REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES SENATE

SITTING AS AN IMPEACHMENT COURT IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF RENATO C. CORONA AS CHIEF JUSTUCE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES,

REPRESENTATIVES NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, LORENZO R. TAADA, III, REYNALDO V. UMALI, ARLENE J. BAG-AO, ET AL., Complainants. CASE NO. 002-2011 x - x

MEMORANDUM (Re: Article II of the Verified Complaint for Impeachment) with OPPOSITION (To: Respondents Motion to Quash Subpoena [Issued to BIR Commissioner Kim Jacinto Henares])

The HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, by its Prosecutors, respectfully states:

MEMORANDUM A. 1. The caption of Article II of the Impeachment Complaint provides: II.

RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES, AND NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. (Underscoring ours) 2. In his Memorandum [On Article II of the Verified Complaint] dated 24 January 2012 (the Memorandum), Respondent Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Corona) insists that insofar as Article II is concerned, evidence on his ill-gotten wealth is irrelevant, improper and violative of (his) constitutional rights. He claims that since Article II merely charges him with failure to disclose to the public his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), any evidence on the veracity of the contents of the SALN would be immaterial. This view is baseless and shows Coronas misappreciation of the constitutional requirement of filing a SALN. 3. The gravamen of the charge in Article II goes far beyond a mere failure on the part of Corona to mechanically file or disclose his SALN. His duty to disclose his SALN to the public necessarily implies a duty to be truthful, honest, and accurate in the sworn contents thereof (this is why the law requires the SALN to be under oath). Coronas disclosure of a false, dishonest, and incomplete SALN is as much a betrayal of public trust as his failure to disclose his SALN. Simply put, the disclosure contemplated by law is disclosure of a SALN that is true, honest and accurate. Anything less would be a useless, futile exercise; make a mockery of the SALN requirement; and be tantamount to a culpable violation of the constitution and betrayal of the public trust. 4. The significance of the truthfulness of the contents of the SALN cannot be overemphasized. It springs from the purpose for which this constitutional requirement was created in the first place, that is to curtail a public officials unlawful accumulation of wealth through graft and corruption. The ruling of the Supreme Court in Ombudsman v. Valeroso[1] is instructive in this regard, thus: Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful acquisition of wealth, the evil sought to be suppressed and avoided, and Section 7, which mandates full disclosure of wealth in the SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is aimed particularly at curtailing and minimizing, the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. Unexplained matter normally results from nondisclosure or concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all public officials and employees are mandated to file, are the means to achieve the policy of accountability of all public officers and employees in the government. By the SALN, the public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; it is a valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth. (Underscoring ours) 5. All told, the prosecutions evidence on Coronas accumulation of ill-gotten wealth strikes at the very heart of his failure to disclose his SALN to the public. It shows that Corona has not been truthful and honest in his SALN, and has therefore violated the very spirit and the letter of the SALN requirement. Such proof is, therefore, very material and relevant. Notably, Corona, through counsel, marked and adopted the SALNs as his own evidence, thereby admitting that the contents of the SALN are material and relevant to Article II. B. 6. In any event, Coronas accumulation of ill-gotten wealth and his commission of graft and corruption were sufficiently alleged in the Impeachment Complaint, as is evident from the following excerpts from the Impeachment Complaint: 6.1 As Chief Justice, Respondent has been lavish in the spending of public funds; blind to ethical standards of behavior expected not only of him, but his family; intrigued and conspired against his fellow justices; and behaved more like a scofflaw than Chief Justice in refusing to disclose his assets and liabilities. (page 6, Complaint);

6.2 x x x; and even reportedly engaging not only in illicitly acquiring assets of high value but even resorting to petty graft and corruption for his own personal profit and convenience. (page 10, Complaint); 6.3 Respondent betrayed the Public Trust, committed Culpable Violation of the Constitution and Graft and Corruption in the following manner: x x x Respondent committed culpable violation of the constitution and/or betrayed the public trust when he failed to disclose to the public his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth as required under Sec. 17, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution. (page 11 and 22 of the Complaint); 6.4 It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his declaration of his assets, liabilities and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. (paragraph 2.3, page 22, Complaint); and 6.5 Respondent is likewise suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits. x x x. Is this acquisition sustained and duly supported by his income as a public official? (paragraph 2.4, page 22, Complaint). 7. Corona claims that paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Complaint are conjectural and speculative, and do not amount to a concrete statement of fact that might require a denial. Corona ignores the reality that these proceedings have long left the realm of pleadings and allegations, and have now reached the stage of the presentation of proof. Today will already be the sixth day of trial. That said, Coronas arguments are utterly baseless and should be rejected. In the first place, Corona has already waived this objection and is now estopped from rehashing it again and again just to avoid trial and facing the evidence against him. Consider the following: 7.1 First, if Corona truly believed that paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 were merely speculative and conjectural, he should have moved to strike these allegations outright before filing his Answer.[2] He did not do so. 7.2 Second, when he filed his Answer, Corona denied Article II, as a whole, and paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 specifically. He also affirmatively alleged that he acquired his assets from legitimate sources of income, mostly from his professional toils and that he and his wife purchased on installment a 300-sq.m. apartment in Taguig, which was declared in his SALN when they acquired it. In other words, Corona joined the issues of whether or not the contents of his SALN were, indeed, accurate and/or whether or not he had accumulated ill-gotten wealth. Upon a joinder of such factual issues, trial and presentation of evidence thereon should necessarily follow. 7.3 Third, in his 29 December 2011 Motion for Preliminary Hearing, which prayed specifically for the dismissal of the Complaint, Corona failed to move for the dismissal of the charges against him for amassing ill-gotten wealth and instead, relied exclusively on the supposedly defective Verification of the Complaint. Coronas failure to argue the insufficiency of the allegations against him for accumulating illgotten wealth prevents him from raising this ground anew in his Memorandum. The Omnibus Motion rule[3] states that a motion attacking a pleading x x x shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. 7.4 Finally, during the 18 January 2012 trial, Corona, through counsel, expressly agreed to abide by the Honorable Presiding Officers ruling to allow the prosecution to present evidence on the Articles of Impeachment despite Coronas objections to the sufficiency of the allegations in paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Complaint, to wit: JUSTICE CUEVAS. x x x

First, the issue of Article II, Your Honor, which is allegedly the SALN, the illegally acquired wealth, Your Honor, is or could be found in paragraph 10 and 11 of theirIn paragraph 10, Your Honor,

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Go ahead. JUSTICE CUEVAS. Paragarah 2.2, Your Honor, it is stated, Respondent failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities and net worth as required by the Constitution. If we go deeper into the import and denotation of this particular allegation, the essence of the imputation is the failure to disclose. Nothing mentioned about the problem of illegally acquired wealth. Paragraph 2.3, it states, and may I be permitted to read for the record, Your Honor, and by way of emphasis, It is also reported, we underscore the word reported, that some of the properties of the respondent are not included in his declaration of assets, liabilities and net worth in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. THE PRESIDING OFFICER. I give you an additional one minute to wind up. JUSTICE CUEVAS. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. Paragraph 2.4 say, Respondent is likewise suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquiring assets and so on with huge deposits. It has been reported. In other words, this allegation gravitates or centers on the alleged suspicion, on the alleged report which cannot be accepted as valid allegations in cases of pleadings required by our Rule of Procedure because our Rule of Proceeding states that the pleadings should contain a brief concise statement of the ultimate facts upon which the pleader relies. On the part of the plaintiff or discourse of action on the part of the defendant for his defense. It has been ruled on so many occasions that report and suspicion cannot form part of allegations of the ultimate fact because they cannot be relied upon. Secondly, if we examine the verification that they are claiming in this case, they never stated they appealed the report and so on and so on. So, to us, it will be a deprivation of our right to continue presenting evidence in this court by reason of the fact that they would be allowed to present evidence of this matter without any resolution before this honourable court on whether these are in accordance with the procedure laid down by our Rules of Court and Rules of Procedure, Your Honor. THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Are you through, counsel? JUSTICE CUEVAS. Yes, Your Honor. Thank you very much. THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Thank you very much. The Chair would like to plead for understanding by both parties about the proceeding. We cannot waste our time arguing with these technicalities. I am sure that as seasoned lawyers, we can handle the situation as it comes inside a courtroom whether the starting point of the presentation of the proponent of the case is anywhere within the allegations in the complaint, the defense, I am sure that they are prepared properly could meet the challenge. So, may I appeal to you that let us proceed with the merits of this case so that the people will not think that we are delaying this proceeding. The Chair, therefore, rules that since yesterday there was a request to reorder the burden of proof to be done by the prosecution, which they have done now, let us comply with that now, and I order that it be so. JUSTICE CUEVAS. Thank you, Your Honor. We will abide. (Underscoring and emphasis ours)

C. 8. Even assuming arguendo that Corona can still question the sufficiency of the allegations at this late stage, the fact is that the allegations in paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 are sufficient. 9. As early as 1960, the Supreme Court in the case of Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corporation,[4] held that a complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though the allegations may be vague or indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, in which event the proper recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill of particulars. The test therefore is whether the allegations in the complaint are adequate enough to put the defendant, accused or respondent on notice of the charges or claims against him. 10. This rule applies regardless of the type of proceeding be it civil, criminal or administrative. Thus, in People v. Elamparo,[5] a criminal case for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the Supreme Court ruled that it is not the designation of the offense in the Information that is controlling but the allegations therein which directly apprise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[6] In Santos v. Spouses De Leon[7], a civil case for forcible entry, the Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine that a complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though the allegations may be vague and indefinite.[8] Further, the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case.[9] Also in Domingo v. Rayala,[10] an administrative case, the Supreme Court held that the designation of the offense charged is not controlling. Rather, the description of the offense and the particular fact recited therein are to be taken into consideration. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.[11] 12. Here, the Impeachment Complaint (including paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 thereof) sufficiently apprised Corona that he is being charged with amassing ill-gotten wealth, to wit: 2.3. It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his declaration of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. 2.4. Respondent is likewise suspected and accused of having ill-gotten wealth, acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits. It has been reported that Respondent has, among others, a 300-sq. meter apartment in a posh Mega World Property development at the Fort in Taguig. Has he reported this, as he is constitutionally-required under Art. XI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution in his Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN)? Is this acquisition sustained and duly supported by his income as a public official? Since his assumption as Associate and subsequently, Chief Justice, has he complied with this duty of public disclosure? (Emphasis and underscoring ours) 13. There is also no merit in Coronas claim that the allegations in paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 are improper as they expanded the charges stated in Article II. They are referring to the caption/heading of Article II. But the caption/heading of Article II should be read in harmony and together with its supporting allegations. Indeed, the Constitution expressly states that it is the Verified Complaint (taken as a whole), and not the mere captions or headings therein, which constitutes the Articles of Impeachment.[12] Article XI, Section 3(4) of the Constitution expressly provides: (4). In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. 13.1. If it is true that, as Corona now claims, the charges should only be limited to the specific captions/headings of the Articles, why did he file a 79-page Answer, denying, admitting, and refuting all the allegations in the Impeachment Complaint?

14. Corona further argues that his Constitutional right to due process of law will be violated if the Prosecution will be permitted to introduce matters outside Article II. This claim is patently baseless. 15. Impeachment does not involve a deprivation of life, liberty or property. Rather, impeachment is a mechanism for determining the continued fitness of a high official to hold public office. It does not involve the imposition of a penalty of imprisonment or fine. Neither does it involve a deprivation of property, since a public officer has no proprietary claim over public office.[13] Rather, public office is a mere privilege, which can be revoked anytime especially if there is a showing of unfitness to hold office. As explained by Fr. Joaquin Bernas (citing Justice Story), impeachment is a proceeding, purely of a political nature, is not so much designed to punish an offender as to secure the state against gross political misdemeanors. It touches neither his person nor his property, but simply divests him of his political capacity. 16. More importantly, the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard.[14] What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. [15] In the instant case, even if this Honorable Court allows the prosecution to present evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Complaint, there are numerous avenues and opportunities for Corona to be heard and defend himself, including raising objections in the course of the presentation of the prosecutions witnesses, vigorous cross-examination of the prosecutions witnesses, and the presentation of defense evidence. 17. Corona also argues that paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Complaint are not in accordance with the law on pleadings or the Rules of Court. He ignores Rule VI of Resolution 39, otherwise known as the Senate Rules on Impeachment, which states that the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily on questions of evidence. There is nothing in the Constitution, the Senate Rules or in jurisprudence, which states that the Rules of Court should strictly apply with respect to the pleadings filed in an impeachment proceeding. 18. And even assuming arguendo that the Rules of Court would apply in matters of pleading, the same specifically states that the rules shall be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.[16] This is supported by a long line of cases where the Supreme Court permitted the liberal interpretation of the rules so as not to frustrate the ends of substantial justice, viz: The fundamental purpose of procedural rules is to afford each litigant every opportunity to present evidence on his behalf in order that substantial justice is achieved. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities.[17] (Underscoring ours) D. 19. In the final analysis, the nations search for truth should not be obstructed by one mans blind and reckless adherence to technicalities (contrary to his previous boast that he is ready to face trial in the Senate[18]). In Coronas own words as the ponente in the case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan:[19] In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks. (Underscoring ours)

OPPOSITION To Respondents Motion to Quash (Subpoena issued to BIR Commissioner Kim Jacinto Henares) 20. The Prosecution adopts the foregoing discussion in support of its herein Opposition to Coronas Motion to Quash (Subpoena issued to BIR Commissioner Kim Henares). 21. In the said Motion to Quash, Corona argues that the income tax returns (ITRs) and other tax-related documents are irrelevant and immaterial. This is baseless. The ITRs and other documents subject of the instant subpoena are very relevant and material to the charges against Corona under Article II of the Impeachment Complaint (and even to some of the other Articles for that matter). He is accused of acquiring ill-gotten wealth. Therefore, it is highly material to determine whether the numerous expensive properties he has acquired, under his name or that of his family, can be explained by his declared sources of income in his ITRs. Under Section 2 of R.A. 1379 or the Forfeiture Law, properties of a public officer which are manifestly out of proportion to his lawful income, are presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. Notably, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra, which was penned by no other than Corona himself, the Supreme Court considered the therein respondents ITRs in determining whether the properties amassed by them during their incumbency in public office were derived from their lawful income. 22. Coronas SALNs have now been presented and marked in evidence by both the Prosecution and the Defense. In his SALNs, Corona has admitted under oath, his assets and liabilities during the periods covered therein. To ascertain the truthfulness and accuracy of these sworn admissions in his SALNs, it is necessary to examine the ITRs which he, his wife and his family members have been filing during the same period. The ITRs will show Coronas (and his familys) financial ability or inability to legally acquire the assets he indicated in his SALNs. 23. Corona also argues that the ITRs of his children and son-in-law are irrelevant, as they are not named in the Impeachment Complaint. This reasoning is both simplistic and flawed, because under the Forfeiture Law (RA 1379), unlawfully acquired property may include not only those in the name of the respondent public official, but also those which are concealed by [their] being recorded in the name of, or held by, the respondents spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives, or any other person. 24. Accordingly, the instant Motion to Quash, based solely on the ground of irrelevance, should be denied.

PRAYER WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that: (1) the reliefs prayed for in Coronas Memorandum be denied; (2) the Prosecution be allowed to continue presenting evidence on Article II, including paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4, of the Impeachment Complaint and on all the Articles and their supporting allegations in the Impeachment Complaint; and (3) the Motion to Quash Subpoena (Issued to BIR Commissioner Kim Jacinto Henares) be denied and that she be allowed to testify and present in evidence the documents subject of the subpoena. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for. Quezon City, Metro Manila, 25 January 2012. [1] G.R. No. 167828, 2 April 2007, 520 SCRA 140, see also Carabeo v. CA, G.R. Nos. 178000 & 178003, December 4, 2009.

[2] See Section 12, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. This is not an admission that the Rules of Court provisions on pleadings are applicable to these proceedings. It is cited merely because the movant himself (Corona) cites the Rules of Court. [3] See Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Again, this is not an admission that the Rules of Court provisions on pleadings are applicable to these proceedings. It is cited merely because the movant himself (Corona) cites the Rules of Court. [4] G.R. No. L-14785 & L-14923, November 29, 1960. [5] G.R. No. 121572, March 31, 2000. [6] Id., Emphasis supplied. [7] G.R. No. 140892. September 21, 2005. [8] Id., Emphasis supplied. [9] Id. [10] G.R. Nos. 155831, 155840 & 158700, February 18, 2008. [11] Id., citing People v. Dimaano, G.R. No. 168168, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 647, 666-668. [12] 1987 Constitution. Article XI, Section 3(4). [13] De Leon. The Law on Public Officers and Election Law (2008), p.3. [14] Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission (G.R. No. 93868, February 19, 1991). [15] Id., citing Tajonero v. Lamarosa, 110 SCRA 438 (1981), [16] Rules of Court, Rule 1, Section 2. [17] Metro Rail Transit Corporation v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 166273, September 21, 2005. [18] Haharapin ko nang buong tapang at talino ang mga walang basehang paratang na ito, punto por punto, sa Senado. Handanghanda akong humarap sa paglilitis. (Dec. 14, 2011 speech) [19] G.R. No. 152154. July 15, 2003. === Source: Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines >>> http://www.gov.ph/2012/01/25/countermemorandum-on-defenses-motion-to-quash-subpoena-january-25-2012/