Samir Mohandes Dr.

Jerzy Rozenblit HNRS 195I 006-CLQ (79539) 10 December 2010 Reliance on Technology As in many fields, the key to effective technology is in striking equilibrium. In the case of technology, this equilibrium must be found between over-reliance on technologycases in which blind faith in a particular device causes an operator to overlook a technical failure, causing disasterand under-reliance on technology, cases in which by using technology rather than overriding it for reasons of ignorance or ineptitude causes a catastrophe. Perhaps the two cases that best illustrate the consequences of disrupting this equilibrium in either direction are those of the Toyota vehicle recallan instance in which insufficient technology caused injuries en masseand the Challenger space shuttle tragedy, an instance in which overlooking important technical aspects led to the death of all crew members on board the shuttle. By examining the over-reliance or under-reliance upon technology in both cases, it can be better determined where exactly this equilibrium is found. In fall of 2009, Toyota was forced to recall millions of vehicles due to a number of runaway car accidents caused by dysfunctional brakes (ODonnell). In most situations, the accelerator would be jammed, and when the brake was applied, the car would continue to move. Jeff Bennett of the Wall Street Journal described this phenomenon in greater detail in a 2010 article: [A jammed accelerator and dysfunctional brake] was the problem an off-duty California state trooper had on Aug. 28 when the Lexus ES350 he was driving

zoomed to 125 miles per hour on a road near San Diego. A passenger in the car called 911 and said the accelerator was stuck and the driver was hitting the brakes. The call ends when the car crashes. The trooper and three members died. (Bennett) Was this tragedyalong with approximately twenty others, all due to the same technical failurepreventable? The consensus: very much so. In the same Wall Street Journal article, Bennett continues, stating that some of the fatal accidents and sudden-acceleration incidents that have caused Toyota Motor Corp. so much trouble may have been avoided if the auto maker had equipped its cars with a technology many of its rivals have offered for years (Bennett). The technology to prevent such an accident has been in place for as long as fifteen years, but was not implemented by Toyota, resulting in twenty accidents, multiple deaths, countless injuries, and millions of recalled vehicles. The technology used by Toyotas competitors that could have prevented these accidents essentially prioritizes brake functions over accelerator functions when both are being requested by interrupting the electronic signal that causes the car to accelerate, according to Bennett: the computer systemknown in the industry as Smart Pedal tells the engine to disregard the accelerator if both the brake and gas pedal are pushed while the vehicle is moving (Bennett). The benefits of Smart Pedal technology are plenty, ensuring driver and passenger safetyas well as safety of other cars on the roadby eliminating the possibility of runaway vehicles. Bennett continues, stating that such a feature may have also helped control those vehicles that reportedly accelerated to high speed. Many of those incidents are believed to have been caused by bulky floor mats that could catch on the gas pedals and pin them down (Bennett).

Moreover, as if the safety advantages afforded by implementation of Smart Pedal technology were insufficient, European auto engineers say that it costs only approximately one dollar per car manufactured to include the Smart Pedal system in vehicles (ODonnell). Thus, the implementation of Smart Pedal systems in Toyota vehicles would actually have been less expensive than the expenditures associated with the ensuing court fees, legal settlements, and recall costs. Thus, both availability of the technology as well as the price of the technology are eliminated as possible reasons why Toyota may have omitted the Smart Pedal systems. The question then becomes: why? Honda and Acura are two other motor companies whose vehicles omit Smart Pedal systems. Honda Spokesman Chris Naughton, in an interview with USA Today, stated that Honda does allow brakes to override the gas pedal because there are trade-offs, and that Honda continues to accept application of the accelerator and brake pedals as representing the drivers intention (ODonnell). In other words, Smart Pedal technology has been allowed to be effectually overridden by the drivers intention, which, in the case of the California state trooperas well as countless othershas led to fatal accidents. The converse of this dilemma of overruled technology was true in the Challenger space shuttle tragedy of 1986. In this case, it was over-reliance on technology that led to the failure to override the launch of the spacecraft, when in fact such an overruling could have saved the lives of the seven crew members aboard the Challenger. The haste that led to this overruling was a result of many combined factors, including economic, political, and scheduling considerations, none of which should have been prioritized before the safety of the crew members. However, the pressure to accommodate such considerations led to miscommunication between management

levels within the NASA organization as well as some corner-cutting on the part of the technical crew. According to a Professor Lowery from Texas A&M University, Unforeseen competition from the European Space Agency put NASA in a position where it would have to fly the shuttle dependably on a very ambitious schedule in order to prove the Space Transportation System's cost effectiveness and potential for commercialization. This prompted NASA to schedule a record number of missions in 1986 to make a case for its budget requests. (Lowery) Furthermore, the previous shuttle mission had been continually delayed as a result of inclement weather and mechanical mishaps, making NASA particularly impatient in launching the Challenger without any delays. By ensuring a prompt and punctual launch of the Challenger, the launch pad could be prepared on schedule for the next mission, which would be carrying a probe intended for the examination and observation of Halley's Comet. Lowery also points out that if launched on time, this probe would have collected data a few days before a similar Russian probe would be launched, and that there was probably also pressure to launch Challenger so it could be in space when President Reagan gave his State of the Union address. Reagan's main topic was to be education, and he was expected to mention the shuttle and the first teacher in space, Christa McAuliffe (Lowery). As a result of these combined factors, the Challenger was constructed and prepared for launch hastily. Then, on January 28, 1986, just over a minute after what appeared to be a successful launch, the Challenger began to break apart, finally disintegrating over the Atlantic Ocean near the Florida coastline. As a result, a mission that was supposed to be the mission to definitively give the United States the conclusive edge over Russia in the space race and put the first teacher in space instead ended in catastrophe. All seven crew members perished in the

explosion. Texas A&M Universitys Professor Lowery continues, explaining in detail the technical factors and mechanical failures attributed to the disaster: The failure of the solid rocket booster O-rings to seat properly allowed hot combustion gases to leak from the side of the booster and burn through the external fuel tank. The failure of the O-ring was attributed to several factors, including faulty design of the solid rocket boosters, insufficient low- temperature testing of the O-ring material and the joints that the O-ring sealed, and lack of proper communication between different levels of NASA management. (Lowery) As illustrated above by Lowery, technical failure of the seal allowed hot gases to leak out of the fuel rocket, where they were exposed to flames from the booster rocket thrusters. This increased the size of what was previously just a pinhole leak, allowing more flames to enter the apparatus. This was able to effectively separate the booster from the remainder of the rocket. Once free, the booster collided with the fuel tank, creating a second hole in the Challenger. From this larger hole in the fuel tank, hydrogen and oxygen fuels leaked and ignited, causing the explosion that began the destruction of the Challenger. The reason for the O-ring failure that caused this disastrous chain reaction was nothing else than simply that the weather was colder than usual on the day of the launch. The structural integrity of the O-ring material had never been tested at such a temperature. A component of the rocket that likely seemed to be an irrelevant consideration at the time of construction ended up causing the most catastrophic and tragic launch day disaster in NASA history. By over-relying on the O-ring technology and assuming it to be effective in circumstances when it was not, as is often the case when technology is overrelied upon, disaster ensued. Had blind faith not been put into the O-rings, an observant

technician may have suggested repair or testing prior to the launch, and the explosion could have been prevented. The lessons learned from the Toyota recalls and the Challenger disasters are twofold: firstly, that under-reliance on technology can expose human fallibility when the unexpected strikes; and second, that technology is only as smart, reliable, or omniscient as the humans who design it. The key, then, is equilibrium; that is, operators of technologyespecially when such technology is designed for the safety of the operatormust realize its limitations and act (or prepare) accordingly. Check, double check, and triple check; this is the best that can be done for the disaster that cannot be foreseen.

Works Cited Bennett, Jeff. "Many Auto Makers Offer Brake-Override Systems." The Wall Street Journal [New York] 8 Feb. 2010. Print. Lowery, L. "Shuttle." Engineering Ethics. 25 Aug. 2000. Web. 7 Dec. 2010. <http://ethics.tamu.edu/ethics/shuttle/shuttle1.htm>. O'Donnell, Jayne. "'Smart Pedals' Could Stop Crashes like Those behind Recall." USA Today 31 Jan. 2010. Print.