People, plaintiff-appellee v.

Mapa defendant-appellant GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164) En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant and appellant. Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Asst. Solicitor General F .R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C . Hernandez for plaintiff and appellee. Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4 (home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities) Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm

Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition (Sec 878 RA 4 of the RAC) except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails (Sec 879) It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent. Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speaks with authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in People v. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by

section 879, Thus, in the present case, therefore, the conviction must stand. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.56 FACTS: Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax from 1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, have all been met with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Finally on June 26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as provided for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a period of ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. On July 6, 1961, defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiffs delinquency in municipal license tax; notice was received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who acknowledged the distraint. Said articles (the cement bags) will be sold by public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, proceeds thereof will in part be utilized to settle the account. Despite notice of sale, it did not take place on July 27, 1961 but on January 30, 1962 ISSUE: W/N the distraint and public auction were valid.

HELD: Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and the expenses of the distraint. The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which upheld the validity of the auction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43 United Christian Missionary Society vs. Social Security Commission G.R. No. L-26712-16 (December 27, 1969) Chapter III, Page 206, Footnote No.206 FACTS: Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not know that they had to pay tax for their operations. Nevertheless, upon knowledge thereof, they paid their premium remittances but refused to pay the incredible penalty fees since they did not know that they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances, claiming that the assessed penalties were inequitable. Respondent said that their organization is embraced in the Social Security Act; therefore the assessed penalties are imposed on them.

ISSUE: W/N Respondent erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Security Act to condone, waive or relinquish the penalty prescribed by law for late payment of remittances. HELD: Respondent has no such authority. Petition is dismissed on the ground that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting Respondent the power to condone penalties, it has no legal authority to condone, waive, or relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the SS Act. The reason of the law is to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people to provide employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age, and death. Good faith and bad faith are irrelevant since the law makes no distinction. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no room for interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6b, 7a, 9a, 26

P14,000 for his outstanding obligation, out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to RA No. 897 (RA 897). Respondent advised petitioners of the non-acceptance of the offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953 when RA 897 was approved. ISSUE: W/N petitioners obligation is subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. HELD: No. The provision expressly provides that the obligations must be subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. Hence, when such backpay certificates are offered in payment to a government-owned corporation of obligation thereto which was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said Act on June 20, 1953, such corporation may not legally be compelled to accept the certificates. The Court cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the provision of law. LATIN MAXIM: 28, 7a, 6c, 1

Quijano v. Development Bank of Philippines G. R. No. 26419 (October 16, 1970)

the

Republic Flour Mills, Inc v. Commissioner of Customs G. R. No. L-28463 (May 31, 1971) Chapter V, Page 184, Footnote No.39 FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in which they found in Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner was assessed wharfage dues for the exportation of bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) under Sec. 2802 of

FACTS: Petitioner filed an urban estate loan with respondent which was approved. The loan was to be released in installments. The outstanding obligation of the petitioners with respondent, including interests, amounted to P13,983.59. Petitioner wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of

the Tariff and Customs Code which states: There shall be levied collected and paid on products of the Philippines exported from the Philippines, a charge of 2 pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage ISSUE: W/N the words products of the Philippines excludes bran and pollard on the ground that they are from wheat grain, which is imported into the Philippines. HELD: No. Even without undue scrutiny it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. The Term product of the Philippines should be taken in its usual signification to mean any product produced in the country; hence, bran(ipa) and pollard(darak) produced from wheat imported into the country are products of the Philippines. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 7a, 24a, 24b

ISSUE: W/N courts may be labor arbiters that can pass on a suit for damages filed by an employer or is it the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC? HELD: Yes, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. In the Labor Code, Sec. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with original jurisdiction. However, P.D. 1367 amended Sec. 217, vesting courts of first instance with original jurisdiction to award damages for illegal dismissal. But again P.D. 1691 amended Sec. 217 to return the jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters. Additionally, BP 130 amended the same section, but without changing original jurisdiction of LA over money claims arising from employer-employee relations. Thus the law is clear, respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to act on the case. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a

no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit unions in the payroll collection. ISSUE: W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit unions credit into a first priority credit. HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The RA Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall be granted first priority in the salary collections. According to Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion, it is well established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful. Justice Barrera adds: the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

National Federation of Labor v. Hon. Eisma G.R. No. L-61236 (January 31, 1984) FACTS: Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal termination of their union leader and underpayment of their monthly allowance. In the process, they blocked the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from entering the premises. Thereafter, Respondent filed in court for damages for obstruction of private property. Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this case belongs to Labor Arbiter and not for courts to decide.

KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979) FACTS: The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied. Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023 compels employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions the debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court has already granted there is

Radio Communications of the Philippines v. National Telecom. Com. G.R. No. L-68729 (May 29, 1987) FACTS: Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in 1957 by RA 2036 to operate a radio communications system, recognized by the Public Service Commission (PSC). Petitioner then established services in Sorsogon, Mindoro, and Samar. In 1980, the Respondent, which replaced the PSC, authorized Kayumanggi to set up radio systems in Mindoro and Samar too. Respondent, after conducting a hearing upon a

complaint by Kayumanggi, ordered Petitioner to stop operating, because it didnt have a certificate of public convenience, which is necessary under EO 546 for any public service to operate. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner still needs a certificate of candidacy before it can validly operate. HELD: Yes, they need such certificates to validly operate. Petitioner was created under RA 2036, governed by the Public Service Commission. Under it, radio companies did not need a certificate of public convenience to operate. However, P.D. 1 abolished the Public Service Commission and EO 546 created the Respondent Commission. Under EO 546, Respondent must issue a certificate of public convenience for the operation of radio communications systems. Petitioner did not avail of it when they should have. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 30, 46a, 49

SSUE: 1) W/N the trial courts judgment should be sustained in conformity with the doctrine laid down in People v. Tac-an, People v. Tiozon, People v. Caling, etc. OR to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People v. Barros. 2) W/N the 2nd par of Sec 1 of PD1866 integrated illegal possession of firearm and the resultant killing into a single integrated offense. HELD: 1) The trial courts judgment is affirmed. 2) 2nd par of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of illegal possession with homicide or murder. It does not use the clause as a result or on the occasion of to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime, but rather it uses the clause with the use of. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

as to their absence. On May 10, l993, Private Respondents tendered their explanation letters. Despite their explanation, they were not allowed to resume their work and were advised to await the decision of the management whether or not the real reason for their absence was intended to sabotage the operations of Petitioner. But other line leaders were allowed to resume their work despite their absence on May 5 and 6, l993. ISSUE: 1. W/N the failure of Petitioner to allow Private Respondents from resuming their work constitutes dismissal from the service? 2. W/N the Labor Arbiter erred in limiting the award of backwages for only a period not exceeding three 3 years? HELD: Under the old doctrine, the backwages that can be awarded to illegally dismissed employees was not to exceed a period of three years. However, a new doctrine allowed the awarding of full backwages and also prevented the company from deducting the earnings of the illegally dismissed employees elsewhere during the pendency of their case. The Labor Arbiter was wrong in awarding backwages for a period of not exceeding three years. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 6a, 6c, 7a, 49

People v. Quijada G.R. Nos. 115008 (July 24, 1996) FACTS: Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. He was convicted of 2 offenses, which were separately filed: 1) Murder under Art. 248 of the RPC 2) Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866 Par 2 of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 states that, If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.

Ala Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRC G. R. No. 122165 (February 17, l997) Chapter IV, Page 138, Footnote No. 53 FACTS: Respondents were both employees of Petitioner and holding position as line leaders, tasked to supervise 36 sewers each. On May 5 and 6, l993, all the line leaders did not report for work. On May 6, l993, Private Respondents were not allowed to enter the premises of the Petitioner, and then required to submit written explanations

Enrile v. Salazar G.R. No. 92163 (June 5, 1990) FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with

murder and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Petitioners contend that they are being charged for a criminal offense that does not exist in the statute books because technically, the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof. ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners falls under the Hernandez doctrine. HELD: The doctrine in the case People v. Hernandez remains as the binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. The charges of murder and multiple frustrated murders are absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion. Therefore, charges against Petitioners in the information should be understood as that of simple rebellion under the RPC. Furthermore, in a concurring opinion, Justice Feliciano states that if the court ruled that the charges of murder could be prosecuted separately from rebellion, then the principle of non-retroactivity would be violated. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a, 48

Workmens Compensation Act. However, a later report on the accident showed there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation. Thereafter, Petitioners filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporations reckless and wanton negligence. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between availing of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act or suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. HELD: Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. However, in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages from the Workmens Compensation Act, if they are awarded a greater amount in the regular courts, the amount received from this Act shall be deducted to prevent the instance of double recovery. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts, the Court stated that it did not legislate in this case but rather, applied and gave effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 40a

Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation. During the pendency, Respondent attached some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersedes bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attached properties were released. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian, which was granted. However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted. ISSUE: W/N the counter bond issued was valid. HELD: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. It appllies to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff. The only logical conclusion is that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be charged against such counter bond. The rule therefore, is that the counter bond to life attachment shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment of pending appeal. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 26, 36a

Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation G.R. No. L- 30642 (April 30, 1985) FACTS: Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent Corporation who died as a result of a cavein while working in underground mining operations. Petitioners, with the exception of Floresca, recovered damages under the Philippine British Assurance v. Intermediate Appelate Court G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987) Chapter 5, Page 200, Footnote No.99 FACTS:

Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking Corporation G.R. No. 74917 (January 20, 1988) FACTS: Respondent Bank filed a case against Petitioner Bank for reimbursement of P45,982.23 as a consequence of six crossed Managers checks which turned out to have forged and/or unauthorized endorsements appearing at the back of each check. Philippine Clearing House Corp. (PCHC) ordered Petitioner Bank to pay the said amount. Petitioner Bank appealed saying that PCHC had no jurisdiction because the checks involved were non-negotiable checks. ISSUE: W/N PCHC had jurisdiction over checks which are non-negotiable. HELD: Yes. As provided in the articles of incorporation of PCHC, its operation extends to clearing checks and other clearing items. Clearly, the term checks refer to checks in general use in commercial and business activities, including nonnegotiable checks. No doubt nonnegotiable checks are within the ambit of PCHCs jurisdiction. There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated for courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 24b, 25a, 25b, 26

Salenillas v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989) Chapter IV, Page 135, Footnote No.47 FACTS: On December 4, 1973, the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay their loan, the property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by Private Respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property under Sec.119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified Petitioners from being legal heirs vis--vis the said property. Respondent also maintains that the period for repurchase as already prescribed based on Monge et al. vs. Angeles. ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said Act. 2. W/N the prescription period had already prescribed. Held: The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the Act. Petitioners contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. With regard to prescription, the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be different. For foreclosure sales, the prescription period starts on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was executed. LATIN MAXIM: 9b, 26, 27, 9b, 42a