1. COSTABELLA CORP. VS.

CA- EASEMENT RIGHT OF WAY

The convenience of the dominant estate is not the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way but rather, it should satisfy all four requisites (emphasis on 1st requisite- it should be merely for convenience but it must be due to the fact that the dominant estate does not have an adequate outlet to a public highway.

FACTS: Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their beach hotel. Before such construction, the private respondent, in going to and from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioners property. As a result of the construction, this passageway, including the alternative route, was obstructed. Private respondent filed for injunction plus damages. In the same complaint the private respondents also alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latters property without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris of flotsam on the beach. The private respondent also claim that the have acquired the right of way through prescription. They prayed for the re-opening of the ancient road right of way (what they called the supposed easement in this case) and the destruction of the dike. Petitioner answered by saying that their predecessor in interests act of allowing them to pass was gratuitous and in fact, they were just tolerating the use of the private respondents. CA ruled in favor of the private respondents.

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not easement of right and way can be acquired through prescription? 2) Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way in the form of a passageway, on the petitioners property?

RULING: 1) NO. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it cannot be subject to acquisitive prescription.

2) NO. one may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has proven the: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The private respondent failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public highway; in

fact the lower court confirmed that there is another outlet for the private respondents to the main road (yet they ruled in favor of the private respondents). Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate was never a gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. There must be a real necessity and not mere convenience for the dominant estate to acquire such easement. Also, the private respondents made no mention of their intention to indemnify the petitioners. The SC also clarified that least prejudicial prevails over shortest distance (so shortest distance isnt necessarily the best choice.)

2. VILLANUEVA VS. VELASCO- LEGAL EASEMENT

A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest and becomes a continuing property right unless its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed before the execution of the conveyance; Essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva bought a parcel of land in QC from Pacific Banking Corporation which it acquired from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. When he bought it, there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupies one meter of two meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of the private respondents, in a contract of easement of right of way. Amongst others, the contract provides that the easements purpose is to have an outlet to Tandang Sora which is the nearest public road and the least burdensome (Espinolass property being the dominant estate and Gabriel spousess as the servient estate.) It was also provided in the contract that the easement shall be binding to the successors, assigns without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property that will warrant the circumstances.

The private respondents were able to acquire a writ of demolition on the house obstructing the easement against the Spouses Gabriel. The petitioner filed a third party claim with prayer to quash the writ saying that he was not made a party to the civil case and that the writ of demolition should not

prosper since the easement which is meant to protect was not annotated in the peti tioners title. CA ruled in favor of the private respondents saying that the easement exists even though it was not annotated in the torrens title because servitudes are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong. And that Villanueva is bound by the contact of easement, not only as a voluntary easement but as a legal easement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner?

RULING: YES. A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to exists unless its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed before the execution of the conveyance conformably with Art 647 in accordance with Article 617 of the Civil Code.

Essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The existence of the easement has been established by the lower courts and the same has become conclusive to the SC. The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents cement mixer and motor vehicle (no mention of what kind.) Accordingly, the petitioner has to demolish the house to make way for the easement.

3. CRISTOBAL V. CA 291 SCRA 122 FACTS: Cristobal owned a house and lot in Visayas Avenue Extension. Ledesma on the other hand was the owner of the adjoining subdivision, which included the disputed lots 1 and 2. Lots 1 and 2 were originally a part of the private road. Upon the making of Visayas Avenue as a public road, Ledesma petitioned the exclusion of the two disputed lots from the road. He was granted to do so. Upon the sale of the lots to a third person, it was discovered that there were squatters on the land and that it was being used as a passageway by petitioners. This prompted the new owner to enclose the lot. HELD: The essential requisites for the compulsory right of way are as follows 1. The property is surrounded by estate of others and there is no adequate outlet to a public highway 2. It must be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distancefrom the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest 3. There must be payment of the proper indemnity 4. The isolation should not be due to the proprietors own acts In co nsideration of the above, mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up the compulsory right of way.

4. FLORO V. LLENADO- LEGAL EASEMENT

A legal easement cannot arise merely for the convenience of the dominant estate. The owner must prove that the easement is absolutely necessary and least restrictive on the servient estate.

FACTS: Mr Floro owned the Floro Park Subdivision situated in Bulacan. The subdivision has its own access roads from the MacArthur Highway through road lot 4. Another fellow, Llenado, owned the Llenado Homes Subdivision. He obtained the same from Mr. de Castro, when it was known as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, Llenado Homes was bounded on the south by the Palanas Creek, 5 which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision. To the west sat the ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo. The controversy brewed since Llenado Homes did not have any passage to the MacArthur Highway. However, a proposed access road passing the abandoned riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan of the former Emmanuel Homes Subdivision. This plan was approved by the HLURB. Because the access road through the Ipapo Riceland did not exist yet, the Llenados sought, and were granted, oral permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park . At this point, remember that the agreement was merely provisional as the parties were still drafting a contract. Later, Floro discovered grave damage to the lots in question from the passage of heavy machinery. He then barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones. He essentially implied Llenados to keep out off property.

Llenado pursued an easement claim with the RTC. The RTC denied the request. On appeal by LLenado, and ordered that Mr. Floro remove the barricades. Mr. Floro went to the SC

ISSUE: Whether or not the requirements for legal easement existed to allow Llenado to claim the same against Mr. Floro.

HELD: NO. As in the earlier case, the court held that to be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These include: that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the

servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

For this case, it is apparent that the elements have not been met. The original subdivision development plan presented by Llenado indicates an existing and prior agreement with Ms. Ipapo to create a right of way through the abandoned Ipapo ricefield. Ipapo had long agreed to these terms but Llenado apparently thought it too much work and cost to develop such road. It was easier for him to create an easement via the Floro property.

The court ruled time and again that one may not claim a legal easement merely out of convenience. Convenience motivated Llenando to abandon the Ipapo access road development and pursue an access road through the Floro estate. He was stacking the cards in his favor to the unnecessary detriment of his neighbor. The court refused to countenance his behavior.

5. FRANCISCO V. IAC- EASEMENT OF WAY

An owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. Isolation must not be due to his own acts.

FACTS: Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate owned by several co-owners. On December 3,1947, the co-owners of Lot 860 (Cornelia and Frisca Dila) executed a deed by which an undivided 1/3 portion of the land was donated to a niece, Epifania Dila, and another undivided 1/3 portion to the children of a deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, and the remaining portion, also an undivided third, was declared to pertain exclusively to and would be retained by Cornelia Dila. A partition was then executed.

The former co-owners overlooked the fact that, by reason of the subdivision, Epifania Dilas lot came to include the entire frontage of what used to be Lot 860 along Parada Road, and thus effectively isolated from said road the other lots, i.e., of Cornelia Dila, and of the children of Anacleta Dila. Despit that, Cornelia sold the lot to some buyers who subsequently sold them to Ramos. Ramos asked for a right of way through Franciscos land but negotiations failed. Francisco's proposal for an exchange of land at the rate of 1 sq.m from him to three 3 sq.m from Ramos, as was supposedly the custom in the locality, was unacceptable to Ramos.

Later that year, Ramos succeeded was able to obtain a 3m wide passageway through Dilas lot. Yet in August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a 10ft high concrete wall on his lot, thereby closing the very right of way granted to him across Lot 860-B. [It seems that what he wished was to have a right of passage precisely through Francisco's land, considering this to be more convenient to him, and he did not bother to keep quiet about his determination to bring suit, if necessary, to get what he wanted.] Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing the barbed-wire fence on his lot along Parada Road with a stone wall. Shortly thereafter, Francisco filed a case against him asserting his right to a legal easement.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ramos was entitled to an easement of right of way through the land belonging to Francisco

HELD: NO The law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself procured the isolation of his property had not been met indeed the respondent had actually brought about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was dffficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been held that mere inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar easement in an alternative location.

6. QUIMEN V. CA- EASEMENT LEAST DAMAGE > SHORTEST DISTANCE When the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

FACTS: Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3 brothers and sister, inherited a piece of property in Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves. The shares of Anastacia and 3 other siblings were next to the municipal road. Anastacias was at the extreme left of the road while the lots on the right were sold by her brothers to Catalina Santos. A portion of the lots behind Anastacias were sold by her (as her brothers adminstratix) brother to Yolanda.

Yolanda was hesitant to buy the back property at first because it d no access to the public road. Anastacia prevailed upon her by assuring her that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property (which was in front) for p200 per square meter.

Yolonda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a portion of anastacias property. But when yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property.

After a few years, Yolanda purchased another lot from the Quimens (a brother), located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house, extending about 19m from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of one brother, and Anastacias perimeter fence.

In 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacias property. The proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacia s property facing the public highway, starting from the back of the sari-sari store and extending inward by 1m to her property and turning left for about 5m to avoid the store in order to reach the municipal road. The way was unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the middle.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, explaining that the right of way

through the brothers property was a straight path and to allow a detour by cutting through Anastacias property would no longer make the path straight. They held that it was more practical to extend the existing pathway to the public road by removing that portion of the store blocking the path as that was the shortest route to the public road and the least prejudicial to the parties concerned than passing through Anastacias property.

CA reversed and held that Yolanda was entitled to a right of way on Anastacias property. The court, however, did not award damages to her and held that Anastacia was not in bad faith when she resisted the claim.

Anastacia went to the SC alleging that her lot should be considered as a servient estate despite the fact that it does not abut or adjoin the property of private respondent. She denies ever promising Yolonda a right of way.

Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda purchased the second lot, the easement of right of way she provided was ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of ownership of the dominant and the servient estates in one person so that there was no longer any compelling reason to provide private respondent with a right of way as there are other surrounding lots suitable for the purpose.

She also strongly maintains that the proposed right of way is not the shortest access to the public road because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the most damage as she derives a net income of P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and considering that an avocado has an average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning from it.

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not there was a valid grant of an easement 2) Whether or not the right of way proposed by Yolonda is the least onerous/least prejudicial to the parties

HELD: YES to both 1) A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by law to a person or class of persons to pass over anothers property when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property.

The conditions for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

These elements were clearly present. The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient estate. These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the trial court itself declared that [t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public highway.

2) Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. When the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

TCs findings: > Yolandas property was situated at the back of her fathers property and held that there existed an available space of about 19m long which could conveniently serve as a right of way between the boundary line and the house of Yolanda s father > The vacant space ended at the left back of the store which was made of strong materials > Which explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to the public highway.

CAs finding: > The proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is 1m wide and 5m long at the extreme right of Anastacias property will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda s father which would mean destroying the sari -sari store made of strong materials.

Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, the SC accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred.

8. REMIGIO O. RAMOS, SR. vs. GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC., ET AL. G.R. No. 75905; October 12, 1987 FACTS: Plaintiff Ramos acquired from Science Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision a house and lot containing an area of 901 square meters situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila. In the subdivision survey plan, two road lots abut plaintiff's property namely lot 4133-G-12 with an area of 2,160 square meters clearly appearing as a proposed road in the Lombos subdivision plan and Lot 4135 of the Paraaque Cadastre now known as Pambansa Road but more commonly referred to as Gatchalian Avenue. Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135. Gatchalian Avenue is alongside Lot 4135. Respondent Gatchalian Realty was granted the road right of way and drainage along Lot 4135 to service the Gatchalian and Asprec subdivision, by the respondent Asprecs. On April 30, 1981, Ramos filed a complaint for an easement of a right of way with preliminary mandatory injunction against the private respondents, alleging, among others the that he constructed his house at 27 Gatchalian Avenue (also known as Pambansa Road), Paranaque, and has since resided therein with his family from 1977 up to the present; that during construction of the house, Gatchalian Realty, Inc. built a 7-8, feet high concrete wall right infront of his premises, blocking his entrance/exit to Gatchalian Road, the nearest being only about 100 meters, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the public road or highway, the Sucat Road (now known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Paraaque); that with the construction of the 7-8 feet concrete wall has constrained plaintiff and his family to use as temporary ingress/egress and with great inconvenience and hardship other lots belonging to different owners, and this becomes all the more pronounced during the rainy season due to flood and mud; and, lastly, that the aforesaid concrete wall is dangerously leaning towards appellant's premises posing great danger or hazard. The lower court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals

found that the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of the pre-conditions in order that he could legally be entitled to an easement of a right of way as it affirmed the lower court's order. ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff has successfully shown that all the requisites necessary for the grant of an easement of a right of way in his favor are present. HELD: The Court finds the petition not to be impressed with merit. An easement or servitude in an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner as defined in Article 613 of the Civil Code. It is established either by law, in which case it is called legal or by the will of the parties, in which event it is a voluntary easement. Since there is no agreement between the contending parties in this case granting a right of way by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a voluntary easement between the plaintiff and the respondent company and/or the other private respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of a right of way. A compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the following four requisites are first shown to exist: (1) That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2) After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, p. 1. end); (3) That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts (Art. 649, last par.); and (4) That the right of way claimed is "at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest." (Art. 650). On the first requisite, the Court finds no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact that the plaintiff failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there is a road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the plaintiff when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite. The Court agree with the appellate court's observation that the plaintiff should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec. To allow the plaintiff access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue in spite of a road right of way provided by the plaintiff's subdivision for its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows plaintiff a much greater ease in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of a right of way, that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it." Considering that the plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of the first requisite as aforestated, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the preconditions for a legal or compulsory right of way.

9. Dichoso v Marcos Digest G.R. No. 180282, April 11, 2011 Nachura, J.:

Facts: 1. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the CA decision and resolution which reversed and set aside the RTC decision on the civil case. The resolution denied the MR filed by the petitioners .

2.

In 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against the respondent Patrocinio L. Marcos and alleged therein that they are the owners of Lot No. 21553; while respondent is the owner another lot.

3.

Since the petitioners had no access to a public road to and from their property, they claimed to have used a portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since 1970. Respondent, however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand. Though petitioners have been granted another passageway by Spouses Arce, the owners of another adjacent lot.

4.

Hence the complaint before the RTC. Instead of filing an Answer, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action and noncompliance with the requisite certificate of non-forum shopping.

5.

The RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss.

6.

Respondent denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot No. 1 as passageway and that petitioners claim of right of way is only due to expediency and not necessity. He also maintained that there is an existing easement of right of way available to petitioners granted by the Spouses Arce. The RTC declared that respondents answer failed to tender an issue, and opted to render judgment on the pleadings and thus deemed the case submitted for decision.

7.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, granting a right of way over Lot 01 after finding that petitioners adequately established the requisites to justify an easement of right of way in accordance with Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.

8.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed petitioners complaint. It concluded that there is no need to establish an easement over respondents property since the Arce

spouses had already provided an access road which is adequate. It emphasized that the convenience of the dominant estate is never the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that respondent's lot is the shortest route in going to and fro their property to a public street and where they used to pass.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners are entitled to a legal easement

NO. The petition is without merit. Petitioners failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the enumerated requirements under Art. 650 (NCC).

1.

By its very nature, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way may be granted.

2.

Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. The true standard for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy." In order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. As such, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.

3.

Petitioners had already been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot. There is an existing outlet to and from the public road. Other lot owners use the said outlet in going to and coming from the public highway.

10. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. CA- EASEMENT AND JUST COMPENSATION When a land, originally public land is awarded to a provate individual, a legal easement may be constituted and thus no just compensation is required. It would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way.

FACTS:

A free patent over three (3) hectares of land, situated in the province of Cagayan was issued in the name of Vicente Manglapus, and registered under OCT No. P-24814. The land was granted subject to the following proviso expressly stated in the title:

"... it shall not be subject to any encumbrance whatsoever in favor of any corporation, association or partnership except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and solely for educational, religious or charitable purposes or for a right of way; and subject finally to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended..."

Subsequently, respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale. Sometime in 1982, NIA was to construct canals in Amulung, Cagayan and Alcala, Cagayan. NIA then entered a portion of Manglapus' land and made diggings and fillings thereon. Manglapus filed a complaint for damages against NIA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a portion of his property for use as easement of a right of way.

RULING: No. The transfer certificate of title contains such a reservation. It states that title to the land shall be: ". . . subject to the provisions of said Land Registration Act and the Public Land Act, as well as those of Mining Laws, if the land is mineral, and subject, further to such conditions contained in the original title as may be subsisting."

Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a reservation and condition that the land is subject to "to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This reservation, unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant, was not limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting condition.

Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands granted by patent, "shall further be subject to a right of way sot exceeding twenty meters in width for public highways, railroads,irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs and telephone lines, and similar works..."

We note that the canal NIA constructed was only eleven (11) meters in width. This is well within the limit provided by law. Manglapus has therefore no cause to complain.

Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements." In the present case, we find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the government.

The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way.

11. ABELLANA VS. CA- EASEMENTS OF RIGHT OF WAY

Easements of right of way may not be acquired by prescription because it is not a continuous easement.

FACTS: Petitioners are owners of a parcel of land on the NW side of Nonoc Subdivision, Cebu. They sued to establish an easement of a right of way over a subdivision road, which they claim theyve acquired through prescription since their ancestors have been using these since time immemorial.

They pray that the concrete wall surrounding the village be taken down to allow easy access to the public highway.

RTC found for the petitioners. CA reversed, averring that road lots in subdivisions are private property and may only be used as a public highway once acquired by the government through donation, purchase or expropriation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescription?

HELD: No. Art. 620 of the Civil Code provides that only continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by prescription. The easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous because its use is at intervals and is dependent on the acts of man.

ENCARNACION V. COURT OF APPEALS- EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY

An easement of right of way exists as a matter of law when a private property has no access to a public road and the needs of such property determines the width of the easement which requires payment of indemnity which consists of the value of the land and the amount of the damages caused.

FACTS: Tomas Encarnacion is the owner of the dominant estate which is bounded on the north by the servient estates of Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Masigno, on the south by a dried river and the Taal Lake. The servient estate is bounded on the north by the National Highway.

Prior to 1960, persons going to the national highway would just cross the servient estate at no particular point. In 1960, Sagun and Masigno enclosed their lands with a fence but provided a roadpath 25 meters long and about 1 meter in width. At this time, Encarnacion started his plant nursery business on his land. When his business flourished, it became more difficult to transfer the plants and garden soil through the use of a pushcart so Encarnacion bought an owner-type jeep for transporting the plants. However, the jeep could not pass through the roadpath so he approached Sagun and Masigno asking them if they would sell to him 1 meters of their property to add to the existing roadpath but the 2 refused the offer.

Encarnacion then instituted an action before the RTC to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least 2 meters. The RTC dismissed the complaint for there is another outlet, which is through the dried river bed. This was affirmed by the CA thus the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Encarnacion is entitled to an widening of an already existing easement of right-of-way

RULING: YES Encarnacion has sufficiently established his claim. Generally, a right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the case at bar, although there is a dried river bed, t it traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no egress or ingress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump 4-5 meters up. And during rainy season, it is impassable due to the floods. When a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. With the non-availability of the dried river bed as an alternative route, the servient estates should accommodate the needs of the dominant estate. Art. 651 provides that the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate To grant the additional easement of right of way of 1 met ers, Encarnacion must indemnify Sagun and Masigno the value of the land occupied plus amount of the damages caused until his offer to buy the land is considered.

13. VDA. DE BALTAZAR V. COURT OF APPEALS- EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY

For someone to be entitled of an easement of right of way, 4 requisites must be present: (1) the estate must be surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway (2) after payment of the proper indemnity (3) the isolation is not due to the propietors own acts and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

FACTS: Daniel Panganiban is the owner of Lot No. 1027. It is bounded on the north by Sta. Ana River, on the south by the land of vda. de Baltazar and on the west by lot 1028 and on the east by Lot 1025. Directly in front of 1026, 1028, and 1025 is the Braulio St.

Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars for the establishment of a permanent and perpetual easement of right of way for him to have access to the provincial road. The RTC dismissed the complaint for it found 2 other passageways. The CA reversed the decision for it found that there was a strip of land used by Panganiban and his grandfather as a right of way for 30 years until it was closed

and that the 2 other passageways were only temporary and was granted to Panganiban when the right of way was closed. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Panganiban is entitled to an easement of right of way

RULING: YES It has been held that for someone to be entitled of an easement of right of way, 4 requisites must be present. (1) the estate must be surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway (2) after payment of the proper indemnity (3) the isolation is not due to the propietors own acts and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

Panganiban has all 4 requisites. With regard to the 1st requisite, his land is bounded on all sides by immovables, the lands of Baltazar, Legaspi and Calimon and by the river. The 2nd requisite is settled by a remand to the lower court for the determination of the proper indemnity. As regards the 3rd requisite, it was found that Panganiban bought the land from the Baltazars therefore its isolation was not due to his own acts. And with regard to the 4th requisite, the passage claimed is the shortest distance from his lot to Braulio Street. Panganiban was established all 4 requisites therefore is entitled to the easement.

16. DIONISIO V. ORTIZ 204 SCRA 745 FACTS: Petitioners were owners of contiguous lots. Adjacent to it were the lots of private respondents. Through an agreement, they were granted a right of way over Howmart Road, transverring through the properties of private respondents. Petitioner then decided to partition his lot into 2, which led to the construction of a new gate. This gate opened directly to the property of one of the private respondent. Later, a steel barricade was constructed to block the gate. HELD: Easement is not compulsory if the isolation was due to the proprietors own acts.