmented into two political parties: Ashigga and Umma.5 Ashigga became the National Unionist Party in t he 1950s a nd le d t o t he t ransitional g overnment un der t he l ast co lonial g overnorgeneral o f S udan. Th ese p olitical p arties w ere a t t he cen tre o f t he di visive a nd violent political developments after independence. The first post-colonial elections in 1958 revealed serious divisions in the ranks of the northern parties. The Umma Party won the election, but could not attain a decisive victory to enable it to push an Islamic constitution through parliament. The s everity o f t he p olitical f eud b etween t he U mma P arty a nd o ther p olitical parties in vited t he S udanese mi litary t o t he p olitical a rena. Thi s le d t o G eneral Ibrahim A bboud t aking p ower t hrough a mi litary coup d tat on 17 N ovember 1958.6 The purpose of the takeover was to silence the demand of southerners for a federal sys tem o f g overnment a nd t o im pose A rabisation a nd I slamisation b y force. A bbouds p olicies p recipitated a n ational p olitical di vide a nd le d t o t he emergence of the Anyanya movement in 1963. At the time, competition for power between civilian and military elites became a n ew p henomenon in S udanese p olitics. I n fac t, p ower os cillated b etween t he military a nd t he ci vilian e lites t hroughout t he p ost-colonial hi story o f S udan. Rebellions w ere t he common den ominator in t he r ivalries b etween t he mi litary and democratic governments. Most regime changes took place in Sudan when an active civil war was raging in the country.
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Economic and social exclusion

Historically, t he co lonial g overnment wa s n ot in terested in b alanced e conomic growth. I t f ocused o n exp ort-oriented de velopment p rogrammes s uch a s t he production o f co tton a nd gum A rabic. A gricultural s chemes a nd t ransport infrastructure were planned and developed to respond to British demand for these products. F or t his r eason, ra ilway lin es a nd a groindustry s prang u p in cen tral Sudan, while infrastructure in the outlying regions of southern and western Sudan was n eglected. Th e co lonial de velopment p rogramme l aid t he f oundation o f imbalanced economic development. As a result, the post-colonial governments of Sudan inherited the Gezira Scheme and Sudan Railways, in addition to a few light industries around Khartoum. There are manifest links between economic policies, welfare o f ci tizens a nd a rmed co nflicts in a g iven p olitical sys tem. S tudies o f
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conflict economics demonstrate that there is a potential for violence when glaring economic disparities characterise an economic system and armed conflicts have economic cos ts r elated t o wa ging ci vil wa rs o r p reventing t hem.10 This wa s t he situation in S udan w hen A bbouds mi litary r egime l aunched t he f irst t en-year national de velopment p lan in 1960 a nd t he s ubsequent f ive-year p lans d uring Nimeiris military regime in the 1970s. Plans formulated by the government reinforced concentration of development programmes in cen tral Sudan. For example, new d ams were built at Er R usairis and New Halfa to boost irrigation projects in Khashm el Girba and Managil; sugar factories w ere co nstructed a t G uneid H ajr e l-Asalaya a nd K enana; a nd cem ent factories were built in R abak and Atbara. These plans allowed a concentration of development activities in the centre of the country while outlying regions such as Southern S udan, t he N uba M ountains, s outhern B lue N ile, e astern S udan a nd Darfur were excluded from economic development, thus exacerbating feelings of marginalisation. Th e r ebellions a nd ci vil wa rs a fter t he in dependence o f S udan could be attributed to economic and social exclusion from national development plans.

Map 91: Oil exploration and conflict areas

Oil exploration and exploitation

A n ew fac tor t hat co ntributed t o t he exi sting p roblems wa s o il. Oi l i s a lso considered an immediate cause of the civil war that started in 1983. The discovery of oil in 1978 and how it was exploited was a major factor in triggering the conflict between t he g overnment o f N imeiri a nd t he r egional g overnment o f S outhern Sudan in 1983. 11 Oil exploitation in S outhern Sudan adds to the regions strategic importance and attracted transnational companies (TNCs) such as the American Chevron, the French Total, and the Canadian Arakis Energy Corporation. These companies were involved in o il exploration and exploitation in t he region in t he period 19781998. P atey refers to Chevron, Total and Arakis as first movers and to Talisman, OVM-Austria and Lundin Petroleum which entered the race for oil in 19982003 a s Western j uniors.12 But p ressure f rom h uman r ights g roups forced o ut t he f irst t wo in 2002 a nd 2003 r espectively, le aving o nly L undin Petroleum of Sweden still in operation in Sudan.
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Source: http://www.rightsmaps.com/.

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Asian TN Cs, s uch a s t he C hina N ational P etroleum C orporation, t he Malaysian Petronas and the Indian ONGC, filled the vacuum left by the departed Western o il in vestors. Th ese TN Cs co ntinued t o o perate in S udanese o ilfields despite cr iticism b y h uman r ights o rganisations. Th e W est acc used t hem o f sponsoring militia in Unity State and northern Upper Nile to protect their business interests. The desire to control the oilfields became a decisive factor in the creation and use of tribal militia forces to ensure the security of TNCs in the oil areas. The relations b etween TN Cs a nd mi litia g roups w ere n ot w ell r eceived b y t he lo cal population a nd t he S udan P eoples L iberation A rmy (S PLA). Oi lfield s ecurity arrangements b etween t he government, t he TNCs and t he lo cal mi litia t argeted local co mmunities t hat w ere u prooted a nd r eplaced b y n ew s ettlers. P aul Wani Gore13 explains the demographic impact of oil exploration in the northern Upper Nile as follows:
First, during the civil war people were forced to leave their land in masses either as displaced p eople w ithin t he G oS co ntrolled a reas o r b ehind t he S PLA lin es. Th e population in t he area was thus drastically reduced. Second, those who remained behind were dislodged or killed when oil was discovered on their land. About 80 villages were burned and the inhabitants were either killed or forced to escape from the advancing army and the militias who came to clear the area to make way for the oil companies.

rebel groups have emerged to seek justice for the marginalised peoples of Sudan through armed struggle. The history of rebel groups since independence reveals that S outhern Sudan wa s t he h othouse o f t hese r ebellions, le ading t he w orld t o describe the conflict in the country as a southnorth conflict. As different civilian and military regimes emerged and collapsed, there were also a m ultiplication of rebel g roups in t he t ransitional areas such as t he Nuba Mountains and t he Blue Nile, as well as in other regions such as eastern Sudan and Darfur. Although t his c hapter em phasises t he S PLA a nd S udan L iberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) rebel groups in Sudan, table 91 provides a summary of all the main rebel groups in Sudan from 1955 to 2009. Table 91: Main rebel groups in Sudan
Year Rebel movement launched Torit Mutineers 1955 Estimated Leadership strength* NA Comments/notes

Emidio Tafeng Some disappeared into the countryside and others resettled in and Paul Ali Gbutala Congo-Lopoldville (Kinshasa) where they regrouped to launch the Anyanya I armed movement Emidio Tafeng, 19631969 Joseph Lagu, 19701972 Operations concentrated along the border areas of Congo (now the DRC), Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. Disbanded in 1972 with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement Remnants of the Akobo Mutiny in 1975 who escaped into Ethiopia. Leaders killed by the SPLA; dispersed and became government militia in Upper Nile. Choul and Koang replaced the murdered leaders

Anyanya

1963

15 000

Despite t hese in cidents, t he A sian TN Cs r emained imm une t o h uman r ights groups protests to excesses committed by government forces and the militias in Sudan. Th ey w ere in terested in t he exp loitation o f t he o il a t a ny cos t. I n 2004, China had the largest share (41 p er cent) in Petrodar, a co nsortium of the China National P etroleum C orporation, P etronas (40 p er cen t) a nd o ther les ser companies. The Chinese brand of bilateralism with the government of Sudan was not linked to conflict resolution, as it kept aloof from the excesses committed by the g overnment o r i ts t ribal mi litias in o ilfields a nd e ven side d w ith S udan in multilateral forums such as the UN Security Council.

Anyanya II

1977

NA

REBEL GROUPS IN SUDAN

Sudanese rebel groups can be def ined as organised armed movements that have risen up against central governments in Khartoum to pursue identity, nationalism, justice, p olitical r ights a nd c hange in t he p olitical sys tem es tablished sin ce independence of the country in 1956. From the inception of the SPLA in 1983, the distribution of rebel groups has tended to stretch beyond Southern Sudan. Various
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Samuel Gai Tut; Akuot Atem to 19751983; William Abdalla Choul; Gordon Koang Dr John Garang, 19832005

Sudan Peoples Liberation Army

1983

125 000*

Launched in 1983 and supported by the Ethiopian Derg. Operated in the whole Southern Sudan, parts of the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and eastern Sudan. Transformed into an army in 2005 after the CPA

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Eastern Front

2005

6 000 to 7 000

Musa Mohamed Ahmed and Mabruk Salim Mubarak Abdel Wahid el-Nur (2003 to date)

An amalgam of rebel groups that operated under the umbrella of the Democratic National Alliance established in 1989. They signed the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement in 2007 Operates in the three states of Darfur with a concentration around Jebel Marra Mountain. The SLA Abdel Wahid faction continues to wage an armed struggle to liberate Darfur

Sudan Liberation Army

2003

8 000 to 9 000

Koang C hol. However, t he M arxist-Leninist r egime o f Ethiopia did n ot len d i ts support t o t he Anyanya I I movement, w hich c alled f or s eparation o f S outhern Sudan. (Thi s c hapter w ill t reat t he S PLA a nd S udan L iberation A rmy [S LA] a s typical S udanese exa mples o f t he p roliferation o f r ebel g roups t hat w ere established b ecause o f m arginalisation a nd w hich s trived t o ac hieve j ustice in a united Sudan.)

THE SUDAN PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY

The SPLA emerged as a r esult of acc umulated g rievances of S outhern Sudanese against the central government in Khartoum, such as poor implementation of the Addis A baba A greement. Th e a brogation o f t he A ddis A baba A greement a nd promulgation of September Laws in 1983 were merely the final nails in the coffin of the decade-long fragile peace. The SPLA originated in the Bor mutiny on 13 May 1983 under the command of Karbino Kuanyin. It was the result of an underground resistance movement led by John Garang. The Ethiopian government requested the Southern Sudanese to submit co ncept n otes o utlining t heir g oals a nd o bjectives t o p rove t heirs wa s a liberation movement worth supporting. The first paper presented by the Anyanya II leadership s tressed s ecession o f S outhern S udan f rom t he r est o f S udan. However, the Ethiopian government rejected the idea of secession and accordingly refused to support a cause that would play into the hands of Eritrean secessionist armed movements. John Garang then prepared a second concept paper, stressing unity of the Sudan on a n ew basis that would create New Sudan, which won the acceptance o f t he E thiopian g overnment. Th e p aper s tated t hat t he S udanese movement would create a socialist-oriented united Sudan and that the movement would b e c alled t he S udan P eoples L iberation M ovement/Army (S PLM/A). Ethiopian en dorsement o f Ga rangs p aper s parked a de adly p ower s truggle between his g roup and t he Anyanya I I supporters, t he majority of w hom hailed from the Nuer Nilotic group. The disagreement degenerated into a Din ka versus Nuer confrontation and political leaders of Anyanya II such as Samuel Gai Tut and Akuot Atem were killed.15 The launching of the SPLA on a di vided platform of Sudan (secession versus unity) co ntinued t o h aunt t he r ebel g roup in i ts de velopment a s a li beration movement. In recognition of this fact, Arop attributes the following statement to John Garang:
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Minni Minawi Joined the government of Sudan after signing the DPA in 2006. (2006 to Operated in Darfur like a prodate) government militia group Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 2003 5 000 Khalil Ibrahim Operates in Darfur, but attacked Omdurman in May 2008. Signed a framework peace agreement with the government in Qatar in February 2010

* Excluding joint integration units, police, prisons and wildlife services. Sources: constructed by the author from sources such as Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: from conflict to peace, Khartoum: Khartoum Bookshop, 1975, 68; Grard Prunier, Armed movements in Sudan, Chad, CAR, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Analyse 02/08, Berlin: Centre for International Peace Operations, 2008, 34; ICG, Sudan: saving peace in the east, Africa Report 102 (5 January 2006), 6; Sudan Issue Brief 15, December 2009, 8, htpp://www.smallarmssurvey sudan.org (accessed 15 March 2010).

Historical fac ts a bout p olitical co nflict in S udan s how t hat t he n umber o f Sudanese r ebel g roups i s in creasing.14 The f irst r ecognised r ebel g roup in p ostcolonial Sudan was the Anyanya movement. This rebel group concluded the Addis Ababa Agreement w ith t he mi litary g overnment of Jaafar Nimeiri in 1972. Th e agreement g ranted t he g roup a f orm o f autonomy simi lar t o t he f ederal sys tem southerners were calling for before the independence of Sudan. Disenchantment with t he implementation o f t he a greement c ame t o lig ht w hen t he A kobo Wau garrisons and Juba Airport soldiers mutinied during the period 19751976, which led t o t he des ertion f rom t he a rmy b y f ormer Anyanya soldiers. Th e A kobo mutineers co ngregated a t B ilpam in E thiopia un der t he co mmand o f G ordon
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Our objective was therefore to influence Anyanya II and to have them join us. The Anyanya II, on the other hand, were trying to influence us to join them. Thus, at the start we had two movements with different objectives. While SPLM was for the unity of the Sudan, the Anyanya II was for the separation of Southern Sudan.16

The S PLA ide ology wa s s pelled o ut in t he r efined do cument J ohn Ga rang presented to the Ethiopian government. The SPLM Manifesto issued in July 1983 embraced Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology. Tenets of the manifesto rotate around issues such as creation of a new united Sudan that would provide equality and j ustice t o m arginalised a reas; adoption o f a socialist system o f r ule; restructuring of power of the central government to end the monopoly of power by groups of individuals such as cliques in Khartoum, and fighting against racism that minority groups have institutionalised and instrumentalised to repress people of the marginalised areas of Sudan. Having successfully overcome the Anyanya II, the SPLA institutionalised the military co mmand s tructure a nd i ts p olitical w ing, t he S PLM. J ohn Ga rang became i ts c hairman a nd co mmander-in-chief o f t he S PLA. K erubino Kwanyin Bol a nd W illiam N yuon B any w ere b oth p romoted t o t he g rade o f lieu tenantcolonel a nd w ere m ade dep uty c hairman a nd dep uty co mmander-in-chief a nd chief o f s taff f or s ecurity o perations r espectively. Sa lva K iir wa s e levated t o t he grade o f m ajor a nd appointed dep uty c hief o f s taff f or s ecurity o perations. Th e SPLA wa s o fficially l aunched. M any o fficers a nd o fficials def ected f rom t he government and the army to join the SPLA. They were absorbed into the existing military and civilian structure established by the movement. The S PLA wa s s uccessful mi litarily in i ts e arly d ays. Thi s wa s r einforced b y intensive propaganda campaigns from a radio t ransmitter in E thiopia. The rebel group was able to build a credible army that managed to overrun and control main towns in S outhern Sudan. With the exception of Malakal, the SPLA captured all towns e ast o f t he W hite N ile b y 1989. M ilitary s uccesses o f t he S PLA w ere accompanied by diplomacy. The rebel group left channels of communication open with g roups s uch a s t he N ational A lliance o f w orkers a nd p olitical p arties t hat culminated in t he K oka D am D eclaration o n 24 M arch 1986. Th e de claration called f or co mmitment t o co nflict r esolution; es tablishment o f p arliamentary democracy; r einstatement o f t he 1964 co nstitution o f S udan; a bolition o f t he September Laws (Sharia laws); and formation of a unity government. The collapse of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia led to internal dissent in t he SPLA. Two senior SPLA officers, Riek Machar and Lam Akol, staged a premature
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military co up t o o ust t he m ovements le ader, J ohn Ga rang. Th e N asir fac tion managed t o r elease s enior S PLA o fficers s uch a s K erubino K uanyin a nd Th on Arok Th on W illiam N yuon f rom det ention, w ho t hen j oined t he fac tion. Th e failure of the coup had a lasting effect on the SPLA, which led to it being divided into the Torit (or mainstream) and Nasir factions. It degenerated into intertribal violence that pitched the Nuer against the Dinka. The Bor Dinka bore the brunt of the conflict, as t he Nuer-dominated Nasir fac tion overran towns and v illages in Jonglei State. It drove out t he B or Din ka f rom t heir areas, forcing t hem t o s eek refuge in E quatoria. In addition, prominent s outhern p oliticians s uch a s Joseph Oduho and Martin Majier were casualties of the power struggle between the Torit and Nasir factions. The Nasir faction collaborated with the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime, w ith t he s upport of t he n ew Tigrean-dominated regime in A ddis Ababa under Meles Zenawi, to overrun almost all the towns east of the White Nile previously controlled by the SPLA. The SPLA received moral and military support from Kenya and Uganda after losing its rear bases in Ethiopia. With this support, it was able to reorganise to halt government offensives in a n arrow strip of land along the border of Sudan with Uganda. This led to the Nasir group being isolated from neighbouring countries, especially Ethiopia, which compelled the group to open communications with the NIF r egime in K hartoum. Thi s c ulminated o n 21 A pril 1997 in a n a greement known as the Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA). This agreement revealed a level of fragmentation in the ranks of the Nasir faction.17 There were seven signatories to the agreement:
I I I I I I I

The Southern Sudan Independent Movement led by Riek Machar The SPLA Bahr el Ghazal group led by Kerubino Kuanyin Bol The SPLA Bor group led by Arok Thon Arok The SPLA independent group led by Kwac Makuei The Equatoria Defence Force led by Theophilus Ochang The Union of African Parties under the leadership of Samuel Aru Bol The SPLM-United led by Lam Akol (this group signed a separate agreement in 1997 called the Fashoda Peace Agreement)

These developments weakened the SPLA in t he 1990s until the period leading to IGAD (I nter-governmental A uthority o n D evelopment) r ounds o f n egotiations culminating in the CPA signing in Kenya. The government of Sudan exploited the situation to incorporate the disparate forces of the Nasir faction into the ranks of
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its mi litia g roups. However, le aders of t he Nasir g roup s oon discovered t hat t he government wa s n ot in terested in im plementing t he KPA, a nd t his le d t o t heir defection between 2002 and 2004. In the meantime, the SPLA-Torit faction began to regain strength and overran towns such as Kurmuk, Yei, Rumbek, Tonj, Thiet Gogrial and Kapoeta. The SPLA increased i ts p ressure o n t he g overnment b y b esieging m ajor ci ties o f S outhern Sudan s uch a s J uba a nd W au. A s talemate o n t he wa r f ronts p rovided b etter opportunities f or a n egotiated s ettlement o f t he S udanese a rmed co nflict. Th e SPLA Nairobi Declaration of January 2002 called for change and the establishment of a system of accountability to ensure unity in the IGAD peace process. This was followed by a number of seminars on the process of institution building. Map 92: Rebel-controlled areas in south Sudan, 2001

Source: http://www.rightsmaps.com/.

The message was appealing to the disillusioned leaders of the Nasir faction in the Khartoum government, who entered into negotiations with the SPLA in N airobi and def ected t o t he S PLA. Th ese in cluded s enior le aders s uch a s R iek M achar, Taban D eng Ga i a nd L am A kol. Th ey w ere r eintegrated in to t he r ebel mi litary structure and organisation. In a gesture of unity before the signing of the CPA, the SPLA r eshuffled i ts co mmand s tructure t o in clude R iek M achar, b y p ersuading
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Wani Igga to turn his portfolio of third-in-command over to Machar. The top four commanders of the SPLA were John Garang, Salva Kiir, Riek Machar and Wani Igga. This streamlining of command and the integration of former defectors into the ranks of the SPLA enabled the rebel group to conduct negotiations in Kenya as a united movement. Although the political wing of the SPLA was not developed to the standard of the military wing, the rebel group was pragmatic in dealing with the international actors. J ohn Ga rangs s upport o f Operation L ifeline Su dan enabled t he S PLA t o penetrate t he Western w orld. Th e o rganisation s hifted much o f i ts r esources t o SPLA-controlled areas in the 1990s because of government intransigence towards the W estern w orld.18 The S PLA a lso es tablished t he S udan R elief a nd Rehabilitation A gency a s a n um brella o rganisation f or lo cal S outhern Sudanese non-governmental o rganisations (N GOs) b ased in N airobi. I t b ecame t he gatekeeper of b oth lo cal a nd international N GOs operating in S outhern Sudan. The SPLA used the agency to control civilians and assert its political dominance over external resources.19 Also, the SPLA created faith-based organisations such as the New Sudan Council of Churches, which were loyal to it. This council enabled the S PLA t o dra w t o i ts side C hristian o rganisations s uch a s t he C hristian Solidarity I nternational a nd t he Sa maritan Pur se. Th ese o rganisations, t ogether with Sudanese churches, dislodged the SPLA from the Marxist-Leninist character it adopted to garner the support of Mengistus Derg in Ethiopia. The SPLA learned from the mistakes that were made during negotiations of the Addis Ababa Agreement under Joseph Lagu in 1972. The first weakness of this agreement h ad b een t he va gueness a nd l ack o f gu arantees t o en sure i ts implementation. Th at t he S PLA f eared a r epetition wa s dem onstrated in t he length of negotiations of the CPA and details of the agreement. Then John Garang made s ure t hat t here w ere m any w itnesses t o t he a greement. A nother les son learned by the SPLA from the Addis Ababa Agreement was in the area of security arrangements. The Anyanya forces (some 6 000 men) had been absorbed into the Sudan a rmed f orces, w hile a f urther 6 000 h ad b een a bsorbed in to t he p olice, prisons a nd w ildlife f orces o f S outhern S udan.20 Their m ost s enior o fficers, including J oseph L agu him self, h ad b een t ransferred t o t he n orth, w hich lef t members in t he s outh w ithout s enior mi litary le adership. Th e S PLA a voided a similar arrangement. However, its presence in the joint integrated units (JIUs) has not fostered integration in t he proper sense of the word. The SPLA coexisted in designated uni ts in t he lo cations o f dep loyment a s s tipulated in t he CP A.
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Consequently, it remained as an army with its own command during the interim period.

The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

The SLM/A was founded by Abdel Wahid Nur, a lawyer, Abd al-Shafi, a student of education, and Abdu Abdalla, a graduate in languages. It emerged as an organised rebel g roup o n t he S udanese p olitical s cene w hen M inni A rkou M innawi, t he secretary-general of the SLM/A, made its political declaration in a press release on 14 March 2003. In the declaration the movement claimed that Darfur had been an independent state from the 16th century to the second decade of the 20th century, when it was forcibly annexed to the modern-day Sudan. The SLM/A accused the post-independent r egimes in K hartoum o f sys tematically p ursuing a p olicy o f marginalisation, di scrimination, ex clusion a nd exp loitation of D arfur w hile waging war against ethnic groups of marginalised regions such as the Nuba, Funj, Beja a nd R ashaida. Th e de claration f urther hig hlighted t he m onopoly of p ower and w ealth a nd in stitutionalisation o f h egemonic p olicies o f co ntrol b y S udans successive civilian and military regimes in Khartoum. The SLM/A also stated that its objective was to create a united Sudan on a new basis o f e quality, co mplete r estructuring a nd de volution o f p ower, e ven development, cultural and political pluralism, and moral and material prosperity for all Sudanese.21 It made the following statements:
I

The de claration o f t he S LA r esembled t he S PLA m anifesto in m any r espects, indicating that there were connections between the two. Although the latter had denied any relationships with groups on another war front in western Sudan, these have been confirmed by Wear and Whitehouse:
The SLAs connection to the souths SPLA is not just alphabetic or ideological. Since 1991, w hen t he US s tarted t o s upport him, J ohn Ga rang s ought t o o pen u p a Darfurian front in his war against Khartoum. The International Crisis Group (ICG) reports t hat t he S PLA gave mi litary t raining t o 1 500 D arfurians in M arch 2002. These t hen w ent o n t o b ecome t he co re f ighters o f t he S LA. I ndeed t he ini tial manifesto of the SLA was edited by the SPLA.22

Government forces and security agents began to harass members of the Fur tribes in Zalingei, Tour and Nyarteti on the western slopes of Jebel Marra in 2002. Th e lack of security along the Nyala-Kas-Zalingei road was blamed on gangs of bandits associated with the Fur people. Indeed, armed resistance had started earlier than the date of the SLA political declaration. The SLA was first known as the Darfur Liberation Front when it launched a mi litary attack on Golou in West Darfur on 26 F ebruary 2003. A fter m aking i ts p olitical de claration, t he S LA a ttacked E l Fashir Airport in North Darfur on 25 April 2003, killing 75 soldiers and destroying seven a ircraft.23 The S LA en joyed t he b acking o f t he F ur, t he l argest A frican Muslim ethnic group in Darfur, as well as the backing of the Zaghawa and Masalit under the leadership of Abdul Wahid al-Nur. Table 92: Main Darfur rebel factions after the Darfur Peace Agreement
Rebel groups / estimated military strength SLM 8 000 9 000 Faction/year of establishment Factional leadership Comments

The unity of Sudan must be anchored on a new basis that is predicated on full acknowledgement of Sudans ethnic, cultural and political diversity There s hould b e a de centralised f orm o f g overnance b ased o n t he r ight o f Sudans different regions to govern themselves autonomously through a federal or confederal system Arab tribes and groups were an integral and indivisible component of Darfur social fabric that have been equally marginalised and deprived of their rights to development and genuine political participation The S LM/A w ould w ork t o ac hieve a n un derstanding a nd co mmon g round with t he D emocratic National A lliance and other p olitical forces in o rder to remove the NIFs dictatorial regime and establish a dem ocratic system based on a n ew p olitical di spensation o f f reedom, j ustice a nd r espect f or h uman rights, and equality for all Sudanese
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The largest rebel group, which rejected the DPA and enjoys broad support in Darfur. The leader is rather isolated from his supporters Signed a peace deal with the government in May 2006. Weak after the signing of the DPA and many field commanders deserted the group

SLM Government 2006

Mini Minawi

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SLM Masalit 2006 SLM/Classic 2006 SLM Free Will 2006

Khamis Abdalla Ahmed Abdel Shafie

Tribal in composition. Operated in Dar Masalit in west Darfur The group is led by a founding member of the SLM. The faction rejected the DPA Composed exclusively of Tunjur nationals. The leader was politically manipulated and the group became a pro-government faction Umbrella organisation under the leadership of the Maidob group in North Darfur Showed the highest military presence in Darfur in 2007 and Kordofan after defectors of Minnawi rallied around this faction

Abdel Rahman Musa

Group of 19 2005 SLM/Unity 2006

Suleiman Marajan

JEM 5 000

JEM Mainstream 2003

Khalil Ibrahim

The best organised and supported by both Chad and Eritrea. Its programme is Islamic and negotiated with the government in Qatar (Doha) Considered to be the militant Islamic wing of JEM, but merged with the SLM in late 2007 Dormant since its establishment. It is one of the factions created with indirect support of the government to weaken the JEM mainstream Supported by the Chadian military

JEM Field Revolutionary Command 2005 JEM Collective Leadership 2007 National Movement for Other rebel Reform and groups Development 500 2004

Mohamed Saleh Harba

Abdallah Banda and Bahar Abu Garda

Jibril Abdel Karim Bari

Mohamed Idris Azrag The only faction that has called for Darfur Independence secession of Darfur from Sudan Front/Army 2007 Sources: Grard Prunier, Armed movements in Sudan, Chad, CAR, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Analyse 02/08, Berlin: Centre for International Peace Operations, 2008, 34; Johan Brosch, Darfur: dimensions and dilemmas of a complex situation, Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2008, 2438; Sudan Issue Brief Number 15, December 2009.

However, acco rding t o B rosch24 and G ore et al 25 armed co nflict h ad s tarted in Darfur b efore 2003. C onflicts b etween et hnic g roups h ave b een p art o f community relationships over local political issues and administrative boundaries for m ore t han f our de cades. Th e r ebel g roups in D arfur s uffered f rom factionalisation d ue t o et hnic dif ferences a nd m anipulation b y t he r egime in Khartoum. Table 92 p rovides a s ummary of the main Darfur rebel groups and factions that were formed after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja in April 2006. According t o P runier t here h as b een a n in creased f ragmentation o f r ebel groups in w estern S udan a fter M inni M innawi o f t he S LA sig ned t he D PA in Abuja.26 The SLM splintered further when Minnawi signed an agreement with the government of Sudan in M ay 2006, a s most of his commanders deserted him. A major split o ccurred b etween Abdul Wahid a l-Nur, w ho controlled t he p olitical wing of the SLA, and Minni Minnawi, who controlled its military wing. Groups such a s t he G roup o f 19 r emained a s um brella o rganisations t hat f ragmented further into SLM/Unity and SLM Free Will, as shown in table 92 alongside. Unlike in S outhern S udan, fac tionalisation a ffected r ebel m ovements o f Darfur for a number of reasons. First, there was no history of armed movements from which the current rebel groups could learn lessons, which meant that they were un prepared in t he ext reme f or a s ustainable a rmed a nd p olitical s truggle. They launched a rebellion with the hope of finding a quick fix to their grievances, but without considering the political environment and the incompatible economic and c ultural in terests o f t heir s ub-region. S econd, t he g overnment p layed a n important role in splitting the SLA. For instance, the SLM Free Will leader ended up a s g overnment mini ster in F ebruary 2007. 27 The co mpeting in ternational interests over the possibility of oil reserves in Darfur and northern Chad attracted many peace brokers and spoilers. It should be noted that the regions adjacent to Darfur h ave p otential o il r esources. Fin ally, t he inf ormal fac tor in t he c urrent Darfur co nflict i s a c ultural co mpetition a mong A rab, En glish a nd F rench speakers.

RESPONSES OF THE GOVERNMENT: ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITIA GROUPS

Militia g roups in S udan a re o ften hir ed a nd o rganised b y t he g overnment a s auxiliaries of the national army to fight rebels groups. They are heterogeneous in
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composition a nd operate un der dif ferent n ames, o ften acco rding t o t heir geographic lo cations. Th e mi litia g roups in S udan a re p art a nd p arcel o f t he governments counterinsurgency strategy. As such, they are hired to fight for the government def ence f orce. S ome mi litia g roups h ave a n et hnic o bjective w hile others are created by influential individuals with the goal of enriching themselves. They m ake m oney from in ternal social di sorder w ith the s upport o f t he government b y wa ging v iolence a gainst r ebels a nd p lundering p roperties o f communities supporting rebel groups. The heavy reliance of the government on militia groups is both an economic and a tactical strategy. From an economic perspective, the militias are cheap to maintain because they do not receive regular wages from the government. Their work is voluntary and self-paying because they keep all the loot acquired during an operation. Tactically, the g overnment dep ends o n mi litia g roups b ecause t he wa r zo nes in S udan a re very ext ensive, le ading t o t hin di stribution o f t he p rofessional a rmy. A nother reason for dependence on militia groups is that the military regime of Omer elBashir purged most of the professional officers from the army. The few remaining military and security officers were deployed around the national capital to protect the seat of the government, and light and heavy industries in central Sudan. The various militia groups in Sudan are described in t his study as ethnic and tribal. Other civilian paramilitary groups are recruited, trained and armed by the government for the purpose of waging proxy wars against rebels and communities supporting rebel movements. The formation of tribal militia groups started under Nimeiri in 1983 as a counterinsurgency strategy.28 The mi litary r egime o f Om ar e l-Bashir in stitutionalised a ll mi litia g roups supported by the government after promulgation of the Popular Defence Act in October 1989. Thi s A ct leg itimised mi litia a nd a llied p aramilitary g roups a s auxiliaries of the national army. Scholars such as Salmon29 and Young30 examined the origins, composition and de velopment of t he Popular D efence Force (PDF). There w ere 12 m ain mi litia g roups di stributed in dif ferent p arts o f S outhern Sudan, but the number increased depending on new political developments. The PDF was headed by Brigadier Babiker Abdel Mahmoud Hassan, who was directly responsible to the president of Sudan. After 1990, all militia groups were organised into military formations modelled on t he structure of t he PDF, and trained and deployed in s ensitive areas such as oilfields and other oil infrastructures such as pipelines a nd r efineries. Thi s s tudy exa mines t wo mi litia g roups in o rder t o deepen the understanding of the counterinsurgency strategy of the government in Sudan.
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The Southern Sudan Defence Force and tribal militia groups in Southern Sudan
The es tablishment o f mi litia g roups in t he co ntext o f p olitical de velopments i s closely r elated t o t he g eographical di stribution o f ac tors a nd o rganisational structures. The government responded to operations of rebel groups by creating the P DF in 1989. I t i s a n um brella o rganisation f or a ll p aramilitary g roups t hat existed before the NIF came to power on 30 June of the same year. There are about 10 000 ac tive m embers o f t he P DF, w ith 85 000 r eserves.31 These f orces w ere deployed a longside r egular a rmy uni ts a gainst va rious r ebel g roups. S o t he disparate mi litia g roups were united under t he PDF in n orthern Sudan and t he Southern Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) in S outhern Sudan. S everal tribal militia groups a lready exi sted in S outhern S udan b y 1989. Th ey co ntinued t o b e controlled by the military intelligence until the government and the Nasir faction of the SPLA concluded the Khartoum Peace Agreement. The SSDF was created in 1997 as a Southern Sudan component of the PDF and as p art o f t he K hartoum Peace A greement t o b ring a ll t he t ribal mi litia g roups under a unified command of Paulino Matip, who was appointed the chief of staff of t he SS DF. Th e F ertit F riendly F orces wa s un der E l Tom E l N our in B ahr e l Ghazal, the Mundari militia under Clement Wani in Equatoria, and the Peace and Reconstruction Brigade under Sultan Abdel Bagi Ayii in northern Bahr el-Ghazal, and s o f orth. Tribal wa rlords w ere g iven mi litary t itles a nd w ere a uthorised t o control t he a reas w here t heir p resence wa s p ermanently m aintained. Thi s structure was composed of a number of militia groups distributed in all the main regions of Southern Sudan. Young observed that in the context of the second civil war, t he t erritorial b oundaries o f S outhern S udanese a rmed g roups w ere n ever demarcated and the loyalties of individual members to their groups were typically temporal a nd t ransient.32 The t urnover o f b oth t erritory a nd g roup a ffiliation including side switching between the government of Sudan and the SPLA was high among militia groups. Young summarised the problem as follows:
There is no doubt that the SSDF comprised a significant number of fighting forces at i ts p eak o f ac tivity. D uring t he l ast s tages o f t he s econd ci vil wa r va rious components o f t he SS DF (o f w hich t here a re o ver 30) co ntrolled l arge p arts o f western, cen tral a nd e astern U pper N ile, p arts o f n orthern a nd w estern B ahr e l Ghazal, a nd a reas o f E astern E quatoria t hat w ere cr itical in m aking p ossible t he development and operation of the country's emerging oil industry...
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But a rriving at a n acc urate co unt of SSDF m embers remains hig hly problematic. First, the numbers change constantly as recruitment within some groups is ongoing. Secondly, the SSDF is largely made up of non-regular forces and the dividing line between civilians and combatants is extremely grey. Thirdly, some individuals may identify t hemselves a s a ffiliated a t o ne m oment b ut t hen r eject t he l abel o nce a particular objective has been achieved or given up.33

National Peace Forces (Fertit) Peace and Reconstruction Brigade

Major-General Eltom Elnur Daldoum Sultan Abdel Bagi Ayii

Bazia, Geitano, Taban, Bussere, Halima, Bagare, Mboro, Khor Gana, Deim Zubeir, Sopo, Raja and Tumsah El Miram, Bahr el Arab, Agok, Malual, Tadama, Um Driesi and Bringi

The CPA progressively changed the relations between the militia groups and the SPLA. I n t he b eginning t hey w ere a ngered b ecause o f t heir ex clusion f rom t he negotiation process in Kenya. Militia groups were not accommodated in the SPLA as was stipulated in the CPA when John Garang was alive. The ascendance of Salva Kiir to power after the death of Garang was marked by reconciliation between the SPLA a nd m ain mi litia g roups in t he SS DF. Th e p rocess o f r econciliation wa s sealed by the Juba Declaration of 8 January 2006. This arrangement paved the way for absorption of about 18 militia groups under a number of warlords, while others joined t he SAF a s s tipulated in t he CP A. I n s hort, t he mi litias o perating in Southern Sudan are referred to in t he CPA as other armed groups. Table 9-3 is a sample ext racted f rom a lo nger t able, co mpiled b y Y oung a nd co ntaining a n exhaustive list of 60 dif ferent militia groups allied with the government army or the SPLA, which shows the heterogeneity of militia groups in Southern Sudan that constituted the SSDF before the Juba Declaration. Table 93: Sample of militia groups according to the three regions of Southern Sudan
Militia group South Sudan Unity Movement Fangak Forces Pibor Defence Forces Mundari Forces Equatoria Defence Force Commander/ leader Major-General Paulino Matip Major-General Gabriel Tangyan Major-General Ismael Konyi Areas of operation before the Juba Declaration Bentiu, Rubkona, Mayom, Makien Wankay, Nhialdiu, Heglig and Kharasana Bashlakon, Fangak, Deil, Kwerkan, Kwerdaf, Faguer, Fag, Kaldak and Dor Pibor, Akobo Road, Likuangole, Juba and Bor

Source: John Young, The south Sudan defence forces in the wake of the Juba Declaration, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2006, 4248, also available at http://www.googlesyndicatedsearch.com/u/SmallArmsSurvey?q=John+Young%2C+The+south +Sudan+defence+forces+in+the+wake+of+th&sa=go%C2%A0 (accessed 18 December 2009).

The in crease in n umbers i s a ttributed t o di sagreements b etween mi litia g roups over integrating into the government army or the SPLA. Most of the militia groups were divided into two groups under new leaders who joined the government. For example, w hen P aulino M atip j oined t he S PLA un der t he t erms o f t he J uba Declaration, hi s s enior lieu tenants, G ordon K ong a nd Ga briel T angyang, established t heir o wn g roups a nd a llied w ith t he S udan g overnment a rmy. Th e huge n umber o f mi litia g roups co mplicated t he im plementation o f t he CPA in Southern Sudan because they created insecurity and continuously switched sides between t he Sudan government forces and t he SPLA dep ending on t he b enefits one of the two may offer. The militia groups that were dissatisfied with the CPA partners melted into communities and engaged in banditry and cattle rustling.

The Janjaweed in Darfur

The Janjaweed militia group became prominent after the Darfur rebellion in 2003. It is described as an Arab paramilitary militia group on camels and horses and is known for perpetrating violence against civilians in Darfur. The Janjaweed is a mi litia g roup o rganised b y t he g overnment t o wa ge wa r against r ebel g roups in D arfur. I ts m embers en listed w ith t he S udanese a rmy within the framework of the PDF and the military structure in D arfur known as the Border Intelligence and are recruited from two categories of Arab tribesmen, namely c amel o wners in t he des ert a reas o f N orth D arfur a nd c attle o wners in South D arfur. Th e f ormer co mprise t he M ahariya, I raygat, M ahamid a nd B eni Hussein w ho u se c amels in t he o ffensive a gainst t he ci vilians b elieved t o b e supporting t he S LA. Th e c attle-owning A rabs a re t he R ezeigat, B eni H alba, Taaisha a nd M aaliya. Th e c urrent es timated s trength o f t he Janjaweed is a bout 5 000 men.34
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Major-General Clement Terekaka, Juba road, Tali, Rejaf East, Kaltok, Wani Gemeiza and Jebel Lado Brigadier Fabiano Odongi Torit, Juba, Torit Road and mountains around Torit

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Gore et al argue that Arab paramilitary groups have been operating in Darfur since 1980 as Libyan proxy forces.35 After the victory of Habr over Libyan-backed rebel groups in Chad, they retreated to Darfur in 1988. Hoile confirms that there is a Chadian factor in the evolution of the Janjaweed.36 Armed Arab groups known as the Islamic Legion, which operated in Chad but were based in Sudan and were allegedly e quipped b y L ibya, w ere s potted in D arfur in 1987 d uring t he government of Saddiq Al Mahdi. Authorities in the greater Darfur area described these armed groups as robbers and bandits. Janjaweed militia groups have a well structured leadership at the political and military levels. The known political organisers in Darfur were Ahmed Haroun and Ali Kushayb, who both hailed from South Darfur. The latter is the commander of South D arfur a nd o verall co mmander o f Janjaweed armed uni ts in t he t hree Darfur states. The other two Darfur states were commanded by Abdullah Mustafa Abu Shineibat (West D arfur), and b oth Mohamed A li Hamiditi and Musa Hilal (North D arfur). Musa H ilal wa s t he m ost n otorious f ield co mmander in N orth Darfur. The government of Sudan directed operations of the Janjaweed against the SLM and the JEM, which draw support mostly from the African tribes of the Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit, Dajo, Maidoub, Berti and Tunjur. The Janjaweed strategy was to destroy v illages a nd, acco rding t o B rosch, 1 595 v illages w ere des troyed in t he period 20032007.37 It should be noted that many Janjaweed attacks against civilian populations had both e conomic a nd raci al m otives. Th e g overnment u sed t he Janjaweed as counterinsurgency f orces, w ith ex cellent k nowledge o f t he t errain, t o a void spreading t he a rmy t hinly in a n exp ansive r egion t he size o f F rance. S udanese authorities t ook ad vantage o f t he r eadiness o f t he Janjaweed to do t he f ighting because t his en abled t hem t o b uild u p t ight s ecurity a round K hartoum w here there are huge investments and oil business installations. Actors in t he S udanese co nflict o f D arfur m aintain co mplex r elations in pursuing their interests. Ethnic contiguity plays its role as many tribes straddle the border with Chad. Interactions increased between rebel groups (such as the SLA and JEM) a nd s ections o f A rab mi litias in t he wa ke o f t he D PA w hen t he government of Sudan committed itself to disarming the Janjaweed. The latter felt betrayed by the government because it blamed it for all the atrocities committed in Darfur. This development brought some rapprochement between sections of the Janjaweed and the rebel groups in Darfur.
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The popularity of the rebel groups at the beginning of active rebellion in 2003 cannot be overestimated. The call of the rebel groups for an end to government neglect of Darfur was popular, also among the Arabs. Communities supported the rebels with food supplies and cash, and many youths joined the rebels. However, the D PA c hanged t he deg ree o f s upport t o t he g overnment a mong A frican a nd Arab tribes. While the support for signatories of the DPA declined, the popularity of n on-signatories (S LA-Abdul Wahid a nd t he JEM) wa s r emarkable. A lthough ethnicity wa s a fac tor in t he f ragmentation o f t he r ebel g roups, t he m ajority o f Arabs remained neutral in t he conflict. Tanner and Tubiana observed that Mujib ar-Rahman az-Zubeir of the SLA-Abdul Wahid initiated contact with the Baggara and Abbala (Mahariyya and Mahamids) tribes at Wadi Toro and Sabanga in t he northwest and in the area of Jebel Marra.38 Agreements between the parties led to the o pening o f j oint A rab-Fur m arkets in t he r ebel-held a rea o f J ebel M arra. Looted li vestock wa s r eturned t o o wners a nd e ventually 500 Arab f ighters, including f ormerly ac tive Janjaweed elements, j oined t he S LA-Abdul W ahid faction.

IMPACT OF THE REBEL GROUPS AND MILITIA ON SOCIETY

Small a rms t hreaten t he li ves o f un armed ci vilians in t he a ftermath o f p eace agreements. Th e si tuation o f S outhern S udan a fter t he CP A j ustifies t his assumption. Garfields study in t he L akes State of S outhern Sudan demonstrates that violent insecurity is pervasive (with robbery and intercommunity fights most commonly reported) because residents are heavily armed.39 This human insecurity is w idespread acr oss m any s tates in t he r egion. I n s ome c ases, di sagreements between t he S PLA a nd f ormer mi litia f orces er upt in v iolent co nfrontations in which hundreds of civilians lose lives and their properties are looted. Destruction o f b asic s ervices i s in evitable in S udanese a rmed co nflicts. Th e army, r ebel g roups a nd p aramilitary g roups a ll co ntribute t o t he des tructive processes. Th ey de liberately des troy t he inf rastructure f or e ducation, h ealth, markets and transport services. Vandalised schools, health centres and bridges are a common feature and continue to be so in war zones of Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains a nd t he B lue N ile, a nd r ecently in t he D arfur r egion. Th e t actic o f destroying f ood s upplies, b ombarding c attle c amps a nd di splacing r ural populations has resulted in food insecurity and market disruptions. The situation
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has not stabilised sufficiently in D arfur to enable surveys on t he impact of war. Some o f t he des truction i s a n in evitable o utcome o f t he wa r s trategies a nd t he tactics used during the civil war. Sudanese ci vil wa rs a ffected s tructures o f g overnment a nd r ural e conomic systems in m arginalised areas in t he country. The nucleus of political systems is confined t o ga rrison t owns w hile t he r ural a reas a re t he s cene o f mi litary operations. R ebel a nd mi litia m ovements co ntributed t o t he sys tematic destruction of local authority that used to maintain law and order in r ural areas. As t he civil war intensified, civilian p opulations were dislodged and resettled in peace v illages, ID P c amps in K hartoum, o r a round t he ga rrison t owns. P eople holding gun s w ere t he s ources o f a uthority. F or exa mple, in U pper N ile, commanders of mi litia g roups such as t he White Army (G eish Mabor) ac ted as tribal c hiefs. A ctions o f r ebel a nd mi litia le aders di srupted c ustoms, c ulture, civilian lif e a nd k inship s tructures a nd in t he process des troyed human dig nity. This resulted in the breakdown of law and order in society. Roles o f dif ferent r ebels a nd mi litia g roups in un dermining r ural e conomic systems co uld b e s een in t heir c apacity t o b rutalise ci vilian p opulations d uring hostilities in wa r zo nes. W ar t actics in cluded des truction o f cr ops a nd commandeering of livestock to bring besieged populations to submission. In other cases, r ural p astoralists f ound i t dif ficult t o m ove lo ng di stances in s earch f or richer pastures and the result was overgrazing and environmental degradation in war zones. The government-supported militia in oilfields stole livestock and drove away co mmunities t o le ave s pace f or o il exp loration a nd exp loitation. S imilarly, some Nuba communities were besieged to submission and were resettled in peace villages. Finally, a huge disruption of the socioeconomic system was experienced in northern B ahr el Ghazal during the militia missions that accompanied trains from Babanusa to Wau. Civilian populations were subjected to systematic plunder of li vestock, des truction of crops a nd a bduction of w omen a nd c hildren during these o perations. A simi lar s trategy wa s r eplicated in t he D arfur r egion w here civilian populations were displaced and ended up in camps. Although these camps were guarded by AU and UN p eacekeepers, they have b een subjected to attacks and raids.

multidimensional. Approaches and responses to t he complex armed conflicts in Sudan could be explained in terms of the interests, positions and roles of the main protagonists. The complexity of Sudanese conflicts, with the increasing number of rebel g roups, i s a c hallenge f or ga uging p olitical a nd co mmunity r eactions, sentiments and sympathies.

Responses of local communities

Conflict-affected co mmunities in S udan h ave limi ted o ptions in t he face o f t he military, rebel and militia offensives in war zones and in destinations of flight from violence. In the experience of Sudan, the first response of communities is to avoid being t rapped in wa r zo nes. M any p eople f lee a rmed co nflict a nd b ecome internally di splaced p ersons (ID Ps) a round ga rrison t owns o r r efugees in neighbouring co untries. A ccording t o t he I nternal Di splacement M onitoring Centre there are about 2,7 million IDPs within Darfur and nearly 250 000 refugees from Darfur in eastern Chad.40 The second option for communities is to protect their land and property from occupation b y o ther et hnic co mmunities. Thi s i s a p atriotic a pproach t hat transforms co mmunity m embers in to r ebels a nd o ther p aramilitary g roups. People remaining behind during armed conflicts are emotionally attached to their ancestral lands to the extent that they become embroiled in the violence between the warring parties. In the name of defence of ancestral land, local communities seek p rotection f rom ei ther side o f t he wa r a nd in ext reme c ases o pt f or s elfdefence g roups, t hereby mi litarising t he co mmunity. Thi s k ind o f co mmunity action le ads t o t he b reakdown o f t he r ule o f l aw a nd los s o f a uthority o f lo cal communities. C ommunal mi litarisation i s a fac tor in t he dif ferent t ypes o f banditry experienced during the conflict or in the post-conflict period.

Militarist responses of the government

The mi litary g overnment h as u sed f orce t o m aintain uni ty sin ce 1989, w hen i t overthrew the democratically elected government of Saddiq Al Mahdi. One of the main reasons for ousting the civilian government was that the latter was too weak to deal with the SPLA, which was the dominant rebel movement at that time. The combination of mi litaristic and diplomatic approaches b egan in 1994 un der t he auspices of the IGAD. However, it took more than a decade for the government to
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Responses of actors and stakeholders

Responses o f va rious s takeholders t o a rmed co nflicts a re r elated t o s ocial a nd political structures of affected societies. These responses are as varied as they are
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reconsider militarism as an approach to resolving t he conflict with t he SPLA in Southern Sudan and the three areas of Abyei, Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains. Despite the CPA, there have been sporadic military operations in Abyei and South Kordofan, t oo. Th e Abyei Administrative A rea exp erienced c lashes b etween t he government and SPLA forces in 2008. Th e government denied involvement and blamed t he M isseriya mi litia a nd t he S PLA f or en gaging in a rmed v iolence. President el-Bashir addressed the problem by issuing Republican Decree 146, and an agreement entitled Roadmap for return of IDPs and implementation of Abyei Protocol was signed by the ruling National Congress Party and the SPLM.41 Militarist t endencies p ersist in wa r-affected r egions co vered b y p eace agreements. For instance, violence erupted in Upper Nile (Malakal town) on two occasions in 2006 a nd 2009, r esulting in h eavy ci vilian c asualties. Th e A frican Union M ission in S udan (AMIS) los t t en s oldiers o n 29 S eptember 2007 in i ts camp at Haskanita, with government and rebel groups trading accusations about the in cident.42 Brosch co nfirmed t hat AMIS a nd UN exp erts w ere un able t o identify t he p erpetrators o f t he in cident. H owever, t he a ssumption i s t hat t he government o f S udan wa s b ehind t he a ttack, i ts p urpose b eing t o f rustrate negotiations a bout t he dep loyment o f t roops f rom t he UN A frican M ission in Darfur (UN AMID). D arfur wa s t he s cene o f s ustained mi litary ac tion b y t he government against the rebel groups that did not sign the DPA.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO SUDANESE ARMED CONFLICTS

The co mplexity o f t he S udanese co nflicts h as in vited b oth b ilateral a nd multilateral r esponses. B ilateral r esponses t o a rmed co nflict h ave ra rely h elped Sudan in addr essing the underlying causes of the political conflicts, for they are expressed in t erms of ideology and business interests. The relationship of the US with Sudan has been ambiguous because the country appeared to put pressure on Sudan to resolve its chronic conflicts, but at t he s ame t ime t ried to appease t he country t o ga in a nti-terrorism co operation. S udan p roved t o b e u seful f or intelligence ga thering a bout in stitutions a nd p eople a ssociated w ith O sama b in Laden, w ho li ved in S udan un til 1994. H owever, a nother r ole o f t he US wa s t o contain t he s pread o f mi litant I slam f rom S udan t o n eighbouring g eopolitical regions. These two incompatible US p olicy goals only aggravated the conflict in Darfur and made the CPA rather shaky.
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This US a pproach i s n ot o nly a pplied in b ilateral r elations, b ut a lso a t t he multilateral le vel w ith r egard t o in ternational o rganisations a nd s eems t o h ave worked in the case of SPLA-led conflict in Sudan. The US supported the SPLA in the I GAD p eace ini tiative, a nd inf luenced i ts E uropean p artners. Th e I GAD process was a combination of a regional approach backed by multilateral support. The roles of the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), the US a nd the UN in s upporting mediation ef forts o f Kenya y ielded p ositive r esults, a s wa s dem onstrated b y t he signing o f t he CP A. H owever, t his t ype o f a pproach i s l acking in t he D arfur conflict. Th e AMIS wa s dep loyed in D arfur a nd wa s l ater t ransformed in to UNAMID. This hybrid force lacked the logistical and financial support that would make it effective in its operations. Western powers such as the US and France are reluctant t o co mmit cr itically n eeded e quipment t o t he f orce. Th e UN S ecurity Council made resolutions that remain blueprints, because both Russia and China frustrated t he possibility o f s trong ac tion in t he Darfur a rmed conflict. Accordingly, the positive contribution of the UN to the Darfur conflict is restricted to the provision of humanitarian assistance to IDPs within Darfur and Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad. The strongest response of the UN to the armed conflict in Darfur could be seen in t he h andling o f a trocities co mmitted b y t he Janjaweed against un armed civilians. Th e UN S ecurity C ouncil r eferred t he c ase o f a trocities t o t he International Criminal Court in March 2005. The Court issued a warrant for the arrest o f A hmed H aroun, a g overnment mini ster a nd t he g overnor o f S outh Kordofan, and Ali Kushayb, a Janjaweed commander, in April 2007. The refusal of the government to co operate w ith t he C ourt es calated t he conflict to t he extent that the president of Sudan was indicted for crimes against humanity in D arfur. This wa s released in a p ress s tatement o f t he j udges o n 4 M arch 2009. Th e AU considered the decision inappropriate with regard to an African president still in power.

CONCLUSION
Sudan experienced numerous conflicts in nearly all its regions except the extreme north. Sudan emerged as an independent country amid mutiny and rebellion. The length o f t he ci vil wa r a nd fa ulty p olicy de velopment hig hlighted n ational consciousness a bout m arginalisation a nd s ocial ex clusion a nd r esorting t o violence to solve problems. The essence of governance is at stake in S udan, with the n umber o f r ebel a nd mi litia m ovements co nstantly in creasing sin ce
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independence. This is an indicator that the underlying causes of conflict have yet to be addressed by the parties to Sudanese conflict. Human security is threatened in zones of armed conflict, which extends to peaceful areas inside and outside the country. Thi s h appens in t erms o f wa r-related mig rants w ho t ry t o es cape t he excesses o f t he ci vil wa r t hat des troyed t heir p roperty a nd in stitutions o f governance. One key finding of this study is that rebel groups seek policy or regime change through v iolence, f orcing g overnments t o r ecognise t heir iden tities a nd t heir participation in t he formulation of p olitical, social a nd economic p olicies. Meanwhile, militia groups lack a vision of their own, but are part of war strategies of r uling e lites t hat a ttempt t o r emain in p ower o r p ursue v ested e conomic interests. I n t his r espect, mi litia g roups o perate li ke m ercenaries b ecause t heir motives a re p rimarily e conomic. Th ey a re em powered t o lo ot a nd di srupt community livelihoods and force civilians into submission through the weapon of hunger. Both rebel and militia groups are sources of banditry and insecurity in the regions o f S udan t hat h ave b een a ffected b y a rmed co nflict. F or in stance, t he proliferation of sm all arms constitutes a m ajor s ource of in security in S outhern Sudan in the post-conflict period. The f uture o f S udan w ill co ntinue t o h ang in t he b alance s o lo ng a s cr itical demands o f t he p eripheral r egions a re n ot s eriously addr essed b y t he cen tral government in Khartoum. The demands revolve around the national questions of identity a nd c ulture c lashes, e conomic de velopment, p ower s haring a nd w ealth sharing. Th e g rievances exp ressed b y t he m arginalised p eople co uld le ad t o balkanisation of Sudan. This can be prevented only if A frican countries take the lead in finding suitable compromises to ensure that peace prevails on the continent as a w hole. The Southern Sudanese are pressing for the referendum to take place in 2011, in line with the terms of the CPA. If the referendum results are in favour of secession of Southern Sudan, there is a li kelihood of more social and political instability in S udan, w hich w ill cer tainly h ave a n ad verse ef fect o n t he A frican continent.

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NOTES
1 P M H olt a nd M W D aly, A history o f t he S udan: f rom t he c oming o f Islam t o t he p resent day, 5th ed, Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000, 27.
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Mohamed Omer Beshir The Southern Sudan: background to conflict, London: Hurst, 1968, 3769; Sir James Robertson, Transition in Africa: from direct rule to independence, London: Hurst, 1974, 102116; O liver B A lbino, En r oute to Addis Ababa, University of Juba, First Conference 1985, 2628 F ebruary, The role o f S outhern S udanese p eople i n t he b uilding o f modern Sudan, Khartoum: Arrow, 1986, 111123; R obert O C ollins, Sudanese nationalism, southern policy and unification of the Sudan, 19391946, in M ahasin Abdel Gadir H ag al Safi (ed), The Nationalist Movement in the Sudan, Khartoum: Institute for African and Asian Studies, U niversity o f K hartoum, 1989, 230260; S everino F uli, Shaping a f ree S outhern Sudan, Limuru: Paulines Publications Africa, 2002, 168. G N Sanderson, Indirect rule in n orthern Sudan as an anti-nationalist strategy, 19201939, in Mahasin Abdel Gadir Hag al Safi (ed), The nationalist movement in the Sudan, Khartoum: Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, 1989, 340. Beshir, The S outhern S udan: b ackground t o c onflict, 73; J oseph L agu, S udan: o dyssey through a state from ruins to hope, Khartoum: Mohamed Omer Beshir Centre for Sudanese Studies, Omdurman Ahlia University, 491493. Holt and Daly, A history of the Sudan, 126127. Ibid, 148150. Ann M osely L esch, Sudan: c ontested n ational i dentities. B loomington: I ndiana U niversity Press, 1524. Ibid, 3740. Madut Jok, Sudan: race, religion and violence, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2007, 5380. Gran L indgren, Studies in c onflict e conomics and e conomic g rowth, Uppsala: D epartment of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2006, 4968. Samson S Wassara, A f ramework for economic and social development of Southern Sudan: implications f or o il a nd wa ter m anagement a nd r esource p olitics, in K arl W ohlmuth, Reconstructing economic governance after conflict in resource-rich African countries: learning from country experiences, Bremen: Universitt Bremen, 2008, 177. Luke A P atey, U nderstanding m ultinational co rporations in wa r-torn s ocieties: S udan in focus, in K arl Wohlmuth and Urban Tino (e ds), Reconstructing economic governance after conflict in resource-rich African countries, Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2007, 182184. Paul Wani Gore, The oil and its influence on the demographic, economic and commercial processes: the case of northern Upper Nile in Southern Sudan, in Karl Wohlmuth and Tino Urban (e ds), Reconstructing e conomic go vernance a fter c onflict i n r esource-rich A frican countries, Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2007, 174175. Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: from conflict to peace, Khartoum: Khartoum Bookshop, 1975, 5071. Arop M adut-Arop, Sudans p ainful r oad t o p eace: a f ull s tory o f t he f ounding a nd development o f S PLM/SPLA, BookSurge, LL C, 2006, 5058, h ttp://www.booksurge.com (accessed 12 March 2010). Ibid, 74. Arop Sudans painful road to peace, 333. Atul Karim, Operation Lifeline Sudan: a review, 1996, 182, h ttp://www.cf-hst.net/UNICEFTemp/Doc-Repository/doc/dpc388692 (accessed 10 May 2010). William R eno, Complex o perations i n w eak a nd f ailing s tates: t he S udan r ebel p erspective, in Prism 1(2), sd, 116117.
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20 Beshir, The Southern Sudan: from conflict to peace, 172. 21 Minni A rkou M innawi, The S udan L iberation M ovement a nd S udan L iberation aA rmy (SLM/SLA) political declaration, 2003, 2, p osted on 14 March 2003 on http://www.sudannet (accessed 21 February 2010). 22 Avery Wear and David Whitehouse, Save Darfur from US intervention, Institute of Socialist Review, issue 50, November-December 2006), 6. 23 Darfur Liberation Front, Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), Justice a nd E quality M ovement, 2007, 13, h ttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ para/darfur.htm (accessed 19 March 2010). 24 Johan B rosch, Darfur: d imensions a nd d ilemmas o f a c omplex s ituation, U ppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2008, 513. 25 Paul Wani Gore et al , Eight grassroots conflicts in Sudan, Khartoum: UNICEF, 2004, 4952. 26 Grard P runier, Armed m ovements i n S udan, Ch ad, CAR , S omalia, E ritrea a nd E thiopia, Analyse 02/08, Berlin: Centre for International Peace Operations, 2008, 36. 27 Ibid, 4. 28 Douglas H J ohnson, The root causes of Sudans civil wars, Oxford: James Currey, 2003, 67 69. 29 Salmon, A paramilitary revolution, 1219. 30 John Young, The s outh S udan d efence f orces i n t he w ake o f t he J uba D eclaration, G eneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2006, 1318, also available at http://www.googlesyndicatedsearch.com/u/SmallArmsSurvey?q=John+Young%2C+ The+south+Sudan+defence+forces+in+the+wake+of+th&sa=go%C2%A0 (acces sed 18 December 2009). 31 Country p rofile: S udan, 2004, 11, a vailalble a t h ttp://mongabay.com/reference/country_ profiles/20042005/Sudan.html (accessed 15 March 2010). 32 Ibid, 19. 33 Ibid. 34 Sudan I ssue B rief N umber 15, D ecember 2009, 8, h ttp://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org (accessed 15 March 2010). 35 Paul W ani G ore, A bdel H amid B alla, M una M ohamed T aha A youb, A bbas S hah Musa, El Tayeb Ibrahim Ahmed Wadi, Osman Mohamed Osman, Musa Adam and Abraham Matoch Dhal, Eight grassroots conflicts in Sudan, 4654. 36 David Hoile, Darfur: the road to peace, 3rd ed, London: European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, 2008, 135136. 37 Brosch, Darfur: dimensions and dilemmas of a complex situation, 4041. 38 Victor Tanner a nd J rme Tubiana, Divided t hey f all: t he f ragmentation o f D arfurs r ebel groups, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2007, 6264. 39 Richard Garfield, Violence and victimisation in south Sudan: Lakes State in the post-conflict period, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2007, 1213. 40 Internal Di splacement M onitoring C entre, S udan: 4,9 mi llion ID Ps acr oss S udan face o ngoing t urmoil, N orwegian R efugee C ouncil, 27 M ay 2009, 6, h ttp://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/%28httpInfoFiles%29/A5170810EB2A7213C12575C 300342A91/$file/Sudan_Overview_May09.pdf (accessed 27 February 2010). 41 UNMIS, The CPA m onitor: m onthly report on t he implementation o f t he CPA, June 2008, 27, http://www.unis.org/english/cpaMonitor.htm. 42 Brosch, Darfur: dimensions and dilemmas of a complex situation, 7073.

C HAPTER 10

The regionalisation of rebel activities: the case of the Lords Resistance Army
PAUL OMACH

INTRODUCTION
Since 1986, n orthern U ganda h as b een b edevilled b y v iolent a rmed co nflict between s uccessive r ebel g roups a nd t he N ational R esistance A rmy/Movement (NRA/M) government led by Yoweri Museveni. The most resilient of these rebel groups has been the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), led by the enigmatic Joseph Kony. Th e a rmed co nflict in n orthern U ganda i s r ooted in U gandas do mestic politics and the problems of state-making and nation-building, including the lack of national integration and failure to build consensus on the role of the constituent groups in national politics. But the conflict has been regionalised. Louise Fawcett defined regionalisation as a si tuation in w hich inter- and intrastate conflicts spill over in to n eighbouring co untries, lin k u p w ith co nflicts in t hose co untries a nd draw t hem a nd o ther ac tors, a nd a lso a ttract t he in tervention o f in ternational actors.1 In n orthern Uganda, s uccessive r ebel g roups, es pecially t he LR A, o rganised and sought support externally and set up bases and sanctuaries across the border and, in s o doing, have destabilised regional security. The government of Uganda countered support for the LRA by supporting rebel groups in neighbouring Sudan
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and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and by intervening in conflicts in those countries. The conflict in northern Uganda has thus been linked to conflicts in n eighbouring co untries a nd w ith in traregional co nflicts in t he G reat L akes complex. US intervention to safeguard its geostrategic interests against the threats of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism increased the complexity of the conflict and has made it more difficult to resolve. The linkage of the conflict to a regional conflict complex contributed to transforming the LRA from a rag-tag rebel outfit to a f ormidable guer rilla f orce w hose ac tivities s pan s tate b oundaries a nd h ave serious consequences for foreign policies of states and for regional security. This chapter examines the regionalisation of the conflict in n orthern Uganda and t he t ransformation of t he LR A rebel movement into a r egional ac tor in t he security of East and Central Africa regions. It does so by examining the problems of state-making and nation-building and conflicts in Uganda; the regional security environment a nd r elations o f t he co untries in E ast a nd C entral A frica; g lobal geostrategic interests, and coincidence of the domestic, regional and global.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND REGIONAL CONFLICT COMPLEXES

Recent attempts at un derstanding t he p roblem o f internal co nflicts, w hich h ave become the dominant threat to peace and security, have focused on the nature of the state and on domestic politics. A review of the debates on internal conflicts in Africa by Richard Jackson offers useful insights in t his regard.2 Internal conflicts are t he r esult o f s tate-making a nd n ation-building a nd o f accumulating, centralising a nd co ncentrating t he p ower r esources n ecessary f or ef fective territorial do mination.3 State-making in A frica h as b een co mpared w ith t he European experience, which took centuries and generated collective violence from rebel groups.4 Africa has b een likened to Western Europe b etween the 16th and 18th centuries when the earliest sovereign states emerged.5 This was a p eriod of violent co nflicts d uring w hich weak s tates w ere e liminated a nd p olitical arrangements t hat were n ot v iable were either reformed or di sappeared.6 But in Africa, external interference created and preserved several unviable states, added to t he s ecurity p redicament, a nd m ade co nflict a c haracter o f t he co ntinent.7 Colonial powers created states with artificial boundaries, lack of leg itimacy and incapacity to control their territories.8 The processes of state-making and nationbuilding have been compressed within a relatively short time. This is in contrast to the E uropean exp erience, w hich s aw sim ultaneous a ttempts a t s tate-making,
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institution-building a nd dem ocratisation. I nternational n orms h ave a lso lo cked diverse groups within colonially defined boundaries, and granted them rights to make demands that the state cannot satisfy due to the lack of empirical attributes of statehood. This has proved to have a destabilising effect on the emerging states. The historical process of state-making that Africa experienced resulted in t he creation of weak states lacking the attributes of empirical statehood.9 Weak states lack domestic political and social consensus, the idea and institutions of the state are contested and governments face challenges to legitimacy and viability. Regimes rely on the suppression of opponents, the use of force and political cooptation to remain in p ower. I n s uch si tuations t hreats t o t he s tability o f t he s tate em anate from do mestic s ources. S ecurity in a w eak s tate i s v iewed in t erms o f fac tional struggles, whereby ruling cliques obscure the distinctions between regime security and s ecurity o f t he s tate.10 However, t he co nflicts t hat r esult f rom do mestic incoherence a re ra rely p urely in ternal o r co nfined w ithin t he b oundaries o f a single state. They spill over into neighbouring states and are linked to conflicts in those s tates a nd w ith n eighbourly r elations. P olitics a nd v iolence b ecome interconnected and intertwined at the local, national, regional and global level as insurgents and governments compete for external support using various networks. The p reservation a nd s trengthening o f t he s tate b ecomes t he p riority o f governments, b oth do mestically a nd ext ernally. Th e b oundary b etween internal and international conflict is blurred, and the value of foreign intervention becomes harder t o a ssess in t he n ational s ecurity s tate, a s o utside p owers a nd f orces intervene to support conflicting factions.11 Recent s tudies h ave hig hlighted t he r egional a nd g lobal d ynamics o f contemporary intrastate co nflicts. Th ese d ynamics a nd lin ks h ave b een l abelled regional s ecurity co mplexes, r egional co nflict f ormations a nd r egional co nflict complexes.12 These studies build on the old analysis of regions, which is defined as the existence of distinct and significant subsystem of networks or relations among a set of states located in geographical proximity to each other. A region mediates the interplay of t he s tate a nd t he international sys tem. B uzan o bserved t hat t he reality o f s ecurity in terdependence i s un avoidable, es pecially w ith n eighbours, because threats and friendship are most intensely felt at close range.13 Interaction b etween s tates r esults in a w eb o f s ecurity in terdependence o r formations c alled security co mplexes. Thi s r efers t o a g roup o f s tates w hose primary security concerns link together sufficiently that the national security of each c annot r ealistically b e co nsidered apart f rom t he o thers. Thi s def inition i s consistent w ith t hose o f V ayrynen t hat regional co nflict f ormations a re s o
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complex a nd en tangled t hat t hey cannot b e e asily de composed in to in dividual conflicts. He defined regional conflict formations as a complex mixture of intranational, intraregional and extraregional conflicts of violent character.14 In a study of armed conflicts in the period 19891997, Wallensteen and Sollenberg identified 15 regional co nflict co mplexes, w hich t hey def ined a s situations w here neighbouring countries experience internal or interstate conflicts with significant links between the conflicts.15 This accounted for more than half of the conflicts that were t aking p lace a t t he t ime. L inks b etween co nflicts im pact o n p eace ef forts since changes in conflict dynamics or resolution of one conflict will have an effect on a neighbouring conflict. Conflict linkages are composed of numerous transnational networks, ranging from mi litary, e conomic a nd s ocial t o p olitical n etworks.16 Military n etworks increase ac tivities li ke t he cross-border f low of arms and combatants, overt and covert mi litary in tervention a nd h arbouring o f r ebels f rom n eighbouring countries. Political n etworks in clude cr oss-border lin ks b etween e lites, p ersonal connections and friendship between politicians, ideological affinity and historical antagonism. Economic and financial networks, especially those of an illicit nature, increase regional and global links of war economies and of conflicts. Rebel groups, criminal gangs and the state all rely on cross-border networks of the shadow trade in looted goods and natural resources as a source of revenue. Social networks, such as t he exi stence o f et hnic g roups acr oss b orders, r efugee f lows a nd di aspora communities, faci litate i llicit t rade and arms t ransfers and promote t he regional interconnectedness of conflicts. The lin k b etween t he co nflict in n orthern U ganda a nd co nflicts in neighbouring countries as well as intervention by extraregional actors, notably the US, led to regionalisation of the activities of the LRA. This has made the conflict more co mplex a nd dif ficult t o r esolve. Th e lin k in volves va rious n etworks b y which a rms a nd co mbatants m ove acr oss p orous s tate b oundaries a nd dif ferent conflicts w ith e ase. Th ere i s a lso w idespread in volvement b y g overnment a rmy officers and rebels a like in a t rade in va luable resources and b asic commodities across t he co nflict zo nes in t he G reat L akes r egion. Di aspora co mmunities a nd refugees have also added to the interlinking of conflicts.

STATE-MAKING AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN UGANDA

To understand the roots of conflict in n orthern Uganda and why it has b een s o intractable, it is important to examine the problems of state-making and nation290
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building. In Uganda, the social contract of independence dissipated fairly rapidly. Since then, violent internal conflicts have been endemic. This may be explained by the s tructure a nd p rocesses o f a w eak s tate. Th e U gandan s tate i s a dislocated polity, c haracterised b y t he l ack o f do mestic p olitical a nd s ocial co nsensus a nd sufficient structural integration of the constituent regional, ethnic, religious and ideological parts.17 Internal threats to stability of the state and regimes are endemic and governments face challenges to their legitimacy and viability. In a weak state like U ganda, t he p olitical e lite i s p reoccupied w ith i ts p olitical s urvival a nd maintaining an integrated state. It has to manage both internal threats from local strongmen o r g roups a nd ext ernal t hreats. Thi s le ads t o ex clusive p olitics, authoritarianism and an intense struggle for political dominance. The p olitical s truggles in U ganda a fter in dependence, s pecifically a fter t he collapse o f t he 1962 s emi-federal co nstitution a nd t he f irst p ost-independent coalition government headed by Milton Obote, reflected precisely such a struggle for political dominance. The first post-independence government was an attempt to de licately b alance va rious r egional, et hnic a nd ide ological in terests. B ut t his ultimately co llapsed w hen O bote a rrested di ssident m embers o f t he c abinet, suspended the constitution and forced the Kabaka of the Baganda, the dominant ethnic group in Uganda, into exile in 1966. 18 This resulted in a crisis of legitimacy and h eightened co nflicts in t he et hnically f ragile s tate. W ith dimini shed legitimacy, Obote began to rely increasingly on the army to maintain power, but it also gave the army a taste for power and in 1971 the army, under the command of Idi A min, o verthrew t he O bote g overnment. I nitially, A min a ttempted t o w in support a mong g roups t hat w ere h ostile t o O bote, b ut b efore lo ng, v iolence, repression and t error, w hich t he regime u sed a s t he m ethods of control, c aused widespread alienation, generated bitterness and hostilities, and intensified ethnic and r eligious co nflicts in U ganda.19 It a lso r esulted in to s ocial di slocation a nd institutional decay. The presence of a large number of Ugandan exiles in Tanzania who were committed to the overthrow of Amins regime and Tanzanias hostility led t o t he in terface o f do mestic a nd r egional s ecurity. A min wa s e ventually overthrown in 1979 by a combined force of the Tanzanian Peoples Defence Force and Ugandan guerrillas after the invasion and occupation of Tanzanian territory north of the Kagera River by Amins army in October 1978.20 After t he o verthrow o f A min, v iolence a nd di sorder co ntinued, a nd t he successive regimes w ere confronted w ith t he problem of re-establishing s ocietal and p olitical o rder. Th ere wa s a n in stitutional a nd p olitical vac uum, w hich t he anti-Amin coalition (which was hastily put together during the Moshi conference
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in Tanzania) was not able to f ill. The major p olitical ac tors of the time, most of whom were political returnees whose claim to a role in national politics rested on their roles in the overthrow of Amin, were deeply divided along regional, ethnic, military, p olitical and ide ological lin es.21 Intrigues and m anoeuvres were r ife, a s different groups positioned themselves for political control, but the euphoria and hopes o f p rogress a nd n ational r econciliation t hat f ollowed t he en d o f A mins brutal rule dissipated.22 The first post-Amin choice for the presidency, Yusuf Lule, held p ower f or o nly t hree m onths, w hile hi s s uccessor, G odfrey B inaisa, wa s deposed from office after nine months. After t he o verthrow o f B inaisa, a caretaker mi litary co uncil o rganised multiparty dem ocratic e lections in D ecember 1980. F our p olitical p arties contested t he e lections: t he Uganda Peoples C ongress (UPC) le d b y O bote, t he Democratic P arty (D P) le d b y P aul S emogerere, t he C onservative P arty (CP) under t he le adership o f M ayanja N kanji a nd t he U ganda P atriotic M ovement (UPM) led by Yoweri Museveni. But the elections were held in a tense atmosphere of co nsiderable co ntroversy, mi strust, p olitical v iolence a nd t hreats o f ci vil wa r. Allegations o f ir regularities in fa vour o f t he UPC, w hich o btained t he m ost parliamentary seats, created problems of legitimacy for the new government and triggered more armed conflict. Museveni, who had threatened to go to the bush and wage war if t he elections were rigged, formed a r ebel group and launched a guerrilla war a gainst t he UPC g overnment of O bote. Th e conflict in creased t he militarisation o f p olitics, w ith t he mi litary b eing u sed t o r esolve p olitical differences. Th e co nflict a lso p olarised U ganda a long t he r egional a nd et hnic north-south divides, creating conditions for more conflicts. The army g radually succumbed to fragmentation along ethnic lines, and in J uly 1985, i t deposed the UPC government of Obote. After a mi litary takeover, President Daniel arap Moi of K enya in tervened in t he co nflict a nd un successfully t ried t o m ediate in t he peace t alks b etween t he mi litary g overnment a nd M useveni. I n J anuary 1986, Museveni and the NRA deposed the military junta of General Tito Okello. The NRM p romised t o r estore p eace, p olitical s tability a nd dem ocracy, a nd within a few months it succeeded in extending its control over the entire country and es tablishing a m easure o f s tability.23 In M ay 1987, t he NRM g overnment signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and b egan t o im plement s tructural ad justment p rogrammes. Thi s en deared t he NRM government to Western donors and resulted in a flow of aid. Western donors began to view Uganda as an island of stability in a t roubled region and a country that enjoyed political stability and sustained economic growth.
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However, the optimism was premature. The country was highly polarised and divided along the regional and ethnic northsouth divide. The support base of the NRA wa s a lso cen tred in a nd co nfined t o t he s outhern p arts o f t he co untry. Furthermore, t he c apture o f p ower b y t he NR A h ad n ot addr essed t he cr ucial question of the post-war order, including issues related to political control and the roles of the various actors in national politics. The NRA adopted the language of inclusion a nd ex clusion, a nd t hat det ermined t he r ole o f t he dif ferent ac tors in national p olitics. I t ex cluded t hose M useveni l abelled criminal e lements f rom participation in p olitics. Th e p eace t he NR A c laimed t o h ave r estored wa s therefore a victors peace, which depended on the ability of the NRA to impose and maintain its control over the defeated groups. The imm ediate c hallenge t o t he NRM g overnment em erged f rom e lements associated with the parties the NRA defeated. A number of rebel groups of varying political a nd mi litary sig nificance t ook u p a rms a gainst t he NR A g overnment. They included the Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA), Uganda Peoples Army, N inth O ctober M ovement, H oly S pirit M obile F orces (HS MF) a nd t he National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU).

THE REGIONAL CONTEXT OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA

From t he o utset, t here wa s a n o verlap o f t he co nflict in n orthern Uganda w ith conflicts in n eighbouring countries. The overlap was created by, among others, a massive inf low o f r efugees f rom U ganda t o S udan, p ermeable b orders, a proliferation of arms across the border, a l arge number of armed Ugandan exiles in neighbouring Sudan, and a history of mutual suspicion and elite networks. The capture of state power in Uganda by the NRA after a guerrilla war and Musevenis negative a ttitude t owards t he in ternationally acc laimed p rinciple o f s tate sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of other states created anxiety among Ugandas neighbours and heightened suspicion. During the OAU summit in Addis Ababa in July 1986, Museveni castigated African leaders for advocating the sanctity of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of states in the face of oppression.24 The lin kages o f t he do mestic s ecurity b etween U ganda a nd S udan w ere highlighted in t he outbreak of violence in n orthern Uganda simultaneously with attacks on Ugandan refugees in the east bank refugee camps in Southern Sudan by
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Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels. The SPLA feared that the Sudan government would enlist the help of Ugandan refugees to fight against it. The NRA government, which was sympathetic to the SPLA, on the other hand feared that the S udan g overnment w ould h elp t he exi led g roup t o r ecapture p ower in Uganda.25 The a ttack acce lerated t he r eorganisation o f exi led s oldiers o f t he defeated U ganda N ational L iberation A rmy (UNL A) a nd t he f ormation o f t he UPDA rebel group and armed attacks against the NRA in Uganda. Following attacks on government army positions in Uganda by UPDA rebels, President Museveni accused the Sudanese government troops stationed in Nimule of re-arming and providing t ransport for t he UP DA. He s aid t hat t he Sudanese government wa nted t o u se n orthern Uganda a s a r ear f lank a gainst t he S PLA.26 Sudan s trenuously denie d a r ole in t he a ttack a nd, in t urn, acc used Uganda o f supporting t he SPLA and of t rying to exp ort its revolution. President Museveni denied the accusation, and tried to calm his neighbours fear:
[I]t is not our duty not even our desire to export this revolution to anybody else, or to any other African country. Likewise, it is not correct for anybody to seek to export counter-revolution t o Uganda. L et u s a llow t he p eople of e ach country to shape t heir des tiny w ithout interference f rom ext ernal q uarter, b e i t b rotherly o r foreign.27

The t wo n eighbours h eld s everal b ilateral m eetings b etween 1987 a nd 1993, during which they pledged not to support each others criminals, and to cooperate on border security. In 1990 Uganda and Sudan reached an agreement in terms of which Sudan deployed a military team to monitor whether Uganda was supplying the S PLA. Th ese b ilateral a greements w ere limi ted t o co nfidence b uilding measures s uch a s a n ex change o f mi litary mi ssions. Th ey did n ot addr ess t he underlying issues in t he conflict or face up to the reality that the criminals were not only proxies; they had their own interests and strategies. Meanwhile, distrust and r ecriminations co ntinued a mid o ccasional a ir ra ids b y S udan o n U gandan territory, and cross-border skirmishes involving armies of the two countries and rebel groups. The co nflict in n orthern U ganda a lso o verlapped w ith in ternal co nflicts in Kenya a nd inf luenced r egional r elations.28 Like n eighbouring S udan, K enya harboured a s uspicion t hat t he Ugandan le ader w ould s upport di ssident g roups seeking to overthrow the regime of President Moi. Since the abortive coup in 1982, Mois regime had b een under growing threat f rom dissident groups. There were fears t hat M usevenis a scent t o p ower t hrough a n a rmed s truggle w ould h ave
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contagious effects.29 Moi also felt personally insulted when Museveni marched to Kampala a nd t ook p ower b y f orce a fter sig ning a p eace a greement t hat h e h ad facilitated, for Moi had staked his reputation on brokering t he p eace agreement between Musevenis NRA rebels and the Okello government.30 Faced with internal threats, t he K enyan le ader in 1987 acc used U ganda o f s upporting K enyan dissidents and of training Kenyan youth and helping others to travel to Libya for military training.31 On its part, Uganda accused Kenya of allowing insurgents to use Kenya as a r ear p osition and t ransit route. Suspicion was heightened by t he capture in November 1987 of Brigadier Smith Opon Acak and Major John Olwol, two f ormer o fficers o f t he def unct UNL A, in e astern U ganda, a fter t hey h ad entered Uganda from Kenya.32 The media in the two countries heightened tension with h ostile p ropaganda, b ut t he t wo co untries un dertook n umerous b ilateral initiatives to reduce the tension. The NR A g overnment u sed a co mbination o f mi litary a nd di plomatic initiatives in its response to the conflict in northern Uganda. In an address to the nation on the anniversary of Ugandas independence, President Museveni declared that fighting a nd a nnihilating t hese t ypes o f e lements i s a j ustified c ause.33 He embarked o n a di plomatic o ffensive t o cr iminalise r ebel g roups, a mong o thers referring to them as the elements that have caused untold suffering to the people of Uganda, violated human rights, murdered people, destroyed the economy and violated the sovereignty of the people of Uganda.34 Criminalisation of rebels was aimed a t ra tionalising t he g overnments mi litarist p olicy a nd m obilising international s upport. Th e government s ought t o de legitimise opposition of t he Ugandan diaspora, which was critical of the NRM government and sympathetic to the rebels. Internationalisation added to the complexity of the conflict. After more than a y ear of military stalemate, the NRA government agreed to grant amnesty to those who renounced rebellion. It also agreed to negotiate with the UPDA, the main rebel group operating in n orthern Uganda. At the time the UPDA was under pressure from the Holy Spirit Movement, a splinter rebel group led b y Joseph Kony, w hich wa s em erging a s a f ormidable a nd co ntending r ebel group. Negotiations b etween NR A and UPDA commanders b egan in e arnest in March 1988, c ulminating in a n a greement o n 3 J une 1988. H owever, a s plit occurred within the ranks of the UPDA: the larger faction under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Angelo Okello Okeno surrendered and was integrated into the NRA, w hile a nother fac tion un der B rigadier O dong L atek di sowned t he p eace talks and t he s ettlement, and opted to continue f ighting. According to a f ormer UPDA rebel, some Ugandans in the diaspora advised the UPDA not to agree to the
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terms of the settlement.35 The peace initiative failed to acknowledge the complexity of t he co nflict. It did n ot in clude s trategic ac tors li ke m embers o f t he Ugandan diaspora o r o ther n ational a nd r egional ac tors. A s Wallensteen a nd S ollenberg argued, i t i s v ital f or a ny p eace ini tiative t o ac knowledge r egional co nflict complexes where they exist and develop processes that involve them all.36 The faction of the UPDA rebel group, which disassociated itself from the peace agreement, allied with Konys Holy Spirit Movement to form the Uganda Christian Democratic Army. In 1992, the group was renamed the Lords Resistance Army. By then, Kony h ad p urged t he g roup o f o ther le aders a nd co nsolidated hi s co ntrol over the group. The LRA is an arcane rebel movement, of which little is known, due to the failure by its leadership to present a coherent programme to the public, apart from the obvious objectives of overthrowing the government of Museveni. The o rganisation co mprises f ormer s oldiers a nd c hild s oldiers w ho h ave b een forcibly r ecruited a nd i s a hig hly m obile guer rilla g roup, w ith t he dep lorable reputation of killing civilians and committing other human rights abuses. Kony, who claims to be a spirit medium, started his rebel career as spiritual adviser to a UPDA battalion commanded by Major Opia. After Major Opia died in a b attle in 1987, Kony took command of the unit and formed the Holy Spirit Movement. He em barked o n f orcible r ecruitment o f f ormer s oldiers a nd UP DA r ebels, and abduction of civilians, mainly children, to build his force. The LRA emerged as the most formidable rebel group in t he 1990s, a fter the surrender o f t he UP DA. B ut t he r ise o f t he LR A co incided w ith a de cline o f support f or r ebels a mong t he lo cal p opulation in n orthern U ganda, a nd t he governments p olicy o f in volving t he lo cal p opulation in co unterinsurgency operations as vigilantes. By 1993, the loss of civilian support began to impact on the group, which also lost a n umber of its fighters when they surrendered to the government. Thr ough in termediaries, t he LR A co ntacted t he U ganda governments mini ster o f s tate in c harge o f pacification o f t he n orth, B etty Bigombe, and requested negotiations to end the conflict. Peace talks between LRA commanders and their NRA counterparts and Bigombe began at the end of 1993, with religious leaders and elders attending as observers. Agreement was reached on a ce asefire a nd f ree p assage f or LR A r ebels, b ut co llapsed in F ebruary 1994 when Museveni gave an ultimatum to the LRA to surrender within seven days or face mi litary ac tion. Museveni acc used t he LR A of dishonesty and l ack of good faith, and argued that the LRA was using the negotiations to rebuild its capacity through recruitment and that it was negotiating with the government of Sudan for
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military assistance. Others blame political rivalry between local politicians, while yet others blamed NRA military officers for sabotaging the negotiations.37

THE ROLE OF THE LORDS RESISTANCE ARMY IN THE REGIONAL CONFLICT COMPLEX
Renewed h ostilities f ollowed t he co llapse o f p eace t alks a nd t he LR A l aunched numerous attacks to prove that it was still a force to be reckoned with. It intensified its guerrilla activities and abducted children and took them for training in Sudan, which h ad b egun t o p rovide s ubstantial log istical s upport f or t he g roup. Th e conflict thus became closely intertwined with the conflict in Sudan and the global and geostrategic issues such as the US-led war against terrorism. The LRA became an actor in regional security, and a pawn in relations between Sudan and Uganda. In October 1994, Uganda cancelled the agreement it had reached with Sudan in 1990 allowing Sudan to station a military monitoring team in Uganda, accusing the team of engaging in ac tivities incompatible with its mandate.38 Uganda broke off diplomatic relations with Sudan in April of the following year on the grounds that t he l atter wa s s upporting i ts di ssidents.39 During t his p eriod, t he U ganda government a rmy c lashed w ith a nd des troyed t he c amps o f a lleged I slamic fundamentalist rebels at B useruka on t he es carpment of t he w estern R ift Valley near L ake A lbert. I ncidences o f a rmed a ttacks o n p olice s tations in M pigi a nd Mukono districts in central Uganda were also reported.40 By now, Ugandas policy towards Sudan had converged with those of Western states. S udan h ad b een in creasingly i solated sin ce t he f irst G ulf War, d ue t o i ts perceived radic al I slamist ide ology a nd exp ansionist a genda. I n 1990 t he G ulf states s topped e conomic a ssistance a nd f inance o f S udans t hree-year r ecovery programme. I n 1991, t he E uropean C ommunity h alted n on-humanitarian economic assistance to Sudan. In the same year, the US added Sudan to its list of state s ponsors o f t errorism. B y 1995, t he US wa s ac tively p roviding mi litary assistance to armed opponents of t he K hartoum regime: t he rebel umbrella, t he National D emocratic A lliance a nd t he S PLA, a s w ell a s E thiopia, Er itrea a nd Uganda. Th ese t hree s tates w ere co nsidered b y t he US t o b e t he new f rontline states against the Islamist regime in Sudan. In 1996, Washington approved US$20 million t o t he t hree co untries.41 In t he s ame y ear, t he U nited N ations im posed sanctions on Sudan to force it to hand over suspects implicated in the assassination attempt o n E gyptian p resident H osni M ubarak. A ppearing b efore t he S enate
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Subcommittees o n A frica a nd o n O perations a nd H uman R ights, US A ssistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, acknowledged that the US h ad delivered non-lethal, defensive military assistance to Uganda to help improve the effectiveness of its military to defend itself against Sudanese sponsored aggression, in particular that of the LRA.42 The US provided US$3,85 million in financial years 1997 and 1998 in addi tion to a US$400 000 in ternational military education and training programme to improve professionalism of the Ugandan army.43 I have also pointed out elsewhere that the US used the conflict in northern Uganda as a proxy to supply t he SPLA, with w hich t he UPDF shared military facilities.44 US p olicy was inf luenced b y i ts p erception o f M useveni a s a r eliable p artner a nd a s a n interlocutor in t he region.45 In the process, the conflict in n orthern Uganda and the LR A w ere lin ked t o a co mplex w eb co nstituting t he G reat L akes co nflict complex. This increased the cycle of violence and counter-violence. Between 1995 a nd 1998 U ganda fought proxy wars w ith Sudan t hat drew in Ethiopia a nd Er itrea, b oth m embers o f t he new f rontline s tates a gainst t he Islamist regime in Sudan. Both countries had broken off diplomatic relations with Sudan a fter acc using i t o f des tabilising t heir co untries b y s upporting di ssidents and s ponsoring t he s pread o f I slamic f undamentalism. U gandan t roops m ade periodic incursions into Sudan in pursuit of the LRA and two other Uganda rebel groups, the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF), a nd a lso in s upport o f t he S PLA. Th e WNB F a nd UNRF II r ebels operated f rom b ases in S udan a nd Z aire. B etween 1994 a nd 1997, t he WNB F launched a s eries o f a ttacks in t he W est N ile, f rom t heir b ases in S udan a nd northeastern Zaire. In September 1996, between 600 and 800 WNBF soldiers were reported to have entered Uganda through Zaire.46 They, among others, destroyed bridges, mined roads and attacked refugee camps. Museveni reasoned that Sudan and Zaire under Mobutu intended to keep the Ugandan army pinned down and make it incapable of coming to the aid of Rwanda, which was under threat from former Forces A rmes Rwandais and Hutu Interahamwe militias o perating f rom bases in eastern Zaire.47 In 1996, Uganda, together with Rwanda and Angola, which felt their security was threatened by Mobutu, intervened in Zaire in support of dissidents fighting to overthrow hi s r egime. WNB F c amps in n ortheastern Z aire w ere o verrun b y Ugandan government troops, and the security of the border areas was handed over to the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo rebels, who were
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fighting a gainst M obutus g overnment.48 In M arch o f t he s ame y ear, t he S PLA destroyed WNB F b ases in S udan a nd c aptured a n umber o f i ts s oldiers, w hile others surrendered to Ugandan government troops.

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS

Concerns about the inter-linkage of conflicts in Uganda and Sudan in the regional conflict complex and t he increased t hreats to regional stability le d to numerous interventions in the form of mediation, among others, by Libya, Iran and Malawi, without much success.49 The complexity of the conflict, multiplicity of issues and lack o f sin cerity b ogged do wn t he n egotiations. N onetheless, w idespread abduction of children by the LRA and their use as child soldiers and sex slaves, together with other gross violations of human rights and abuses, led to widespread international pressure on Sudan and Uganda to seek a peaceful end to the conflict. Former US President Jimmy Carter, acting through the Carter Center, brokered an agreement b etween U ganda a nd S udan t hat wa s sig ned in D ecember 1999 in Nairobi and witnessed by the UN C hildrens Fund (UNICEF), Save the Children and s ome f riendly f oreign g overnments. U nder t he acco rd, U ganda a nd S udan agreed t o ce ase h ostilities a gainst e ach o ther, s top s upporting e ach o thers dissidents, exchange prisoners of war and facilitate the return of war captives, and restore di plomatic t ies b y t he en d o f F ebruary 2000. 50 Although a l ack o f t rust stalled t he p rocess o f im plementation, t he acco rd p rovided t he b asis f or f uture relations. In the course of 2000, intense diplomatic activities by the Carter Center and UNI CEF, t he UN H igh C ommissioner f or R efugees, t he C anadian government, Libya and Egypt resulted in the signing of a new agreement.51 In t he wa ke o f im proved r elations b etween S udan a nd U ganda, t he International Organisation of Migration (IOM), UNICEF and the governments of Sudan and Uganda repatriated about 323 p eople who had been abducted by the LRA b ut h ad es caped t o n orthern S udan f rom t he s outh.52 A t urning p oint in relations b etween U ganda a nd S udan o ccurred on 12 J anuary 2002, w hen Presidents Om ar e l-Bashir a nd M useveni h eld a m eeting in K hartoum. Th e improved r elations b etween t he t wo co untries c ulminated in t he sig ning o f a protocol on 10 M arch 2002, w hich allowed the Ugandan government soldiers to execute a limi ted mi litary o peration w ithin t he b orders o f S udan a gainst t he LRA.53 Thereafter, Ugandan government troops were deployed as far as Juba, the regional capital of Southern Sudan.
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REGIONAL CONFLICT COMPLEX: DYNAMICS AND TRANSFORMATION

The im provement in t he r elations b etween S udan a nd U ganda r eflected t he interplay o f do mestic, r egional a nd in ternational de velopments. S ince t he mid1990s, the Khartoum government had been under growing international pressure to prove its anti-terrorist credentials. Sudan had been internationally isolated since 1991 and subject to UN sanctions since 1996. Sanctions were beginning to have an impact on the regime in Khartoum. The costs of armed conflict and pressure from various di ssident g roups w ere a lso a ffecting t he g overnment. A s a r esult, t he Khartoum regime ended the alliance with the radical National Islamic Front Party of Al Hassan Turabi and also ratified the 1997 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism a nd t he 1999 I nternational C onvention f or t he S uppression o f Financing Terrorism.54 Uganda was also under international pressure to peacefully resolve i ts co nflict w ith t he K hartoum g overnment, a nd en d t he k illings a nd abduction of civilians by the LRA. The military solution to the conflict had proved ineffective a nd t he new f rontline a lliance h ad f loundered w ith t he E thiopianEritrean co nflict a nd t he co nflicts in t he D RC a nd t hat b etween U ganda a nd Rwanda d uring t he intervention by t he t wo co untries in t he D RC. In 1999, t he government reluctantly a greed t o g rant amnesty t o rebels and t he A mnesty Act was promulgated in 2000. The 11 S eptember 2001 t errorist attacks on t he World Trade C enter in N ew York and the Pentagon in Washington D C, and the resultant US war on terror, added a n ew dim ension. A fter t he a ttacks, r ebel g roups b egan t o b e v iewed a s potential terrorist organisations and possible cells in a n international network of terrorist o rganisations. M ost s tates w ere t herefore a t p ains t o p rove t heir a ntiterrorist cr edentials. I n D ecember 2001, t he US adde d t he LR A a nd t he A llied Democratic F orces (AD F) r ebels in U ganda t o i ts Terrorist E xclusion L ist designed t o protect t he s afety of t he country and its citizens un der t he n ew US Patriot A ct. B oth r ebel g roups w ere b eing s upported b y S udan. I n M arch 2002 Uganda f ollowed s uit a nd p assed t he A nti-Terrorism Act, t hereby cr iminalising the LR A a nd o ther r ebel g roups.55 Thus U ganda a nd S udan p resented t he cooperation between them as a demonstration of their coordination and readiness to s upport t he in ternational co mmunity in i ts leg itimate m easures t o co mbat terrorism as reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 1373.56 Following the signing of the protocol of 10 M arch 2002, un der which Sudan allowed t he Ugandan a rmy t o c arry o ut mi litary o perations a gainst t he LR A in Southern Sudan, the Ugandan army launched Operation Iron Fist to destroy the LRA rebels at their bases in Southern Sudan. The Ugandan government had for a
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long t ime a rgued t hat co operation b y t he g overnment o f S udan wa s v ital f or defeating the LRA and for ending the conflict in northern Uganda. Intervention by the Ugandan a rmy into S outhern S udan h ad a b oomerang ef fect, f or in stead o f destroying the LRA, it elicited counter-violence against the civilian population in Southern S udan a nd n orthern U ganda. Th e LR A cr ossed b ack in to n orthern Uganda, spreading more mayhem and destruction. Within a short time, the scale of the humanitarian crisis reached unprecedented heights as entire communities beyond t he t raditional a rea o f LR A o peration in t he A choli s ub-region w ere displaced. I nternational a ttention o n t he co nflict in creased, a s did p rotection activities b y in ternational n on-governmental o rganisations (N GOs) a nd UN agencies.57 Chris D olan a nd L ucy H ovil h ave a rgued t hat t he UN u sed humanitarian protection as a Trojan horse to intervene in the conflict because of resistance by the Ugandan government to external intervention in the conflict.58 In N ovember 2003, J an E geland, t he UN U nder S ecretary-General f or Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief, referred to the conflict as one of the worlds l argest n eglected h umanitarian em ergencies a nd, o n 14 A pril 2004, h e briefed the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in n orthern Uganda. Among o thers, t he S ecurity C ouncil s tressed t he im portance o f exploring a ll peaceful avenues to resolve t he conflict, including t hrough creating a c limate in which s olution b ased o n di alogue mig ht b e f ound.59 The Ugandan g overnment described t he S ecurity C ouncil s tatement a s unacceptable,60 and t he c all b y t he Permanent Representative of Canada to the President of the Security Council for the situation in northern Uganda to be put on the agenda of the Security Council as unjustified.61 It reiterated its view that the situation in n orthern Uganda is an internal matter on w hich she is t he only one w ho can recommend, call for, and initiate action as she sees fit. It insisted on a military solution to the conflict, and demanded a regional military approach involving the Mission des Nations Unies en Rpublique D mocratique d u C ongo (MONUC), U nited N ations M ission in t he Sudan (UNIMIS), A frican Union Forces in Sudan, the SPLA, Sudan and DRC to disarm t he LR A.62 In do ing s o, t he Uganda g overnment co ntradicted i tself a nd unwittingly acknowledged the regional and global entanglement of the conflict. The dem and b y t he g overnment o f Uganda f or a r egional mi litary o ffensive against t he LR A did n ot r eceive a sy mpathetic h earing63 and r elations b etween Uganda and the DRC were less than cordial. Uganda had only recently ended its military in tervention in t he D RC in s upport o f va rious r ebel g roups a nd t he government of the DRC had also filed a case against Uganda with the International Court of Justice, accusing Uganda of illegal exploitation of natural resources from
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Map 101: LRA activities, December 2008 April 2010

Source: Amelie Desgroppes, IFRA/ICG.

the D RC. Th e S PLA a nd t he g overnment o f S udan h ad j ust sig ned t he Comprehensive P eace A greement (CP A) a nd t he a utonomous g overnment o f Southern Sudan had been established. As the organisation leading the government of Southern Sudan, the SPLA was trying to enlist support and cooperation of the various armed groups in t he south, including former allies of the LRA. Engaging the LRA militarily would create a split and jeopardise efforts aimed at uniting the
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various fac tions in t he s outh, a nd un leash s erious r eprisal a gainst ci vilians. A military c ampaign a gainst t he LR A w ould b e b urdensome f or M ONUC in t he northeastern DRC and UNIMIS and African Union forces in Sudan who were too thin on the ground and overstretched. The UN and AU were therefore reluctant to take on another conflict.64 The government of Uganda contributed further to internationalisation of the conflict by referring the LRA to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC opened investigations against the LRA in J uly 2004 a nd in O ctober 2005, i ssued arrest warrants against five top LRA commanders for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Adam Branch65 correctly argued that the government of Uganda was using the ICC as a political instrument to advance its militarisation of the co nflict a nd wa s cr iminalising t he LR A a s a m eans o f de legitimising i ts political a nd mi litary o pposition. Th e g overnment exp ected t o b enefit f rom internationalisation of the conflict and hoped that the ICC indictment would put pressure on the government of Sudan to stop supporting the LRA, which would accelerate the demise of the rebel group. However, the ICC indictment made the conflict m ore co mplex a nd en tangled in t he p olitics o f in ternational cr iminal prosecution and has proved to be an obstacle to peaceful settlement of the conflict rather than a help. When co nflicts a re en tangled in a r egional co mplex, t he d ynamics o r resolution o f o ne o f t he co nflicts h as a n ef fect o n n eighbouring co nflicts. Improvement in relations between Uganda and Sudan, and the signing of the CPA between the government of Sudan and the SPLA, affected the conflict in northern Uganda a nd t he LR A. Th e es tablishment o f t he a utonomous g overnment in Southern S udan, in lin e w ith p rovisions o f t he CPA, dep rived t he LR A o f t he freedom to operate from bases in Southern Sudan and of direct support from the government of Sudan. It prompted the LRA to shift its base from Southern Sudan to Garamba National Park in the northeastern part of the DRC. Ugandan security officials66 suspected that the relocation was done with the help of the government of S udan a nd f ull k nowledge o f o fficials in t he D RC. Th ere w ere a lso f ears b y Ugandan s ecurity o fficials t hat t he LR A mig ht h ave es tablished b ases in t he Central African Republic (CAR), and linked up with rebel groups in Chad and the CAR. Chad has consistently accused Sudan of supporting Chadian rebel groups. A visit t o U ganda in l ate 2007 b y t he p resident o f t he CAR a t t he in vitation o f Museveni might have been related to these fears. Relocation by the LRA to the northeastern part of the DRC resulted in LR A attacks spreading to a wider area. The LRA has been accused of attacking civilians
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and h umanitarian w orkers in S outhern S udan, a nd im peding r epatriation o f Sudanese r efugees f rom t he D RC, t he CAR a nd U ganda.67 A hig h-profile LR A attack in the DRC took place on 23 January 2006 when the rebel group attacked a detachment o f M ONUC f orces a nd k illed eig ht G uatemalan p eacekeepers a nd severely w ounded f ive o thers. Thi s le d t o di scussions b y t he UNSC a nd t he sponsorship by the UK of a resolution for military action against the LRA.68 Transformation in t he regional conflict complex a lso ac ted a s a s pur for t he historic J uba p eace t alks b etween t he LR A a nd g overnment o f U ganda. A n improvement in t he r elations b etween Uganda a nd S udan dep rived t he LR A o f direct s upport, w hile Operation I ron F ist disrupted t he mi litary f ormation a nd organisation of the LRA. In May 2006, Kony, the LRA leader, released a v ideo in which h e c alled f or p eace n egotiations w ith t he g overnment o f U ganda. Th e message was delivered to President Museveni by President Salva Kiir of Southern Sudan, w ho o ffered t o m ediate. H e m ade t his o ffer b ecause t he g overnment o f Southern Sudan knew that if the conflict in northern Uganda did not end, it would complicate the implementation of the CPA and lead to a fresh outbreak of conflict in Southern Sudan. Therefore, the government of Southern Sudan was intent on getting r id of t he LR A fac tor and s trengthening its p osition in de aling w ith t he government of Sudan. Initially, Ugandan president Museveni insisted on an unconditional surrender by the LRA, but he later agreed to take part in t he peace talks with the LRA.69 In an address to the nation, the president acknowledged that there was tremendous pressure on the government to negotiate with the LRA rebels. At the time Uganda was p reparing t o h ost t he p restigious C ommonwealth h eads o f s tates a nd governments m eeting. Since t he disastrous i ntervention i n t he DRC and increasing authoritarianism at home, Western governments had begun to rethink their previously favourable opinion of the Ugandan leader. It was therefore vital for Museveni to reinvent himself as a peacemaker. Talks between delegations from the LRA and the government of Uganda began on 14 J uly 2006 in J uba un der t he m ediation o f t he v ice-president o f S outhern Sudan, Riek Machar. However, the talks got off to a difficult start with both parties taking hard-line stances. From the onset, the government viewed the purpose of the talks as negotiating the terms of surrender for the LRA. It rejected LRA calls for cessation of hostilities. The LRA adopted the tactic of walking out and stalling the negotiations.70 The p eace t alks w ere faci litated a nd w itnessed b y a n umber o f f riendly countries, s uch a s Norway, C anada a nd D enmark. Th e UN a ppointed a s pecial
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envoy, w hich raised t he profile of t he negotiations. O ther African countries li ke Kenya, Tanzania a nd S outh A frica s ent o bservers, w hile N GOs s uch a s C aritas, Saint Egidio and Pax Christi also acted as observers and peace advocates. Despite initial challenges, in an unprecedented development, the LRA and government of Uganda sig ned a l andmark ces sation o f h ostilities a greement in A ugust 2006. 71 Agreements were also later reached on the other items on the agenda. However, the failure of Kony to show up in R ikwangba for the signing of the final agreement raised doubts about the future of the peace talks. Demands by the LRA le ader f or clarification, in cluding o n s ome i ssues a lready a greed u pon, showed that mistrust and suspicion remained between the two parties. Even the fact t hat t he t alks w ere g oing o n did n ot s top M useveni f rom en tering in to a n agreement w ith t he D RC f or a j oint mi litary ac tion a gainst t he LR A.72 The cessation of hostilities agreement f inally collapsed when, on 14 D ecember 2008, the Ugandan army, with the consent and backing of the DRC and the US, launched military strikes against LRA rebel jungle hideouts in the Garamba National Park. The offensive, which lasted three months, was a dismal failure. It did not achieve its in tended o bjective o f de cimating t he le adership o f t he LR A a nd in stead provoked brutal LRA reprisals against civilians in the DRC and to some extent in Southern Sudan.

REGIONALISATION OF CONFLICTS AND REBEL ACTIVITIES

The p receding di scussion s hows t hat t he co nflict in n orthern Uganda h as b een very dynamic. It evolved from a local and national level conflict that was rooted in the problems of a w eak state, to a r egional level conflict with global dimensions. Weak in ternal g overnance, fa ilure t o es tablish s tate co ntrol a nd m eaningful administration in t he b order a reas o f n orthern U ganda, S outhern S udan, northeastern D RC a nd t he CAR p rovided a n o pportunity f or r ebels t o o perate almost un hindered. L ikewise, a rms a nd g overnment s oldiers h ave b een m oving across p orous b orders in p ursuit o f r ebels a nd in tervening in n eighbouring conflicts. The UPDF has made periodic incursions into Southern Sudan and the DRC in p ursuit o f t he LR A, a nd a lso t o a ssist t he S PLA. Thi s h as r esulted in interlinking of the conflicts across the region, regionalisation of rebel activities and the de velopment of t he Great L akes regional conflict formation. Th e conflict in northern U ganda i s p art o f t his r egional co nflict co mplex o r f ormation. Th e boundaries of the regional conflict complex are fluid and dynamic. The conflict is
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also lin ked b y n etworks o f i llicit t rade in n atural r esources, s uch a s t imber a nd minerals, which has sustained the conflict. Against the background of regionalisation, the LRA rebel group has changed over time from an organisation made up of former soldiers of the defeated UNLA who were fighting to recapture state power, to an army of predominantly children abducted f rom northern Uganda. It has operated as a p roxy in t he war between Uganda and the US on the one hand, and the Islamist government in Sudan, which the US accused of sponsoring fundamentalism and terrorism, on the other. Since 2007, the LRA has b een abducting civilians f rom the DRC and S outhern Sudan and conscripting them into its ranks. Inevitably, the composition and interests of the LR A h ave va ried a nd c hanged w ith t ime. Th e co nflict a lso a ttracted o ther actors: t he US adde d t he LR A t o i ts li st o f terrorist o rganisations, a nd humanitarian agencies and the ICC also intervened in the conflict. This has made the conflict more complex, and has had an impact on the search for a negotiated settlement. I n addi tion, t he in teraction b etween t he LR A a nd s tates w ithin t he region a nd o ther ac tors h as e volved a nd i t i s co nceivable t hat w ith t ime, t he character of the LRA might change as its interaction with other actors continues to change. Any analysis and intervention to resolve the conflict must take note of the dynamic nature of the conflict. Regionalisation of rebel activities and links between conflicts in neighbouring countries mean that changes and dynamics in o ne conflict have effects on other conflicts within the region. The signing of the CPA in Sudan in January 2005 and election in t he DRC in 2006 h ad an impact on both the LRA and the conflict in northern Uganda. I t les sened t he va lue o f t he LR A t o S udan, s o t hat S outhern Sudan was not willing to continue hosting the UPDF on its territory, while in the DRC ef forts were m ade to integrate various rebel forces into t he n ational army. Efforts t o r esolve t he co nflicts in t he D RC t hrough p eaceful m eans p rovided a solution to the problem of the meddling by the UPDF in the conflict. Apart from directly intervening in t he DRC, the UPDF had also been providing support for rebel groups in the DRC. These developments influenced the strategic options and choices o f b oth t he LR A a nd t he g overnment o f S outhern S udan (G oSS) a nd provided an impetus for the Juba peace talks. The im plication i s t hat co nflicts t hat a re in terlinked n eed t o b e addr essed within a r egional f ramework. A ttempts m ust b e m ade t o in volve a ll s trategic actors, at the local, national, regional and global levels. Conflicts that are entangled in a regional web cannot be meaningfully addressed in isolation of other conflicts that impact on it.
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CONCLUSION
Since t he 1990s, m ost v iolent co nflicts h ave h ad a n in trastate n ature. A n explanation f or t hese co nflicts c an b e f ound in in ternal di scord, lin ked t o t he process of state-making and nation-building. These conflicts involve the state as well a s n on-state ac tors s uch a s r ebel m ovements a nd mi litias t hat co ntest t he political authority and legitimacy of governments. But contemporary conflicts are not o nly in ternal, t hey a re a lso r egional. Th ey s pill o ver b orders, lin k u p w ith conflicts in neighbouring countries and draw in neighbouring states, and develop into regional conflict complexes. In t he process, t hey attract t he intervention of international ac tors. Thi s h as t ransformed n on-state r ebel g roups in to m ajor actors in r egional a nd in ternational s ecurity. I n U ganda, t he co nflict in i ts northern part and which has its roots in domestic political problems related to the failure to build national consensus, has linked up with conflicts in n eighbouring states and regional conflicts. The conflict became regionalised and the LRA, which has b een t he m ost f ormidable r ebel g roup in n orthern U ganda, exp anded i ts activities to the whole region. The increased role of rebel movements in r egional and international security has presented problems on whether to engage with them and how to do so. Most of the rebel groups have the dubious reputation of engaging in cr iminal violence and p erpetrating w idespread h uman r ights a buses. Th e LR A r ebel g roup in Uganda has such a reputation too, which has made it unattractive to engage using peaceful m eans. Thi s di lemma h as b ecome m ore ac ute sin ce S eptember 2001, when rebel groups began to be viewed as terrorist organisations, although opinion is divided on this classification. Thus, countries like the US and Uganda added the LRA to the list of terrorist states, but other countries still feel that Uganda should engage with the LRA and seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. There is a need to de velop a co herent p olicy o n h ow t o en gage r ebel g roups. To l abel t hem a s terrorist and preclude any engagement with them is not a useful option. The voices of rebel movements must be heard. However, engaging rebel groups should not be misconstrued for condoning their criminal activities. Emphasis should also be placed on understanding the domestic contexts that lead to conflicts and the emergence of rebel groups, and on trying to address them. The b order a reas w here r ebels o perate h ave lo w le vels o f g overnance a nd administrative co ntrol. E stablishing a n ef fective s tate a uthority a nd m eaningful administration o ver f rontier t erritories w ould b e a n im portant s tep t owards addressing the regionalisation of conflicts.
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It i s a lso v ital t o exa mine exi sting r egional s ecurity f rameworks a nd t heir suitability for helping the grievances of the rebel groups to be heard, for these are often lef t o ut o f n egotiations. C onflict m anagement n eeds t o h ave a r egional awareness and take into account various dimensions of regional interlinkages. It should not be restricted to individual states or conflicts, because the resolution of conflict in one country may require resolution of other conflicts within the region.

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NOTES
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37 D Pain, The b ending of spears: producing consensus for p eace and d evelopment in northern Uganda, R eport C ommissioned b y I nternational A lert a nd K acoke M adit, L ondon, 1997; Paul Om ach, Th e s tate, in surgency a nd in ternational r elations: t he c ase o f U ganda, Unpublished PhD thesis, Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, 2003. 38 Africa Research Bulletin, 24 November 1994, 11603. 39 Africa Research Bulletin, 25 May 1995, 11813. 40 Africa Research Bulletin, 26 April 1995, 11801. 41 Africa Confidential 37(3) (1996), 1. 42 Susan R ice, s peech h eld o n 29 J uly 1998, ci ted in Om ach, The s tate, i nsurgency a nd international relations. 43 Ibid. 44 Paul Om ach, Elusive s earch f or p eace i n n orthern U ganda, R esearch p aper s ubmitted t o Concern for Development Initiatives in Africa (ForDIA), Dar es Salaam, 2008. 45 E H auser, U gandas r elations w ith W estern do nors in t he 1990s: w hat im pact o n democratisation?, Journal of Modern African Studies 37(4) (1999), 621641. 46 Africa Research Bulletin, 30 December 1996, 12480. 47 Y K Museveni, Ugandas role in t he Democratic Republic of Congo, Address to Parliament in Kampala on 28 May 2000. 48 Africa Research Bulletin, 19 M ay 1997, 12659; R G ersony, The anguish of northern Uganda, Report o n t he r esults o f f ield-based a ssessment o f t he co nflict in n orthern U ganda, Submitted to the US embassy and USAID mission, Kampala, August 1997, 78. 49 Africa Research Bulletin, 24 October 1996, 12390. 50 UN Security Council (UNSC), Uganda/Sudan: joint statement S/2002/269, 15 M arch 2002; Wairagala Wakabi, Will Atlanta save the day for Sudans core fundamentalists?, East African, 1723 July 2000, 32. 51 East African, 1723 July 2000, 32; East African, 28 October 2000, 10. 52 Omach, The state, insurgency and international relations. 53 UNSC, S/2002/269. 54 Omach The state, insurgency and international relations. 55 Ibid. 56 UNSC, Resolution 1373, Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, adopted b y t he S ecurity C ouncil a t i ts 4385t h m eeting, o n 28 S eptember 2001, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf? OpenElement (accessed 22 April 2008). 57 Monitor, 17 December 2003; New Vision, 28 February 2004, 1; Monitor, 5 April 2004. 58 Chris D olan, a nd L ucy H ovil, H umanitarian p rotection in U ganda: a T rojan h orse? Background paper, Londen: Humanitarian Policy Group, 2006. 59 UNSC, SC/8057 AFR/900. 60 Daily Monitor, 7 October 2005, 12. 61 UNSC, S/2006/29; SC/8695. 62 UNSC, S/2005/785; S/2006/29; New Vision, 8 May 2006, 12. 63 Daily Monitor, 7 October 2005, 12. 64 East African, 1218 June 2006, 12. 65 Adam B ranch, U gandas ci vil wa r a nd t he p olitics o f I CC in tervention, Ethics a nd International Affairs 21(2) (2007), 179198.

66 Confidential interview, Kampala, November 2007, ci ted in Om ach, Elusive search for peace in northern Uganda. 67 UNSC, S/PV 5331. 68 UNSC, S/PV 5359. 69 East African, 2228 May 2006, 1, 4. 70 East African, 1016, July 2006, 8; Daily Monitor, 17 July 2006, 12. 71 Sunday Vision, 27 August 2006, 12. 72 Daily Monitor, 12 December 2007, 3;

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Militant Islamist groups in northern Nigeria

MUHAMMED KABIR ISA

INTRODUCTION
This c hapter f ocuses o n t he ac tivities o f mi litant I slamic g roups in n orthern Nigeria and recounts how in recent times they have capitalised on the opportunity provided b y t he c urrent dem ocratic di spensation t o in crease t heir ac tivities a s non-state ac tors. Th e o bjective i s t o in terrogate t he in creasing c hallenges a nd threats posed to state power and its territorial integrity by the growth and spread of mi litant I slamist g roups in n orthern N igeria, p articularly sin ce t he 1980s. A major a im i s t o p rovide a n exp lanation o f t he r esurgence a nd r e-emergence o f these g roups in n orthern N igeria.1 The c hapter a lso a ssesses t he t rends a nd dynamics that have accounted for the emergence of groups such as the Maitastine sect, the Zakzaky Shiite movement, and the Nigerian Taleban in Yobe State and its subsequent transformation into Boko Haram. Pertinent questions that the chapter seeks to answer are:
I

How h as t he em ergence o f mi litant I slamic g roups/movements in n orthern Nigeria posed a c hallenge and threat to the power of the secular state and its sovereignty? What are the historical trends and dynamics associated with the emergence of the militant Islamic groups in northern Nigeria?
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I I

What are the conditions that breed militant Islamism? What roles do religious doctrine, sociopolitical realities or ideology play?

The analysis is based on the assumption that the emergence, growth and spread of militant Islamist groups in northern Nigeria pose a challenge to the legitimacy of the state and are symptomatic of the weak nature and character of the state. The causes a nd co nsequences o f t he r esurgence o f mi litant I slamist m ovements a nd their challenge to the political status quo are discussed in t he context of existing political realities. The N igerian s tate h as, o ver t ime, b een c haracterised b y unmi tigated despotism, c apricious g overnment p olicies, f iscal cr ises, de bt-ridden e conomy, inequalities a nd in justices, b ad g overnance, l arge-scale co rruption, fractionalisation of the ruling class, weak political and economic institutions, and a n ear a bsence o f s ecurity o f li ves a nd p roperty. Th e c urrent e conomic cr isis manifested b y t he h arsh r ealities o f exi stence r einforces t he c hallenges t o t he legitimacy o f t he s tate b y t hese mi litant I slamist g roups. Th e s eemingly complacent way in which the state manages the emerging issue of militant Islamic groups points to one fact the inability of the ruling class to properly manage the state affairs. ISLAMISM AND MILITANT ISLAMISM CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS Studies o n I slamism, jihad, f undamentalism a nd mi litancy a re va ried a nd divergent, specifically in terms of their perceptions. Daniel Pipes, an editor of the Middle East Q uarterly, i s a le ading s cholar among t hose w ho p erceive Islamism and militant Islamism as a dangerous threat to the political stability of the world. He v iews I slamism a nd f undamentalism a s a b elief sys tem, a f orm o f p olitical ideology t hat i s e very b it a s d angerous a s co mmunism a nd o ne t hat s hould therefore b e co nfronted h ead-on, j ust a s A merica a nd t he W est co nfronted communism.2 The s trength o f t his a rgument lies in t he fac t t hat e ven s ome Muslims co nsider I slamism a nd f undamentalism a s r epresenting a t hreat t o political stability in the countries where they are active and by implication a threat to world peace in general. Pipes argues that religious and civil law should be kept separate f rom e ach o ther a nd t hat Q uranic l aw i s f lexible en ough t o p ermit changes in tradition. On the other side of the debate is John Esposito, who argues that Islamism or Islamic fundamentalism does not pose a major threat to world political stability.3
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He p osits t hat t here i s a n eed t o a ppreciate e ach c ase o f f undamentalism a nd Islamism independently in the country where it is found and constitutes a political force, and to consider its developments in that particular cultural context. Esposito further m aintains t hat t alk o f a w orldwide I slamic u prising a nd a c lash o f civilisations4 in which Islam may overwhelm the West is just a p art of the search for a new enemy, something to fill the threat vacuum created by the demise of the Soviet Union and subsequent discreditation of communism. His conclusions are that the fear of a unified Islamist uprising is unwarranted. In the perception of Mahmood,5 and scholars such as Marty and Appleby,6 the analysis of Islamism and religion in general is consistent with the assumptions of the t heories o f m odernisation t hat p erceive r eligion a s a ntithetical t o t he development o f dem ocratic, m odern s ocieties. H ence, I slamism a nd o ther politico-religious m ovements a re considered t o b e o pposed t o m odernity, w hile opportunistically tapping its achievements for developing its own tenets. Islamism co nceptually i s a bout p olitical m ovements t hat p ursue I slamic idealism, m odern ide ologies a nd a p olitical p rogramme. I slamism, w hich in Arabic denotes al-islaamiyya, is a s et of ideologies depicting Islam not only as a religion b ut a lso a p olitical sys tem co mparable t o s ocialism o r c apitalism a nd which holds that modern Muslims must return to the roots of their religion and unite p olitically by t he formation of Islamic p olitical movements (al-harakat alislamiyya al-siyassiyya).7 However, t his do es not imply t hat t here are universally accepted conceptions of Islamism.8 Islamism w hich do es n ot n ecessarily im ply mi litancy i s a n um brella concept a pplicable t o di verse I slamist m ovements t hat a re o ften co mmonly grouped under the banner of Islamist, such as the Saudi Wahhabism, al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Algeria, the Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the Taleban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.9 Simply lumping together these varied and distinct streams o f Islamist g roups, f or exa mple by implying t hat t he Wahhabism of t he Taleban and the Salafism of al-Qaeda constitute a homogeneous brand of Islam, is likely to add to the confusion.10 Islamism does have its roots in b oth the Salafiyya movement and the radical Islamist o rganisations c urrently co mpeting f or p olitical p ower a ll acr oss t he Middle East and similarly can be said to have its roots in t he nation-states of the Middle E ast a nd N orth A frica. O ther va riants o f I slam t hat h ave ga ined prominence are Shiism and Sunni. The former is a min ority variant of Islam that acquired p rominence in t he wa ke o f t he 1979 I ranian r evolution. Th e min ority status of Shiites compared t o t he Sunni Muslims, t he Shiite communal ac tivism,
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and a lso t he le ading p olitical role played by Shia s cholars ( ulama) and religious authorities o f t he Shiite over t ime h ave unif ied Shiite Islamism, s aving i t f rom fragmentation and degeneration.11 Nevertheless, t he p rincipal r esponsibility f or mi litant I slamism lies w ith Muslims a nd, m ore s pecifically, w ith t he A rabs. H ow c an t hey co nfront t hese responsibilities? Should the response b e national or international, theological or philosophical, intellectual o r p olitical, r epressive o r acco mmodating, Muslim o r Arab?12 Islamism as a concept also increasingly denotes the political manifestations of Islam. L eading I slamic t hinkers s uch a s M uhammad I qbal, J amal ad-Din a lAfghani, Sa yyid A bdul Ala M aududi (P akistan), Sa yyid Q utb (E gypt) a nd t he Ayatollah K homeini (I ran)13 have a spired t o apply m any a spects o f t he Shariah, particularly t hat de aling w ith r eviving a nd r evitalising m odern s ociety, cr eating pan-Islamic p olitical uni ty, a nd e liminating n on-Muslims a nd p articularly Western inf luences f rom t he M uslim w orld.14 These I slamic p hilosophical underpinnings laid the basis and premises for contemporary Islamism. Islamism is therefore a form of identity politics that is usually expressed through movements whose a im i s t o p romote M uslim iden tity. E xamples o f I slamist p olitical movements are the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, Jamaal Islamiyya in Egypt, the Justice and Development Party in Turkey and Morocco, and the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan and Syria.15 The militant Islamist movement is a m odern phenomenon that constitutes a part o f a w ider r esurgence o f r eligious iden tity de veloping acr oss t he M uslim world. Militant Islamism as well as radical Islamism is rooted in the recurring cycles of revivals characteristic of Muslim history. It is also a reaction, more often than not very violent, to the severe crisis of modernity converging with the rise of charismatic p rophetic le aders. M ilitant I slamism i s a r eligious m ovement a nd a political ideology that encompasses a s ocial element of protest, engagement in a counterattack o n s ecularism a nd a n iden tity f or t he h ave-nots o f t he M uslim world.16 Militant Islamists seeks a way of life that differs from Western secularism. They also wa nt t o t otally I slamisise t he s ocial a nd p olitical sys tems un der G ods sovereignty, r ule a nd l aw. Th ese g oals a re t o b e r ealised t hrough r evival o r establishment of a w orldwide Islamic state based on Shariah law. Their emphasis is on t he state, w hich is s een as t he main instrument for ac tualising t he Islamic religion that will guarantee the revival of and a total return to the Quran and the
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Hadith. M ilitant I slamists t herefore s eek t o c apture t he s tate t hrough lega l a nd democratic means or through a violent revolution, coup dtat or secession.17 Militant I slamists radic ally r einterpret t raditional I slamic co ncepts, particularly its views of battles or jihads, when mobilising the faithful by warning them against enemies of Islam and urging them to defend the faith. The faithful are en couraged t o t rain, organise and ac tively p articipate in t he ac tualisation of their goals by employing tactics such as temporary withdrawal from society.18 The faithful can also be urged to target state institutions and symbols that are regarded as s ecular o r s tate in struments, o r a gencies t hat a re p erceived t o b e t ools o f oppression and domination. There a re t hree m ain va riants o f mi litant I slamism: t he in ternal mi litancy against Muslim regimes that are considered to b e impious (such as in M orocco, Libya a nd A lgeria), t he ir redentists f ighting t o r edeem t he l and r uled b y n onMuslims or under occupation (such as in Nigeria) and the global militants waging a jihad against the West.19

ISLAMISM AND MILITANT ISLAMISM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

Contemporary militant Islamist movements in northern Nigeria can be identified by the manner in which they pursue the principles of Islam. They seek to achieve their goals by v iolently confronting t he sy mbols and institutions of s tate p ower, authority and legitimacy with the ultimate aim of taking over state power. Further, they s eek t he s trict a pplication o f I slamic l aw, t he t ransformation o f M uslim society, a nd t he a bandonment o f E uropean/Western c ultural inf luences a nd innovations. The logic of Islamism and political Islam is a di stinct and unif ying idea that characterises a nd i s in herent in I slamic hi story a nd exp eriences t hrough t he Muslim eschatology on the idea of Islamism that is associated with the Mahdi. The Islamic doctrine of death and afterlife is based in the belief in the Mahdi, the great reviver w ho w ill e ventually come b ack to purify t he Islamic faith by struggling with a nd co nquering t he en emies o f t he I slamic o rder. Th e co nquering Mahdi would e ventually es tablish j ustice a nd e quality in t he g lobal o rder a nd f reedom from tyranny and oppression.20
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This b elief in t he r esurgence o f t he Mahdi is w idely accep ted b y Sunni and Shiite Muslims in n orthern N igeria (a s w ell a s t he g lobal I slamic community/order), e ven t hough t he Shiite (Shia) s ects v iew t he Mahdi as t he hidden Imam. Therefore, Muslims have come to define and justify most and any attempts a t r eviving r eligion t hrough mi litant I slamism t o f ight in justices a nd oppression a s p art o f t heir r eligious o bligations. U ltimately, t he b elief i s t hat a charismatic Islamic leader would emerge to oust an existing order of injustice and inequality and establish in its place one that is equal and just, as enshrined by the Quran and the Sunnah or practices of the Prophet Muhammad. It is therefore not uncommon f or t he f ollowers o f o rganised I slamist m ovements t o iden tify t heir leaders as the Mahdi and to also refer to him as a mujaddid (reviver or reformer).21 One o f t he m ajor t rends t hat h ave c haracterised n orthern N igeria f rom t he early 19th century to the present is the emergence and/or resurgence of revivalists, reformists, radicals, fundamentalists and revolutionary Islamist movements. Most of t hese m ovements h ave, a t va rious s tages o f t heir de velopment a nd d uring almost every period, opposed and in s ome cases totally rejected established and existing I slamic s cholarship. M ore o ften t han n ot, t he mi litant a nd ext remist variants of these movements have become very critical of the nature, character and constituent order of the state in Nigeria.22 A cursory examination of the recorded history of the resurgence of Islamism and mi litant m ovements in n orthern N igeria r eveals t hat t hey a re a r ecurring phenomenon that is similar to the 19th-century jihad of Uthman dan Fodio. The key to understanding contemporary mi litant Islamism in n orthern Nigeria is to comprehend the role and place of the S okoto jihad, the caliphate order that was established t o r esist co lonialism a nd s ecular W estern r ule t hrough a r egional network. Islamist movements in northern Nigeria have capitalised on this network to create transnational connections with global Islamic society. The most recent militancy has been spurred by both the economic crisis and governance def iciencies a t a ll le vels o f t he N igerian g overnment, a s w ell a s b y opportunities provided by the opening up of the democratic space. But it is mainly based on the traditional protest agenda of challenging and undermining the postcolonial s ecular s tate. Thi s h as b een acco mpanied b y a nti-Western s entiments fuelled by external influences that included Arab financial support for Wahhabistyle p reaching, t he r egression o f t he N igerian e conomy, a nd t he M iddle E ast conflicts.23 All t hrough N igerias c hequered p olitical de velopment sin ce t he p re318
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colonial t o t he p resent t imes, t here h as exi sted in creasing a ppeal t o a n I slamic alternative, manifested by calling for the Islamisation or reIslamisation of society.

THE STATE AND RESURGENCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN NIGERIA

In Nigeria, the burgeoning capitalist class comprises not only the comprador and indigenous b usinesspeople b ut a lso s tate em ployees f rom t he ci vil s ervice, t he military and the p olice. The state itself over the years b ecame the major s ource, facilitator and protector of their wealth, either through deliberate policies such as indigenisation, co mmercialisation a nd p rivatisation a nd t rade li beralisation policies, or through corruption. It is fundamental given the critical role of the state in capital accumulation in t he post-colonial era t hat political contestation would be b ased o n c apturing s tate p ower. H ence, t he co ntest f or t he c apture o f s tate power is intense between the competing sections of the polity. This is especially true in view of the expanded revenue base the state has acquired from petroleum export earnings, which has risen dramatically from the 1970s.24 The hi storical o rigin o f t he s tate in t he co lonial era a nd i ts r ole in t he development of capitalist production processes and relations, largely shaped and defined its role in the accumulation process in the post-colonial era. The existence of the ruling class revolves around the state from which it derives its origin and wealth by employing every available means to secure power and access. Thus, the competition a nd s truggles f or s tate p ower, p articularly in t he e conomic cr isis period and the post-adjustment era, heightened identity politics in Nigeria.25 The accentuation of identity politics is linked to the phenomenon of prolonged military r ule a nd i ts in stitutionalisation o f permanent t ransition, w hich le d t o increased r epression o f m ass a nd p opular o pinions a nd e qually in creased disarticulation from the legitimacy of the state. This situation intensified different forms of identity mobilisation and consciousness on the ethnic, regional, religious, communal and minority political levels. Identity co nsciousness a nd m obilisation a re o ften p ositive f eatures o f p lural societies b ut m ay b ecome co unterproductive w hen t hey a re em ployed f or discriminatory practices and unjustified use of violence.26 The perception of denial of r ights a nd do mination b y o thers cr eates t he b asis f or iden tity co nflicts, w ith identities b ecoming hig hly p oliticised over t he i ssues o f co ntrol o f p olitical a nd economic power.27
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The accen tuation o f r eligious iden tities a nd t he p henomenal g rowth o f religious revivalism exploded in the era of the post-adjustment economy. The rise of religious identity is linked to the phenomenon of increased economic hardship under the structural adjustment programme, which accounted for the sharp rise in r eligious ac tivities a nd t he m obilisation o f r eligious iden tities in co mpetitive politics. Ibrahim convincingly showed that the dynamics of religious movements in co ntemporary N igeria i s v ery co mplex a nd c annot b e r educed t o a sim ple revivalist movement or a mechanical response to political and economic crisis.28 However, h e o bserved t hat i t i s f undamentally im portant t o co mprehend t he multiplication of religious movements in N igeria and the intensification of their fervour within the context of economic and social crises. One should also consider the co nditions cr eated b y t he fa ilures o f t he mi litary t ransition p rogramme t o democracy, failure of the civilian and democratic processes, and most importantly amid t hese fa ilures a nd cr ises, t he a ttempt b y t he co mmon p eople t o s eek a nd produce autonomous spheres of meaning and actions in the context of the severity of economic hardships created by the mortgaging and sale of the state through the policy of privatisation of the state and its investments.29 It is s afe to p ostulate at t his juncture t hat colonial and p ost-colonial Nigeria had been characterised and dominated by regimes that have been repressive and, over time, these regimes imposed their ideologies and p olitical authority on the people. Ibrahim also avers that the repression, imposition of an official ideology, and t he ex cesses o f t he p arty m achine f orced p eople t o r etreat in to ide ological domains not controlled by the state and it would seem that religion is the major expression of this possibility.30 In t he p ast de cade, Nigeria h as w itnessed s ome m ainly Muslim states in t he north transform their legal systems to conform to Shariah, with p enal laws that apply severe p unishment f or cr imes. The j udiciaries in t hese s tates w ere reorganised a nd in s ome in stances cr eated t o admini ster p urely Shariah law. I n furtherance of Shariah law, state policies were aimed at cleansing society in order to establish social justice through organising Zakkah collection and distribution to the needy, banning begging, rehabilitating the destitute and prostitutes, improving education, and creating a state-controlled and -funded security machinery called the Hisbah to function alongside the Nigerian police force. Several r easons h ave b een ad vanced t o exp lain t he ad vocacy o f Shariah implementation in N igeria. On e exp lanation i s t hat t he N igerian f ederation i s becoming more decentralised and part of the decentralisation is taking the form
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of c ultural s elf-determination. I n Y orubaland, t his c ultural s elf-determinism assumed the form of Yoruba nationalism, in Igboland it manifested in demands for confederation, while in the Muslim north it took the shape of Shariah advocacy.31 A s econd explanation for t he ascendancy of Shariah was its use as a b argaining chip b y t he n orth, w hich wa s losin g p olitical inf luence a nd r elevancy in t he Nigerian federation. In order to reassert the regions influence, its dominant class employed Shariah as a negotiating chip for a new national pact among contending national forces.32 One of the triggers of Shariah advocacy in some northern Nigerian states was the r esentment o f b eing a t t he p eriphery o f N igerian p olitics a nd i ts p ower configuration. There were times when the northern political leaders held powerful political p ositions in N igeria a nd o thers w hen t he n ortherners accep ted t heir economically marginal position. However, with the federal elections of 1999, t he balance of political power shifted to the south without a marked transformation in the e conomic m arginality o f t he n orth. Hence, t he p olitics o f Shariah advocacy was part of a protest against regional economic inequalities in Nigeria.33 Map 111: Nigerian map of states with Shariah laws and principles

The 12 northern states, in green, that have adopted Shariah laws and principles are Borno, Yobe, Gombe, Bauchi, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kaduna, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi and Niger. The northern states that have not adopted Shariah are Adamawa, Taraba, Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa, Kogi and Kwara.
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Another fac tor t hat m ay n ot b e co mpletely r uled o ut i s t hat t he implementation of Shariah in some northern Nigerian states was not unconnected to the desire of Muslims to embrace Islamic law to govern their lives, coupled with the fa ilure of Western-trained e lites t o de liver s ervices t hrough Western s ecular state f unctions. Th ey b elieved t hat o bedience t o G od en genders p eace a nd progress, which their elites were incapable of providing. These Muslims who are largely p easants, un employed o r l andless p roletariats a spired t o h ave t heir society li berated f rom in justice, in equality, co rruption, cr ime, in efficiency, backwardness, social dislocation and neglect through Uthman Dan Fodios jihad.34 The rising popularity of militant Islamist movements in northern Nigeria can be attributed to a combination of factors, including increased inequality, injustices, poverty, fa iled s ocial s ervices, in security a nd leg itimacy cr ises o f t he w eak authoritarian Nigeria state, as well as failed structural adjustment programmes.35 Ironically, Islamist militant movements regard themselves as pragmatic and a modern adaptation of Western-styled organisations that are better suited to deliver the s ervices demanded by large educated cohorts of Muslim youths in n orthern Nigerian ci ties. Th ese m ovements a re q uick t o ado pt W estern inf ormation technology to advance their cause, reach out to adherents and solicit funds, as well as to connect to other global Islamic movements.36 The contemporary militant Islamist movements and organisations in northern Nigeria h ave r emained t he dr iving f orce b ehind t he s pread o f I slamism in t he country. I n fact, some o f these o rganisations have co me t o r epresent the embodiment o f a n I slamic a lternative a nd, if y ou li ke, a t hreat t o W estern secularism, democracy and Western-oriented perceptions of rights in the views of Western o bservers a nd s cholars s uch a s Huntington, P ipes, Marty, Appleby a nd Fuller, as well as the Nigerian and many Middle Eastern governments. However, t o m any a rdent ad herents o f Islamism a nd Islamist m ovements in northern N igeria, t hese r epresent a n a lternative t o co rrupt, exh austed a nd ineffectual r egimes t hat h ave fa iled t o de liver o n p romises m ade. T o m any observers from outside the movements,37 they represent a des tabilising force and tools in the hands of demagogues who will employ whatever means available in the globalised w orld t o s eize p ower. T o n ational g overnments a nd t heir o fficials, movements such as the Maitastine, Shiite (Muslim Brothers or Islamic Movement of N igeria) a nd N igerian Taleban (Boko H aram) co njure u p t he im age o f confrontational outfits, violence and terrorist groups.38
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MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

Recent political developments, such as the implementation of Shariah law in states of n orthern N igeria a nd t he r esurgence o f radic al a nd r evolutionary I slamic movements, can best be understood from their history, nature and character, and the s ociety in w hich t hey e volved. Thi s w ould r equire a n in-dep th s tudy o f t he ideas and philosophy of these movements. Militant Islamist movements and their organisation are spread across a w ide range of demographics and vistas in n orthern Nigeria. Central to understanding these movements is the Sokoto jihad and caliphate, founded by Uthman Ibn Fodio, which s erve a s a f ramework, a n in spiration a nd a m odel f or p resent-day movements, both Sunni and Shia.39

Early militant Islamic movements of northern Nigeria

Militant Islamist movements of the early 19th century in Hausa societies that later evolved in to t odays mi litants in n orthern N igeria w ere t he Quadriyya and Tijjaniyya. Th ese m ovements ad vocated t he p urification o f I slamic b eliefs a nd practices, w hich had b een corrupted by practices and c ustoms considered to b e unIslamic. Early Islamic militants under the banner of the Quadriyya accused the leadership o f t he t hen Hausa s ocieties a nd t heir a ssociates o f un godly p ractices leading to polytheism and syncretism. This laid the basis for Ibn Fodios Sokoto jihad, which challenged unjust and corrupt rulers, particularly their distortions of the Islamic system.40 According to Uthman Ibn Fodios manifesto, Jihad was aimed at teaching and spreading pristine or true Islam and the establishment of a system of government based on the Shariah. With support from Hausa and Fulani peasants, Uthman Ibn Fodio succeeded in es tablishing an Islamic political order governed by the Amir ul-Muminin (commander of the faithful), who later transformed himself into the Sarkin M usulmi (ruler o f M uslims). Th e jihad challenged a nd q uestioned t he management of religious and political power in n orthern Nigeria and succeeded in replacing t he Hausa aristocratic g roup w ith an intellectual and s cholarly elite that led the emirates across the region. The administrative structures put in place after t he jihad represented t he sy mbolic im portance a nd p lace o f t he S okoto caliphate today.41 The jihad of Uthman Ibn Fodio continues to exert a great cultural influence in northern N igeria. A t i ts in ception, t he caliphate state em phasised j ustice, t he
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removal of unfair taxes, and an Islamic education for the Hausa communities. The jihad was also a challenge to the polytheism and syncretism that was prevalent in the Hausa states at the time.42 To date, the jihad has represented one of the major landmarks in the political history of events of Islam in northern Nigeria and West Africa as a whole. It was a turning point that shaped the history of West Africa in the 19th century.43 Under co lonialism, t he g reatest c hallenge t o t he s tate a nd co lonial authority came from the rise of the Mahdist militant Islamist movement ( Mahdiyya), with Mahdism as its guiding philosophy and principle. The Mahdist movement evolved as a trans-Saharan anti-colonial Islamic fundamentalist movement. Its origins can be traced to a messianic doctrine that proffered that at the turn of each century, a Mahdi would emerge with powers to strengthen Islam and make justice triumph. The do ctrine h olds t hat w hen t he Mahdi emerges, h e w ould a ttract a l arge followership of Muslims in hi s quest to establish justice and Islamism in s ociety. Most M uslims lo ok t owards t he a rrival o f t he Mahdi for de liverance f rom inequalities, unjust leadership and bad governance. The Mahdist militant Islamist movement considered British colonial rule and the amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates as satanic and evil. The movement was inspired by the resistance of Sultan Attahiru and his rejection of B ritish r ule b y un dertaking t he hijra or f light t o S udan a s sy mbolic o f t he Prophet Mohammads flight from Mecca to Medina in 621 AD (t he Hijrah), after the s ultanate f ell t o B ritish im perial a nd co lonial r ule in t he 1900s. 44 In 1907 concerted ef forts w ere m ade b y t he Mahdist movement t o r egain t he S okoto Sultanate, b ut i t fa iled t o m atch t he s uperiority o f B ritish p ower a nd mi litary might. However, some of the members of the ruling aristocratic elite and Islamic scholars co mpromised b y en tering in to s ome f orm o f un derstanding w ith t he British to recognise and allow the emirs and their subjects to practise the Islamic faith and religion unhindered.45 In spite of the British assurances that it would not interfere with the way of life of caliphate society, the British colonial state and emirs were threatened and challenged by the Mahdist movement for several years. The awakening and rising tide of contemporary militant Islamist tendencies apart f rom t he 19t h-century Ib n F odio jihad a re in timately lin ked t o t he perception o f t he s uccessful I ranian r evolution o f t he 1970s. The I ranian revolution provided a symbolic orientation to radical scholars such as Ibrahim elZakzaky that revolutionary change can lead to a r eplacement of the secular state order w ith a n I slamic caliphate state. It radic alised Muslim p olitics in n orthern
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Nigeria, as exemplified in t he intensification of t he demand for t he inclusion of Shariah laws in t he Nigerian constitution during the constitutional conference of the 1970s. Th e I ranian r evolution o ccurred a t a t ime w hen m ost s cholarly endeavours w ere dir ected a t de bating t he accep tance o f ei ther c apitalism o r socialism. Islamism s erved a s a t hird option, but t he p erception wa s t hat it wa s dominated a nd s uppressed b y t he o ther t wo. I slamism wa s a lso lin ked t o t he Muslim Students Society of Nigeria (MSS) in the 1970s.46

Recent militant Islamist movement in northern Nigeria: the Maitastine and Shiite movements
It should be stated clearly that the reason for classifying the Maitastine movement with the Shiite is not because they share common doctrinal beliefs, approaches or principles, b ut ra ther b ecause o f cer tain s hared c haracteristics. Th e t wo movements em erged a t a bout t he s ame t ime, a nd i t i s li kely t hat t he s ame conditions dic tated t he log ic o f t heir em ergence. I n addi tion, t hey b oth h ave a radical and revolutionary anti-establishment stance and share the total rejection of the exi sting s tate o rder. Thi s wa s p rominent in t he co ntinuous a nd p ervasive confrontations and very often violent armed conflicts with constituted authority or its agencies, and also in the concerted pursuit and desire to change the secular state o rder t hrough a jihad or I ranian-styled r evolution t hat w ould u ltimately replace the corrupt, Western-styled secular state with an Islamic state. Apart f rom t hese simi larities, t here wa s n o di stinctive lin k b etween t he t wo movements in t erms of Islamic doctrines and principles. As a m atter of fact, the Shiite movement took a lesson from the state handling of the Maitastine movement to r ealign i ts s trategy a nd a pproach t owards t he s tate, w hile n ot r ejecting o r jettisoning i ts ide als a nd p rinciple o f a r evolution o r jihad for es tablishing a n Islamic state. The Maitastine radical militant Islamist movement became very popular in the early 1980s in the city of Kano and other areas of northern Nigeria. It came to the limelight a s a r esult o f i ts p rolonged a rmed a nd v iolent co nfrontation w ith t he security a nd mi litary a gencies, h ence t he r eference t o t he 1980 Maitastine civil disturbance in K ano. Thi s v iolent co nfrontation l ater s pread t o o ther ci ties o f northern Nigeria. The Maitastine was a n a nti-status q uo movement dr iven b y I slamic fundamentalism. I ts m embers a re a nti-establishment sy ncretists w ho c hallenge
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both t he do minant r eligious a nd p olitical a uthorities, a nd in deed t he l arger Muslim ummah (community). Th e m ovement wa s f ounded b y A lhaji M arwa Maitastine, who was killed in a co nfrontation with the political authorities in the 1980 di sturbances in w hich m ore t han 4 177 p eople die d.47 The m ovement h as been classified as radical and militant with a millenarian belief largely because of its expressed perceptions that the dominant Muslim population is derailing from the tenets of the Quran and getting richer and more Westernised to the detriment of the lowly, poor and non-Westernised segment of society.48 The Maitastine movement r epresents a radic al s hift f rom o ther f orms o f Islamist movements because it operated at variance with established or accepted beliefs o r t heories, es pecially w ith r egard t o I slamic b eliefs a nd in junctions (heterodox m ovement). Th e Maitastine movement b elieved t hat i t s hould b e constituted only of genuine Muslims and righteous servants of God. The members rejected other Muslims for having gone astray while maintaining that their beliefs are t he m ost r ealistic b ecause t hey r evolve a round Quran only, a t endency towards an obsession with the Quran and a rejection of the Hadith and Sunnah of the P rophet M uhammad a nd o ther r elated s anctioned s ources o f I slamic l aw. Members of the movement live in secluded quarters isolated from other members of s ociety w hile r ejecting e verything t hat i s E uropean o r W estern, es pecially education, s chools a nd m aterial t hings li ke radios a nd w ristwatches. Th ey a re opposed t o a ffluence a nd a s s uch co ndemn m aterial w ealth a nd t he r ich.49 The members exhi bit in tense h atred f or a gents o f t he s tate s uch a s t he p olice a nd armed f orces. Th ese f eelings p artly co ntributed t o t he r ecurrence o f v iolent confrontations with the security and military agencies in Kano and other parts of northern Nigeria in the 1980s.50 It was believed that the group had been completely suppressed by the state in 1980, but it resurfaced in 2005 in t he Jigawa and Kano states of northern Nigeria. This im plies t hat t he Maitastine movement m ust h ave b een o perating underground in n orthern Nigeria f or y ears. Th e m embers a re s cattered a ll over northern N igeria, a s fa r a s Jalingo in T araba S tate.51 It i s dif ficult t o iden tify i ts leaders and c urrent ide ological underpinnings b ecause o f i ts co vert a nd clandestine manner of operation and the fact that it has gone unnoticed in society in northern Nigeria. The first group of contemporary Muslims in northern Nigeria to be classified as radic al a nd mi litant I slamists w ere t he M uslim B rothers le d b y Ib rahim e lZakzaky. He was a student at the Ahmadu Bello University at the time of the 1970 Iranian revolution and wa s inspired by it to le ad t he MSS. E l-Zakzaky u sed t he
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MSS t o m obilise M uslim s tudents t o ad vocate in 1978 f or t he in clusion o f t he Shariah penal code law in the Nigerian constitution and later for a revolution that would lead to a t ransformation of the Nigerian secular state into an Islamic one. These firebrand revolutionary tendencies led him to confront the agencies of the state, which ultimately led to his expulsion from the university.52 The Muslim Brothers, then under the leadership of el-Zakzaky, do not regard themselves as members of an organisation, but claim total commitment to Islam. As such their aim is to establish a nation which should be wholly Islamic; Islamic in t he s ense t hat i t co nsiders Allah as t he L ord o f t he n ation.53 To t he M uslim Brothers, no Muslim can be a M uslim and a s ecularist at the same time; in fac t, secularism is disbelief.54 The Muslim Brothers attracted members from mainly the youthful segment of society, p articularly f rom uni versities a nd o ther t ertiary in stitutions a nd f rom secondary s chools. I nitially, i t wa s m ore o f a n e lite I slamic va nguard in i ts membership and recruiting style. It saw itself as a mi ssionary and revolutionary group that sought to address the ills of Muslim society. Its initial doctrine, among others, focused on the ills of the Muslim ummah in Nigeria, including moral laxity, unIslamic practices, di ssatisfaction w ith governance by Muslim le aders, and t he lack of access to political expression, particularly participatory politics, under an authoritarian regime. The situation in Nigeria particularly under military rule was exacerb ated b y s erious e conomic a nd s ocial cr ises t hat r esulted in t he va st majority o f p eople s uffering p overty, un employment a nd h unger. Th e M uslim Brothers offered the anxious youths seeking change, a brighter future.55 When i t wa s ini tially es tablished, t he M uslim B rothers wa s a p urely Sunni group. H owever, t he c lose a ssociation o f i ts le adership w ith I ran s ubsequently brought about the infiltration of the movement by Shiite doctrines, and el-Zakzaky later iden tified w ith t he I slamic do ctrine o f Shiism. Thi s u ltimately le d t o a fractionalisation of the Muslim Brothers into a Sunni group and a Shiite group. The Shiite splinter g roup wa s le d b y e l-Zakzaky a nd wa s l ater t ransformed in to a militant Islamist group, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN). The Sunni group was le d b y e l-Zakzakys f ormer lo yal s upporters A bubakar M ujahid (in Z aria), Aminu A liyu G usau (in Z amfara) a nd H allam A hmed S huaibu (in K ano). Th e Sunni group dif fered f undamentally f rom e l-Zakzaky o n i ssues o f do ctrine a nd rejected t he injection of Shiite doctrine and t heology into t he m ovement. It h as continued to retain its commitment to a radical process of Islamisation under the Sunni doctrine.56
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In the past, the disregard for state authority of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) was exhibited in a n umber of confrontations with the state. Its leader, elZakzaky, s pent in t otal a bout nin e y ears in nin e dif ferent p risons f rom 1981 t o 1998, under different administrations and regimes. The Shiite denounced the state and g overnment, di sregarded p arty p olitics a nd e lections, wa s co ntemptuous o f Nigerias constitution, refused to recognise its laws, refused to respect the national anthem and national pledge, and disregarded the Nigerian flag. In other words, the Shiite rejected every symbol of Nigerian statehood.57 The Shiite faction had open confrontations a nd r unning b attles w ith s ecurity a gents o f t he s tate f or s everal years that often resulted in t he loss of lives and property. Bloody confrontations and clashes have characterised its relationship with the state and the mode of state responses until 1999, the beginning of the era of democratic enterprise in Nigeria. Over t ime, t he IMN h as r estrategised a nd c hanged t actics. I t i s n o lo nger confrontational a nd, a s s uch, h as s hed i ts mi litant ga rb. H owever, i t r etains i ts ideals and goals of an Islamic state. This was aptly captured in its condemnation of the introduction of Islamic Shariah laws and penal code, especially with regard to punishment in w hat i t r egards a s a n unI slamic s tate. I n t he Shiite view, t he politicians who started the reform do not have a history of Islamic activism and are seen a s o pportunists.58 In r ecent t imes, t he le aders o f t he m ovement h ave b een coopted by dominant state elements such t hat t hey are espousing and using t he same symbols of power that they had denounced in the past. In fact, between 1999 and 2007 the leader of the movement was a senior special adviser to the governor of K aduna S tate, w hich gu aranteed him dir ect acces s t o t he co rridors o f p ower rather than the corridors of prisons. The Sunni splinter g roup w ent in to de cline a nd wa s r educed t o m ainly missionary activities ( daawah). Its membership further shrunk as a r esult of the growing inf luence o f t he m ainstream Sunni Wahhabi movement o f Jamaatul Izalatul Bidah Wa Ikamatus Sunnah (JIBWIS) in northern Nigeria.

The Tijjaniyya and Quadriyya, which have spiritual and commercial links with other Sufi orders in West and North Africa The Wahhabi Izala movement, which runs a charity and first aid organisation and has links with the Saudis The Salafiyya movement, w hich r uns s chools, in ternet c afs a nd b usiness outlets, or The militant Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) (formerly under the banner of M uslim B rotherhood), w hich n ot o nly h as a w ebsite, r uns s chools a nd clinics a nd p ublishes n ewspapers, b ut a lso p ossesses t he a ttributes a nd disposition of an organisation like Hezbollah (with which it is linked and which operates like a state within the state in Lebanon)

The emergence of neo-militant Islamist movements in northern Nigeria: the Nigerian Taleban or Boko Haram phenomenon, 20012009
The emergence of a nebulous neo-militant Islamist movement in the eastern part of northern Nigeria in 2001 should not be equated to or classified with established Sufi Sunni movements such as the following:
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The emergence and subsequent transformation of this movement are linked with the dissatisfaction associated with the weak economic base of the contemporary Nigerian economy, which is characterised by poverty, deteriorating social services and inf rastructure, e ducational b ackwardness, r ising n umbers o f un employed graduates, m assive n umbers o f un employed y ouths, d windling f ortunes in agriculture, inadequate and near lack of support for agriculture, and the weak and dwindling productive base of the northern economy. According to this movement, the current democratic enterprise has produced a set of political leaders who lead by de ception a nd s loganeering o f I slamic r evivalism t o m obilise a nd c apture support by claiming to be reintroducing Islamic legal principles despite a massive collapse of services, poverty, failed governance, absence of social justice and a fair electoral process that produced consensus candidates that lack legitimacy. These corrupt and power-hungry politicians hijack votes and are self-imposed leaders. They de clare b illions o f f ictitious a mounts o f naira as a ssets t o b e r ecouped a s investments through falsification and overpricing of contracts all of this in spite of the existence of a framework of due process and diligence in contracts awarded and procurements.59 The neo-militant Islamist movement was aimed primarily at overthrowing the present Western a nd secular s tate o rder in N igeria a nd r eplacing i t t hrough violent m eans w ith a h olistic I slamic m odel a nd o rder. Th e g roup c alled Muhajirun holds that it should start by exclusion from other segments of society by r eplicating t he hijira (the ep ic hi storical r etreat a nd exi le o f t he P rophet Muhammad from Mecca to the mountains) that ultimately led to the creation of the first Islamic state in Mecca (the kingdom of Saudi Arabia). The Muhajirun, in
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its early formative stage in 2001 s trove for self-exclusion of its members from the mainstream corrupt society by living in areas outside or far away from society in order t o in tellectualise a nd radic alise t he r evolutionary p rocesses t hat w ould ultimately le ad t o a v iolent t akeover of t he s tate. It a lso ad vocated f or t he s trict application o f I slamic l aw a nd t he t ransformation o f t ainted M uslim s ociety through a violent armed and revolutionary takeover of the secular state, which was seen as evil and unjust. The movement also sought to eliminate external influences and innovations in t he practice of Islam.60 However, it did n ot reject or refuse to use technological elements such as motorcycles, cars, cellular phones and AK-47 guns, and other benefits that modernity confers on society and which are derived from Western civilisation. The Muhajirun, Hijrah or Ahl al-Sunna Wal Jamaah as it was known before its metamorphosis into Boko Haram aptly fits the description of a neo-militant Islamist m ovement. A lthough i ts I slamist do ctrine wa s in spired b y t he A fghan Taleban of the late 1990s, i t has no established link with the Afghan group. The members o f w hat i s s ometimes r eferred t o a s t he Nigerian Taleban an d Afghanistan a re m ainly f rom t he u pper a nd midd le c lasses o f n ortheastern Nigeria. A ccording t o t he f ormer g overnor o f Yobe S tate, A lhaji B ukar A bba Ibrahim, some of its leaders and members are university graduates and students from inf luential a nd a ffluent b ackgrounds. Th e m ovement r ecruits i ts f ollowers from unemployed youth and is based on a cell network to ensure adequate training and skills in the use of weapons as well as ideological orientation.61 In 2003, t he Muhajirun organised a nd r eplicated t he hijrah of t he P rophet Muhammad f rom M aiduguri o nce t he a ncient c apital o f t he K anem B ornu Empire, the earliest Islamic empire in t he region before the advent of the Sokoto caliphate t o a n unin habited a rea b etween Yobe S tate a nd t he N iger R epublic called Kanamma. It was from this location that it began to launch its attacks. Their first v ictims w ere m embers o f t he lo cal co mmunity w ith w hom i t c lashed o ver farmlands a nd f ishing g rounds. S ubsequently i t b egan l aunching a ttacks o n t he symbols of state authority such as the police stations in K anamma, Geidam and Damaturu, the state capital of Yobe State. In some of the raids on police stations it stripped them of caches of arms and ammunitions, burned them down, and killed several p olice o fficers. A fter t he a ttack o n K anamma p olice s tation t he g roup retreated t o a p rimary s chool in K anamma w here i t h oisted t he f lag o f Afghanistan.62
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The Nigerian army s ent in t roops to deal with the militants w hen it b ecame clear t hat t he N igerian p olice co uld n ot co ntain t hem. A t le ast 18 p eople w ere killed in a fortnight of clashes between the group and a combined force of the army and t he p olice. A fter t he es calation o f t he co nflict, t he co ncern wa s h ow t he authorities had allowed the group to evolve into a p ublic security threat. Related questions were how the group obtained arms and weapons training and who its internal and external sponsors and links were. It was obvious that the militants had an ext ensive n etwork o f ce lls t hat r ecruited m embers f rom p laces a s va ried a s Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State in the northeast, to the states neighbouring Niger and Chad.63 Early in 2003, t he t hen g overnor of Yobe State intervened by requesting t he members of the group to disband peacefully and return to their parents, but they refused to heed his call. In a l ast show of defiance, they engaged in a v iolent and confrontational o uting w ith t he s ecurity a gencies in D ecember 2003, a ttacking Geidam police station. This resulted in the arrest of about 200 members and loss of 18 li ves. S ince t hen t here h ave b een s poradic v iolent co nfrontations b etween fragmented members of Ahl al-Sunna wal Jamaah and the security agencies, the latest being in July 2009. Boko Haram is a transmutation of the Muhajirun, Hijirah or Ahl al-Sunnal wal Jamaah group once referred to as the Nigerian Taleban. It is the same movement that was dislodged from the Kanamma region of Yobe State in December 2003 and was then led by Aminu Tashen-Ilimi, a university dropout. It is also the movement that reincarnated and reinvented itself as Boko Haram in Maiduguri, from where it established, directed and controlled cell networks with cell commanders in a ll the major cities of northern Nigeria (Maiduguri, Bauchi, Potiskum, Wudil, Kano, Zaria, Katsina, Jos, Jalingo, Danja etc) between January 2004 a nd July 2009. Th e Islamist Movement, after its reinvention as Boko Haram, was led by a new leader, Muhammad Y usuf. W ith s ome o f hi s f ormer a llies a nd co mpatriots f rom t he Muhajirun, t he m ovement en gaged in a s eries o f n ew f orms o f v iolent confrontations with the police and other security agencies.64 Boko Haram set up its headquarters at the Ibn Taimiyya Mosque in the ancient city of Maiduguri, in the eastern part of northern Nigeria. The mosque doubled as the residence of Muhammad Yusuf and as its ideological, orientation headquarters and training camp. Boko Haram did not really change its doctrine from its earlier one of o pposition t o a ll f orms of Western e ducation a nd ci vilisation (w hile s till using i ts t echnological t ools). Thi s o pposition t o W estern e ducation a nd
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civilisation could be seen in t he light of the class consciousness of the group, in that the elites of northern Nigeria had failed to live up to expectations and deliver on promises made, especially regarding t he establishment and enactment of t he Shariah and principles in Muslim-dominant states in northern Nigeria.65 The word boko is derived from the English word book and was coined at the inception of colonialism in northern Nigeria.66 It has come to mean the ability to read a nd w rite, es pecially in t he Western-styled e ducational sys tem, a s di stinct from the Islamic, Arab and Middle Eastern educational systems, which existed in northern Nigeria before being dislodged by colonialism. It served as a rejection and in i ts e arliest f orm a s a r esistance t o co lonial im position o f W estern education a nd i ts sys tem o f co lonial s ocial o rganisation, w hich r eplaced a nd degraded the earlier Islamic order of the jihadist state. Islamic s cholars a nd c lerics w ho o nce h eld swa y in t he caliphate state a nd courts, a ssigned t he n ame boko to n orthern e lites w ho s poke, ac ted, r uled a nd operated the state like their Western colonial masters. It is not uncommon to hear in discussions among Islamist scholars and average northerners that poverty and collapsed governance the bane of the region can be blamed on the failures and corrupt attitudes of yan boko (modern elites trained at secular schools) who have acquired a Western education and are currently in positions of power. As such, the system represented by the yan boko is unjust, secular and has no divine origin. It is therefore unIslamic, which in turn accounts for its ineptitude and corruptness. All of this forms a sound basis for the ideological orientation and mobilisation of unemployed and unskilled Muslim youths in n orthern Nigeria. These youths have unfettered access to Islamic education in which the criteria for admission are informal and less cumbersome as long as one can serve ones master/tutor for the duration o f o nes s tudy in fa rmlands a nd in p etty t rading in urb an centres a s opposed to access to Western education t hat is restricted by entry requirements and that is not readily available. In co lonial a nd p ost-colonial n orthern N igeria, acq uisition o f a W estern education b ecame t he sine q ua n on of a b etter s tandard o f li ving a nd a k ey t o opportunity, a means of uplifting ones position and access to power. In the poststructural ad justment era o f t he l ate 1980s, a n ew f orm o f n eo-liberal m arket economy wa s u shered in t hat p rivatised t he s tate a nd r esulted in uni versityeducated graduates struggling to find employment. Employment became a matter of a patron-client relationship, coupled with access to state power.
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The ide a of boko is not just about rejecting Western e ducation p er s e; it is a judgement of its failure to provide opportunities for better lives and thus became a symbol for the Boko Haram movement to capitalise on the shortcomings of yan boko. Subsequently it was coupled with haram (forbidden). The movement used the term to mobilise unemployed, unskilled and poverty-stricken youths to join its cause, di slodge t he s ecular, boko-controlled s tate in N igeria, a nd in troduce t he strict application of Shariah law and the creation of an Islamic state. This partly explains w hy Boko H arams p rimary t argets o f a ttack w ere sy mbols o f t he s tate such as security agencies, which had become widely despised. Boko H aram considers i tself t o b e t he l aw enf orcement a gent a gainst t hose opposed t o i ts do ctrine. I n i ts v iolent co nfrontation w ith t he N igerian s ecurity forces (a combined team of the army, police and other agencies) from 25 to 31 July 2009, i ts le ader, M uhammad Y usuf, wa s k illed in M aiduguri.67 Confrontations between the group and the police in several cities in northeastern Nigeria revealed that Boko H aram had g rown in size a nd m embership a nd h ad le arned f rom i ts experiences sin ce r elocating f rom K anamma. I t h ad c hanged i ts ide ology a nd strategy of advocating for a s trict compliance with Islamic laws and principles of Shariah to a lso co ndemning Western e ducation a nd s ecularism. It a lso t argeted northern e lites a nd I slamic c lerics w ho h ave ad apted t o a nd f ollowed Westernstyled dem ocracy a nd s ecular ide ology. Th e July 2009 en counter lef t a bout 700 people dead in Maiduguri alone and displaced about 5 000 in just five days. It was reported t hat, in B auchi, a bout 50 m embers o f t he s ect h ad b een k illed a nd hundreds arrested. Between 2003 and 2009, the group had grown to such an extent that it was able to mobilise thousands of members from Katsina, Damaturu and Potiskum to rally behind their leader, Muhammad Yusuf. The security forces had to use intensive fire power to dislodge the group and its leaders from their hideout. The a rrests o f s ome C hadians le d t o s peculation t hat t here co uld b e a n international dimension through a network of Chadian and Nigerian rebels. A chilling revelation is that some of the captured graduates belonging to the movement are children of the affluent in society. The fact that most investigations initiated by the government in the past few years were never concluded leads some to conclude that the current investigations would suffer the same fate as previous ones. For example, six y ears after the 2003 in cident nothing has been heard of a report or government white paper about the outcome of the investigation on the neo-militant Islamist movements activities, or about its source of funds, support
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base, recruitment style and networking, and most importantly sources of arms and ammunition. The resurgence and spread of this and similar groups confirm that the state in Nigeria i s weak and in capable of m anaging mi litant Islamists or g roups s uch a s those in t he N iger D elta b ecause o f t he w eak c haracter, in eptitude a nd co rrupt nature of t he le adership and its r uling c lass. Th e s tate s eems t o l ack a co mmon approach of dealing with armed non-state groups. Although the state responded with massive and unprecedented force to the Boko Haram uprising and the Niger Delta insurgence, it has so far extended amnesty only to the Niger Delta militants. It is obvious that the presence of natural resources such as oil has influenced the different a pproaches t aken b y t he g overnment t o addr ess mi litant u prisings in different regions of the country.

Global and regional response to militant Islamic groups in Nigeria and Africa
The sig nificance o f t his s tudy a lso lies in t he 11 S eptember 2001 a ttacks o n American soil. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, US foreign policy dramatically changed from the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War era to a heavy focus on defining, co nceptualising, p reventing a nd co mbating g lobal t errorist t hreats against American interests and allies. The aftermath of 9/11 included a change in US foreign policy towards countries with predominantly or substantially Muslim populations. Muslims in N igeria, North A frica and elsewhere were p erceived to espouse radic al v iews o r t he ide ology o f I slam t hat p romoted v iolence a gainst Western interests. Islam was intrinsically and incorrectly linked to terrorism and regarded a s a m ajor t hreat t o US n ational s ecurity. Thi s, in t urn, cr eated misconceptions of Muslims, by the development of events post 9/11, a s terrorist suspects and Islam as an anti-Western ideology. Americans and their Western allies evolved a n umber of misconceptions and prescriptions about Islam, Islamism and militant Islamist movements in Africa. First, they view Muslims in A frica as generally attracted to a radic al ideology that is promoting violence against Western interests. Second, they see this form of terrorism a s a t hreat t o A frican in terests t hemselves. I n o ther w ords, I slamist terrorism i s s een a s a m ajor a nd f undamental t hreat t o t he li velihoods o f t he people in Africa as opposed to security threats such as urban violence, pastoralist conflicts, the proliferation of arms and state violence. Similarly, Islamism in Africa
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is perceived as a greater threat than among others hunger, disease (HIV/AIDS, malaria et c), l ack o f lif es b asic n eeds, o ppressive l aws, b ad le adership, p oor governance, unfair terms of international trade, foreign debt and conditionalities of in ternational f inancial in stitutions.68 And f inally, A frica i s r egarded a s b eing incapable of addressing its own problems despite efforts such as the formation of the New Partnership for Africas Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU) and the efforts of such African organisations to address underdevelopment, violent conflicts and threats to human security. African governments are seen as too weak to govern, or being governed by corrupt governments that have limited or unr eliable c apacities f or in ternal s ecurity, l aw enf orcement a nd b order protection. As such, this lack of governance capacity makes them attractive venues for the development of violent extremism, terrorism and criminal activities.69 In order to prop up these weak and failing African states, the US in F ebruary 2007 l aunched AFRICOM (t he US A frican C ommand), w hich h as a s one of its objectives addr essing t he t errorist t hreats em anating f rom A frica. AFRI COM seeks t o b uild t he c apacities o f A frican s tates t o p revent a nd co mbat mi litancy, terrorism, ext remism a nd in surgencies t hat co uld in terfere w ith acces s t o o il supplies f rom co untries s uch a s N igeria.70 There i s a v ery s trong A frican apprehension t hat AFRI COM, in t he gui se o f de velopment a ssistance a nd combating terrorism, could b e used to destabilise African countries w ith w hose leaders and governments the US do es not get along. Similarly, there is a fear that instead of preventing and combating terrorism, AFRICOM could make countries that are closely associated with Islamism targets of American hostilities.71 AFRICOMs s tated mi ssion i s t o p revent co nflicts b y p romoting s tability regionally a nd prevail o ver ext remism b y n ever let ting i ts s eeds g erminate in Africa. This was to be realised through active security missions that address the underdevelopment and poverty that are making Africa a f ertile breeding ground for terrorists. In essence, AFRICOM is a reincarnation of the US manifest destiny policy t hat s eeks t o s ave A fricans f rom t heir in ability t o r ule t hemselves and t o transform the conditions under which they can be turned into terrorists.72 Although N igeria i s o ne o f t he co untries AFRI COM h as t argeted t o b enefit from i ts w ide ra nge o f p rogrammes, i ts g overnment h as b een n ervous a bout openly em bracing i t in v iew o f t he w idespread o pposition o n t he co ntinent. However, AFRICOM has gone ahead and included northern Nigeria in t he PanSaharan r egion t hat i t i s c losely m onitoring f or t errorist t hreats. I t w ould b e interesting to see how the leadership in Abuja will behave in the future in terms of
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accepting American assistance to deal with Islamic militancy in the northern and the in surgency in t he N iger D elta r egions. S uch accep tance w ould im ply acknowledgement o f t he s tates in capacity t o de al w ith n ational s ecurity t hreats and also inflame anti-government and anti-Western passions.

CONCLUSIONS
It is fast becoming obvious to social observers and scholars alike that in the years ahead religion as a social phenomenon more than any other social variable such as et hnicity w ill t ake cen tre s tage in t he di scourse o n N igerias p olitical landscape. It will play a major role in shaping the future direction of the country. Many fac tors acco unt f or t his de velopment a nd i t i s cr ucial t o a ppreciate t he challenges they pose to the Nigerian project at this early stage of the debate. Globally, t here i s a lso a r ising t endency t owards w hat i s t ermed religious essentialism. Thi s p henomenon, w hich i s a lso t ermed mi litancy, ext remism, radicalism o r f undamentalism, h as t he p otential o f ext ending acr oss n ational boundaries a nd r egions. N igeria i s n ot s pared f rom t he g lobal wa ve o f t his phenomenon. Through the use of information technology, Nigerian militants now have acces s t o m aterial, f inance a nd o ther r esources t hat t hey c an u se t o cr eate organisations a nd n etworks, proselytise radic al ide as a nd recruit n ew m embers. The activities of these radical groups could be inadvertently assisted by the failed neo-liberal p olicies o f s tructural ad justment, n egative co nsequences o f globalisation, the poorly performing Nigerian economy, and the poor leadership and g overnance t hat a re m arginalising cer tain g roups in t he co untry. I n s uch circumstances, r eligion b ecomes a v iable a lternative f or s ocial di scourse a nd identity, as well as a means to achieving social justice and equality. Militancy, extremism, radicalism and fundamentalist means or ideologies are used to fill alternative spaces that the state has either failed to provide or closed; or they are a reaction against alienation from modern institutions of governance that fail to deliver social services and other benefits to the people. The search and quest to re-assert identities, institutions, values and norms that make meaningful sense to t he a verage ci tizen in N igeria c annot b e w ished a way, p articularly a mid t he decaying inf rastructure a nd det eriorating s ocial s ervices in t he co untry. Th e search f or a lternative o r n ew o rders i s p articularly a ttractive t o t he vu lnerable, disempowered a nd m arginalised N igerians w ho a re a lso s usceptible t o manipulation by elites wielding or seeking power.
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It i s ir onic t hat t he exp ansion o f dem ocratic s paces in N igeria h as cr eated opportunities for civil society as well as non-state actors to increase their powers and ac tivities. M ilitant r eligious a nd s ocial m ovements o f va rying p ersuasions, some of which pursue extreme ideals, are more willing than ever to capitalise on the weakening power and legitimacy of the state in order to assert their doctrines and philosophy. In some instances, avowed militants use extremist movements to create q uasi-states w ithin t he N igerian s tate, t hereby f urther w eakening a nd undermining its legitimacy. The failure of the government in N igeria to provide social and economic benefits to the citizens has severely undermined its support from the populace. However, t he g overnment c an t urn a round t his n egative t rend b y strengthening its capacity to provide public goods, proactively responding to the needs of its citizens, and strengthening democracy as well as free and fair elections to gu arantee t he r ights a nd s ecurity o f ci tizens. Th e s tate m ust a lso di stribute national resources equitably and transparently, and has to b e accountable to the population f or h ow i t u ses t hese r esources. Th e s tate in N igeria m ust p ursue a social a nd e conomic p olicy t hat w ill en sure t he realisation of r ights, e quity a nd justice for all Nigerians, regardless of their identity (religious, ethnic, regional and or other affiliations). The b est gu arantee f or a p eaceful a nd p rosperous N igeria i s o ne t hat i s n ot threatened b y ext remism o r radic alism, h as de ep dem ocratic va lues a nd institutions, p romotes g ood g overnance, a nd e qual a nd fa ir t reatment o f a ll citizens, a nd h as a v isionary le adership t hat i s f ully co mmitted t o t he N igerian nation. A nything s hort o f t his w ould gu arantee t he co ntinuation a nd e ven generation o f m ore mi litancy t hat w e a re w itnessing in t he n orthern a nd Niger Delta regions of the country at present.

NOTES
1 Politically, Nigeria is divided into 36 admini strative divisions, referred to as states, and one federal c apital t erritory, n amely Abuja. N orthern N igeria i s a l arge g eographical a rea a nd contains 19 of the 36 states that make up the administrative units of Nigeria. The country is further constituted into six g eopolitical zones, of which three are part of northern Nigeria. The northeast zone consists of Adamawa, B auchi, B orno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe states. The northwest zone is made up of Kano, Jigawa, Katsina, Kaduna, Zamfara, Birnin Kebbi and Sokoto, a nd t he n orth-central zo ne o f N iger, Kwara, B enue, K ogi, N asarawa a nd P lateau states. S ee Nations On line: co untries o f t he w orld, F ederal R epublic o f N igeria co untry profile, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/first.shtml (accessed 9 June 2009).
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D P ipes, I s I slamic f undamentalism a t hreat t o p olitical s tability? F rom s ame dif ferences, National Review, 7 November 1994. John L E sposito, Political Islam: beyond the green menace, Current History, January 1994, http://www.iiu.edu.my/deed/articles/espo.html (accessed 15 May 2010). S P H untington, Th e c lash o f ci vilisations? , Foreign A ffairs 72(3) (S ummer 1993), 2228, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-ofcivilizations (accessed 15 May 2010). S Mahmood, Islam and fundamentalism, Middle East Report 191 (1994), 2930. Martin E Marty and R Scott Appleby, Introduction, in Martin E Martin and R Scott Appleby (eds), Fundamentalism and the state, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, 3. Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/islamism (accessed 15 March 2009). International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, Middle East/North Africa Report 37, 2 March 2005, h ttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/ 037-understanding-islamism.aspx (accessed 3 August 2010). Trevor Stanley, Definitions: Islamism, Islamist, Islamiste, Islamicist, Perspectives on World History a nd C urrent E vents, July 2005, h ttp://www.pwhce.org/islamism.html (acces sed 19 March 2010). Ibid. International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, Executive summary. H Redissi, Toward a third type of fundamentalism, 2002, http://www.codesria.org/Archives/ ga10/Abstracts/20611/Religion_Redissi.htm (accessed 13 March 2009). See S M A bbas Z aidi, Th e f undamentalist di stortion o f t he I slamic m essage, Athena Intelligence J ournal 3(4) (2008), 5975, h ttp://www.athenaintelligence.org/aij-vol3-a18.pdf (accessed 6 March 2009). Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/islamism (accessed 15 March 2009). International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism. D Z eidan, The Islamic f undamentalist view of life as a p erennial b attle, Moral e conomy of Islam 5(4) (2001), 24. Ibid, 25. Ibid. International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism. I M uazzam, New I slamic r eligious m ovements a nd d emocratic go vernance i n N igeria. A research report on the Muslim Brothers, Research report submitted to the Centre for Research and Documentation (CRD), Kano, Nigeria, July 2001. Ibid. R L oimeier, P atterns a nd p eculiarities o f I slamic r eform in A frica, Journal o f R eligion i n Africa 33(3), Islamic thoughts in 20th-century Africa (2003), 237262, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/1581849 (accessed 25 February 2009). P L ubeck, R L ipschutz a nd E W eeks, Th e g lobality o f I slam: Sharia as a N igerian selfdetermination m ovement, P aper p resented a t t he C onference o n G lobalisation a nd S elfDetermination, QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS106, London, April 2003. A J ega (e d), Identity t ransformation a nd i dentity p olitics u nder s tructural a djustment i n Nigeria, K ano, N igeria: N ordiska A frikainstitutet a nd C entre f or R esearch a nd Documentation, 2000. Ibid.
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26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Jibrin Ib rahim, P luralism a nd r eligious co nflict in N igeria: a r esearch a genda, P aper presented at the African Studies Association Conference, Boston, 1993, 2. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid, 3. 31 Ali A M azrui, Shariacracy and f ederal m odels in t he era o f g lobalisation: N igeria in comparative perspective, Paper delivered at the International Conference on Sharia, held at the C ommonwealth Institute, L ondon, 1415 A pril 2001, h ttp://www.gamji.com (acces sed 10 June 2001). 32 Ibid, 1. 33 Ibid, 3. 34 M Tabiu, Sharia, federalism and Nigerian constitution, Paper delivered at the International Conference on the Restoration of Shariah in Nigeria: Challenges and Benefits, London, 2001, http://www.gamji.com (accessed 10 June 2001). 35 Lubeck et al, The globality of Islam, 2. 36 Ibid. 37 For exa mple t he R esearch a nd Pu blic P olicy C enter, R AND C orporation, Sa nta M onica, California, US (American); and the Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) of t he G lobal R esearch in I nternational A ffairs (GL ORIA) C entre a t t he I nterdisciplinary Centre Herzliya (Jewish). 38 J L E sposito (ed), Political Islam: revolution, radicalism or reform? London: Lynne Rienner, 1997. 39 J N P aden, Faith a nd p olitics i n N igeria: N igeria as a p ivotal s tate i n t he M uslim w orld, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008, http://www.usip.org/resources/faithand-politics-nigeria (accessed 15 May 2010). 40 A R Moten, Political science: an Islamic perspective, London: Macmillan, 1996. 41 Ibid. 42 Paden, Faith and politics in Nigeria. 43 Moten, Political science: an Islamic perspective. 44 S Best, Nigeria: the Islamist challenge: the Nigerian shiite movement, http://www.conflictprevention.net/page.php? id=40&formid=73&action=show&surveyid=1#author (acces sed 15 May 2010). 45 Ibid. 46 Best, N igeria: t he I slamist c hallenge; M uazzam, N ew I slamic r eligious m ovements; S L Sanusi, Fundamentalist groups and the Nigerian legal system: some reflections, in A Imam, J M organ a nd N Y uval-Davis (e ds), Warning s igns o f f undamentalisms, N ottingham, UK: Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), 2004. 47 K Z S kuratowicz, R eligious f undamentalist m ovements: s ocial m ovements in t he w orld system? Case study of the Maitatsine movement in Nigeria, 198085, Paper presented at the annual m eeting o f t he A merican S ociological A ssociation, P hiladelphia, 12 A ugust 2005, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/3/2/5/1/pages32519/ p325191.php (accessed 13 March 2009).
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48 Centre f or D emocratic R esearch a nd Training (CD RT), B ayero University, K ano, 2005, A report o f a c ommissioned s tudy o n t he Ul ama i n c ontemporary n orthern s tates o f N igeria, Report submitted to the Federal Government of Nigeria. 49 Ibid; Skuratowicz, Religious fundamentalist movements. 50 Best, Nigeria: the Islamist challenge. 51 Centre f or D emocratic R esearch a nd Training, A r eport o f a c ommissioned s tudy o n t he Ulama. 52 Ibid. 53 Muazzam, New Islamic religious movements. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Sanusi, Fundamentalist groups and the Nigerian legal system. 57 Best, Nigeria: the Islamist challenge. 58 Best, Nigeria: the Islamist challenge; Sanusi, Fundamentalist groups and the Nigerian legal system. 59 Paden, Faith and politics in Nigeria. 60 Sanusi, Fundamentalist groups and the Nigerian legal system. 61 IRIN H umanitarian N ews a nd A nalysis, N igeria: Muslim f undamentalist u prising r aises fears o f t errorism, UN Of fice f or t he C oordination o f H umanitarian A ffairs, 16 J anuary 2009, http://www.irinnews.org/Reort.aspex?ReportId=82382. A similar report can be found at h ttp://www.jihad watch.org/archives/000727.php-3/1 a nd h ttp://www.nigeriamasterweb. com/Talebanofnigeria.html. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid; I sa Umar G usau, Boko H aram: h ow i t a ll b egan, 2 A ugust 2009, h ttp://www.sunday. dailytrust.com (accessed 2 August 2009). 65 Isa Umar Gusau, Boko Haram. 66 Wikipedia, Boko H aram, h ttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram (acces sed 1 A ugust 2009). 67 BBC News, Nigeria sect head dies in custody, 31 July 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/africa/8177451.stm (accessed 31 July 2009). 68 W Okumu, Africa Command: opportunity for enhanced engagement or the militarisation of US-Africa r elations? Pretoria: I nstitute f or S ecurity S tudies, A frican S ecurity A nalysis Programme, 2007; B M esfin, The establishment and implications of the United States Africa Command: an African perspective, ISS Occasional Paper 183, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2009. 69 Okumu, Africa Command. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid.

C HAPTER 12

Armed Islamist groups in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco

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INTRODUCTION
This c hapter exa mines t he m ost p rominent a nd c urrent m ajor a rmed I slamist groups in E gypt, A lgeria a nd M orocco. It di scusses t heir co mmon f eatures a nd differences, in cluding ide ology, r ecruitment a nd p articular f eatures s uch a s development and activities. C ontemporary armed Islamist groups in t hese three countries have emerged as a v iolent manifestation of Islamist opposition against the state, which originated in Egypt in the 1960s, but also draws inspiration from earlier forms of Islamism. Their emergence is simultaneously a r esponse to state policies, social crisis and international factors. Since t he 1970s, t he a ppearance o f s ocial, p olitical a nd f inancial I slamist networks h as c ulminated in t he un precedented in ternationalist c haracter o f t he now global jihad. Th ese n etworks h ave b ecome in creasingly im portant in t he recent de velopment a nd a gendas o f E gyptian, A lgerian a nd M oroccan a rmed Islamist groups as they have sought to overcome their local weaknesses through regional a nd in ternational lin kages. Thi s de velopment r eflects c hanges in t he conception a nd p ractice o f jihad, a s a rmed I slamist g roups h ave ad apted t heir ideology a nd p raxis t o t he lo cal, r egional a nd g lobal co ntext. R egional a nd international fac tors h ave b een sig nificant in s haping t heir a gendas, t argets a nd
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recruiting practices sin ce t he 1990s, r esulting in a co mbination of b oth internal and external activities, while apparently lacking, however, any strategic cohesion. The major g roups discussed in t his chapter are t he al-Jihad/Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) in Egypt, the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour l a P rdication e t l e C ombat, GSPC) / al-Qaeda in t he L and o f t he I slamic Maghreb (AQIM) in A lgeria, and the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group ( Groupe Islamique C ombattant Marocain, GICM) in M orocco. The EIJ a nd AQIM insert themselves within a hi storical legac y of armed Islamist violence, which has now assumed a m ore in ternational a pproach, w hile t he GI CM c an b e de emed m ore clearly a direct product of this recent internationalisation. The chapter is organised in the following manner: the next section provides a general o verview o f t he e volution o f a rmed I slamist g roups a nd t heir ide ology within t he b roader co ntext o f I slamism, a nd exa mines t he ext ernal fac tors t hat have inf luenced this e volution. It is followed by a t hird s ection that provides an outline of t he internal fac tors t hat have impacted on t he de velopment, ac tivities and r ecruitment p ractices o f t he g roups a s w ell a s o n t heir internationalisation. The fourth section examines the global war on terror (GWoT) and how initiatives such t he Trans-Saharan C ounterterrorism I nitiative (T SCTI) h ave a ffected n ot only a rmed Islamist g roups o perating in t he region b ut a lso, a nd p erhaps m ore importantly, t he r egimes g overning t hese t hree co untries. Th e f ifth s ection contains some concluding remarks.

pursue their objectives through the violent actions of armed groups and how this development fits into the context of wider trends within Islamism is the subject of this section.

Islamism, political Islam and Salafi jihadism

The a rmed I slamist g roups ac tive in E gypt, A lgeria a nd M orocco a re Sunni in orientation a nd o ften c laim s ome f orm o f a ssociation w ith Salafi jihadism (a lSalafiyya al-Jihadiyya), the global jihad nominally led by al-Qaeda. Salafi jihadism is j ust o ne m anifestation o f Sunni Islamism, i tself p art o f a w ider I slamism understood here as the ac tive assertion and promotion of b eliefs, prescriptions, laws or policies that are held to be Islamic in character.1 Islamism is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, but for the purposes of this analysis it may be said to encompass three broad approaches.2 Insofar as it offers guidelines for the organisation and governance of Muslim communities, I slam a s a r eligion m ay b e s aid t o be in herently p olitical. Nonetheless, t he t erm political I slam i s a nalytically u seful in a ssigning a classification t o t hose g roups p ossessing cer tain s pecific c haracteristics w ithin Islamism. Political Islam as an expression first gained currency after 1979 in t he context o f I rans I slamic r evolution a s t he co mbination o f I slam a nd p olitics became perceived as a threat in the West. In the process, it established the lasting perception that the linking of Islam and politics was a radical deviation rather than a historical constant in Muslim societies.3 The Muslim Brotherhood is emblematic of those groups and organisations that now recognise some degree of distinction between the political and the religious, and pursue societal reform institutionally through a u sually n on-violent p olitical p rocess. M uslim B rotherhood organisations a re p resent t hroughout t he M iddle E ast a s w ell a s in A lgeria a nd Sudan, a nd simi lar p olitical g roupings a re ac tive in T urkey, M orocco a nd Indonesia. While these organisations have continued to seek guidance from Islams holy texts, they have favoured an interpretation of Islam that is compatible with elements o f m odernity, a llowing t hem t o o perate a nd f unction o penly w ithin modern state structures and their institutions. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in E gypt by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 against the background of Ataturks abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate four years earlier, g rowing W estern inf luence in M uslim l ands, a nd t he b udding a nticolonialism of the Western-educated elite. The demise of the symbolic unity of the
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Violent f orms o f I slamism a nd t heir ext reme m anifestations ex emplified in t he actions o f a rmed I slamist g roups a re b ut o ne o f t he t rajectories f ollowed b y dissenting a nd co ntesting v oices in t he I slamic w orld a gainst es tablished sociopolitical o rder a nd p ractices. Th e em ergence o f t hese g roups r epresents a particular a nd sin gular t rajectory co nditioned b y t he in terplay b etween w ider historical fac tors o perating a t a n ational a nd in ternational le vel, a nd t he corresponding evolution of Islamism as it has responded to the challenges posed by m odernism, n ationalism, s ecularism, co mmunism, in ternal p olitical c hange and stagnation, and most recently globalisation. How and why some advocates of the most radical brand of Islamism in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco have chosen to
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Arab M uslim w orld a nd t he im ported m odernist v isions o f n ationalism, secularism a nd p rogress le d t he B rotherhood t o ado pt a n o utspokenly a ntiWestern outlook based on respect for Islamic values. The Brotherhoods popularity grew and the organisation extended its reach beyond Egypt and into neighbouring countries through a co mbination of social work, preaching ( dawa), and Islamic anti-colonialism.4 In 1954, t wo y ears a fter E gypts in dependence, t he c lash b etween N assers nationalism and the Islamism of the Brothers resulted in t he organisation b eing banned a nd v iolently s uppressed. Th ese v iolent c lashes w itnessed t he r ise o f Sayyid Qutb, who by equating the nationalist regime with jahiliya, a s tate of preIslamic ig norance, c hallenged t he r egimes leg itimacy o n p rofoundly acc usatory and di visive r eligious g rounds. Following Q utbs ex ecution in 1966, t he Muslim Brotherhood r e-assessed hi s co ntroversial a pplication o f kufr (impious) a nd whether it applied to the regime only, to the whole of a corrupt society, or was to be interpreted metaphorically.5 The implications were significant, given that Qutb had argued that Muslims had the religious duty to conduct jihad against those who were deemed to be kufr in order to salvage Islamic society from decay. Taken to the extreme, t he log ic o f Q utbs t hinking in spired a rmed g roups, m ost n otably in Egypt a nd in A lgeria, t o p ursue v iolent c ampaigns o f t error a gainst r egimes accused of profanation against divine sovereignty, their perceived supporters, and eventually against all those who failed to share the same radical politico-religious beliefs. The Muslim Brotherhood continues to be a major force within political Islam. Its political engagement and renunciation of the violence inherent to Qutbs ideas helped to lay the foundation for what Tibi refers to as institutional Islamism,6 the hallmarks of which are a reconciliation of Islam with elements of modernity and a non-violent a ttempt t o ga in p ower t hrough es tablished p olitical s tructures. Indeed, the majority of Muslim Brotherhood organisations have worked within a legal framework, except where they were prevented from taking political action.7 Second, the writings of al-Banna and, in p articular, those of Qutb have provided key s ources o f in spiration a nd f orm p art o f t he ideological f ramework f or t he current Salafi jihadist movement. A s econd m anifestation o f Islamism in cludes m ovements s uch a s t he Salafi, which h ave r emained a political a nd s ought t o ac hieve s ocietal r eform t hrough non-violent action, often focused on preaching. Since its beginnings in t he early 20th century, Salafism has looked to the teachings of the venerable ancestors, the
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al-Salaf a l S alih, for guid ance, a nd i t ini tially s ought t o in tegrate e lements o f modernity t o p repare I slamic s ocieties f or t he c hallenges o f t he co ntemporary world. Salafists eventually b ecame in creasingly co ncerned w ith r esistance t o Western inf luence a nd de veloped w hat w ould t urn o ut t o b e lo ng-lasting lin ks with the Wahhabi Islam of Saudi Arabia. The opposition to political Islam reflects a p an-Islamist, a nti-nationalistic do ctrine t hat h as faci litated co nvergence o f interests for decades between religiously conservative Sunni regimes and Western interests o pposed t o A rab n ationalism. M oreover, Sa udi A rabias w ealth h as enabled the Kingdom to export Wahhabi Islam and solidify its connection to the Salafis, while extending its influence in the context of its rivalry with Iran.8 The Salafis place great importance on a strict adherence to Islamic individual behaviour and adopt a co nservative f undamentalist interpretation of Islam. Th e emphasis on preaching and t he promotion of Islamic virtues and va lues reflects the traditional Salafi concern with preserving and uniting the Muslim community of believers (ummah) and rejecting the legitimacy of modern concepts such as the nation o r t he n ation-state a s f orms o f s ocial o rganisation a nd g overnance. Th e Salafis h ave f ocused o n dawa rather t han p olitics, a nd o pposed t he M uslim Brotherhoods p olitical ac tivism. N onetheless, t heir r eligious a uthorities, t he ulema, h ave c alled a ttention t o co rruption a nd unI slamic m oral b ehaviour a nd officials h ave r esponded b y in tegrating t hem in to s tate s tructures, w hich h as allowed their influence to impose itself in certain communities and push sections of t hem in t he dir ection o f v iolent di sposition t owards Islamic l aw a nd o rder.9 Because o f i ts ra pid g rowth in r ecent y ears, a nd w hile r emaining os tensibly apolitical, Dawa Salafism now represents a de cisive constituency in p laces such as Algeria.10 Salafi jihadism, a third form of Islamism, borrows elements from the legacy of both the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood. It shares with the Salafis a strong conviction t hat I slamic va lues m ust b e r estored a nd a r efusal t o r econcile t he modern concepts of political organisation and nation-states with its interpretation of Islamic doctrine. Contrary to the traditional Salafis, however, it advocates jihad, a re ligiously s anctioned a rmed s truggle, ra ther t han p reaching a s t he m eans o f achieving its ends. Jihad symbolises the sacred defence of Muslim lands and the Algerian war of independence, for instance, associated the concept of jihad with the a rmed s truggle a gainst t he co lonial p ower. A co ntemporary p arallel exi sts today in t he P alestinian M uslim B rotherhood o rganisation, H amas, a nd i ts struggle a s a f orm o f jihad in r esponse t o o ccupation. Th us dep ending o n i ts
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interpretation, jihad may be conducted internally against Muslim rulers, globally against the West or be irredentist in character, as in the case of Palestine.11 The Salafi jihad adopts the thought of Qutb when it considers violent action against M uslim r ulers de emed kufr a r eligious d uty. A s le ader o f t he M uslim Brotherhood in E gypt during the 1960s, Sayyid Qutb called for the overthrow of the n ationalist N asser r egime, w hich h e co nsidered unI slamic f or p lacing t he sovereignty of the nation ahead of divine authority. As seen above, this occurred as t he US f omented a p ro-Western p an-Islamism w ith r eligiously co nservative regimes in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as a bulwark against the rise and spread of Nassers A rab n ationalism. Q utb u sed t he co ncept o f den unciation ( takfir) to declare the Nasser regime kufr and believed that Muslim society was reverting to a s tate of p re-Islamic ig norance ( jamaliya). B y ado pting these views, t he contemporary Salafi jihadists have dep arted sig nificantly f rom t he t raditional Salafi respect for Muslim authorities, provided these abide by Islamic principles. Salafi jihadists have o bjected t o t he s trategic a lignment of Muslim g overnments with the West in co untries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Algeria. In line with this cr iticism, b eginning in t he 1980s, t he focus of t he Salafi jihad expanded t o include Western interests in Africa, Europe, America and South Asia.

After ideology: external factors in the evolution of armed Islamist groups

The evolution of armed Islamist groups in E gypt, Algeria and Morocco has been marked b y f our k ey mi lestones: t he ini tial r esponse t o Q utbs ide as a nd t he accompanying radic alisation o f cer tain e lements w ithin a w ider I slamism; t he congregation, s truggle a nd e ventual v ictory o f a m ultinational M uslim f ighting force in A fghanistan and creation of jihadi salafist networks; the return of these combatants t o t heir h ome co untries a nd t heir co ntribution t o a n in ternal jihad against unIslamic regimes, and finally, the global jihad targeting enemies of Islam around the world.12 These milestones have been reached against the background of a s eries o f in ternal a nd ext ernal fac tors t hat, in ef fect, h ave co nditioned t he evolution of armed Islamist groups. In Egypt during t he 1970s a nd 1980s, a s well as in A lgeria in t he 1990s, t he internal jihad against impious regimes aimed at toppling and replacing the state. The merging of religious fundamentalism and a violent political ideology in these two countries cr ystallised with devastating results and it is now characteristic of
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the groups and individuals claiming to form part of al-Qaeda. Throughout these three de cades a s eries o f mi litary a nd p olitical e vents, b eginning w ith t he 1967 Israeli defeat of the Arab states and Egypts peace with Israel in 1978, continuously undermined t he Islamic leg itimacy o f n ationalist r egimes in t he e yes o f radicalised Islamists. The Palestinian cause has been an important rallying cry for Egyptian armed Islamic groups since the 1970s a nd the unresolved conflict may have in spired s ome o f t he a ttacks a gainst t he E gyptian t ourist in dustry in 20042006. The Palestinian question appears to have been converted into a source of funding and used to recruit volunteers internationally for the global jihad.13 Secular A rab n ationalism h as r esponded b y a sserting i ts do minion o ver t he religious s phere, ei ther t hrough v iolent r epression o r b y co opting di ssenters. Religion h as b een u sed a s a s ource o f leg itimacy f or t hese r egimes, b oth t o consolidate t heir h old o n p ower a nd t o f orge a n ational iden tity. I slamism wa s itself at times profoundly nationalist and drew on the association of religion and the nation for its own legitimacy. The idea of a jihad against a foreign non-Muslim oppressor was a popular mobilising factor in the war of independence of the Front de Libration N ationale (FLN) in A lgeria, w hile in t he l ate 1980s a nd 1990s t he Front I slamique du S alut (FIS) p ortrayed i ts I slamism a s a co ntinuation a nd recuperation of the liberation struggle against France. During the 1980s, a s eries of events further encouraged the growth of armed Islamic g roups a nd adde d a l ayer o f co mplexity t o t heir r elationship w ith t he governing regimes of t heir home states. These regimes reacted cautiously to t he growing power of radical violent Islamism, exemplified by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, A nwar Sad ats a ssassination in 1981 a nd t he a ttacks o n US M arines in Beirut in 1983. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 t hus proved timely by providing an external enemy and a c ause towards w hich worried regimes could redirect internal di ssent a nd a nti-US s entiment. It a lso o ffered a v ehicle f or t he spread of Saudi Wahhabism and for a Cold War rapprochement between Pakistan and t he US. Sa udi Wahhabism has b een s trategically a ligned w ith t he US sin ce 1945, w hich h as r esulted in t he o rientation o f jihad towards A rab n ationalist regimes and Soviet influence in places such as Egypt, Algeria and Afghanistan. It is estimated that up to 50 000 Arab14 fighters went through Afghanistan, the majority co ming f rom Sa udi A rabia, E gypt a nd A lgeria. Th e victory o f t he mujahedeen and their subsequent return to their countries of origin furthered the radicalisation of violent Islamism in s everal ways. This future first generation of al-Qaeda came dir ectly f rom M uslim co untries w here t hey h ad a lready b een
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politically ac tive. Th e A fghan exp erience cr eated o pportune co nditions f or t he reinforcement o f Sa udi-financed in ternational I slamist n etworks a round Salafi jihadists and forged increased commonalities between armed Islamist opposition in Egypt and Algeria. It allowed, for instance, the EIJ to tap into private financing to f und i ts ac tivities, p ermitted o perations w ithout a n e laborate s ocial constituency, and faci litated an e ventual merger w ith al-Qaeda in 2001. EIJ wa s founded in A fghanistan during t he 1980s b efore b ecoming ac tive in E gypt, and exerted influence over Osama bin Laden, a son of an important Saudi family and a founding leader of al-Qaeda. The radic alisation o f t he r eturnees wa s co mpounded b y t he dif ficult r einsertion of t he veterans into civilian life, le ading s ome A lgerian mujahedeen to influence the creation and strategies of both the FIS a nd the Groupes Islamiques Arms (GIA). Finally, following the Soviet defeat, the US turned its attention away from Afghanistan, leaving Saudi Arabia and Pakistan less subjected to American influence as they reconfigured their relationship with the armed groups. In the five years t hat elapsed b etween t he f irst World Trade C entre attacks in N ew York in 1993 and the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the US paid little attention to the activities of armed Islamist groups.15 During the 1990s, however, a number of US foreign policy decisions shifted the attention of the jihadists from targeting the regimes of Islamic countries to a global jihad against external enemies. Armed Islamist groups interpreted the 1991 US-le d Gulf War in Iraq and the deployment of troops in Somalia in 1993 as evidence of US imperial designs on the Muslim world, and responded with their own February 1993 attacks in New York. While relations with the West and the issue of how to confront or coopt violent forms o f I slamism w ere a lready fac tors b efore 1991, t he co nflict accen tuated a crisis in M uslim s tates a nd w ithin I slamic m ovements t hat di vided e ven t he supranational Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the 1996 Taleban rise to power, t he Arab v olunteers r emaining in A fghanistan r eorganised a round t he networks supported by bin L aden, himself only recently arrived f rom Sudan. In Algeria, the GIA began targeting France as an ally of the regime, and networks of returning mujahedeen promoted t he in ternationalisation o f v iolent I slamism. Young re-Islamised Algerians in France with little connection to the project of an Islamic state in t heir homeland, were drawn to the more radical GIA before later aligning themselves with the global jihad and surfacing in Afghanistan, the US and
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Yemen in def ence o f a s upranational ummah. A co nnection b egan t o a ppear between deterritorialisation and radical Islamisation.16 Compared w ith o ther m anifestations o f v iolent I slamism, t his g lobal jihad appears as the only one with no detectable strategy or clear objectives.17 Drawing on Qutbs legacy, the five-pillar doctrine18 of s unni jihadists internationalism calls for a violent world revolution against jahiliya (pre-Islamic barbarism) and al-kufr al-alami (international unbelief).19 It is thus markedly different from the internal jihad against impious regimes or the irredentist jihad in Palestine. The internal jihad in Egypt and Algeria largely failed to reach their objectives in the 1990s and groups s uch a s t he EIJ a nd t he GS PC r eoriented t heir s truggle t o in clude international o bjectives a nd r emote en emies s uch a s t he US, I srael a nd t heir Western a llies. G roups o f m ore r ecent cr eation s uch a s M oroccos GI CM h ave focused dir ectly o n in ternational t argets a nd, t ogether w ith t he EIJ a nd GS PC, claim membership with the al-Qaeda network. While this international tendency continues to be prevalent, internal agendas persist a s w ell, b inding t ogether t he in ternal a nd in ternational s truggle a gainst Qutbs jahiliya. This is the case with the Algerian AQIM, which continues to target the s tate a nd i ts a llies in A lgeria. Salafi jihadism also co ntinues t o b e o riented towards r egime c hange in p laces s uch a s I raq, w here t he in surgents r eject democracy and Shia rule and seek to establish an Islamic emirate,20 taking aim at sheikist Salafists and m ore m oderate Muslim B rothers k nown t o s eek p olitical compromises w ith s ecularists.21 In Sa udi A rabia, t he c lose co nnections b etween Salafis and Wahhabis and a regime aligned with the US have combined to place the Kingdom in a de licate position in r elation to the politically radical wing of neofundamentalism.22 As the next section will explore, the development and activities of a rmed I slamist g roups co ntinue t o r espond t o t he dem ands o f a n ide ology constantly adapting to internal and external factors.

INTERNAL FACTORS IN THE RECRUITMENT AND ACTIVITIES OF THE MAIN EGYPTIAN, ALGERIAN AND MOROCCAN ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS
A number of internal fac tors h elp one t o un derstand t he r ise of armed Islamist groups in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco. This section identifies and examines these factors and their influence on the recruitment and activities of these groups, and concludes by looking at the recent trend towards internationalisation.
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Internal factors and general recruitment trends

Since in dependence, p ost-colonial regimes in E gypt, A lgeria a nd Morocco h ave engaged in authoritarian and repressive policies, which lay emphasis on coercion and co ncentration o f s tate r esources a t t he di sposal o f t he g overning e lite. Consequently, t he s ocioeconomic l andscape h as b ecome a r eflection o f s tate agendas in which political and economic power has been placed in the hands of a small n umber o f p rivileged in dividuals. Thi s h as r esulted in g rowing e conomic imbalances, a mplified b y t he l ate 1980s r ecession, a nd t he in ability o r unwillingness o f t he s tates t o p rovide social, e conomic, p olitical a nd psy chic goods t o t heir exp anding, in creasingly y outhful, urb anised a nd li terate populations.23 Thus, an expanding youth population has found itself alienated due to a lack of opportunities, w hich co ntrasts w ith t he m edia im ages o f w ealth in E urope a nd America. The dream of a b etter material life has remained unfulfilled, leading to disenchantment and bitterness across wide sectors of the population. In Egypt, this has manifested in a g eneralised hopelessness particularly among an urban youth that has grown increasingly religiously conservative in response to unmet material expectations.24 In Morocco, similar sentiment has been witnessed in the phrase ana daya (my life is a m ess),25 and in A lgeria in hitiste, a co mbination of t he Arabic word f or wall a nd a F rench s uffix u sed b y t he A lgerian y outh t o s uggest employment p rospects limi ted t o r eclining a gainst a wa ll.26 This m alaise i s reflective o f a s ocial cr isis n ot addr essed b y s tate p olicies. I t i s sy mptomatic o f populations in Arab countries no longer willing to see their dignity, their worth as human b eings, t heir h uman r ights a nd t heir f undamental f reedoms t rampled upon on a d aily basis by institutions and individuals, including security forces, who act on behalf of, and on orders from, national political authorities.27 This deepening disillusionment has contributed to the conditions conducive to political ext remism m anifested in a n I slamic r esurgence a nd i ts m ore v iolent expressions a s a co unterforce t o t he a uthoritarian s tates. A lienation f rom a n increasingly m odern s ociety t hat r emained in accessible p rovoked a mi litant response a mong t he g rowing, co nservative s ections o f t he p oor a nd e ducated youth, and provided momentum for Islamist organisations and t heir ide ologies. Linking iden tity i ssues w ith s ocial j ustice, I slamist g roups b ecame p articularly appealing t o t he m arginalised s ectors o f t he p opulation b ecause t hey p rovided services w here t he g overnment fa iled t o do s o a nd o ffered r emedies t o o ther aspects of the social crisis.28
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Some Islamist groups, such as the Salafi in Algeria, have sought to establish an alternative community through the provision of services and Islamic order and the creation o f a lternative I slamic n etworks.29 Others h ave en gaged in p roviding education a nd s ocial s ervices t hrough c haritable ac tivities, ci vil s ociety, s tudent unions, p rofessional l abour o rganisations, s ocial h elp a ssociations a nd I slamic banks. These groups also appeal to liberal professionals and members of the urban middle c lasses di sgruntled b y t he l ack o f p rospects un der mi litary r ule a nd economic crisis.30 In E gypt, A lgeria a nd M orocco, t he s tates w ithdrawal f rom im poverished neighbourhoods and slums has created space for the growth of local Islamic orders based largely on neo-fundamentalist foundations. These spaces, consisting of parts of individual neighbourhoods, are often governed by Shariah (Islamic law) and at times, violent coercion is used to enforce the Islamist order seen as a prerequisite for establishing an Islamic community. This trend has also reached poor Muslim neighbourhoods in the West, where some armed Islamist groups have recruited in places of congregation (mosques, internet cafs, cafeterias, gyms, summer camps etc), a mong t he vu lnerable a nd m arginalised (p risons, r efugee cen tres, w elfare agencies, possibly universities etc), and through radical mosques and bookshops that act as recruitment magnets.31

Egypt
The o rigins o f al-Jihad/EIJ r elate t o t he E gyptian s tates in creasing instrumentalisation o f r eligion in t he co ntext o f a r egional I slamic r esurgence during t he 1970s. Thi s le d t o a g rowing I slamisation o f s ociety a nd t he politicisation of religion. The Islamist political oppositions challenge to the state as a r eligious-political ac tor gained strength,32 which in t urn provoked a r egime crackdown o n t he I slamist m ovement in t he l atter 1970s. W hile t he M uslim Brotherhood operated as the outlawed mainstream religious opposition, its armed offshoots ado pted a v iolent a pproach t hat e ventually b irthed t he f ounding o f groups s uch a s al-Jihad (now k nown a s t he EIJ), Takfir w al-Hijra and Hizb a lTahrir al-Islami. While regime repression weakened the violent jihadist elements under Kamal Habib in Alexandria, the groups of Mohammad Abd al-Salam Farag in Cairo and followers of Karam Mohammed Zuhdi in A ssiut survived. In 1980, al-Jihad took shape with the fusion of Farags group in Cairo and Zuhdis branch in Assiut, with the l atter in corporating hi s al-Jamaa a l-islamiyya a l-jihad i yya ( Jihadi Islamic
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Group, JI G) in to t he n ew m ovement.33 The le adership o f al-Jihad was f urther reinforced by a m ember of Egyptian military intelligence, Abbud al-Zumur, who orchestrated the groups armed activities. Al-Jihad rejected both Sadats credentials as a p ious M uslim le ader a nd t he s tates in strumentalisation o f r eligion.34 Borrowing t he a rguments p ut f orward e arlier b y Q utb, al-Jihad embarked o n a campaign of violence against the regime and propagated popular mass rebellion. Despite o rchestrating t he a ssassination o f Sad at o n 6 O ctober 1981, al-Jihads planned I slamic r evolution fa iled t o m aterialise a nd o nly i solated di sturbances took place near Assiut. The state retaliated by imprisoning al-Zumur, Farag and a number of al-Jihad leaders as well as Sadats assassin, Khaled al-Islambouli.35 Armed Islamist groups in Egypt regained strength in the early 1990s with the return o f t he mujahedeen from A fghanistan. Th ey r einforced t heir p resence in urban a reas o f U pper E gypt a nd n eighbourhoods o f C airo a nd A lexandria b y employing a mix ed s trategy of conviction a nd intimidation w hile continuing t o target t he E gyptian p olitical e lite.36 Obtaining f inancing u sed a s a n ext ension o f Saudi f oreign p olicy,37 the m ovements w ere dr iven m ostly b y s tudents o f lo wer socioeconomic s tanding a nd t he urb an midd le-class b ourgeoisie, im posing morality and discipline through an authoritarian community.38 Their appeal to the middle classes was brief, however, as the poorer cadres of the society and eventual power base of the groups turned increasingly violent, targeting the middle classes which then turned to the state structures for stability and protection.39 One p rincipal c haracteristic o f al-Jihads recruiting s trategy wa s r eligious agitation. I t u sed a n etwork o f p rivate m osques, s ome Sa udi-funded, in w hich radical preachers such as Muhammad Abd al-Salam Farag engaged in recruitment. In its heyday during the 1990s, t he organisation also recruited from the ranks of the p residential gu ard, t he ci vil s ervice, mi litary in telligence, t he m edia a nd academia.40 Farags b ranch o f al-Jihad in C airo wa s co mposed o f f ive t o six autonomous and loosely linked cells presided over by emirs41 such as Ayman alZawahiri, and controlled through a common strategy. In Assiut, the other main alJihad branch operating under Karam Mohammed Zuhdi consisted of a number of small groups in university towns recruited through kinship and tribal bonds.42 In t he e arly 1990s, a l-Zawahiri a ssumed t he le adership o f t he EIJ fac tion, breaking ra nks w ith t he im prisoned a l-Zumur a nd co nverting t he g roup in to a network isolated from a c lear social constituency43 and increasingly targeting the Egyptian r egime. I n 1990, f ive m embers o f t he o rganisation w ere a rrested f or assassinating t he s peaker o f t he n ational a ssembly, a nd f rom 1992 t o 1997 i t
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engaged in i solated a ttacks desig ned t o p aralyse t he r egimes t ourism in dustry, ending with the November 1997 massacre in Luxor. On 25 June 1995, it staged an assassination a ttempt o n P resident Mubarak d uring a n Or ganisation o f A frican Unity (OAU) summit in Ethiopia in collaboration with the Sudanese intelligence, which included as protagonists individuals claiming affiliation with al-Qaeda. By this time, however, Egypts armed Islamists had already begun to shift their focus to international targets, as the EIJ m oved closer to the networks orchestrated by Osama bin Laden. The EIJs current base resides principally with an exiled leadership in Western countries and, to a lesser degree, in urban centres of northern Egypt. In 1998 the group announced that it had joined al-Qaeda, with which it merged in 2001. B in Laden has provided financing to the group through the Faisal Islamic Bank and the A l-Shamal I slamic B ank in S udan, w here h e wa s h osted b y t he co untrys Islamist regime from 1992 to 1996. The international activities of EIJ are attributed to t he inf luence o f a l-Zawahiri, w hose p rominence in t he o rganisation h as convinced some followers to associate themselves with al-Qaeda. Divisions within EIJ appeared in December 2007 when imprisoned leader Sayed Imam abandoned the use of violence and announced the cessation of armed activities. There i s n ow e vidence t hat t he in ternet h as ga ined im portance a s a n international recruitment tool. Al-Qaeda has reportedly recruited individual cells by facilitating operations within Egypt through information sharing, training and networking.44 On 23 F ebruary 2009, a b omb exploded in C airos Khan al-Khalili market killing a French tourist. The attack was allegedly perpetrated by an isolated group p ossibly inspired by t he internet,45 or a jihadist self-starter, rather t han a commanded or guided group.46

Algeria
By the late 1980s, an Islamist movement consisting mostly of university professors and students had taken form in response to state repression in Algeria. This group recruited l argely b y p reaching in popular n eighbourhoods w here lo cal ulema enjoyed s upport. U nlike E gypt, w here t he r egime h ad w eakened t he I slamist opposition t hough t he a pplication o f a s tate r eligious do ctrine, t he A lgerian authorities proved incapable of channelling religious s entiment in t heir favour.47 Algerian I slamist g roups u sed t he a vailable p olitical s pace t o cr eate a m ass movement revolving around the ulema and an increasingly receptive poor urban youth harbouring grievances arising from the economic crisis and the disruption
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of t he dem ocratic process. Thi s c ulminated in t he creation of t he FIS in M arch 1989 as an Islamist alliance of various groups.48 The early success of the FIS stemmed from its ability to unite the poor urban youth w ith t he p ious b ourgeoisie un der t he s ame I slamist ide ology in o rder t o challenge t he r egime a nd p rovide a n a lternative p roject t o a n ex clusive a nd repressive s tate. H owever, in t he co urse o f t he 1990s a nd es pecially a fter t he government cancelled elections in 1991 to prevent the victory of the FIS, violence escalated t o s uch le vels t hat i t f ragmented t he I slamist m ovement a nd i ts constituency. Factions dominated by t he mujahedeen leadership migrated to t he ranks of the more radical and violent GIA, rallying the urban youth underclass and opposing any compromise with the regime. The GIA deliberately targeted civilians and i ts v iolence a lienated a m ore m oderate p ious b ourgeoisie t hat t hrew i ts support behind the Arme Islamique du S alut (AIS), the armed wing of the FIS, ultimately resulting in a r econciliation of sorts with the regime in a p rocess that mirrored the Egyptian experience.49 By 1998, popular support for the GIA had eroded dramatically and the global jihadist movement o ffered a des perately n eeded ide ological a nd s trategic alternative, particularly for the Salafi jihadists from Afghanistan. This resulted in Hassan H attab b reaking f rom t he GI A t o f orm t he GS PC in S eptember 1998, publicly co ndemning a ttacks a gainst ci vilians a nd limi ting i ts v iolence t o representatives of the state.50 The GSPC has attracted the most attention among the remaining armed Islamist groups in A lgeria for both its alleged ties to al-Qaeda and its activities. In September 2006, the group officially announced its adherence to al-Qaeda, changing its name to Al-Qaeda in the L and of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM h as sin ce co ntinued t o o rient i ts a ttacks o n t he s tate s ecurity apparatus, a s w ell a s f oreign in terests, w hile un dertaking k idnappings t hat a lso appear to have b een f inancially lucrative. In May and June 2009 i t engaged in a campaign o f s uicide a ttacks a nd a mbushes, n otably a gainst a mi litary co nvoy protecting Chinese workers, police recruits and paramilitary gendarmes.51 Integration in to a n in ternational c ampaign g rants a n ext ernal leg itimacy t o AQIM t hat i t h as fa iled t o o btain in ternally a nd p rovides a n o utlet f rom i ts ideological p osition t o purify s ociety. W hile t he A fghan v eterans a nd t he remaining members of the Islamic insurgency share an ideological and personal connection w ith other g roups of t he al-Qaeda network, t he continued f ocus on overthrowing the FLN r egime in A lgeria has hindered its capacity to attract new recruits more inspired by the transnational jihadism of al-Qaeda. As a r esult, the
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media-savvy AQIM has produced propaganda videos in the local Berber language and couched its recruitment in terms of historical grievances by calling for the reconquest o f A l-Andalus, w hich in cludes l arge p arts o f S pain, a nd a nger a t a century o f f oreign do mination. Thi s h as b een co mbined w ith m ore t raditional preaching in m osques, t he invocation o f a p ervasive s tate o f s ocial m alaise a nd humiliating images of Muslim immigrants in Western countries.52 This propaganda has been used to raise the profile of the international jihad, most notably in Iraq, above internal concerns and to facilitate the recruitment of young people detached from the nationalist project of the FIS and more attracted to jihadist internet sites. New recruits h ave reportedly b een s ent t o radicalising training camps for three to six m onths either to prepare them to fight in Iraq or oblige t hem, k nowingly o r n ot, t o t ake p art in s uicide a ttacks in A lgeria.53 This demonstrates that both AQIMs internal and external agendas remain significant and interlocked.

Morocco
The Groupe Islamique de Combat Marocain (GICM) was formed during the 1990s around a n ucleus of Moroccan A fghanistan veterans en dorsing a r igorous interpretation of the Quran and Sunna and the rejection of a s tate not based on Islamic l aw.54 The f ounding o f t he GI CM co incided w ith t he M oroccan s tates decision t o r educe i ts p resence in t he im poverished o utskirts o f C asablanca, increasing t he a ppeal o f I slamism w ithin di senfranchised a nd di sconnected sectors o f t he p opulation. Th e GI CM p rovided a s ense o f s olidarity in t hese quarters t hrough recruitment into small g roups and lo cal orders le d by an emir and united by a common Salafist ideology. As in Egypt, these organisations police their neighbourhoods and enforce their interpretation of a s trict moral and legal Islamic co de. Yet, ra ther t han b eing le d b y p rominent in dividuals a s w ith alJihad/EIJ, any Islamist individuals to whom at least one other person is willing to pledge allegiance can potentially achieve the status of emir.55 The GICM represents the increasingly international approach adopted by the armed I slamist g roups sin ce t he 1990s. Th e GI CM a ppears t o h ave m aintained contacts with violent Algerian Islamists in F rance and Belgium ,and its activities have included propaganda, recruitment for international jihad and coordination of local cells through what is portrayed as the international al-Qaeda network. The May 2003 Casablanca and March 2004 Madrid bombings as well as accusations of serving a s a log istical b ase f or al-Qaeda have p laced t he g roup un der r enewed
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scrutiny.56 According to newspaper accounts, the GICM has received funds from al-Qaeda and its European financiers, and logistical support, training and religious education from the Taleban, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, the Algerian GIA and GSPC, and several other violent extremist groups.57 As far as its internal jihad is co ncerned, h owever, t he GI CM h as b een un able t o b uild a n a genda t hat successfully challenges the religious legitimacy of the monarchy in the eyes of the general population.

Western countries have led the US to turn its attention to the vast lands that lie to the south of these countries.

The global war on terror and armed Islamist groups in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco
The g lobal wa r o n t error (GWoT)67 has h ad im portant r epercussions in E gypt, Algeria and Morocco. These three countries have all collaborated with the US-led war o n t error a nd o ne o f t he k eys t o det ermining s tate r esponse h as b een t he degree to which the actions and presence of violent actors have been perceived by the r egimes n ot a s a t hreat, b ut a s b eneficial t o s tability a nd s ecurity.68 While officially meant to offer new measures against the threat of armed Islamist groups in t he r egion, ini tiatives s uch a s t he T SCTI h ave a lso cr eated a f ramework b y means of which regimes can gain access to new resources in exchange for a more muscular foreign presence to penetrate the region.

INTERNATIONALISATION
The armed Islamic groups in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco have shown a growing international orientation since the late 1990s t hrough their al-Qaeda affiliation.58 This s hould n ot di stract f rom co ntinuing national o r in ternal a gendas a nd activities, particularly in the case of Algeria, while recognising that the frustrated attempts a t in ternal jihad in t he 1980s a nd 1990s h ave le d m any f ollowers t o renounce v iolence a nd dem and a m ore in clusive p olitical p rocess t hrough democratisation.59 Algerians, m oreover, h ave a lso ad hered in l arge n umbers t o conservative, n on-political, n on-violent Salafi organisations, o r sim ply a spire t o leave the country.60 Outside N orth A frica, r ecruitment in to a rmed I slamist E uropean ce lls in Britain, France and Spain has also taken place. It has been achieved by drawing on a s ense o f a lienation a nd s eparation, h umiliation, r eligious co mmitment, p eer pressure, t he ummah as a n a lternative t o t he E uropean co ncept o f n ation, a nd emphasising t he importance of v iolent jihad.61 Radical imams and ac tivists have used in doctrination, s ubversion a nd s ocialisation a s m ethods o f r eligious a nd political propaganda,62 at t imes resulting in v iolent ac ts t hat s eek to emulate t he jihadist cause in Iraq.63 Moreover, the internet continues to attract followers to the al-Qaeda agenda in the transnational ummah with jihadist networks extending into Western countries. Recruiting ac tivities a re k nown t o h ave t aken p lace in m osques in H amburg, London, Marseilles and Montreal.64 Whereas internet propaganda reaches sections of di sgruntled s econd-generation immig rants in t he Western co untries, i t a lone appears n ot t o b e s ufficient f or s uccessful r ecruitment,65 but i t m ay in spire individual acts of Islamist violence.66 In North Africa, the uncertainty concerning the exact nature of the activities of armed Islamic groups and the perceived threat of v iolent I slamism u sing t he r egion a s a n in cubator b efore s pilling o ut in to
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The global war on terror and regime response to armed Islamist groups
Egypt, Algeria and Morocco openly supported the US in 2001 and 2002, but found their domestic support compromised by the decision to invade Iraq, an event met with demonstrations of anger across North Africa.69 Morocco is considered by the US t o b e a k ey n on-NATO p artner70 and r eports h ave s uggested t hat t errorist suspects w ere q uestioned b y M oroccan a uthorities o n b ehalf o f US in telligence services. Egypt h as a lso provided interrogation s ervices, a lthough it h as kept its support lo w p rofile in a n ef fort t o r econcile p ublic o pinion a nd t he a nnual US$2 billion in aid received from the US.71 One report on Algeria already noted in 2004 that states openly supporting the war on terror risked finding the threat of extremism increasing rather than diminishing. For these regimes, US involvement may undermine the strategic weakness, dependent nature and possible legitimacy deficits of the states concerned.72 Joining the war on terror, however, also conceivably offers an opportunity to settle p olitical s cores a nd ga in n ewfound international leg itimacy.73 In e xchange for s upport, dem ands f or im provements in t he a reas o f h uman r ights a nd democracy m ay m ore e asily b e ig nored a nd e ven r efuted un der t he p retext o f controlling the Islamist threat.74 Egypt has had a state of emergency in place since
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Sadats a ssassination in 1981 a nd A lgeria sin ce t he c ancelled e lections o f 1991. Algeria h as s upported t he wa r o n t error a nd, in ex change, r eceived mi litary equipment p reviously w ithheld d ue t o h uman r ights co ncerns. A n a pparent resurgence of armed Islamic groups in the region, evidenced in the reported 2003 kidnapping of 32 European tourists in southern Algeria for which AQIM claimed responsibility, s trengthened t he r egimes mi litary c apabilities, a nd b y ext ension, the US p resence in t he a rea.75A cer tain d uality m ay b e det ected in t he o fficial Algerian response; on the one hand, its internal discourse has announced violent groups t o b e o n v erge o f di sappearance, w hile t he r egime h as sim ultaneously emphasised the omnipresence of danger for external audiences.76

Armed Islamist groups and the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative

Algeria a nd M orocco h ave b oth co llaborated w ith t he US o n i ts Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism I nitiative, a p rogramme t hat a lso in cludes M auritania, M ali, Niger, Chad, Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Senegal. The stated objective is to help secure t he region f rom p otential terrorist t hreats and underlies t he fear t hat t he Sahara may become, or may already be, a base for terrorist camps. It thus seeks to enhance t he mi litary a nd p olice c apabilities o f r egional s tates t o s upport t he eradication of violent non-state actors.77 The programme is headed by the US State Department a nd in cludes t he US A id A gency a s w ell a s t he D epartment o f Defence. Its anti-terror activities range from diplomacy, development assistance, and military activities aimed at strengthening partner countries counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology.78 The rationale for the TSCTI is arguably based on what Keenan has referred to as the banana theory of terrorism, whereby terrorists coming out of Afghanistan move through Iraq and into the Horn of Africa and the Sahel to receive al-Qaeda training before making their way to North Africa, Europe and the US.79 This threat was magnified by the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, leading to the fear that armed I slamic g roups n ow h ad a f irmly es tablished c apacity t o s trike a long Europes s outhern p eriphery. Th us, t he g lobalisation o f t he t errorist t hreat h as allowed the US to pressure its allies, increased the sense of fear within Europe, and set the stage for the creation in 2007 of the first US command dedicated to Africa and responsible for the military component of the TSCTI.
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While E gypts p osition a s a m ajor US p artner in t he r egion r emains uncontested, A lgeria h as s ought t o c hallenge M oroccos p rivileged r ole b y emphasising its own experience with violent Islamism and portraying the country as a b astion of regional and international security. Algeria has received US a rmy training a nd accep ted t he p resence o f t he US F ederal B ureau o f I nvestigation (FBI). Moreover, it is suspected that some sectors of the armed forces connected to the oil industry are receptive to the US securitisation of the Sahara, since it may in fact be beneficial to their interests.80 This situation reflects the Algerian leaderships propensity t o co ntinue i ts ex clusive g overnance, t his t ime b y u sing US mi litary support to monopolise oil-generated revenue. For the US, it remains unclear how strongly democratisation, good governance or respect for human rights should be prioritised w hen s trong-armed r egimes m ay b e co nsidered m ore ef ficient a nd compliant allies.81

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Armed Islamist groups in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco emerged in the generalised context of a crisis of the post-colonial state. As such, these groups initially sought to p rovide a n a lternative I slamic p olitical o rder a nd v iolently c hallenged t heir respective r egimes in o rder t o ac hieve t heir g oal. A fter t hree de cades a nd unsuccessful internal jihads, the strategy and objectives of the now global jihad is no longer clear. While t here is no denying t hat t he g lobal jihad has appealed to individuals across t he world and at t imes produced s pectacular and de vastating results, the route chosen by political Islamists where regimes have allowed Islamic parties to enter the political arena appears to have yielded more results in terms of setting the groundwork towards the creation of an Islamic society, albeit one that incorporates some elements of modernity. This political Islam, however, has been the subject of intense criticism not only from Salafi jihadists, but also from non-violent and apolitical Salafi movements. In countries s uch a s A lgeria, a t endency t o w ithdraw co mpletely a nd w ithout confrontation from the political arena and from the state appears to be gathering momentum a nd en joying g reater p opular s upport t han t he g lobal jihad. Th e emphasis on the security of the state as opposed to that of the individual, which partially exp lains t he s tates g radual w ithdrawal f rom t he e veryday lif e o f i ts citizens a s a p rovider o f s ervices, a m ediator o r a faci litator o f o pportunities, contributed to the appeal of radical Islamist ideas among the poor and disgruntled
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sectors of the population and within the ranks of a f rustrated middle class. This frustration a nd di senchantment h ave n ot va nished a nd s hould n ot b e underestimated, but for the most part they do not appear to be channelled towards violent jihad. Moreover, although the perpetrators now come from across the Muslim world, the ranks of armed Islamic groups do not appear to have swelled proportionally to the level of dissatisfaction felt by the general population. Armed Islamist groups in Egypt A lgeria a nd M orocco, w eakened in ternally b y a co mbination o f l ack o f popular support and regime crackdowns in the context of the war on terror, have embarked on a campaign to compensate for their internal failures by increasingly emphasising external agendas. Armed Islamist groups have thus been portrayed as real t hreats t o t he p revailing status q uo by b oth t heir r espective s tates a nd t he international community, irrespective of their actual capacity. This explains why regional a nd in ternational co ntexts h ave b ecome p rogressively p ertinent, o r in some cases, even a dominant part of their agendas and activities. Despite l acking common strategic unity, t hese g roups do co ntinue to p ose a threat. This threat, however, do es not appear to lie in t he capacity to destabilise regimes o r t he w ider in ternational co mmunity. Above a ll, i t i s a m enace t o t he security o f t he in dividual ci tizen fa lling v ictim t o a n i solated m anifestation o f armed Islamist activity in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and elsewhere.

NOTES
1 International Crisis Group (ICG), Understanding Islamism, Middle East/ North Africa Report 37, 2 Ma rch 2005, 1, h ttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/ r egions/middle-east-north-africa/northafrica/037-understanding-islamism. aspx?alt_lang=he (accessed 15 February 2009). This a b road c lassification u sefully p ut f orward b y I nternational Cr isis G roup, Understanding Islamism, 35. Ibid, 2. G Kepel, La yihad: expansin y declive del Islamismo, Barcelona: Ediciones Pennsula, 2001, 2738. Ibid, 41. Bassan Tibi, Political Islam, world politics and Europe, Abingdon: Routledge, 2008, 101, r efers to institutional I slam a s a peaceful va riety o f p olitical I slam b ut h as c lear r eservations a bout i ts democratic credentials. See chapter 7, Political decline and democracys decline to a voting procedure. O Roy, Globalised Islam: the search for a new ummah, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, 60. International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, 89. Ibid, 12.

2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9

10 A B oubekeur, Salafism and radic al p olitics in p ost-conflict A lgeria, C arnegie En dowment f or International P eace, C arnegie P aper 11, S eptember 2008, 1317, h ttp://www.carnegie endowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view& id =22293 (accessed 1 July 2009). 11 International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, 14. 12 Ibid. 13 K Dalacoura, Islamist movements as non-state actors and their relevance to international relations, in D Josselin and W Wallace (eds), Non-state actors in world politics, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001, 235248, 238239. 14 In Afghanistan the externally recruited mujahedeen were often considered Arabs and Afghans upon return to their countries of origin. 15 Roy, Globalised Islam, 292301. 16 Ibid, 69. 17 Ibid, 55. 18 According t o M H afez, Suicide b ombers i n I raq: t he s trategy a nd i deology o f m artyrdom, Washington, D C: United S tates I nstitute f or Peace, 2007, 6670, t hese f ive co ncepts a re tawhid (unity of God) as a way of life, hakimiyyat Allah (Gods sovereignty) over right and wrong, bida as strict j urisprudence a nd r ejection o f inn ovation, takfir with M uslims ac ting o utside t he cr eed either to repent of face execution, and jihad in terms of violent struggle. 19 Tibi, Political Islam, world politics and Europe, 99101. 20 Hafez, Suicide bombers in Iraq. 21 Kepel, La yihad. 22 Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: the search for a n ew ummah, 233, s uggests neo-fundamentalism is less historically ambiguous than salafi. 23 B Maddy-Weitzman, The Islamic c hallenge i n North Africa, Middle Eas t R eview o f International Affairs 1(2) (1997), h ttp://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/ 1997/issue2/jv1n2a7.html (accessed 5 F ebruary 2009). 24 Immigration a nd R efugee B oard o f C anada, E gypt: R ecruitment b y I slamist mi litant g roups, including methods and incidence, Immigration and Refugee B oard of C anada, 19 A ugust 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 49b92b4b12.html (accessed 26 June 2009). 25 Ibid. 26 Kepel, La yihad, 260. 27 B Chourou, Promoting human security: ethical, normative and educational frameworks in the Arab states, Paris: UNESCO, 2005, 63. 28 A Hermassi, State and democratisation in the Maghreb, in E G oldberg, R Kasalen and J S M igdal (eds), Rules and r ights in t he Middle Eas t, S eattle: Washington University P ress, 1993, 102117, 106107. 29 Boubekeur, Salafism and radical politics in post-conflict Algeria, 1317. 30 G Martnez Muoz, El estado rabe, Barcelona: Bellaterra, 1999: 327328; D Zeidan, Radical Islam in E gypt: a co mparison o f t wo g roups, Middle Eas t R eview o f International A ffairs 3(3) (1999), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/ 1999/issue3/jv3n3a1.html (accessed 5 February 2009). 31 Peter R N eumann a nd B rooke R ogers, R ecruitment a nd m obilisation f or t he I slamist mi litant movement in Europe, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, December 2007, 46, h ttp://ec.europa.eu/ j ustice_home/fsj/terrorism/prevention/docs/ec_ radicalisation_study_on_mobilisation_tactics_en.pdf (accessed 27 June 2009).

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32 The governments promotion of Islamism resulted in a proliferation of private mosques (ahli) away from the regime control. These became meeting places for militants and recruits, reinforcing the Muslim Brotherhood and more radical groups. Providing identity and community discourse along with services and welfare became paramount in t he Islamist project, facilitating recruitment and training of radicals (J L Esposito, The Islamic threat: myth or reality?, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, 138139). These groups found fertile ground in Upper Egypt and Alexandria, as well as in t he Ain S hams a nd I mbaba n eighbourhoods in C airo, em ploying a mix ed s trategy o f conviction and intimidation, S Ismail, The politics of urban Cairo: informal communities and the state, Arab Studies Journal 4(2) (1996), 119132. 33 M Sageman, Understanding terror networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, 134. 34 Farags group claimed that the states measures to incorporate Islamic law ( Sharia) in 1980 a s the main s ource o f leg islation wa s hypocritical b ecause i t co incided w ith a c lampdown o f Muslim Brothers a nd I slamist s tudent o rganisations a s a n ext ension o f a p olicy o f ra pprochement w ith Israel. 35 International Crisis Group, Islamism, violence and reform in A lgeria, Middle East/North Africa Report 29, 30 July 2004, 45, http://www.crisisgroup.org/ home/index.cfm?id=2884&l=1 (accessed 15 February 2009). 36 Ismail, The politics of urban Cairo, 119132; Martnez Muoz, El estado rabe, 273. 37 Dalacoura, Islamist movements as non-state actors, 240241. 38 S Z ubaida, Trajectories o f p olitical I slam: E gypt, I ran a nd Turkey, The P olitical Q uarterly 71(3) (2000), 6078, 68. 39 Kepel, La yihad. 40 Immigration a nd R efugee B oard o f C anada, E gypt: R ecruitment b y I slamist mi litant g roups, including methods and incidence. 41 Emir in t his context refers to a r epresentative of an armed Islamist group in E gypt or Morocco who assumes the religious title in part to boost his legitimacy and facilitate recruitment. 42 Sageman, Understanding terror networks, 134. 43 Ibid, 148. 44 Immigration a nd R efugee B oard o f C anada, E gypt: R ecruitment b y I slamist mi litant g roups, including methods and incidence. 45 C Johnston, A nalysis-Egypt b omb un likely t o sig nal mi litancy resurgence, Reuters, 24 F ebruary 2009, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/ LN428437.htm (accessed 30 March 2009). 46 Neumann a nd R ogers, R ecruitment a nd m obilisation f or t he I slamist mi litant m ovement in Europe, 26. 47 Kepel, La yihad, 269. 48 Ibid, 270271. 49 Ibid, 400. 50 L Martinez, Le cheminement singulier de la violence islamiste en Algrie, Critique internationale, 20 J uly 2003, 172, h ttp://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/publica/critique/article/ci20p164177.pdf (accessed 15 February 2009). 51 Aljazeera, P olice die in A lgeria a mbush, 18 J une 2009, h ttp://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/ 2009/06/20096189448297706.html (acces sed 29 J une 2009); B BC, A lgeria mi litants ambush police, 18 June 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/africa/8108159.stm (accessed 8 May 2010). 52 Boubekeur, Salafism and radical politics in post-conflict Algeria, 10.

53 Ibid. 54 El Pa s, L a ra ma m arroqu de al Q aeda, 1 A pril 2004, h ttp://www.elpais.com/articulo/ internacional/rama/marroqui/Qaeda/elpepuint/20040401elpepuint_9/Tes (acces sed 30 M arch 2009). 55 S Z emni, Moroccan I slamism b etween l ocal p articipation a nd i nternational I slamist n etworks o f influence? Presented a t E xperts R oundtable C onference: in ter-regional c hallenges o f I slamic fundamentalist movements in North Africa in relation to network support, Addis Ababa: Institute for Security Studies, 1718 June 2009, 67. 56 El Pas, La rama marroqu de al Qaeda; H Roberts, Jihadi movements in North Africa: the dynamics of radicalisation, deradicalisation and redeployment, Presentation at Jihadi terrorism w here do we s tand? , S econd R oyal I nstitute f or I nternational R elations C onference o n I nternational Terrorism, 13 F ebruary 2006, h ttp://www.irri-kiib.be/speechnotes/06/060213-jihad.terr/ roberts. htm (accessed 31 March 2009). 57 El Pas, La rama marroqu de al Qaeda. 58 International Crisis Group, Islamism, violence and reform in Algeria, 17. 59 Roy, Globalised Islam, 1, 2. 60 A Boubekeur, Political Islam in Algeria, Centre for European Policy Studies, Working Document 268, M ay 2007, 4, h ttp://www.appstudies.org/pictures/fileStudies/News0.8086664_Political %20 Islam%20in%20Algeria.pdf (accessed 29 June 2009); Boubekeur, Salafism and radical politics in post-conflict Algeria. 61 Neumann a nd R ogers, R ecruitment a nd m obilisation f or t he I slamist mi litant m ovement in Europe, 80. 62 Ibid, 64. 63 Boubekeur, Salafism and radical politics in post-conflict Algeria, 10. 64 Roy, Globalised Islam, 282, 302. 65 Neumann a nd R ogers, R ecruitment a nd m obilisation f or t he I slamist mi litant m ovement in Europe, 84, 87. 66 Johnston, Analysis-Egypt bomb unlikely to signal militancy resurgence. 67 The administration of President Barack Obama has discontinued use of the term war on terror and in stead u ses t he t erm overseas co ntingency o peration: Wikipedia, h ttp://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/War_on_Terror (accessed 28 April 2010). 68 J A Nuez Villaverde, B Hageraats and K Malgorzata, Terrorismo Internacional en frica, Madrid: Catarata, 2009, 170. 69 M el-Khawas, North Africa and the war on terror, in J Davis (ed), Africa and the war on terrorism, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, 83. 70 T A rcher a nd T P opovic, The t rans-Saharan c ounterterrorism t hreat, Th e Finni sh I nstitute o f International A ffairs, FII A R eport 16, 2007, 34, w ww.upi-iia.fi/assets/publications/FIIA_ Report_16_2007.pdf (accessed 5 June 2009). 71 El-Khawas, North Africa and the war on terror, 8183, 88. 72 International Crisis Group, Islamism, violence and reform in Algeria, 23. 73 Nuez Villaverde, Hageraats and Malgorzata, Terrorismo Internacional en frica, 127. 74 Chourou, Promoting human security, 64. 75 J K eenan, Th e b anana t heory o f t errorism: a lternative t ruths a nd t he co llapse o f t he second (Saharan) front in the war on terror, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25(1) (2007), 3158, 45.

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76 Archer and Popovic, The trans-Saharan counterterrorism threat, 32. 77 Ibid, 810. 78 United States Government Accountability Office (USGAO), Combating terrorism: actions needed to enhance implementation of trans-Sahara c ounterterrorism p artnership, USGAO, R eport t o t he Ranking M ember, C ommittee o n F oreign A ffairs, H ouse o f R epresentatives, J uly 2008, 1, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08860.pdf (accessed 5 March 2009). 79 Keenan, The banana theory of terrorism, 4445. 80 Boubekeur, Salafism and radical politics in post-conflict Algeria, 1112. 81 Keenan, US militarisation in Africa, 1819.

C HAPTER 13

From rebellion to opposition: UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique

JUSTIN PEARCE

INTRODUCTION
It is tempting to consider Angola and Mozambique as two countries with parallel histories.1 Both w ere co lonised b y P ortugal a nd r emained un der co lonial domination f or m ore t han a de cade a fter t he de colonisation o f m ost o f t he continent. B oth b ecame in dependent in 1975 w ith g overnments do minated b y Portuguese-speaking urban elites that had nationalist aspirations but which were firmly rooted in particular regions and whose rhetoric inclined to the left. Both of these governments were seen as a t hreat by apartheid South Africa and by rightwing elements in t he West. B oth Angola and Mozambique exp erienced internal conflicts t hat w ere f uelled b y S outh A frican b acking f or a rmed o pposition movements: Resistncia N acional d e M oambique (RENAMO) in M ozambique and Unio p ara a I ndependncia T otal d e A ngola (UNITA) in A ngola. Th e international dt ente o f t he l ate 1980s le d t o in ternationally s upported p eace processes, which envisaged the ruling parties and rebel movements in Angola and Mozambique competing at the ballot box. From that point, the well-known stories diverge. Angola returned to war only months after the 1992 elections, and peace did not arrive definitively until after the
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death o f J onas Sa vimbi, f ounder a nd le ader o f UNIT A, in F ebruary 2002. I n Mozambique, by contrast, there has been no threat of a return to civil war since the first e lection in 1994, a nd f urther e lections h ave b een h eld r egularly sin ce t hat time. Moreover, to concentrate on the obvious historical parallels between Angola and Mozambique is to ignore some fundamental differences, most crucially in the respective o rigins o f UNIT A a nd REN AMO. UNIT A, a long w ith i ts r ivals t he Movimento P opular d a L ibertao d e A ngola (MPLA) a nd Frente N acional d e Libertao d e A ngola (FNLA), s tarted o ut a s a n ationalist m ovement t hat wa s founded to oppose Portuguese colonialism in A ngola, and only later acquired its foreign co nnections. I n M ozambique, FRELIM O wa s t he o nly m ovement t hat mobilised a gainst co lonialism. REN AMO c ame in to b eing o nly a fter independence, f ounded b y R hodesia w ith t he p urpose o f des tabilising t he FRELIMO government. Today, however, we might see the narratives converging again: the MPLA and FRELIMO remain firmly in p ower, with UNITA and RENAMO looking weaker than e ver b efore. T o un derstand w hy t hese p arties h ave n ot b ecome ef fective opposition movements, we need to ask a number of questions about the political space in Angola and Mozambique, as well as about the parties themselves. To what extent is this about the weakness of democratic institutions, and to what extent is it a bout t he p arties o wn s hortcomings? T o w hat ext ent a re t he p roblems experienced by UNITA and RENAMO specific to former rebel movements, and to what extent are they analogous to the difficulties faced by all opposition parties? To answer such questions will require an examination of the individual histories of UNITA and RENAMO and their relationship with the people whom the leaders of both m ovements s aw a s t heir co nstituencies.2 This c hapter w ill a rgue t hat ide as about politics that were formed in wartime, more particularly about the concepts of p arty, s tate a nd g overnment a nd t heir r elationship w ith p eople, s till p ersist today a nd h ave hin dered t he f ormer r ebel m ovements in es tablishing a r ole befitting players in a multiparty democracy.

Ovimbundu migrant labourers who were working in the north at the time. Before 1974, UNIT A guer rillas w ere a ble t o inf iltrate e astern A ngola f rom b ases in independent Z ambia. But the colonial governments suppression of anti-colonial activity p revented UNITA f rom o perating in t he C entral H ighlands, t he r egion with w hich i t i s u sually a ssociated a nd in w hich i t m ade i ts s trongest iden titybased claims. It wa s o nly a fter t he co up o f 25 A pril 1974 in P ortugal t hat t he li beration movements were able to operate freely in the colonies. When UNITA, the MPLA and the FNLA arrived in the Central Highlands, the lack of previous politicisation meant t hat t hey were received as strangers and outsiders. The t hree movements competed in an open field for the support of the local population. It was, however, UNITA that succeeded in m aking the most forceful identity-based claims to the people o f t he C entral H ighlands. Sa vimbi u sed hi s faci lity w ith t he U mbundu language t o p ersuade t he p eople o f t he C entral H ighlands t hat h e a nd UNITA could r epresent t heir in terests b etter t han t he P ortuguese-speaking MP LA leadership in faraway Luanda. Respect for local tradition and for the churches also formed an important part of UNITAs early discourse. UNITA evoked the MPLAs alliance with Cuba as evidence that the party was committed to an atheist doctrine, and used this to win the support of a mostly Christian rural population. Relations b etween t he t hree in dependence m ovements det eriorated d uring 1975 and their rivalry became an all-out struggle to take unique control of the state upon in dependence. Th e s upport t hat UNITA h ad m obilised in t he 18 m onths following t he P ortuguese co up a llowed Sa vimbi t o de clare in dependence in Huambo o n t he s ame d ay t hat t he MP LAs p resident, A gostinho Neto, de clared independence in Luanda. Savimbis reign in t he city of Huambo lasted only until February 1976, when UNITA was expelled by Cuban forces allied to the MPLA.

Guerrilla warfare against the MPLA

The f ollowing 12 y ears w ere cr ucial in s haping t he c haracter o f UNIT A a s i t established i tself in r ural A ngola. Th e MP LA n ever ga ined co ntrol o ver t he countryside, a nd t he s tate t hat i t es tablished co nsisted es sentially o f urb an enclaves. Th e r ural zo nes w ere ei ther t he do main o f UNIT A, o r co ntested militarily between the two sides. UNITA sought to establish bases that served both a military and civic function. Its success in doing so depended on how secure its military control was over a particular area. Accounts of UNITAs violence against people on the margins of areas of control are many, but my concern here is with
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UNITAs o rigins m ust b e s een w ithin t he w ider co ntext o f a nti-colonial mobilisation in A ngola. The MPLA and FNLA had been active for several years before UNIT As in ception in 1966. Sa vimbi, f ormerly a n o fficial in t he FNL A, broke away and founded UNITA on the grounds that the FNLA, based among the Bakongo et hnic g roup o f n orthern A ngola, di scriminated a gainst s outhern
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the a reas w here UNITA wa s w ell es tablished: h ere, b ases b ecame t he h ome t o soldiers, to political officials, and to professionals such as teachers and nurses, and were central to UNITAs relationship with the farming population. UNITA would establish a r elationship with the soba (village chief), persuading him o f the need for the village to supply food to UNITA. A UNITA loyalist in the village would be recruited to coordinate the rendition of a quota of food production to the people at the base. Teachers and nurses would go into the villages to offer education and health c are t o t he lo cal p opulation. UNIT A a s a p olitical o rganisation wa s indistinguishable f rom UNITA a s a p rovider o f s ervices a nd f rom UNITA a s a military movement. UNITA tried to convince people that it was the defender of their own best interests against a hostile MPLA. This type of relationship between UNITA a nd t he p eople r eached i ts m ost s ophisticated exp ression w ith t he establishment of Jamba, UNITAs bush capital in Cuando Cubango province, in the early 1980s. Jambas location, far from the Ovimbundu heartland, was determined by ease of access for the South African planes that supplied it. But to the people who spent time there, Jamba was almost like a ci ty or a state within a s tate. Its hospitals, its schools, its international air links and its visits from S outh African dignitaries were seen as evidence of UNITAs potential as a government in waiting.

temporarily, it would take the peasant population with it, removing people from areas where they might be controlled by the government and placing them in areas that were more securely under UNITAs control. UNITA also conducted raids on government-held areas, or attacked groups of people as they journeyed from one town to another. The people kidnapped in these attacks were typically put to work for UNITA, sometimes as soldiers or porters, but often in professional roles. The movement o f p eople wa s n o les s im portant f or t he MP LA: t he g overnment relocated people from the contested zones to resettlement areas alongside the main roads, o r w ithin t he limi ts o f ci ties t hat w ere co ntrolled b y t he g overnment, physically bringing people under the control of the state.

Identity politics
To each of the political movements, the people under its control were our people, and those under the control of the other side were enemy people. People came to identify themselves as government people or UNITA people. Yet these identities were not a matter of political choice, they were a matter of necessity. To profess to be a UNITA p erson in g overnment t erritory wa s t o r isk de ath, a nd v ice v ersa. Hence the paradox of political identities in wa rtime Angola: identities had to be maintained a s a m atter o f lif e o r de ath, y et t he dep th o f t he co nviction t hat underlay t hese identities wa s questionable, a nd identities could (a nd h ad t o) b e changed as one passed from the control of one armed force to another. Those people who lived close to the frontlines of military control would talk about b oth sides a s predators. But t hose w ho spent extended p eriods under t he control of one or other or both sides, exposed to the state-building efforts of either or b oth, w ere m ore li kely t o ac knowledge t he leg itimacy o f t he m ovement, o r movements, w hose co ntrol t hey exp erienced. W hen a sked w hy A ngola experienced s uch a p rotracted co nflict, s everal interviewees a nswered a long t he lines of there were two governments the MPLA and UNITA and both wanted power. Th e co ncept o f t he p olitical m ovement a s a co mpetitor in a ga me f or absolute power and exclusive legitimacy is important for understanding political developments after the end of the war.

A parallel state?
As UNIT A b uilt i ts b ases in t he co untryside a nd a t J amba, t he MP LA wa s establishing its state in the towns. Within these enclaves, the MPLAs state-building efforts included the establishment of a system of state-run shops that ensured lowcost f ood f or t he urb an p opulation, w hich wa s i ssued w ith ration c ards. People who lived in the city during this period would speak with approval of the MPLAs efforts to keep a supply of food coming into a city, which, thanks to the war, was virtually cut off from its agricultural hinterland. They also spoke of the provision of e ducation a nd h ealth s ervices un der t he MP LA: s ervices t hat w ere m ade possible o nly b y t he p resence o f C uban exp ertise. It wa s a p oliticised s ociety attendance at MPLA rallies was encouraged, if not obligatory. While the MPLA state was recognised as such, and UNITA was not, there are some s triking p arallels t o b e f ound in t he m anner in w hich t hey co nstructed a relationship w ith lo cal p opulations. B oth s ought leg itimacy b y p ositioning themselves a s p roviders o f s ervices a nd a s t he def enders o f t he n ation a gainst foreign a ggression. Th e m ovement o f p eople b ecame a n im portant s trategy f or both sides. W henever UNIT A wa s f orced t o r etreat ei ther p ermanently o r
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The peace process and renewed war

The Angolan peace process that culminated in the 1991 Bicesse Accord was largely a p roduct o f t he dt ente in in ternational p olitics o f t hat p eriod a nd t he end o f history narratives that accompanied it.3 It took little account of Angolas internal
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politics. A s I h ave o utlined, t here wa s n o s pace f or p olitical c hoice in wa rtime Angola. Politics wa s un derstood a s co mpulsory identification w ith a m ovement that was in power in a particular region of the country by force of arms. Angola in 1992 remained divided militarily b etween the MPLA and UNITA; there was no reason why a n otional ceasefire would change the way in w hich political control was understood. The 1992 election results largely reflected the pattern of military control as it was at that stage of the conflict. Voting was a matter of endorsing the authority o f t he p arty in c harge, h ence UNITAs s trong s howing in t he C entral Highlands. The circumstances and actions that led to the return to war early in 1993 a re beyond the scope of this chapter; suffice to say that they reflected the continuing aspirations t o a bsolute p ower b y b oth p arties t o t he co nflict, n either o f w hich complied w ith t he s pirit o f t he p eace acco rd, a nd b oth o f w hich ac ted in a provocative manner. It was only after the Lusaka Accord of 1994, when the UNITA deputies elected in September 1992 took up their seats in parliament, that we can start t o t alk a bout UNIT As r ole a s a n o pposition m ovement. B ut t he parliamentarians role was circumscribed by the extraordinary situation in which they found themselves. With the leadership on both sides dedicated to winning the conflict by military means, there was no space for democratic engagement. Even if UNITA at the time had had the p olitical imagination to mobilise in t he civilian sphere, it would have been impossible to do s o thanks to the repressive political climate in Luanda at the time. After 1998, the civilian wing of UNITA was further weakened b y t he em ergence o f UNITA R enovada, a s plit in t he p arty t hat wa s engineered b y t he g overnment in a wa y t hat wa s m ade p ossible b y t he MP LAs command of the financial and judicial resources of the state. Messiant argues that the B icesse A ccord en trenched a mi litary log ic in p olitics b y v irtue o f b eing a settlement t hat excluded t he majority of Angolans, and gave a v oice only to t he MPLA and UNITA; these two parties had been fashioned by this war a nd by intense and various connections with other countries that each had woven in and for this war.4 The elections were thus the last battle in the war, and the return to war was inevitable.5 Neither side co mplied completely w ith t he Lusaka Accord; as t he agreement collapsed, the governments endgame to the war comprised a co unterinsurgency strategy a imed a t des troying UNIT As a gricultural b ase. Th e r esult wa s t he displacement o f s everal mi llion r ural p eople, m any o f w hom t hus en tered
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government controlled territory in some cases for the first time ever, or at least for the first time since the 1992 elections.

From military collapse to political defeat

The m emorandum o f un derstanding sig ned b y t he A ngolan A rmed F orces a nd UNITA a fter Sa vimbis de ath in F ebruary 2002 l aid o ut a p rocess w hereby t he people still remaining under UNITA control at that point would be reincorporated into civilian life. Simultaneously, those UNITA leaders who had been in the bush with Savimbi were relocated to Luanda, far from the movements core constituency in the Central Highlands. The m assive m ovement o f p eople a t t he en d o f t he wa r m ay h ave b een conceived for mi litary purposes, but it a lso had p olitical consequences. Political identity was still equated with political control, and the state remained identified with the MPLA. People who may have spent decades under the control of UNITA now became government people. This provided the context for the parliamentary elections of 2008, in w hich a c lear MPLA victory in t he provinces of the Central Highlands contrasted with UNITAs electoral success in t he region in 1992. 6 The notion t hat t he f ormer UNITA p eople w ere n ow government p eople wa s reinforced by the MPLAs firm control of state resources throughout the national territory. In some cases, being employed in government service after the end of the war was contingent on joining the party. The MPLA began promoting its electoral message months before the official start of the campaign, and was helped by the bias towards the party in state media. Party c ampaigners p resented t ools a nd g rain t o r ural co mmunities, a nd motorcycles t o t he c hiefs. A t t he s ame t ime, t he g overnment h urried t o f inish projects such as n ational r oads, e lectricity infrastructure a nd ci ty centre renovation schemes. These were inaugurated during a n ational tour by President dos Sa ntos in t he w eeks b efore t he e lection, in w hich t he n ew p rojects w ere presented as the gift of the MPLA. All this helped to project the MPLA as the party of p eace a nd r econstruction, a p oint o f v iew t hat wa s f urther em phasised b y references t o UNIT A a s h aving b een w holly r esponsible f or t he wa r a nd i ts associated des truction. I nterviews w ith v illagers r evealed t hat p olitical t hinking was still guided by an either-or logic learnt during wartime. UNITA h ad n either t he s pace n or t he r esources t o p romote a n a lternative message. Th e p arty h ad li ttle m ore t han i ts s tatutory a llocation f rom t he s tate budget, w hich in a ny c ase wa s di sbursed s everal w eeks l ate, a fter t he e lectoral
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campaign had supposedly begun. Nor could UNITA call upon its old foreign allies, since in ternational o pinion h ad d uring t he 1990s s hifted t owards a n MP LA government whose control of the countrys oil resources appeared unchallenged.7 This shift in o pinion was manifested, inter alia, in g overnments support for UN sanctions a gainst t he di amond t rade w ith UNITA, a nd l ater f or t he K imberley Process t hat s eeks t o ex clude f rom in ternational m arkets di amonds min ed in rebel-held a reas. B y t he t ime o f t he p arliamentary e lection in 2008, UNIT As former foreign allies showed little interest in challenging the MPLAs domination of the political system. Already co nstrained b y a l ack o f r esources, UNIT As m ost s killed le aders appeared more dedicated to reconstructing the party as a national force in Luanda than to mobilising in the partys heartland. Those who remained in the provinces seemed to be concentrating their resources on providing for the welfare needs of those p eople w hose p ro-UNITA co nvictions r emained s trong en ough t o k eep them w ith t he p arty. Th ose w ho s till iden tified t hemselves a s UNITA p eople would h abitually a pproach t heir lo cal p arty b ranch f or h elp w ith m oney in a n emergency, or to find a j ob in a b usiness run by a UNITA sympathiser. Many of these people felt that their continued adherence to UNITA prevented them from seeking jobs in t he state sector, and they saw UNITA as the body to which they should turn for welfare. UNITA, in the eyes of its followers, played a state-like role for t hose w ho f elt n o s ense o f ci tizenship in a s tate t hat r emained s trongly identified with a single party.8 It was significant that in 2008 UNITA achieved its best result (31,37 per cent of the p arliamentary v ote) in C abinda, a lo ng wa y f rom i ts hi storic h eartland. Cabinda has a well-organised civil society, which had coalesced around demands for a utonomy s everal y ears b efore UNIT A t urned i ts a ttention t o t he ex clave province. As the elections approached, UNITA built links with existing networks of opposition to the MPLA. Operating in an environment where it had no strong historic t ies w ith t he p eople, UNITA wa s a ble t o b reak f ree f rom t he o ld-style politics that it practised in the Central Highlands and seek a mode of engagement more befitting a democracy.

finding a n ew p atron in a partheid S outh A frica. B efore 1990, m ost acco unts o f RENAMOs ac tivity em phasise i ts r ole a s a f orce a lien t o M ozambican s ociety, pseudo-guerrillas9 who engaged in violence with no political purpose other than what wa s o rdained b y i ts f oreign b ackers. I t wa s o nly in 1981 t hat REN AMO adopted a p olitical programme, and then it did s o only at the urging of its South African s ponsors. I ts p rofessed co mmitment t o a f ree m arket e conomy s eems, with hin dsight, t o h ave b een a c ynical c hoice desig ned t o ga in t he a pproval o f foreign b ackers. D uring t he wa r, RENAMOs p olitical s tructure in side Mozambique [wa s] li ttle m ore t han a n o ffshoot o f i ts mi litary co mmand structure.10

Political engagement in wartime

Yet des pite i ts f oreign o rigins a nd l ack o f a co nsistent p olitical p rogramme, RENAMO s ucceeded in s ome a reas in es tablishing a p olitical r elationship w ith rural Mozambicans as opposed simply to subordinating them in a regime of fear.11 The nature of the relationship between RENAMO and the civilian population has been the subject of controversy among observers of Mozambique.12 What is clear, however, i s t hat REN AMOs wa ys o f o perating dif fered f rom o ne p art o f Mozambique t o a nother, dep ending o n h ow r eceptive t he lo cal p eople w ere towards t he guer rillas, a nd o n REN AMOs mi litary s uccess in p enetrating a particular area. During the war, RENAMO was best able to establish a relationship with t he r ural p opulation in t hose a reas w here FRELIM Os r ural de velopment policies, p articularly v illagisation, cr eated di scontent a mong t he fa rming population.13 Opposition t o v illagisation wa s m ost m arked in t he n orth, w here peasants h ad n o exp erience o f li ving in l arge v illages. G effray g oes s o fa r a s t o suggest that peasant farmers in Nampula Province were in conflict with FRELIMO before RENAMO even arrived, and the rebel movement simply took advantage of existing g rievances in m obilising t he fa rming p opulations. B y co ntrast, RENAMOs r elationship w ith p eople in t he s outh wa s l argely o ne o f t error a nd predation, a fac t t hat R oesch a ttributes t o s outhern fa rmers b eing m ore enthusiastic about FRELIMOs agricultural reform policies than was the case in the north.14 Yet even within the southern province of Gaza, R oesch found there were different a ttitudes t owards FRELIM O in dif ferent p arts o f t he p rovince, a nd resentment of FRELIM O in cer tain a reas a gain cr eated a m ore conducive environment for RENAMO.
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RENAMOs o rigins w ere n ot p ropitious f or i ts de velopment in to a p opular opposition m ovement. It wa s cr eated by t he intelligence s ervices o f w hite-ruled Rhodesia w ith t he p urpose o f des tabilising t he FRELIM O g overnment, l ater
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Ethnicity was another tool that RENAMO used to gain adherence in cer tain areas. RENAMO made claims to ethnic solidarity with the Ndau (Shona-speaking) people o f cen tral M ozambique, a n a rea q uite di stinct f rom N ampula, w here RENAMO wa s b est a ble t o m ake i ts s trongest p olitical c laims.15 But e ven if RENAMOs p rincipal et hnic a ssociation wa s w ith t he N dau, REN AMO nevertheless managed to make identity claims in the north as well, capitalising on the historic marginalisation of the Makua people of the region. An influential analysis by Gersony divides RENAMOs areas of influence into zones of taxation, control and destruction.16 Tax areas were those with a dispersed population t hat wa s lef t a lone in ex change for t ribute. C ontrol areas were t hose where RENAMO organised labour. Destruction areas were where RENAMO had no h ope o f es tablishing a p olitical r elationship, a nd r elied o n p ure t error. According to Vines the major function of RENAMOs control areas was:
to provide food and services for the organisation RENAMO obtains most of its labour forces from the other two zones, tax and destruction areas. Its workforce is therefore predominantly captive, detained against its will and forbidden to depart. RENAMO exploits those very areas from which its first constituency of support was drawn rural peasant communities.17

Roesch f ound t hat a bout h alf o f p eople o n t he b ases c ame t o accep t lif e un der RENAMO a s p referable t o lif e e lsewhere.19 RENAMO en couraged identification with t he m ovement t hrough perfunctory p olitical e ducation, t hough neotraditional r eligious di scourse s eemed t o b e REN AMOs fa voured s trategy f or gaining the allegiance of people under its control. The kind of positive incentives described here the promise of patronage and influence in return for support are significant in that they prefigure the methods used b y REN AMO a fter t he en d o f t he wa r. N evertheless, t he fa ilure o f b oth FRELIMO and RENAMO to establish a peaceful and sustainable relationship with much of the rural population led to many people being alienated from both sides, even if they had no choice but to profess support for whichever side controlled the area in which they lived: It appears they now support[ed] whichever side [would] protect them, in order to save their own skin.20

Peace settlement
As with Angolas Bicesse Accord, the peace settlement in Mozambique grew out of international political developments rather than as a result of any internal change in the country. Following the General Peace Accord of October 1992, RENAMO benefited from funding from foreign donors, who saw the former rebel movement as t he log ical co unterpoise t o FRELIM O in a m ultiparty Mozambique, a nd wa s encouraged b y i ts f ormer p rincipal b acker, S outh A frica, t o t ake u p t his r ole. However, t he m odality o f t he p eace p lan wa s s uch t hat REN AMO wa s a ble t o continue behaving not so much as a p olitical party as a mi litary movement with aspirations to statehood.21 RENAMO retained control of its armed forces during the electoral campaign period, and restricted the access of FRELIMO campaigners, and even some voter education t rainers, t o REN AMO-controlled zo nes. E uropean p arliamentary monitors observed that at one location in N ampula province, the polling station was located inside a RENAMO camp that remained essentially intact, patrolled by armed RENAMO soldiers, despite the supposed demobilisation process.22 The si tuation des cribed h ere s uggests a simi lar log ic o f wa r t o t hat w hich Messiant identified as underlying the failure of the Angolan peace process in t he early 1990s.23 The fact that the militarised, territorial politics of wartime continued into t he t ransition p eriod in M ozambique wa s a p owerful b argaining c hip f or RENAMOs le ader, A fonso D hlakama, a p oint t hat h e un derscored w hen h e announced that he was pulling out of the election; it took diplomatic intervention
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Vines nevertheless observes that RENAMOs relationship with the population in control areas was not only one of forced labour:
Despite t he o verall p icture o f REN AMOs h arsh t reatment o f t he p opulation i t encounters, there is another side t o its administrative practices. When RENAMO enters a district for the first time there is some attempt to win over peasant support. Already in t he early 1980s REN AMO played in t his way on local discontent with FRELIMOs ac hievements, p articularly a bout t he l ack o f co nsumer g oods a nd villagisation, to obtain sympathy Promise of power and land has also been one of the offers RENAMO has made in rural areas to obtain support Further confirmation that RENAMO was attracting the disgruntled and the power-hungry came in 1982 through research conducted by FRELIMO. It showed t hat many of t he rebels in I nhambane province were failed local election candidates from 1978, w ho saw RENAMO as an alternative method to take power.18 374
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to bring RENAMO back in.24 Yet fears that this situation of divided military control would destroy Mozambiques electoral process just as it had done in A ngola two years e arlier p roved t o b e unf ounded, p ossibly b ecause FRELIM O a voided a ny action that might have provoked a reaction from RENAMO.25

Electoral gains
Some h ave s uggested t hat REN AMOs t hreatening b ehaviour a head o f t he elections scared people into voting for RENAMO.26 What is more certain is that RENAMO m anaged t o w in v otes a bove a nd b eyond t hose o f t he p eople in t he areas that it controlled. UN f igures suggest that at the time of the peace accord, RENAMO controlled 24 per cent of the territory and 7 per cent of the population,27 but in t he e lections, t he f ormer r ebel m ovement ga ined 37,78 p er cen t o f t he parliamentary votes, while Dhlakama, its presidential candidate, gained 33,73 per cent of t he presidential votes. In other words, RENAMOs share of t he vote was greater than the population that it controlled at the end of the war. However, i ts s upport r emained co ncentrated in t hose r egions w here i t h ad been able to make its strongest political and ethnic claims during the war, namely the cen tre a nd cen tre-north o f t he co untry. Its w orst r esults w ere in t he s outh, where e ven t he a reas t hat REN AMO h ad co ntrolled d uring t he wa r v oted f or FRELIMO: this was a reaction to the brutality practised by RENAMO in the areas where it h ad n ever m anaged t o consolidate its p ower by p olitical m eans during wartime. C ahen s uggests t hat f or RENAMO, h aving a p olitical p rogramme wa s less im portant t han p roviding a v oice t o a va riety o f s ocial e lements a nd communities a s ort o f co alition o f m arginals w hich h ave b een ex cluded politically and socially from the state, from the market and from development, not just since FRELIMOs coming to power but in many cases since the beginning of the century.28 After 1994, REN AMO wa s a ble t o b uild o n t he p olitical b ase t hat h ad b een confirmed by t he elections. Fortuitously for RENAMO, t he farmers of northern and central Mozambique t hose who were RENAMOs key constituency during the war were the same people who were worst hit by the economic liberalisation programme that international financial institutions obliged FRELIMO to adopt as a co ndition f or lo ans t o f inance r edevelopment. Th e r esulting r esentment wa s compounded by the fact that the mid- to late 1990s saw rapid growth in southern Mozambique as the areas proximity to South Africa helped it to attract investment. The growing wealth gap served to consolidate RENAMOs position as a p olitical
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force in t he n orth.29 RENAMOs s uccess w ent b eyond t he a reas t hat i t h ad controlled mi litarily d uring t he wa r. I n Il ha de M oambique, f or exa mple, RENAMO b ecame t he do minant p arty b ecause t he i slands r esidents h ad, f or geographical r easons, b een s pared t he v iolence o f t he wa r. Thi s lef t r oom f or RENAMO to mobilise long-standing resentment over the belief that the island, the original core of colonial Mozambique, had been marginalised since independence. In cer tain provincial urb an centres, notably t he city of B eira, RENAMO proved able to mobilise local sentiment of discontent with the government in Maputo.

Waning support
This apparent firming of RENAMOs political position in the decade following the first elections led commentators t o suggest t hat t he 2 004 p residential a nd parliamentary elections could prove to present t he biggest electoral challenge to FRELIMO e ver. I nstead, t he 2004 e lections s aw a s harp dr op in REN AMOs support. More recently, controversy over the nomination of candidates in Beira for the 2008 lo cal elections has presented RENAMO with arguably its deepest crisis since the end of the war. RENAMOs electoral decline is not an isolated event, nor the r esult o f a s udden c hange in f ortunes; i t i s b est un derstood b y t racing RENAMOs trajectory since the peace accord. RENAMOs guerrilla origins left it with a lack of cadres, and the party came to be r un b y a sm all g roup cen tred a round D hlakama. Thi s g roups p osition wa s reinforced b y t he fac t t hat i t b ecame a c hannel f or f unding t o t he p arty f rom foreign donors who recognised Dhlakamas legitimacy.30 RENAMO continued to operate acco rding t o a p atron-client log ic w ith r espect t o i ts s upporters, in a manner analogous to the way in w hich it had tried to win support in s ome areas during the war. In the early 1990s, the party faced a crisis over young people who had been recruited to the party with the promise of study bursaries, which never materialised. The result was an angry protest, in w hich RENAMO officials were taken h ostage and D hlakama wa s c alled upon t o intervene; hi s response wa s t o promise that the party would contact foreign sponsors with a view to resolving the situation.31 The C omprehensive P eace A greement (CP A) gu aranteed t he deployment o f REN AMO p ersonnel in t eaching a nd o ther g overnment s ervice positions. I n t hose a reas t hat w ere s een a s REN AMO a reas, t his p rocess wa s delayed b y a l ack o f co operation b etween t he g overnment a nd REN AMO, a nd ultimately i t wa s REN AMO t hat s uffered t hrough t he los s o f r esources o f
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patronage. In another example of patronage politics,32 RENAMO granted timber concessions to businessmen in areas that it controlled. What i s sig nificant a bout t hese in stances i s t hat t hey r eflect h abits le arnt during the time of war, when RENAMO operated as a quasi-governmental entity in the areas that it controlled. The persistence of this mode of operating is a sig n that RENAMO has had difficulty in adapting to a role appropriate to a multiparty political system. Manning characterises RENAMO as a military organisation with weakly de veloped admini strative a nd p olitical w ings h aving t o do wnplay i ts military character and strengthen its political and administrative side, largely by recruiting n ew p eople in t he ci ties.33 The r esult wa s t ensions b etween t he n ew, urban RENAMO cadres and the old guard whose sense of entitlement was derived from the time they spent in t he bush. When fears were raised of defection from RENAMO o r es pionage, [a]lm ost uni versally a mong t op le vel o fficials, t he solution most commonly proposed for this problem is more money to distribute as patronage.34 Thus RENAMO approached t he 2004 e lections w ithout h aving co nsolidated the gains it had made in t he previous ten years. The elections were characterised by a s harp dr op in t urn-out co mpared w ith t he p revious n ational e lections o f 1999.35 Such voter apathy, much remarked upon by political commentators, was far more damaging to RENAMO than to FRELIMO: RENAMO received 1,6 mi llion votes in 1999 but only 900 000 in 2004. For those who took a negative view of the status quo, FRELIMO had not delivered, but RENAMO had not delivered either, and m anifestly h ad n othing t o de liver. Moreover, t he ide a o f dem ocracy, w hich had been so prominent in t he political discourse that surrounded the end of the war, had also failed to present the better life that was promised. In other words, those who were dissatisfied with the governments performance appeared to have become dissatisfied with the political system as a whole. Rather than voting for the opposition, they saw no reason to participate in t he democratic process at all. In 2004, Dhlakama managed to gain only 31,74 p er cent of the vote, just under half the 63,74 p er cent received by FRELIMOs candidate, Armando Guebuza. This is in contrast to t he 1999 p residential election, in w hich Dhlakama received 47,71 per cent of the vote, less than five percentage points behind incumbent president Joaquim Chissano, who gained 52,29 per cent. Events s urrounding t he 2008 m unicipal e lections in B eira p rovide a f urther illustration o f REN AMOs le adership p roblems. I ntraparty t ensions s aw D aviz Simango, the natural RENAMO candidate for the city leadership, pushed aside by the p arty hiera rchy in fa vour o f M anuel P ereira.36 Simango s tood a s a n
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independent running on a ticket that sought to put the local needs of Beira ahead of n ational p arty-political co ncerns. H e w on co nvincingly, a pparently h aving attracted the support of a large number of people who would otherwise have voted for RENAMO. As Lus de B ritos analysis makes clear, RENAMOs failure in t his case was due to a de cision-making process that favoured the views of party elites above those of the mass support base. Simango was expelled from RENAMO in September a nd w ent o n t o f orm a n ew p olitical p arty, t he M ozambique Democratic M ovement. E arly in M arch 2009, REN AMOs p olitical co mmission sacked the head, deputy head and spokesperson of the parliamentary group, Maria Moreno, L uis T rinta a nd E duardo N amburete. Th e p arty exp lained M orenos dismissal in t erms o f h er h aving a ppeared o n a p ublic p latform w ith S imango, while reports suggested that Trinta and Namburete were also close to Simango.37 The les son o f B eira f or REN AMO wa t hat t he p arty wa s a ble t o c apitalise o n popular discontent b ut only for as long as RENAMO was prepared to put t he wishes of potential voters ahead of the priorities of the party hierarchy. The more recent events give credibility to De Britos warning that the crisis surrounding the Beira lo cal e lection b odes i ll f or REN AMO a nd in deed f or t he f uture o f t he multiparty system in Mozambique.

THE BURDENS OF OPPOSITION

This c hapter h as s o fa r attempted t o t race t he co ntinuities b etween RENAMOs and UNITAs history as rebel movements, and the difficulties they have faced in becoming effective opposition parties in peacetime. It is, nevertheless, evident that some of the most serious challenges that they face are the same difficulties that all opposition parties have in common. It would be short-sighted to look at UNITAs and REN AMOs p roblems w ithout co nsidering t hat t he o pposition p arties t hat have em erged sin ce 1990 in b oth co untries h ave p roved t o b e co nsiderably les s successful than the former rebel movements in consolidating electoral support. All opposition p arties m ust co ntend w ith t he fac t t hat t he r uling p arty en joys abundant fa vourable m edia co verage a nd h as t he r esources a t i ts di sposal t o present s tate-sponsored b enefits a nd de velopment a s t he g ift o f t he p arty.38 At present, t hese p henomena a re m ore e vident in A ngola t han in M ozambique, thanks to the greater concentration of Angolas media in the hands of the state, and Angolas o il-based e conomy t hat le aves t he p arty-state c ash-rich. Th e opportunities for patronage enjoyed by ruling parties encourage them to swallow sections o f t he o pposition, w hile t hemselves r emaining in tact: w itness t he l arge
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number of defections from UNITA and other opposition parties to the MPLA in the months preceding the 2008 elections in Angola. On the level of public discourse, all the opposition parties suffer from underrepresentation in the media: more so in Angola than in Mozambique. But here the former rebel movements have a particular problem over and above the difficulties faced by p arties t hat do n ot h ave a mi litary hi story. Th e MP LA a nd FRELIM O have v irtually m onopolised n ationalist di scourse in t heir r espective co untries, each party portraying itself and itself alone as the guardian of the national interest. RENAMOs o wn hi story m akes i t dif ficult t o p ut f orward cr edible n ationalist claims of its own. UNITA, on the other hand, has so far proved unable or unwilling to r eclaim i ts e arly hi story o f a nti-colonial m obilisation. Thi s a ppears t o b e t he result of t he MP LA b oth h aving cornered t he p olitical initiative and h aving t he monopoly over the means of expression. Similarly, when the ruling party enjoys a disproportionate le vel o f lo yalty f rom t he n ational m edia, i t b ecomes e asy t o discredit the opposition by blaming it for the past conflict.39

TURNING ARMIES INTO PARTIES

Turning now to the internal difficulties that the former rebel movements face as a consequence o f t heir hi story, i t i s c lear t hat b oth UNITA a nd REN AMO h ave suffered as a result of a particular kind of authoritarian leadership, in the persons of Dhlakama and Savimbi. Authoritarianism is not exclusively a problem of former rebel m ovements, a lthough s uch a le adership s tyle f lourishes in a mi litary environment. But aside from the character of leaders, there is a more fundamental and more obvious p oint to b e made: an armed rebel movement is not the s ame thing a s a p olitical p arty, a nd i t i s h ere t hat I w ould s uggest t hat f ormer r ebel movements a re a t a p articular di sadvantage w hen co mpared w ith t hose p arties whose origins are in civil society.40 In wa rtime, b oth UNITA a nd RENAMO en gaged w ith p opulations in wa ys that ranged from terror and coercion to the cultivation of a co nsensual political relationship between the political movement and the people under its control. The latter case represents the more positive face of the rebel movements, and it is this version of events that tends to be evoked by the movements leadership in making their claims to political legitimacy: a legitimacy that would be denied by those who saw t he r ebel m ovements o nly a s v iolent a nd p redatory. Y et t he exa mples o f UNITA and RENAMO illustrate that this political relationship, forged in wartime, has nothing in common with the workings of a political party in a democracy. For
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the rebel movements in the bush power, achieved by force of arms, came first. The political r elationship c ame l ater, a nd i t wa s a n ex clusive o ne. Th e p olitical relationship did n ot co nsist in p eople c hoosing a m ovement t o le ad t hem: i t consisted o f a p olitical-military e lite det ermining t he t erms o f en gagement between the movement and the p opulation. At no stage was there a q uestion of political c hoice f or t he p eople un der t he co ntrol o f t he m ovement. I n A ngola, UNITA and the MPLA were perceived as rival governments. There is evidence to suggest that RENAMO, too, saw itself and presented itself as an organisation with the p rerogatives a nd t he r esponsibilities o f a s tate. B oth m ovements c laimed exclusive power, and the exclusive right to exercise the prerogative of violence, in the territory and over the people they controlled. Once the two movements are understood in t his way, it should become clear why their transition to working within a democratic polity has not been easy. The post-war t ransitions o f t he e arly 1990s a ppear t o h ave b een b ased o n t he assumption that the rival movements represented the interests of different groups within the population, whose differences could best be resolved at the ballot box. People would vote for the party of their choice, and in this way the election would become a n exp ression o f p opular w ill w ithin a sin gle p olity, t his p olity b eing associated with a non-partisan state and a common vision of nationhood. Such a vision had little in co mmon with the nature and the modus operandi of UNITA and REN AMO n or in deed o f t he MP LA a nd FRELIM O in t he 1970s a nd 1980s, y et t he e lections w ere o rganised o n a ssumptions t hat ig nored t his fac t. Indeed, in stead o f a sking w hy f ormer r ebel m ovements h ave n ot do ne w ell a s opposition p olitical p arties, it mig ht b e m ore in structive t o a sk w hy it wa s e ver assumed that rebel movements and, for that matter, authoritarian party-states were capable of transforming themselves into political parties worthy of the name. The exa mples q uoted e arlier f rom M annings r esearch i llustrate h ow RENAMO continued after the 1992 p eace accord to operate according to a log ic learnt in wartime: a logic in which RENAMO controlled territory and had certain rights and responsibilities regarding that territory and the people who lived in it. UNITA has been operating in a peacetime environment only since 2002, a decade less than RENAMO, a nd i ts mode o f e ngagement w ith i ts constituents in peacetime h as y et t o b e es tablished. Th ere are, h owever, sig ns t hat UNITA, li ke RENAMO, co ntinues t o a ttempt t he p olitics o f p atronage in de aling w ith t he minority of supporters who, despite pressure from the MPLA, have remained loyal to UNITA since the end of the war.41
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This s trategy i s s ustainable f or n either side , g iven t he s uperior r esources enjoyed in each case by the government. While patronage politics is not unique to former rebel movements, the quasi-governmental character of RENAMO and of UNITA in the bush meant that both movements and their constituents entered the democratic era with entrenched ideas about the responsibilities of the political movement towards those under its control, and with no tradition of articulating popular dem ands w ithin a dem ocratic sys tem. REN AMO m ay h ave s tarted t o break t he m ould b y ado pting a m ore s ocially en gaged s tyle o f p olitics in, f or example, B eira, but t hen hig h-handed le adership reversed its successes. It is too soon t o t ell w hether UNIT A w ill le arn les sons f rom i ts sig nificant ga ins in Cabinda.

CONCLUSION
Given t he y outh o f A ngolan a nd M ozambican p olitical sys tems, i t w ould b e premature t o m ake def initive j udgements r egarding t heir s uccess a nd fa ilure a s opposition movements. First, it is difficult and perhaps meaningless to disentangle assessment of the parties themselves from the assessment of democratic systems as a whole. A restrictive constitutional system limits opposition parties possibilities for ac tion, b ut a t t he s ame t ime a sys tem t hat o n p aper o ffers o pportunities t o opposition parties is of little value if the parties do not actively seek to define and defend t he p olitical s pace t hat i s available t o t hem. UNITA in t his s ense i s at a particular disadvantage, given that the MPLA government used the smokescreen provided b y t he r esumption o f wa r in t he 1990s t o s trengthen i ts g rip o n t he institutions of state in a manner contrary to the democratic promises of the postBicesse constitution. Second, success and failure are relative; however, at the time of writing it is evident that neither UNITA nor RENAMO is a s erious contender for government, nor is either party in a p osition to bring strong pressure to bear on legislation in p arliament. In terms of these minimal definitions, neither party can be described as effective. The r easons f or t his a re co mplex, a s t he hi stories o utlined in t his c hapter demonstrate, a nd t he dif ferent t rajectories f ollowed b y UNITA a nd REN AMO should serve as a warning against making blanket assumptions about the political efficacy of former rebel movements. Similarly, there are no obvious comparisons to b e drawn b etween UNITAs and RENAMOs p ost-war trajectory and those of other African guerrilla movements.
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First, t he n ature o f t he t wo guer rilla m ovements i s h ard t o p in do wn. Christopher Clapham has presented an inf luential typology of guerrilla warfare; he iden tifies li beration in surgencies (w hich s eek in dependence f rom a co lonial power), s eparatist in surgencies (w hich s eek in dependence f or a r egion o f a n existing state), reform insurgencies (which seek profound changes in a n existing state), a nd wa rlord in surgencies, where t he in surgency i s dir ected t owards a change of leadership that does not involve the creation of a state any different from that which it seeks to overthrow, and which may involve the creation of a personal fiefdom separate from the existing state structures and boundaries.42 UNITA defies categorisation here, since it began as a liberation movement that became a reform insurgency that also had elements of warlordism. RENAMO likewise straddles the latter two categories, if not the first. Clapham himself acknowledges that reliance on s uch t ypologies runs t he r isk o f im posing o versimplified c ategorisations o n movements whose character is both changeable and mixed.43 This is particularly true of a m ovement like UNITA, which existed for over 30 y ears and adapted to different political and military circumstances. Second, cases in w hich former armed movements became civilian opposition parties are extremely rare, which again leave us little basis for comparison. Let us consider the various uprisings in independent African states that have ended in a change in the political order: Ethiopia, Eritrea and Rwanda present cases of rebel movements t hat c ame t o p ower b y f orce o f a rms ra ther t han b y co nverting themselves into civilian opposition movements. Sudan presents a uniq ue case in that t he CP A en sured t he admi ssion o f t he S udanese P eoples L iberation Movement rebels to government as junior members of a co alition at the national level, but a lso as t he governing p arty in a n ewly de volved regional government. Since t hen, t he p riorities o f t he S udan P eoples L iberation A rmy h ave b een determined b y t he r eal p rospect o f le ading a n in dependent S outhern S udan. Liberias post-war settlement served to accommodate several former rebel leaders as public office bearers, and with only one election having been held since the end of t he wa r, t here i s n o e vidence o f a ny o ther f ormer r ebels m aking h eadway in opposition p olitics. I n B urundi, t he Forces p our l a D fense d e l a D mocratie, a former rebel group associated with the ethnic Hutu majority, gained p ower in a free election in 2005 t hat resulted from a p eace settlement. It took several more years, to 2009, b efore a sm aller rebel g roup, t he Forces Nationales de Libration, laid down its arms and transformed itself into a political party. Its effectiveness as an opposition party has yet to be demonstrated.
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The c ases m ost co mparable t o A ngola a nd M ozambique a re t hose o f S ierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): these provide examples of former rebel movements attempting to operate as political parties, though making less impact than either RENAMO or UNITA. In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United F ront P arty (R UFP), t he p eacetime in carnation o f t he R evolutionary United F ront (R UF) r ebel g roup, co ntested t he p ost-war e lections in 2002. However, t he p arty gained a m ere 2 p er cent of t he p arliamentary vote and f ive years l ater ef fectively di sappeared in a m erger w ith t he A ll P eoples C ongress. Kandeh ascribes the RUFPs failure to the fact that Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, was in jail and the RUF faced an uphill task convincing the public to vote for the very elements that had laid waste to the country.44 This contrasts with Angola and Mozambique, where the votes for the opposition came from those people whose experience of the rebels had not primarily been one of violence and where the lack of any post-conflict justice mechanism left rebel leaders at liberty to campaign. In the D RC, m embers o f t he f ormer r ebel m ovement, t he Mouvement p our l a Libration du Congo (MLC), assumed seats in parliament after the 2006 post-war election. No co nclusive r esearch h as b een do ne o n t he ML Cs ef fectiveness a s a political actor, in a country where the reach of the state system remains limited. If the Angolan and Mozambican cases allow few points of direct comparison with other African conflicts, what then do they have in common with each other? In b oth A ngola a nd Mozambique, a g overnment wa s o pposed b y a sin gle r ebel movement, a nd e ach o f t he r ebel m ovements wa s hig hly cen tralised a round a n iconic le ader: t his l argely eliminated t he p ossibility of rogue t roops and splinter groups threatening the peace. However, in the Angolan case it also made it easy for Savimbi t o r emobilise hi s f orces w hen h e b ecame di ssatisfied w ith t he 1992 election r esults. Th e p olitical di scourses a ssociated w ith UNIT A w ere m ore coherent and more entrenched among a certain section of the Angolan population than was the case with RENAMO, and this enabled UNITA to retain some of its support base when it went back to war. Though both RENAMO and UNITA were associated w ith cer tain r egions o f t heir r espective co untries, n either m ovement had a s trong ethnic character that could guarantee it votes purely on the basis of identity, and nor did either have separatist aspirations in the manner of the Sudan Peoples L iberation A rmy. A lthough t here w ere m any in stances o f t he a buse o f state power in A ngola and in M ozambique in t he 1980s, t here was nothing on a scale t hat provoked t he k ind of di ssatisfaction t hat en sured w idespread p opular support f or t he E thiopian a nd Er itrean r ebellions. On t he o ther h and, n either UNITA n or RENAMO wa s o perating in t he en vironment o f s tate co llapse t hat
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allowed the Rwanda Patriotic Front to sweep to power following the genocide of 1994. In brief, the fact that neither UNITA nor RENAMO won a wa r, and the fact that both had the chance to contest elections, stems from particular contingencies that were replicated in n o other cases. To these we must, of course, also add t he internationally dominant political ethos of the early 1990s: the idea of liberal peace that enjoyed a resurgence with the end of the Cold War. However, as argued earlier, in hin dsight t he a ssumption t hat r ebel m ovements co uld e asily t ransform themselves into opposition parties appears misguided; in t heir relationship with society in peacetime, both parties have been constrained by the habits of the past. Yet t he mi litary origins of UNITA and RENAMO tell only p art of t he story. The different choices by the two parties made after the elections of the early 1990s also affected t heir l ater fortunes, UNITAs unwillingness to play an oppositional role after 1992 contributed in the end to the greater consolidation of power by the MPLA, w hile RENAMOs p articipation s aw i ts s upport g row d uring t he de cade following e lections, a s i t s eemed t o t urn i ts b ack o n i ts mi litary o rigins a nd managed t o m obilise s upport w ithin a dem ocratic sys tem. B oth m ovements retained t he s upport o f s ome o f t heir wa rtime f oreign a llies t hrough t he e arly 1990s but such support was no longer available to UNITA as it emerged from the last phase of the war in 2002. Particularly in the case of Angola, the superiority of resources enjoyed by the ruling party cannot be ignored. Leadership styles, too, are to blame, p articularly for RENAMOs inability to consolidate t he support t hat it gained after the war ended. It would be wrong to blame all of UNITAs and RENAMOs problems on their wartime o rigins. W hat i s c lear i s t hat w here t hey h ave en joyed s uccess in peacetime politics, they have not done so as a consequence of being former rebel movements. On t he co ntrary, t hey h ave s ucceeded o nly in asmuch a s t hey h ave managed to move away from their military past. If there is a p olicy lesson to be learnt from these observations, it is that the strategy of offering rebel movements the o pportunity t o co ntest e lections in t he a mbit o f a p eace p rocess m ust b e recognised f or w hat i t i s: a n exp edient m edium-term m easure t o faci litate t he laying down of arms without any party to the conflict having to lose face. It should not b e mi staken f or a n e asy r oute t o a f unctioning dem ocracy. A f ormer r ebel movement is, at best, no more than a basis for the construction of a political party. This basis may provide visibility and, depending on the wartime behaviour of the movement, a m easure o f leg itimacy, b ut t he c ases o f REN AMO a nd UNIT A
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demonstrate t hat f ormer r ebel m ovements co me w ith a legac y o f p olitical arrogance and authoritarian methods. As a contributor to a new and participatory democratic sys tem, a f ormer r ebel m ovement h as n o n atural ad vantage o ver a newly established party.

NOTES
1 P Chabal, with D B irmingham, J F orrest, M N ewitt, J S eibert and E A ndrade, A history of post-colonial l usophone A frica, London: H urst, 2002, a nd W M inter, Apartheids c ontras, London: Z ed B ooks, 1994, p rovide a co ncise o verview o f t he de colonisation p rocess a nd subsequent developments in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa. 2 The observations made about UNITAs wartime strategies, unless otherwise attributed, are based o n in terviews co nducted b y t he a uthor in A ngola in 2008 w ith p eople f ormerly attached to UNITA. The analysis of Mozambique relies more on existing literature on t he country. 3 F Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992, provides the b est-known exp osition o f t his t hinking, w hile a t renchant cr itique o f i ts b lanket application to situations such as that in Angola is provided by Margaret Anstee, who was UN special representative in A ngola during t he 1992 e lections. M A nstee, Orphan of the C old War: t he i nside s tory o f t he c ollapse o f t he A ngolan p eace p rocess, 19923, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996, 127, o bserved an a larming tendency in Western international p olitics post-Cold War to preach universal remedies in the starkest terms of black and white On the political side it lies in embracing democracy and carrying out, as quickly as possible, free a nd fa ir m ultiparty e lections. Th e p roblem w ith t he en gagingly sim ple a nd v ery possibly simplistic a pproach i s t hat w hen y ou t ry t o f ollow t he p recepts, r eality h as t he uncomfortable habit of getting in the way Democracy cannot be created overnight, least of all in places with a long history of authoritarian rule or civil war. 4 C Messiant, MPLA et UNITA: processus de paix et logique de guerre, Politique Africaine 57 (1995), 4057, 43. 5 Ibid, 49. 6 In t he 2008 e lections, t he MPLA gained 82 p er cent of t he vote in H uambo province and almost 75 p er cent in B i, in co ntrast t o 1992, w hen UNITA ac hieved a m ajority in b oth provinces. 7 C Messiant, Angola: Une victoire sans fin? Politique Africaine 81 (2001), 143161. 8 J Pearce, LUnita l a recherche de son peuple: carnets dune noncampagne sur le p lanalto, Politique Africaine 110 (2008), 4764. 9 A Nilsson, From pseudo-terrorists to pseudo-guerrillas: the MNR in M ozambique, Review of African Political Economy 58 (1993), 3542. 10 A Vines, Renamo: terrorism in Mozambique, London: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, in association with James Currey, 1991, 80. 11 M C ahen, C heck o n s ocialism in M ozambique: W hat c heck? W hat s ocialism? Review o f African Political Economy 57 (1993), 4659.
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12 C G effray, La c ause d es a rmes a u M ozambique: a nthropologie d une g uerre ci vile, P aris: Karthala, 1990; R G ersony, Summary of Mozambican refugee accounts of principally conflictrelated experience in Mozambique: report submitted to Ambassador Moore and Dr Chester A Crocker, Washington, DC: US D epartment of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs, 1988; M Hall, Th e M ozambican N ational R esistance M ovement (REN AMO): a s tudy in t he destruction o f a n A frican co untry, Africa 60(1) (1990); J M cGregor, V iolence a nd s ocial change in a border economy: War in the Maputo hinterland, 19841992, Journal of Southern African S tudies 24(1) (1998), 3760; M inter, Apartheids c ontras; N ilsson, F rom ps eudoterrorists to pseudo-guerrillas; T Young, The MNR/Renamo: external and internal dynamics, African Affairs 89(357) (1990), 491509. 13 Vines, Renamo: terrorism in Mozambique, 114115. 14 O Roesch, Renamo and the peasantry in southern Mozambique: a view from Gaza Province, Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des tudes Africaines 26(3) (1992), 462484. 15 Roesch, Renamo and the peasantry in s outhern Mozambique, 469, des cribes RENAMO as very m uch a n N dau p olitical p roject. V ines, Renamo: t errorism i n M ozambique, 83, attributes the association between RENAMO and the Ndau to the fact that the Ndau inhabit the area closest to the Zimbabwe border from which the first RENAMO insurgents arrived, and the choice of Ndau as a lingua franca in the RENAMO military. 16 Gersony, Summary of Mozambican refugee accounts. 17 Vines, Renamo: terrorism in Mozambique, 91. 18 Ibid, 93. 19 Roesch, Renamo and the peasantry in southern Mozambique, 472. 20 Vines, Renamo: terrorism in Mozambique, 94. 21 M C ahen, Dhlakama m aningue nice! : a n a typical f ormer guer rilla in t he M ozambican electoral campaign, Transformation 35 (1998), 148. 22 African-European I nstitute / A WEPA, Report o f AWEPAs o bservation o f t he M ozambique electoral process 19921994, Amsterdam: AWEPA, 1995. 23 Messiant, MPLA et UNITA. 24 African-European Institute / AWEPA, Report of AWEPAs observation. 25 Contrast this with the actions of the Angolan government in the months following the 1992 elections: see Messiant, MPLA et UNITA. 26 African-European Institute/AWEPA, Report of AWEPAs observation. 27 Ibid, 13. 28 Cahen, Check on socialism in Mozambique, 56. 29 J Pearce, 2004, Mozambique: across the great divide, Mail & Guardian, 29 November 2004, http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/6788.html (accessed 20 March 2009). 30 C Manning, Armed opposition groups into political parties: comparing Bosnia, Kosovo and Mozambique, Studies in Comparative International Development 39(1) (2004), 5476, 6465. 31 C Manning, Constructing opposition in Mozambique: Renamo as political party, Journal of Southern African Studies 24(1) (1998), Special Issue on Mozambique. 32 Ibid, 185. 33 Ibid, 188. 34 Ibid, 188.
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35 Voter turnout was 69,51 per cent in 1999 b ut fell to between 36 per cent and 43 per cent in 2004 (Mozambique News Agency, Supreme court ratifies election results, AIM reports 173, 5 J anuary 2000, h ttp://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/aim173.html (accessed 22 M arch 2009); M ozambique News Agency, Frelimo w in huge election v ictory, AIM r eports 289, 22 D ecember 2004, h ttp://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/ newsletter/aim289.html (acces sed 22 M arch 2009) co mments t hat [t]h e lo w t urnout i s largely a REN AMO p henomenon, w ith its s upporters failing t o g o t o t he p olling s tations. FRELIMO mobilised its core votes, RENAMO did not. 36 L de Brito, Beira o fim da Renamo? IDeAS: Informao sobre Desenvolvimento, Instituies e Anlise Social 5, Maputo: Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Econmicos, 2008. 37 Allafrica.com, M ozambique: R enamo s acks p arliamentary le adership, 10 M arch 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200903100433.html (accessed 18 March 2009). 38 The co mment by C habal a nd D aloz o n t he dif ficulties face d b y m any A frican o pposition parties is of relevance here: If the notion of the individual and the meaning of representation are bound up with the identity, defence and furtherance of the interests of the community, then t here c an b e n o p lace in t he p olitical sys tem f or a n o pposition w ith n o m eans o f delivering resources to its constituents (P Chabal and J-P Daloz, Africa works: disorder as a political instrument, Oxford: James Currey, 1999, 55). 39 The FRELIMO campaign in t he 1999 n ational elections in M ozambique played on threats that REN AMO mig ht r eturn t o wa r (C arter C entre, O bserving t he 1999 e lections in Mozambique: Fin al r eport, 2000). I nterviews co nducted b y t he a uthor in A ngola in 2008 suggest that the MPLA used similar tactics against UNITA. 40 For example, Zimbabwes Movement for Democratic Change, with its origins in the union movement. South Africas African National Congress, although it had an armed element, was able to benefit from the widespread popular mobilisation against apartheid that had taken place in the 1980s by its allies and sympathisers within South Africa. 41 J Pearce, LUnita la recherche de son peuple. 42 C Clapham, African guerrillas, Oxford: James Currey, 1998, 7. 43 Ibid, 6. 44 J K andeh, S ierra L eones p ost-conflict e lections o f 2002, The J ournal o f M odern A frican Studies 41(2) (2003), 189216, 199.

Part III Responses

C HAPTER 14

Local communities, militias and rebel movements: the case of the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone
KRIJN PETERS

INTRODUCTION
African r ebel m ovements em erging a fter t he en d o f t he C old War h ave r eadily been di smissed a s l acking a ny c lear ide ology o r p olitical a genda, let a lone representing the voice of the people. Evidence for this can be found in the uneasy, if not oppressive, relationship these movements have with local communities and in the need to increase their ranks by force, rather than on a voluntary basis, or so it is argued.1 On top of that, African conflicts are presented as having clear dividing lines b etween, on t he one hand, civilians o ften p ortrayed as p assive v ictims and, on the other, atrocious rebels. The conflicts in Sierra Leone and Uganda and their respective rebel movements, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) and the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), are repeatedly used as examples to underline this thesis. Material presented in this chapter, collected from former RUF combatants and civilians w ho li ved in R UF t erritory, g ives r eason t o do ubt t hese ra ther o nedimensional p erceptions.2 Instead, t he d ata hin t a t a m uch m ore co mplex
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relationship, constantly changing over the course of the war. Accounts of ex-RUF combatants and civilians who lived in r ebel-controlled areas suggest that a w ide and di verse ra nge o f in teractions w ere t aking p lace, in w hich b oth g roups expressed sig nificant le vels o f a gency,3 necessary t o n avigate t he d angerous wa r terrain t o t heir b est a bility. T o b etter un derstand h ow b oth co mbatants a nd civilians move through an unstable political landscape, I use the concept of social navigation, as developed by Mats Utas and Henrik Vigh. Social navigation can be described a s the wa y in w hich a gents s eek t o dra w a nd ac tualise t heir lif e trajectories in o rder t o in crease t heir s ocial p ossibilities a nd lif e c hances in a shifting a nd v olatile s ocial en vironment.4 In t heir w ork, U tas a nd V igh f ocus mainly on (ex)combatants in L iberia (Utas5) and Guinea-Bissau (Vigh6), but t he framework of social navigation is also helpful for understanding the trajectories of other combatants in other conflicts (including those of Sierra Leone and Uganda). Equally, I b elieve, t he concept of social n avigation i s u seful to un derstand h ow civilians (are forced to) move in a war context. As Vigh explains, navigat[ing] the terrain o f wa r i s p rimarily a q uestion o f e valuating t he m ovement o f t he s ocial environment, ones own possibilities for moving through it, and its effect on ones planned and actual movement,7 and this is what civilians in war zones have to do all the time in order to survive. Rather than evaluating the social environment, Vigh argues for evaluating the movement of t he s ocial en vironment [o wn em phasis] a nd b y s o do ing acknowledges t he ra pidly c hanging a nd f luid s ocial t errain cr eated b y wa r. F or instance, the RUF in 1991 was not the same movement as the RUF in 1995, in 1998 or in 2000. A mong t he f eatures t hat c hanged (o n s everal o ccasions d uring t he course of the war) were its military tactics, its mode of conscription, the level of civilian s upport, t he n umber a nd n ature (lo cal, n ational o r in ternational) o f enemies and allies, and the kind of atrocities it committed. As the RUF created and responded to new situations, these in turn offered new possibilities and terminated previous ones for civilians living in the danger zone, requiring active navigation. I thus suggest an approach in studying local communities in war zones that is able to take this constantly moving terrain into account and acknowledges civilians in war zones as active survivors rather than passive victims. Four dif ferent p hases in t he co nflict a re di scussed b elow. I n e ach o f t hese phases, t he R UF did un dergo sig nificant c hanges a nd a s a r esult r epresented a different social environment that local communities had to navigate. I will discuss some of the attitudes and responses of the local communities to the demands of,
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and si tuations cr eated b y, t he r ebel en vironment, a nd s how h ow t hese c hanged during the course of the war. On several occasions I refer to the conflict in Uganda and the LRA, with which, I believe, the RUF shared considerable similarities. The phases distinguished in the conflict are as follows:
I

Phase I (19911993): co nventional wa rfare, f rom t he R UF in cursion t o i ts near defeat Phase II (19941996): b ush c amps, f rom t he es tablishment o f i solated R UF jungle bases to their destruction Phase III (19971999): co llaboration, f rom j oining t he mi litary j unta t o t he Lom Peace Accord Phase IV (19992002): s talemate, f rom t erritorial o ccupation t o demobilisation

Preamble: the making of the Revolutionary United Front

In 1978, Sierra Leone became a one-party regime under the authoritarian rule of President Siaka Stevens of the All Peoples Congress Party. Political opposition was either oppressed or bought off by Stevens. Radical students in Freetown and some other m ajor t owns, in terested in s ocialism, Gadd afis Green B ook a nd P anAfricanism, organised themselves in the Mass Awareness and Participation (MAP) movement and became increasingly proactive in their protests against the regime.8 Forced into exiled by the regime, MAP le ader Alie Kabbah then approached the Sierra L eonean P an-African U nion (P ANAFU) w ith t he r equest t o ga ther candidates for revolutionary training in L ibya, but PANAFU rejected the idea of an a rmed s truggle. N evertheless, in t he l ate 1980s, a round 50 S ierra L eoneans travelled to Benghazi, Libya, to receive military training.9 Among them was Foday Sankoh, a former corporal in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) and f uture le ader of t he RUF. A fter Sa nkoh returned t o S ierra L eone t o f urther organise his rebellion, he met with Charles Taylor leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).10 The NPFL with the support of Sankoh and a group of Sierra L eoneans f irst l aunched i ts in cursion in to L iberia in D ecember 1989. Fifteen months later, the RUF used NPFL-controlled territory to start its incursion into Sierra Leone.
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Phase I (19911993): Conventional warfare; from the RUF incursion to its near defeat
In M arch 1991, n o m ore t han a h undred f ighters en tered K ailahun di strict in eastern Sierra Leone from neighbouring Liberia. Ten days later this was followed by another group of fighters entering the southeastern border district of Pujehun. The groups were composed of Sierra Leoneans some were trained in Libya and some were more recently recruited in Liberia and trained at the NPFLs infamous Sogoto base and Liberian special forces on loan from Charles Taylors NPFL. In addition, both groups had some revolutionaries from Burkina Faso among them.11 Although it was well known that the RSLMF did h ave a m ore ceremonial role Stevens and his handpicked successor Momoh relied more on a special and wellarmed p olice force unit, the Internal S ecurity Unit, t han on any real capacity to deal with military threats it was clear to the insurgents that they had to embark on a m assive r ecruitment c ampaign t o in crease t he m ovements n umbers. Th e NPFL rebels had previously employed this tactic in L iberia. When, in D ecember 1989, t he NP FL en tered L iberia (f rom C te d Ivoire), i t a lso did t his w ith a relatively sm all f orce. H owever, i t q uickly in creased i ts ra nks b y ef fectively recruiting predominately among the Mano and Gio ethnic groups, which had been marginalised and oppressed by the authoritarian President Samuel Doe, an ethnic Krahn. A brutal counterinsurgency by Does forces only played in the hands of the NPFL.12 As was the case in President Does counterinsurgency in neighbouring Liberia, the response by the Sierra Leonean army did not make things much better.13 In a number of cases it sealed the fate of the voluntary and forced rebel recruits and civilians, a s i s exp lained b y a n admini strator w ithin t he Ci vil D efence F orce, a militia group fighting against the RUF (see below):
The counterinsurgency of [among others] the Sierra Leone army was quite ruthless, straight f rom t he b eginning, [a nd t his] m ade t hose R UF f ighters a nd ci vilians forcibly co nscripted a nd w ho w ere lo oking o ut f or a n o pportunity t o es cape t o hesitate a bout t heir es cape p lans. I f s ummary ex ecution wa s wa iting a fter a successful desertion attempt, it was probably a better deal to stay in the movement and adapt to it as [well] as possible.14

It was in 1993 t hat the rebels captured my brother. Then the soldiers came to our village. They accused my father that he had given his son to the rebels. To punish him for that they killed him. That was the reason for me to join the rebels. At that time, if you only were giving water to the rebels, the soldiers would kill you.15

This i s un derlined b y a f emale ex-R UF co mbatant w ho r efers t o t he counterinsurgency tactics of the army as the main reason why she joined the RUF:
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Part of the explanation for these particular brutal counterinsurgency practices and the opposite effect they had on ending the war or winning the support of the local population m ay b e found in t he et hnic m anipulation of t he mi litary forces. For instance, a fter co ming t o p ower in 1980, P resident D oe t urned t he L iberian national army into an ethnic Krahn-dominated force that went on the rampage in Gio- and Mano-dominated areas. Stevens and Momoh made the Sierra Leonean army an almost completely ethnic Temne, Koranko and Yalunka (all ethnic groups from the northern part of the country) institution, which had less affiliation with civilians living in Mende-dominated areas. In Uganda, the first president, Milton Obote, himself a Langi from the northern part of the country, relied heavily on the army dominated by northerners. Idi Amin, who ousted Obote in a co up in 1971, massacred thousands of soldiers from the Langi and Acholi ethnic groups.16 Amin was o verthrown in 1979 a nd O bote c ame b ack in p ower a s a r esult o f a controversial election in 1980. Yoweri Museveni, who helped in the overthrow of Amin, took his forces to the bush and fought against Obote for the next five years. In 1986, Museveni seized power, ignoring negotiation attempts by Tito Okello, an Acholi w ho h ad o verthrown O bote t he p revious y ear. E thnic g roups f rom t he southwest a nd s outh do minated Musevenis National R esistance A rmy, a nd t his may explain to some extent the unscrupulous behaviour of a section of his soldiers when on a mission in Acholiland. To co py t he NP FLs t actic o f r ecruiting a mong o ppressed et hnic g roups perhaps on the suggestion of the Liberian special forces the RUF tried to exploit the resentments of local people against the All Peoples C ongress (APC) r egime. The APC a party mainly representing the interests of the Temne ethnic group was widely condemned by the Sierra Leone population. This resentment turned into o pen h atred in t he e astern p art o f t he co untry, w hich f ormed t he p olitical homeland of the banned Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), an organisation that mainly r epresented t he M ende et hnic in terests. N evertheless, t he r eality o n t he ground was more complicated. Many civil servants and police officers of Mende ethnicity had little choice but to cooperate with the APC r egime. Others, whose political or economic positions were endorsed by the regime, often in exchange for loyalty t o t he APC, ac ted a s b rokers a nd p atrons f or t he p easantry. L ocal
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populations at all levels were thus navigating the pre-war (but clearly not peaceful) terrain to the best of their abilities. The in discriminate k illings b y t he r ebels o f t hose w ho w ere e ven va guely associated with the APC regime did not evoke the widespread support among the population in t he eastern districts the RUF had hoped for. The larger part of the population although in favour of change and perhaps even endorsing an armed struggle judged their own possibilities for surviving and moving through these insecure t imes t he hig hest if t hey did n ot j oin. B ut t here wa s s ome le vel o f voluntary co nscription, in p articular a mong a c lass o f s ocioeconomic marginalised young people, often belonging to the weaker lineages in society. The labour of some of these youngsters had been exploited by landlords or families-inlaw (as part of a bride price). Others were school dropouts. By the end of the 1980s, the extent of support trickling down to the end of the patrimonial chain, where most of the rural youngsters were positioned, dried up completely a nd t he y oungsters t ried t o s urvive b y do ing p iece j obs (a nd sometimes co mmitting p etty cr imes) in urb anised cen tres o r in t he co untrys many alluvial diamond-mining pits. Or they ran away from their villages to escape the made-up charges of kangaroo courts controlled by the rural elite.17 For these rural vagrants, the RUFs populist ideology of no more slave, no more master and its promises of free education and medical care for the masses must have sounded attractive and of particular relevance to their own situations. In co ntrast, y oung p eople f rom s tronger lin eages o r m ore f irmly t ied t o a patrimonial network were much more likely to join the Civil Defence Force (CDF) militia. This is confirmed for instance by William Reno, who shows how the level of control over youth (more particularly, illicit diamond mining gangs) by chiefs determined whether these gangs joined the RUF or were turned into militia units to defend local communities.18 Similarly, support for the (chiefly aligned) CDF a militia that was based on the hunter guilds called the Kamajoisia in Mende in the main v illages in t he e astern di strict wa s hig her t han in t he sm aller a nd m ore isolated villages, which often have their origin as a main villages farming outpost, staffed b y do mestic s laves.19 The a bove s hows t hat t o b etter un derstand lo cal communities responses to, and support for, rebel movements, a detailed historical and political analysis of the local situation is necessary. Local a nd p re-war fac tors did inf luence t he R UF a nd i ts c ampaign in a different way, too. The first rebels to enter Sierra Leone the so-called Vanguards h ad limited inf ormation a bout w ho wa s a nd w ho wa s n ot a n APC s upporter, beyond the most visible public figures. Therefore they had to rely on information
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provided by villagers and/or new recruits from the area. In more than a few cases, the RUF and the other factions were used by civilians to settle local disputes, as is evident from a comment made by a former RUF clerk:
The civilians played a do uble role. They were going to the RUF and from there to the SLA [Sierra Leone Army] and then to the CDF [Civil Defence Force]. So that is how t he R UF b ecame s uspicious. M any ci vilians u sed t he fac tions f or t aking revenge on each other for old quarrels and grudges. So the enemy of the RUF was not only the CDF or the SLA, but the whole society. Many of the earlier atrocities of the RUF can be explained by this double role of the civilians.20

The a bove co mment s uggests a n a gentive t hat i s, exp ressing a gency r ole by local co mmunities/people. R ather t han b eing p assive v ictims, t hey w ere ac tive survivors, in s ome c ases u sing t he a rmed fac tions t o t heir own b enefit. C learly, civilians caught up in the war terrain tried to build up some relationship with the armed groups to increase their possibilities for survival. This is also illustrated by the following comment of a ci vilian who remained in hi s village throughout the war (first under RUF control, then under Sierra Leone Army [SLA] control, and then again under RUF control):21
It was important to have a good relationship with the commander, so whenever he asked you do something, you do it quickly and do it right. Then he can protect you. If y ou g ive him a sm all p resent o r s o, h e s tarts t o li ke y ou. Th e m ajority o f t he civilians a re un der t he p rotection o f a s pecific co mmander o r f ighter. M y o wn commander, M R ogers, was not too bad. At least he was much better than M [t he RUF commander in charge during the second RUF occupation]. Rogers talked for the civilians [pleaded on their behalf], for all civilians. His wife is from W [a nearby village].22

On 29 April 1992, a s uccessful coup was staged. The National Provisional Ruling Council, headed by the 27-year-old Valentine Strasser, took power and was much more favourably predisposed towards the Mendes. However, the regime made the tactical mistake of sending some of the APC loyalist and predominately Freetownbased army commanders to frontline positions to let them, too, taste the bitterness of war.23 These commanders had little interest in fighting for their new masters and sabotaged the struggle against the rebels by looting rather than protecting villages
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and towns. The soldier by day, rebel by night or sobel phenomenon was born. Nevertheless, a s a r esult o f c ampaigns b y t he co mbined f orces o f t he RS LMF, Kamajors, G uinean s oldiers (in S ierra L eone a s p art o f a m utual def ence agreement) and the United Liberian Movement for Democracy (a rebel movement created by Liberian exiles in Sierra Leone opposed to the NPFL and the RUF), the rebels found themselves nearly defeated by the end of 1993. Driven back to the far east o f t he co untry, t hey a bandoned t heir h eavy mi litary e quipment a nd disappeared in the Gola Forest, a long strip of primary rainforest along the Sierra Leone/Liberian border.

mainly on t he abduction of p eople, as t he following statement of a f ormer RUF commander attests:

We got our manpower mainly via capturing people. It was not easy for civilians in the government territory to get accurate information about the RUF and its aims and objectives, so they were not likely to join out of free will. But once we captured them we started to sensitise them and people started to join the movement because of the ideology and because they were not harassed any more.25

Phase II (19941996): Bush camps, from the establishment of isolated RUF jungle bases to their destruction
The RUF did not disappear for long, however. Early in 1994 it started to establish jungle camps in in accessible terrain all over the eastern and southern half of the country, in cluding t he s o-called Zogoda in t he K ambui S outh F orest R eserve, where rebel leader Foday Sankoh stayed most of the time. From these camps the RUF launched hit-and-run campaigns or sent fighters on ambush missions. The movement had completely changed its strategy from a m ore or less conventional rebel force aiming to conquer towns and mining areas and ultimately the capital Freetown to a forest-based guerrilla movement with very little control over any territory. Th e i solated b ush c amps w ere un der c losed c anopy a nd p rovided protection to the RUF, but at the same time created a considerable dilemma with regard t o r ecruitment. D uring t he f irst y ears, t he R UF a t le ast p artly r elied o n voluntary r ecruitment. S ometimes v olunteers s tepped f orward a fter t he R UF explained its ideology in the villages and communities; sometimes those interested in joining the RUF actually went to RUF territory to join up.24 If it had had control of villages and towns, it could have rounded up people and forced them to join or have u sed s lightly m ore s ubtle co ercive m easures t o s afeguard n ew r ecruits. However, a s a f orest-based guer rilla m ovement t hese p ossibilities n o lo nger existed. During these years, few volunteered and even if p otential conscripts had the intention of joining the RUF, it was not easy to find a camp and reach it unharmed; both the army and the rebels were highly suspicious of everyone moving around in the combat zones. To increase its ranks, the RUF during this period depended
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The en vironment in w hich t he LR A in U ganda t he o ther r ebel m ovement infamous for its abductions of (predominately) under-age combatants26 operates does s how s ome s triking simi larities w ith t he RUF in p hase II. W hen t he LR A moved its military bases to Southern Sudan, it increasingly became detached from the lo cal p opulation, w hich wa s f orcefully r esettled b y t he a rmy t o s o-called protected villages.27 Moving in terrain sparsely populated by civilians, conscription by abduction seemed to be the only way open for a movement that could not rely on voluntary conscription to fill its ranks. Abductees quickly found out that it was better to become a fighter than remain a RUF civilian in the camp (or for that matter, an LRA civilian) and be extremely vulnerable to harassment (read: forced labour, physical punishments, rape etc). The R UF ac knowledged t hat f orced r ecruitment wa s n ot t he p referred o ption because of the risk forcible recruits present if t hey manage to escape,28 but it had several ways of preventing defection. A mixt ure of warning against desertion by publically p unishing t hose w ho a ttempted t o do s o, a nd r ewarding t hose w ho showed willingness to fight for the RUFs cause with higher ranks and privileges, turned out to be quite effective in limiting desertion. Added to this was the tight security around the camps probably as much to prevent enemies from entering as to prevent RUF conscripts from escaping and the hostile attitudes of the army towards e veryone e ven va guely s uspected o f b eing co nnected t o t he r ebels o r coming from its territory. Even upon reaching their home area, escapees were far from s afe o r s o t he R UF co nscripts b elieved a s t he f ollowing s tatement b y another former RUF fighter confirms:
The reason for their [the RUF conscripts] loyalty was that when you are away from your brothers or family during the war for a lo ng time, they will consider you as their enemy, especially if the people hear that you are rebel. No sooner you come to
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your home town than they will kill you. So that was why we from the RUF stayed together to continue fighting till we were getting peace.
29

Moreover, communities within the RUF zone were under strict orders to return escapees.30 Similarly, Ugandan camp dwellers who had welcomed home-deserted LRA combatants were sometimes hacked to death by LRA fighters. This happened at, for instance, the Pagak camp in May 2004.31 Because of its change in t actics, the RUF no longer had to limit its actions to the eastern part of Sierra Leone. Virtually all villages and communities were now within t he r each o f R UF uni ts, w hich s ometimes t ravelled f or d ays a long t he countrys numerous bush paths to suddenly appear and launch their hit-and-run actions.32 Local communities served as little more than a source of manpower, food and other essentials to the RUF, obtained by intimidation or violence. The military, restrained by its heavy equipment to the more inhabited areas and passable roads, hardly represented a t hreat to t he remote RUF c amps or was in a ny p osition to protect local communities (if it was willing to do so in the first place). It became clear that if lo cal communities wanted protection against the RUF (and t he sobels), t hey h ad t o o rganise i t t hemselves. H ence, t he b irth o f t he Kamajor militia. Kamajors (in Mende kamajoi or kamasoi [singular], Kamajoisia [plural]), were specialist (bush animal) hunters and had superior knowledge of the forest and its bush paths.33 Helping the army from the early days of the conflict as scouts, t hey w ere s ubsequently o rganised b y lo cal c hiefs t o p rotect v illages a nd increasingly did go on the offensive.34 A similar development took place in Uganda where (s tate-sponsored) h omeguard g roups o r lo cal def ence uni ts (LD Us) w ere established in early 1990 in answer to the ambushes and hit-and-run actions of the LRA, a gainst t he b ackground o f a mi litary f orce w ith n o c apability (n or willingness) t o p rotect lo cal co mmunities.35 The Kamajors became in creasingly successful in t heir ac tions, and hig hly p opular among t he p opulation. However, their close ties with local communities many of the earlier Kamajors did the job on a part-time basis, being on guard for several months after which they returned to their farms for the harvesting season36 probably triggered the RUF in a further paranoia a gainst t he ci vilians, f or t hey p erceived a ll t o b e p otential Kamajor supporters (s ee a lso t he co mment a bove b y t he R UF c lerk o n t he double r ole civilians played). In Uganda, the atrocities of the LRA towards local communities also increased when g overnment o fficials cr eated t he LD Us. A s o bserved b y Finn strm o n Acholiland: Even villagers who happen to have a spear or only knife in the hut are
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now a nd t hen acc used [by t he LR A] of h aving j oined t he g overnment [a s LD U members].37 In short, while the Kamajor (and the LDUs) created new possibilities for civilians (that is, to stay in their villages with some level of protection or return to r eclaimed v illages), a t t he s ame t ime i t (unin tentionally) p rovoked f urther hostile reactions from the rebel movements. Overall, the war terrain became even more complex and more difficult to navigate for the local population. During t he s econd h alf o f 1996, t he R UF a nd t he n ewly e lected S LPP government w ere n egotiating a p eace t hat c ulminated in t he sig ning o f t he 30 November 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord, but the Kamajor trained and guided by the S outh A frican m ercenary f irm E xecutive O utcomes a ttacked a n umber of RUF base camps, including the Zogoda. These successful attacks may have forced a reluctant rebel organisation into signing the peace accord. Alternatively, it may have caused the RUF to los e w hat little confidence it had that a p ost-war Sierra Leone under a SLPP government favouring the Kamajor would ever be a safe place to reintegrate. The following comment by a f ormer RUF commander r eferring to the attack on Freetown in January 1999 in which more than 5 000 civilians died s uggests t hat t he co mbined ac tions o f t he Kamajor and E xecutive O utcomes (with the endorsement of the government) in the months before the signing of the 1996 peace accord, provoked a desire for a deadly revenge: In [the attack on] the Zogoda we lost so much manpower. You know, January 6 [1999] was our revenge.38

Phase III (19971999): Collaboration, from joining the military junta to the Lom Peace Accord
Although a peace accord was signed, few soldiers, CDF fighters or rebels registered for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme. There were high levels of distrust between the different factions and a number of violent clashes w ere r eported d uring t he f irst p ost-Abidjan m onths. I n F ebruary 1997, Sankoh wa s a rrested in N igeria o n w eapon c harges a nd k ept in c ustody a t t he request by the Sierra Leonean government. It increasingly became clear that the peace accord would not hold and that the war was not over yet. Nevertheless, t he s uccessful mi litary co up o n 25 M ay 1997 s till c ame a s a surprise to all who did not have their ears to the ground. But those who had, had noticed t hat l arge s egments o f t he a rmy f elt in creasingly side lined b y t he S LPP government, w hich p ut i ts co nfidence a nd s upport in t he p opular a nd w idely praised Kamajor. A nd a n en d t o t he wa r w ould a lso m ean a n en d t o t he wa r
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economy from which many soldiers and commanders profited. However, the next move of the renegade army was truly surprising. Within hours of the successful coup, the renegade soldiers calling themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, AFRC invited their enemy, the RUF, to come out of the bush and join the a rmys f orces in t he c apital. F or eig ht m onths, t he RUF/AFRC j unta wa s in control o f t he c apital, m ost o f t he l arger t owns a nd t he di amond minin g a reas. After more than three years in the bush, the RUF was among the civilians again. But it soon found out how unpopular it was. By sheer intimidation, however, the R UF wa s a ble t o r ecruit n ew f orces, a s t he f ollowing s tatement o f t he paramounts speaker (second in co mmand, after the paramount chief) of a l arge village in central Sierra Leone makes clear:
The RUF just put an ultimatum: if the Kamajor would not surrender it would burn down the whole town. So the paramount chief asked the Kamajor to surrender. The Kamajor leader even became the second-in-command here in M akali under RUF control.39

Still, civilians employed a range of tactics to deal with these threatening situations. According t o t he s ame v illager: To p revent h arassment o r f orced co nscription people hid in the jungle during the daytime; only in the night-time we came back to the town.40 And another villager explained how they prevented the RUF from confiscating their food:
One year before the [1999] ce asefire I s tarted to work on the community farm of which the produce goes to the RUF. Normally you can keep the produce from your own private farm, but if you have a lot of produce the rebels can still take some of it. So what we did was to hide the produce in the 5 gallon containers in the ground. Sometimes the rebels used sticks to search the ground.41

junta from the capital, the major towns and the mining areas. But it failed to crush the RUF/AFRC completely. Again, t here a re s ome s triking simi larities w ith U ganda, w here t he a rmy launched a major military campaign in 2002, t he Iron Fist Offensive, to deal with the LRA once and for all. The campaign included some 10 000 a rmy troops, the use of military gunships, US logistical support and the open support by the SPLA (post-September 11, t he LR A wa s p ut o n t he US t errorist li st a nd p ressure o n President Omar el-Bashirs government in S udan was increasing).42 However, the campaign failed and the LRA moved into new territories. Similarly, the AFRC/RUF forces in Sierra Leone regrouped during the second half of 1998. Starting from their bases in t he east (RUF) and north (AFRC), they recaptured t own a fter t own. On 6 J anuary 1999, t he co mbined f orces a ttacked Freetown a nd en tered t he e astern p art o f t he ci ty. A fter s everal d ays o f in tense fighting t he R UF/AFRC f orces w ere b eaten b ack b y EC OMOG t roops, b ut a n estimated 6 000 p eople (ci vilians a nd f ighters) die d. Th e r ebels a nd r enegade soldiers raped, mutilated and burned alive hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians, taking ra ndom r evenge o n t he c apitals in habitants w ho t hey p erceived a s betraying the RUF/AFRC cause. So again the rebels were driven back, but this time it was clear that no military victory would be possible for either side. The international community pushed for new p eace n egotiations a nd in J uly 1999, t he L om P eace A ccord wa s sig ned between t he R UF a nd t he S LPP g overnment. Th e acco rd p romised a b lanket amnesty for all fighters and commanders and a government of national unity that included cabinet posts for the RUF and AFRC.43

Phase IV (19992002): Stalemate, from territorial occupation to demobilisation

Again, disarmament and demobilisation of fighters did not really take off. At the time of the signing of the Lom Accord, the RUF was in co ntrol of a l arge cigarshaped a rea w hich in cluded t he di amond minin g a reas r unning f rom t he eastern district of Kailahun all the way to the western district of Port Loko. It was reluctant t o h and o ver i ts t erritories o r e ven a llow f ree acces s t o g overnment officials or UN military observers. For nearly two years until DDR really started in May 2001 t he RUF was the de facto government in these areas and again the relationship between the RUF and the civilians changed significantly. For instance,
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Nevertheless, despite t he fac t t hat t he RUF and t he AFRC had j oined forces (to form the so-called Peoples Army), their days were numbered right from the start. The in ternational co mmunity w idely co ndemned t he co up a nd a fter s everal ultimatums, in e arly 1998 t he N igerian-dominated EC OMOG (E conomic Community of West African States Monitoring and Observation Group) troops, supported b y lo yal g overnment f orces a nd t he ci vil def ence f orces, r epelled t he
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although the RUF had already created a so-called G5 branch to deal with civilian and ci vilian-military a ffairs e arly o n in t he co nflict, t his b ranch n ow q uickly expanded to deal with issues such as land disputes, theft, accusations of adultery and local quarrels.44 With the RUF claiming to be the (de facto) government in the areas under its control, local populations could expect at least some level of service provision by the n ew a uthorities. I n fac t, w hen t he R UF l aunched i ts s truggle in 1991 i t propagated an ideology of free education and medical health care to all.45 Some of the l arger p hase II j ungle c amps h ad p rimary s chools, a nd m edicines w ere provided to the fighters and their families free of charge.46 In phase IV t he RUF made some attempts to institutionalise these services in i ts occupied territory, or so t he acco unts s eem t o s uggest. P erhaps t his wa s n o m ore t han a k ind o f opportunistic and last minute attempt by the RUF to win the hearts and minds of the people, but equally it can be argued that only at this stage when not all efforts and resources had to be directed towards fighting was the RUF in a p osition to implement its ideology. In any case, the following comments by two civilians who lived in RUF territory suggest that there was indeed some level of free education and health care under the RUF government:
Here in Pendembu there were free medicines, but not too much. There was also free primary education.47 There were no medicines so we treated ourselves with the native ones [herbs]. But there was a school and it was free education. The teachers were not paid. Six of my grandchildren were in that school. There was no harassment taking place at all.48

[of g ravel] f or t he R UF a nd o ne p ile f or y ourself, b ut y ou h ad t o a rrange t he expenditures [fuel, equipment, food for the miners etc] yourself. If a b ig diamond was found in the RUF pile they could confiscate your pile as well because they then expected something in t here. But if t hey did n ot find a g ood diamond they leave your pile untouched. They introduced these mining licences ... L ater in 2000 t hey banned the card system [mining licences] and introduced two days of labour for the RUF and three days for yourself.49

In pre- and p ost-war Sierra L eone, mining wa s/is b ased on a t wo- or t hree-pile system.50 One p ile o f g ravel (t he g ravel mig ht co ntain t he di amonds) i s f or t he landowner, one is for the supporter (who pays for the fuel, equipment and food) and o ne i s f or t he l abourers. Th e r ebels u sed a simi lar sys tem, w ith t he R UF government t aking t he p osition (a nd t he p ile) o f t he l andowner a nd a t t imes replacing the pile system with a number of days of labour. Evidence suggests that the RUF system became less exploitative after phase III.51 However, it is important to p oint o ut t hat, a t t he s ame t ime, a n in creasing n umber o f R UF a nd AFR C commanders a rranged t heir o wn minin g o perations, a nd s ome o f t hem u sed a much more exploitative system of mining. This governmentalisation o f t he R UF c an a lso b e o bserved w ith r egard t o agriculture. Ex-RUF fighters (both rank and file and commanders) claimed that farming was a central part of the RUFs ideology.52 In phase II, most RUF bases had their own rice farms in proximity to where fighters and civilians worked (the latter most likely as forced labourers). According to an ex-RUF fighter:
Every base got its own [rice] swamp. In a circle of about five miles around the base no ci vilians w ere li ving. B eyond t hat ci vilians w ere li ving in v illages un der t he control o f co mbatants. Th ere w ere t he [r ice] swa mps lo cated w here b oth t he civilians and the combatants worked.53

Controlling t he m ajor di amond minin g a reas, b ut w ithout t he co nstant r isk o f being a ttacked o r b ombarded b y EC OMOG f ighter j ets, t he RUFs a pproach t o mining did s tart t o c hange s omewhat. P reviously, minin g o perations h ad b een likely to be less constant or frequent, but very intensive and heavily dependent on forced l abour. D uring p hase IV, minin g b ecame m ore f ormalised a nd t he R UF experimented with various mining schemes to regulate the mining of diamonds, as is evident from the following extract from an interview with a village chief:
It was from 98 that the RUF was in control of Tongo and Kono, right up to the end of the war. I came here in 2000. The arrangement in place at that time was one pile 402
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During phase IV, accounts seem to suggest that the RUF enforced its ideas about food production in most of its territory, as is suggested by the following comments by a civilian in the Kailahun area:
In G [a village in eastern Sierra Leone] we laid [made] upland [rice] farms. All the landowners had fled, so it was all common land now. We were farming for ourselves and there was a community [RUF] farm. For the community farm, the seed rice was provided by t he RUF. Th ere wa s a [R UF] government s tore, and t he s eed r ice in
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there wa s g iven t o t he fa rmers f or t heir o wn in dividual fa rms, b ut t hey did n ot provide us with food for work when we worked on the community farm. We had to work one day a w eek on the community farm. The produce from our own farms was f or u s t o k eep. I f y ou s ell i t a t t he G uinea b order, y ou h ave t o g ive s ome commission to the RUF.54

As w ith m any o f t he l andowners in t he minin g a reas, t he (b igger) fa rm a nd plantation owners were often the first to flee (or to be killed). By confiscating this land f or co mmunity fa rming ac tivities, t he R UF in ef fect im plemented i ts o wn rough-and-ready land reform agenda. This must have been an attractive element to a rural underclass lacking secure land entitlements. However, the RUF replaced the village farm or field by a community farm on which civilians and fighters had to work. The harvest of these community farms went straight to the RUF and was used to feed the fighters or traded. The n umber o f d ays ci vilians in R UF t erritory h ad t o w ork o n t hese fa rms varied, but seemed to be lower in phase IV. The RUF also introduced government stores that acted as seed banks. Various accounts suggested that these operated on a no- or low-interest basis, reflecting the RUFs socialist ideas about agriculture. Overall, the accounts above do n ot seem to indicate an extremely high degree of civilian l abour exp loitation b y t he R UF d uring p hase IV, b ut i t i s im portant t o acknowledge t hat o ther inf ormants in dicated hig her le vels o f exp loitation, in particular when civilians lived closer to the frontline or within the territory of a particularly unscrupulous commander.55

an es timated 10 mi llion wa r-induced r efugees in t he w orld. Th e n umber o f internally di splaced p eople (ID Ps) wa s e ven hig her: 26 mi llion in 2008. Civilians c an de cide t o m ove t o s afer a reas (s uch a s urb an cen tres in n onviolent parts of the country, special camps, or they can stay with relatives) as a pre-emptive measure, but more likely they have already experienced some level of di sturbance a nd v iolence. In a n umber of c ases (f or exa mple in U ganda), people are forced by the government to move to camps. In other cases, a move can f ollow t he des truction o f a v illage b y f ighting f orces. N either ID P n or refugee c amps a re n ecessarily zo nes o f s afety. ID P a nd r efugee c amps (in particular if r efugee c amps a re lo cated c lose t o a b order) a re f requently targeted by both militias and rebel movements in search of manpower, food or for ac ts o f r etaliation. Th e le vels o f s tructural v iolence (r esulting f rom wa rinduced trauma, for instance) and sexual harassment can be significant within the camps.
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THE RESPONSES OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES TO MILITIA AND REBEL ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA

Above, the conflict in Sierra Leone was discussed, with a special focus on its main rebel movement. I showed how the RUFs multiple changes in (military) strategies offered n ew o pportunities f or ci vilians t o r espond, w hile f rustrating o ther possibilities. It is clear that in situations of prolonged armed conflict civilians and local co mmunities a re f orced t o r espond a nd ac t f or t heir s urvival. I n es sence, three responses are possible:
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Stay i n a d anger o r c onflict z one, b ut t ry t o l imit r isks b y l imiting c ontact and exposure to the fighting forces. Large numbers of civilians in conflict zones decide not to run away but to stay in their villages and communities (at least to start off w ith). Th ey t ry t o s urvive t he t hreats p osed by t he va rious f ighting forces b y em ploying va rious t actics. T emporarily (d ays o r s ometimes e ven weeks), hiding in t he bush or in fa rming fields when there is an attack or the threat of it has enabled civilians to remain in t heir communities for extended periods. C learly, inf ormation a nd e arly-warning m echanisms a re cr ucial f or this (ci vilians o n t he r un f rom a n earby v illage a re a c lear sig nal). I n o ther cases, f ighting f orces h ave a co nstant o r hig hly f requent p resence in v illages and communities so that it does not become feasible to hide anymore. Key to surviving in t hese si tuations i s t o k eep a lo w p rofile, b e o bedient a nd min d ones own business, and not give any reason to be singled out or draw attention. Remain i n o nes v illage i n a d anger z one a nd a ctively s upport a m ilitia o r rebel or ganisation. One de liberately b uilds u p a r elationship w ith a f ighting force, beyond and above a cer tain compliance that may take place under the previous response. Local community members can support the fighting faction financially, with manpower for example a family member or child is enlisted or through providing vital information. In return, the armed group will offer some level of protection. However, by taking sides, one exposes oneself, which can w ork a gainst o ne if t he f ighting f orce le aves (r etaliation b y co mmunity
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Try t o l imit a ny c hance o f (f urther) c ontact w ith r ebel o r m ilitia g roups b y physically distancing oneself from the danger or war zone. Escaping violence by moving to safer areas is a response employed by millions in 200856 there were
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members) or worse, when the enemy manages to capture the village or town (but co llaborators m ay de cide t o f lee b efore t his h appens, t ogether w ith t he repelled fighting forces). Clearly, there can be some level of overlap of these three reactions. Moreover, since war terrains are in co nstant motion, it is possible (and even likely) that within a conflicts lif espan, ci vilians em ploy m ore t han o ne r esponse. A lso, t hese t hree responses do n ot necessarily imply free choice: civilians can be forced to actively support faction fighters or a minor has no other choice but to flee with his parents to safer areas. And most importantly, communities are not homogenous entities, so t here a re li kely t o b e co nsiderable dif ferences a mong t he v illagers a nd community members with regard to the survival mechanism they choose and at what point they do so. There a re m any fac tors inf luencing t he n ature a nd t iming o f ci vilians responses to the threat posed by fighting factions. Some of these factors are related to c haracteristics o f t he f ighting f orce, w hile o thers co ncern t he t raits o f a community. Below I list some of the most important ones.

of fighters and commanders were often not adequate. As a result, few civilians took the risk to remain in their communities when there were rumours that an attack mig ht t ake p lace (in r eturn, t his f earsome r eputation wa s s ometimes used b y t he R UF a s a mi litary t actic). I n t he co nflict (19771992) in Mozambique, t he M ozambican N ational R esistance M ovement, REN AMO, had a simi lar r eputation f or b eing ext remely b rutal, in p articular in t he southern a reas, in stilling f ear a mong t he p eople a nd c ausing m ass displacement.58
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Variables for the fighting force

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Does t he f ighting f orce h ave a c lear a nd m eaningful ide ology o r p olitical agenda that is likely to attract the support of civilians? Clearly, this was one of the weaker points of the RUF, which had little to offer beyond a superficial and populist critique of the political and economic state of the country. In contrast, the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front, which successfully fought against the Derg regime and overthrew Ethiopias dictator Mengistu, had a political agenda that in cluded a b an on e arly m arriages, e qual divorce r ights, e qual acces s t o education a nd e qual p roperty r ights. M any in cluding w omen a nd g irls joined v oluntarily.57 More p rofound p olitical a gendas c an a lso a ttract n oncombatant supporters and intellectuals to enable a group to become more than just an armed movement. Does the fighting force behave well and are there means to address misconduct and h arassment o f f ighters t owards ci vilians, w hich w ould a llow ci vilians t o stay in t heir communities w ithout t oo much r isk? Th e RUF quickly b ecame known as a f ierce rebel movement, and mechanisms to control the behaviour
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Is t he f ighting f orce r oaming, w hich m ay m ake i t p ossible f or ci vilians t o temporarily hide (and also hide their most precious possessions), or is it static and likely to stay for prolonged periods in one community/village? In the latter case, such a response is unlikely to be feasible. Communities under prolonged control of the RUF such as in its stronghold in Kailahun District had to find ways of surviving this occupation, and often built up some relationship with fighters and commanders. However, the phase characterised by the RUF hitand-run attacks did not allow such a response and it was often difficult to take cover in time when there was yet another surprise attack. The conflict in Cte dIvoire b etween g overnment f orces a nd t he P atriotic M ovement o f C te dIvoire (later joined by two other factions forming a politico-military alliance called the New Forces), quickly resulted in a split of the country (including an internationally m onitored b uffer zo ne) w ith t he N ew F orces co ntrolling t he northern h alf o f C te d Ivoire.59 At le ast in t his c ase co mmunities in t he different parts of the country knew with which armed group they were dealing. Is t he f ighting f orce p redatory o n t he co mmunity f or i ts s urvival? I f s o, communities c an b e exp loited b eyond t heir p oint o f s urvival. E vidence suggests t hat in a reas un der s ustained co ntrol o f t he R UF, t he m ovement applied a mixture of means to look after its fighters and supply them with food, without exp loiting co mmunities b eyond r egeneration. With r eference t o t he first wa r (19891996) in L iberia, O utram s uggests t he wa rlord m odel (referring t o a ncient C hina) f or un derstanding t he r uthless p redation o f t he civilian p opulation by f ighters of a ll fac tions. This is p artly explained by t he fact t hat co mmanders acc umulated t he s poils o f t he co nflict b ut did n ot provide for their fighters or pay them.60
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Is the ethnic, religious, national or political composition of the fighting force similar to that of the community? If not, there is a greater risk that civilians will be h arassed by t he f ighters. Th e atrocious b ehaviour of t he L iberian special forces within the RUF in the early days of the insurgency is explained by many ex-combatants a nd wa r-affected ci vilians a s a r esult o f t he fac t t hat t hese Liberians were fighting in a nother country than their country of origin. This would imply, on the other hand, that Liberian fighting forces in Liberia would have a c leaner record, or that Sierra Leonean RUF fighters behaved better in their own country, and both assumptions have proven to be wrong. However, the multiple insurgencies by Rwandan forces into the Democratic Republic of Congo and their atrocious behaviour to local civilians61 makes one wonder if there is after all some truth in this argument.

some point by an increasingly hostile army and civil defence forces to the west and United L iberian Movement f or D emocracy f orces t o t he e ast. Here, t he experience o f t housands o f y oung S outhern S udanese (nic knamed t he los t boys of Sudan) who walked many hundreds of kilometres f irst to Ethiopia and t hen t o Kenya t o es cape t he v iolence d uring S udans s econd ci vil wa r (19832005) b etween t he g overnment a nd t he S udanese P eoples L iberation Army/Movement comes to mind.63
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Variables for the community

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Is the location of the community within or close to a war zone, which increases the r isk o f en countering v iolence? C ommunities in S ierra L eone t hat w ere close to or within contested areas hosted relatively large groups of fighters that were o ften in fighting m ode. C ommunity m embers s ometimes c hose, if allowed, t o m ove de eper in to R UF t erritory w here f ighters w ere un der les s pressure. Villages that changed hands on multiple occasions were particularly vulnerable to suspicion and retaliation, and were more likely to be abandoned. Outram r eferring t o a 1994 r eport b y t he C atholic C hurch o f M aryland County notes that: A report of an NPFL attack on Pleebo, Maryland County, in O ctober 1994, h eld by t he LPC [L iberia Peace C ouncil, one of t he armed factions], s tates t hat a fter t aking t he t own t he NP FL m urdered ci vilians, targeting church and medical personnel and any persons suspected of aiding or supporting the LPC, often merely on the grounds that they had remained in the town while it was under LPC control.62 Does t he p hysical lo cation o f t he co mmunity r estrict t he p ossibilities o f villagers to go to safer places, for instance because of its remote location (no easy access to main roads), the inhospitable terrain or because the nearest safe area (s uch a s a n eighbouring co untry) r equires a j ourney t hrough a n a rea controlled b y m ultiple a nd h ostile a rmed fac tions? Ci vilians in t he R UFcontrolled eastern part of Sierra Leone did f ind themselves locked in p lace at
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What is the strategic importance of a community or village? Communities near bridges, a t cr ossroads, c lose t o minin g a reas et c, m ay a ll b ecome hig hly contested in t he conflict and are likely to experience more fighting. In Sierra Leone, co mmunities w ithin t he di amond minin g di stricts exp erienced hig h levels of violence due to the frequent attacks by the different fighting forces for control o f t he a rea, w ith a r esultant m assive di splacement. B ecause o f t he resumption of fighting between the Angolan government and UNITA in 1992, nearly 400 000 p eople die d, 1,5 mi llion w ere di splaced a nd 330 000 b ecame refugees:64 the c loser t he g overnment forces came t o UNITA-controlled diamond areas, the fiercer the fighting became. What i s t he n ature o f co unterinsurgency? I f i t i s in discriminate a nd unscrupulous, t reating a ll ci vilians co ming f rom r ebel-held t erritory a s potential r ebel co llaborators, ci vilians c an b ecome lo cked in p lace. Thi s happened in the early stages of the conflict in Sierra Leone but also during the January 1999 a ttack o n F reetown. Th en, ci vilians f rom t he e astern a nd AFRC/RUF-controlled part of the capital took a significant risk when crossing to t he w estern a nd EC OMOG-controlled p art, n ot o nly b ecause t hey co uld have been killed by the AFRC/RUF, but also because ECOMOG soldiers were executing s uspected r ebels a nd t heir co llaborators o n t he s pot.65 A (s tatesponsored) co unterinsurgency t hat h as a lienated, u prooted a nd k illed va st numbers o f t he p opulation i s t hat o f t he Janjaweed in t he D arfur r egion in Sudan,66 although in t his c ase t he o bjectives o f t he K hartoum g overnment should be questioned in the first place. Is t he community c apable of, w illing to and supported in ac tively defending itself? Th e r ise o f t he Kamajor/Civil D efence F orce in t he co nflict i s a c lear example. Th e exa mple o f t he U gandan LD U h as a lso b een di scussed. B oth initiatives, although starting as grassroots initiatives, received state support.
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These are just a selection of the variables67 that influence the behaviour of factions and the responses of civilians/communities. Most, if not all, of these variables can change over the course of a co nflict: a fac tion can become more exploitative and hostile to civilians (perhaps in reaction to a lack of military success) over time, or a particular community may exp erience less harassment by a fac tion (b ecause a particular unscrupulous commander is stationed somewhere else and replaced by a m ore g enuine co mmander). Thi s w ill t hen inf luence t he r esponses o f communities. Ethnicity may, in the initial stage of a conflict, be of no importance, but can later be used as a t ool by warlords to engender support, forcing civilians with a nother et hnic b ackground t han t hat o f t he f ighting f orce t o f ear f or t heir lives and thus flee. In short, there are few, if any, general patterns that can be distinguished in the responses by communities to the threat posed by armed militias and rebel groups. Rather, the response is based on a complex equation with multiple variables and I have not even brought opportunity (in other words luck) or psychological traits (such a s r esilience) o f co mmunity m embers in to t he e quation. M oreover, t he responses are not even fixed over time. While it is important to guard against an over-rationalisation a mid an attack few would remain fully capable of making completely calculated decisions by war-affected civilians, it would be wrong not to ac knowledge t he t actics a nd s trategies t hese ci vilians em ploy t o s urvive in a situation created by protracted armed conflict.

insight in to how local or community security may be dependent upon traditional authority and allegiances (provided by local militias established by the community to provide security), dependent upon local warlords or politicians with their own armed forces.68 But it can also show how local communities can actively increase their level of human s ecurity (in t he broader s ense, of for example, gaining access to food or health care) by building up relationships with rebel movements or commanders. In p hase II, w hen i t wa s c ut o ff f rom t he w ider s ociety, t he R UF f orged i ts millenarian s odalities.69 Attacking t he R UFs j ungle b ases did n ot b reak t he fighters spirits but as is the case with so many sectarian movements, including the LR A o nly t riggered a m ore de adly a nd fa talistic a ttitude. I f t here a re a ny possibilities f or de-i solating s ectarian-styled r ebel m ovements f or in stance b y building o n t he t rading ac tivities t hat w ere a lready g oing o n b etween t he R UF camps and petty traders in the area this is worth exploring. In his 1996 book on the conflict in Sierra Leone, Richards describes the following possible scenario in cases w here lo w-level co nflict p ersists in definitely (g iven t he s heer n umber o f disgruntled young people who can be easily be mobilised, if not by the RUF then by some other opportunistic peace spoiler):
one in which civilians give up their understandable nostalgia for peace, come to accept war as a n ormal condition of life, and think creatively about how to build, through civil defence, spiritual sanction, and other inventive uses of a war-oriented, ancestral, informal institutional culture, islands of more regular rural pursuits in the midst of a sea of conflict.70

CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have described some of the responses of local communities to the demands of, and situations created by, a rebel environment. I have also shown that these en vironments a re co nstantly c hanging, r equiring a n a gentive a nd ac tive navigation b y ci vilians in t he wa r zo ne in o rder t o s urvive t he un stable a nd dangerous times. Within the narrow concept of military or national security, there is li ttle s cope f or t aking t he ac tive s trategies o f ci vilians w ithin wa r zo nes in to account. However, t he concept of human s ecurity in i ts restricted s ense as f reedom from violence but even more so in its broader view, which includes protection of basic h uman r ights, f ood s ecurity a nd ade quate s helter dem ands a b etter understanding o f t he f ull ra nge o f in teractions r ebel m ovements h ave w ith civilians in wa r-affected co untries. Using a h uman s ecurity a pproach g ives o ne
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Starting from the observation that: Belligerent groups are likely to tolerate civil recolonisation of at least parts of the war-shattered zone, to ensure better supply of basic commodities, Richards gives the example of market women in government territory w ho have found ways to navigate t he numerous checkpoints and t rade palm oil from rebel-controlled plantations for items of interest to the combatants.71 This example of the attack trade first described with reference to the Biafra war, may be one of the important processes through which the civil agrarian zones in war-torn S ierra L eone g et b ack o n t heir f eet, a nd ext end peace f rom w ithin.72 Initiatives based on this idea of peace from within also materialised in phase IV, giving rise to the RUFs process of governmentalisation. This was made possible because t he R UFs s urvival wa s les s c hallenged a nd sim ultaneously cr eated opportunities for civilian peace-building initiatives.
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The overall observation must be that rebel movements are (of course) not static entities and that their composition, agenda, targets and strategy can and are likely to change over time. This affects the relationship they have with local populations, but these changes are also the result of the responses of civilians to the actions and threats posed by the rebel organisations. Interventions, whether they are aimed at brokering a ce asefire o r a p eace acco rd, h elping ci vilians in t he wa r zo ne o r planning the best counterinsurgency strategy, should take these relationships and how they impact on each other into account.

NOTES
1 See for instance Thandika Mkandawire, The terrible toll of post-colonial rebel movements in Africa: towards an explanation of the violence against the peasantry, Journal of Modern African Studies 40(2) (2002), 181215. The material presented was collected during fieldwork undertaken in three periods, namely November/December 2001, N ovember 2002 t o O ctober 2003 a nd N ovember/December 2006. (S ee Krijn Peters, Expert report on the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra L eone, unpublished report, 2007.) Th e first two periods of fieldwork collection formed part of my PhD r esearch. Th e l ast f ieldwork p eriod, N ovember/December 2006, wa s p art o f t he preparation of an expert witness report on the RUF, requested by the Sesay defence team of the S pecial C ourt f or S ierra L eone. I a pplied t he n ormal r igid s cientific s tandards o f objectivity, independency and triangulation to the data collection processes for this report. No m aterial p rovided b y t he S esay def ence t eam h as b een u sed, a nd co nducted a ll t he interviews, without help or support from the defence team. The defence team has not called upon me as a w itness. Part of this interview material is used for Krijn Peters, War and the crisis of youth in Sierra Leone, New York: Cambridge University Press/International African Library Series (forthcoming in 2011). Norman Long defines the concept of agency as follows: The notion of agency attributes to the individual actor the capacity to process social experiences and to devise ways of coping with life, even under the most extreme forms of coercion. Within the limits of information, uncertainty a nd t he o ther co nstraints (f or exa mple p hysical, n ormative o r p oliticoeconomic) that exist, social actors are knowledgeable and capable. They attempt to solve problems, le arn h ow t o in tervene in t he f low o f s ocial e vents a round t hem, a nd m onitor continuously t heir own ac tions, observing how others react to t heir b ehaviour and t aking note o r t he va rious co ntingent cir cumstances. N L ong, F rom p aradigm los t t o p aradigm regained? The case of the actor-oriented sociology of development, in N L ong and A L ong (eds), Battlefields of knowledge, the interlocking of theory and practice in social research and development, London: Routledge, 1992, 2223. Henrik V igh, Navigating t errains o f w ar: y outh a nd s oldiering i n G uinea-Bissau, N ew York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006. M Utas, Agency of victims: young womens survival strategies in t he Liberian civil war, in Filip D e B oeck a nd A lcinda H onwana (e ds), Makers a nd b reakers: c hildren a nd y outh as
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emerging c ategories i n p ost-colonial A frica, O xford: J ames C urrey, 2005, 5380; M U tas, Building a f uture? Th e r eintegration a nd r emarginalisation o f y outh in L iberia, in P aul Richards (ed), No peace, no war: an anthropology of contemporary armed conflicts, Athens, Ohio: O hio U niversity P ress/Oxford: J ames C urrey, 2005; M U tas, A bject h eroes: marginalised youth, modernity and violent pathways of the Liberian civil war, in Jason Hart (ed), Years of conflict: adolescence, political violence and displacement, Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 2008. Vigh, Navigating t errains o f w ar; H enrik V igh, S ocial de ath a nd v iolent lif e c hances, in Catrine C hristianse, M ats U tas a nd H enrik V igh (e ds), Navigating y outh gen erating adulthood: social becoming in an African context, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006. Vigh, Navigating terrains of war, 13. I Abdullah, Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL), Africa Development 22(3/4) (1997), 4576. Ibid. L Gberie, A dirty war in West Africa: the RUF and the destruction of Sierra Leone, London: Hurst, 2005. P R ichards, Fighting f or t he r ainforest: w ar, y outh a nd r esources i n S ierra L eone, Oxford: James Currey, 1996 (reprinted with additional material in 1998). S E llis, The m ask o f a narchy, t he d estruction o f L iberia a nd t he r eligious d imension o f a n African civil war, London: Hurst, 1999. D Keen, Conflict and collusion in Sierra Leone, Oxford: James Currey, 2005, 2. Krijn Peters, Footpaths to reintegration: armed conflict, youth and the rural crisis in Sierra Leone, Unpublished PhD thesis, Wageningen University, 2006, 63. Peters, War and the crisis of youth in Sierra Leone. Tim A llen, Trial j ustice: t he International C riminal C ourt a nd t he L ords R esistance A rmy, London/New York: Zed Books, 2006, 28. Peters, Footpaths to reintegration. W Reno, Political networks in a failing state: the roots and future of violent conflict in Sierra Leone, Internationale Politik und Gesellshaft 2 (2003), 52. P R ichards, K B ah a nd J V incent, Social c apital a nd s urvival: p rospects f or c ommunitydriven d evelopment i n p ost-conflict S ierra L eone, S ocial D evelopment P apers: C ommunity Driven Development/Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction 12, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2004. Peters, Footpaths to reintegration, 78. The LRA, having its main bases in neighbouring Sudan, also depends on local informants for its intelligence. Apart from obtaining some degree of protection, these informants and their families can, to some extent, manipulate LRA missions for their own ends. Peters, Armed conflict, youth and the rural crisis in Sierra Leone. Richards, Fighting for the rainforest, 12. Krijn Peters, Re-examining voluntarism: youth combatants in Sierra Leone, ISS M onograph 100, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004. Peters, Armed conflict, youth and the rural crisis in Sierra Leone. C Blattman and J A nnan, On t he nature and causes of LRA abduction: what the abductees say, in T A llen a nd K V lassenroot (e ds), The L ords R esistance A rmy: w ar, p eace a nd reconciliation, Oxford: James Currey (forthcoming, 2010).
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27 About 70 p er cen t o f t he A choli p opulation i s es timated t o li ve in t hese ID P c amps. S ee Annette Weber, Jemera Rone, Jo Becker and Tony Tate, Abducted and abused, Human Rights Watch, 14 J uly 2003, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/07/14/abducted-and-abused (accessed 29 June 2009). 28 RUF/SL, Footpaths to democracy: towards a New Sierra Leone, 1995, http://web.archive.org/ web/20070614020255/http://www.sierra-leone.org/footpaths.html (acces sed 10 M ay 2010), 4. 29 Peters, Footpaths to reintegration, 63. 30 Krijn Peters and P R ichards, Why we fight: voices of under-age youth combatants in Sierra Leone, Africa 68(2) (1998), 183210. 31 Allen, Trial justice, 77. 32 For example, on 24 January 1995 the town of Kambia in the far west of the country close to the Guinean border was attacked by the RUF. 33 P Muana, The Kamajoi militia: civil war, internal displacement and the politics of counterinsurgency, Africa Development 22(3/4) (1997), 77100. 34 Other hunter gui lds involved in t he wa r in cluded t he Tamaboros (Koranko et hnic g roup) and the Kapras (Temne ethnic group). 35 Allen, Trial justice, 47. 36 Peters and Richards, Why we fight. 37 S Finn strm, For G od a nd m y lif e: wa r a nd cosm ology in n orthern U ganda, in P aul Richards (e d), No peace no war: an anthropology of contemporary armed conflicts, Oxford: James Currey, 2005, 109. 38 Peters, Footpaths to reintegration, 78. 39 Ibid, 54. 40 Interview conducted as part of the preparation of Peters, Expert report on the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone. 41 Ibid, 59. 42 Allen, Trial justice, 5051. 43 Paying the price: the Sierra Leone peace process, Accord (9), 2000. 44 The author studied over a h undred RUF intelligence (G5, in ternal defence unit, intelligent officer branch, etc) documents dealing with these issues, gathered by the Issa Sesay defence team of which many were produced by RUF G5 branches. Originality of the documents has been confirmed by another external expert. 45 RUF/SL, Footpaths to democracy. 46 Peters, Footpaths to reintegration. 47 Peters, Expert report on the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 58. 48 Ibid, 64. 49 Peters, War and the crisis of youth. 50 C Fithen, Diamonds and war in Sierra Leone: cultural strategies for commercial adaptation to en demic lo w-intensity co nflict, U npublished P hD t hesis, L ondon: U niversity C ollege London, 1999. 51 Peters, E xpert r eport o n t he R evolutionary U nited F ront o f S ierra L eone; P eters, Armed conflict, youth and the rural crisis in Sierra Leone. 52 Peters, Footpaths to reintegration. 53 Ibid, 81.

54 Peters, Expert report on the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 63. 55 Peters, War and the crisis of youth. 56 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Internal displacement: global overview of t rends a nd d evelopments i n 2008, April 2009, 8, h ttp://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 49fe9a952.html (accessed 1 August 2010). 57 A Veale, From c hild s oldier t o ex-f ighter: f emale f ighters, d emobilisation a nd r eintegration in Ethiopia, Monograph 85, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003. 58 M H all, Th e M ozambican N ational R esistance M ovement (REN AMO): a s tudy in t he destruction of an African country, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 60(1) (1990). 59 J-P C hauveau a nd P R ichards, W est A frican in surgencies in a grarian p erspective: C te dIvoire and Sierra Leone compared, Journal of Agrarian Change 8(4) (2008), 515552. 60 Q O utram, Its t erminal ei ther wa y: a n a nalysis o f a rmed co nflict in L iberia, 19891996, Review of African Political Economy 73 (1997), 355371. 61 G P runier, From gen ocide t o c ontinental w ar: t he Congolese c onflict a nd t he cr isis o f contemporary Africa, London: Hurst, 2009. 62 Outram, Its terminal either way, 361. 63 Joan Hecht, The journey of the lost boys, Jacksonville: Allswell Press, 2005. 64 P le B illion, R esource wealth and Angolas uncivil wars, in C J A rnson and I W Z artman, Rethinking the economics of war: the intersection of need, creed, and greed, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005. 65 Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: Getting away with murder, mutilation, rape, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. 66 A de Waal, Counter-insurgency on the cheap, Review of African Political Economy 31(102) (2004). 67 Other va riables f or t he co mmunity a re: (1) Th e k ind o f li velihoods t he co mmunity o r community m embers dep end o n a c arpenter c an le ave w ith hi s t oolbox, b ut a fa rmer cannot take his land with him; (2) some livelihood activities are seasonal (during the harvest period a farmer will be more reluctant to abandon his fields); (3) If the micro-political prewar relations within the community give reason for some to fear that these can be exploited by fellow civilians/fighting factions; and (4) The ethnical, political or religious composition of t he co mmunity a nd if t hese c haracteristics a re a mong t he r oot c auses o f t he wa r a nd therefore something which can agitate factions. 68 Jakkie Ci lliers, Human s ecurity i n A frica: a c onceptual f ramework f or r eview, M onograph, African H uman S ecurity I nitiative, 2004, 9, h ttp://www.iss.co.za/uploads/AHSIMONO1. PDF (accessed 3 August 2010). 69 P R ichards, N ew p olitical v iolence in A frica: s ecular s ectarianism in S ierra L eone, GeoJournal 47 (1999), 433442. 70 Richards, Fighting for the rainforest, 155. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid, 156.

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State, regional and international responses to militia and rebel activities in Africa
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INTRODUCTION
States a re exp ected t o m aintain g eneral h armony a nd s atisfaction a mong t he people, or generic peace, as well as to keep the peace, meaning law and order. Most states, h owever, t end t o co ncentrate o n k eeping t he p eace a t t he exp ense o f maintaining g eneric p eace a nd t he r esult i s o ften co nfrontations.1 This i s particularly the case with fragile states, which, argues Eka Ikpe, lack the capacity and resilience to protect themselves from various challenges. This means that they cannot protect citizens, absorb shocks and manage conflict without resorting to violence.2 Fragility creates an environment for violence because of the perceived inability of s ecurity f orces in a s tate t o co mmand t rust. S uch s tates b ecome b reeding grounds for illicit activities that compound their problems.3 If properly handled, the agitations can lead to reforms or semblances of reform as a way of keeping the peace, for it i s t he un heeded c alls for reforms t hat le ad to rebellions. When t he point of rebellion has been reached, it means that the ruling elite would have lost legitimacy in t he e yes o f t he r uled, w ho h ave t ransferred t heir lo yalty t o n ew groups or leaders.4 In the process, different types of militia and rebels emerge.
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Militias and rebel groups tend to destabilise individual states and their regions and some h ave ext ra-continental ra mifications a nd r equire dif ferent t ypes o f responses. Both these groups challenge constituted authority, whether at the state, regional or international levels. Militias are organised and often armed groups that operate within a s tate and sometimes appear to be condoned. They generally do not challenge t he leg itimacy of t he government. R ebel movements, however, do not co nsider t he g overnment t o b e leg itimate a nd m ay a im a t o verthrowing i t. Since rebels can transform a lo cal conflict into a m uch wider issue that calls for solutions beyond the capacity of any single state, it calls for concerted effort within the region to resolve the conflict, on a regional or even continental basis. Responses t o mi litia a nd r ebel m ovements, w hether a t s tate, r egional a nd international le vels, va ry acco rding t o t he c hallenges t hey p resent. R esponses include a ttempts a t s uppression o r p olitical acco mmodation t hrough constitutional restructuring in t he form of power-sharing. If unresolved, it could lead to state fragmentation and separation. Regional as well as continental players, worried about their complex interests, contribute to each of the responses.

STATE RESPONSES
State responses generally include suppression, creating counterinsurgency forces, constitutional r estructuring a nd in viting f oreign in tervention. I n t he c ase o f suppression, the state tries to destroy militias and rebel movements by mobilising all types of security apparatus in a show of force. The use of force is justified as the proper response of the state to internal enemies. Suppression becomes a l aw and order operation and a les son to other would-be troublemakers that the state has the capacity to act. In Kenya, for instance, Mwai Kibakis administration repeatedly tried t o cr ush t he Mungiki by a rresting m embers a nd le aders in p aramilitary operations.5 Mungiki operations, however, appeared to decline only after its leader, Maina N jenga, wa s r eleased f rom p rison. N jenga t hen lin ked u p w ith f ormer President Daniel arap Moi in a crusade for peace in which he advised his estimated five million followers to change their ways.6 At t imes, s tates en gage in de ceptions a nd p ortray q uestionable b ehaviour a s inevitable and in the best interests of the country.7 To deal with perceived threats, they encourage pro-government militias or even create counterforces to militias in the f orm o f s pecial uni ts. I n S udan, t he g overnment ini tially en couraged A rab militias to counter the advances of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA).8
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In Uganda t he government encouraged and t rained t he Arrow B oys and Amuka Boys supposedly t o p rotect t he ci tizens, w hile i ts s oldiers w ere f ighting J oseph Konys Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in the north. This was in the hope that the government would be able to disarm the militia once the LRA had been defeated.9 In R wanda t he s tate h elped t o cr eate t he Interahamwe as a wa y o f m eeting a n assumed t hreat in t he c hallenge p osed b y t he Tutsi, b ut t hen i t s eemingly los t control of the group.10 The danger is that such counterforces could embarrass those who s tart or condone t hem w hen t hey b ecome un controllable and t ake t he l aw into their own hands.11 Another t ype o f r esponse i s t o en gage in co nstitutional r estructuring, a socioeconomic and political redistribution mechanism to deal with two internal challenges. The first is the political differences among politicians and the second is the friction between the idea of state and the idea of nation. Accommodating political differences takes into account political interests of key players who have the proven ability to exercise influence on militias to disrupt or continue to disrupt the p eace if t hey are not addressed. Of va rious options, a ll of t hem focusing on political co ntrol, p ower s haring h as in creasingly b ecome t he accep ted m ode o f constitutional r estructuring.12 This i s do ne b y cr eating s pecial p ositions t o accommodate v ocal le aders w ho inf luence mi litias, a s h appened in K enya a nd Zimbabwe in 2008. 13 The s econd t ype o f co nstitutional r estructuring t akes in to co nsideration t he existing f riction b etween t he ide a o f a n ation a nd t he ide a o f a s tate14 by recommending dif ferent wa ys o f s plitting t he s tate. On e wa y i s t o cr eate ministates, o r p rovinces a nd di stricts, w ithin t he s tate, w hich t hen r eceive lo cal autonomy, w hile r emaining s ubordinate t o t he n ational g overnment. Th ey a lso tend to compete with each other for national attention. Another way is to permit territories to secede from the state and become independent countries. Both types are f ound in co nflicts in E thiopian co nstitutional r econstruction.15 While s tates were f ree t o s ecede in t he reconstructed Ethiopian f ederal sys tem a fter m eeting laid-down stipulations, t hey still tend to compete for b enefits f rom t he national government. A dif ferent t ype o f r esponse i s t o in vite ext ernal in tervention, w hich i s a n admission of defeat. Often it is the leaders of the rebellions who call for external intervention. In Liberia, for instance, critics of Samuel Doe, such as Taylor, stirred up foreign interest groups.16 However, when governments are desperate they, too, call for intervention. The transitional government in Somalia, unable to contain Al Shabaab, r epeatedly c alled o n E thiopia o r K enya t o in tervene o n i ts b ehalf.17
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Although Kenya did n ot intervene, Ethiopia and Uganda did in t he name of the African Union.

CLUSTERS OF CONFLICT AND REGIONAL RESPONSES

The c alls f or in tervention f ocus a ttention o n t he r ole o f n eighbours in a g iven region, particularly on the African continent. Political disputes among leaders that degenerate into disruption of the peace have garnered an assortment of regional responses. The presence of rival militias and rebel movements in a s tate or in the region m akes in tervention p roblematic, y et A frica, a s a co ntinent, h as h ad t o respond. Since independence in t he 1960s, mi litias and rebel movements have b een a source of concern to the African continent and the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was itself a response to this concern. The OAU had to deal with rebel movements that challenged, in t he first place, the states as territorially constituted a nd, in t he s econd, t he leg itimacy o f g overnmental a uthorities. Th e response o f t he OAU wa s t o di scourage b oth t ypes o f c hallenges. It u pheld t he sanctity o f co lonial b oundaries a nd t hereby di scouraged s ecessionist r ebel movements. It also prohibited interference in t he internal affairs of a si ster state, which implied no support to those who challenged governmental legitimacy.18 This p osition, h owever, did n ot s top m ember s tates f rom in terfering in t he internal a ffairs o f o thers o r en couraging di ssidence, a nd a s a r esult t here w ere numerous quasi-wars between states. Somalia had irredentist ambitions in Kenya, Ethiopia and D jibouti and supported rebels in t hose areas. L ike S omalia, Sudan supported Er itrean s ecessionists a gainst E thiopia.19 Sudan a nd L ibya s upported rebellions in C had w ith L ibyas t roops o ccupying t he Aouzou S trip in n orthern Chad.20 Libyas Muammar Gaddafi did n ot consider artificial colonial boundaries an obstacle to his grand idea of unif ying brothers and sisters in Tunisia, Chad, Mali and Niger with Libya.21 The OAU therefore eventually had to deal with the growth of militias and rebel movements that tended to destabilise regions and generate refugees. Security was a m ajor co ncern a nd s o m embers a t t he 1969 O AU C onvention o n R efugees requested that those offering asylum to refugees ensure that the latter abstain from any subversive activities against any member state of the OAU. In return, signatory states undertook to prohibit refugees residing in t heir respective territories from attacking a ny s tate m ember o f t he OAU, b y a ny ac tivity li kely t o c ause t ension between member states, and in particular by use of arms, through the press, or by
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radio.22 Despite these undertakings, disputes in one country spread to neighbours and led to the development of some four geographical clusters of conflict, namely the Mano River cluster, the Southern Africa cluster, the Great Lakes cluster, and the Horn of Africa cluster. In each cluster, militia and rebel activities that started in o ne co untry t ended t o s pread t o n earby s tates a nd t o b ecome r egional problems.23

The Mano River cluster

The conflicts in West Africa revolved mainly around the Mano River and attracted their fair share of regional intervention. Although the Mano River cluster affected mostly Sierra Leone and Liberia, it disrupted Guinea and Cte dIvoire, too. Sierra Leone and Liberia are products of post-American revolution debates on the future of free blacks in North America. To start with, the English created Sierra Leone as a place to take blacks from Nova Scotia or slaves caught on the high seas rather than t ake t hem t o C anada o r B ritain. Th e returnees b ecame t he Krios, w ho dominated t he in digenous p opulations.24 Liberia wa s a p roduct o f f ear o f t he presence of free blacks among slaves in t he United States. Given that free blacks were suspected of inspiring slave revolt, the US did i ts best to find an alternative place f or s uch p eople, a nd L iberia wa s f orcibly acq uired f or t hat p urpose.25 The blacks, w ho went to b e f ree in W est A frica, w hether in S ierra L eone or L iberia, became m embers o f t he p rivileged c lass t hat t ended t o do minate t he natives, which in turn created simmering resentments. When Doe, a Krahn rather than an Americo-Liberian, t ook p ower in 1980, h e ga ined p opularity f or ex ecuting 13 Americo-Liberian t op o fficials f rom t he p revious g overnment a t w hat b ecame known as the Liberian Beach Party.26 Conflicts in L iberia a nd S ierra L eone er upted in t he 1990s, s tarting w ith Liberia w hen Taylor l aunched hi s a ttack in D ecember 1989, a fter m ysteriously escaping from a Massachusetts jail, before spreading to neighbouring Sierra Leone. Taylor h ad b road-based s upport in L iberia (in cluding c urrent P resident E llen Johnson-Sirleaf, w ho do nated US$10 000)27 and wa s a lso s upported b y international o perators.28 After T aylors co alition o f r ebels ra pidly a nnihilated Does f orces b y J uly 1990, i t s tarted f ragmenting in to f euding p ower-seeking groups that seemingly threatened the rest of West Africa. The regional response in W est A frica wa s b oth diplomatic a nd mi litary a nd had mixed results. The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS)
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tried t o in tervene di plomatically b ut fa iled. EC OWAS, le d b y N igeria, t hen transformed itself into a military organ called ECOMOG to intervene and restore peace in L iberia.29 Not all member countries were willing to s end troops and s o ECOMOG seemed to become part of the problem as other countries questioned Nigerias role and ac tivities.30 ECOMOG e ventually h elped to s ettle t he L iberian civil wa r b y p romising T aylor imm unity f rom in ternational p rosecution a nd asylum in Nigeria. Nigerias foreign affairs minister, Oleyumi Adeniji, asserted that the a sylum wa s g iven on h umanitarian g rounds in o rder t o s ave t he L iberian people from fighting, in o rder to save the peace process and vowed that Nigeria would not be harassed by anybody to hand over Taylor because that is not what a sovereign country would do.31 Pointing out that if Nigeria reneged on the asylum, nobody w ill r espect u s, N igerian P resident O lusegun O basanjo in sisted t hat nothing should be done to erode the credibility of Nigeria.32 The impression created was that since the level of conflict in t he Mano River cluster declined, providing a safe haven to warlords might be a way for regions to end p rolonged co nflicts in t heir c lusters. Thi s t ype o f r esponse, h owever, wa s eroded in 2006, w hen P resident O basanjo, un der p ressure f rom US P resident George W B ush, reneged on Taylors asylum. By handing over Taylor, O basanjo eroded the credibility of Nigeria, which then undermined Nigerias standing as a possible mediator in other conflicts.33

The Southern Africa cluster

The response to rebel movements in the Southern Africa cluster had two racially opposed aspects. The first responses came from white political entities trying to survive in t he mid st o f g rowing a nti-colonialism in A frica. Th e s econd wa s engendered by the attitudes and activities of liberated African states in support of freedom fighters in the remaining colonial states, namely Rhodesia, South Africa, South West Africa, Mozambique and Angola. The OAU expected every member to contribute financially according to ability, to assist such freedom fighters.34 On their part, the racist regimes tried to put up a united front against what they believed was an affront to the Western way of life. This was particularly the case in the 1960s, w hen, o ther t han S outh A frica, o nly t he P ortuguese co lonies a nd Rhodesia r emained a s b astions o f w hite s upremacy, def ending w hat R hodesias prime mini ster, I an S mith, c alled Western, C hristian ci vilisation.35 When t he Portuguese quit in t he 1970s, Mozambique fell under the Frente de Libertao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) and Angola under the Movimento Popular da Libertao
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de Angola (MPLA). South Africa had also responded to the presence of the MPLA in A ngola w ith an invasion, condoned by t he US, a nd t hereby m ade A ngola an ideological and physical battleground in the Cold War.36 South Africa and Rhodesia adopted a s trategy of destabilisation of anti-racist forces in t he neighbouring states. Given that FRELIMO worked closely with the Zimbabwe A frican N ational U nion (Z ANU), R hodesia s upported a r ebel movement c alled t he N ational R esistance M ovement (MNR o r REN AMO) t o destabilise M ozambique. W hen Z ANU w on a nd R hodesia b ecame Z imbabwe, South A frica in herited t he s ponsorship o f REN AMO a nd h elped t o m ake i t politically acceptable.37 South Africa also mounted raids on frontline states in i ts total n ational s trategy o f des tabilisation.38 To t his en d, S outh A frica f orced Mozambique to sign the Nkomati Accord, denying bases to the African National Congress (ANC).39 Destabilisation of frontline states, however, could not stop the metamorphosis o f R hodesia in to Z imbabwe in 1980 o r S outh West A frica in to Namibia in 1990. A nd a lthough S outh A frica t ried t o un dermine t he a ntiapartheid image by sponsoring a third force in support of black-on-black violence within South Africa, it was forced to abandon apartheid because it could no longer guarantee white rule in the midst of increasing pressure for change.40 The response from the African side o f the racial equation was twofold. One, victims of colonialism and apartheid mounted guerrilla warfare against the regime and appealed for international help, starting with neighbouring African countries. Two, j ust a s S outh A frica appeared t o h ave t he t acit s upport o f t he West, b lack South A fricans f ighting a partheid h ad b oth o pen a nd t acit s upport o f A frican countries. Th ese co untries, h owever, w ere in dividually vu lnerable a nd t ogether formed the frontline states to coordinate their responses to the threats posed by South A frica. Th e t hreats w ere b oth mi litary a nd e conomic, le ading, a mong others, t o t he f ormation o f t he S outhern A frican D evelopment C ommunity (SADC). Th e purpose wa s t o les sen t he e conomic dep endence of t he frontline states on South Africa, but SADC also aimed at coordinating its support for antiapartheid forces operating in t heir own countries. Thi s objective changed w hen apartheid was defeated.

The Great Lakes cluster

Zimbabwe p resident, R obert M ugabe, a long w ith UN S ecretary-General K ofi Annan a nd A U C ommission C hairman A lpha O umar K onare, a s w ell a s t he
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presidents of S outh Africa, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, Namibia and Malawi, were witnesses to the 2004 declaration by the International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes region (ICGLR), which was sig ned in D ar-es-Salaam b y p residents o f 11 A frican co untries (A ngola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Republic o f C ongo a nd S udan). Th e de claration s tressed t hat m ember s tates should n ot b e a llowed t o u se t heir t erritories a s b ases f or a ggression a nd subversion a gainst e ach o ther. Th ey a greed t o neutralise, di sarm, a rrest a nd transfer to relevant international tribunals the perpetrators of genocide and also committed t hemselves t o p reventing any dir ect o r in direct s upport, de livery o f arms or any other form of assistance to armed groups operating in the region.41 To prove i t wa s s erious, I CGLR o fficials faci litated t he a rrest a nd t ransfer t o Th e Hague for trial by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba.42 The D ar-es-Salaam D eclaration wa s o ne o f t he r egional r esponses t o developments m ainly in t he Great L akes cluster t hat involved Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and particularly Congo. It was a response to the challenges posed by rebel movements a nd mi litias, w hich r equired co ncerted ef forts in t he f orm o f mediations, p ower-sharing de als a nd in vasions. A t in dependence, w ith m any politicians w illing t o be bought t o u ndermine t he government of P atrice Lumumba, Joseph Mobutu ultimately replaced Lumumba and plunged the Congo, which he renamed Zaire, into protracted chaos that affected the neighbours for a long t ime.43 With t he em ergence o f M obutu a s t he s trong m an s oon a fter independence, activities by Congolese militias and rebel movements affected and tended to destabilise its neighbours. Among those neighbours that were affected were Uganda and Rwanda in t he east a nd b oth h ad t heir o wn p roblems t hat w ere co mpounded b y e vents in t he Congo. Internal problems in Uganda had led Idi Amin to overthrow Milton Obote, who then organised rebel movements from Tanzania. After ousting Amin in 1980, the rebels fragmented and Kenyas effort to mediate was not successful. Eventually Yoweri Musevenis National Resistance Army came to power in 1986. 44 Museveni was helped by Rwandese rebels, called the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). Members of the RPF were Rwandese exiles, mostly from a Tutsi background, who were in conflict with Juvnal Habyarimana's government. Under the umbrella of t he OAU, t he r egion t ried t o m ediate b etween H abyarimana a nd t he RP F a t Arusha, Tanzania, and succeeded in getting the two sides to sign a power-sharing deal. Th e de al did n ot l ast a nd in stead, f ollowing t he a ssassination o f
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Habyarimana, there was a mass slaughter of the Tutsis. A government-sponsored militia, the Interahamwe, went on a rampage in 1994 and killed more than 800 000 people.45 The mass killings stopped when the RPF, operating from Uganda, took over co ntrol o f t he co untry a nd f ormer g overnment o fficials a s w ell a s t he Interahamwe militias es caped t o e astern Z aire, w here t hey b ecame a s ource o f concern for the cluster. By t he l ate 1980s, M obutu h ad b ecome a r egional em barrassment f or o ther leaders in the Great Lakes cluster. Their response to the crisis in eastern Zaire was twofold, with countries united but then turning on each other. At first leaders Paul K agame o f R wanda, Y oweri M useveni o f U ganda, R obert M ugabe o f Zimbabwe a nd J os dos Sa ntos o f A ngola f ormed a t emporary a lliance t o support a rebellion against Mobutu.46 The second response led to the fragmentation of the alliance as allies turned on each other. Each appeared bent on exploiting the natural wealth in the Congo and some b ecame b ig exp orters o f min erals n ot f ound in t heir o wn co untries. Th e allies started accusing each other of all sorts of things, and Kabila kicked Kagames men out of Kinshasa and then Museveni and Kagame turned on each other in the eastern C ongo. S tate in terests t ook cen tre s tage. Th ey a ll s tarted u sing r ebel movements t hat w ere iden tified w ith o ne co untry a s o pposed t o t he o ther, a s proxies within the eastern Congo.

The Horn of Africa cluster

Some countries in the Great Lakes cluster are linked to the Horn of Africa cluster, which i s e qually co mplex in t erms o f t he im pact o f, a nd r esponses t o, r ebel movements and militias. It is a cluster in which conflicts tend to be in multiples of seeming in compatibles a nd t here h ave b een a t le ast f our b order di sputes, t wo leading t o wars.47 In competing for l and, resources, t he hi storical m emory, faith and ide ology, co untries t end t o s upport r ebel m ovements in t he p erceived r ival country. Th e r egional o rgan t hrough w hich i ssues w ere t o b e h andled wa s t he Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which started as a b ody concerned with the effects of drought, but then turned to security matters.48 Three co untries t hat do minate t he H orn o f A frica a s fa r a s r egionally destructive r ebel m ovements a re co ncerned, a re S udan, E thiopia a nd S omalia. They have competing interests that encourage rebellions and even wars, some of them in t he form of proxy wars in w hich rebels are u sed a gainst other s tates.49
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They suffer, notes Ruth Iyob, from a crisis of identity, stemming from the contest for hegemony by Christianity and Islam and African and Arab civilisations.50 At one time, Pan-Ethiopianism appeared to be the dominating influence in the region in co mpetition w ith t he A rab M uslim inf luence, w hich wa s exp anding southwards. B oth E thiopia a nd S udan s tressed hi storical c laims t hat p re-dated European conquests. These were complicated by the Somali vision of occupying Djibouti, Ethiopia and parts of Kenya. The regional response varied from mediations to taking part in p eacekeeping operations, a nd e ven cra fting g overnments o f n ational uni ty, a nd wa s o ften specific to t he p articular country. The f irst were challenges f rom S omalia, in i ts Pan-Somali dr eam, in t he f orm o f s upport o f r ebel ac tivities in K enya a nd Ethiopia. Thi s r esulted in t he l atter t wo en tering in to a def ence a greement a nd seeking OAU help. It also led Somalia into a quasi-war with Kenya, known as the Shifta, a nd a r eal wa r w ith E thiopia, t he Ogaden W ar.51 Instead o f ac hieving i ts dream, Somalia eventually disintegrated after 1991, w hen President Mohammed Siad Barre was ousted by forces of the United Somali Congress.52 Somalia thereafter became a United Nations and OAU security problem, as it fragmented into warlord fiefdoms. The issue was handled in t wo ways. First, the US le d a UN-a ttempted in tervention t o r estore o rder b y di sarming S omali warlords. This was poorly executed and forced the UN to leave in an embarrassing manner.53 Second, t he O AU p aid m ore a ttention a nd en couraged I GAD t o de al with S omalia a nd i t s eemingly ado pted a t wo-track s trategy: o n t he o ne h and restoring cen tral a uthority a nd, o n t he o ther, k eeping t he p eace. T o r estore governance, I GAD faci litated t he cr eation o f a f ederal t ransitional g overnment with elections being held in N airobi.54 Transferring the Somali government from Nairobi t o M ogadishu r equired s ecurity b ecause t he n umber o f wa rlords wa s increasing, and some were comfortable in Nairobi.55 IGAD authorised the creation of a p eacekeeping f orce, f irst k nown a s t he I GAD P eace S upport M ission t o Somalia, w hich did n ot t ake p lace b ecause o f log istical fa ilures. N ext, I GAD authorised the AU Mission to Somalia, which was partially realised in 2007 a nd tries to keep the Federal Transitional Government afloat in the midst of opposition from Al Shabaab and the warlords who are responsible for piracy along the Somali coast.56 Apart f rom S omalia, I GAD a lso co ncerned i tself w ith S udan, w here n either negative p eace n or p ositive p eace exi sts, p articularly in t he s outhern p art. Rebellion in S outhern Sudan started soon after independence and despite many
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attempts a t p eacemaking, h as n ot b een r esolved y et. I nstead, t he n eighbouring countries o f S udan a nd U ganda en ded u p t rading acc usations t hat e ach wa s supporting rebels. Uganda supported the SPLA, while Sudan supported the LRA. IGAD faci litated t he p eace p rocess in S udan b etween t he g overnment a nd t he SPLA t hat le d to t he C omprehensive Peace Agreement in S udan.57 This h ad t he effect of reducing the need for Sudan to continue using the LRA or Uganda using the S PLA a s p roxies. Th e r egion r emains v olatile es pecially w ith r egard t o t he question of Somalia, which has called on its neighbours to intervene and save it.58 In the Horn of Africa cluster, the organisation for responding is the IGAD and it has had mixed results. It still faces c hallenges relating to disputes over borders mainly b etween E thiopia a nd Er itrea, a nd o ver h ow t o de al w ith p roblems in Somalia. With the support of the AU and the international community, IGAD has had some limited successes in es tablishing a g overnment in S omalia, although it remains fragile, and in faci litating a s ettlement of the dispute between the SPLA and the government of Sudan.

EXTRA-CONTINENTAL RESPONSES
Extra-continental f orces, t ermed t he international co mmunity in r eference t o powerful North American and Western European countries, affect developments in Africa and respond in roughly four overlapping ways. The first is a temporary promotion o f a nti-government le aders t o o ust r egimes o r t o s upport le aders o f such regimes against the rebels. Such people, whether they are leaders of regimes or rebel movements, are discarded once they have outlived their usefulness. The second i s t o m ount in tervention, ei ther uni laterally o r t hrough r ecognised international organs like the UN or the OAU/AU. The third is to accept a stalemate and pressure the parties to negotiate and accept a power-sharing deal. The fourth is to mobilise the International Criminal Court (ICC) to try specific persons. There a re t imes w hen a ll f our a ppear t o a pply a nd t hey a ll f ind in tellectual support in t he assertions of experts on Africa. Given that the power to define is the power to destroy or create,59 the experts tend to guide the responses with their commentaries p ortraying s overeignty in A frica a s fa rce, p hantom o r mira ge. Jeffrey Herbst, other than recommending redrawing of African boundaries rather than try to resuscitate failing states, wanted the UN to decertify or deregister some countries from the roster of sovereign states. Christopher Clapham, believing that the existence of some states is itself a threat to security, thinks that the sovereignty
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of African states should be shared with an external entity.60 Advocates of coups and arming r ebel g roups t arget m ainly R obert M ugabe, t he im perial bogeyman.61 Thus, James Kirchick of The New Republic begged outgoing US President George W Bu sh t o en hance hi s legac y a s a li berator by invading Z imbabwe in o rder t o liberate mi llions.62 And Paul C ollier, claiming t hat mi litary coups in A frica are progressive, wanted the new US president, Barack Obama, to use moral authority derived from his African identity to help mount coups.63 Congo i s a g ood exa mple o f t he f irst t ype o f in ternational r esponse o f promoting and then dumping leaders. Soon after Congo became independent in 1960, P atrice L umumba a nnoyed ext ra-continental f orces w ith hi s n ationalistic policies on Congo. Immediately, interference from the US and Belgium, assisted by France, B ritain a nd S outh A frica, p lunged t hat co untry in to c haos. Th ey w ere supported b y C ongolese p oliticians w ho h ad li ttle t ime f or L umumbas p olitical and e conomic n ationalism.64 As a r esult, J oseph M obutu b ecame p resident o f Congo but after he outlived his usefulness, he became expendable. The effort to distance t hemselves f rom s ome o f t heir o wn cr eations wa s p artly b ecause t hese countries considered that relying on individual leaders in a symbiotic relationship was in i tself unreliable.65 The US, a mong others, started to shift positions and to abandon what former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, termed the essence of post-war American foreign policy.66 The French have a record of giving the second type of international response, namely intervention.67 Considered a traditional gendarme in Africa,68 the French response has tended to be one of intervention either to ensure survival of its men in power or to depose them after they had outlived their usefulness.69 There were times, t herefore, w hen t he F rench u sed m ercenaries w ho h ad dir ect lin ks t o Jacques F occart, t he p rincipal ad viser o f t he F rench g overnment o n A frica. I n Rwanda, the French helped to train and arm the Interahamwe, which was largely responsible for the genocide.70 Despite French support the rebel RPF won, which accounted for the subsequent hostility between France and Rwanda. The image of France as a supporter of mass killers accounts for the French attempt, according to current p resident N ikolas Sa rkozy, t o rid t he r elationship b etween A frica a nd France of the fantasies and the myths that pollute it.71 It was Bernard Kouchner, Sarkozys current foreign minister, who founded Mdecins Sans Frontires in 1971, and later advanced the idea of the right to military humanitarian intervention.72 Americans a lso engage in dif ferent t ypes o f in tervention, dir ectly a nd indirectly, and they find it difficult to refrain from total involvement, particularly
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of a mi litary nature. After the disaster in S omalia, however, they tend to look for different wa ys o f r esponding t o t hreats t o t heir in terests a nd f ind a llies a mong rebel movements and militias. Former American secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, a sserted in 2008 t hat t he US wa s c alled t o le ad in de aling w ith a n ew perspective on what constituted threats to an international order that reflects our values.73 This mig ht h elp exp lain t he 2007 cr eation o f t he A frican C ommand (AFRICOM), in itself an indication of Africa becoming more important from a US security p oint o f v iew.74 Through t he three D s o f di plomacy, de velopment a nd defence, AFRI COM i s s upposed t o h elp s olve s ecurity p roblems w ithout ext racontinental intervention, while keeping American troops out of Africa for decades to come or the next 50 years.75 African states, however, showed reluctance to host AFRICOM, in t he light of the Bush grand strategy of pre-emptive strikes based on suspicions of dictatorial inclinations or non-cooperation with, and possible questioning, of US hegemonic desires.76 AFRICOM i s exp ected t o o utsource s ervices t o p rivate s ecurity companies,77 which, according to Andrew Bearpark, director-general of the British Association o f P rivate S ecurity C ompanies, carry o ut ac tivities p reviously performed by national militaries.78 African states resist hosting the command for fear i t mig ht b e u sed t o s tage q uick a ttacks o n n eighbouring co untries o r e ven destabilise the host country. The third response is to try a multilateral approach to negotiated settlement in a perceived stalemate between governments and rebels. The Germans, preferring to side w ith the US a nd France, opt for coordinated responses from the West in stemming t he inf lux o f A fricans t o E urope.79 They wa nt conflict p revention measures to ensure development at the grassroots level and to address the root causes t hat g ive r ise t o r ebels. W here t hat i s n ot p ossible, a s in t he c ase o f Zimbabwe, where the leader supposedly destroys the country,80 Germans consider the exit option of quitting.81 The Germans, not alone in seeking root causes, often join others in imposing power-sharing in order to end a perceived stalemate. The f ourth t ype o f ext ra-continental r esponse co mbines t he o verthrow o f governments w ith t he a rrest o f le aders o f r ebel m ovements t o b e t ried a t Th e Hague by the ICC as a way of curbing impunity. Although the US refused to be a member o f t he I CC, i t i s ac tive in r eferring A fricans t o in ternational cr iminal tribunals. Thi s h appened t o C harles T aylor, w hose r ebel m ovement ini tially appeared to have American support in o verthrowing Liberias Samuel Doe,82 but after p lunging t he r egion in to de ep c haos, A mericans en sured t hat Taylor wa s
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taken to trial at The Hague.83 Despite accusations of selective justice and targeting Africans, particularly when it picked on Sudans President Omar el-Bashir, and of ignoring perpetrators of atrocities in big powerful countries,84 the threat of being referred t o t he I CC h as acq uired in ternational p olitical c urrency in A frica a s a warning to both rebel movements and most governments. From t he a bove, i t i s c lear t hat t here i s a g reat va riety in ext ra-continental responses and that they are affected by perceived interests. There are times when they en courage r ebel m ovements t o des tabilise le aders o f t arget s tates w ithout direct in tervention. S ometimes t hey in tervene dir ectly a nd im pose a p erson o f their choice as the new ruler on a given state. They also put pressure on the parties in conflict to negotiate and reach power-sharing settlements. Most recently, they have used the ICC to give political warnings to leaders of both regimes and rebel movements.

CONCLUSION
The response to the presence of militias and rebel movements in any place and at any level is determined by the interests being advanced and protected. At the state level, t he g overnment r esponse c an t ake t he f orm o f a ttempted r epression, accommodation t o t he w ishes o f s ome o f t he mi litias a nd r ebel m ovements, o r succumbing to pressure and getting out or agreeing to decapacitate the state. Some militia a re s ponsored b y inf luential p eople in g overnments, o thers a re co opted after being established and perhaps being hard to control, and they are generally used t o co unter r ebel m ovements. There a re r ebels w ho a spire t o p ower irrespective of how it is achieved. If the state is weak, it surrenders power to the rebels or opts for a p ower-sharing deal. In most cases, the state tends to respond by suppressing the rebellion and trying to deny it legitimacy or eventually cutting a deal on an aspect of autonomy or even separation. States in a region worry about growing instability in an area within the region. This i s b ecause t he ac tivities o f mi litias a nd r ebel m ovements, a s w ell a s t he responses from governments, tend to generate refugees who flee to neighbouring states and also to create regional instability. The region then responds in s everal ways, depending on whether the rebel objective is to take over power or fragment the state. It tries to mediate and often suggest power-sharing deals. The region is likely t o s upport t he exi sting g overnment if i t co nsiders t he r ebels t o b e t he problem, o r m ay s upport t he r ebels if t he g overnment i s co nsidered t o b e t he
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problem. On t he issue of separation, however, regional neighbours tend to insist on the sanctity of the state as constituted. On the regional front, there have been limited successes in terms of settlement but not of resolution of conflicts. In part, the seeming success in t he Mano River cluster was due to the strong action taken by ECOMOG, led by Nigeria, as well as the s upport o f ext ra-continental f orces, a lthough t he co untries in volved w ere extremely weak. In the Horn of Africa, IGAD produced s ettlements in S omalia, which q uickly f loundered, a nd in S udan, w hich i s h olding. I n t he G reat L akes cluster, t he r esponse va ried f rom mi litary in terventions t o cra fting a p owersharing de al in t he D emocratic R epublic o f C ongo (D RC), b ut t his wa s undermined by competing country and international interests. In the Southern Africa cluster, the region intervened to settle an acrimonious political dispute in Zimbabwe that affected the area, by brokering a power-sharing deal. Power sharing is often an external imposition either by regional neighbours or by ext ra-continental f orces. Th e r esponses f rom ext ra-continental f orces, a ll driven b y t heir o wn in terests, va ry, b ut t here i s t he t endency t o s upport r ebel movements plotting to oust target regimes or to strengthen leaders of such regimes against the rebels. Protection for such leaders is withdrawn once they outlive their value. A t t imes, t he s upport t akes t he f orm o f uni lateral o r m ultilateral intervention supposedly on humanitarian grounds. An alternative, when there is a perceived stalemate, is to pressure the parties concerned to settle through powersharing arrangements. In recent t imes, t he ext ra-continental p owers respond by using t he ICC as a wa rning to force le aders of regimes and rebel movements to behave. I rrespective o f t he si tuation, ext ra-continental p owers s upport c lient regimes or rebel movements when it suits their interests. In the process, they help to cr eate in stability by a iding r ebel m ovements a nd e ven s ponsor co ups a gainst regimes t hey do n ot li ke or restore t he p eace by a ssisting in s ettling di sputes in prolonged conflicts.

NOTES
1 2 3 Macharia M unene, Generic p eace a nd the p eace: a di scourse, The J ournal o f L anguage, Technology & Entrepreneurship in Africa 1(2) (2009), 218228. Eka Ik pe, C hallenging t he di scourse o n f ragile s tates, Conflict, Security a nd D evelopment 7(1) (2007), 85124, 86. Gumisai M utume, Or ganised cr ime t argets w eak A frican s tates, Africa R enewal, U nited Nations Department of Public Information 21(2) (July 2007), 3.
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4 5

6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14

15

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19 20

Macharia M unene, The p olitics o f t ransition i n K enya, 19951998, N airobi: Q uest a nd Insight, 2001, 4952, 54, 9496. Wangui Kanina and C Bryson Hull, Bodies pile up in Kenyas Mungiki gang war, Reuters, 26 June 2008; Jane Mugambi, Kenya: massive manhunt in Central, Nairobi Star, 21 April 2009; Kioi Mbugua, Containing Mungiki menace will require change in policy, The Nation, 29 May 2007; F red M ukinda, K illings lin ked t o t he wa r a gainst Mungiki sect, Daily N ation, 23 October 2007, h ttp://.religionnewsblog.com/19737/mungiki-32 (acces sed 5 M ay 2010); Gitau Warigi, Police impunity: Maj General Ali seems to be playing his politics better than Raila, Sunday Nation, 22 March 2009. Beatrice O bwocha a nd J ames M unyeki, M oi a sks le aders t o s top wa r o f w ords a nd s eek dialogue, The Standard on Sunday, 7 March 2010, 4. John Kurk Jacobsen, Why do states bother to deceive? Managing trust at home and abroad, Review of International Studies 34(2), (2008), 337, 340. John Prendergast, Roots of famine in Sudans killing fields, in John B Sorensen (ed), Disaster and development in the Horn of Africa, New York: St Martins Press, 1995. Kasaija P hilip Apuuli, Th e I nternational Cr iminal C ourt a nd t he L ords R esistance A rmy insurgency in n orthern U ganda, in A lfred N hema a nd P aul T iyambe Z eleza (e ds), The resolution o f A frican c onflicts: t he m anagement o f c onflict r esolution a nd p ost-conflict reconstruction, Addis Ababa: OSSREA, 2008, 55. David McDonald, From guerrillas to government: post-conflict stability in Liberia, Uganda and Rwanda, Third World Quarterly 29(2) (2008), 363. David Francis, Introduction, in David Francis (ed), Civil militias: Africas intractable security menace, London: Ashgate, 2005, 121. Rene Lemarchand, Consociationalism and power sharing in A frica: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, African Affairs 106(422) (2007), 120. Paul Collier, Obamas footsteps, The Guardian, 12 February 2009. Alfred Nhema, Introduction: the resolution of African conflicts, in Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Z eleza (e ds), The r esolution o f A frican c onflicts: t he m anagement o f c onflict resolution and post conflict reconstruction, Addis Ababa: OSSREA, 2008, 2. Teshome B W ondwosen a nd J an Z hrok, F ederalism in A frica: t he c ase o f et hnic-based federalism in Ethiopia, International Journal of Human Sciences 5(2) (2008), 1517; K idane Mengisteab, Ethiopias ethnic-based federalism: 10 years after, African Issues 29(1/2) (2001), 2025. William R eno, Warlord p olitics a nd A frican sta tes, B oulder a nd L ondon: L ynne R ienner, 1998, 29, 38. David Ochami, Leaders call for intervention in Somalia crisis, The Standard, Kenya, 18 July 2009. Jon Woronoff, Organising African Unity, Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, 1970, 329330; Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and intervention in the Horn of Africa, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980, 45; K orwa G A dar, Kenyan foreign policy behaviour towards Somalia, 19631983, Lanham: University Press of America, 1994, 2939. C O C A mate, Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in practice, London: Macmillan, 1986, 459 460. Ibid, 450.
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21 Benjamin Nueberger, Irredentism and politics in Africa, in Naomi Chazan (ed), Irredentism and international politics, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 1991, 99100. 22 Quotes f rom O sita C Eze , Human r ights i n A frica: s ome s elected p roblems, L agos: Th e Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1984, 235240. 23 Stephen Jackson, B orderlands and t he t ransformation of war e conomies: lessons f rom DR Congo, Conflict, Security and Development 6(3) (2006), 426. 24 Marq de V illiers a nd S heila H irtle, Into A frica: a jo urney t hrough t he a ncient em pires, London: Phoenix Giant, 1998, 251. 25 Macharia M unene, The T ruman a dministration a nd t he d ecolonisation o f s ub-Saharan Africa, Nairobi: Nairobi University Press, 1995, 56. 26 Reno, Warlord politics and African states, 8081, 85. 27 Pita Ochai, Johnson-Sirleaf in the eye of the storm, Newswatch Magazine, 12 July 2009; Kate Thomas, Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission retracts controversial report, 2 July 2009, h ttp://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-07-02-voa31-68744357.html (accessed 5 May 2010); BBC News, Sirleaf sorry she backed Taylor, BBC, 12 February 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7887117.stm (accessed 5 May 2010). 28 Reno, Warlord politics and African states, 92. 29 Benjamin W A hadzi, F ailure o f do mestic p olitics a nd ci vil wa r in L iberia: r egional ramifications o f EC OWAS in tervention, in K enneth Om eje (e d), War t o p eace t ransition, Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 2009, 5357. 30 Tom P orteous, Resolving African conflicts, C rimes of W ar P roject: w ar i n A frica, http://www.crimesofwar.org/africa-mag/afr_01_porteos.html (accessed 19 February 2007). 31 Liberia-Nigeria: questions raised over Taylors exile in Nigeria, IRIN, Lagos, 21 August 2003, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx/ReportedId=45709 (accessed 5 May 2010). 32 Michael A Fletcher, Nigerian leader says he wont turn Taylor over for trial, The Washington Post, 6 May 2005. 33 A Bolaji Akinyemi, The Taylor saga: a clash of civilisations, New Africa, May 2006, 2024. 34 Amate, Inside the OAU, 459460. 35 James Kirchick, How tyranny came to Zimbabwe: Jimmy Carter still has a lot to answer for, The Weekly Standard, 12(38) (18 June 2007). 36 Peter J S chraeder, United S tates f oreign p olicy t oward A frica: i ncrementalism, cr isis a nd change, Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 211215. 37 Tom Y oung, F rom t he MNR t o REN AMO: m aking s ense o f a n A frican co unterrevolutionary insurgency, in P aul B R ich (e d), The dynamics of change in S outhern Africa, New York: St Martins Press, 1994, 149164. 38 Gwinyayi A lbert D zinesa, Swords i nto p loughshares: d isarmament, d emobilisation a nd reintegration in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, ISS P aper 120, P retoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2006, 3. 39 Stephen E llis a nd T sepo S echaba, Comrades a gainst a partheid: t he AN C a nd t he S outh African Communist Party in exile, London: James Currey, 1992, 136138. 40 Joan Wardrop, Th e s tate, p olitics a nd v iolence, 19891991, in N orman E therington (e d), Peace, politics and violence in the New South Africa, New York: Hans Zell, 1992, 4668. 41 Dar-es-Salaam D eclaration on Peace, S ecurity, D emocracy a nd D evelopment in t he G reat Lakes Region, Adopted by the heads of state and government, at its first summit, held in Dares-Salaam, 1920 N ovember 2004, h ttp://www.icglr.org/key-documents/declarationsMIILITIAS, R EBELS ISLAMIST MILITANTS: HUMAN INSECURITY State Crises AFRICA

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pacts/Dar%20Es%20Salaam%20Declaration%20on%20Peace%20Security%20Democracy% 20and%20Development.pdf (accessed 7 May 2010). Charles Kazooba, Central Africa: Great Lakes nations to send war crimes suspects to ICC, The Eas t A frican, 7 D ecember 2009, h ttp://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200912070705. html (accessed 7 May 2010). Indar Jit Rikhye, Military adviser to the Secretary-General: UN p eacekeeping and the Congo crisis, New York: St Martins Press, 1993, 12, 318; J acques Depelchin, From the Congo free state to Zaire, 18851974: Towards a demystification of economic and political history, Dakar: Codesria, 1992, 8586; Marq de Villiers and Sheila Hirtle, Into Africa: a journey through the ancient empires, New York: Phoenix Giant, 1997, 186; H erbert Weiss, War and peace in t he Democratic Republic of the Congo, Parts I, II a nd III, American Diplomacy V(3) (Summer 2000), http://www.unc.edu/depts./diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_16/weiss/ weiss (acces sed 7 May 2010). McDonough, From guerrillas to government, 361362. Georges N zongola-Ntalaja, From Z aire t o D emocratic R epublic o f t he C ongo, U ppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998, 7. Michela Wrong, In t he f ootsteps o f M r K urtz: l iving o n t he b rink o f d isaster i n t he C ongo, London: Fourth Estate, 2000, 257289, 237. Markus Kornprobst, The management of border disputes in Africa: comparing West Africa and the Horn of Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies 40(3) (2002), 369. Dani W Nabudere, The role of intellectuals and integration in the IGAD region, in Heinrich Bll Foundation, In quest for a culture of peace in the IGAD region: the role of intellectuals and scholars, Nairobi: Heinrich Bll Foundation, 2006, 73. Jon A bbink, E thiopia-Eritrea: p roxy wa rs a nd p rospects f or p eace in t he H orn o f A frica, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 21(3) (2003), 409. Ruth Iyob, The foreign policies of the Horn: the clash between the old and the new, in Gilbert M K hadiagala a nd T errence L yons (e ds), African f oreign p olicies: p ower a nd p rocesses, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, 113116. Nene Mburu, Bandits on the border: the last frontier in the search for Somali unity, Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2005, 173229; Selassie, Conflict and intervention, 117125, 5. Bahru Zewde, Embattled identity in northeast Africa: a comparative essay, in Heinrich Bll Foundation, In quest for a culture of peace in the IGAD region, 2122. Robert G P atman, Di sarming S omalia: t he co ntrasting f ortunes o f U nited S tates a nd Australian peacekeepers during United Nations intervention, 19921993, African Affairs 96 (1997), 509533. Khalif Hassan Ahmed, Somalia: a nation in search of a state, in Heinrich Bll Foundation, In quest for a culture of peace in the IGAD region, 169. Greg Mills, How to intervene in Africas wars, Crimes of War Project: war in Africa, October 2004, http://www.crimesofwar.org/africa-mag/afr_03_mills.html (accessed 7 May 2010). Ben Macintyre, The battle against piracy begins in Mogadishu, Times Online, 16 April 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/ben_macintyre/article6101229.ece (accessed 7 M ay 2010); Ga rowe On line, S omalia: A mison denies Al-Shabaab claims, 12 February 2010, h ttp://allafrica.com/stories/printable/201002120931.html (acces sed 7 M ay 2010).
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57 Suzanne Jambo, Sudan: the challenge of national renewal, in H einrich Bll Foundation, In quest f or a cu lture o f p eace i n t he I GAD r egion, 149159; A bdi I smail Sa matar a nd Waqo Machaka, Conflict and peace in Africa: a regional approach, in Heinrich Bll Foundation, In quest for a culture of peace in the IGAD region, 3538, 46. 58 Ochami, Leaders call for intervention in Somalia crisis. 59 Dan F H ahn, Political c ommunication: r hetoric, go vernment a nd ci tizens, S tate C ollege, Penn: Strata Publishing, 1998, 65. 60 Brennan M K raxberger, F ailed s tates: t emporary o bstacles t o dem ocratic dif fusion o r fundamental h oles in t he w orld p olitical m ap? Third W orld Q uarterly 28(6) (2007), 10551071. 61 Macharia Munene, Zimbabwe: The bogeyman and the empire, Business Daily, 7 July 2008. 62 Kirchick, Mr President, liberate Zimbabwe. 63 Paul C ollier, I n p raise o f t he co up: mi litary t akeovers c an b e a g ood t hing f or A frican democracy, New Humanist 124(2) (2009), http://newhumanist.org.uk/1997/in-praise-of-thecoup (accessed 3 August 2010). 64 Rikhye, Military Adviser, 12, 318 (see footnote 48); Depelchin, From the Congo free state to Zaire, 8586; D e Villiers and Hirtle, Into Africa, 186; N zongola-Ntalaja, Congo, 101; Weiss, War and peace. 65 Macharia M unene, C old wa r di sillusionment a nd A frica, in M acharia M unene, J O leweNyunya and Korwa Adar (eds), The United States and Africa: from independence to the end of the Cold War, Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1995, 2549. 66 Henry K issinger, Does A merica n eed a f oreign p olicy? T oward a d iplomacy f or t he 21s t century, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001, 29. 67 Comoros: reforming the coup-coup islands, IRIN humanitarian news and analysis, 10 April 2010, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=83144 (accessed 16 July 2009). 68 Michael M oran, Th e n ew African C ommand, C ouncil o n F oreign R elations, 9 F ebruary 2007, h ttp://www.cfr.org/publication/12583/new_african_command.html (acces sed 19 February 2007). 69 Robert D G rey, A b alance s heet o n ext ernal a ssistance: F rance a nd A frica, The Journal o f Modern African Studies 28(1) (1990), 102105; McGowan, African military, 357. 70 John James Quinn, Diffusion and escalation in the Great Lakes: the Rwandan genocide, the rebellion in Z aire, a nd M obutus o verthrow, in S teven E L obell a nd P hilip M auceri (e ds), Ethnic conflict and international politics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 119; We trained Interahamwe & E x-FAR a s t ranslators a long F rench s oldiers, Rwanda N ews A gency, 2 October 2008. 71 Moran, The new African Command. 72 Edward B Rackley, Could Frances new odd couple Sarkozy and Kouchner spell the end of F rench p rivilege f or A fricas m ost v enal, 3 Q uarks D aily, 28 M ay 2007, http://3quarksdaily.blogs.com/3quarksdaily/2007/05/could_frances_n.html (acces sed 6 March 2010). 73 Condoleezza R ice, R ethinking t he n ational in terest: A merican r ealism f or a n ew w orld, Foreign Affairs 87(4) (2008), 2, 26.
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74 Chris J aniec, U nited s tates exp eriments w ith A frican C ommand, P olicy I nnovations, 29 October 2008, h ttp://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/briefings/data/000084/:pf_printable (accessed 23 A pril 2010); S ean M cFate, B riefing, US A frica C ommand: n ext s tep o r n ext stumble, African Affairs 107(426) (2008), 113. 75 Janiec, United States experiments with African Command. 76 John L Gaddi s, A g rand s trategy o f t ransformation, Foreign P olicy, N ovember/December 2002, 5057; Michael Barone, Bushs grand strategy, US News and World Report, 26 February 2006. 77 McFate, Briefing, US Africa Command, 119. 78 Interview w ith A ndrew B earpark, International R eview o f t he R ed C ross 88 (863) (2006), 449457. 79 Stefan M air, G erman in terests a nd A frica p olicy, in U lf En gel a nd R obert K appel (e ds), Germanys Africa policy revisited: interests, images and incrementalism, London: Transaction Publishers, 2002, 15. 80 Rainer T etzlaff, C ommitted p olitical le adership m atters! E thiopia un der P rime M inister Meles Zenawi and the question of continuity of political leadership, in Eva-Maria Bruchhaus and Monika M Sommer (eds), Hot spot Horn of Africa revisited: approaches to make sense of conflict, Mnster/Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2008, 112. 81 Andreas Mehler, Cr isis prevention: a n ew p aradigm for G ermanys Africa p olicy, in En gel and Kappel (eds), Germanys Africa policy revisited, 179188. 82 Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia: a wa rlords peace, in S tephen John Stedman, Donald Rothschild and Elizabeth M C ousens (eds), Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements, London: Lynne Rienner, 2002, 599630. 83 Baffour Ankomah, Baffours beef: a pound of flesh, but in whose interest? New African, May 2006, 89; A B olaji A kinyemi, Th e Taylor s aga: a c lash o f ci vilisations, New A frican, M ay 2006, 2024. 84 Targeting Africa: the case for and against the ICC, New African, May 2009; ICC justice: whos next? New African, July 2009.

C HAPTER 16

Confronting the threats of armed non-state groups to human security and the state in Africa
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INTRODUCTION
Activities of armed non-state groups (ANSGs) have had devastating consequences for ci vilian p opulations a s w ell a s t he inf rastructure t hat s upports t heir w elfare. The African adage that when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers is true of a rmed co nflicts, f or ci vilians a re n ot o nly s trategic t argets b ut a lso b ear t he brunt of the consequences. African battle spaces are characterised by young boys carrying weapons taller than they, government forces and armed groups violating international h umanitarian a nd h uman r ights l aws w ith im punity, t errified a nd massively displaced civilians, and carcasses of destroyed homes and infrastructure. ANSGs are not uniquely or exclusively an African phenomenon, for they are common in m any p olitical sys tems, in cluding ad vanced s ocieties s uch a s t he United States (Michigan Militia Corps), Canada ( Front de Libration du Qubec, Quebec L iberation F ront, FL Q), I taly ( Brigate R osse, R ed B rigades, B R) a nd Spain/France (B asque n ationalists). W hat i s uniq ue t o A frica i s t he a larmingly high level of loss of human life and destruction of property that militant and rebel groups a nd v iolent co nflicts c ause, t he lo ngevity o f s ome o f t hese g roups, t he
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seeming in ability o f g overnments t o h andle t hem, a nd t he p enchant o f A frican governments to create fertile grounds from which such groups emerge. Although t hese g roups h ave h ad a p rofound im pact o n A fricas p olitical, economic and social development, currently no dedicated research is being carried out to determine how many there are or to analyse the impact of their activities on the livelihoods of populations and capacities of states to function. Attempts made thus far have related to analyses of their histories, roots, objectives, motives and modi operandi, and the impact of their activities on socioeconomic systems.1 The difficulties of pinpointing t he exac t or e ven approximate number of g roups and their membership, and the effects that they have on society, state, governance and human security, partly stem from the lack of data and the state security policy of denying t hat t hey exi st o r inf lating t heir n umbers f or b udgetary r easons o r criminalising p olitical o pponents b y b randing t hem va gabonds, b andits a nd terrorists. I n s ome c ases, g overnments h ave denie d t he exi stence o f mi litia a nd rebel g roups t o co ver u p s erious g overnance a nd s ecurity si tuations t hat co uld damage their reputations and scare away foreign investments. Nevertheless, there is a need to monitor and document ANSGs activities and to s tudy t hem f rom a m ultidisciplinary p erspective. On e o f t he m ajor contributions of this work is the use of multidisciplinary approaches and concepts as well as analytical f rameworks and p erspectives drawn mainly f rom t he s ocial sciences and humanities to shed light on how militias, Islamic militants and rebel groups in A frica are formed and affect human security and state capacity, on the one hand, and how they can be understood and dealt with at different levels, on the other hand. This chapter highlights some of the key findings and conclusions of the work and captures the key policy recommendations that can be used to prevent ANSGs and t he v iolent co nflicts in w hich t hey a re en gaged f rom un dermining h uman security and state capacity to provide public services.

explained p artly b y t he p olicymakers u se o f o ne-dimensional a pproaches t o understand t he p henomenon, deni al o f g overnments f lawed p olicies t hat contribute t o t hese g roups f ormation, a nd i ll-conceived m easures t o co nfront them. While s ome of t he governments measures u sed to confront t hese g roups have achieved limited results, most of t hem, such as use of brute v iolence, have been counter-productive, as they end up recruiting sympathisers and followers for these g roups. Th e l ack o f a ppropriate a pproaches a nd r esources t o co nfront ANSGs h as b een acco mpanied b y t he u se o f ex cessive f orce t hat v iolates international h umanitarian a nd h uman r ights l aws, a nd t he cr iminalisation o f these groups that make it difficult to engage them in peace talks. In o rder t o g enerate p ointers t hat co uld inf orm p olicy r esponses, i t i s important to first highlight the importance of factors such as state governance, the role of elite and youth groups, and the management of border areas and natural resources in the formulation of policy and legal responses to prevent and combat the ANSG phenomenon in Africa.

State governance2
One of t he k ey f indings in t his s tudy i s t hat w eak a nd b adly g overned s tates in Africa have a t endency to generate ANSGs o r to create fertile g rounds for t heir development. A b adly g overned s tate m arginalises, ex cludes, im poverishes a nd suppresses s ome s egments o f t he p opulation b ecause o f t heir iden tities a nd relations with the centre of power. Some victims of misgovernance pick up arms to redress their grievances. In reaction, states have clamped down on them with an excessive u se o f s o-called leg itimate v iolence. B y u sing ex cessive a nd s enseless force t o leg itimise t hemselves, t hese s tates a lienate t hemselves f rom t he lo cal populations, increasing both sympathy and support for the ANSGs. The unconventional ANSG tactics, in turn, impair the states ability to provide public goods and services, alienating it from the population, which perceives it to be too weak and ineffective to exercise its legitimate roles. The legitimacy of the state is further eroded when its responses are heavy handed, fail to protect civilians or treat local populations as accomplices or sympathisers of ANSGs. Some African military f orces e ven h ave a bandoned customary co des t hat g overn t he u se o f force3 in co nfrontations w ith ANSGs b y t he di sproportionate u se o f v iolence, sometimes against civilians. When the military and police use excessive force and extra-judicial means to extract information about ANSGs and discourage civilians
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TOWARDS ADDRESSING THE ANSG PHENOMENON IN AFRICA

In t rying t o un derstand w hy t he ANSG p henomenon h as b ecome p revalent in Africa, w e c an s urmise f rom t he d ata p resented a nd a nalysed in t he va rious chapters t hat p olicymakers a re p alpably c hallenged w hen i t co mes t o desig ning measures t hat c an ef fectively p revent a nd co nfront t hese g roups. Thi s co uld b e
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from s upporting t hem, t hey p ut a ll m embers o f t he lo cal p opulation a t r isk, especially when government forces withdraw from an area after operations. While ANSGs extensively and commonly use terror as a tactic, some states have chosen to respond with similar tactics. There is a growing tendency in Africa for states to delegate co nflicts t o r ebels [a nd mi litias] ra ther t han u se t heir o wn f orces.4 However, such a strategy can lead to international condemnation, as happened in the case of the Janjaweed in Darfur. Although ANSGs are, to a large extent, a product of weak and failing African states, their activities have threatened human security and contributed to the crisis of the state, which manifests in the inability to provide public goods and services and u se v iolence in t he n ational in terest o nly. A part f rom co ntributing t o t he mushrooming o f ANSGs in A frica, t he cr isis o f t he s tate h as len t cr edibility t o some of these ANSGs to challenge its legitimacy. Indeed, there is a high possibility for opportunistic rebel groups to emerge where governments lack the legitimacy, capacity and resources to govern and control their territories. In his chapter on the crises of the state and governance (chapter 5), Ik elegbe argues t hat t he r ise a nd m ultiplication o f ANSGs sin ce t he in dependence o f African s tates a re in dications o f t he co ntinents g overnance cr isis, w hich h as marginalised and excluded groups due to their age and other characteristics, and has created a political environment that allows state abuse and misuse. The tragedy of state weakness and failure, and its consequences for human security, can best be overcome through completion of the nation-building project, immunisation of the state a gainst a n eg oistic n ational e lite, a nd es tablishment o f d urable g overnance processes that enhance national interests. The nation-building project should aim specifically a t addr essing q uestions o f iden tity, a nd in clude e conomic development, equitable distribution of national wealth, inclusion of all citizenry in national matters, and balanced use of state power. National development policies should aim at promoting national cohesion, stability and unity.5 Ironically, des pite ANSGs g rievances a gainst t he s tate f or fa iling t o p rovide public goods and services, they too are:
un likely t o de liver t he p olitical a nd e conomic r eforms n ecessary f or development. I nstead, s uch r ebel o rganisations w ill t end t oward cr iminal enterprise, taking advantage of the absence of state control to extract resources from the t erritory o r p opulation a nd, w here in surgency i s s uccessful, m ay im plement authoritarian structures no different than those set in place by their predecessors.6 440
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Youth factor
Although the book does not have a c hapter dedicated to the role of the youth in ANSGs, t he c hapters b y En gels, Ik elegbe, Ib aba, K abir a nd O loo s how t hat t he youth have been the dominant base of recruitment and participation in the ANSGs as a result of their high levels of unemployment, poor education and addiction to drugs. Ikelegbe points out that conditions in A frica that made the youth turn on society in ra ge, def iance, s ubversion a nd r esistance h ave a lso cr eated a y outh culture w ith e lements o f ni hilism, fa talism, de viance, p opulism, r esentment, impunity a nd v iolence.7 Accordingly, a pproaches f or p reventing a nd co mbating ANSG activities must aim at addressing societal inequalities, marginalisation and vulnerabilities t hat a llow a v iolent y outh c ulture a nd r ecruitment o pportunities into the ANSG rank and file to emerge. The y outh c an a lso b e p revented f rom j oining ANSGs t hrough in stilling a peace s oftware, w hich co ntains va lues t hat r espect lif e. P eace va lues s hould b e instilled among youths before they fall prey to political opportunists and warlords who are out to exploit their material situation and lure them into political militia and rebel groups. African governments need to provide greater incentives for the youth t o en gage in p roductive ac tivities ra ther t han t o j oin v iolent g roups t hat terrorise the population to survive.

Political elite manipulation

In ga ining a de eper un derstanding o f t he r elationship b etween t he s tate a nd ANSGs, special attention should b e paid to how p olitical elites govern the state, manipulate groups and use violence to maintain control of the state. This calls for critical interrogation of how elections are held, how free and fair they are, and the role that violence plays in t he electoral process. In all the cases examined in t he book, t here a re s trong lin ks a mong p olitics, o pportunistic p oliticians a nd e lites, unemployed youth and badly governed states. When stakes are high in elections, politicians t urn t o p olitical ga ngs t o intimidate o pponents a nd v oters. A fter t he elections, these political gangs are either transformed into criminal gangs or into rebel groups, as was the case with Yoweri Musevenis Popular Resistance Army in Uganda that was launched in February 1981 to protest the outcome of the election that returned Milton Obote to power in December 1980.8 Sabine Carey argues that the risks of rebellion and insurgencies in s ub-Saharan Africa increase because of the way e lections a re c arried o ut f rom multiparty presidential e lections t o n o
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elections at all w ith the latter increasing the chances of political instability and large-scale violence.9 Some of the hitherto abandoned elite-sponsored political violent gangs, as is the c ase in N iger D elta, l ater t ransformed t hemselves into mi litias and cr iminal gangs. A s t he exa mple o f t he Mungiki shows, t hese g roups exp loit t he p ower vacuum cr eated b y w eak s tates t o cr eate a n a lternative government, w hich provides security and survives by extracting levies for this service. In order to stop this trend, keen attention should be paid to the mode of conducting elections in Africa, with the aim of immunising it against abuse by political elites who pursue political power at the expense of democracy. The manner in which political elites capture political power and use it is critical to understanding the source and nature of political violence and how it has been used to gain control of the state. In A frica, t here i s a t endency f or n ational e lites t o u se a ny m eans a t t heir disposal t o c apture s tate p ower a nd m onopolise i t, t o ex clude a nd m arginalise other ci tizens f rom t he b enefits o f t he s tate, a nd t o u se v iolence t o co ntain o r threaten opponents. When these threats reach a certain level, the ruling elite forms state mi litias t hat i t u ses a gainst o pponents, t hus r emoving i tself f rom dir ect intervention a nd cr eating p lausible deni ability.10 Governments hidden contribution to the formation and support of ANSGs is, nevertheless, discernable across the continent. For instance, in 2003 a le ading Kenyan newspaper revealed that the Mungiki had received military vehicles and sophisticated communication equipment f rom t he g overnment t o p romote a cer tain c andidates p residential campaign in t he D ecember 2002 e lection.11 Although a llocation o f s uch government e quipment co uld h ave b een a uthorised o nly a t t he hig hest le vel o f government, h ow a mi litia g roup t hat h ad a r eputation f or c arrying o ut horrendous ac ts o f b rutality o n t he p opulation g ot t he hig hly s ophisticated military equipment has never come to light. Oloo (chapter 6) recommends that elites who use ANSGs be held accountable for their violation of domestic and international laws. Those who fund and arm the youth, organise t hem into mi litia g roups and manipulate t hem to engage in violence, s hould b e arrested, prosecuted and punished. National l aws s hould b e strengthened t o p revent a nd co mbat t he f unding a nd o rganising o f ANSGs. However, t he s tate a nd t he ci tizens, t hrough ci vil s ociety, s hould s hare t he responsibility for ending political violence, particularly during election periods, by monitoring and promoting a peaceful articulation of interests. It is obvious that the persistence of militias in A frica reflects the penchant of elites for manipulation of the youth, and as Oloo notes, the depth of the culture of
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impunity in most African societies.12 This culture allows these groups to develop parallel g overnance sys tems t hat w eaken t he leg itimacy o f t he s tate, a nd u se violence a nd in timidation t o s ubjugate ci tizens. W ith t he s tates w eak l aw enforcement capabilities and failure to deliver public services, these groups offer such services for a fee. Apart from revenue losses that further deprive the state of resources i t n eeds t o m eet i ts o bligations t o t he ci tizenry, ANSGs p resence in ungoverned spaces and provision of social services undermine state legitimacy.

Controlling borders and border areas

Borders and border areas are favoured by rebel groups because these enable them to extend t he b attlefield r egionally a nd t ransnationally.13 These b order a reas become even more sought after if they contain natural resources. If a rebel group is able to control a b order, this enables it to smuggle minerals out of the country and s o f inance i ts wa r ac tivities. D arfurian r ebels, t he L ords R esistance A rmy (LRA) and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Uganda, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) and other groups frustrated government operations due to their ability to move easily across porous and poorly controlled borders and into o ther s tates t erritories. S tates c an a lso a ttract ANSGs f rom n eighbouring states if their capacities to manage and control their border areas are weak, as these then s erve a s h avens f or t hese g roups. W hen a s tate i s t oo w eak t o co ntrol i ts frontiers, these territories often become a no-mans land in which rebels reign and terrorise local populations. The failure of the state to provide security to its citizens in m arginal t erritories er odes t heir lo yalty t o t he s tate a nd g ives r ebels a n advantage when faced with responses such as military operations.14 Borders and border areas can become theatres of confrontation if they separate antagonistic states. Poor interstate relations between leaders of neighbouring states also p lay a r ole in p romoting ANSG ac tivities. F or exa mple, t he s our r elations between presidents Yoweri Museveni and Omar el-Bashir were a key factor in the support each accorded the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) and the LRA respectively, as was the case of Rwandan and Ugandan support of anti-Kabila rebel groups.15 Foreign support given to rebels includes intelligence, training facilities, weapons and ammunition, logistical assistance, tactical advice, financial support and s anctuary. S uch s upport a llows ANSGs t o exp and t heir a reas o f o perations across borders and makes it harder to deal with them without a regional strategy. In a l ater section, we in fac t show that countries in t he Great L akes region have now devised a regional strategy to deal with ANSGs.
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Idean Sa lehyan p oints o ut t hat sin ce ext raterritorial b ases a llow r ebels t o prolong co nflicts a nd co ntribute t o r egional h ostilities a nd in stability, t here i s a necessity o f a b road r egional co operation in b ringing a bout a n en d t o transnational rebellions.16 In order to end armed conflicts, rebel host states must provide credible promises of their own to demonstrate that foreign combatants on their territory are not welcome, now and in t he f uture. They must also monitor and verify rebel disarmament.17 Even if a state has superior military capabilities to keep rebels outside its boundaries, ANSGs s uch as the FDLR and the LRA could still continue to t hreaten and undermine t he livelihoods of t he citizens of t hose countries where they are allowed to roam free. Saleyhan argues that conflict can be terminated by removal of sanctuary and actions by host states as was the case in Rwanda. Due t o t he a rtificial co lonial p artitioning o f A frica a nd m arginalisation o f frontiers and border areas,18 ethnic groups across borders are easily exploited by ANSGs. This is why ANSGs that rely on sociocultural and sociospatial settings are not bound by territorial borders,19 especially those who are members of ethnic communities t hat s traddle s tate b oundaries. T ransboundary r ebel g roups a re difficult to manage due to the external resources, sanctuary and support that they receive, w hich les sen t heir dep endence on t he g oodwill o f t he do mestic population for their viability.20

APPROACHES TO CONFRONTING THE ANSG PHENOMENON IN AFRICA Local responses

How an ANSG behaves determines, to a large extent, the support it receives from the local population and the level of success in meeting its objectives. ANSGs rely on local support to launch their campaigns against the state. Capitalising on local support a nd k nowledge o f t he lo cal t errain, ANSGs c an ini tially f rustrate government responses and draw out the conflict for a long period. A states control of a territory does not guarantee the support of the local population, particularly if it has been marginalised and excluded from the centre of power. Most military campaigns against rebel groups have been largely unsuccessful because they lacked intelligence a nd w ere n ot p lanned w ith a c lear un derstanding o f t hese g roups areas of operations.21 ANSGs, in most cases, possess accurate intelligence, are privy
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to g overnment p lans a nd r etreat b efore o perations o r di ssolve in to ci vilian populations. Local communities respond to ANSGs in varied ways. In most cases, they flee their homes and seek safety in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps or across borders. In other cases, locals protect themselves and their property by taking up arms a nd f orming s elf-defence uni ts. Th ere a re a lso c ases w here lo cals s upport rebels o r j oin t hem t o en sure t heir p roperty a nd fa milies a re s afe f rom a ttacks. However, in m ost o f t hese si tuations, a s W assara o bserves in c hapter 9, t he outcome i s a b reakdown o f t he r ule o f l aw, los s o f lo cal g overnance a nd militarisation o f t he co mmunities. Thi s, in t urn, co mplicates p ost-conflict peacebuilding ef forts a imed a t r estoring t he r ule o f l aw a nd j ustice, a nd demilitarising co mmunities t hrough dem obilisation a nd di sarmament programmes. At the end of a conflict, these local communities are usually afraid to hand over their weapons or reveal their actual involvement in the conflict. While some of the former combatants are reluctant to come forward to be demobilised for f ear o f b eing h eld acco untable f or t heir ac ts d uring t he co nflict, o thers a re disinclined t o h and o ver t heir w eapons w hile t heir s ecurity a nd s afety a re n ot guaranteed and mutual mistrust between communities continues to prevail. Peters chapter (chapter 14) reveals that the strength of the relationship existing between rebels a nd lo cal communities i s cr itical in det ermining t he t iming a nd type of intervention in a conflict. For instance, at the early stages, when rebels have friendly relations with local communities, they can be intransigent, as their antiestablishment message, cloaked in the form of grievances against the government, resonates with locals. However, the situation changes when, at a later stage, a rebel group alienates itself from the local population often through the brutal tactics it employs, so that it loses the ground advantage. In such a c ase, it is easier for the government to succeed in ending the conflict by exerting military and diplomatic pressure. H owever, mi litary m easures s hould en sure ade quate p rotection f or civilians o r e lse t hey co uld r egenerate s upport f or t he r ebels. Thi s i s w hat happened in n orthern Uganda during three highly publicised operations against the LR A, w hich were w idely cr iticised for failing to e liminate t he Kony m enace and left civilians vulnerable to his reprisals. In the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), locals have formed civil defence units to protect themselves, similar to the formation of the Kamajor in Sierra Leone. In the long run, these units could transform themselves into full-fledged rebel and militia groups filling the void left by the lack of a state presence.
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Apart f rom i ts le adership a nd o rganisation, t he en durance a nd s uccess o f a rebel g roup dep end, t o a l arge deg ree, o n t he lo cal s upport a nd a vailability o f capital to finance the logistics of a military campaign.22 Consequently, it has to tap into t wo s ources: [E]co nomic en dowments, w hich co me f rom di verse s ources, including n atural r esource ext raction, t axation, cr iminal ac tivity o r ext ernal patronage; a nd s ocial en dowments, in cluding s hared b eliefs, exp ectations a nd norms t hat may exist in (o r b e mobilised f rom w ithin) cer tain et hnic, religious, cultural or ideological groups.23 Therefore, a strategy for confronting ANSGs must aim at denying them such resources, because their availability, particularly at the beginning, determines the type of members and way in which they are recruited, and how they commit to the groups objectives.24 The ability of ANSG le aders to gain access to and use these resources determines how its members behave vis-vis ci vilians a nd h ow lo ng i t l asts. F urther, if t here a re f ew r esources, m embers would probably engage in lo oting and other criminal activities to acquire funds. However, if t hey do h ave acces s t o n atural r esources, t hey co uld cr eate a wa r economy in which they play different roles.25 In co untries w here ANSGs a re a fac tor in t he n atural r esource c urse, a n obvious s olution w ould b e t o co me u p w ith better wa ys o f m anaging r esource wealth for the benefit of the population.26 Weinstein contends that a critical factor determining t he p ropensity o f a r ebel g roups u se o f v iolence i s t he a bility t o mobilise m aterial r esources t o f inance t he wa rfare. H ence, rebel g roups t hat emerge in environments rich in natural resources or with the external support of an o utside p atron t end t o co mmit hig h le vels o f in discriminate v iolence; movements that arise in r esource-poor contexts p erpetrate far fewer abuses and employ v iolence s electively a nd s trategically.27 Although n atural r esources h ave been widely regarded as Africas curse, there is no scientific evidence to prove that resource abundance causes conflict. On the contrary, conflicts in resource-wealthy countries a re c aused b y poor in stitutional a nd g overnance q uality t hat a llows national elite to become corrupt and give maximum advantage to foreign mining companies to reap huge profits.28 Measures that could b e used to eliminate the risk of ANSG v iolence include increasing income levels and equitably distributing such natural wealth resources. Ibaba and Ikelegbe further propose some form of local resource ownership and control, increases in the derivation fund and abrogation of repressive oil laws that will allow the governed to access and to extract the resources. This, as the case of the N iger D elta i llustrates, m ust b e acco mpanied b y adoption o f dem ocratic principles such as the rule of law, fundamental human rights, rule by consent and
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public in terest-based p olitical p articipation [w hich] w ill en hance acco untability and transparency and, by extension, popular participation in government.29

State responses
In her chapter on the analysis of ANSGs through the comprehensive framework of their relationship w ith t he g overnment a nd attitude t owards s tate m onopoly o f violence, En gels p oints o ut t hat n ational a rmies p lay a cr ucial r ole in t he emergence o f a rmed n on-state g roups.30 Ibaba a nd Ik elegbe, O loo a nd Wassara also call for special attention to the role that state violence plays in g erminating rebel ac tivities. A co mmon s tate r esponse t o r ebel ac tivities i s t he u se o f b rute force, aimed at eliminating the groups, in p olice and military operations and the activities of paramilitary and pro-government militia groups. In a statement given before t he United N ations H uman R ights C ouncil, P rofessor P hilip A lston, t he special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, pointed out that hyper-active de ath s quads bring no relief to t he ANSG v iolence. Instead, they have only succeeded in un dermining the rule of law, distracting the police from t heir p rotection a nd in vestigative r oles, f uelling t he c ycle o f v iolence a nd tarnishing [the governments] reputation.31 Alston advised governments to come up with a detailed and convincing strategy for combating violence, extortion and other cr imes b y ga ngs, a nd a void m aking s tatements t hat t he g overnment w ill crush or smash such groups. Governments in decisiveness a nd im proper r esponses h ave a lso en gendered impunity and emboldened these groups. Though state responses are a k ey factor in containing ANSG activities, if an operation is carried out in ways that alienate the local population, it ends up driving it into the arms of the rebels. Ibaba and Ikelegbe argue that violent repression of conflicts will accentuate insecurity and sweeps the causes of agitation and dissent under the carpet for a moment, only for them to flare up again, often with disastrous consequences.32 Addressing the ANSG p henomenon is not solely a l aw enforcement measure calling for the application of brute force, as this approach not only violates human rights through arbitrary executions and instilling fear in civilian populations, but also generates counterviolence and lawlessness, which these groups exploit. This is clearly illustrated by Oloos analysis in c hapter 6 o f the factors that contribute to the armed groups in Kenya. The two main reasons why there is a proliferation of armed militias are the failure by the government to arrest, prosecute and punish members o f t hese mi litias a nd t heir s ponsors33 and p oor g overnance, w hich
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generate conditions such as p overty t hat le ad to t he emergence of t hese g roups. This means addressing this phenomenon requires a comprehensive approach that includes p unishment f or im punity, dem ocratic g overnance o f t he s tate, enhancement of human security, equitable distribution of national wealth and/or resources, and promotion of peace values. The failure of brute force to repress the ANSG phenomenon and rebellion and the sinister motives that sometimes underlie such an approach are demonstrated by the following examples. When the Mengistu government was confronted by a rebel insurgency in t he Ogaden in 1980, i t adopted a p olicy of depopulating the region.34 Calling i t a f inal s olution t o t he S omali in surgencies, t he g overnment aimed at forcing an exodus of Somali-speaking Ethiopians as a way of ending the 20-year-old guerrilla war in the Ogaden.35 The policy entailed government soldiers machine gunning herds of camels, robbing and burning fields, destroying settled farms a nd t aking a way y oung m en t o f ight in Er itrea. A lthough E thiopia h ad defeated the Somali army that invaded the region in March 1978, a rebel group, the Western S omali L iberation Front (WSLF), continued to wage an ir redentist war with t he s upport o f E gypt a nd I raq. W hen t he f ront ce ased t o exi st in 1989, a splinter group formed the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). In n orthern U ganda, t he g overnment o f M useveni es tablished a sys tem t o protect t he lo cal p opulation f rom t he LR A rebels a nd a lso dep opulate t he r ural areas in o rder to a llow mopping up by t he mi litary.36 This encampment of lo cal populations was also aimed at controlling the local populations and ensuring they neither supported t he LR A nor di ssented against t he government. Nevertheless, argues Chris Dolan, the local population was subjected to social torture through an enf orced dep endency o n a p rotection sys tem t hat t hreatened i ts s ocial, economic and psychological wellbeing. The protected villages that were set up in northern Uganda (which turned out to be squalid internal displacement camps) were criticised by human rights groups for making the residents more vulnerable to various violations by the Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) and the LRA. Dolan argues that ending the LRA insurgency has not been in t he governments interests, as that would have deprived it of its reason for controlling a population that it regards as hostile. Counterinsurgency against the LRA, apart from serving this p urpose, h as a lso b een u sed t o en hance e conomic in terests o f t he mi litary through dubious purchases of weapons and hiring of ghost soldiers.37 Fighting a gainst mi litias a nd r ebels h as p rovided en ormous f inancial opportunities f or t he s ecurity p ersonnel t o b enefit p ersonally f rom t he procurement o f w eapons a nd hir ing o f s oldiers a nd l aw enf orcement o fficials.
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Some governments use the presence of ANSGs to militarise the state by pointing out that their activities are inimical to state and human security. For that reason, governments proceed to increase military budgets, and adopt draconian laws and measures that in the short and long term severely undermine state legitimacy and the c ulture o f h uman r ights. I n K enya, t here a re s peculations t hat t he S pecial Branch, a n in telligence o rganisation t hat wa s l ater r eplaced b y t he N ational Security Intelligence Service was responsible for setting up and sustaining a rebel group, the February 18 Revolutionary Army, in the early 1990s to boost and justify its high budget allocations to security apparatuses.38 With r egard t o N orth A frica, G eorge a nd Y lnen s tate in c hapter 12 t hat confronting Islamist militants could be complicated by the fact that their link to the global jihad is no longer clear. The approach of some states to allow Islamist political parties has yielded some positive results when combined with changes in government p olicies t hat t arget a frustrated midd le c lass a nd the p oor a nd disgruntled sectors of the population.39 They recommend that states should seize the opportunity when frustration and disenchantment [are not being] channelled towards violent jihad to improve the human security of their citizens. In chapter 11, Muhammad K abir a lso hig hlights t his cr itical r ole o f t he s tate in p roviding social a nd e conomic b enefits a s a p reventive m easure f or g rowth of ANSGs, b y arguing t hat i ts c apacity s hould b e s trengthened t o p rovide p ublic g oods a nd services, proactively respond to the needs of its citizens, guarantee a dem ocratic society, equitably distribute national resources, and pursue a social and economic policy that will ensure the realisation of rights, equity and justice for all citizens regardless of their identity.40 African governments could learn some useful lessons from law enforcement in the U nited S tates a nd p articularly h ow i t h as de alt w ith o ver 500 un organised militia groups such as the Hutaree, which is not part of the National Guard or the Naval M ilitia.41 Between 27 a nd 29 M arch 2010, a j oint a nti-terrorism t askforce comprising state and local police forces, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives carried out special operations t hat le d t o t he a rrest o f nin e m embers o f t he H utaree mi litia in Michigan, Ohio and Indiana after collecting intelligence on the groups intentions to commit mass violence. Apart from monitoring the groups use of media such as YouTube, F acebook, radio b roadcasts, e-m ail a nd v oice co mmunications, l aw enforcement agencies also infiltrated the group and gained knowledge on its plans, which m ade i t p ossible t o co ntain i t.42 The g overnments s pecial o peration
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effectively prevented an uprising that the group had intended to trigger by killing police officers to provoke a heavy-handed government reaction.43 African g overnments h ave t raditionally s ought t o s ubjugate in surgencies through military force, as most consider negotiating with opponents to be a sig n of weakness. Consequently, most armed conflicts between government forces and ANSGs, such as that between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA, take long to en d. Of ten, t he in surgent g roups e ventually n egotiate t hemselves in to government, as was the case with the SPLA, RENAMO (the Resistncia Nacional Moambicana, Mozambican National Resistance) and RUF.

Transforming ANSGs into civil actors: cases and challenges

How can ANSGs be transformed into parties that vie for and properly use political power? Th e a nswer t o t his q uestion co uld b e o f in terest t o t he S udan P eoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), which recently won elections in s outh Sudan and is poised to run it as the newest state in Africa after a referendum next year.44 Many rebel groups find it difficult to transform into a political party or to function in a democratic p olitical sys tem. W ith a f ew ex ceptions, r ebel g roups s uch a s RENAMO in M ozambique a nd UNITA ( Unio N acional p ara a I ndependncia Total de Angola, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in Angola have found the political terrain too rugged to navigate with a guerrilla mindset and modus operandi. These groups, as Justin Pearce put it in chapter 13, have suffered as a r esult o f a p articular k ind o f authoritarian le adership. As Pearce n otes, t he performances of these groups in post-conflict political environments prove that a political r elationship, f orged in wa rtime, h as n othing in co mmon w ith t he workings of a political party in a democracy.45 Although U gandas N ational R esistance A rmy (NR A) a nd t he R wandan Patriotic Front (RPF) stand out as good examples of rebel groups that successfully transformed t hemselves in to r espectable r uling p arties, t he S PLM h as b een accused of being dictatorial and embracing a guer rilla mentality while in p ower. During the 22 y ears it fought a b ush war against the north, the SPLM was never run as a democratic outfit and is known to have dealt mercilessly with dissent on a number of occasions. In the past few years that the SPLM has been learning the ropes o f g overnance a nd s tatecraft, i t h as face d s erious q uestions a bout i ts commitments to democracy, governance and human rights. The fallout from the April 2010 e lections s eems t o h ave g enerated s plinter g roups t hat wa nt t o u se violence to gain acceptance in the new political dispensation.
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An in teresting t ransformation o f a n ANSG in to a p olitical p arty i s t hat o f Kenyas outlawed Mungiki sect, which transformed itself into the Kenya National Youth A lliance (KNYA). D espite p roscription, j ailing o f i ts m embers a nd b eing targeted by special police squads for elimination, the Mungiki has become a force to reckon w ith on Kenyas p olitical l andscape. C laiming mi llions of members, it has recently attempted to influence political developments in the country by either sponsoring p oliticians o r h aving i ts o wn m embers r un f or o ffice. A part f rom forming KNYA, which later became the Progressive Party Alliance, to overcome its scary im age of a m urderous a nd b loody s ect, s ome Mungiki leaders h ave either converted t o C hristianity o r j oined es tablishment p oliticians t o p romote c auses such as adoption of a new constitution that seeks to address Kenyas long-standing historical grievances and injustices. However, Denis Tull and Andreas Mehler are opposed to providing rebels with a share of state power, as it creates an incentive for groups to seek power through insurgent v iolence.46 Ian S pears i s a lso o pposed t o p ower s haring b etween governments and ANSGs because it is a surprisingly unstable form of government that p rovides o nly a s hort-term r eprieve f rom v iolent co nflict, i s virtually unworkable beyond the transitional phase, as it is difficult to implement, and does not r esolve co nflict b ut in stead m ay o nly t emporarily di splace i t o r di sguise disputants more malevolent intentions.47 Among power-sharing agreements that failed w ere t hose en tered in to t o en d ci vil wa rs in S ierra L eone, A ngola a nd Rwanda.48 While groups such as the RPF captured power after the failure of the Arusha Peace A greement b ecause o f g overnment h ardliners w ho w ere o pposed t o t he arrangement, o thers, s uch a s t he M useveni-led NR A, s eized p ower a fter abandoning t he N airobi a greement w ith t he t hen O kello mi litary g overnment. Indeed, as Patricia Daley argues, approaches that seek to simply establish negative peace t hrough ce asefire a greements, t ransitional g overnments, demi litarisation and constitutional reform that end in democratic elections cannot be expected to guarantee lo ng-term p eace.49 Ending exi sting v iolent co nflicts t hrough agreements that establish positive peace is the best guarantee for preventing future conflicts. Governments must develop coherent approaches for addressing ANSGs based on a n un derstanding o f t heir o bjectives a nd t he r easons t hat gave r ise t o t hem, instead o f m aking k neejerk r esponses t hat cr iminalise a nd b rand t hem a s terrorists, and using brute force to eliminate them. Criminalising and labelling a group as terrorist inevitably shuts out peaceful negotiation options and opens the
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door t o t he u se o f s tate s ecurity a pparatuses. Thi s wa s i llustrated b y h ow t he solution of the northern Uganda conflict became complicated once the Museveni government branded the LRA a t errorist organisation and ruled out any attempt to n egotiate w ith i t. Om ach c autions t hat en gaging r ebel g roups in p eaceful negotiations should not be misconstrued as condoning their criminal activities.50

Regional responses
Saleyhan argues that although building domestic institutions and state capacity, fostering economic growth, reducing corruption and power-sharing among ethnic groups h ave b een o ffered a s s trategies f or co nfronting ANSGs, t hey s hould b e undertaken w ithin a r egional f ramework.51 However, regional s trategy do es n ot deny t he im portance o f lo cal p olicing a nd s ervice p rovision. R ather, i t add s meaningful in ternational co operation a mong s tates in t he r egion t o t he mix o f solutions to a civil conflict.52 Conflicts in which ANSGs are supported by other states are difficult to address unless t hese s tates a re co mpelled t o a bandon t he s upport in t he in terests o f regional integration, peace and stability. The best example of the use of a regional framework for such a purpose is the International Conference on the Great Lakes region (I CGLR) o f A frica. A r egional p act, s uch a s t hat o f t he I CGLR, i s a n appropriate m easure f or co nfronting ANSGs. H owever, i t m ust b e f ully implemented and supported by all participating governments. An initiative such as that by the African Union to transform borders into bridges of cooperation and integration co uld e liminate co nditions t hat a llow b order a reas t o b e a reas o f operations for ANSGs.53 Furthermore, co ntinental ini tiatives s uch a s t he A frican P eer R eview Mechanism (APRM) of the New Partnership for Africas Development (NEPAD) could be very effective tools for preventing ANSGs if t hey are fully implemented. This proviso also applies to the APRM, which aims at improving governance and effectiveness o f A frican s tates. F or in stance, in i ts 2007 r eport o n K enya, t he APRM warned of the impending eruption of ethnic violence if the way the country was being governed did not change. Had the government heeded this warning, the post-election violence of 2008 that was mainly spread by ANSGs and government forces could have been prevented. Since ANSGs s uch a s t he LR A h ave r egionalised t hemselves t hrough t heir activities, networking and sponsorships, regional mechanisms are needed to deal with t hem.54 Such m echanisms s hould co ntain co nflict cir cuit b reakers s uch a s
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those c alled f or in t he I CGLR p act, p articularly t he es tablishment o f r egional projects on governance and economic growth that aim at eliminating conditions that g ive r ise to and sustain ANSGs. 55 The affected countries c an a lso t ake j oint regional m easures t hat in clude sharing in telligence w ith o ne a nother, coordinating co unterinsurgency ac tions a nd p roviding b order s ecurity.56 Since unilateral mi litary s olutions a gainst r ebels w ithout b orders h ave only minim al success, it i s ad visable t o avoid t hem sin ce t hey go only s o fa r in (t emporarily) containing v iolence. I nstead, Sa leyhan r ecommends m ediation, w hich i s m ore likely t o s ucceed in s olving lo ng-standing in surgency.57 And w here ANSGs a re still active, attempts should be made to create an environment that allows peaceful negotiations t o t ake p lace. Thi s co uld in clude sig ning a nd enf orcing ce asefire agreements and deployment of a force to monitor their implementation. Indeed, the sponsoring and facilitation of peace negotiations have become one of the common regional responses to ANSGs. Most peace negotiations on armed conflicts b etween s tates a nd ANSGs h ave b een c arried o ut w ithin r egional frameworks. Th ese in clude t he I GAD-facilitated C omprehensive P eace Agreement t hat en ded t he n orthsouth wa r in S udan, a nd t he p eace p rocesses facilitated b y t he E conomic C ommunity o f West A frica S tates (EC OWAS) t hat ended civil wars in L iberia and Sierra Leone. The successes of these agreements can be measured by how they address the root causes of the conflicts to produce durable s olutions t hat e quitably di stribute n ational r esources, b uild s tate institutions t hat gu arantee h uman s ecurity, a nd es tablish p rocesses t hat a llow peaceful and democratic engagement between citizens and communities and with the state. The biggest challenges facing regionally facilitated peace agreements are the lack of resources and weak monitoring regimes to ensure full implementation. Poor implementation of a peace agreement can have catastrophic consequences, as Gilbert K hadiagala co nfirms: Rwandas g enocide r esulted in p art f rom t he weakness o f t he A rusha A greement a nd t he p altry ef forts t o im plement i t. I n particular, the agreement sought to transform the existing dominant ethnic basis of power, and in t he process caused an extremist reaction.58 This agreement was also exp ected t o b e im plemented in a hig hly v olatile r egion a nd f unded b y unwilling and unprepared international actors. As Engels (chapter 2), Omach (chapter 10) and Munene (chapter 15) point out, there a re r ebel ac tivities t hat t ranscend n ational b oundaries a nd h ave r egional dimensions. Addressing rebel activities in conflict clusters such as the Mano River and Great Lakes regions can be very complicated due to the skill with which these groups tactically and strategically use porous borders. In the Mano River conflict
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cluster, for example, rebel groups formed networks and worked closely together, which required a r egional f ramework t hat included lo cal, national, regional and international actors to address the rebel activities. Such a framework, according to Omach, should focus on border areas and aim to establish effective state authority and m eaningful admini stration o ver f rontier t erritories [a s] a n im portant s tep towards addr essing t he r egionalisation o f co nflicts.59 Saleyhan p roposes t hat international l aw b e s trengthened t o m ake h arbouring o f ANSGs in a s tates territory an act of direct military aggression and violation of the UN Charter. He proposes that the UN Security Council must treat deliberate support for another states rebel organisation an act of war and adopt an equivalent response.60

International responses
International di scourses o n A frican h uman s ecurity h ave, sin ce 11 S eptember 2001, focused on t he s ecurity-development nexus and s ecuritisation of p overtystricken Africa. Rita Abrahamsen argues that by linking the source of its security threats in A frica t o p overty a nd lo w de velopment le vels, t he West h as j ustified militarisation of its foreign policy to root out radical elements.61 It is further argued that the high poverty levels and poor governance in Africa are threats to Western security, a s t hey cr eate f ertile b reeding g rounds f or radic alised a nti-Western elements a mong t he ANSGs. I n o rder t o co nfront a nd co ntain t hese t hreats in Africa before they threaten its interests on the continent and reach the West, the US has formed an Africa Military Command (AFRICOM), whose task is to break up a ny lin ks o r n etworks t hat co uld p romote f undamentalism o r radic al ide as across r egions in p articularly A frica a nd a lso t he M iddle E ast. S uch a n inappropriate attitude and approach to addressing African security challenges will fail, a s i t p ays li ttle a ttention t o t he r eal c auses o f t he ANSG p henomenon. AFRICOM is a one-size-fits-all solution to African security challenges and does not r ecognise t hat a t hreat t o A frican s ecurity i s n ot n ecessarily a t hreat t o t he Wests security. In fact, the reverse is true, for Africas security is more likely to be threatened b y lin king i t t o t he s ecurity o f t he West. A s K abir, a nd G eorge a nd Ylnen point out in their chapters, African militant and armed Islamist groups do not necessarily have links with the global jihad that the West regards as one of the biggest threats to its security. Therefore, approaches for confronting militant and armed Islamist groups in Africa should be based on the understanding that these groups a re n ot c learly a nd dir ectly t ied o r lin ked t o t he g lobal jihad, as has generally been understood in the West.
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This le aves t he q uestion: w hat a re t he b est in ternational a pproaches f or addressing ANSG threats to human and state security in Africa? Although each ANSG activity has elicited different international responses, the most co mmon o ne i s faci litation o f n egotiations w ith g overnments t hey a re fighting against and those that support them. Other responses have been regional initiatives such as the ICGLRs Pact on Security, Stability and Development, which in p art c alls o n m ember s tates To a bstain f rom s ending o r s upporting a rmed opposition f orces o r a rmed g roups o r in surgents o nto t he t erritory o f o ther member states, or from tolerating the presence on their territories of armed groups or in surgents en gaged in a rmed co nflicts o r in volved in ac ts o f v iolence o r subversion against the government of another state (article 5[b]). 62 Furthermore, states a re exp ected To co operate a t a ll le vels w ith a v iew t o di sarming a nd dismantling exi sting a rmed r ebel g roups a nd t o p romote t he j oint a nd participatory management of state and human security on their common borders (article 5[c]). I t h as b een t hrough t his f ramework t hat R wandan a nd U gandan forces have launched Operation Amani, Operation Kimia and Operation Lightning Thunder to pursue rebel groups such as the Forces Dmocratiques de Libration du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, FDLR) and LRA into the DRC. This pact also aims to end state-sponsored rebel activities such as the LRA in Uganda by the el-Bashir government. While the above operations have had mixed r esults in t erms o f en ding r ebel ac tivities, i t h as sig nificantly r educed governments support of rebels operating in neighbouring countries. The latest international attempt to stamp out rebel activities is the US L ords Resistance A rmy Di sarmament a nd N orthern U ganda R ecovery A ct o f 2009, which desig nates t he LR A a s a t errorist organisation a nd s eeks t o e liminate t he threats i t p oses t o civilians a nd r egional s tability t hrough political, e conomic, military and intelligence support for viable multilateral effort to protect civilians to apprehend or otherwise remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield to disarm and demobilise Lords Resistance Army fighters.63 This would en tail co ntinuing t o a ssist U gandan a nd C ongolese t roops t hrough AFRICOM and diplomatically engaging with regional mechanisms, including the Tripartite P lus C ommission a nd t he G reat L akes P act in im plementing t he US policy on the LRA. The countries in the Great Lakes region are aware of the role rebel and militia groups play in illegally exploiting natural resources such as coltan to finance their activities, a nd h ave p roposed a cer tification m echanism f or t he r egions n atural resources. Th e C ertification S cheme f or t he G reat L akes r egion a ims t o t arget
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those natural resources with the highest potential for illegal exploitation by rebel groups and others financing armed conflicts. This certification mechanism has yet to b e desig ned, de veloped a nd im plemented d ue t o a l ack o f p olitical w ill a nd financial co mmitment b y t he g overnments in t he r egion a nd t he in ternational community. Other international responses have included deployment of AU and UN forces and arraignment of rebel leaders such as Joseph Kony and Thomas Lubango, and President Om ar e l-Bashir, b efore t he I nternational Cr iminal C ourt (I CC) f or displacing, harming, raping and killing civilians. The successes of these measures are mixed, as both AU and UN missions in Somalia and the DRC have yet to wipe out a ny ANSG t hat i s t hreatening h uman s ecurity a nd un dermining t he establishment o f s tate s overeignties in t hose co untries. Th e ef fectiveness o f international justice to deter ANSGs that target and use violence against civilians is discussed in detail in the next section. The AU has made a firm commitment to address the phenomenon of ANSGs through t he ado ption o f a c harter o n dem ocracy t hat p rohibits, r ejects a nd condemns un constitutional c hange o f g overnment in a ny m ember s tate (a rticle 2(4)).64 African co untries a re a lso en couraged t o cooperate w ith e ach o ther t o ensure t hat t hose w ho a ttempt t o r emove a n e lected g overnment t hrough unconstitutional means are dealt with in accordance with the law (article 14[3]). This charter cites an armed rebellion against a democratically elected government as one of the illegal means of accessing or maintaining power [that] constitute an unconstitutional change of government (article 23). The AU does not recognise militias and armed religious groups as liberation movements that are exempted under the terrorism definition by the principles of international l aw f or li beration o r s elf-determination, in cluding a rmed s truggle against co lonialism, o ccupation, a ggression a nd do mination b y f oreign f orces (article 3[1]). 65 The A U f urther p rohibits t he u se o f v iolence f or political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives (article 3[2]). But t here a re g rey a reas in t hese p rescriptions. Fir st, t he A U l aw i s si lent o n governments t hat a re democratically e lected b ut u se v iolence t o s tay in p ower and, s econd, t he s ame l aw i s si lent o n w hether ci vilians co uld j ustifiably u se violence t o def end t hemselves a gainst s tate v iolence s uch a s t he u se o f s tatesponsored militias as an alternative to direct use of force.66 The def inition o f w hat co nstitutes h uman r ights v iolations s hould b e broadened t o in clude acts o f v iolence co mmitted b y r ebel g roups. H owever,
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according t o W einstein, t he a vailable t ools t o inf luence ANSGs t o r espect international humanitarian and human rights laws are too blunt, too ineffective, or w holly ir relevant.67 To o vercome t his, t he I nternational R escue C ommittee (IRC) is carrying out an innovative programme in the Central African Republic to train t he co untrys va rious a rmed g roups in h uman r ights a nd in ternational humanitarian law, Geneva Convention or any other international laws. Members of the main rebel group, LArme Populaire pour la Restauration de la Rpublique et la Dmocratie (Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy, APRD), a re t rained n ot o nly in procedures t o f ollow a t a c heckpoint t hat a re respectful of rights, but also in international laws regarding civilian protection in armed conflicts. These rebels are given the incentive of recognition and legitimacy if t hey r espect h uman r ights a nd t he r ule o f l aw. Th e s trategy o f t he IR C o f targeting the leadership for behaviour change and participation in the programme seem to be bearing fruit, as the rebels undergoing the training have shown a keen interest in le arning about international humanitarian laws and applying them in the field.68 In addition, the international community can employ a variety of instruments to confront ANSGs a nd eliminate or limit their negative impact on civilians and the state:
I

Name, s hame a nd t arget ANSGs f or n ational, r egional a nd in ternational action. In order to do this, ANSGs should be closely monitored by national and international o rganisations t hat gather inf ormation o n h uman r ights violations, assess its validity, and write reports that are quickly made public and placed in the hands of key policymakers and the media.69 However, Weinstein and J effrey H erbst70 question h ow n aming a nd s haming in t he m edia c an influence the behaviour of a rebel group such as the LRA, which does not seem to care how it is viewed by Ugandans and the international community. Indeed, the LR A h as b een k nown t o en gage in a trocious ac ts t o dra w a ttention a nd generate publicity for itself. Naming and shaming will be effective only if they lead to serious consequences for ANSGs. Impose s anctions o n ANSGs t o inf luence t heir b ehaviour. R egional a nd international g overnments c an t ake m easures s uch a s travel b ans, b ans o n investment in a reas un der r ebel co ntrol, r estrictions o n a rms t ransfers, t he freezing o f f oreign a ssets a nd p rohibitions o n a g roups p olitical ac tivities abroad.71 Economic s anctions c an a lso b e im posed o n lega lly t raded
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commodities em erging f rom co nflict a reas. S uch s anctions are desig ned t o criminalise s pecific s uppliers w ithin a n o therwise lici t in dustry.72 Sanctions against ANSGs can take two forms. The first type aims at gaining economic leverage over combatant factions by limiting their capacity to trade in particular commodities.73 These sanctions specifically t arget g overnments t hat s upport r ebel g roups a nd le aders o f t he groups. However, if these sanctions are to be effective, they must be monitored on the ground and states must cooperate to enforce them. Although the record of commodity s anctions has b een mixed, t he impact of t he UN s anctions to weaken UNITA has been cited as a successful example. The second type is certification of commodities from conflict areas, which aims to prevent the trade in a s pecific commodity from particular producers from b eing s old o n t he w orld m arkets.74 Since cer tification i s b ased o n controlling access to the market for commodities that have not been certified, it w ill b e m ost ef fective w hen firms t hat p urchase a nd s tates t hat co nsume these co mmodities co operate b y n ot b uying un certified p roducts. A lthough these r egimes p rovide les s le verage o ver a p articular g roup in a p articular conflict t hey s end a s trong m essage t hat a g roups e conomic r esources a re insecure.75 Apart from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds,76 another example of eliminating trade in conflict natural resources is the Great Lakes regions mineral certification of origin scheme. If effectively carried out, sanctions and certification regimes [that can] choke the lifeline that s ustains a rmed n on-state g roups a nd h elp t o s tarve b elligerents o f revenue, make the benefits of peace more attractive, or raise the costs of trade sufficiently t o d ampen p rofit m argins. Th ey a lso undermine co mfortable stalemates in which both sides benefit from continued conflict.77 The ef fectiveness o f s anctions w ill dep end o n t he f ollowing: t he r ebel organisation must be sufficiently dependent on a particular resource flow to make the organisation and implementation of s anctions worth t he costs of mobilising compliance and enforcement mechanisms. Second, the leadership must be able to bring the members of the faction along if the lever is powerful enough to provide incentives for settlement or behavioural change.78 The side effect of this prescription is that when a non-state armed group is denied access to e conomic endowments such as natural resources t hat sustain it, it will probably resort to looting to maintain its membership.79
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Legal approaches for addressing the ANSG phenomenon in Africa

Legal m easures c an b e t aken a t n ational a nd in ternational le vels t o addr ess t he ANSG phenomenon in Africa. At the national level, one of the most common legal measures i s g ranting o f a mnesty. Ib aba a nd Ik elegbe (c hapter 8) s uggest t hat amnesty p rogrammes, w hich a re p art o f p ackages t hat in clude e conomic empowerment, s hould b e p roperly p lanned a nd ex ecuted t o en sure f ull reintegration o f f ormer co mbatants a nd s hould in clude t he es tablishment o f youth-based conflict prevention projects. Amnesties have been widely applied and used co ncurrently w ith o ther m easures. For in stance, t he Ugandan g overnment has offered amnesty packages to LRA combatants under a law guaranteeing them a r esettlement p ackage t hat in cludes a l ump s um o f a bout US$150, a m attress, blanket, hoe and some seeds. Although the Uganda Amnesty Commission claims to have demobilised 16 245 individuals and provided reintegration support to 14 604 others,80 the ef fectiveness of t he programme has b een w idely questioned, as some of its beneficiaries were never fully integrated, have returned to rebel ranks or h ave t aken u p a lif e o f cr ime t o s urvive. Th e ef fectiveness o f t he N igerian amnesty programme, which was launched in October 2009 to end militia activities in t he N iger D elta r egion a nd i s c urrently b eing im plemented, i s a lso b eing criticised f or l acking a p eace a greement f ramework t hat in cludes co nfidence building, and commitments to addressing grievances and other issues that could have co ntributed t o t he em ergence o f ANSGs in t he co untry in t he f irst p lace. Other criticisms levelled at the Nigerian amnesty programme are its lack of legal status a nd a co mprehensive di sarmament, dem obilisation, r ehabilitation a nd reintegration p rogramme t hat in cludes t otal demi litarisation o f t he r egion. Because of such shortcomings, it is most li kely t hat it w ill fail to restore justice, destroy t he i llegal e conomy, p romote h uman a nd en vironmental s ecurity, a nd establish governance systems that ensure natural resources are equitably shared. Apart f rom t he u se o f n on-incarcerating m echanisms s uch a s a mnesty a nd truth co mmissions f or addr essing ANSG v iolence, cr iminal p rosecution h as become the preferred method of the international community.81 Legal approaches for addressing the bedlam caused by ANSGs s uch as the Mungiki, Mai-Mai and Boko Haram are complicated by the fact that they cannot be classified in terms of international law definitions of militias and self-determination groups. Even those
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groups that are fighting for national liberation, and are effectively recognised by the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention,82 have been denied recognition by states that instead treat them as criminals or terrorists. This has conveniently allowed governments t o apply n ational cr iminal l aws t o de al w ith t hese g roups. Regardless of whether the state regards ANSGs a s rebels, criminals or terrorists, they are obligated under international humanitarian laws to handle them in ways that do not violate their rights. On their part, ANSGs are also obligated to observe and respect international human rights and humanitarian laws.83 Some r ebels g roups h ave m ade i t e asy f or g overnments t o b rand t hem criminals d ue t o t heir l ack o f li beration cr edentials, cr iminal co nduct a nd destruction o f ci vilian p opulation li velihoods. I n r esponse t o t hreats p osed b y rebel groups, Musila (in chapter 4) points out that while some states have enacted national laws that categorise them as criminals or terrorists, others have refused to ratify or apply international laws that would give them legal status. This further complicates peacemaking efforts, as governments take obdurate positions of not negotiating with terrorist or criminal groups. Currently, t he in ternational co mmunity i s in clined t o h old le aders a nd members of ANSGs accountable for violations of international humanitarian and human r ights l aws. A part f rom t he a pplication o f t he uni versal j urisdiction principle, t here a re va rious in stitutional f orums s uch a s ad ho c tribunals f or example the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court f or S ierra L eone, a nd t he I CC, t hat a re b eing u sed t o det er a nd p unish human rights violations committed by armed non-state groups.84 The main aim of these trials and tribunals is to send a strong signal to perpetrators and would-be perpetrators t hat t hey w ill b e h eld in dividually acco untable f or h uman r ights violations t hey co mmit.85 However, in o rder f or t hese t rials a nd det errents t o effectively influence the behaviour of ANSGs and their leaders, they must be seen to restore justice and punish perpetrators of violence. Drawn-out trials such as that of Charles Taylor and the perpetrators of the 1994 Rwanda genocide at the ICTR, as w ell a s t he s eeming p owerlessness o f t he I CC t o a rrest J oseph K ony a nd hi s commanders, h ave lo wered t he exp ectations m any h ad o f t hese in struments o f international justice to contribute to the promotion of peace and justice in Africa. Julian Ku and Jide Nzelibe argue that if ANSGs a re operating in w eak states, they a re m ore li kely t o b e det erred b y inf ormal s anctions s uch a s de ath, imprisonment a nd t orture t han b y in ternational cr iminal t ribunal (I CT) prosecutions.86 The a wareness o f le aders s uch a s K ony o f the sig nificant
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constraints ICTs face in admini stering s anctions also make international justice ineffective in en ding ANSGs v iolence. Instead of lo oking to ICTs to punish and deter in ternational cr iminals, m ore ef fort s hould b e p ut in to developing a n effective f ramework f or addr essing h umanitarian a trocities b y building r obust domestic in stitutions in w eak s tates t hat c an s uccessfully c hannel p olitical participation a nd di spute r esolution.87 Ku a nd N zelibe c aution t hat I CT prosecutions mig ht a lso fa il t o det er ANSG v iolence if t hey t ry t o r emove a nd arrest the leadership prior to the resolution of a ci vil conflict. In addition, going the international justice route might distort the incentives of leaders in weak states to en gage in t he k inds o f co nstructive r eform ef forts t hat w ill t hwart f uture humanitarian atrocities. In other words, rather t han invest in b uilding domestic institutions t hat c an in capacitate do mestic o ffenders, le aders o f s uch s tates w ill often s eek t o u se t he t hreat o f a n I CT p rosecution t o ac hieve n arrow p olitical objectives that will often be inconsistent with the norm-promotion goals of ICTs.88 Okechukwu Oko argues that although the criminal process can be deployed to engineer compliance with the law and to deter would be perpetrators of evil the objectives o f u sing cr iminal p rosecution t o r e-establish s ocial e quilibrium a nd promote reconciliation are simply unattainable. It is unrealistic to assume that international cr iminal p rosecutions w ill r econcile m utually di strustful et hnic groups with a long history of reciprocal hatred.89 In the sense that the aim of such prosecutions is t o a pportion b lame a nd p unish t he gui lty, t hey fa il t o addr ess other s ources o f co nflict s uch a s s tate w eakness, p oor g overnance, in equitable allocation o f r esources, co rruption a nd m arginalisation t hat des tabilise n ational states.90 Legal m easures w ould addr ess t he un derlying c auses o nly if t hey w ere undertaken in co ncert w ith p olitical r eforms a nd n ational s ocioeconomic development. O ko c autions f urther t hat traditional n otions o f t he cr iminal process c annot address t he t ype of v iolence committed by g roups against other groups. F urthermore, i t h as n ot b een em pirically v erified t hat in ternational criminal p rosecution c an det er v iolence. A b igger c hallenge f or enf orcing international justice in A frica lies in A frican governments reluctance to support prosecution o f A fricans in in ternational t ribunals f or wa r cr imes. A frican governments a re n ot o nly s ceptical a bout in ternational cr iminal l aw b ut a lso openly hostile towards it,91 as shown by the position the AU has taken towards the ICC and its pursuit of bringing the Sudanese president to justice in Th e Hague. Ralph Zacklin dismisses international criminal prosecution bodies as mechanism for de aling w ith j ustice in p ost-conflict s ocieties, s tating t hat t hey a re n ot politically and financially viable, and are inefficient and ineffective.92
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CONCLUSION
As stated above, this book is an exercise in b ringing about a g reater and deeper understanding about ANSGs in A frica by providing a comprehensive framework of analysis that categorises them and analyses each groups motives, mobilisation and recruitment, as well as its relationship to the state as either an instrument or victim of its violence.93 Such a framework will assist with the conduct of in-depth studies o n ANSGs a nd p roduce k nowledge t hat inf orms ef forts a t co nfronting their threats to human and state security. The utility of such a framework in policy formation lies in p roviding information on options for dealing with ANSGs t hat transcend a one-size-fits-all approach to prevent and combat ANSGs activities, as it r ecognises t hat e ach g roups uniq ue c haracteristics r equire t ailor-made measures. The exercise of generating effective policy responses should start with a thorough mapping of a groups background, raison dtre, organisational structure, leadership, modus operandi and sources of sustainability and support. This should be f ollowed b y a n a nalysis o f t he g roups r elations t o t he s tate a nd va rious responses to its activities. The s tudies in t his b ook s how t hat ANSGs h ave dif ferent m otives a nd strategies t hat m ake i t dif ficult t o f ormulate co mmon s trategies f or co ntaining their activities. ANSG activities undermine human security and the state capacity to fulfil social contract obligations. With the weakening of the capacity of African states t o de liver p ublic g oods a nd s ervices, i t i s m ost li kely t hat ANSGs m ay continue t o t hreaten h uman s ecurity f or t he f oreseeable f uture. B ased o n t his finding, an effective way to prevent and confront ANSGs is to build state capacity to fully implement national development policies. There is no single effective measure for addressing the ANSG phenomenon; a combination of measures is needed. For instance, it would be simplistic to assume that holding free-and-fair elections would guarantee good governance and install good leadership. Ensuring that elections are not fraudulent could pre-empt action by disgruntled losers to adopt the rebel route (as Museveni did in 1982) o r cause neighbours to kill each other (as the Kenyans did in 2008). But most importantly, it i s h ow e lected g overnments de liver p ublic g oods a nd s ervices t o a ll ci tizens regardless o f a ge, r eligion, et hnicity, g ender o r r egion a fter t he e lections t hat matter most. If elections are used to promote sectarian, elite, individual or group interests, they will most likely be accompanied by violence or plant its seeds. In addition, Africa needs to revise the methods of holding elections, immunise the state f rom b eing c aptured by rapacious elites w ho use it to maintain p atronage462
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client sys tems, a nd c hange t he m ode o f p olitical en gagement f rom a zer o-sum game to a p ositive-sum game, which benefits all and does not allow a los er to be excluded a nd m arginalised a s fa r a s acces s t o p ublic g oods a nd s ervices i s concerned. Furthermore, states should be secured against political elites who use it to marginalise citizens on the basis of their identity, and exclude them from the benefits of public goods and services. However, a w ord o f c aution i s n ecessary: t here i s n o gu arantee t hat e ven a combination o f t he r esponses hig hlighted in t his a nd o ther c hapters w ould effectively ext erminate t he ANSG t hreats t o h uman s ecurity. W hile t he c ase o f Uganda s hows t hat r esponses s uch a s mi litary o perations, ci vilian c amps, amnesties, p eace t alks, r egional mi litary ac tions a nd I CC in dictments94 have provided some measure of state security, most of them have done more harm than good t o ci vilian p opulations a ffected b y t he LR As s trategy o f r egionalising violence. However, whatever combination of approaches is adopted at the local, national, regional and international levels, the burden of responsibility for combating and preventing ANSG ac tivities lies w ith t he s tates t hemselves. Ik elegbe c learly illustrated the correlations between the nature of states, how they are governed and the phenomenon of non-state institutions of violence. If a state is badly governed, constantly t hreatens t he livelihoods of its p opulation, excludes and marginalises segments of its population (particularly the youth) and uses violence to legitimise itself, then there is a hig h likelihood that its citizens could b e lured into joining ANSGs, a s t he c ase s tudies in t his b ook h ave s hown. B ut ci tizens a lso h ave t he responsibility of ensuring that good leaders run their states properly and according to their wishes, which means that the citizenry must possess the software of peace that enables it to live in j ust, democratic and fair societies. Citizen knowledge of international humanitarian law and the consequences of violating these laws could help t hem to block p oliticians or warlords f rom forming mi litias and l aunching attacks against civilians. Monitoring and documenting activities of politicians and other political opportunists are critical for holding them accountable through local legal systems or international bodies such as the ICC. Ultimately, t he r esponsibility f or en suring t hat ANSG v iolence do es n ot weaken the state and threaten human security lies w ith the governments (which must en sure t hat t hey do n ot a buse t heir t raditional m onopoly o n v iolence t o legitimise themselves) and political elites (who must desist from using the youth and v iolence t o ga in a nd r etain p ower). A s tates a buse o f i ts m onopoly t o u se violence f or t he p ublic g ood, a nd e lite p roclivity t o p olitical v iolence, a re t he
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elements m ost li kely t o cr eate a v icious c ycle o f s ocietal v iolence a nd institutionalise it as a means of conflict resolution.

NOTES
1 See in particular works by T O Ranger, Connexions between primary resistance movements and modern mass nationalism in E ast and Central Africa, The Journal of African History 9 (1968), 437453; D onald Crummey, Banditry, rebellion and social protest in Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 1986; Stanley Cohen, Bandits, rebels or criminals: African history and Western criminology, Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute 56(4) (1986), 468483; Alice Hills, Warlords, militia and conflict in contemporary Africa: a re-examination of terms, Small W ars & I nsurgencies 8(1) (S pring 1997), 3551; C hristopher S C lapham, African guerrillas, Oxford: James C urrey, 1998; W illiam R eno, Warlord p olitics a nd A frican sta tes, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 1999; David J Francis, Civil militia: Africas intractable security menace? Farnham, S urrey: A shgate, 2005; M orten B s a nd K evin C D unn, African guerrillas: r aging a gainst t he m achine, B oulder, C olo: L ynne R ienner, 2007; a nd A ssis Malaquias, Rebels a nd r obbers: v iolence i n p ost-colonial A ngola, U ppsala: N ordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007. For a detailed analysis of the nexus between state, governance and rebel formation, see Denis Tull, The reconfiguration of political order in Africa: a case study of North Kivu (DR Congo), Hamburg: GIGA, 2005. See Richard H S hultz and Andrea J D ew, Insurgents, terrorists and militias: the warriors of contemporary combat, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 268. Idean Sa leyhan, Rebels w ithout b orders: t ransnational i nsurgencies i n w orld p olitics, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009, 170. Wassara, chapter 9. Jeremy M W einstein, Inside r ebellion: t he p olitics o f i nsurgent v iolence, New Y ork: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 341. Ikelegbe and Garuba, Youth conflicts in West Africa, 124147. The Popular Resistance Army (PRA) later merged with the Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF) led by Yusuf Lule, to become the National Resistance Army (NRA). Sabine C Carey, Rebellion in Africa: disaggregating the effect of political regimes, Journal of Peace Research 44(1) (2007), 4764. An example of using militia to cover up a s tates role in v iolence against civilians is Sudan, where the government supported militia groups such as the Janjaweed in Darfur to confront rebels who were challenging their marginalisation from the centre of power in Khartoum. See Nation Team, Officers quizzed over missing Land Rovers, Daily Nation, 4 February 2003. Oloo, chapter 6, 176. See Shultz and Dew, Insurgents, terrorists and militias, 266. See W illiam R eno, A frican r ebels a nd t he ci tizenship q uestion, in Sa ra D orman, D aniel Patrick H ammett a nd P aul N ugent (e ds), Making n ations, cr eating s trangers: s tates a nd citizenship in Africa, Leiden: Brill, 2007. See Omach (chapter 10) and Kasaija (chapter 7). Saleyhan, Rebels without borders, 162.
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11 12 13 14

15 16

17 Ibid, 163. 18 See A I A siwaju (e d), Partitioned A fricans: e thnic r elations a cross A fricas i nternational boundaries, 18841984, London: Hurst, 1985. 19 Saleyhan, Rebels without borders, 163. 20 Ibid, 176. 21 See Shultz and Dew, Insurgents, terrorists and militias, 266. 22 Weinstein, Inside rebellion, 7. 23 Ibid. 24 For a detailed analysis on how rebel groups recruit members, see Weinstein, Inside rebellion, 816. 25 W J B reytenbach, Of r ulers, r ebels a nd m ercantilists: t owards a n exp lanation f or t he continents resource wars, Africa Insight 32(2) (2002), 39. 26 Weinstein, Inside rebellion, 342. 27 Ibid, 7. 28 Wafula O kumu, U ganda m ay face a n o il c urse, The A frican.org, J une/July 2010, 4244, http://www.the-african.org/ (accessed 9 July 2010). 29 Ibaba and Ikelegbe, chapter 8, 248. 30 Engels, chapter 3, 84. 31 See United Nations Human R ights C ouncil, s tatement b y P rofessor P hilip A lston, S pecial Rapporteur o n ext rajudicial, s ummary o r a rbitrary ex ecutions, G eneva, 3 J une 2009, 5, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/index.htm (accessed 11 February 2010). 32 Ibaba and Ikelegbe, chapter 8, 247. 33 Oloo, chapter 6. 34 Victoria Brittain, Ethiopia forces Ogaden exodus, Guardian (UK), 20 May 1980. 35 Ibid. 36 Chris D olan, Social t orture: t he c ase o f n orthern U ganda, 19862006, Oxford: B erghahn Books, 2009. 37 At the height of the war with the LRA, the Uganda Peoples Defence Force deployed more than 5 000 ghost s oldiers. S ee Jenkins Kiwanuka, Ghost s oldiers delayed end of northern war, Monitor, 29 May 2008. 38 See Sunday Standard, 23 April 2000. 39 See George and Ylnen, chapter 11, 360. 40 Kabir, chapter 11, 334. 41 Anti-government extremist groups and militias in t he US g rew from 149 in 2008 t o 512 in 2009. See Niraj Warikoo, Experts: Christian militia part of growing trend, Detroit Free Press, 29 M arch 2010, h ttp://www.freep.com/article/20100329/NEWS05/100329048/1318/WillHutaree-militia-suspects-be-released/Experts-Christian-militia-part-of-growing-trend (accessed 4 April 2010). 42 See Fred Burton and Ben West, The Hutarees: exposure and vulnerability, Stratfor, 1 A pril 2010, h ttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100331_hutarees_exposure_and_vulnerability? (accessed 3 April 2010). 43 See M ark W S mith, F acebook a n o pen w indow t o H utaree mi litia, Detroit F ree P ress, 30 March 2010, h ttp://www.freep.com/article/20100330/BLOG36/100330033/1318/Will Hutaree-militia-suspects-be-released/Facebook-an-open-window-to-Hutaree-militia (accessed 3 A pril 2010); B en S chmitt, FB I u ses r use t o l ure H utaree mi litia: m emorial
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45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

54

55 56 57 58

59 60 61 62

gathering brought out group, Detroit Free Press, 2 April 2010, http://www.freep.com/article/ 20100402/NEWS01/4020343/1318/Will-Hutaree-militia-suspects-be-released?-Judgesruling-expected (accessed 3 April 2010). This q uestion i s a nswered in det ail b y J eroen de Z eeuw, U nderstanding t he p olitical transformation o f r ebel m ovements, in J eroen de Z eeuw (e d), From s oldiers t o p oliticians: transforming rebel m ovements after civil w ar, Boulder, C olo: Lynne R ienner, 2008; M immi Sderberg Kovacs, When rebels change their stripes, in Anna K Jarstad and Timothy D Sisk (eds), From war to democracy: the dilemmas of peacekeeping, Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pearce, chapter 13, 380. See D enis M T ull a nd A ndreas M ehler, Th e hidden cos ts o f p ower-sharing: r eproducing insurgent violence in Africa, African Affairs 104(416) (2005), 375398. Ian S S pears, Africa: the limits of power-sharing, Journal of Democracy 13(3) (2002), 123 136. See the Lom Peace Agreement of 18 May 1999, the Lusaka Protocol of 15 November 1994 and the Arusha Peace Agreement of 4 August 1993. Patricia Daley, Challenges to peace: conflict resolution in t he Great Lakes region of Africa, Third World Quarterly 27(2) (2006), 303319. Omach, chapter 10, 307. Saleyhan, Rebels without borders, 172. Ibid. See A frican U nion, D eclaration o n t he A frican U nion B order P rogramme a nd i ts Implementation Modalities, Adopted by the Conference of African Ministers in C harge of Border I ssues, h eld in A ddis A baba, E thiopia, o n 7 J une 2007, h ttp://www.africaunion.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/ps/PSC%20Publications/Border%20Issues_E.p df (accessed 21 May 2008). See D avid M waniki, M anasseh Wepundi a nd H arriet M orolong, The (n orthern) U ganda peace p rocess: a n u pdate o n r ecent d evelopments, ISS S ituation R eport, 2 F ebruary 2009, http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/SITREPUGANDA02-02-09.PDF (accessed 25 July 2010). See William Church and Marco Jowell, Conflict circuit breakers of the Great Lakes region of Africa, African Security Review (16)1 (2007), 1832. Saleyhan, Rebels without borders, 173. Ibid, 172173, 176. Gilbert Khadiagala, Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda, in Stephen John Stedman, D onald S R othchild a nd E lizabeth M C ousens (e ds), Ending ci vil w ars: t he implementation of peace agreements, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2002, 463. Omach, chapter 10, 307. Saleyhan, Rebels without borders, 173. Rita A brahamsen, A b reeding g round f or t errorists? A frica & B ritains war o n t errorism, Review of African Political Economy 31(102) (2004), 677684. Pact on Peace, Stability and Development in t he Great Lakes region, adopted by the heads of state and government of the ICGLR member states in Nairobi on 15 December 2006, and entered in to f orce o n 21 J une 2008, h ttp://www.icglr.org/icglr-pacte.php (acces sed 5 September 2008). Th e I CGLR m embers a re A ngola, B urundi, C entral A frican R epublic,
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64

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66 67 68

69 70

71 72 73 74 75 76

77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86

Democratic R epublic o f C ongo, K enya, R wanda, R epublic o f C ongo, S udan, U ganda, Tanzania and Zambia. See United S tates C ongress, L ords R esistance A rmy Di sarmament a nd N orthern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, 111th Congress, 1st session, S 1067, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ billtext.xpd?bill=h111-2478 (accessed 19 May 2010). See African Union, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted by the eig hth o rdinary s ession o f t he A ssembly, A ddis A baba, E thiopia, 30 J anuary 2007, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/Charter%20on%20 Democracy.pdf (accessed 9 May 2007). See Organisation of African Unity, OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, ado pted b y t he 35t h O AU S ummit in A lgiers, A lgeria, in J uly 1999, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Algiers_convention %20on%20Terrorism.pdf (accessed 9 July 2010). Saleyhan, Rebels without borders, 162. Weinstein, Inside rebellion, 343. Peter Biro, Rebel training: introducing human rights in war-torn Central African Republic, The Huffington Post, 7 July 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-biro/rebel-trainingintroducin_b_638545.html (accessed 9 July 2010). Weinstein, Inside rebellion, 344. Jeffrey Herbst, International laws and the African child: norms, compliance, and sovereignty, in M ichael D oyle a nd E dward L uck (e ds), International l aw a nd o rganisation: c losing t he compliance gap, Lanham, Md: Rowan & Litttlefied, 2004, 187205. Ibid, 346. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid, 347. Ibid. Kimberley P rocess C ertification S cheme f or R ough Di amonds, ado pted a t a mini sterial meeting in I nterlaken on 5 N ovember 2002, h ttp://www.kimberleyprocess.com (accessed 5 April 2010). Weinstein, Inside rebellion, 347. Ibid. Ibid, 348. See U ganda A mnesty C ommission, h ttp://www.justiceinperspective.org.za/index.php? option=com_content&task=view&id=39&Itemid=79 (accessed 10 June 2010). See Okechukwu Oko, The challenges of international criminal prosecutions in Africa, 2007, http://works.bepress.com/okechukwu_oko/1 (accessed 5 April 2010). Additional Protocol I, P rotocol Additional to the Geneva C onventions of 12 A ugust 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977. Bert V A R ling, Th e lega l s tatus o f r ebels a nd r ebellion, Journal o f P eace R esearch 13(2) (1976), 149163. Weinstein, Inside rebellion, 348. Ibid, 349. Julian Ku and Jide Nzelibe, Do international criminal tribunals deter or exacerbate humanitarian atrocities? Washington University Law Review 84, 2006, 832.
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Ibid, 832. Ibid, 832. Oko, The challenges of international criminal prosecutions in Africa, 7. Ibid, 8. Ibid, 914. See R alph Z acklin, Th e fa ilings o f ad ho c international t ribunals, Journal of I nternational Criminal Justice 2 (2004), 542. 93 Rebel motives are also unpacked by Halvard Buhaug, Relative capability and rebel objective in civil war, Journal of Peace Research 43(6) (2006), 691708. 94 See Wafula O kumu, D omestic t errorism in U ganda, in W afula O kumu a nd A nneli B otha (eds), Understanding d omestic te rrorism i n A frica, P retoria: I nstitute f or S ecurity S tudies, 2007, 8082.

87 88 89 90 91 92

Appendix
Militia and rebel groups in post-independent sub-Saharan Africa
Country Angola Name of group Frente de Libertao do Estado de Cabinda Abbreviation Time period and further notes FLEC Established 1963, aiming at independence of the enclave of Cabinda. Dissolved in 1976, re-appeared in June 1991 Established 1954 Established 1956 Established 1966, supported by US during the Cold War Established 1994, Hutu-Guerrilla

Angola Angola Angola

Frente Nacional da Libertao de Angola Movimento Popular de Libertao de Angola Unio Nacional para Indepndencia Total de Angola Force pour la Dfense de la Dmocratie Parti pour la Libration du Peuple Hutu Forces Nationales de Libration Union des Populations du Cameroun Mouvement Patriotique pour la Restauration de la Rpublique Centrafricaine Union des Forces Dmocratiques pour le Rassemblement

FNLA MPLA UNITA

Burundi Burundi

FDD PALIPEHUTU FNL UPC

Cameroon

Established in 1948; led by Ruben Um Nyob; anti-colonial movement Established 2005

Central African Republic Central African Republic

MPRC

UFDR

Established 2006, umbrella group (Groupe dAction Patriotique pour la Libration de Centrafrique + Mouvement des Librateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice + Front Dmocratique Centrafricain)

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Central African Republic

Arme Populaire pour la Restauration de la Rpublique et la Dmocratie Front Dmocratique du Peuple Centrafricain

APRD

Established 2005

Chad

Mouvement pour la Paix, la Rconstruction et le Dveloppement Mouvement pour la Dmocratie et le Dveloppement

MPRD

Chad FDPC Established 2005 Chad

MDD

Central African Republic Central African Republic Chad

Rassemblement des RFC Forces pour le Changement Socle pour le Changement, lUnit et la Dmocratie Union des Forces pour la Dmocratie et le Dveloppement Ninjas Cobras Alliance de Forces Dmocratiques pour la Libration du Congo Congrs National pour la Dfense du Peuple Conseil National de Libration / Arme Populaire de Libration Confderation des Associations Tribales de Katanga Forces Dmocratique pour la Libration du Rwanda Front de Libration Nationale Congolais Front Nationalistes et Integrationistes Forces de Rsistance Patriotique dIturi AFDL SCUD Established 2005, eastern Chad

Union des Forces Rpublicaines

UFR

Chad

Arme Nationale de Rsistance

ANR

Led by Mahamt Garfa (until 1994 commandant of the national armed forces); active in Eastern and Southern Chad, split off in 2003

Chad

UFDD

Congo (RC) Congo (RC) Congo (DRC)

Established 2002, ceasefire 2003 Second half of the 1990s Established October 1996

Chad

Concorde Nationale Tchadienne Comit de Sursaut National de la Paix et de la Dmocratie Forces Armes du Nord

CNT

Chad

CSNP Congo (DRC) Congo (DRC) CNDP CNL/APL Established 2006, North Kivu 19641966

Chad

FAN

Led by Hissen Habr; first rebel movement in Africa since anticolonial struggles to seize power

Congo (DRC)

Conakat

19601963

Chad

Forces Armes de la Rpublique Fdrale Front de Libration Nationale du Tchad Front Uni pour le Changement Dmocratique Mouvement pour la Dmocratie et la Justice au Tchad

FARF Congo (DRC)

FDLR

Chad

Frolinat

Established 1966 Congo (DRC

Estimated 9 000 fighters; former Rwandan militaries and militias participating in the 1994 genocide Established 1968 by former army officer Nathaniel Mbumba; military defeat 1978 Agreed to disarm in August 2007 Established November 2002

Chad

FUC

FLNC

Congo (DRC) Chad MDJT Established 1998, northern Chad, ceasefire 2003 Congo (DRC)

FNI FRPI

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Congo (DRC) Congo (DRC) Congo (DRC) Congo (DRC) Congo (DRC) Congo (DRC)

Mai-Mai militia Mouvement pour la Libration du Congo Mouvement National Congolais/Lumumba Mouvement National Congolais/Kalondji Mouvement Rvolutionnaire Congolais Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dmocratie Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dmocratie Goma RCD Mouvement de Libration Union des Patriotes Congolais Congrs des Jeunes Patriotes (Young Patriots including student militia) Forces Nouvelles de Cte dIvoire (alliance of Mouvement Patriotique de Cte dIvoire, Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix and Mouvement Populaire pour le Grand Ouest) Front de Libration du Grand Ouest MLC MNC/L MNC/K MRC RCD

Collective term for local militia in the Kivus Established shortly after the beginning of the war in 1998 1960/61

Cte dIvoire

Groupe Patriotique pour la Paix Union des Patriotes pour la Libration Totale de la Cte dIvoire Front pour la Restauration de lUnit et de la Dmocratie Alliance of Eritrean National Forces Eritrean Liberation Front

GPP

Established 2002, umbrella group of pro-government militia Established 2003, pro-government militia

Cte dIvoire

UPLTCI

Djibouti 1960/61 Agreed to disarm in August 2007 Split after the war of 1996/97 Ethiopia/ Eritrea Ethiopia/ Eritrea Ethiopia RCD Goma Established 1998 Ethiopia/ Eritrea RCD-ML Established 1999, North Kivu, supported by Uganda, split from the RCD Established 2002, led by Thomas Lubanga, Ituri region Supports President Laurent Gbagbo (but not government controlled) Alliance of the FNCI formed in 2003 during the war; political leader Guillaume Soro (now prime minister); supported by traditional Dozo hunters (especially in 2002/03), http://www.fninfo.ci Established 2002, patriotic youth militia in the Western region (loyal to the president/government side, fought against MJP and MPIGO) Established 2002, pro-government militia Ethiopia/ Eritrea

FRUD

AENF

Established 1999

ELF

Established early 1960s

Congo (DRC)

Ethiopian Democratic Union Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front

EDU

Conservative/monarchist

EPLF

Congo (DRC)

Established 1970, split off to form the ELF. Linked to the TPLF; EPRDF + EPLF overthrew the Ethiopian government in 1991 EPRDF + EPLF overthrew the Ethiopian government in 1991

Congo (DRC) Cte dIvoire

UPC Cojep

Ethiopian Peoples EPRDF Revolutionary Democratic Front Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromiya Oromo Liberation Front IFLO

Ethiopia

OLF splinter group

Cte dIvoire

FNCI (MPCI + MJP + MPIGO)

Ethiopia

OLF

Established 1973, http://www.oromoliberation front.org Established 1969

Ethiopia

Ogaden National Liberation Front/Army Tigray Liberation Front

ONLF/A

Ethiopia

TLF

Cte dIvoire

FLGO

Established 1974 as a students organisation, dissolved 1976 by the TPLF Established 1975

Ethiopia

Tigray Peoples Liberation Front Green Boys

TPLF

Cte dIvoire

Front pour la Scurit de Centre-Ouest

FSCO

The Gambia

Pro-government, reported to be affiliated with the ruling APRC

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Guinea Guinea Guinea

Union des Forces Dmocratiques de Guine Union des Forces pour une Guine Nouvelle Rassemblement des forces Dmocratiques de Guine / Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea Young Volunteers

UFDG UFGN RFDG

Armed conflict against the government of Guinea in 2000/01

Madagascar

JINA (secret organisation)

Established 1945, anti-colonial movement Established 1945, anti-colonial movement, military defeated 1956 Established 1945, anti-colonial movement Established 2006, former combatants of the 1990s Tuareg rebellion ARLA Tuareg rebellion 19901996

Madagascar

Mouvement de la Rnovation Malgache PANAMA (secret organisation) Alliance Dmocratique du 23 mai pour le Changement Arme Rvolutionaire de Libration de lAzawad Front Populaire pour la Libration de lAzawad Front Islamique Arabe de lAzawad Front National pour la Libration de lAzawad Front Uni de la Libration de lAzawad Mouvement Populaire de lAzawad Mouvement Populaire pour la Libration de lAzawad Mouvement Touareg Nord-Mali pour le Changement Frente Popular de Liberacin de Seguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro

Madagascar

Mali

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau Partido Africano da Independncia da Guin e Cabo Verde / Frente da Tutta para la Independencia Nacional da Guin Kenya Kenya Liberia Liberia Liberia Rebellion Shifta Lofa Defence Force Liberian Peace Council Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia

PAIGC/FLING

Seized power after independence in 1975; overthrown by a coup in 1980

Mali

Mali

FPLA

Tuareg rebellion 19901996

Mali Anti-colonial revolt 195256 Secessionist/separatist war 1963 67 LDF LPC LURD Established 1993, partly proxy of the armed forces of Liberia, fought against NPFL Split to form the NPFL in February 1990 because of personal rivalries between Prince Johnson (INPFL) and Charles Taylor (NFPL) Established 1989, led by Charles Taylor; overthrew Does regime in September 1990 Established in early 1993 Established 1991 Loma-dominated, allied to Charles Taylor Mali

FIAA

Tuareg rebellion 19901996

FNLA

Tuareg rebellion 19901996

Mali

FULA

Tuareg rebellion 19901996

Mali

MPA

Tuareg rebellion 19901996

Mali

MPLA

Tuareg rebellion 19901996

Liberia

INPFL

Mali

MTNMC

Founded 18 September 2007

Liberia

National Patriotic Front of Liberia Movement for Democracy in Liberia United Liberation Movement for Democracy

NPFL

Mauretania

Polisario

19751991

Liberia Liberia

MODEL ULIMO

Mozambique Frente de Libertao de Moambique Mozambique Resistncia Nacional Moambicana

FRELIMO

19641974

RENAMO

19751992, supported by US during the Cold War

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Namibia

South West Africa Peoples Organisation / Peoples Liberation Army Namibia Forces Armes Rvolutionnaires du Sahara Front Dmocratique pour le Renouveau Front pour la Libration de lAir et de lAzawad Mouvement des Nigriens pour la Justice Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa Al-Sunna Wal Jamma (Followers of the Prophet) Arewa Peoples Congress Bakassi Movement for Self-Determination Bakassi Boys Bakassi Freedom Fighters

SWAPO/PLAN

Established 1960

Nigeria (Niger Delta)

Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force

NDPVF

Established 2003, broke up after the detention of its leader, Dokubo-Asari, in September 2005

Niger

FARS

Nigeria (Niger Delta) Nigeria (Niger Delta)

Niger Delta Volunteer Force Niger Delta Vigilante

NDVF NDV Leader Ateke Tom

Niger Niger Niger Nigeria (North) Nigeria Nigeria Nigeria (south-east) Nigeria (south-east) Nigeria (south-east) Nigeria (Biafra) Nigeria Nigeria (North) Nigeria (Biafra) Nigeria (Niger Delta)

FDR FLAA MNJ

1990s Tuareg rebellion 19901994 Established 1991 Rwanda Nigeria (Centre, Lagos) Nigeria O'odudua (also O'odua) Peoples Council OPC Established 1994, south-western Nigeria

Zamfara State Vigilante Service Forces Dmocratique pour la Libration du Rwanda Front Patriotique Rwandaise Interahamwe, Hutu Militia

ZSVS

Established 1999

FDLR

Established 2000; DRC and Rwanda agreed to disband the FDLR in December 2008

Established 2002, also known as Taleban APC BAMOSD Declared secession from Nigeria in 2006 Established 1999

Rwanda

FPR

Rwanda

Interahamwe was not formally dissolved after the 1994 genocide but merged with the Hutu Militia MFDC Established 1982; armed conflict 19902004, split in Front Nord and Front Sud Defected members of the armed forces

Senegal

Mouvement des Forces Dmocratiques de Casamane Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Civil Defence Force Revolutionary United Front West Side Boys Al-Ittihad al-Islami / (Islamic Union)

Sierra Leone Biafran Organisation of Freedom Fighters Egbesu Boys of Africa Hisba Movement for the Realisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta MASSOB BOFF EBA Established 2001 Sierra Leone Established 1999 Somalia Name was given only at the end of the Biafran war (19671970)

AFRC

Sierra Leone Sierra Leone

CDF RUF Entered 1991 Sierra Leone, supported by NPFL Fighters Led by Foday Kallay Established 1992

WSB AIAI

Somalia MEND Active since January 2006

Alliance for the Liberation ALS/ARS of Somalia / Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia

Established 2007

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Somalia/ Djibouti Somalia

Front de Libration de la Cte des Somalis Northern Frontier District Liberation Front Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of Two Migrations Rahanweyn Resistance Army Somali Democratic Movement

FLCS

Sudan Sudan Sudan

Justice and Equality Movement Justice Front New Sudan Brigade Popular Defence Forces Sudan Alliance Forces Sudan Liberation Movement/Army Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army The Beja Congress

JEM

Darfur Established 2007, Arab militia Established 1995, eastern branch of SPLA Government-controlled armed group

NFDLF

Somalia

PRA

Established 2007 Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Sudan Uganda Uganda Uganda

Somalia

RRA

Established 1995/96, allied with SDM Established 1992, southern Somalia Established July 1992 as an alliance of parts of the USC and the Somali Patriotic Movement; led by Mohammed Farah Aidid Established 1991 Established 1982, declared independent republic of Somaliland in 1991 Established 1989

SAF SLM/A SPLM/A

Established 1994 Established June 1992 at the University of Khartoum Established 1983, Southern Sudan Established 1993, eastern Sudan Established 2007 Established 2007 Established 1995 Established 1973 Established by Alice Auma (Alice Lakwena) (later her father, Severino Lukoya) since August 1986 Established 1987 by Joseph Kony Led by Yoweri Museveni, seized power in 1986 Former Save Uganda Movement, 1980s 19861988 Established 1979, defeated by the NRA in 1986 19801986

Somalia

SDM

Somalia

Somali National Alliance / SNA United Somali Congress

United Front for Liberation UFDL and Development United Revolutionary Force Front Allied Democratic Forces Front for National Salvation Holy Spirit Mobile Forces URFF ADF Fronasa HSMF

Somalia Somalia

Somali National Front Somali National Movement

SNF SNM

Somalia

Somali Patriotic Movement Somali Salvation Democratic Front

SPM

Somalia

SSDF

Established 1978, declared autonomy of the Puntland region in 1998 Uganda Uganda Lords Resistance Army National Resistance Movement/Army Uganda Freedom Movement Uganda Peoples Democratic Army Uganda National Liberation Front/Army Uganda National Rescue Front LRA NRM/A UFM UPDA UNLF/A UNRF

Somalia

Supreme Islamic Courts Council Union of Islamic Courts

SICC

Somalia

UIC

Established 1991, supported by Eritrea

Uganda Uganda

Somalia

Western Somali Liberation Front Umkhonto we Sizwe Eastern Front Janjaweed, Fursan and Malihiyat

WSLF

South Africa Sudan Sudan

MK Uganda Established 2005, ceasefire Arab and Fur militias first mentioned in 1994, Darfur Uganda

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Uganda Uganda Uganda Zambia

Uganda National Rescue Front II Uganda Peoples Army West Nile Bank Front Mushala-Army

UNRF II UPA WNBF

Established 1996, signed ceasefire in December 2002

Established 1995 19761982, leader Adamson Mushala; restricted to the NorthWest Province of Zambia

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Zimbabwe African National Union Zimbabwe African Peoples Union

ZANU ZAPU Established 1961, merged with ZANU in December 1987

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Index
Please note: page numbers in italics refer to tables and figures.
Abacha, General Sani 57 Abboud, Ibrahim 258, 25960 Abdalla, Abdu 270 Abidjan Peace Accord 399 Abyei area, Sudan 282; Protocol 282 Acak, Smith Opon 295 accountability: acts of rebels and militias 1012; international laws 1026; measures under national law 1079 Adaka Boro revolt, Niger Delta 238 Adaka Marines, Niger Delta 227 Addis Ababa Agreement 264, 265, 269 Adeniji, Oleyumi 422 Afghanistan 346; Soviet invasion 347 Africa Military Command (AFRICOM) 454 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 203 African Commission 103 African Court 92 African National Congress (ANC), South Africa 11, 89, 95, 100, 108, 423 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 452 African traditional world views 478; and spiritualism 1734 African Union (AU) 91, 92, 100, 204, 335, 420, 456; charteron democracy 1001; enforcement actions 98; Forces in Sudan 301, 303; Mission to Somalia 426; Peace and Security Council 205 African Union Forces in Sudan 301, 303 African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 282 AFRICOM, US 3356, 429; see also Africa Military Command; US Africa Command Ahl al-Sunna Wal Jamaah movement 330, 331 ahlu Sunna religious militia, Somalia 12 Ahmad, Muhammad (Mahdi) 4950 Akabo Wau garrisons, Sudan 264 Akol, Lam 2667, 268 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din 316

al-Azhari, Ismail 2578 al-Bashir, Omar 6, 274, 282, 430 Algeria 1, 12, 120, 131, 317, 3412; armed Islamist groups 3429; global war on terror 3578; internationalisation 3567; recruitment and activities 349351, 353355 alien occupation 97 Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) 11, 90, 1868, 298 al-Islambouli, Khaled 352 al-Jihad/Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) 342, 351, 352 Alliance pour la Majorit Prsidentielle (AMP) 190 Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Uganda 187, 205, 300, 443 All Ijaw Youths Summit, Bayelsa State 237 Al-Ittihad al-Islami (Union of Islamic Courts, UIC), Somalia 12 al-Jihad group 12 All Peoples Congress (APC) 393, 394 All Peoples Congress Party, Sierra Leone 391 al-Mahdi, Sadiq 278, 281 al-Nur, Abdul Wahid 273 Al-Qaeda 12, 158, 342, 343, 3478, 358; network 349; Salafism 315; transnational jihadism 3546; Western countries 356 Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), Algeria 342, 3545 al-Shafi, Abd 270 Al-Shahaab religious militia, Somalia 12, 61, 62, 93, 419 Alston, Philip 157, 1623, 165, 447 al-Zawahiri, Ayman 352 al-Zumar, Abbud 352 Amachuma militia, Kenya 7, 151 America 4289; post-war foreign policy 428 American Mineral Fields International 188 Americo-Liberian top officials 421 Amin, Idi 291, 393, 424 Amnesty International 157 Amuka Boys, Uganda 419 Angola 1, 17, 20, 26, 33, 34, 37, 38, 71, 90, 120, 131,187, 3656, 451; small arms proliferation 24 Angolan Armed Forces 371; Memorandum of Understanding 371 Annan, Kofi 4234 anti-colonial grievances 11 Anti Stock-Theft Unit, Kenya 172 Anti-Terrorism Act, Uganda 300 Anyanya movement, Sudan 258, 265, 266, 269 apartheid South Africa 95, 98, 108, 373, 423
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Arab-Fur markets 279 Arabs 316, 344; nationalism 3456, 347 Area Boys, Lagos 16 Arewa Peoples Congress 57 armed conflicts, causality and sustainment 18 Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 106, 400; and RUF, Peoples Army 4001 armed Islamist groups 3412; external factors after ideology 346349; external factors and ideology 3426; global war on terror and regime response 3578; internal factors in recruitment and activities 34951; internationalisation 3567; Islamism, political Islamism and Salafi jihadism 3436; recruitment into European cells 356; see also under Algeria; Egypt; Morocco armed non-state groups (ANSGs) 14, 1415, 1820, 2728, 31, 349, 437; borders and border areas 4434; international responses 4548; legal approaches 45962; local responses 4447; nature and character in Africa 1415; phenomenon of 1368, 4389; place of women 16; political elite manipulation 4413; regional responses 4524; state and governance as victims 13940; state governance 43940; state responses 44750; transforming into civil actors 4502; youth factor 441 Arme Islamique du Salut (AIS) 12, 354 arms proliferation 135 Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) 199 Arrow Boys, Uganda 419 Arugbo Freedom Fighters, Niger Delta 227 Atem, Akuot 265 authority: African conceptions of 46; and contemporary politics 547; ethnicity and kinship 556 az-Zubeir, Mujib ar-Rahman 279 Babanginda, Ibrahim 57 Baghdad Boys, Kenya 151 Bakajika Law, DRC 190 Bakassi Boys 57, 76

Banda, Hastings 556 Bantu militia 176 Bany, William Nyuon 266 Barre, Siad 426 Basque nationalists, Spain/France 4378 Bayaye, Kenya/Uganda 16 Bayelsa Volunteers, Niger Delta 227 Bearpark, Andrew 429 Bdi, Henri Konan 76 Belgian colonial rule of Congo 1845 Belgium 355, 428 Bemba, Jean-Pierre 192, 210, 424 Biafra 57 Biafran war, Nigeria 71 Bicasse Accord, Angola 36970 Bigombe, Betty 296 bin Laden, Osama 12, 282, 348 Biya, Paul 126 Black Braziers group, Niger Delta 225 black markets, smuggling and illegal trading 135 Boko Haram, Egypt/Nigeria 12, 34, 313, 330, 459 Bol, Kerubino Kwanyin 266 Boro, Adaka 225 Botswana 126, 128, 131 Brazzaville, see Republic of Congo Brigate Rosse (BR), Italy 4378 Britain 428 British Association of Private Security Companies 429 Bululu, Lunda 192 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, US 449 Burkino Faso 38, 131, 392 Burundi 1, 14, 21, 35, 37, 38, 69, 120, 131, 187; Hutus 11; Tutsis 11, 21 Bush, George W 422, 428 Bush Boys group, Niger Delta 225 Cameroon 37, 126, 131; armed insurgencies 71; Beti militia, University of Yaound 73 Carter, Jimmy 299 Carter Centre 299 Central African Republic (CAR) 1, 20, 32, 34, 35, 38, 61, 69, 81, 120, 126, 131, 303, 457 certification of commodities 458 Certification Scheme for the Great Lakes region 456 Chad 1, 20, 35, 38, 69, 78, 81, 83, 100, 120, 187, 273, 303, 331, 333, 358, 420 charismatic leaders 26 Chicoco Movement 57
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Chissano, Joaquim 378 children: abduction 102, 191; enslavement of girls 102; rebel groups 17; recruitment 17, 38, 1745; soldiers 63, 202, 296 Chinkororo militia, Kenya 7, 151 Chol, Gordon Koang 2645 Christian Solidarity International 269 Chui, Mathieu Ngudjolo 209 circumcision 612 citizens and popular groups responses 1346 civil defence forces (CDF) 106, 394, 399 civil struggle groups 3 civil wars 120 Coalition for Militant Action (COMA), Niger Delta 226, 227 Cobras militia, RoC 6 Cold War 51, 71, 324, 389, 423 collective identity constructions 79 Collier, Paul 428 colonialism 46, 51, 71, 97, 125 Comit Spcial du Katanga, DRC 1889 Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 92 Commission on Human Security 53 communism 9 community militias 7, 8, 16 Comoros 90 Compagnie du Katanga, DRC 1889 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Sudan 259, 269, 276, 277, 3012, 306, 453 Congrs National pour la Defnse du Peuple (CNDP), Rwanda 37, 103, 191, 202, 205 Congo-Brazzaville, see Democratic Republic of Congo Conseil Nationale de Libration (CNL) 18990 Conseil National pour la Dfense de Dmocratie/Forces pour la Dfense de la Dmocratie (CNDD-FDD), Burundi 11, 389 Conservative Party (CP), Uganda 292 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism 300 corrupt and impious regimes 22 corruption and mismanagement 130 Cte dIvoire 6, 17, 21, 35, 37, 38, 69, 78, 83, 120, 126, 131 counter-insurgency tactics 30 counter-insurgent militias 7, 8 Court on Human Peoples Rights 103 crimes against humanity 101, 102 criminal militias 7, 8 Cuba 367, 368 culture 3, 256, 48, 54, 57; and religion 1734; symbols and traditions 789 customary law 92

Dar-es-Salaam Declaration 434 Darfur 273; Border Intelligence 277; rebel groups 6, 100, 2712, 443 Darfur Liberation Front 6 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 273 Dawa S alafism 345 Deby, Idriss 12 decolonisation era 1345 Deegbam group, Niger Delta 225 Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 59 Democratic Party (DP), Uganda 292 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 12, 6, 7, 14, 17, 19, 20, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 52, 59, 69, 106, 120, 131, 288, 301, 445; atrocities 102; collaboration with FDLR and PARECO 199201; conflicts 300; cross-border trading 190; current status of conflict 1901; history of conflict 1848; independence period 1856; international responses to conflict 20610; Kinyarwanda-speaking communities 58; Kivu region 58, 78; militias and rebel movements 1914; natural resources in eastern DRC 189, 197, 1979; natural resources and conflict areas 201; rebel groups in eastern DRC 1946; regional responses to conflict 2046; Rwanda and CNDP 2013; struggle for control of natural resources 18390; UgandaMLC collaboration 203; war crimes against humanity 99; youths and children 30, 38 democracy 126 democratisation 131 destruction of property 102 Dhlakama, Afonso 3756, 380 diasporas 79; Ugandan 2956 dictatorships 126 disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes 206, 4012 displacement of populations 191 Doe, Samuel 35, 392, 419, 421, 429 dos Santos, Jos 435 Dozo, Cte dIvoire 73, 76 drugs 17
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Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 2445, 4212, 453; Convention on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons 25 Economic Community of West African States Monitoring and Observation Group (ECOMOG) 4001, 422 economic crimes 19 economic crisis and security 52 economic decline 130, 135; and social ferment 23 economic incentives 26 economic resources 74 Egbema National Congress, Niger Delta 225 Egbesu Boys of Africa, Niger Delta 19, 57, 73, 225, 226, 227 Egeland, Jan 301 Egypt 2, 12, 131; armed Islamist groups 3429; global war on terror 3578; internationalisation 3567; Islamic Jihad 61; peace with Israel 347; recruitment and activities 349353; tourist industry 347 Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) 349, 353 el-Bashir, Omar 299, 401, 443, 456 elections 126, 127, 135, 231; rebellion and insurgencies 4412 elite 7, 39, 65, 73, 122, 131, 177, 236, 365, 379, 439, 446; business 160; civilian and military 258; construction 223; governing 35, 350; intellectual and scholarly 323; networks 293; political 30, 23, 29, 40, 65, 82, 129, 1489, 291, 352, 4412, 463; political and military 381; ruling 7, 29, 128, 284, 324, 417; Western-educated 3434 el-Zakzaky, Ibrahim 3268 embargoes 98 emigration 135 Equatorial Guinea 20, 26, 37, 126, 131 Eritrea 14, 71, 90, 297, 298; secessionists against Ethiopia 420 Eritrean-Ethiopia war 34 Eritrea Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) 11, 12, 14, 16, 71, 95 Ethiopia 2, 20, 21, 35, 120, 297, 298, 420, 4257; constitutional reconstruction 419; Derg 269;

Ogaden region 12; Oromo opposition 72 Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict 300 Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 11 ethnicity 16, 723, 135, 259; politicisation of 1489 ethnic militias 7, 8 ethnic mobilisation and coercion 26 European Community 297 extortion and plundering regime 33 Farag, Mohammad Abd al-Salam 351, 352 Fatah, Palestine 95 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), US 359, 449 Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC) 226, 2423 Fodio, Uthman Ibn 49, 318, 322, 3234 Force Publique, Congo 185, 188 Forces Armes de la Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo (FARDC) 94, 187, 191, 193, 200, 207 Forces Armes du Nord (FAN), Chad 11 Forces Armes Rwandaises (FAR) 93, 183 Forces Dmocratiques de Libration du Rwanda (FDLR) 102, 191, 193, 194, 199201, 202, 205, 207, 444, 455 Forces de Libration du Grand Ouest (FLGO), Cte dIvoire 38 Forces Nationales de Libration (FNL), Burundi 11 Forces Nouvelles, Cte dIvoire 103 Foreign Policy index 31; Failed States Index 128 Forum for the Restoration of Democracy Kenya (FORDK) 161 France 5, 283, 347, 348, 355, 356, 428 Frente de Libertao de Moambique (FRELIMO) 11, 31, 89, 94, 366, 373, 3758, 4223 Frente Nacional de Liberao de Angola (FNLA) 366 Front de Libration du Congo (FLC) 203 Front de Libration du Qubec (FLQ), Canada 4378 Front de Libration Nationale (FLN), Algeria 9, 11, 89, 347 Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) 347, 348, 354 functionality and dysfunctionality 301 Gabon 126, 131 Gaddafi, Muammar 391, 420; Green Book 391 Gai, Taban Deng 268 Gambia 767 Garang, John 2657, 269 gender: role distribution 64; violence 64 Gnrale des Carrires et des Mines, DRC 190 General Peace Accord 375 General Service Unit, Kenya 172
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Geneva Conventions 97, 102, 457; Additional Protocol I 95, 97, 460; Additional Protocol II 98, 104, 105; breaches of 1045; and Protocols 103 genocide 101, 102 Germans 429; Niger Delta group 225 Ghana 55, 126, 131 Gio groups, Liberia 17 Global and All Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC 206 globalisation 74; and arms proliferation 245 global war on terror (GWoT) 342, 357 Goma Acts of Engagement 191 good governance, attributes of 123 government militias 5 government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) 306 governance and development 1234, 1302 Graduates Congress, Sudan 258 Great Lakes region 59, 69, 81, 288, 305, 443, 4556; Pact on Security, Stability and Development 204, 455 Green Bombers, Zimbabwe 17 Greenlanders, Niger Delta 225 grievance(s): and opportunism 1820; versus greed discourse 18 Gronna Boys, Liberia 17 Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM) 342, 349, 3556 Groupe Salafiste pour la Prdication et le Combat (GSPC), Algeria 12, 342, 354, 356 Groups Islamiques Arms (GIA) 348, 354, 356 Guebuza, Armando 378 Guinea 17, 37, 69, 126, 131 Guinea-Bissau 71, 131, 390 Gulf of Guinea 245 Gulf War 297 gun boat diplomacy 25 Gusau, Aminu Aliyu 327 Habib, Kamal 3512 Habyarimana, Juvenal 35, 424 Hadith 317 Hague, The 424, 42930; Regulations 93 Hamas, Palestine 95, 345 Haroun, Ahmed 278, 283 Hassan, Babiker Abdel Mahmoud 274 Hijrah 330 Hilal, Musa 278

Hittiste, Algeria 16 HIV and AIDS 64 Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami movement 315, 351 Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF), Uganda 293 Holy Spirit Movement (later IRA) 61, 73, 2956 Horn of Africa 31, 61, 65, 81, 358, 421, 431 human insecurity 2, 312, 36, 39, 27980 humanitarian crisis 34 humanitarian law 101 human rights 92, 101, 457; groups 260; violations 2034 Human Rights Watch 157, 172, 231 human security 2; crisis and resource conflicts, Niger Delta 244 Hussein, Kimani Ruo 156 Hutu: in Burundu 11; extremists 187; government 2012 Hutu-Tutsi promordial dichotomy 589 Ibrahim, Alhaji Bukar Abba 330 Icelanders group, Niger Delta 225 identity 70, 7273, 7881; crisis 21; national 259; politics 369; in search of 579 identity-based grievances 17 ideology 70, 723 Iduwini Volunteer Force, Niger Delta 227 Igga, Wani 269 Ijaw militant youths, Niger Delta 225 Ijaw National Congress, Niger Delta 225 Ijaw Youths Movement 57, 228 Ikome, Francis 126 illegal trading and commercial networks 37 Ilunga, Emile 192 Imam, Sayed 353 independence period 46, 47, 51 individual rights 92 Indonesia 343 industrial capacity utilisation 130 inequalities 127; class-based and social 82 insurgent militias 7 insurgent rebel movement 9 Interahamwe militia, Rwanda 7, 9, 93, 102, 183, 187, 191, 194, 199, 205, 419, 425, 428
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Inter-Congolese Dialogue 190, 203 Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 2678, 281, 425, 426; Partners Forum (IPF) 283; peace process 268, 283 internal displacement 34 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 281 internally displaced persons (IDPs) 281 internal rebellion 120 Internal Security Force, Ogoniland 228 International Conference on the Great Lakes region (ICGLR) 204, 205, 424, 452, 453; Pact on Security, Stability and Development 455 International Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism 300 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 99 international courts 93 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 203 international crimes 101 International Criminal Court (ICC) 99, 20910, 283, 303, 424, 430, 456, 460; Rome Statute 102, 209 international criminal law (ICL) 101, 1057, 4601 International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) 4601 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 99, 105, 107, 460 international criminal tribunals 106 International Crisis Group 187 international humanitarian law (IHL) 93, 1045, 457 International human rights law (IHRL) 1024 international law 3, 11, 901; accountability 101; breaches by rebels and militia 91, 1012; enforcement action 979; legal responses and accountability 969; locating non-state actors 912; norm generation 978; political responses 1001; variety of non-state actors 935; Westphalian model 91 international legal order 90 International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 106 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 523, 130, 292 International Organisation of Migration (IOM) 299 international organisations 92 International Rescue Committee (IRC) 457 international tribunals 105 Internet: jihadist sites 355; and recruitment 353, 3567 intra-state conflicts 45-6, 28990 Iqbal, Muhammad 316 Iran 299; revolution 31516, 3245, 347 Iraq 349; US-led Gulf War 348

irredentist rebel movement, see separist rebel movement Islam, conversion to 1567 Islamic fundamentalism 297, 298 Islamic law 317 Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) 322, 3278, 329 Islamic political movements 315 Islamic Salvation Front political movement, Algeria 316 Islamism: and militant Islamism 31417; political and Salafi jihadism 3436; see also militant Islamist groups, Northern Nigeria Isoko Community Oil Producing Forum, Niger Delta 225 Israel 97, 99, 349; defeat of Arab states 347 Jamaal Islamiyya political movement, Egypt 316 Jamaatul Izalatul Bidah Wa Ikamatus Sunnah (JIBWIS) 328 Janjaweed militia, Darfur 6, 93, 2779, 283; Arab tribesmen 2778 Jeshi la Embakasi militia, Kenya 151 Jeshi la Kayole militia, Kenya 7 Jeshi la Mzee militia, Kenya 151 Jesus is Alive Ministry 62 Jeunes Patriotes militia, Cte dIvoire 6 jihad 317; global 12, 341, 343, 347, 348, 454; Islamic 49, 314; Palestine 349; Sokoto 318, 323; see also Fodio, Uthman Ibn Jihadi Islamic Group (JIG) 3512 Johnson-Sirleaf, Ellen 421 joint integrated units (JIUs), Sudan 269 Joint Military Task Force, Niger Delta 227, 230 Juba: Airport soldiers 264; Conference, Sudan 257; Declaration 2767; Peace Agreement 109; peace talks 306 Justice and Development Party, Turkey/Morocco 316 Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Khartoum 108, 278, 279 justice-seeking and loot-seeking 18 Kabarebe, James 187, 202 Kabbah, Alie 391 Kabila, Joseph 1868, 190, 199, 200, 425 Kabila, Laurent-Dsir 31, 38, 1868, 18990 Kagame, Paul 425 Kaiama Declaration, Niger Delta 226, 2289, 2378 Kamajor militias, Sierra Leone 89, 73, 76, 445
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Kamotho, Joseph 162 Kamunya, John Maina 161 Kango, Kaahwa Mandro 193 Karaha, Bizima 192 Karume, Njenga 161, 162 Kasavubu, Joseph 186 Katanga, Germain 107, 209 Kaunda, Kenneth 556 Kaya Bombo Youth gang, Kenya 151 Kenya 2, 7, 21, 223, 27, 34, 55, 120, 126, 127, 131, 283, 294, 419, 420; armed insurgencies 71, 447; bombings 348; criminal gangs 150, 1512; ethnic groups 1489, 152; internally displaced persons (IDPs) 154; Kalenjin warriors 150; Kengakenga execution centre 176; Kikuyu group 148, 150, 160, 162, 175; Kirinyaga Kingdom 155; Kwekwe hit squad 1645; Maasai morans 150; Muslim community 1567; Nandi rebellion 50; origin and rise of militia groups 14952; post-election violence 65; ritualistic practices 25; social base 16; Special Branch 449; state, ethnicity and militias 1479; vigilantes 15860 Kenya African Democratic Union 150 Kenya African National Union (KANU) 148, 1601, 171; youth wing 150 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) 165, 172 Kenya National Youth Alliance (KNYA) 162, 451; renamed Progressive Party Alliance 162 Kenyan Human Rights Commission 157 Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) 150 Kenyatta, Jomo 556 Kenyatta, Uhuru 161, 164 Khartoum 297, 300 Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA) 267, 275 Khomeini, Ayatollah 316 Kibaki, Mwai 148, 164, 418 Kiboi, Bramwell Kiso 169 Kidogos, Uganda 17 Kihara, Jane 162 Kiir, Salva 266, 269, 304

Kimani, Kihika 164 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds 209, 458 Kissinger, Henry 428 Koko Dam Declaration, Sudan 270 Konare, Alpha Oumar 4234 Kong, Gordon 277 Kony, Joseph 15, 287, 2956, 304, 305, 419, 456, 460 Kouchner, Bernard 428 Kuanyin, Kerubino 267 Kushayb, Ali 278, 283 Lagos 16 Lagu, Joseph 269 land entitlements 73 language 259 Lankwena, Alice 61 LArme Populaire pour la Restauration de la Rpublique et la Dmocraticie (APRD) 457 Latek, Odong 295 leadership 1415, 29, 35, 54, 712, 221, 446; community 222, 2467; political 222, 249; traditional 56 League of Nations 91 Lendu militia, DRC 7 Lopold II, King 1845 l tat Indpendant du Congo 186 liberation: movements 71; rebel movement 9, 11; struggle 46 Liberia 2, 6, 14, 19, 20, 33, 35, 38, 64, 69, 78, 120, 138, 390, 392, 419, 421; civil war 37; small arms proliferation 24; youths 30, 80 Liberian Beach Party 421 Liberian Special Forces 392, 393 Libya 131, 299, 317, 391, 420 Libyan Islamic Fighting Group 356 Lom Peace Accord 399410 Lom Peace Agreement 99, 106 Lords Resistance Army (LRA), Uganda 12, 15, 17, 32, 34, 61, 72, 73, 93, 191, 193, 205, 2878, 296, 300,389, 391, 397, 419, 444, 445; activities 302; border crossing 443; internal and regional conflicts 28890; Khartoum backing 98; regional and international interventions 299; regional conflict complex 2978, 299305; regionalisation of conflicts and rebel activities 3056
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Lords Resistance Army Disarmament, US 455 Lubanga, Thomas 107, 193, 209, 456 Lule, Yusuf 292 Lumumba, Patrice 1856, 207, 424, 428 Lusaka Accord 370 Machar, Riek 2667, 2689 Machicha, Tanzania 16 Madagascar 131 Mafia group, Niger Delta 225 Mahdi, belief in 31718 Mahdism 324 Mai-Mai militia, DRC 7, 50, 934, 102, 193, 200, 459 Mai-Mai-Yakutumba, DRC 193 Mai-Mai-Zabuloni, DRC 193 Maitastine, Alhaji Marwa 326 Maitastine movement 313, 322, 3258 Makoit, Moses 171 Malawi 34, 55, 299 Mali 20, 21, 120, 131, 358 Mambas government militias (RoC) 6 Mano groups, Liberia 17; River region 81 Martyrs Brigade, Niger Delta 226, 227 Marxism 46, 71 Mass Awareness and Participation (MAP) movement 391 Matakwei, Wycliffe 167, 168 Matip, Paulino 275, 277 Maududi, Sayyid Abdul Ala 316 Mau Mau, Kenya 9, 50, 89, 14950, 157, 173 Mauritania 99, 100, 358 Mauritius 126, 128, 131 Mazrui, Ali 54, 64 Mbau, Elias 162 Mdecins Sans Frontires 428 Meinbutus militias, Niger Delta 227 Mende ethnic group, Sierra Leone 17 Mengistu, Haile Mariam 35, 2667, 269, 448 Michigan Militia Corps, US 4378 Middle East conflicts 318, 343 migration 7881 militant Islamist groups in Northern Nigeria: caliphate order 318, 3234, 332; early movements 3235; global regional response 3346; Mahdist movement 324; neo-militant movements 32834; Quadriyya 323; recent movement 3258; Tijjaniyya 323; see also jihad

militia and rebel activities 41718; extra-continental responses 42730; Great Lakes cluster 4235; Horn of Africa cluster 4257; Mano River cluster 4212; regional responses 4207; Southern Africa cluster 4223; state responses 41820 militias 49, 13, 53, 76, 934, 138; in government, Niger Delta 241; as members of civil society, Niger Delta 2423; as pseudo-government, Niger Delta 2412; social bases 1517; types in Africa 8; violence and atrocities 625 militias and civil society organisations (CSOs) 242 mineral wealth 19 Minnawi, Minni Arkou 270, 273 Mission de lOrganisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) 207, 208, 211 Mission des Nations Unies en Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo (MONUC) 207, 301, 3024 Mkapa, Benjamin 2056 Mobutu, Joseph Dsir 31, 58, 1856, 187, 191, 298, 424, 425, 428 Mohamed, Ali 256 Moi, Daniel Arap 148, 150, 161, 163, 292, 2945, 418 Momoh, Joseph 35, 392, 393 monarchical regimes 131 Moorland Defence Force, Kenya 176 Morel, E D 185 Moreno, Maria 379 Morocco 99, 100, 131, 317, 358; armed Islamist groups 3429; global war on terror 3578; internationalisation 3567; Islamic Jihad 61; recruitment and activities 349353, 3556 Moryham youths, Somalia 16 Moshi conference, Tanzania 2912 Mouvement des Forces Dmoctatiques de la Casamance (MFDC), Senegal 12 Mouvement des Nigriens pour la Justice 80 Mouvement Patriotique de Cte dIvoire 73 Mouvement pour la Libration du Congo (MLC) 37, 192, 200, 203 Mouvement Rvolutionnaire Congolais (MRC), DRC 7 Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) 38 Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 37, 219, 225, 226, 227 Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, Niger Delta 225 Movimento Popular de Liberteo de Angola (MPLA) 9, 94, 3667, 369, 381, 4223 Mozambique 2, 17, 26, 34, 71, 90, 120, 131;
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FRELIMO-RENAMO blanket amnesty 99; youths 30; see also Resistncia Nacional de Moambique (RENAMO) Mozambique Democratic Movement 379 Mubarak, Hosni 297 Mugabe, Robert 556, 423, 425, 428 Muhajirun 32930 Muhammad, the Prophet 124, 318, 32930 Mujaddid (reformer) 49 mujahedeen 347, 348, 352, 354 Mujahid, Abubakar 327 Mulele, Pierre 189 Mulele rebellion 189 Mungiki militia, Kenya 7, 147, 150, 151, 1523, 418, 442, 451, 459; Defence Council 164; oaths 154, 155; origin and composition 1535; politics 1603; religious resources 612; religious roots 1558; state response 1635; tactics and strategies 15860 Museveni, Yoweri 12, 17, 72, 192, 287, 2923, 296, 298, 299, 304, 393, 424, 425, 441, 443 Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt/Algeria 315, 322, 3267, 329, 3434, 348 Muslims 49, 316; movements 318 Muslim Students Society (MSS), Nigeria 325, 127 Musulmi, Sarkin (ruler of Muslims) 323 mutilation 102 Mwangi, Gitau 162 Mwathi, Mohamed Kamau 156 Namburete, Eduardo 379 Namibia 26, 37, 38, 71, 187 Nasser, Gamal Abdul 344, 346 National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) 187, 205, 293 National Congress for the Defence of the People 59 National Democratic Alliance, Khartoum 297 National Islamic Front (NIF) 267, 300 national liberation movements (NLMs) 91, 946 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 17, 38, 71, 90, 391, 392 National Provisional Ruling Council, Sierra Leone 3956 National Resistance Army (NRA), Uganda 11, 14, 31, 71, 287, 2924, 450, 451 National Resistance Movement (NRM), Uganda 90, 287, 293, 423 National Resistance Party, Uganda 393, 424 National Security Intelligence Service, Kenya 449 National Unionist Party, Sudan 258 natural resources 18 Ndicho, Stephen 161 neo-liberalism 74 Neto, Agostinho 367

New Partnership for Africas Development (NEPAD) 206, 335, 452 New Sudan Council of Churches 269 Ngudjolo, Matheu 107 Ngwale, Kinjikitile (prophet) 50 Niger 120, 131, 331, 358, 420 Niger Delta 16, 37, 72, 73, 83, 234, 4467; actors in conflicts 23840; bomb attack on Bori Camp 22930; civil society groups 225; corruption and poor planning 222; counterinsurgency operation 229; cult groups 225; ethnic militias 227; grievance versus greed thesis 221, 222; impact of militia activities and conflicts 243; inequitable distribution of resources 223; inter- and intra-community struggles 2335; inter-ethnic struggles and antagonisms 2323; militarisation of politics 2312; militia groups 225; militias and military engagements 22830; militias, opportunism and crime 230; Nigerias oil and gas wealth 219; oil politics and criminalisation of insurgency 2357; pan-ethnic militias 227; private militias 227; regional and international interventions 244245; resources and conflict 2203, 244; revenue allocation 236; trend of conflicts 224; violence and crisis 2235; youth movement 2379 Niger Delta Coastal Guerrillas 227 Niger Delta Development Board 245 Niger Delta Development Commission 245 Niger Delta Militant Force Squad (NDMFS) 225, 227 Niger Delta Oil Producing Communities Development Organisation 226 Niger Delta Peoples Republic 225 Niger Delta Peoples Salvation Front (NDPSF) 219, 225, 227 Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) 219, 226, 227, 231 Niger Delta Resistance Movement 226 Niger Delta Vigilante 227 Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) 225, 226 Nigeria 2, 14, 16, 20, 21, 34, 35, 567, 90, 120, 126, 131, 131, 333; case analysis 1324; economic crisis 318; elites 22; Islamist militancy 25; Niger Delta 19, 23, 27;

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religious revivalism 230; ritualistic practices 25; small arms proliferation 24; state and social movements 31922; states with Shariah laws and principles 321, 3212 Nigerian state and transnational oil companies: federal government response 2456; oil company responses 2467 Nimeira, Jaafar 264 Ninja militias (RoC) 6 Ninth October Movement, Uganda 293 Njenga, Maina (alias) 153, 157, 418; see also Kamunya, John Maina Njenga, Mohamed 156 Nkanji, Mayanja 292 Nkomati Accord 423 Nkrumah, Kwame 556 Nkunda, Laurent 59, 191, 2012 neo-patrimony 28 non-governmental organisations (NGOs): Caritas 305; Pax Christi 305; Saint Egidio 305 non-state violent actors: belligerents, insurgents, rebels 96; historicity 702; militias 934; motives, mobilisation and recruitment 725; national liberation movements (NLMs) 946; relationship to state and government 77; social embeddings 7881; state, military and armed groups 758 non-statist or private militias 5, 6 North Africa 449 Northern Uganda Recovery Act, US 455 Nouri, Mahamat 108 Ntaganda, Bosco 202, 209 Nur, Abdel Wahid 270 Nyarugabo, Moise 192 Nyuon, Thon Arok Thon William 267 Obama, Barack 428 Obasanjo, Olusegun 2056, 422 Obote, Milton 31, 35, 291, 292, 393, 424, 441 Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Ethiopia 12, 16, 448 Ogaden War 426, 448 Oil Derivation Fund for the Oil Producing States 245 Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission 245 Okello, Tito 35, 292, 393 Okeno, Angelo Okello 295 Olwol, John 295

Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), Nigeria 16, 57, 74 Operation Amani, Rwanda, Uganda 455 Operation Flush Out, Niger Delta 228 Operation Hakuri I and II, Niger Delta 228 Operation Iron Fist, Uganda 193, 300, 304 Operation Kimia, Rwanda, Uganda 455 Operation Lifeline Sudan 269 Operation Lightening Thunder, Sudan, Uganda 194 Operation Okoa Maisha, Kenya 172 Operation Restore Hope, Niger Delta 228 Operations and Human Rights 2978 oppression and foreign intrusion 4951 Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), Kenya 171, 172 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 97, 420, 426; Convention on Refugees 420; summit in Addis Ababa 293, 353 Organisation of Petroleum Producing Countries (OPEC) 1323 Oromo Liberation Front rebels 100 Othaya 162 Pakistan 335, 346, 347, 348 Palestine 95, 99, 347, 349 Pan-Africanism 391 Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), South Africa 11, 95 Pan-African Union (PANAFU), Sierra Leone 391 Partido Africano da Independncia da Guin e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), Cape Verde 11, 72 Parti pour lUnit et la Sauvegarde de IIntgrit du Congo (PUSIC) 193 Party of National Unity (PNU), Kenya 173 Patriotes Rsistants Congolais (PARECO) 193, 201 Peace of Westphalia 91 Peoples Defence Force, Tanzania 291 Peoples Militia, Tanzania 76 Peoples Redemption Army, DRC 1916 Peoples Volunteer Force, Niger Delta 57 Permanent Representative of Canada 301 personal and arbitrary rule 1267 political dimensions 123 political indoctrination 26 political militias 6, 7, 8 Political Revenge Movements, Kenya 176 politics: militarisation of 129; nature of 1278; of violence 129 Popular Defence Force (PDF), Sudan 274 Popular de Liberacin de Sagua el Hamra y Rio de Oro (Polisario) Front, Western Sahara 95, 100 Popular Resistance Army, Uganda 441 Portuguese colonies 4223

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post-colonial period 212, 125; insurgencies 1112; state, governance and conflict 513 Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy and Decision, AU 206 post-independence period 130, 134, 136 poverty 32, 52, 801, 1338, 147, 1745, 206, 221, 2357, 2423, 329, 346 power 135; masculinity and relations 64; struggles for 278, 127; supernatural 60, 168 pre-colonial experiences 125 Prncipe 131 pro-government militias 8 Protocol against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 204 Protocol on Non-aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes region 204 pro-Western pan-Islamism 346 pseudo-democracies 131 Quran 31617, 318, 326 Quranic law 314 quasi-military or paramilitary militias 56 Qutb, Sayyid 316, 344, 349, 352 racist regimes 97 Raray boys, Sierra Leone 16 Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dmocratie (RCD) 1878, 1912; RCD-Goma199, 200, 202; RCD-Kisangani (RCD-ML) 192, 193; RCD-ML 203 Rassemblement Dmocratique pour le Rwanda (RDR) 199 reactive desperation 22 rebellion and resistance 4951 rebel movements 9, 1112, 13; social bases 1517; types of militia in Africa 10 recruitment 801; forced 745; see also under armed Islamic groups; Internet reform insurgencies 71 reformist rebel movement 9 refugee crisis 34 regional and international dynamics 36 regional embeddings 81 regional interests 135 regional militias 7, 16 regional recruits (migrants) 17, 7980 regional warriors (recruited fighters) 17, 80 religion 3, 16, 256, 723, 135, 259; African traditional 49, 50, 59, 61, 1734;

Arab 426; Christianity 48, 50, 59, 61, 174, 426, 451; Islam 49, 59, 61, 351, 426; narratives and symbols 46; rituals 48, 601; use of 5962 Republic of Congo (RoC) 1, 14, 20, 35, 120 Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) 391, 392 resistance 467, 120 Resistncia Nacional de Moambique (RENAMO), Mozambique 11, 28, 31, 3656, 3723, 450; armies into parties 3802; burdens of opposition 379380; electoral gains 3767; peace settlement 3756; political engagement in wartime 3735; waning support 3779 resource-rich regions in Africa 20 resources 46, 70; cattle 64; competition model 20; Congolese 184, 186, 188, 190, 1923, 202; cotton and gum Arabic 259; crude oil 37; gas 12; minerals 20, 24, 37; natural wealth 102; oil 12, 20-1, 24, 73; oil price decline 130; palm oil trade 25; struggle for 201; wild rubber 1845 restorative justice for victims 107 Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Sierra Leone 15, 17, 32, 34, 71, 450; border crossing 443; bush camps 3969; conventional warfare 3926; making of 391; territorial occupation to demobilisation 4014 Rhodesia 4223; later Zimbabwe 423 Rice, Condoleezza 429 Rice, Susan 2978 Rift Valley Kalenjin Warriors, Kenya 7 road blocks and taxes 202 Roadmap for return of IDPs 282 Rwanda 2, 14, 21, 34, 35, 37, 38, 69, 120, 187, 428, 451; and CNDP 201203; Congo Desk 199; genocide 589, 99, 102, 460; refugees to Zaire 1889
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Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) 202 Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 16, 38, 90, 98, 107, 450 Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army (RPF/A) 186 Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) 7, 27, 34, 147, 165; Chebyuk Phase I settlement scheme 166; Chebyuk Phase II (Cheptoror) 166; comparison with Mungiki 1736; Mount Elgon forest 165, 166, 167, 169, 172, 173; organisational form 1679; origin and composition 1667; politics 1712; source of funds 16970; Soy sub-tribe 1667; state response to 1723; tactics and strategies 1701 Sadat, Anwar 347, 358 Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) 100 Salafi jihadism (al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya) 3436, 349, 351, 354 Salafiyya movement 315 Samaritan Purse (Christian organisation) 269 sanctions 98 Sankoh, Foday 15, 17, 71, 82, 106, 391, 396 So Tom 131 Sarkozy, Nikolas 428 Saudi-Arabia 345, 346, 349; Wahhabism movement 315, 347 Savimbi, Jonas 3667, 371, 380 scramble for Africa 46 secessionist rebel movement, see separist rebel movement security forces of state 76 Seko, Mobutu Sese 35, 556, 186 self-determination militias 7 Semogerere, Paul 292 Senate Subcommittees on Africa 2978 Senegal 12, 21, 120, 131, 358; struggle for autonomy in Casamane 71 separist rebel movement 9 Serut, John 171 Settlement Plan 100 sexual violence 102 Shariah law 31617, 3201, 333 Shell Petroleum Development Company 246 Shifta guerrillas, Kenya 71 Shiism, variant of Islam 31516 Shiite (Shia) movement 318, 3258; Muslims 318

Shineibat, Abdullah Mustafa Abu 278 Shuaibu, Hallam Ahmed 327 Siche, David 1678 Sierra Leone 2, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 26, 32, 33, 35, 38, 69, 78, 83, 106, 120, 131, 451; civil war 37; Kamajor militia 398, 399; mining 403; responses of local communities 4046; ritualist practices 25; small arms proliferation 24; territorial occupation to demobilisation 4014; variables for community 40810; variables for fighting force 4068; youths 234, 30, 80; see also Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 389 Sierra Leone Army (SLA) 395 Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) 393 Simango, Daviz 3789 single party systems 126 slave trade 51 Small Boys Unit (SBU), Liberia 17 Smith, Ian 422 social discontent 23 socialism 46 social movement/broad-based militias 7 social relationships 70, 74 Society of the Muslim Brotherhood 316 socio-economic disruptions and poverty 323; individuals and communities 901 Somalia 2, 12, 16, 35, 56, 61, 120, 122, 348, 420, 4257 Soro, Guillaume 82 South Africa 16, 71, 95, 97, 131, 423, 428; ANC-National Party agreement 99; Executive Outcomes mercenary firm 399 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 423 Southern Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) 2757 Southern Sudan rebellion 4267 South West Africa 96; later Namibia 423 South West Africa Peoples Organisation (SWAPO), Namibia 11, 89, 94, 108 Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 99, 105, 460 statehood, dimensions of 122 state in Africa: collapse 122; crisis 1248; and governance crises 212; legal entity 121; nature of 120122; power and capacity 121; responses to rebels and militias 978; weakness and collapse 346, 1289
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state-patronised militias 5, 6 statist militias 5, 8 Stevens, Siaka 391, 392, 393 Strasser, Valentine 395 sub-Saharan Africa 128 Sudan 2, 6, 14, 20, 21, 34, 35, 36, 38, 61, 69, 76, 81, 106, 120, 2556, 298, 301, 343, 418, 4257; actors and stakeholders 2801; Arabs versus black Africans 256; Ashigga political party 258; British Southern policy 257; conflict and security 256; cultural and ideological domination 259; economic and social exclusion 25960; ethnic composition 65, 256; government responses 2734; historical grievances 2578; international responses 2823; local communities 281; militarist responses of government 2812; oil exploration and exploitation 260, 261, 262; post-colonial elections 258; power and political rivalry 258; rebel-controlled areas 268; rebel groups 2623, 2634, 2645; society, rebel groups and militia 27980; Southern 90, 99; Torit mutiny 258; Turko-Egyptian-European intrusion 4950; Turko-Egyptian military campaigns 256; Umma political party 258 Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) 276 Sudanese and Chadian rebels 100 Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) 271, 279 Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 263, 2701, 273 Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) 1934, 2623, 26570, 276, 281, 297, 298, 3012, 401, 418, 427, 443, 450; attacks on Ugandan refugees 2934; Manifesto 266; Nairobi Declaration 268 Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) 450 Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) 12, 98, 265 support for struggle against Khartoum 100 Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency 269 Sufi Sunni movements 3289; Salafiyya 329; Tijjaniyya 329; Wahhabi Izala 329; see also Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) Sungu Sungu gang, Kenya 151

Sunnah Muslims 318 Sunni, variant of Islam 31516, 3278 Sunni Muslims 318 Sunni Wahhabi movement 328 Supreme Egbesu Assembly, Niger Delta 226 Swaziland 131 Swiss Federal Council 95 Takfir wal-Hijra group 351 Taleban: Afghanistan 315, 330, 348; Egypt 12; Kenya 151, 176; Morocco 356; Nigeria 313, 322, 3312; Pakistan 315 Tambwe, Alexis 192 Tangyang, Gabriel 277 Tanzania 16, 126; bombings 348; German regime 50 Taylor, Charles 17, 38, 71, 82, 391, 392, 419, 429, 460 territorial liberation revolts 71 Territory of Congo (DRC v Uganda) 2034 Tigray Peoples Liberation Front 71 Togo 78, 131 Torture Convention 102 traditions 256; and social norms 49 transnational companies (TNCs) 260, 262 Transparency International 31 Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) 342, 357, 3589 tribunals 101 Trinta, Luis 379 Tripartite Plus Commission, US 455 Tsotsis, South Africa 16 Tuareg rebellion (Mali, Niger and South Algeria) 12; Azawad independent state 12, 21 Tunisia 126, 358, 420 Turabi, Al Hassan 300 Turkey 343 Tut, Samuel Gai 265 Tutsis 419, 425; in Burundi 11; Congolese 187 Uganda 2, 14, 17, 26, 34, 35, 367, 38, 69, 99, 100, 102, 1089, 120, 126, 131, 138, 187, 192, 199, 297, 3901, 419; exiles in Sudan 293;
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guerrillas 291; Karamajong people 64; local defence units (LDUs) 398; operations against LRA 445; regional context of conflict 2936; and Rwanda conflict 300; state making and internal conflicts 2903 Uganda Amnesty Commission 459 Uganda Christian Democratic Army 296 Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) 294, 306 Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF) 298 Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) 292 Uganda Peoples Army 293 Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) 292 Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) 1934, 298 Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA) 293, 2956 ul-Muminin, Amir (commander of the faithful) 323 Umkhonto we Siswe, South Africa 89 underground economies 19 Unio para a Independncia Total de Angola (UNITA) 11, 3657; armies into parties 3802; guerrilla warfare 3678; identity politics 369; military collapse to political defeat 3712; as parallel state 3689; peace process and renewed war 36971; UNITA Renovada 370 Union des Forces pour la Dmocratie et la Dveloppement (UFDD), Chad 1112 Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) militia, DRC 7, 193 Union du Haut-Katanga, DRC 1889 Union Minire du Haut-Katanga 190 United Force for Democracy and Development, Chad 108 United Liberian Movement for Democracy 396 United Nations (UN) 91, 92, 94, 97, 100, 204, 426, 427, 456; enforcement actions 98; Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief 301; Human Rights Council 447; Save the Children 299 United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) 282 United Nations Charter 454 United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) 299 United Nations Development Plan (UNDP) 123, 193 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 31 United Nations Human Development Index 128 United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNIMIS) 301, 303 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 98, 99, 106, 283, 300, 301, 454; MONUC and sanctions 2068 United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) 2078, 211

United Somali Congress 426 United States (US) 334, 421; imperial designs on Muslim world 348; law enforcement 449; Marines in Beirut 347; Patriot Act 300; response to Sudanese armed conflicts 2823; Terrorist Exclusion List 300; war against terrorism 297 US Africa Command 3356, 429 vigilante militias 7, 8, 76 Vikings group, Niger Delta 225 violence: and culture link 623; dialects of 2830; elite-sponsored political gangs 442; engagement and resistance 22; forms of Islamism 3423; indiscriminate, crime and terror 32, in politics 129; institutionalisation of 2; instrument of politics 127; murder 102, 191; rape 102, 194; rape of women and children 64; terrorist groups 322; torture 102, 191; see also under militias Vultures group, Niger Delta 225 Wagacha, Hassan Waithaka 156 Wahhabi Islam, Saudi Arabia 345 Wamba, Ernest dia 1878 Wangari, Khadija 156 war crimes 101, 102, 109 warlord: insurgencies 9; militias 7, 8 Warsama, Nathan 171 Waruinge, Ndura 153, 156, 161; conversion to Christianity 157; conversion to Islam 156 Waterways Security Committee, Niger Delta 227 weapons: AK-47 rifle 645, 168; G3 rifle 168; traditional 168 Western Kenya Human Rights Watch (WKHRW) 168 Western Sahara 95, 99 Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) 448 West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) 298; bases in Sudan and Zaire 298
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white minority rule 71 World Bank 523, 130, 292; report of 2006 128 World Trade Centre terrorist attacks 300, 348 World War II 94 Yan D aba, Nigeria 16 Yemen 349 youth 234; arms bought for 232; crisis and militancy 813; exploitation of 65; manipulation of 4423; militias 7, 8, 17, 23; poverty 333; scholarships 78; social status 82; violent culture 441 Yusuf, Muhammad 3313 Zaire 31, 37, 56, 90, 126, 186; see also Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Zakzaky Shiite movement 313 Zambia 55, 188, 367 Zenawi, Meles 267 Zimbabwe 17, 26, 37, 38, 55, 71, 126, 127, 131, 187, 419, 428 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 11, 423 Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) 11 Zolou militias, RoC 6 Zuhdi, Karam Mohammed 3512

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Throughout Africa, armed militia, rebel and militant groups continue to threaten state sovereignty and to destabilise the security of some of even the strongest economies on the continent. The question is: How should African states respond to the challenge posed by such armed groups? The impressive range of case studies gathered here, ranging from the pirates of the Niger Delta and the rebels of the eastern DRC who prey upon rich natural resources, to the cultural and religious advocacy by Kenyas Mungiki and the armed Islamists of Northern Africa, reveals the complexity of the problem. For all those who wish to understand the contribution these groups make to continuing insecurity in African states, this collection of well-researched case studies is essential reading. David M Anderson Professor of African Politics at the University of Oxford and Fellow at St Cross College, Oxford Militias, rebels and Islamist militants is a carefully researched study which shows that armed non-state actors have become major contributors to human insecurity on the continent. It analyses the causes of the phenomenon and its consequences on the populations and the capacity (or lack of it) of states to protect against it and deal with it. The book also provides practical suggestions on how to deal with this phenomenon. It is highly recommended reading for scholars, researchers, policy makers and anyone seeking a deeper understanding of militia, rebel and Islamist militant groups and the impact their actions have on human insecurity and the state crisis in Africa. Major General Henry K Anyidoho Deputy Joint Special Representative for the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operations in Darfur (UNAMID) and former Deputy Force Commander and Chief of Staff of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe have done a sterling job in assembling a wide cross-section of able Africanist scholars to analyse the challenging dynamics of violence perpetrated by armed nonstate groups which continues to undermine the emergence and maturation of African states in the post-colonial and post-Cold War eras. Africa needs concrete proposals on how to address the human, national and regional insecurity posed by rebel, militia and Islamist militant groups. This book is a must-read for both intellectuals and practitioners interested in promoting human security in Africa. Martin R Rupiya Executive Director The African Public Policy & Research Institute (APPRI)

Understanding the genesis and evolution of violent armed groups in Africa is a critical enterprise as part of the effort to contain the phenomenon of weak, failed and failing states in Africa. This book contends that armed militia and insurgent groups with a variety of assorted grievances have proliferated in Africa because of the profound crisis that has bedevilled the project of post-independence nation building on the continent. Militias, rebels and Islamist militants discusses the worrying trend that has emerged from the progressive militarisation of societies and polities across Africa and the formidable challenges of restoring a healthy balance between civilian and military institutions. It reminds one that violent groups and movements are not simply going to fade away and that there is a need for vigorous efforts to check their proliferation. Gilbert M Khadiagala Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa