King Prajadhipoks Institute

47/101 Seminar Center Building, Civil Service Training Institute,

Tiwanon Road, Nonthaburi 11000
Tel. 0-2527-7830-9
Fax. 0-2527-7824
http://www.kpi.ac.th
Constitution Reform:
Comparative Perspectives
November 3-5, 2006
United Nations Conference Center
Rajdamnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand

King Prajadhipoks Institute

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Constitution Reform:
ISBN : 978-974-449-395-8
1,299 B.-
Constitution Reform:
Comparative Perspectives

November 3-5, 2006

United Nations Conference Center
Rajdamnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand

King Prajadhipoks Institute

Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
Copyright 2008 by King Prajadhipoks Institute
First edition: February 2008
Second Edition: August 2008
Number of copies: 200










Cost: 500 Baht
Editors: Prof. Andrew Harding and Dr. Thawilwadee Bureekul
Coordinator: Chaiwatchara Promjittiphong and Saiphone Suthikool
Cover Design: Chakkrish Rerkindra-Aree, Suchat Vivattrakool
Publisher: King Prajadhipoks Institute
47/101 Seminar Center Building, Civil Service Training Institute,
Tiwanon Road, Nonthaburi 11000
Tel. 0-2527-7830-9
Fax. 0-2527-7824
http://www.kpi.ac.th
Printer: Charansanitwong Printing
285-292 Moo 4 Petchakasem Road,
Laksong, Bangkae, Bangkok 10160
Tel. 0-2809-2281-3, 0-2809-2285 Fax. 0-2809-2284
All right reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior
permission of the publisher.
Nation: Library of Thailand Cataloging in Publication Data
King Prajadhipoks Institute
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives King Prajadhipoks
Institute 2008, 608 pages
I. Constitution
ISBN 978-974-449-395-8
King Prajadhipoks Institute
III
Preamble


T he King Prajadhipoks Institute, an academic institution under supervision of
the President of the Parliament, has organized annual KPI Congress events on regular
basis since the institutes establishment. As for the 2006 KPI Congress, the eight
annual symposium titled Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
with a special emphasis on constitutional issues was held at the United Nations
Conference Center, Ratchadamnoen Avenue, Bangkok during 3-5 November 2006.
Its objective was to serve as a public forum for presentation of academic research
pertinent to constitutional reform, to exchange knowledge and comparative
perspectives, and to share experiences from local and foreign academics and other
interested participants. The program consisted of two types of keynote address i.e.
opening and closing address; and two types of academic discussion i.e. plenary
session and six panel discussion groups as well as educational exhibitions and
activities organized by various organizations relating to the effectiveness of the
constitutional reform and constitutional enforcement.
The King Prajadhipoks Institute was immensely gratified to receive the honor
from H.R.H. Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn Mahidol appointing H.R.H.
Princess Bajrakittiyabha to preside over the opening ceremony of the KPI Congress.
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
IV
This document comprises summary report of the symposium with a collection
of discussion points on a wide range of issues such as political parties, election,
exercise of legislative power, balance of power and relationship between legislative
and executive branch, oversight of the exercise of state power by constitutionally
mandated bodies and the civil sector, decentralization and empowerment of the civil
society, and unjust discrimination against the people. All these are the essences of the
constitutional reform which is reckoned an essential element in constitutional
development of Thailand.
The King Prajadhipoks Institute would like to express sincere gratitude to the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Centre for Asia-Pacific
Initiatives, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Republique Francaise, Columbo Plan, and PTT
Public Company Limited which recognized the value of the education among general
public and kindly co-sponsored this event. Furthermore, we are also grateful to
lecturers, moderators, and participants who actively engaged in sharing knowledge,
experiences, and viewpoints which are instrumental in fostering constitutional
development.
King Prajadhipoks Institute
V
CONTENTS
Preamble III
Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives 1
Tentative Program 5
Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
Exhibition Agenda 11
Citizen Forum for Constitutional Reform on KPI Congress VIII
Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
Opening Remarks 15
Opening Ceremony of the KPI Congress VIII
Re: Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
H.R.H. Princess Bajrakittyabhas Address 19
At the Opening Ceremony of the KPI Congress VIII
Re: Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
The Keynote Address at the 8
th
Annual Congress of 21
King Prajadhipoks Institute
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
VI
Panel Discussion 1 23
The Process of Constitutional Reform
From Foreign Comparative Perspectives
New Asian Constitutionalism: Myth or Reality? 25
Prof. Andrew Harding
LA RVISION CONSTITUTIONNELLE EN FRANCE 51
PROBLMATIQUE GNRALE
Par Andr Roux
Constitutional Problems and Constitutional Reform: 69
The UK, Thailand and the case for preservation as well as change
Peter Leyland
The Lifespan of Written Constitutions 89
Tom Ginsburg
Constitutional tradition and constitutional reform in Germany 127
Klaus Messerschmidt, Humboldt
Panel Summary and Discussions 161
The Process of Constitutional Reform from
Foreign Comparative Perspectives
Panel Discussion 2 165
The Process of Constitutional Reform
From Thai Comparative Perspectives
Features for the new Constitution 167
Prof. Dr. Amorn Chandarasomboon
Part 1 Fundamental Constitutional Drafting 171
for the Second Political Reform 2006
Part 2 Prescription Method 175
Policies of Political Parties (New Parties)
Prof. Dr. Amorn Chandarasomboon
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
VII
Panel Summary 183
The Process of Constitutional Reform
from Thai Comparative Perspectives
Group 1 187
Political Parties, Elections and the Exercise of Legislative Power
Political Parties, Elections and the Exercise of Legislative Power 189
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Preecha Hongkrailert
Constructing Democratic Institutions: 193
Structures of Political Parties and Elections in Thailand
Prof. Robert B. Albritton
Constitutional Reform without Constitutionalism: 216
The Politics of Legal Adaptation of Chinese Authoritarianism
Assoc. Prof. Guoguang Wu
Group 2 217
Balance of Power and Relationships between
the Legislative and Executive Branches
Balance of Power and Relationship between the Legislative 219
and Executive Branches
Montri Rupsuwan
Approaches for Solving Corruption and Conflict of Interest 249
Wiitayakorn Chiangkun
Dynamics and Problems of Constitution-making in Asia and Beyond 281
Prof. Andrew Harding
Group 3 297
Oversight of the Exercise of State Power by
Independent Organizations According to the Constitution
Issues to be Considered for Constitutional Amendment 299
Charan Pakdithanakul
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
VIII
Inquiry and Impeachment Process for High-Level Office Holder 303
Niyom Rathamarit
Investigative Study of Independence of the Constitutional 323
Mandated Bodies under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540
Asst. Prof. Dr. Chalad Chongsuebphan and Team
Courts and Watchdog Bodies: 357
Appointment Processes Reviewed and Compared?
Prof. Peter Leyland
Group 4 381
Oversight of the Exercise State Power by the People
Inspection of the State Power by the Public 383
Boonlert Changyai
People Sector s Inspection against Corruption 401
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nuannoi Treerat
People Sectors Inspection against Corruption 403
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nuannoi Treerat
Peoples Inspection on the State Power 435
Rosana Tositakul
The Codification of Rights in the Thailand Constitution: 453
A Comparative Point of View
Tania Groppi
Constitutional Provisions and the Media: 477
Lessons from Thailand for Italy?
Sara Pennicino*
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
IX
Group 5 479
Decentralization and Empowerment of Civil Society
Democratic and civil society movement 481
ProfessorDr.AmaraPongsapij
Federalism, Regionalism and Devolution in a comparative context 509
A path to be followed by Thailands constitutional framers?
JustinOrlandoFrosini*
Group 6 511
Unjust Discrimination against People
Migrant workers and access to membership goods 513
Dr.SriprapaPetchmeesri
Unjust Discrimination 515
SirimitreBoonmoon
Constitutions and Women 539
IsabellLoyd
The legal recognition of same-sex partnerships: 541
a comparative constitutional analysis
NicholasBamforth
We have never planned to give any teeth to Suhakam: 545
Aspiration, Actualisation and National Human Rights Protection in Malaysia
Prof.ThioLi-ann
Group Summary and Discussions 547
PoliticalParties,ElectionsandtheExerciseofLegislativePower 549
BalanceofPowerandRelationships 551
betweentheLegislativeandExecutiveBranches
OversightoftheExerciseofStatePowerbyIndependentOrganizations 555
AccordingtotheConstitution
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
X
Oversight of the Exercise State Power by the People 557
Decentralization and Empowerment of Civil Society 561
Unjust Discrimination against People 565
Summary of discussion from participants 567
Special Keynote Address 569
By Former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai
Closing Remarks 585
By Associate Professor Noranit Setabutr
APPENDIX 589
Collection of the image activities















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Hosted by King Prajadhipoks Institute

in conjunction with the Centre for
Asia-Pacific Initiatives,University of Victoria, Canada

Rationale
It hasbeenover70yearssinceThailandbecameaconstitutionalmonarchyand
beganalongprocessofdemocratization.Periodsofmilitarydictatorship,sometimes
lastingalongtime,haveinterruptedthedemocratizationprocesses.Theglobaltrend
towardsdemocracy,however,finallyreachedThailand,creatingpublicdemandfor
rights,libertiesandpoliticalparticipation,includingeffortstofostergenuine
democracy.Peoplebelievedthatdemocracywouldbringthemsustainablepeace.
Politicalmovementsarose,oftendemonstratingtomaketheircausesheard,for
example,intheeventoftheuprisingsinOctober1973,October1976andMay1992.
ConstitutionalReform:
ComparativePerspectives
November 3 5, 2006
United Nations Conference Center, Bangkok
Ratchadoemnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand
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PoliticalchangesinMay1992broughtaboutpoliticalreform.Thepolicy-making
processwasreviewedinanefforttomakeThailandspoliticalsystemmore
democratic.
Thereemergedanintenttoprotecthumandignity,rightsandliberties,aswell
astopromotepublicparticipationandoversightoftheexerciseofstatepowerto
allowsustainabledemocracy.Peoplebegantounderstandtheirrighttopublic
participation,allowingthemtoinspectthestatesactionsanddemandthatauthorities
honorpolicycommitments.Therewasaperiodofpoliticalreforminwhichseveral
autonomousoversightorganizationswereestablished.Inthenearly10yearssince
politicalreformbegantherehavebeengreatachievements,butalsomanyproblems,
notallofwhichwereenvisagedbydraftersofpreviousconstitutions.Itiswidely
thoughtthattheseproblemsshouldbeaddressed.
Itistimelytoassessthesuccessesandfailuresofpoliticalreformandthe
previousconstitutioninordertogaininformationfordraftinganewconstitutionthat
willfostergenuinedemocraticdevelopmentappropriatetotheThaicontext.
Furthermore,inrecentyears,Korea,JapanandthePhilippineshaveconfronted
problemsofconstitutionalreformaswell.Inthiscontext,KingPrajadhipoks
InstitutewillorganizeKPICongressVIII,Constitutional Reform: Comparative
Perspectives.ThisCongress,inonegeneralsessionandsixdiscussionpanels,will
allowparticipantstoexchangeknowledgeandideasaboutpoliticalreform,ina
comparativeperspective,whichwillbeusefulforThailandsfuturepoliticalreform.

Objectives
1. Toserveasapublicforumtopresentacademicresearchconcerning
constitutionalreform.
2. Toexchangeknowledgeamongdomesticandforeignacademicsandthe
generalpublic.

Expectedoutcomes
1.Academics,studentsandthegeneralpublicwillbeabletoreviewproblems
oftheConstitution,andexchangeknowledgeandideasthatwillbeuseful
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forfuturepoliticalreform.
2.Recommendationsonconstitutionalreformwillbeproposed.

Mainactivities
TherewillbethreemainactivitiesconductedduringtheCongress:
1)Keynoteaddresses;2)Academicseminar;3)Exhibition.
1) Keynote addresses
Keynoteaddresseswillbedeliveredbyforeignanddomesticexpertswhowill
sharetheirknowledgeandexperiencesconcerningpoliticaldevelopment,especially
constitutionalreform:
Specialkeynoteaddressbyaforeignexpertonhisorherexperienceof
constitutionalreform
SpecialkeynoteaddressbyaThaiexpertonthelastdayoftheCongress.
TheaddresswillfocusonthedirectionofconstitutionalreformandThai
politics
2) Academic seminar
Theobjectiveoftheacademicseminaristoserveasaforumtobrainstormand
exchangeideasaboutconstitutionalreformanddevelopmentofThaipolitics.
Participantsintheseminarwillincludeacademics,experts,membersofparliament,
senators,localauthorities,journalists,NGOmembersandrepresentativesofstateand
independentstateagencies.
Theacademicseminarconsistsof
1. Paneldiscussions:toexpressperspectivesandexchangeexperiencesin
politicalaffairsamongdomesticandforeignacademics
Paneldiscussionamongforeignexperts
Paneldiscussionamongdomesticexpertstoexchangeexperiencesand
ideasaboutConstitutionalreform
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2.Groupdiscussions:topresentacademicarticlesandresearchresults
Group1 PoliticalParties,ElectionsandtheExerciseofLegislative
Power
Group2 Bal ance of Power and Rel at i onshi ps bet ween t he
LegislativeandExecutiveBranches
Group3 OversightoftheExerciseofStatePowerbyIndependent
OrganizationsAccordingtotheConstitution
Group4 OversightoftheExerciseofStatePowerbythePeople
Group5 DecentralizationandEmpowermentofCivilSociety
Group6 UnjustDiscriminationagainstPeople
3. Groupdiscussionsummary:topresentasummaryofeachgroupdiscussion
3) Exhibition
Theexhibitionwillbeheldinordertodisplayanddisseminateinformation
abouttheworkofvariousorganizationsconcerningeffectivenessofconstitutional
reform,theenactmentoftheConstitutionanditsproblems.

Congressparticipants
FormerMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,formersenators,policy-
makers,officialsofstateandindependentstateagencies,NGOmembers,peoples
sectornetworkmembers,academicsandrepresentativesofinternationalagencies
thatworkonthepromotionofdemocracyareinvitedtoattendtheCongress.About
700participantsareexpected.

Datesandvenue
HeldFriday3November2006at13.00-17.00
SaturdayandSunday4-5November2006at08.30-17.00
UnitedNationsESCAPBuilding,RatchadoemnernAvenue,Bangkok,Thailand

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TentativeProgram
ConstitutionalReform:ComparativePerspectives

November 3 5, 2006
United Nations Conference Center, Bangkok
Ratchadoemnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand

Hosted by King Prajadhipoks Institute

in conjunction with the Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives,
University of Victoria, Canada

November 3, 2006 (Friday)

13.0014.00 Registration
14.0014.30 H.R.H.TheCrownPrinceMahaVajiralongkornMahidol
hasgraciouslydesignatedH.R.H. Princess Bajrakitiyabhato
presideovertheopeningoftheCongress
14.3014.45 Vi deo Present at i on: Const i t ut i onal Reform: Comparat i ve
Perspectives
14.4515.00 Coffeebreak
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15.0016.30 Specialkeynoteaddress
Prof. Lloyd Axworthy,President&Vice-Chancellor,
UniversityofWinnipeg,Canada

November 4, 2006 (Saturday)

08.0008.30 Registration
08.3010.30 Paneldiscussion1
The Process of Constitutional Reform from Foreign
Comparative Perspectives
1)Prof.AndrewHarding,UniversityofVictoria,Canada
2)Prof.AndrRoux,DirecteurdelInstitutLouisFavoreu,France
3)Prof.PeterLeyland,LondonMetropolitanUniversity,UK
4)Prof.TomGinsburg,UniversityofIllinoisCollegeofLaw,USA
5) Dr.KlausMesserschmidtHumboldtUniversityofBerlin,
Germany
Moderator:Dr.JingjaiHanchanlash,
ExecutiveCommitteemember,KingPrajadhipoksInstitute
10.3010.45 Coffeebreak
10.4512.00 Paneldiscussion1(continued)
12.0013.00 Luncheon
13.0015.00 Paneldiscussion2
The Process of Constitutional Reform from Thai Comparative
Perspectives
1) Prof.Dr.Chai-AnanSamudavanija,
Director,VajiravudhCollegeandformerJudgeofthe
ConstitutionalCourt
2) Prof.Dr.BorwornsakUwanno,
ProfessorEmeritus,PublicLaw
3) Dr.BhokinBalakula,
FormerSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives
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4)Prof.Dr.AmornChandarasomboon,
FormerSecretaryGeneraloftheCouncilofState
5)Assoc.Prof.Dr.TeeraphatSerirangsan
Moderator:Prof.Dr.SomkidLertpaitoon,
DeputyDean,ThammasatUniversity
15.0015.15 Coffeebreak
15.1516.30 Paneldiscussion2(continued)

November 5, 2006 (Sunday)

07.3009.00 Registration
09.0010.30 Groupdiscussion(6groups)
GROUP 1
Political Parties, Elections and the Exercise of Legislative
Power
1)Assoc.Prof.NoranitSetabutr:Chairs
2) Assoc.Prof.Dr.PreechaHongkrailert
3) Dr.PanasTassaneeyanont
4) Prof.RobertB.Albritton:UniversityofMississippi
5) Assoc.Prof.Dr.GuoguangWu:UniversityofVictoria
6) Assoc.Prof.Dr.PathanSuvanamongkol:
Rapporteur
GROUP 2
Balance of Power and Relationships between the Legislative
and Executive Branches
1)Prof.Dr.SomkidLertpaitoon:Chairs
2)Assoc.Prof.Dr.MontriRoopsuwan
3)Assoc.Prof.WittayakornChiangkool
4)Dr.KevinTan:Consultant,Singapore
5)Prof.RaulPangalangan:UniversityofPhilippines
6)Prof.AndrewHarding:UniversityofVictoria
7)Assoc.Prof.Dr.kowitKangsanan:Rapporteur
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute

GROUP 3
Oversight of the Exercise of State Power by Independent
Organizations According to the Constitution
1)Assoc.Prof.Dr.UdomRathamarit:Chairs
2)Prof.Dr.CharunPakdeetanakul
3)Assoc.Prof.Dr.NiyomRathamarit
4)Asst.Prof.Dr.CharatChongseuppan
5)Prof.PeterLeyland:LondonMetropolitanUniversity
6)Assoc.Prof.Dr.BunjerdSinganeti:Rapporteur
GROUP 4
Oversight of the Exercise State Power by the People
1)Prof.Dr.BorwornsakUwanno:Chairs
2)Assoc.Prof.Dr.NuannoiTrirat
3)Mrs.RossanaTositrakul
4)Mr.BoonlertKachayudhadej
5)Dr.SaraPennicino:BolognaUniversity
6)Prof.TaniaGroppi:UniversityofSiena
7)Dr.ThawilwadeeBureekul:Rapporteur
GROUP 5
Decentralization and Empowerment of Civil Society
1)Prof.Dr.CharasSuwanmala:Chairs
2)Prof.Dr.AmaraPongsapit
3)Assoc.Prof.Dr.NakarinMektrirat
4)Prof.JustinFrosini:BolognaUniversity
5)MikePalmer:Soas,UniversityofLondon
6)Assoc.Prof.WoothisarnTanchai:Rapporteur
GROUP 6
Unjust Discrimination against People
1)Prof.Dr.ViriyaNamsiripongpan:Chairs
2)Dr.SriprapaPetchmeesri
3)Mr.SirimitBoonmoon
4)IsabellLoyd:UNIFEMThailand
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5)MaureenMaloney:Uvic
6)NicholasBamforth:Oxford
7)Prof.ThioLi-ann:NationalUniversityofSingapore
8)Assoc.Prof.PornchaiThappanya:Rapporteur
10.3010.45 Coffeebreak
10.4512.00 Groupdiscussion(Continued)
12.0013.30 Luncheon
13.3015.30 Presentationanddiscussionof6groupdiscussionresults
(15minuteseach)
Group1:Assoc.Prof.Dr.PathanSuvanamongkol
Group2:Assoc.Prof.Dr.KowitKangsanan
Group3:Assoc.Prof.Dr.BunjerdSinganeti
Group4:Dr.ThawilwadeeBureekul
Group5:Assoc.Prof.WoothisarnTanchai
Group6:Assoc.Prof.PornchaiThappanya
15.3015.45 CoffeeBreak
15.4516.15 SpecialKeynoteaddressonTheConstitution:Sustainabilityof
Democracy
Mr. Chuan Leekpai, FormerPrimeMinister
16.1516.25 VideoPresentation:KPICongressIX(2007)
16.2516.30 ClosingceremonybyAssoc.Prof.NoranitSetabutr,
SecretaryGeneral,KingPrajadhipoksInstitute
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ExhibitionAgenda
CitizenForumforConstitutionalReform
onKPICongressVIII
ConstitutionalReform:ComparativePerspectives

November 3 5, 2006
United Nations Conference Center, Bangkok
Ratchadoemnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand

Hosted by King Prajadhipoks Institute

in conjunction with the Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives,
University of Victoria, Canada

November 3, 2006 (Friday)

14.3014.45 H.R.H. Princess Bajrakitiyabha
Opening Ceremony of The Exhibition of KPI Congress VIII

November 4, 2006 (Saturday)

09.0009.15 TheExhibitionforDemocracyPromotion:1
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09.1510.30 TheExhibitionofCitizenForumforConstitutionalReform
- TheofPublicOpinionbyTheRepresentativesofTheGroups/
OrganizationsofChildren,Women,andAgeingPeople
10.3010.45 TheExhibitionforDemocracyPromotion:1(Continued)
10.4512.00 TheExhibitionofCitizenForumforConstitutionalReform
- TheExchangeofPublicOpinionbyTheRepresentativesofThe
Groups/OrganizationsofChildren,Women,andAgeingPeople
12.0013.00 Luncheon
13.0013.15 TheExhibitionforDemocracyPromotion:2
13.1514.30 TheExhibitionofCitizenForumforConstitutionalReform
- TheExchangeofPublicOpinionbyTheRepresentativesof
TheGroups/OrganizationsofLabor,SocialWelfare,and
Agriculture
14.3014.45 TheExhibitionforDemocracyPromotion:2(Continued)
14.4516.00 TheExhibitionofCitizenForumforConstitutionalReform
- TheExchangeofPublicOpinionbyTheRepresentativesofThe
Groups/OrganizationsofPublicPolicyandEnvironment

November 5, 2006 (Sunday)

09.0009.15 TheExhibitionforDemocracyPromotion:3
09.1510.30 TheExhibitionofCitizenForumforConstitutionalReform
- TheExchangeofPublicOpinionbyTheRepresentativesof
TheGroups/OrganizationsofDemocracyPromotion
10.3010.45 TheExhibitionforDemocracyPromotion:3(Continued)
10.4512.00 TheExhibitionofCitizenForumforConstitutionalReform
- TheExchangeofPublicOpinionbyTheRepresentativesofThe
Groups/OrganizationsofDemocracyandLocalGovernment
Promotion
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12.0013.00 Luncheon
13.0013.15 TheExhibitionforDemocracyPromotion:4
13.1515.15 TheExhibitionofCitizenForumforConstitutionalReform
- TheExchangeofPublicOpinionbyTheRepresentativesofThe
StudentOrganizationsofUniversity
15.1515.30 TheExhibitionforDemocracyPromotion:4(Continued)
15.3016.00 ClosingCeremony

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OpeningRemarks
OpeningCeremonyoftheKPICongressVIII
Re:ConstitutionalReform:ComparativePerspectives
DeliveredbyMr.MeechaiRuechuphan,
President of the National Legislative Assembly
Friday, 3 November 2006
UN Conference Center, Ratchadamnoen Avenue, Bangkok

YourHighness,
I, MeechaiRuechuphan,PresidentoftheNationalLegislativeAssembly,inthe
capacityoftheChairmanofKingPrajadhipoksInstituteCouncil,othercouncil
membersandtheorganizingcommitteeoftheKPICongressVIIIaswellas
academics,competentindividuals,andallparticipantsinthiscongressaredeeply
gratifiedwiththeutmostgenerosityofH.R.H.CrownPrinceMahaVajiralongkorn
MahidolfortheappointmentofH.R.H.PrincessBajrakittiyabhatograciously
presideovertheopeningceremonyoftheKPICongressVIIItitledConstitutional
Reform: Comparative Perspectivestoday.
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Therefore,nowIwouldliketobrieflypresentthebackgroundandobjectivesof
theKPICongressVIIIasfollows:
DespitethefactthatThailandhasbeenembracingtransformationtowards
democraticsystemforover70years,authoritarianismintervenedperiodically
throughoutthehistoryofdemocratizationandattimesdespoticrulersgovernedthe
countryforalongperiodoftime.Finally,provokedbytheinroadofglobal
democraticmovementinThailand,generalpublicbeguntorecognizeanddemand
civilrightsandlibertyandgreaterparticipationinpoliticalprocesses,andmade
effortsinpropellingtheemergenceoffull-fledgeddemocracy.Peopleareconvinced
thatdemocraticsystemisanadministrativeregimethatwillbeinstrumentalin
realizingpeaceandsustainablelivelihood.Consequently,civicgroupsstageda
numberofdemonstrationstocallforfull-fledgeddemocracysuchastheeventsin
October1973,October1976,andMay1992.Finally,themajorpoliticalupturnin
May1992entaileddiscerningpoliticalreforminThailand.Politicaldemandofthe
peopleandoversightinpolicyformulationprocessesamongotherthingshavebeen
infullswing,eventuallypavingawaytowardspoliticalreformwhichhasmanifested
changesintheadministrativesystemofThailand,whichisnowregardedasmore
democratic.
Subsequently,thesocietyenthusedoverprotectionofhumandignityandrights
andlibertyaswellasenhancementofpublicparticipation.Systemswereinstalledto
carryoutoversightofstatepoweraswell.Itishopefulthatsuchmovementswill
lead to political stability for the sake of longevity of the democracy.With
understandingaboutindividualrightsinpublicparticipation,peoplecanexamineand
demandthoseinpowertoimplementvariouspoliciespledgedtothemandthis
developmentiscertainlydifferentcomparedtothepast.Moreover,otherpolitical
changesalsofollowed.Forinstance,anumberofindependentbodieswere
establishedtoperformtheirdutiesasprescribedintheconstitution.Thepolitical
reformhasbeeninprogressfornearlytenyearsnowandwehavewitnessed
successesindemocraticdevelopment.Atthesametime,amultitudeofproblems
haveemerged.Alltheseproblemsmightnotbeanticipatedbythedraftersofthe
previousconstitutions.However,suchproblemseventuallyculminatedinsubsequent
demandforconstitutionalamendment.
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ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo

Itmightbesaidthatitisnowthetimetoundertakeastudyonsuccessesand
failuresofthepoliticalreformandthepastconstitutions inordertogather
informationfordeliberationindraftingofthenewconstitutionthatisgenuinely
befittingtothecontextofThaisocietyandourdemocraticdevelopment.Notably,
severalyearsagomanycountriessuchasKorea,Japan,andPhilippinesalso
observedsimilarflawsintheirconstitutions.Therefore,theorganizationofthis
congressforsharingknowledgeandviewpointsisdeemedgreatlybeneficialforthe
politicalreformprocessinourcountry.
Accordingly,KingPrajadhipoksInstitutehasorganizedtheKPICongressVIII
fortheyear2006titledConstitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
basedonthefollowingobjectives:
1.Toserveasapublicforumforpresentationofacademicresearchpertaining
toconstitutionalreform.
2.Toexchangeknowledge,comparativeperspectives,andexperiencesoflocal
andforeignacademicsandgeneralpublic.
ParticipantsinthiscongresscomprisemembersoftheNationalLegislative
Assembly,formermembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,formersenators,
membersoflocaladministrativeorganizations,policymakers,stateagencies,
independentbodies,NGOs,civicgroupsornetworks,academics,andinternational
agenciesconcerningwithpromotionanddevelopmentofthedemocracy,aswellas
secondaryschoolanduniversitystudentsandgeneralpublic,totaling700persons.
Theactivitiesinthiscongressconsistofthreemainactivitiesincludingkeynote
address,academicseminar,andexhibition.Thethree-daycongresswillbeheld
during3-5November2006.
KingPrajadhipoksInstitutewishesthatthiscongresswillserveasaforumfor
exchangeofhighlyvaluableknowledge,viewpoints,andexperiencesamongall
participants,thusleadingtoenhancementanddevelopmentofrobustandsustainable
democracy.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
IwouldliketotakethisopportunitytosummonYourHighnesstoformally
convenetheKPICongressVIIIIasabenedictionforeveryparticipantsinthe
congress.Andlateron,mayIrequestthehonorofYourHighnesstogracethe
ribbon-cuttingceremonyfortheopeningoftheexhibitiontitledCivic Forum for
Constitutional Amendment?

As it may warrant Your Highness consideration.

ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
H.R.H.PrincessBajrakittyabhasAddress
AttheOpeningCeremonyoftheKPICongressVIII
Re:ConstitutionalReform:ComparativePerspectives

Friday, 3 November 2006, 14.30 hrs.

UN Conference Center, Ratchadamnoen Avenue, Bangkok

H. R.H.PrincessBajrakittiyabha:H.R.H.CrownPrinceMahaVajiralongkorn
MahidolgraciouslyappointedmetopresideovertheopeningceremonyoftheKPI
CongressVIIItitledConstitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives.TodayI
amsincerelypleasedtotakepartinthisevent.Asweallknow,Thailandisgoverned
underthedemocraticsystemunderconstitutionalmonarchy,andtheconstitutionis
reckonedasthesupremelawofthecountry.Atpresent,weareintheprocessof
draftinganew,permanentconstitutionforenactmentofconstitutionallawswhichare
suitableforthecountrysadministrationunderthedemocraticregime.Itisadmirable
thatKingPrajadhipoksInstituteisorganizingthiscongresstoserveasaforumfor
localandforeignacademicstopresentrelevantacademicresearchandexchange
knowledge,perception,andexperiencesaswellascomparativeperspectiveson
constitutionalreform.Moreover,thecongresswillgreatlycontributetothe
bettermentandtheadoptionofamoresuitableconstitutionaldevelopmentand
reforminThailand.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ao
OnbehalfofH.R.H.CrownPrinceMahaVajiralongkornMahidol,Inow
declaretheKPICongressVIIIopen.Iwishthiscongressagreatsuccessasintended
andIwishyouallhappinessandgoodfortune

ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
a
TheKeynoteAddress
atthe8
th
AnnualCongressof
KingPrajadhipoksInstitute
Prof.LloydAxworthy

P rofessorAxworthybeganbyestablishingthebasicassumptionthathaving
societybasedonrulesandlawsisthemostimportantwayofprovidingadecent,safe
lifeforallofhumanity.ThegreatestaccomplishmentinthedecadesafterWorldWar
IIwasthecreationofframeworksoflawthatprotectagainsttheabuseofpowerand
standardsthatgivepeopletherighttoparticipateindecisionsaffectingthem.
Thebreakdownofinternationalruleoflawisapotentthreat,andtheworld
seemstobegoingthroughaperiodofbreakdown,asillustratedbythesituationsin
Sudan,Iraq,AfghanistanandSriLanka.Insuchplacespeopledonothavethe
protectionofthestate;theirhumanrightsandeventheirlivesarethreatened.The
conflictsinvolvedaredifferentfromwarsastheyhavepreviouslybeenunderstood;
thesearenotconflictsbetweennationstatesbutratherareconflictsconcerning
ethnicity,religion,andpolitics,whichofteninvolvegreatanimosity.Furthermore,
theycannotbeconfinedwithinnationalboundaries.Theseconflictsundermine
statesfundamentalpoliticalresponsibilitytoprotecttheircitizens.
Amajorchallengeindealingwithsuchconflictsisthattheactorsareoftennot
addressedintraditionalconstitutions.Internationaleffortstoaddressproblemsface
thedifficultyofreconcilinginternationalrule-makingwithnationaljurisdictions.
Stilltheworldfacessuchconflictsandotherchallengesthatrequireacollective
response,likepandemics,globalwarningandinternationalmigration.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
aa
Inresponsetotransnationalproblems,governmentshaveusurpedintrusive
powers,threateningandevenerasingcivilrightsandprotections.Buttherootsof
dissatisfaction,conflictandinsurgencylieinpeoplebeingunabletoparticipatein
shapingtheirsocietiesandeconomies.
ProfessorAxworthyturnedtoconstitutions.HepraisedThailands1997
constitution,assertingthatitnotonlyestablishedrightsinthecountrybutalsohelped
shapeThailandasaregionalleaderindevelopinganarchitectureoflegalrestraints.
Itisimportanttohavegaconstitutionalframeworkthatallowsconstant
discussionofconflictsinasettingofsharedrules,permittingnegotiationof
differencesratherthanconfrontation.
SuchflexibilityhasallowedlocalauthoritiesinCanadaandtheUnitedStates
tobeginbypassingtheircentralgovernmentstomakeagreementsaimedat
addressingtransnationalproblemssuchascarbonemissionsandpollution.
Canadasdecisionin1982toentrenchpreviously-unrecognizedcivilandgroup
rightsinitsrepatriatedconstitutiontransformedthenation,changingtheway
Canadiansinterpretrightsandengrainingthoserightsinthenewgeneration.The
rightsalsobecameatemplateforCanadaseffortsintheinternationalarena.
ThecreationoftheInternationalCriminalCourtwaspresentedasanexample
ofhowhumansecuritypolicyhasbecomepartofthethinkingofacoalitionoflike-
mindedstates.Overtime,suchthinkinganddevelopmentswillchangethebehavior
ofpeopleandnations.
TheUnitedNationshasrecognizedaninternationalobligationforcountriesto
interveneinplaceswheregovernmentsareunableorunwillingtoprotecttheir
people.Theexacttermsofwhatjustifiesinterventionarestillevolving.Asiahas
becomeadrivingforceinsettingtheinternationalagenda,andthechallengenowis
todevelopnetworkstoseethateveryoneintheworldisprotectedandthatthosewho
makedecisionshavearesponsibilitytoprotect.
PanelDiscussion1

TheProcessofConstitutionalReform
FromForeignComparativePerspectives

ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ae
Introduction
T hemilitarycoupdetaton19September2006broughttoanend,atleast
temporarily,theprocessofconstitutionalreforminThailandthathadbegunwiththe
bringingintoeffectofthe1997Constitution.
2
Theexperienceofthelastnineyears
wi l l be hi ghl y i ns t r uct i ve i n cons i der i ng t he next s t eps i n devel opi ng
constitutionalisminThailand,asitwillalsobeinstructivetoothercountriesinthe
NewAsianConstitutionalism:
MythorReality?
Prof.AndrewHarding
1

1
ProfessorofAsia-PacifcLaw,UniversityofVictoria,BritishColumbia,Canada.Thispaper
isgivenaspartoftheprojectLaw,GovernanceandtheConstitutioninThailand,directed
byProfessorPeterLeylandandmyself,forwhichseehttp://www.law.uvic.ca/seals/lgcrt.
htm.

2
McCargo,D.(2002),(ed), Reforming Thai Politics(Copenhagen,NIAS);Nelson,M.H.
(ed),Thailand s New Politics: KPI Yearbook 2001 (NonthaburiandBangkok,King
PrajadhipoksInstituteandWhiteLotusPress,2001).
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ae
region
3
andelsewherecontemplatingorimplementingtheirownconstitutional
reforms.
InthispaperIwishtoplacethisexperienceonabroadcanvasnamelythe
developmentofconstitutionalisminEastAsiainthelast20yearsandearlier.
4
We
willseethatconstitutionalismisnotcreatedovernight,butistheresultofmany
struggles,manyfalsedawnsandmanyambiguoussunsets.AsProfessorvan
Caeneghem,speakingofWesternEurope,remindsus,thefundamentalnotionofthe
Rechtsstaatortheruleoflawwasnotconceivedoutoftheblueandintroduced
withoutresistance.Itwas,infact,thefruitofpoliticalconflictandscholarlydisputes
stretchingovermanycenturies.
5
ThespreadofconstitutionalisminEastAsia,where
constitutionallawhasinvariablybeentransplantedinsomewayfromWestern
countries,canhardlybeexpectedthereforetobesmoothoruntroubled.Evenin
constitutionalismsEuropeanheartlanditisnotmuchmorethan30yearsagothat
Greece,SpainandPortugalwereunderauthoritarian,militaryrule,andtherewastalk
ofEuroecommunisminFranceandItaly,andcorporatism,andelective
dictatorshipintheUnitedKingdom.EventheUnitedStateshaditsperiodof
authoritariananti-communistMcCarthyisminthe1950sandappearsevenatthe
presenttimetohavedeviatedquiteseriouslyfromconstitutionalrectitudeasdefined
inAmericanterms.Wehavetotakethelonghistoricalviewtoremindusofthese
facts,andcompelustoentertainneithergloomnorcomplacencyastothefateof
constitutionalismanywhere.

3
TheASEANCharterinitiativecommencedwiththeKualaLumpurDeclarationonthe
EstablishmentoftheASEANCharter,December2005,isanothersignifcantcontextin
whichthisexperiencewouldbevalid.TheDeclarationaffrmsthepromotionofdemoc-
racy,humanrightsandobligations,transparencyandgoodgovernanceandstrengthening
democraticinstitutions.See,further,Severino,R.C.(comp),Framing ASEAN Charter:
An ISEAS Perspective(Singapore,ISEAS,2005).

4
Beer,L.W.,Constitutional Systems in Late Twentieth Century Asia(Universityof
WashingtonPress,Seattle,1992);Harding,A.J.,ComparativePublicLaw:SomeLessons
fromSouthEastAsia,Ch.14ofHarding,A.J.andrc,E.(eds),Comparative
Law in the 21
st
Century(Kluwer,TheHague,2002);Hassall,G.andSaunders,C.,
Asia-Pacific Constitutional Systems(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2002).

5
Van Caeneghem, R. , An Historical Introduction to Western Constitutional Law
(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1995),17.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
a
NewAsianConstitutionalism
LetmefirstexplainthehypothesisIamproposingandwhatexactlyImeanby
thetermnewAsianconstitutionalism.
6
Onclosescrutinythephraseactuallybegsa
number of awkwar d ques t i ons . Does new i mpl y t her e was noAs i an
constitutionalismbefore?DoesAsianimplythatthisnewconstitutionalismhas
distinctivelyAsianfeaturesandwhatmightthosebe?
7
Doesconstitutionalismitself
implyakindofWesternisticmodelofliberaldemocracyorsomekindofglobal
constitutionalconvergence?Thesearelarge,complexandcontroversialquestionsto
takeon,andIwouldliketosetoutaparticularapproachandmuchcomparative
backgroundbeforetacklingmoredirectlythequestionsIhavejustraised.However,
letmestateclearlythatthepropositionIamseekingtoestablishisthatinthelast20
yearswehaveseenthebeginnings,hardlyheraldedineithertheEastortheWest,of
aremarkable,andtoalargedegreeunexpected,riseofconstitutionalisminthe
countriescomprisingtheEastAsianregion,aregionoftenspokenofasembodying
theoppositeofconstitutionalism,evenbysomeofthosewhoadvocateitsadoption
inthispartoftheworld.Thehopefullytemporaryeclipseofconstitutionalismin
Thailandshouldnotblindustothedevelopmentsaroundus,andshouldgiveushope
anddeterminationtobuildontheachievementsofrecenttimes.

Constitutionalism:TextsandBeyond
8
Itisacommonresponsetostatementsaboutconstitutionsandconstitutional
lawthattextsaremerelytextsandmaynotreflectorevenaffecttheactual
underlyingpoliticalandsocialrealitiesthattheypurporttodirectandencompass.

6
See,further,Harding.A.J.,MaytherebeVirtue:NewAsianConstitutionalisminThai-
land,[2001]Australian Journal of Asian Law 24.
7
Bell,D.,East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia(Princeton,NJ,
PrincetonUniversityPress,2000).

8
InthissectionIamdrawingfreelyonapiececo-authoredwithPeterLeyland,nowin
press:ComparativeLawinConstitutionalContexts,ch.14ofOrucu,E.,andNelken,D.
(ed), A Comparative LawHandbook(Oxford,HartPublishing,2007,forthcoming).
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ae
This might be particularly true in countries that have adopted, adapted or
transplantedconstitutionallawfromelsewhere.Thisresponseisnotconfinedto
thosewhoarescepticalaboutconstitutions.AsJacksonandTushnetobserve:
ifitiscorrectthatbothconstitutionallawandconstitutionalsystemsdepend
importantlyonpopularunderstandingsandthepolitical-socialenvironment,
thentheworkofconstitutionallawandcomparativeconstitutionallaw
cannotcarryforwardinintellectualisolationfromtheworkofother
disciplinesofpoliticalscience,culturalanthropology,thecognitivesciences,
oreconomics.
9
Iagree.Theconstitutionalanalystmustaddressquestionsassociatedwith
practicalimplementation,lookingattheprogressiveapplicationoftheconstitution
anditsassociatedrules;aswellasattemptingtounderstandthetheoryorthinking
thatliesbehindthetextandtheentirecontextinwhichitfunctions.Acrucial
distinctionneedstobedrawnbetweentheconstitutionaltext,andthemannerofits
practicalimplementation,informedbythethinkingbehindtheconstitution,whichis
whatImeanbyconstitutionalism.
Anygivenconstitutionmayappeartodisplayclosetextualsimilaritieswith
otherselectedexamples.Itisaninterestinggametodeletethenameandobvious
identifiersfromagivenconstitutionandaskwhocanidentifythecountryofwhichit
istheconstitution:theresultsmayindeedbesurprising.However,eachconstitution
willinvariablyacquireanddisplaystrongautochthonouscharacteristicsasthe
constitutionalformstretcheswithitsapplicationinresponsetoactuallocal
conditions, much in the way unyielding leather shoes adapt their shape to
accommodatethefeetofthewearer.ByautochthonousImeanhome-grownor
intimatelyrelatedtothelocalcontext.Itisinfactrelativelyeasytoidentifysuch
featuresofagivenconstitution,totheextentthatonecaninsomeinstancesreada
constitutionasakindofautobiographyofthenation.Autochthonouselementsmay
alsorelateintimatelytotraditionalinstitutionsortoreligion.InThailandithas
proveddifficultfortheshoes,tocontinuetheanalogy,toadapttothefeetofthe
wearer,becausetheshoeshavebeenchangedsofrequently(18timessince1932)

9
Jackson,V.C.andTushnet,M.V.,Comparative Constitutional Law (NewYork,Foundation
Press,1999),atxviii.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ae
thattherehasbeennotimeforsuchadaptation.Walkingaroundallthetimeinnew
shoesthatpinchmayleadtoacertainirritationwiththeveryideaofwearingshoesat
all.Nonetheless,itshouldbepossibletodiscernwaysinwhichconstitutional
adaptationhastakenplaceinconstitutionalthinking,intheThaiconceptionof
constitutionalism,andalsoin institutional developmenttranscendingtheparticular
constitutionunderconsideration.
10
InThailandwecanseethatcertaintraditional
elementsareverystrongthemonarchyandreligion,forexample.
11
Other
traditionalelementsmightbeseenasstanding inthewayofconstitutional
development,suchassocialhierarchiesthatexistinparticularinruralareas.
ThecaseofMalaysiamakesaninterestingcomparison,becausealthough
MalaysiainsomewayslagsbehindThailandinconstitutionaldevelopment,itwillat
leasthavehadthesameconstitutionfor50years,come31August2007.
12
Inthis
constitutionitisrelativelyeasytoidentifysuchelements,despitewhatwemaycall
theAnglo-Indianoriginsofthe1957Constitution:thespecialprivilegesofMalays
andnativesofSabahandSarawak,andthelegitimateinterestsofothercommunities;
andtherestrictionofrightsoffreedomofexpressioninawaythatisdesignedto
protect thesocial fabricfrom being rent byracially or religiously divisive
pronouncements.MoreovertheConstitutionprovidesforthepositionofIslamand
thepracticeofotherreligions;restrictspropagationofotherreligionsamong
Muslims;providesfortraditionalelementsofgovernancesuchasthemonarchiesand
theConferenceofRulers;andtheMalaystatesthemselveswithinthefederal
structure.Inthesematters,whetherornotwedescribethemasAsianconstitutional
features,theyarecertainlyonesbasedonlocal,distinctivelyMalaysianvalues,
politicalandeconomicfactors,andalsoculturaltraditions.Theyalsoconformwith
10
Leyland,P.,Droit AdministratifThai-Style,8:2AustralianJournalofAsianLaw121
(2006).

11
Harding,A.J.,Buddhism,HumanRightsandConstitutionalReforminThailand,
RudolphC.BarnesSeminar,LegitimacyandWesternandnon-WesternViewsofHuman
Rights,Feb.2006.
12
Harding,A.J.,andLee,H.P.(ed),Constitutional Landmarks in Malaysia: the First Fifty
Years(KualaLumpur,MalayanLawJournal,2007,forthcoming);Harding,A.J.,Law,
GovernmentandtheConstitutioninMalaysia(KualaLumpur,MalayanLawJournal,
1996).
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ao
the rukunegara(nationalideology)of1970andthesocialcontractof1957onwhich
itisbased.Malaysiaisagoodexample,butinfactanunusualone,ofacountrywith
anautochthonousconstitution.Itisarguablethattheattentiongivenbythe1956
ConstitutionalCommissioninthedraftingprocesstolocalcircumstancesisareason
whytheirconstitutionhasenduredforhalfacentury,anoutcomefewpeoplewould
havepredicted.
Constitutionsthenaretextsbutarealsomorethantexts.Theirstudyinvolves
anunderstandingofanycombinationoftheinterpretivecontextswemaycall
political,economic,cultural,ideological,andliterary.Justastheconstitutionis
workedoutthroughavarietyofpoliticalpractices,administrativeagenciesand
procedures,organiclawsandpracticallimitations,soourunderstandingofthese
ourunderstandingofconstitutionalismtakenassetofgeneralideasandtheir
practicalapplications,orelsetheideaswhichtaketheplaceofconstitutionalism
where i t i s not present provi de us wi t h a profound underst andi ng of t he
constitutionaltextandhowweshouldinterpretit.Inconstitutionallawthemodeof
interpretationiseverything.Thisisafactwhichweshouldalwayskeepinmind
whenweaddresswhatareoftenlabelleddraftingdefects,oranomalies.Itiseasy,
evenforpoliticalscientistsandothernon-lawyers,togetdistractedbytextsandlose
focusonthewidercontextsIhavementioned.IntheUnitedKingdom,whichhasone
ofthelongestunbrokenconstitutionaltraditionsonearth,goingbackatleastto
MagnaCartaof1215,theonlyattempttodraftaconstitution
13
wasadismalfailure,
andthepathofslowlydevelopingcustom,practice,commonlaw,andorganicstatute
lawhasveryadequatelyfilledthespacewhichwouldnormallybeoccupiedbya
writtenconstitution.Althoughmostconstitutionallawsarenowwritten,andmajor
reforms have been undert aken i n t he l ast t en years, i t i s st i l l t he case t hat
constitutionalismexistsasakindofpermanentaspectofthepoliticalandlegal
landscape.
There is of course invariably a gulf of some kind between the formal
constitutionandthemannerinwhichgovernmentisactuallyconducted-inother
words,betweentheconstitutionandwhatIhavereferredtoasconstitutionalism.In
general,itmightbesuggestedthatconstitutionsonlyseektoembedagivensetof

13
CromwellsInstrumentofGovernment1653.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
a
fundamentalprinciplesaspartofthesystemofgovernmentthatactuallyprevails.
Constitutionalism,ontheotherhand,embodiesanormativedimension;herethe
constitutionnotonlyanchorsandenforcescertainprinciples,butalsorepresentsa
clearsetofvalues.Anycommitmentinthecodifiedtexttowards,forexample,
generalenfranchisement,democratisation,rights,oreconomicredistributionhasto
beassessedagainsttheprevailingconditionsofgovernance.Anyexerciseofpolitical
powerwillbeboundedbyasystemofhigherorderruleswhichwill
determinethevalidityoflegislativeandexecutiveactionbyprescribingthe
procedureaccordingtowhichitmustbeperformedorbydelimitingits
permissiblecontent.Therulesmaybeatoneextrememereconventional
normsandattheother,directionsorprohibitionssetdowninabasic
constitutionalinstrument,disregardofwhichmaybepronouncedineffectual
byacourtoflaw.Constitutionalismbecomesalivingrealitytotheextent
thattheserulescurbarbitrarinessofdiscretionandare in fact observed by
the wielders of political power,andtotheextentthatwithintheforbidden
zonesuponwhichauthoritymaynottrespass,thereissignificantroomfor
theenjoymentofindividualliberty.
14
Theemphasishereisnotsimplyonprocedureandrules,butonachieving
conformity with the intention behind the rules. Apartfromitspositiveaspects,
namelydealingwiththegenerationandorganizationofpower,aconstitutionmaybe
takentocompriseaseriesofdevicesdesignedtocurbdiscretionaryorunlimited
power.Inmanyinstancesitseekstoestablishdifferentformsofaccountability,not
simplythroughasystemoffreelyelectedgovernment,butbyplacingrestrictionson
thepowerofthemajority.Thisaccountabilityisreliantontransparency,anditis
actedoutinanumberoffamiliarways:anobligationforthegovernmenttobe
responsibletotheelectedParliament;legallimitsestablishedbythecourtsonthe
exerciseofpublicpower;formalfinancialaccountabilityinpublicaffairs;
accountabilitythroughcontractualagreementwherepublicservicesareprovidedby
privateorganizations;andadditionally,accountabilitythroughtheinterventionof
specialistconstitutionaloversightbodiessuchasthosedesignedaspartofthe
constitutionalreformsinThailandfrom1997andIndonesiafrom1999.
14
DeSmith,S.A.,ConstitutionalismintheCommonwealthToday,4MalayaLawReview
205(1962).
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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aa
To summar i ze al l nat i ons have a const i t ut i on of some ki nd, but
constitutionalismisonlyestablishedinthetruesensewherepoliticalbehaviourisin
generalactually contained within the prescribed boundaries.Inaddition,therules
needtoembodyadefensibleconstitutionalmoralitythataccordswithwhatare
currentlytermedtheprinciplesofgoodgovernance;buttheconstitutionmustalso
representawidelyacceptedpoliticalsettlement.Finally,theremustbeageneral
adherenceatalllevelstotheconstitutionalrulesandthewiderbodyoflawand
conventionsassociatedwiththem.Thisidealdoesofcourserepresentaverytall
orderwhenweseektoapplyitandentrenchit.

TheHistoricalContext:
FourWavesofConstitution-making
Havingsetoutthebasisofageneralcomparativeapproachtoconstitutionsand
adefinitionofconstitutionalism,Iwishtocontinuetheinquirybysettingin
historicalandglobalcontextthegrowthofconstitutionalisminEastAsia.
15
Overthespanofmodernhistoryonecandiscernfourwavesofconstitution-
making,eachofwhichdevelopedwhatwenowcallconstitutionalgovernment,or
constitutionalisminthesenseIhaveindicated.
Thefirst waveoccurredinthe18thcenturywiththeconstitutionsofthe
AmericancoloniesandthentheUnitedStatesandFrenchconstitutions,togetherwith
theconstitutionsofthosestatesthatimmediatelyfollowedtheseexamples,suchas
thoseofLatinAmerica.Theseconstitutionswereverybasicbymodernstandardsand
emphasizedtherightsofmanandpopularassenttoandcontrolovergovernment.
ThiswavewasrelevanttoAsiaonlytotheextentthatitinfluencedtheconstitutional
dimensionsofcolonialismthatextentwasintruthnotgreat,asitwasnotthe
intentionofmostconstitutionalreformersinEuropeandNorthAmericatospread
theirideastootherpartsoftheworld,despitetheirbeliefintherightsofman,which
extendedatthattimeonlytoadultmalesofEuropeanextraction.
15
Nelson,M.H.(ed), Thai Politics: Local and Global Perspectives: KPI Yearbook 2002/03
(Bangkok,KingPrajadhipoksInstitute,2002)
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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aa
Thesecond waveofconstitution-makingoccurredbetweenthemid-19
th
and
early20
th
centuries,whenaliberalizationanddemocratizationprocesscommenced
withthe1848revolutionsinEuropeandgraduallyworkeditselfoutinmodern
constitutionalforms.Theseconstitutionsweremoreconcernedwiththeconceptsof
politicalrepresentation,accountabilityandcitizenship.Theyemphasizedthe
legislatureastheforuminwhichtheexerciseofpowercouldbescrutinized,andthe
expansionofthefranchise.Tosomeextenttheaspirationsof1848cametofruitionin
EuropeandevenNorthAmericaonlyduringthecourseofthefirsthalfofthe20
th

century.IntheUnitedKingdom,forexample,thefranchisereacheditspresentextent
onlyin1928,whenvoteswerefinallygiventowomenonthesamebasisasmen.
However,thetransplantationoftheseconstitutionalprinciplestoAsia,bywayof
emulation,oraspirationtomodernity,orsometimesasaresult(asinIndiaand
Indonesia)ofcolonialpowershavingnodefenceagainsttheirassertionaspartofthe
demandforself-governmentorindependence,wasfairlyrapid.Japanhadadoptedits
firstwrittenconstitutionasearlyas1889.Thailand,whichwasofcoursenever
colonized,adopteditsfirstwrittenconstitution,providingforconstitutional
monarchy,in1932.TheGovernmentofIndiaActwaspassedin1935,thesameyear
astheConstitutionofthePhilippines,bothprovidingforgreaterself-governmentand
eventualindependence.MeanwhiletheruleoflawontheEnglishpattern,aswell
federalgovernment,spreadthroughthestatesMalaya,theruleoflawhavingbeen
establishedintheStraitsSettlementsmuchearlier.InChinaaconstitutionalist
movementdevelopedaroundtheyoungQingemperorinthelate19
th
century,onlyto
becrushedinafinaldesperateassertionofvigourbytheQingdynasty;butthe
emergencesoonafterwardsoftheRepublicofChinain1911andthepoliticalideas
ofDr.SunYatSen,ensuredthatconstitutionalismwouldremainatleastastrandof
thought,ifnotadominantideology,ingreaterChinaduringthenext100years.In
Japanthe1889Constitutionfollowedthetransplantingofcivillaw,onlytobe
subvertedbymilitarisminthe1930s.
Thethird waveofconstitution-makingtookplaceinthedecadesimmediately
followingWorldWarII,ascolonialempiresweredisbandedandwar-ravaged
countrieswereoccupiedorrecoveredfromoccupationorinstability.Thisprocess
continuedinEastAsiafromthe1940stothe1960sandbeyond.Indonesiaadopted
itsnationalistindependenceconstitutionin1945.ThepresentJapaneseConstitution
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
a<
cameintoeffectin1946.TheConstitutionofIndiacameintoeffectin1950,deeply
affectingthedraftingoftheConstitutionofBurmaof1948andtheConstitutionof
theFederationofMalayaof1957,whichlatterinturndefinedthegeneralshapeof
constitutionallawinMalaysiawhenitwasformedin1963andinSingaporeafterits
separationfromMalaysiain1965.Itisoftenforgottenthat,notjustIndiaand
Malaysia,butalsoBurma,IndonesiaandthePhilippines,andtoanextentThailand,
CambodiaandSouthVietnam,enjoyedbriefperiodsofparliamentarygovernment
underliberal-democraticconstitutionsinthe1950sandearly1960s.Certainlythese
experimentswereproblematical,butmeantthatEastAsiahadactualliving
experienceofdemocraticinstitutions.Theindependenceconstitutionstendedtocopy
theEuropeanorUnitedStatesconstitutions,dependingontheidentityofthecolonial
power,usuallyretainingsometraditionalelementsofgovernment,suchasthe
existingmonarchiesofCambodiaandtheMalayStatesandthespecialroleof
BuddhismandIslam,respectively,intheirconstitutions.
Thebriefinitialfloweringofliberal,parliamentary,constitutionalismacross
partsofEastAsiainthe1950swassoonhowevereclipsedbythegrowthof
authoritariangovernmentandlargelypersonalrulethroughoutEastAsiainthe1960s
and1970s:ThailandunderPhibunsongkram,SaritandThanom;NeWinsBurma;
SukarnosandthenSuhartosIndonesia;communistChinaunderMaoZedong;North
KoreaunderKimIl-sung;SouthKoreaunderParkChung-hee;Taiwanunderthe
Chiangs;CambodiaunderSihanouk,LonNolandthenPolPot;VietnamunderHo
Chi-minh;andfinallythePhilippinesunderMarcos,succumbedtothedrastic
subversionofconstitutionalprinciples.Indochinawasconsumedbyterribleand
protractedwarfare.Eveninrelativelymorestableanddemocraticstatessuchas
Japan,Malaysia,andSingaporetheexigenciesofethnictensionoreconomic-growth
imperativesresultedintheemergenceofadominantpartysystemandtherestriction
ofanumberofelementsofconstitutionalisminformallaworintheactualpractice
ofgovernment.
ThisperiodisregardedinEastAsiaastheperiodoftheAsiandevelopmental
state,inwhicheithercapitalisteconomicdevelopmentorcollectivismwas
deliberatelyprivilegedoverdemocracyandconstitutionalform.Allthestates
mentioned,apartfromthoseofIndochina,didinfactexperienceatleastsome
economicgrowth,andinsomecasesitwascalledanAsianmiracle.Itcould
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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ae
plausiblybeassertedthatanAsianversionofconstitutionalismwasinpracticebased
onentirelydifferentprinciplesfromthoseofthedemocraticstatesintheWest,whose
constitutionsweresoinfluentialinthethirdwaveofconstitution-making.TheAsian
developmental state typically embodied all or most of: executive-centred
government;administrativediscretion;strongorunquestionablepersonalorparty
leadership;governmentinterferenceineconomicandsocialaffairs;restrictionof
somebasicfreedomsandjudicialindependence;persistentattacksonortotal
submergenceoftheruleoflaw;andthebackingofapowerfulmilitarybranch.Allof
theseelementsareinimicaltoconstitutionalismasIhavedefineditearlier.This
tendency resulted, inAsia, in a very restricted operation or suspension of
constitutionsundermartiallaworemergencyrule,oreventheirabandonmentor
replacementbymoreexecutive-friendlyorleader-friendlydocuments.Oscillationsin
politicalfortuneinSiam/Thailand,forexample,ledtothedraftingofnolessthan16
constitutionsbetween1932and1997,includinganastonishingsixinthevery
turbulentperiodbetween1968and1978,inwhichtherewererapidoscillations
betweenmilitaryanddemocraticgovernment.
16
The fourth waveofconstitutionaldevelopmentcommencedinthemid-1980s,
whenincreasingdemocratizationandglobalization,andtheresolutionoflocal
conflicts,allassistedbytheendofthecoldwarandtheemergenceofanewfactor-
people-power-propelledforwardthroughthe1990sand2000stheconceptofa
liberalandjuststatebasedonfreeandfairelectionsandoperatingwithacomplex
andsophisticatedarrayofgood-governancemechanisms.Thisfourthwavehas
spurredconstitution-buildersandreformerstogreaterandmoreacutefine-tuningof
institutionsofrepresentation,transparency,accountability,geographicaland
administrativedecentralization,practicallaw-enforcementandregulation,and
compliancewithinternationalnorms,collectedtogetherunderthemantraofgood
governance
17
ortheruleoflaw.Thisfourthwavehasencompassedevenmore
countriesthanthefirstthreewaves,includingmanypost-Sovietstatessuchasthose

16
PinaiNanakorn,Re-makingoftheConstitutioninThailand,6SingaporeJournalofInter-
nationalandComparativeLaw90(2002).
17
Botchway,F.N.,GoodGovernance:TheOld,theNew,thePrincipleandtheElements,
FloridaJournalofInternationalLaw,Vol.13,159-210(2001).
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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ae
ofCentralAsia,aswellasdevelopingcountriesallovertheworld.Itsposter-boyis
undoubtedlySouthAfrica,whoseemergencefromapartheidtoconstitutionalism
during1993-6wasrapid,completeandalsobloodless.
18
InEastAsiathefourthwaveresultedinseveralrelevantdevelopments.Anew
constitutionwasdraftedfollowingthepeople-powerrevolutionof1986underthe
AquinogovernmentinthePhilippines,comingintoeffectin1987,anddenying
everytenetofthemilitaristickleptocracyoftheMarcosera,whilealsoinsistingon
theembracingofaformofFilipinonationalism.Aquinosimplyobliteratedthe
previousconstitutionwhichMarcoshadsubvertedinsuchawayastoacquire
massivepersonalpower,andthenappointedadraftingbodytocreateacompletely
newconstitution.Themid-1980ssawthegradualdismantlingofthelegalsupport
systemsofauthoritariangovernmentinTaiwanandSouthKorea,
19
inbothofwhich
statesthereemergedamulti-partydemocracy,areformedparliamentandpresidential
system,andaconstitutionalcourtthatdisplayedvigourandindependenceforthe
firsttime.
Changingnotionsofconstitutionallawandpoliticaleconomyinboththe
PeoplesRepublicofChinafrom1978andVietnamandLaosfrom1986haveledto
aprogressivelygreateradherence,asamatterofconstitutionalprinciple,totherule
oflaw,includingthesubordinationofbothpartyandgovernmenttothelaw,a
positionpreviouslyhereticalincommuniststates,whichinveighedagainst
constitutionalismasaninstrumentofbourgeoisexploitation.Thesepost-communist
one-partystateshavegonethroughseveralstagesofconstitutionalreform,reflecting
stagesofeconomicchange.
20
Althoughitisconsideredinthesestatesthateconomic
18
Venter,F.,Constitutional Comparison: Japan, Germany, Canada and South Africa as
Constitutional States (Kluwer,Juta,2000);Hatchard,J.,Ndulo,M.andSlinn,P.,
Comparative Constitutionalism and Good Governance in the Commonwealth: an Eastern
and Southern African Perspective(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2002).
19
YoonDae-Kyu,LawandPoliticalAuthorityinSouthKorea(Boulder,Westview,1990),
esp.89-108.

20
Sidel,M.,AnalyticalModelsforUnderstandingConstitutionsandConstitutional
DialogueinSocialistTransitionalStates:Re-interpretingConstitutionalDialoguein
Vietnam6:1SingaporeJournalofInternationalandComparativeLaw42(2002).
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
a
liberalizationneednotbelinkedtopoliticalliberalization,thepotentialandactual
linkagecanbeclearlyseeninsuccessivestagesofconstitutionaldevelopment,as
wellasinpopulardemandfordemocracy,suchasthatexpressedinthe1989
TiananmenSquareincident.Multi-partydemocracyalsoemergedinMongoliaunder
the1992Constitution,followingthedissolutionoftheSovietUnion.Theresolution
ofCambodiaslongandagonisingexperienceofwar,brutaloppressionand
disastrousforeigninterferencewasbroughttoanendwiththedraftingofanew,
democraticconstitutionin1993.
Thailandthenfollowedwithitsanti-corruption,peoplesConstitutionof
1997,whichsetupninenewwatchdogbodies,areformedparliamentandelectoral
system,anextensivebillofrights,andanindependentSenateconsistingentirelyof
non-politicians.TheConstitutionalsosentbacktothebarracksthemilitary,authorof
17coupssince1932;andmadeithardertouseno-confidencevotestodismissthe
government,keepinginmindthatThailandhadhad53changesofgovernmentand
23PrimeMinisterssince1932.
21
TheConstitutionwasitselftheoutcomeofpopular
protestagainstthemilitarydictatorshipof1991/2.1997alsosawthehandingoverof
HongKongtoChinesesovereignty,aneventprecededbyunprecedentedpopular
participationandprotest,andextensivedebatesabouttheruleoflawanddemocratic
representation:severalconstitutionalreformshavecomeaboutasaresult.
Interestinglyenough,theeconomiccrisiswhichsweptacrosstheEastAsian
regionin1997/8seemsnottohaveaffectedtheprogressofconstitutionalreform:in
bothIndonesiaandThailand,forexample,wherethecontagionfirststruck,aclear
linkagewasdrawnbetweenthereformsandtheprospectsforeconomicrecovery.
TherelationshipbetweenconstitutionalreformandeconomicdevelopmentinAsiais
indeedanintriguingoneaboutwhichweneedtoknowmore.Iwouldsimplyhere
hazardtheviewthatthereisinfactacloserelationshipbetweenthetwo;EastAsian
experienceseemstosuggestthateconomicdevelopmentdragsconstitutional
developmentinitswake,butitmaywellalsobethecasethatconstitutional
developmentcreatesindispensableconditionsforfurtherorsustainedeconomic
development.
21
AgainMalaysiaaffordsaninterestingcomparison;since1957therehavebeennocoups
detat,onlyfvePrimeMinstersandone(Alliance/BarisanNasional)government.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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ae
FollowingtheresignationofPresidentSuhartoinIndonesiain1998thedamof
constitutionalaspirationburstinafloodofreformsduring1999-2002whichamount
infactifnotintheorytoanalmostentirelynewconstitution(theamended
Constitutionbeingaboutthreetimeslongerthantheoriginal1945Constitution)in
whichtherolesofthepresidency,thelowerhouse,theupperhouse,theprovinces,
theregionsandthecourtsandotherwatchdogagencieshavebeendrastically
realignedinaccordancewiththeidealofconstitutionalism,anddemocratic
institutionsandhumanrightshavebeenentrenchedintheConstitutionand
guaranteedbyaHumanRightsCommissionandaConstitutionalCourt.Democracy
andfreespeecharecelebratedatalllevelsandIndonesiascurrentPresidentisthe
firstin60yearsofIndonesianhistorytobepopularlyanddirectlyelectedinfreeand
fairelections,whichhavealsonotbeencharacterizedbyviolence.Aspartofthis
constitutionalreformprocessTimorLEstealsoreachedindependenceunderanew,
autochthonous,democraticConstitutionin2002.Manyofthesechanges,in
Indonesia,Cambodia,Laos,TimorLEste,Mongolia,andelsewhereinAsia,have
beenstronglysupportedbytheinternationalcommunity,includinginternational
financialinstitutions,inrule-of-lawimplementationorgoodgovernanceprojects.
Duringthisperiodvariousconstitutionalexperimentshavealsobeeninstituted
inSingapore,whichseektodefinethenatureofpoliticalrepresentation,andthe
relationshipbetweengovernmentandopposition,andtofindanewroleforthe
President.MalaysiaintroducedaHumanRightsCommission,ashaveThailand,the
PhilippinesandIndonesia.Burmaremainstheonlystateintheregiontoresistany
kindofsignificantconstitutionalreformandremains,stuckinatime-warpof
authoritarianmilitary government, as the only state without a functioning
constitution,althoughitclaimstobeembarkedontalksleadingtoaconstitutional
reformprocess.
Malaysiameanwhile,unlikemostoftheotherstatesafflictedbytheeconomic
crisisof1997/8,haslargelyresistedtheseductivecallsforconstitutionalreformand
in fact represents a puzzle.At one level Malaysia seems to have remained
constitutionallyvirtuallyimmobilesincetherukunegara constitutionalamendments
of1971.DespitemanyamendingactswhichaltereddetailsoftheConstitution,the
basicfeaturesofthe1957Constitutionremainmoreorlessunalteredandthesurvival
ofthe1957Constitution,relativelyunscathed,foraremarkable50years,isan
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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ae
achievementnottobetakenlightlyinviewoftheturmoilwhichhascharacterised
EastAsiaduringvirtuallyallofthattime.Thelackofanysignificantdevelopment in
constitutionalisminMalaysia,asopposedtoitsmerecontinuanceandoccasional
limitationorminorrefinement,isstrangeandparadoxicalwhenoneconsidersthe
regionasawhole,whichhasdisplayedunprecedentedconstitutionaldynamism.At
anotherlevelonecanseethatsubtlechangesandreaffirmationshavetakenplace:
civilsocietyhasflourished;thepresshasbecomerecentlylargelyfree;genderrights
havebeenentrenchedintheconstitution;democraticelectionsarestillrelevantand
hardfought,withmanypartiescontestingandrepresentedinParliament;strenuous
measuresarebeingtakenagainstcorruption,anddefectsinpolicing;thejudiciaryis
inbettershapethanformanyyears;andtheruleoflawisingeneralobserved,with
verylouddisapprobationwhenitisnot.Onecanthereforesaythattheessenceofthe
1957Constitutionhasbyandlargebeensuccessfullydefended,albeitwithanumber
ofcasualties,suchasthestrengtheningoftheInternalSecurityAct;butifwhatI
havedescribeddoesindeedconstitutenewAsianconstitutionalism,Malaysiaseems
nottohaveimbibedthisheadynewbrewofconstitutionallawanddemocracyexcept
inafewrathercautioussips.WecancallMalaysia,likeIndia,anexampleofold
thatisthirdwave-Asianconstitutionalismthathassurvivedthefourthwave,orthe
recenttsunami,ofconstitution-making.
Toconcludethisbroadsurvey,itseemsthatwearenowintheearlyyearsof
the21
st
centurywitnessingaperiodofimplementationandconsolidationasthe
detailedworkingofthenewconstitutionsandtheircomplexapparatus,involving
electioncommissions,constitutionalcourtsandanti-corruptionagencies,isbeing
examinedandadjusted.
22
Unlikeinpreviousgenerations,duringthisperiodtheordinarypeoplehave
beenpreparedtoprotestunconstitutionalactionsanddemandthattheconstitution
operatefairlyandtransparently.Neverinprevioushistoryhavetheordinarycitizens
ofEastAsianstatesregardedthemselvessoclearlyasentitledtoassertthattheyhave
constitutionalrights,includingtherighttocriticizeandifnecessarychangethe
government.InfactitisworthrememberingthatitwasAsiathatgavetheterm

22
Sunstein,C.R.,Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do(OxfordUniversityPress,
Oxford,2001).
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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<o
people-powertotheworld.Suchpeople-powermovementshavebeenseeninthe
Philippines,Taiwan,SouthKorea,Thailand,IndonesiaandoccasionallyinMalaysia.
EveninChina,whereanassertionofpeoplepowerwassuppressedbymilitaryforce
in1989,thegovernmenthasadmittedthatinonerecentyeartherewereasmanyas
80,000popularmovementsinvariouspartsofthecountry,protestingabusesof
powerbylocalofficials.TheseassertionsofdemocraticwillinEastAsiadonotof
courseprovethatdemocracyexists,andinsomecasesthestatehastreatedprotest
movementsassubversiveoftheruleoflawandofeffectiveorevendemocratic
government.Buttheydoprovethatbeliefinfreedomofexpressionandthepowerof
popularsovereigntyareprevalent.InThailandthebrutalsuppressionofpopular
protestagainstthemilitarygovernmentin1991(aswellasthememoryopfthesame
in1973and1976)ledtothedraftingofthenewconstitutionin1997andanew
conceptofconstitutionalism.MuchthesamecouldbesaidofIndonesiainthepost-
1998eraofhukum reformasi.
Theassertionofpopularvoiceispartandparceloftheexerciseofdemocracy
theworldover.Itisalsoanecessaryingredientinmostcasesofamovefrom
oppressive,authoritariangovernmenttoamorejustandbenignstatethatmakes
rational,incorruptdecisions,andobservesbasicjusticeandhumanrights.People
powerisasignificantfeatureoffourth-waveconstitutionalism.Itrefusestoaccept
riggedelections,anditisascourgeofdictators,oligarchsandkleptocrats.Itis,
however,adouble-edgedswordandnotasubstitute-exceptperhapswherethereis
noalternative-toconstitutionalgovernmentundertheruleoflaw.Inthissensethe
assertionbymainlyurban,mobile-phonewielding,middleclasses,oftheir
constitutionalrightslooksbetterforthemaintenanceofconstitutionalgovernment
than,inmyview,itactuallyisinthelongerterm.Inmanycasesitisasafetyvalve,
broughtintoplaybecauseaconstitutionalmechanismhasactuallyfailed,asinthe
caseofitsdismissalofPresidentEstradainthePhilippinesin2001,anditsresponse
toheavy-handedgovernmentinThailandin2005/6.Accordinglyitmaybeanindex
ofthelackofconstitutionalgovernmentratherthansimplyanexpressionofit.
Accordingly,itoughttobeusedverysparinglyindeed.InthePhilippines,theuseof
people-poweragainstsuccessivepresidentshasledtoquestioningoftheconstitution
andpresidencyitself.NewAsianconstitutionalismhasprogressedinthePhilippines
butisveryfarfromfulfilmentandmaywellresultinashifttoaparliamentary
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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<
systeminthenearfuture,whichwillnodoubtalsorevealproblemsinestablishing
newAsianconstitutionalism.

InsidetheWorks:JudicialReview
HavingsetoutthesesignificantdevelopmentsatsomelengthImightwellbe
asked,inthespiritofmyearlierdiscussionofconstitutionalism,whetherthey
actuallyrepresentconstitutionalismasopposedtomerelytextualconstitutional
reform.Inotherwords,howcanwebesuretheyareserious,thattheyarenotsimply
window-dressing?
Allowmethereforetodigresssomewhattoexplainonerecentinstanceofnew
Asianconstitutionalism,namelythatofThailand,andtoindicatethebreadthand
depthofthechangesitcaninvolve,especiallyinthefieldofjudicialreview.
Forthelast10yearsThailandhasbeenimplementingtheconstitutional
reformsdemandedbythesituationfollowingthemilitarygovernmentof1991/2,
broughtintoeffectin1997,andnowbroughtintoquestionintheconstitutionalcrisis
following theApril 2006 elections and the 19 September coup. Like many
constitution-makersinterestedindemocratic,rule-of-lawreformsduringthe1990s,
theThaiconstitution-makersdecidedtocreatearangeofwatchdogbodies
constitutingacomplexseriesofchecksandbalancestoensurethatpowerwouldbe
exercisedinthepublicinterest:aConstitutionalCourt,
23
asystemofAdministrative
Courts,anOmbudsman,anElectionCommission,aNationalCounter-Corruption
Commission,aNationalHumanRightsCommission,
24
aNationalAuditOffice,anda
newchamberoftheSupremeCourtdealingwithcriminalcasesagainstpersons
holdingpoliticaloffice.Inordertosecuretheindependenceofthesebodies,their

23
Klein,J.,TheBattleforRuleofLawinThailand:TheConstitutionalCourtofThailand,
inRaksasataya,A.andKlein,J.R.(ed)The Constitutional Court of Thailand: The Provi-
sions and The Working of the Court (Bangkok,ConstitutionforthePeopleSociety,2001).
24
VititMuntarbhorn,RuleofLawandAspectsofHumanRightsinThailand:From
ConceptualizationtoImplementation?,ch.11ofPeerenboom,R.(ed),Asian Discourses of
Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries,
France and the US(London,Routledge,2004).
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<a
members are chosen by a compl ex syst em of sel ect i on commi t t ees whose
independenceisinturnsecuredbytheConstitutionandprotectedbytheSenate.At
thesametime,newrulesrelatingtogovernmentformationandParliamentwere
designedtoensurethatThailandwouldnothaveunstablecoalitiongovernmentsor
corruptparliamentarians,ormilitarycoups,ashasbeenthecaseinthepast.The
ConstitutionalCourtwasthecapstonewhichwasintendedtoensurethattheentire
constitutionalarchitecturewouldfunctionproperly.
ToquoteDr.JamesKlein,anexperiencedobserverofthiscountry,writingin
2000:
Thaipoliticians,themilitaryandseniorcivilianbureaucratshavealways
reservedforthemselvesthepowertointerpretthemeaningoflawandthe
intentoftheconstitution.The1997Constitutionseekstoremedythese
problemsbyreversing the course of Thai constitutional law.Itestablishes
theConstitutionasthebasisforalllaw,therebyreducingthepowerof
politiciansandbureaucratstosubvertconstitutionalintent.Second,it
establishesajudicialreviewprocessindependentoftheexecutive,
legislative, and judicial branches, thereby enhancing government
accountabilityandtheprotectionofcivilliberties.Thecentralmechanism
forthesereformsistheConstitutionalCourt.
25
Thisstatementissignificant,becauseitisbecomingincreasinglytrueinother
partsofAsia,andbecause,aswehavenotedearlier,interpretationistheessenceof
constitutionalism.Interestinglyenough,itseemsthatcontrarytoKleinsassertionthe
military does indeed, it now appears, reserve for itself the power to make
constitutionaldispensation.ConstitutionalCourtshaveingeneralbecome,inEast
Asiaaselsewhere,thenewguardiansofconstitutionalreform,democraticprocess,
andtheruleoflaw.
26
Aboutathirdofallstatesintheworldhaveaconstitutional
court,andmostofthesewerecreatedrecently.

25
Klein,aboven.23.
26
Ginsburg,T.,JudicialReviewinNewDemocracies:ConstitutionalCourtsinAsianCases
(CambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork,2003).
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<a
The reasons t hat usual l y mot i vat e const i t ut i on-makers i n creat i ng a
constitutionalcourt
27
are:first,toensureadherencetoanewconstitutionandits
protectionagainstlegislativemajorities;second,toensureunityandfinalityin
interpretation,avoidingthepossibilityofdifferentcourtsadoptingdifferent
interpretationsoftheConstitution;third,toprovideavisiblesymbolofconstitutional
progress;fourth,toensurethatjudicialdeferentialism,whichmayhavecharacterized
previousregimesofjudicialreview,doesnotunderminetheconstitution.Forthose
ofuswhobelieveinacommon-lawstylesupreme-court-basedmodelofjudicial
review,wherethehighestcourtdecidesfinallyalllegalquestions,constitutionalor
otherwise,butotherjudgescan alsodecideconstitutional questions,these
developmentsarethought-provoking.Itisinterestingthatthemaininstancesofold
AsianconstitutionalismIndia,Japan,Singapore,andMalaysiainadditiontothe
Philippines,allusethismodel.Onecannothelpnoticingthatsomeambiguity
surroundstheconstitutionalfunctionofgeneralsuperiorcourtsandthatnosuch
ambiguitysurroundsconstitutionalcourts.InThailandtheConstitutionalCourtwas
introducedintheteethofobjectionfromtheSupremeCourtJudges,whoclearlysaw
themselvesastherightfuladjudicatorsofconstitutionalrectitude.SouthKorea
experimentedwithbothmodelsduringtheperiodofauthoritariangovernment,but
neitherwassuccessfulincurbinggovernmentalexcesses.
28
InTaiwantheCouncilof
GrandJusticeswasalsoformanyyearsineffective;changedcircumstanceshaveseen
bothcountriesusetheconstitutional-courtmodelwithgreatsuccess.
29
Thesecourts
haveacquiredadeservedlyhighreputationfortheirinsightfulandfirmadherenceto
constitutionalprinciple.OneofthetestsofnewAsianconstitutionalismmustbe
whethersuchconstitutionalcourts(ortheirequivalentsindecentralisedconstitutional
adjudicationsystems),willproveeffectiveinthelongerterm.Themodelshereare
27
Comella,V.F.,TheConsequencesofCentralizingConstitutionalReviewinaSpecial
Court:SomeThoughtsonJudicialActivism82:7TexasLawReview1705.(2004).
28
Yoon Dae-Kyu, The Constitutional Court System of Korea: the New Road for
ConstitutionalAdjudication,1:2JournalofKoreanLaw1(2001);West,J.W.,andYoon
Dae-Kyu,TheConstitutionalCourtoftheRepublicofKorea:Transformingthe
JurisprudenceoftheVortex?40AmericanJournalofComparativeLaw73(1992).
29
Ginsburg,T.,ConfucianConstitutionalism?TheEmergenceofConstitutionalReviewin
KoreaandTaiwan27LawandSocialInquiry763(2002).
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<<
theGermanFederalConstitutionalCourt,whoseperformanceandjurisprudenceare
highlyinfluentialinEastAsia,theFrenchConseildEtat,andtheConstitutional
CourtofSouthAfrica.Itisofcourseaninterestingavenueofinquirytodiscoverthe
geneal ogy of t he i nst i t ut i ons whi ch ar e i ndi spensabl e t o t he newAsi an
constitutionalism.ThefirstConstitutionalCourtwascreatedinAustriainthe
1920s.
30
InThailandtheimplementationofthe1997Constitutionrevealedmany
problemswithThaiconstitutionalism.Thetextitselfcouldhardlyhavebeclearerin
itsunequivocaladherencetoconstitutionalvalues:itmadeextensiveprovisionfor
humanrights,
31
theruleoflaw,accountabilityforabuseofpower,andforstable,
elected, civilian government.
32
The result in practice has been much more
ambiguous.TheConstitutiondidnotalwayssucceedinfulfillingitsobjectives.As
youknow,therehavebeenabusesofpowerandofhumanrights,andcorruption
33
is
astatedreasonforthe19Septembercoup.ThemembersoftheNationalCounter-
CorruptionCommissionresignedin2005aftermakinganunlawfuldecisionintheir
owninterest,andwereallreplaced.SomemembersoftheElectionCommissionhave
beenjailedforunconstitutionalactions.ThegeneralelectionofApril2006wasruled
unconstitutional,andthetwomainpoliticalpartieswere(andpossiblystillare)at
riskofbeingdisbandedbytheConstitutionalCourtwhenthecouptookplaceandall
politicalactivitywasbanned.TheCourtitselfperformedindifferently,sometimes
upholdingconstitutionalvalues,sometimesfailingtodoso.Itishardtodrawany
conclusionsastoThaiexperienceinpresentcircumstances,butitshouldbenoted
thatinmanyrespectsthewatchdogbodieshavedoneagoodjob,notablythe
AdministrativeCourt,
34
whichhasmadegoodprogressinassertingjudicialreviewof

30
Machacek,R.,Austrian Contributions to the Rule of Law: The Constitutional Court, the
Administrative Court, European Perspectives(Kehl;Arlington,N.P.,Engel,1994).

31
Harding,A.J.,ThailandsReforms:HumanRightsandtheNationalCommission1
JournalofComparativeLaw88(2006).

32
BowornsakUwannoandBurns,W.D.,TheThaiConstitutionof1997:Sourcesand
Process32UniversityofBritishColumbiaLawReview227(1998).
33
Phongaichit,P.andPiriyarangsan,S.,Corruption and Democracy in Thailand(Chiang
Mai,SilkwormBooks,1996).

34
Leyland,aboven.10.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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<e
evenhigh-levelministerialdecisions.Itishardtoescapethefactthatthewatchdog
bodiesactuallyexistandfunction,andwillnodoubtformanimportantaspectof
futureeffortstore-establishconstitutionalism.
Allisnotplainsailingorrosesalltheway.Whatweareseeingispreciselythe
kindofpoliticalstruggleandscholarlydebatethatVanCaeneghem
35
remindsus
surroundsthedevelopmentofconstitutionalism.Weshouldnotbesurprisedbythis,
becauseconstitutionalismisneverestablishedanywherewithoutstruggle,and
requiresconstantrefinement,reaffirmation,andinterpretation.
Thetaskofinterpretingaconstitutionisgiveninthefinalanalysistothose
withthepowerofconstitutionalreview.Ingeneralitisfeltthatthisawesomepower
shouldbegiventothejudicialbranch.Indeed,itisareasonableindicationofthe
existenceofconstitutionalisminagivensocietythatthereisanindependentagency
thatnotonlyhasjurisdictiontoreviewlegislativeandexecutiveactions,butin
practiceperformsthattaskinaconsistentandconcertedmanner.Withoutjudicial
reviewitishighlydoubtfuliftheruleoflawasproperlydefined,orconstitutionalism
inthesenseIhaveindicated,actuallyexists.Significantly,boththePeoples
RepublicofChinaandVietnamdonothavesuchasystemofreview,butreservethe
taskofconstitutionalinterpretationtoamerecommitteeofthelegislature.Therefore,
accordi ng t o t he cri t eri a ment i oned earl i er, t hese st at es do not adhere t o
constitutionalism,howevermuchtheymayhaveprogressedinthegeneraldirection
oftheruleoflawandaccountability.
36
ConstitutionalreviewhasundoubtedlybecomemoreimportantinAsiain
recentyears.Increasinglyitistakingonfundamentalquestionsofconstitutional
j ust i ce. Thi s can be suppor t ed by a f ew exampl es. I n I ndonesi a t he new
ConstitutionalCourthasstruckdownananti-terrorlawonthegroundsthatitviolates
humanrights.InSouthKoreatheConstitutionalCourthasinvalidatedalawthat
preventedcoupleswiththesamesurnamefrommarrying.TheThaiConstitutional
Courthasstruckdownalawrequiringamarriedwomantoadoptherhusbands
surname.ThePhilippinesSupremeCourthasallowedstandingtoNGOstochallenge

35
Aboven.5.
36
EgSidel,aboven.20.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<e
administrativeactions.TheMalaysiancourtshaverecognizedandenforcedtheland
rightsoftheorang asli. Judicialdecisionshaveoftenbeenbasedonthecaselawof
otherjurisdictions.Thesedecisionsandtheseapproacheswouldhavebeen
unthinkablenotmanyyearsago.Tojudgebytheincidenceofinterpretationthrough
theprocessofconstitutionalreview,newAsianconstitutionalismhasindeedmade
greatprogress.ThecreationofaConstitutionalCourthasevenbeenseriously
mootedinbothChinaandVietnam.

AsianConstitutionalism
Ihavegivenaverybroad-lenspictureofconstitutionaldevelopmentallover
theregioninthelast20yearsorso,anditispertinentIthinkatthispointtoinquire
abouttheAsiannessofthisnewconstitutionalism.Doesthisdevelopmentowe
somethingtouniquelyAsianvalues?IsitauniquelyAsianresponsetochanged
politicalandeconomiccircumstances?
Thisisaquestionthathasintriguedobserversandhasmanyimplications.We
firsthavetoaskwhatcountsasAsian.Asiahasmanycultures,manyhistoriesand
manyconstitutionalsystems.OnemightsaythatinmostofAsiaethnicandreligious
pluralismistheonlythingthatseemstobeacommoncharacteristic.Whateveris
saidtobeAsianwilllikelythereforehavemanyexceptions,andwecanlegitimately
askwhetherthetermAsianhasanyrealmeaninginthepresentcontext,wherewe
arelookingforcommonelementsacrossaregionthatisverydiverseineverysense
ofthethatdescription.Thesecannot,Isuggest,befoundinwhatIhavecalled
traditional,autochthonous,orautobiographicalelements,whichareuniqueto
particularcultures.InthecaseofMalaysia,forexample,aswehavesaid,thereare
suchelements,buttheyaresimplyresponsestotheparticularnatureofMalaysian
societyandhistory.InthePhilippinestherewasaconsciousattempttoreflectinthe
1987ConstitutionadegreeofFilipinonationalism,forexampleinitsemphasison
familylife,andoppositiontoabortionanddivorce.Theseagainareresponsestothe
particularnatureofFilipinosocietyandhistory.Comparingthesetwoexamples,we
canseethattodescribeanythingasAsianislikelytobeadenialoftheuniqueness
ofthemanylocalisedwaysinwhichAsiansexpressbeingAsian,aswellasadenial
ofAsianvaluesasbeingsimplyhumanones,capableofbeingheldalsobyAfricans
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<
orEuropeansorLatinAmericans.
Somet hi ng mor e t han t hi s i s needed i f we ar e t o see t he newAsi an
constitutionalismasinvolvingsomecommonAsianelements.Itisofcourseusual,
forwhatitisworth,torefertocertainvaluesasbeingcharacteristicallyAsian,andas
polaroppositesofthatwhichisWestern.Theseare,forexample,holdingsocietys
interestsandthefamilytobemoreimportantthanindividualrights;andconsensusto
besuperiortoopenopposition.Inthiscontextitwouldmakeanexcellentessay
questiontoaskwhetherthecoupinThailandisinanysenseAsian.Thisisnotthe
place,however,todiscussthemeritsorotherwiseofAsianvaluesasanapproachto
constitutionalism:mypurposehereissimplytoconsidertheAsiannessofthenew
constitutionalismasadiscerniblefact.Wecantake,asanexample,humanrights
provisions,sinceAsianvalueshavebeenroutinelysetupinoppositiontoWestern
conceptionsofhumanrights.
InvestigatingthehumanrightsprovisionsinthenewconstitutionsIhave
discussedonefindsinfactverylittleevidenceofAsianvaluesbeingenshrinedin
theseprovisions.Onewouldexpectprimacytobegiventofamilyvalues,tothe
dutiesofcitizens,tocollectiverightsandinterests,andtotheprotectionand
maintenanceofAsiantraditionsofgovernanceintheformofauthority,consensus,
harmony.However,infactthebillsofrightsmakevirtuallynomentionofthese
matters,beinglargelyfairlycomprehensivestatementsofrightsthataregenerally
recognisedininternationallawandinnationalconstitutions,eventotheextentof
having,inthecaseofthe1997ConstitutionofThailand,adistinctlypost-modern
flavour,includingenvironmentalrightsandrightstopublicparticipation
37
andforall
kindsofminorities.ItistruethattheThaiandIndonesianConstitutionsrefertothe
rightsoftraditionalcommunitiestoprotectandmaintaintheirculture;however,
protectingtherightsofsuchcommunitiesisfarfrombeingdistinctivelyAsian.Inthe
MalaysiancasesmentionedabovethecourtshavefollowedCanadianandAustralian
precedents.InsofarasnewAsianconstitutionalismisinfactAsianincontent,that
Asiannessseemsifanywheretobeexpressed,notintermsofdefinitionsofhuman

37
Haller,K.J.andPatchareeSiroros(ed),Legal Foundations for Public Consultation in
Government Decision-Making(Bangkok,ExecutivePublicAdministrationFoundation,
2003).
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<e
rights,butratherinformalandtraditionalelementssuchasthoserelatingto
monarchyandreligion,whicharenotnormallydeterminativeoftherealcontentof
constitutionalism.AninterestingexampleistheKingofThailandsspeechinMay
thisyearencouragingthejudgestoresolvethecountrysconstitutionalcrisis,which
wasimmediatelyfollowedbytheConstitutionalCourtsrulingthattheApril2006
electionswereinvalid,andhisendorsementofthe19Septembercoup.Itlooksvery
muchasthoughinthisinstanceatraditionalelementwasrequiredtobringnew
Asianconstitutionalismintoplay.Asianness,Iwouldargue,liesifanythingsimplyin
thewayinwhichtheconstitutionrelatestoitsactualpracticearelationshipthat
oneneedstoinvestigateinanyculture,inanyregionoftheworld.
AmorefruitfulapproachmightbethentotrytofinddistinctivelyAsian
elementsintheinformingvaluesandtheactualpracticeoftheconstitutionwhatI
havecalledconstitutionalism.Againthesearehardtofind.Theforcesthatfavour
constitutionalismandtheforcesthatworkagainstitaresurelycommontoall
societies.ThereisnothingespeciallyAsianaboutthedesireforjusticeortheneedto
fightcorruption.EquallythereisnothingparticularlyAsianaboutabuseofpower,
militaryintervention,ortheincidenceofcorruptionallofthesebeingenemiesof
constitutionalism.ThesethingsareallpresentinAsiansocietiesandhaveledto,or
beenobstructiveof,theemergenceofthenewAsianconstitutionalism;butthepoint
isthattheyarehumanconditions,notAsianones.
IamforcedbymyownlogictoconcludethatthenewAsianconstitutionalism
ofwhichIspeakisnotAsianatallexceptinthesensethatitdescribesanemerging
trendinthisregion.Itdoesnotallatprecludesimilardevelopments,similarly
caused,inotherregionsoftheworld,aswehaveseen.

TheFuture
Whatofthefuture?Arewewitnessingaprofoundandlastingconstitutional
changeinAsia?
WeareIthinkwitnessingsomethingprofoundandpossiblyirreversible.Ido
notwishtobeseenassayingthatconstitutionalisminAsiamustofnecessityfollow
thegeneralcontoursofWesternconstitutionalhistory,althoughsometimesthereare
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<e
strikingparallelsbetweenthetwo.RatherIwouldseenewAsianconstitutionalismas
partofaglobalconvergencetowardsamorejustlegalorder.Thisdoesnotmeanthat
Asianideasandproblemswillbesubsumedinamassofundifferentiatedglobal
constitutionallaw.Eachsocietyhastostruggleinitsownwaytowardsthejustice
anddemocraticidealthatconstitutionalismrepresents.Ornotthechoiceisours,
butwecanseethedreadfulconsequencesoffailure,aswellastheproblemsof
partialsuccess.Weknowthatwhatevertheargumentsinfavourofotherformsof
government,constitutionalismrepresentsanindispensablepartofajustandmoral
legalorder.
IbelievethereismuchthatAsiancountries,sousedtoabsorbingthelessonsof
theWest,cannowlearnfromeachothersexperienceandalsoteachtotheworld.
TheASEANCharterisacontextinwhichthiscanoccur,andhopefullyboth
ThailandandtheotherASEANstateswilllearnmuchtotheirmutualbenefit.What
Asiahasdiscoveredinrecentyearsisthatconstitutionalismispreferabletoits
authoritarianalternativesandisessentialtotheachievementofjusticeandahappy,
fairandstablefutureforthebroadmajorityofhumanityunderenlightened
governmentnationallyandinternationally;thepriceoffailureinthisgreatenterprise
isanincreasedchanceofconflict,povertyandfragmentationaffectingeveryone.
Constitutionalismnew,old,Asianorotherwise-isthatimportant.
38

38
Berggren,N.,Karlson,N.andNergelius,J.,Why Constitutions Matter(CityUniversity
Press,Stockholm,2000).
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
L aConstitutionfranaiseactuelle,celletblieparleGnraldeGaulleen
1958,estlaseizimeConstitutionappliquedepuislaRvolutionde1789.
LeffondrementdelamonarchiedelAncienRgimeadoncouvertunelongue
priodedinstabilitinstitutionnelle,chaquergimepolitiquetantcontestpar
desoppositionsquiluirefusaienttoutegitimitetplusieursdentreeuxtant
renversspardescoupsdtat,desrvolutionsoudesguerres.Desorteque
chaquegnrationdeFranaisaeuconsciencedelafragilitdesinstitutions
politiquesdupaysetdelavanitdesconstitutionssuccessives.
Deuxexceptionstoutefoiscetteinstabilitconstitutionnelle:laIII
e
Rpublique
quiadu65ans(entre1875et1940)etlaV
e
Rpubliquequifteradansdeux
anssoncinquantmeanniversaire:cenestpaslemoindremriteduGnralde
GaullequedavoirtabliuneConstitutionquiasutraverserlescrisesetpermisde
raliserlalternancepolitiqueentreladroiteetlagauche(avecllectiondeF.Mitter
LARVISIONCONSTITUTIONNELLEENFRANCE
PROBLMATIQUEGNRALE
ParAndrRoux
Professeur lInstitut dEtudes Politiques dAix-en-Provence
Directeur de lInstitut Louis Favoreu
Groupe dtudes et de recherches sur la justice constitutionnelle
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ea
randlaPrsidencedelaRpubliqueen1981).
IlnendemeurepasmoinsquecetteConstitutionaconnudepuisloriginepas
moinsdedix-huitrvisions,avecunenetteacclrationdurythmedesrvisions
depuisunequinzainedannespuisquequatorzedentreellessontpostrieures
1992.
Ds l ors l a quest i on peut se poser de savoi r pourquoi l on rvi se l es
Constitutions,etlaConstitutionfranaisede1958enparticulier.
Demanireschmatiqueonpeut,jepense,distinguerdeuxgrandstypesde
rvisionconstitutionnelle.
Toutdabordcellesquicorrespondentausoucidamliorerlesmcanismes
constitutionnelsetquirelventdecequonpeutappelerleperfectionnisme
constitutionnel.
Ilsagiraparexempledecomblerdeslacunes,dapporterdesprcisions
oubliesparleconstituant.Ilpeutsagiraussidetirerlaleondelchecoudes
effetsngatifsdecertainesprocduresouencoredaccrotreleurefficacit(ainsien
France en 1974 l a possi bi l i t donne aux parl ement ai res de cont est er l a
constitutionnalitdelaloivotedevantleConseilconstitutionnel).
Larvisionpeutaussirsulterdelapriseencomptededonnesdefaitoude
droitnouvellesaffectantlescaractresdeltat(runificationdelAllemagneen
1990,transfertsdecomptenceauprofitdelUnioneuropenneen1992ayantdes
incidencessurlasouverainetdeltat).
Dans t out es ces hypot hses (et on pourrai t en t rouver daut res) l es
amendement s apport s l a Const i t ut i on, quel l e que soi t l eur t endue, ne
bouleversentpaslesquilibrestablislorigineentrelespouvoirsconstitutionnels.
Onentredansuneautrecatgorielorsquelarvisioncorrespondlavolont,
plusoumoinsclairementexprime,demodifierlesquilibresconstitutionnelsau
profitdunpouvoirdevenudominantenprofitantdunrapportfavorabledesforces
politiques.OnpenseiciauxParliament ActsadoptsenGrandeBretagneen1910et
1946larvisionde1962enFranceinstaurantllectionduPrsidentdela
Rpubliqueausuffrageuniverseldirect,cellesraliseauPortugalpourrduire
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ea
lespouvoirsduPrsident.
Derrirecetteclassificationsommaire(caronpourraitvoqueraussidautres
typesdervisions,cellesparexemplesansobjectifconstitutionnelcommele18
e

amendementinstaurantlaprohibitionen1919auxtats-Unis),transparatdjlide
quelaralisationdunervisionestunenjeudepouvoir,quelleserveconsolider
celuiquilainitie,quellepermettedimposercertainsprincipesdevantrgir
lexercicedupouvoiroulefonctionnementdelasocit,ilsetrouveraleplus
souventdesforcespolitiquespoursyopposer.
Ainsi,enFranceaucunervisionconstitutionnelle,mmemineure,naralis
lunanimit.laquestionPourquoirvise-t-on?necorrespondentdoncpas
uniquementlesrponsessurlobjetoulesraisonsdelarvision.Onpourraitdire:
Onrviseparcequonpeutrviser,ou,plussimplement:Pourrviser,il
fautquelarvisionsoitpossible.
Ilfautvoirl?moinsuneallusionauxpriodespendantlesquelleslarvisionest
exclueparcequelaConstitutionlinterditquunerfrencelancessitde
lexistence,auseindesinstitutionetdanslepays,duneconjoncturepolitiqueetdun
rapportdeforcesfavorableslarvision.Unervisionnepeutrussirquesilexiste
unemajoritcapabledelafaireaboutir.
Et,curieusement,ilnyapasdecorrlationsentreltenduedesmodifications
apporterlaConstitutionetladifficultmenerbienunervision.Lesplus
radicalesserontsouventlesplusaisescarimposesparunenouvellemajoritforte
etcohrente,issueounondeslections:cesontdesrvisionsdevainqueurs.En
revanche,desamendementsdeporte,enapparence,minimeslalimite,de
simplesrvisionstechniquessoulverontpeut-tredesrsistancesacharnes.
Carlarvisionnapasseulementpoureffetdemodifierdesrglesoudes
procdures.Dansunsystmepluraliste,sonsuccsestporteraucrditdeceuxqui
laurontengageetconduitesonterme.Ellevaloriseleurimage,traduit,en
apparenceaumoins,leursoucideperfectionnerlesinstitutions,elletmoigne
positivementdeleurefficacit.Etsilaprocduretrouvesonaboutissementdansun
rfrendum,lesuccsdecelui-ciapparatracommelaconfirmationparlepeuplede
linvestituredonneauxinitiateursdelarvision.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e<

Depuis1958enFrancelerformismeconstitutionnelnapascessdese
manifesteretilsemanifesteencoredanslesdbatsactuelsquiprcdentllection
prsidentiellede2007,lesprincipauxcandidatsdisposantchacunduncataloguede
rformesconstitutionnelles,auxfinalitsdailleursdiffrentes.
Sibienquedeuxquestionsseposent,luneconcernantlecontenudesrformes
constitutionnelles(querviser?),lautreconcernantlesmodalitsdecesrformes
(commentrviser?).

ILE CONTENU DES RFORMESCONSTITUTIONNELLES

Uneconstatationpourcommencer:selonmoiilnapparatpasquily
aitaujourdhuidurgenceimprieuserviser,etencoremoinschangerla
Constitution,mmesicertainsdfendentlideduneVIeRpublique.Celle-ci
fonctionnedanslensembledemaniresatisfaisante:elleatraversdessituations
politiquesdifficiles(guerredAlgrie,vnementsdemai1968,alternances
politiques,cohabitations),elleapusyadaptersansblocagemajeur.Dautre
part,silasocitfranaiseconnatdestensionsgraves(chmage,crisedes
banlieues),celles-cinetiennentpaslinadaptationdesinstitutionsconstitu-
tionnellesetnulnesongemettresurlecomptedecesinstitutionslincapacitdu
pouvoirlesfairedisparatre.Ledbatautourdelancessitdunervisionlarge
est,enconsquence,pourlemoinsartificiel.Onrencontrebienencorequelques
nostalgiquesdurgimeprsidentielquiranimentdetempsautrelacontroverse
autourdeladoptionduntelsystmeet,enconsquence,delancessitdeprocder
unbouleversementdenosinstitutions,maisilssonttrsminoritaires.
Ledbatconstitutionnelest,endfnitive,relativementpaisibleet,cantonn
danslecerclerestreintdesspcialistesdudroitconstitutionnel,illaisselescitoyens
peuprsindiffrents.Onestloindescontroversesetdesconfitsquiaccompagnrent
larvisiondelautomne1962quiainstaurllectionduPrsidentdelaRpublique
ausuffrageuniverseldirect.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
Ilnenapastoujourstainsietilfautserappelerque,danslespremires
annesdelaVeRpublique,unfortcourantdopinionrejetaitenblocetendtailles
nouvellesinstitutions.
Lombredupouvoirpersonnel,deladictatureetducoupdtatauraientpes
surelleset,fautedesprerllaborationbrefdlaidunenouvelleconstitution
plusfdlenotretraditionrpublicaine,certainscontestaienttrsviolemment,entre
autres,larticle16,lespouvoirsquelePrsidenttientdesarticles11et12,les
ordonnancesdelarticle38,lespouvoirsdelarticle19,lescontraintespesantsur
leParlement,biensr,partirde1962,llectionduPrsidentdelaRpubliqueau
suffrageuniversel.
Lapolmiqueautourdecesdispositionspersiste,maisellesestbeaucoup
attnue.Cenestpaslelieuicideretracerlabandonprogressifdecespositions
rvisionnistesmilitantes,parlagaucheenparticulierquiaprsavoircombattula
Constitutionafniparsyrallier.
Enralit,lerformismeconstitutionnelsestdvelopp,etsedveloppe
encoreautourdequelquesaxesprincipaux.
1) La recherche dun nouvel quilibre des pouvoirs
Larecherchedunnouvelquilibredespouvoirsest,depuis1958,leterrain
privilgidecerformismeconstitutionnel.Lquilibretracparleconstituantet
linterprtationquilareuesontcontestsdepuislorsdefaon,audemeurant,
souventcontradictoire.Ledbatnestpasneufetnotrehistoireconstitutionnelle
napparat-ellepas,endfinitive,commelapoursuitetoujoursrecommence,car
toujoursdue,delquilibreidalentrelespouvoirs?
Estencausedabordaujourdhuilaplacedupouvoirjudiciaireenfacedes
deuxautrespouvoirs,delExcutifsurtout.
LesFranais,eneffet,depuisdeuxsiclesontlongtempsprisleurpartidune
justicerameneaurangdesimpleautorit,acceptantquesonindpendance
tienneaucaractredeshommesquilarendentplusquauxgarantiesdontils
disposent.Larfexionconstitutionnelleicisestdveloppeloccasiondaffaires
mettantenlumirelestentationsoulestentativesdelExcutifdepesersurla
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
procdureetpeut-tresurladcision,dansunsensconformesesvues.Laminceur
delaprotectiondujugeetsesdangerssontalorsapparusetontconduitdesprojets
derformedelorganequienalacharge,leConseilSuprieurdelaMagistrature.
Sensiblecetteinquitude,legarantdelindpendancedelautoritjudiciaire,
lePrsidentdelaRpublique,sestjointceuxquiprconisentunervisiondes
dispositionsconcernantleConseil.
Unervisionestintervenueen1993quirenforcelindpendanceduConseil
SuprieurdelaMagistrature,maisuneautrerformequidevaitrenforcerencore
cetteindpendancedelajusticelgarddupouvoirpolitiqueachouen2000,
fautedunemajoritsuffsantepourladopter.
Maislesquilibreslespluscontroversessontceuxentrelelgislatifet
lExcutifet,auseindecedernier,entrelePrsidentetlePremierministre.
Commentsentonner?SagissantdaborddelquilibreentrelExcutifetle
Parlement,touteslesrformesralisesjusquicietcellesactuellementproposes,
notammentparlespartisdegauche,ontpourbutderenforcerlespouvoirsdu
Parlementquiavaienttlimitsdemanireexcessiveen1958afndeluttercontre
linstabilitgouvernementalequiavaitcaractrislaIVeRpublique(24gouverne-
mentsen12ans).
OntaitainsipassdunParlementtoutpuissantunParlementstrictement
encadrtantdanssafonctionlgislativequedanssafonctiondecontrle.
Diversesrformessontintervenuespourdesserrerlescontraintesetpour
revalorisersonrle.Mentionnonsseulementcellede1974quipermetaux
parlementairesdesaisirleConseilconstitutionneldesloisoudestraitsinternation-
aux.Cellede1992quipermetauParlementdedonnersonavissurlesprojetsdactes
europensCellede1995quiremplacelesdeuxsessionsparlementairesparune
sessionuniquedeneufmois,etquirserveunesanceparmoisunordredujour
fxparlesparlementaireseux-mmesouencorelacomptencedonneauParlement
en1996pourvoterlesloisdefnancementdelascuritsociale.
Aujourdhuicertainsproposentdallerplusloinencoreensupprimant
certainesprocduresduparlementarismerationaliscommeparexemplelarticle49
al.3delaConstitutionquipermetaugouvernementdobtenirladoptionduneloi
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
parlAssemblenationalesansquecelle-cisoitvoteexpressment,enengageant
saresponsabilitpolitique.LerenforcementdespouvoirsduParlementtouche
lquilibreinitialdelaConstitution.
IlenvademmedesrformesconcernantlquilibreauseindelExcutif,
entrelePrsidentdelaRpubliqueetlePremierministre,encorequelasituationsoit
icipluscomplexe.
LaConstitutionprvoyaitinitialementunpartagedesrlesentrelePrsident
delaRpubliqueetlePremierministreconformelatraditiondesrgimes
parlementaires,savoirunrledarbitragepourlePrsident(article5C.)etunrle
dechefdelamajoritparlementairepourlePremierministre,comptentcetitre
pourdirigerlegouvernementetpourdterminerlapolitiquedelanation(art.20et
21C.).Mais,trstt,lapratiqueinitieparleGnraldeGaulleaconduitlergime
driverversuneprsidentialisationconcrtiseparunenettesuprmatiedu
PrsidentsurlePremierministrequisetrouveconfinunesimplefonction
dexcutantdelapolitiqueprsidentielleauseindelExcutifetquipeuttre
rvoquparlePrsidentcontrairementcequeprvoitletextedelaConstitution.
Cetteprimautprsidentielleatconfortedemanirevidenteparlarformede
1962quiinstaurellectionduPrsidentausuffrageuniverseldirect(alorsquiltait
luinitialementparuncollgecomposdesparlementairesetdesreprsentantsdes
collectivitsterritoriales).
CetterformeatqualifeparledoyenVedeldeConstitution-biscarelle
confreauPrsidentunefortelgitimitpopulaireenfaisantdeluilereprsentant
delensembledelaNation.ElleconfirmequelePrsidentnestpasseulementun
arbitrecommeleschefsdtatdetypeparlementairemaisquilestaussileprincipal
responsabledelapolitiquenationale,voiremmelevritablechefdugouvernement
conditiontoutefoisquilsoitsoutenuparunemajoritparlementaire(cequinapas
tlecastroisreprises,entre1986et1988,etentre1997et2002,priodesditesde
cohabitationentreunPrsidentetunPremierministredetendancespolitiques
opposes).
CerlebeaucoupplusactifduPrsidentallaitdailleursconduireune
autrervisionconstitutionnelleenoctobre2000,quiaaboutirduirelemandat
prsidentielde7ans5ans,durequicorrespondcelledumandatdesdputs.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
Siunmandatde7ansparaissaitconvenirunchefdeltat-arbitre,ellesemblait
justetitreexcessivepourunchefdtatresponsabledelapolitiquenationale.
Ilapparatdoncquelesrvisionsconstitutionnellespeuventavoirpourbutde
confirmerunepratiqueinstitutionnellequisesttablieinitialementendehorsdu
texteconstitutionnel.
Pourallerjusquauboutdecettelogiqueettirertouteslesconsquencesdes
volutionsquisesontproduites,celledunpouvoirexcutifdominenpratique
parlePrsident,neconviendrait-ilpasalorsderedfnirlerleduPremierministre
dansletextedelaConstitution?Autrementditnefaudraitilpaslimitersonrle
lasimplecoordinationdelactiongouvernementaledontladirectionetlimpulsion
incomberaitauPrsidentlui-mme,commecestlecasendehorsdespriodesde
cohabitation.Cestcequeproposentcertainscandidatsllectionprsidentielle
(NicolasSarkozynotamment),alorsquecertainsmembresdeladoctrineproposent
purementetsimplementquanteuxdesupprimerlePremierministre
2) Renforcer les pouvoirs constitutionnels des citoyens
LescitoyenstaienttrslargementabsentsdutexteinitialdelaConstitu-
tionde1958,lexceptiondureferendumdelarticle11.Aussi,undesobjectifsdu
rformismeest-ildeleurpermettredintervenirplusactivementdanslaviepolitique
etlefonctionnementdesinstitutions.Cestainsiquen1995unervisionatendude
manireimportantelechampdapplicationdurfrendumlgislatif(article11C.)
enprvoyantquecelui-cipourraitporternonseulementsurlesquestionsrelatives
lorganisationdespouvoirspublicsousurlaratifcationdestraitsmaisaussisurles
rformesconcernantlapolitiqueconomiqueousocialedelaNation
etauxservicespublicsquiyconcourent.Forceestcependantdeconstater
quedepuiscetterformeaucunrfrendumnestintervenudanscesnouveaux
domaines,ladcisionderecouriraureferendumrelevantduseulPrsidentdela
Rpublique(surpropositionduPremierministreouduParlement)quipourdes
raisonspolitiquessemontretrsprudentenlamatirecequiconduitcertains
auteurs,trsminoritairescejour,prconiserlerfrendumdinitiativepopulaire
commeenSuisseafndedvelopperlapratiquerfrendaire.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
Sansallerjusquel,larvisionconstitutionnelleintervenueenmars2003
afin de renforcer lautonomie locale a rendu possible lorganisation des
rfrendumsdcisionnelslocaux(danslescommunes,lesdpartementsoules
rgions)linitiativeilestvraidesautoritslocales.Cest,aveclareconnaissance
dudroitdeptitionauniveaulocal,unpascertestimidemaisintressantdansla
voiedeladmocratieparticipativequecertainsconsidrentcommeunremdeaux
insuffsancesdeladmocratiereprsentative
Enfn,ilapparatncessairecertainsdepoursuivrelouvertureducontrle
deconstitutionnalitdesloisentrepriseen1974enaccordant,cettefois-ci,lasaisine
duConseilconstitutionnelauxparticuliers.Ceux-cineseraientplustributairesdela
bonnevolontdestitulairesactuelsdelasaisine,ilspourraient,euxaussi,remettre
encause,parlintermdiaireduneexceptiondinconstitutionnalit,desloisdepuis
longtempspromulgues.Lchecdelarvisionengagecesujeten1990par
FranoisMitterrandnapasmisuntermedfinitiflentreprise,onlaverra
certainementrapparatreunjourcarellevadanslesensdelaffrmationduntat
dedroit,mmesiellesoulvedenombreusesdiffcultspratiques.
3) Participer la construction europenne
ctdesrvisionsinspiresparuncertainperfectionnismeconstitutionnel,
ilenestdautresquisontmoinsvouluesquimposesparunemodificationdes
caractresdeltat.Entredanscettecatgorielarvisiondemars2003djcitequi
aaccentuladcentralisationetlautonomielocale.Maislesplussignifcativesont
tcellesentranesparlaconstructioneuropennecarellestouchentlaquestion
fondamentaledelasouverainetdeltat.
IlconvienticiderappelerquenFranceleConseilconstitutionnelpeuttre
saisiautitredelarticle54C.pourvrifersiunengagementinternationalcomporte
uneclausecontrairelaConstitution.LasaisineduConseilconstitutionnelest
facultativeetellepeuttreexerceparlePrsidentdelaRpublique,lePremier
ministre,lePrsidentdelAssemblenationale,lePrsidentduSnatainsiquepar
soixantedputsousoixantesnateurs.
LasaisineduConseilconstitutionnelintervientaprslasignatureetavant
laratifcationduTraitetsicertainesclausesduTraitsontdclarescontraires
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
eo
laConstitution,lautorisationdeleratifierdoittreprcdedunervisiondela
Constitution.Danscecas,larvisionconditionnelaratification,maislarvision
restebienentendufacultative.Sicelle-cinestpasralise,letraitsignneserapas
ratif,commecelasestproduiten1999(ilsagissaitdelaCharteeuropennesur
leslanguesrgionalesouminoritaires),lePrsidentdelaRpubliquenayantpas
jugopportuneunervisionconstitutionnelle.
En2006laConstitutionabientrvise(le1ermars2005)pourpermettre
laratifcationduTraittablissantuneConstitutionpourlEurope(TECE)mais,cette
fois-ci,cestlaratifcationquinapaseulieudufaitdelchecdurfrendumdu29
mai2005.
Larvisionde2005taitlaquatrime(surdix-neuf)renduencessairepour
permettrelaratificationduntraitoulamiseenapplicationdunacteeuropen,
aprscellesdu25janvier1992(TraitdeMaastricht),du25janvier1959(Trait
dAmsterdam)etdu25mars2003(mandatdarrteuropen).
Laquestionseposedesavoirsilexistedeshabilitationsconstitutionnelles
permettantderaliserdestransfertsdecomptence,deslimitationsdesouverainet
lislaconstructioneuropenne?
Depuislarvisionde1992,laConstitutioncomprenduntitreXVintitul
DescommunautseuropennesetdelUnioneuropenne(art.88-1et88-2)
39

39
Art.88-1.LaRpubliqueparticipeauxCommunautseuropennesetlUnion
europenne,constituesdtatsquiontchoisilibrement,envertudestraitsquilesont
institues,dexercerencommuncertainesdeleurscomptences.
EllepeutparticiperlUnioneuropennedanslesconditionsprvuesparletraittablis
santuneConstitutionpourlEuropesignle29octobre2004.
Art.88-2.SousrservederciprocitetselonlesmodalitsprvuesparleTraitsurlUni
oneuropennesignle7fvrier1992,laFranceconsentauxtransfertsdecomptencesn
cessairesltablissementdelunionconomiqueetmontaireeuropenne.
SouslammerserveetselonlesmodalitsprvuesparleTraitinstituantla
Communauteuropenne,danssardactionrsultantdutraitsignle2octobre1997,
peuventtreconsentislestransfertsdecomptencesladterminationdesrglesrelatives
lalibrecirculationdespersonnesetauxdomainesquiluisontlis.
Laloifxelesrglesrelativesaumandatdarrteuropenenapplicationdesactesprissur
lefondementdutraitsurlUnioneuropenne.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
auquelserfremaintenantleConseilconstitutionnel,lordrejuridiquecommunau-
tairetantconsidrcommeautonomeetspcifqueparrapportlordrejuridique
international.
LeConseilconstitutionnelainterprtlaConstitution,encherchantcon-
cilierdesprincipesconstitutionnelsparfoiscontradictoiresetadterminlestroishy-
pothsesdanslesquellesunervisionconstitutionnelleestncessairepourpermettre
laratifcationduntrait.
Lapremirehypothseestcelledunecontradictiondirecteentreles
clausesduntraiteuropenetlesdispositionsconstitutionnelles.Ainsi
larvisionde1992apermisdaccorderledroitdevoteetdligibilit
souscertainesconditions,auxressortissantseuropensrsidanten
Francepourleslectionsmunicipales,commecelataitprvuparle
TraitdeMaastricht(article88B)maisinterditparlarticle3dela
Constitutionquirservaitcedroitdevoteauxnationaux.
Ladeuximehypothseestcelleountraiteuropenremettaiten
causelesdroitsoulibertsconstitutionnellementgarantis.Elleest
illustreparlarvisionde2003relativeaumandatdarrteuropen.
Latroisimehypothse,lapluscourante,estcelleoletraitporte
atteinteauxconditionsessentiellesdexercicedelasouverainet
nationale,autrement ditlorsquilimpliquedestransferts de
comptenceduniveaunationalauniveaueuropen,lesquelstouchent
desdomainesdesouverainetdeltat(justice,monnaie,fscalit,)
etaboutissentprivercelui-cidunvritablepouvoirdedcisiondans
ledomaineconsidr.Cestainsiquen1992commeen1999la
Constitutionatrvisepourpermettrelaratificationdestraits
deMaastrichtetdAmsterdamquiprvoyaientdestransfertsde
comptencenotammentenmatiredemonnaie,decontrlesaux
frontiresoudepolitiquedimmigration.
Pluttquedemultiplierlesrvisionsconstitutionnelleschaquefoisquilest
ncessairederatiferuntraiteuropen,laquestionseposedesavoirsilneserait
pasprfrabledintroduiredanslaConstitutionuneclausedhabilitationgnrale
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ea
pourlestransfertsdecomptencesauproftdesorganisationsinternationaleseteu-
ropennes,commecelaexistedansplusieurspayseuropens(Allemagne,Belgique
notamment).Linconvnientdecetteclauseseraitvidemmentdouvrirlesvoies,
sansaucuncontrle,auxlimitationsdelasouverainetnationale.

II LES MODALITS DE LA RVISION

Mmesileurrythmesestacclrecesderniresannes,lesrvisions
constitutionnellesrestentdiffciles,endehorsdecellesquirpondentdesexigences
internationalesoueuropennesetpourlesquellesmajoritetoppositionsaccorenten
principe.
Lesconditionsjuridiquesdelarvisionsaccompagnentdeconditions
politiquesdiffcilesrviser,quilsagissedelaprocdurenormaledervision,celle
delarticle89delaConstitutionoudelaprocdureexceptionnelles,celledelarticle
11.
1) Les procdures de larticle 89
Cetarticleprvoitquelinitiativedelarvisionestpartageentrele
PrsidentdelaRpubliqueetlesmembresduParlement.Letextedoitensuitetre
votdanslesmmestermesparlesdeuxassemblesparlementaires(Assemble
nationaleetSnat)quisontsituessurunpieddgalit(chacunepouvantrefuserle
texteetbloquerainsilaprocdure).Enfn,larvisionainsiadopteneseradfnitive
quesielleestapprouveparrfrendum.Maissilsagitduneinitiativeprsidenti-
elle,lePrsidentdelaRpubliquepeutchoisirdviterlerfrendumensoumettant
leprojetdervisionauvoteduCongrsduParlement(runiondesdeuxassembles
parlementaires)quidevralapprouverlamajoritdes3/5edessuffragesexprims.
Surles17rvisionsralisesparlarticle89C.,seizelonttparlavoieduCongrs
etuneseule(larductiondumandatprsidentielparrfrendumen2000).
Ilapparatquenpratiqueunervisionnepeutavoirsonoriginedansune
propositionparlementaire.Depuis1958,aucunedespropositionsdposesparles
dputsouparlessnateursnajamaistadopteparlesdeuxchambres,peumme
onttinstruites,etlesdeuxqueleSnatavaitapprouvesonttrepoussespar
lAssemble.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ea
Ilnesagitpasduneimpossibilitjuridiquemaispolitique.Ilestinconcevable
enpratique,eneffet,quuneinitiativedunparlementairedeloppositionaboutisse
unervision.Desonct,unepropositionprsenteparuneparlementairedela
majoritseraitreprisesoncompteparleGouvernementsiellelintressepour
permettreaussi,ventuellement,delasoumettreauCongrsetnonaurfrendum
; les rvisions techniques (comme par exemple la dure des sessions
parlementaires)nepeuventtrequedoriginegouvernementalepouresquiverla
consultationpopulaireetsalourdeur;sicettepropositionneretientpaslattentiondu
Gouvernement,elleneserapasinscritelordredujour.Laseulepossibilitpourles
parlementairesdefaireaboutirleurvisesrformistesconsisteamenderleprojet
gouvernemental.
Lesreprsentantsdelanationnepouvanttreloriginedunervision,
lunedesprocduresdelarticle89estbloque.Toutauplus,lespropositions
parlementairespourrontpeut-tresensibiliserlopinionlancessitdunerforme
et,indirectement,inciterleGouvernementagir.
UnervisionnestdoncpossiblequlinitiativedelExcutif.Laquestion
seposealorsdesavoirsicelui-ciestenmesuredentreprendreunervisionavecdes
chancesdesuccs.
Uneobservationprliminairepourcommencer:touteinitiativedervision
venantdelExcutifestaujourdhuisuspecteenFrance.Mmesisonobjetneprte
paslacritique,lePrsidentserasouponndevouloirbrouillerlejeupolitique,de
dtournerlattentiondesvritablesproblmes,etsurtoutdenattendreunrenouveau
delgitimitetdautorit.SiunPrsidentestattachunervision,onnesaurait
tropluiconseillerdelentreprendretoutaudbutdesonmandatou,larigueur,au
commencementdunlgislature.
SilePrsidentutiliselaprocduredelarticle89,celle-cipassecommeon
lavuparlaccorddesdeuxchambressuruntexteidentiqueetparlapprobationde
cetextesoitparleCongrssoitparlepeuplelissuedunrfrendum.Lexigence
delaccorddeschambreslimitelechampdanslequelunervisionestenvisageable.
Eneffet,lesparlementairesserontpeudispossapprouverunerformequileur
apparatraitcommeuneatteinteleurstatutoucommeentranant,leurdtriment,
unemodificationdelconomiedusystmeconstitutionnel.Saufconjoncture
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e<
exceptionnelledelexistencedanslesdeuxchambresdunemajorittrs
respectueusedessouhaitsduPrsidentetduGouvernementoudunepression
populaireconsidrable,onpeutconsidrerquilnesauraittrequestionderemettre
encauselesgarantiesdesparlementaires,dedplacerleurdsavantagelalignede
partagedeleursattributionsaveclExcutifoudemodifierleurprrogativesdans
ledroulementdesprocduresdevantlesAssembles.Enralit,celaimportepeu
puisquelatendanceactuelledurformismeconstitutionnelnestpasdfavorable
auParlementetquelesrvisionsenvisagessontailleurs.Comme,desonct,
lExcutifnestguredisposdiminuersesproprescomptences,nombrede
dispositionsconstitutionnellesrestentenpratiqueimpossiblesrviser.
Ajoutonsenfnquilexisteaussideslimitesconstitutionnelleslarvision.
Toutdabord,celle-ciestinterditelorsquilestportatteintelintgritdu
territoire(article89,al.4),pendantlessituationsdempchementoudevacancedela
prsidencedelaRpublique(article7)ouencoreenpriodedecrise(article16C.).
Enfn,ledernieralinadelarticle89fxeunelimitedefondendisposant
quelaformerpublicaineduGouvernementnepeutfairelobjetdunervision.
Cettedisposition,apparuesouslaIIIeRpublique(loiconstitutionnelledu14aot
1884)pourconsoliderlergimerpublicainetcartertoutretourlamonarchie,
avaittrepriseparlarticle90delaConstitutionde1946.
Onapusedemanderalorsquelletaitlarelleportedecetteinterdiction
reprisedansnotreConstitutionactuelle.Selonuneinterprtationstricte,cette
interdiction,tmoignagedunecontinuitconstitutionnellerpublicaine,ne
sappliquequlaformedurgime:larestaurationdelamonarchieoulamiseen
placedunrgimepolitiquenonrpublicaincommeceluideltatfranaisen1940,
nepourraientsefaireparunesimplervisiondelaConstitution.Ilsagit,ici,dega-
rantirlintangibilitdurgimerpublicain.Selonuneconceptionpluslarge,ilsagit
dinterdirelaremiseencausenonseulementdesinstitutionsrpublicainesmais
aussidesvaleursetdesprincipesrpublicains,rassemblantainsiuncorpsdenormes
constitutionnellessuprieuresetintouchablesbnfciantdecequelonappellela
supraconstitutionnalit.Cetteconceptionsembleloignedelaconceptionclassique
dupouvoirconstituantsouverainmaissembleenharmonieavecletextede1958,
notammentsonarticle2quidfnitlaRpubliquecommeunsystmeconsacrantdes
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
valeursfondamentales.
2) La procdure de larticle 11
Larticle11C.estenprincipeprvupourpermettreladoptiondeloisor-
dinairesparrfrendum.Cesten1962,loccasionduprojetdervisionrelatif
llectionduPrsidentdelaRpubliqueausuffrageuniverseldirectquesestpos,
pourlapremirefoisleproblmedurecourslarticle11pourrviserlaConstitu-
tion.LegnraldeGaulle,soucieuxdviterleblocageduSnatetdunepartie
importantedelAssemblenationale,avaitainsiimagindecontournerlobstacle
parlementaireenrecourantdirectementaurfrendumpopulaire.
Lemmeproblmeseposanten1969,avecleprojetderformeduSnatet
satransformationenchambresocioprofessionnellesanspouvoirrel,legnralde
Gaulleprocdedelammemanire,maiscettefoissanssuccs,letexteayantt
rejetparlepeuplefranais,cequileconduiradmissionner.
OutreuneintensequerellepolitiquequiaconduitlAssemblenationale
renverserleGouvernementenoctobre1962,lerecourslarticle11aengendrune
polmiquejuridiquenoncompltementteinte.
Laplupartdesjuristes,sappuyantsurlesdocumentsprparatoiresetsurle
textemmedelaloifondamentalequiconsacreuntitrespciallarvision(letitre
XVI)ontestimquecetteprocduredecontournementntaitnonseulementpas
prvueparlaConstitutionmaisluitaitcontraire.
Lespartisanstrsminoritairesdelarticle11ontjustifleurpositionpar
desargumentsdingalevaleurmaistousjuridiquementfragiles.
Lathselapluslaboreconsistaitsoutenirquelaprocduredelarticle11
setrouveenconcurrenceaveccelledelarticle89,toutcommeaveccellerelative
llaborationparlementairedesloisordinaires(article45)ouorganiques(article46).
Curieusement,FranoisMitterrand,quiavaitten1962eten1969lundes
plusfarouchesadversairesdurecourslarticle11,sembleavoir,unefoisdevenu
PrsidentdelaRpublique,modifradicalementsonanalyse.En1988ilserallie
lathsedelacoutumeconstitutionnelle,lgitimant,a posteriori, lapositiondeson
prdcesseur.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
Enralitlutilisationdelaprocduredurfrendumdirectnepeutrester
quexceptionnelleetellenepeutjouerquencasdeparalysiedupouvoirconstituant
drivordinaire,celuidelarticle89.
LePrsidentdelaRpubliquesevoiteneffetconfierparlarticle5dela
Constitutionunrledarbitrechargdassurerlefonctionnementrgulierdes
Pouvoirspublicsainsiquelacontinuitdeltat.Lorsquelattitudedelune
deschambresbloquetoutepossibilitdervision,empchantainsilesystme
constitutionneldvoluer,desadapter,decorrigerlesdfautsrvlspar
lexprience,lefonctionnementdupouvoirconstituantestinterrompuetilappartient
auchefdeltatdelertablir.Poursortirdunesituationdecrise,parhypothse
grave,lePrsidentsefondantsurlarticle5doitpouvoirrecourir,enaccordavecle
Premierministre,larticle11.
Cestlepeuplequi,endfnitive,dcidera.
IlfautbienvoircependantquelerisquepolitiqueprisparlePrsidenten
organisantunrfrendumdelarticle11neseraitpasngligeable:danslecasdun
conflitavecleParlement,lePrsidentposeraitlaquestiondeconfianceaupays,
uncheclobligeraitdmissionnercommedeGaulleen1969.Ilcompromettrait
dautrepartpourlongtempsunervisionpeuttrencessaireetcelalissuedun
dbatlargementfauss.LesFranaisseverraient,eneffet,demanderunerponse
uniquecesdeuxquestions:Faites-vousconfianceauPrsident?tes-vous
favorableslarvisionpropose?.Danscesconditions,lesuccsdunrfrendum
neseraitpasgaranti;lavoiedurfrendumnestpasplussrequelavoieparlemen-
taire.Lchecdeceluiproposen1969expliquesansdoutequaucunPrsidentnait
parlasuiteempruntcettevoie.
Endfinitiveonpeutsedemandersilneseraitpasopportunderviserla
procduredervisionelle-mmeafnderenforcerlecaractredmocratiquedela
Constitution.
Unesolutionpourviterlesblocagespartisansseraitdinscriredansla
Constitution,ctdesprocduresdelarticle89,leprincipeduneprocdurede
rvisionobligatoire.intervallergulier,touslesdix,douzeouquinzeanspar
exemple,undbatseraitorganisdevantleParlement,oudevantuneAssemblelue
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
pourloccasion,aucoursduquelilseraitprocdunbilandelapplicationdela
Constitutionetlexamendespropositionsdesmodifcationsapporter.
Unprcdentaumoinsexiste,celuidelaConstitutionpolonaisede1921qui
prvoyaitsonarticle125unervisionobligatoiretousles25ansNeserait-ilpas
souhaitable,encomplment,deprvoircommeenSuisseuneprocduredervision
dinitiativepopulaire?Est-ilnormal,eneffet,queseulslesintressscest--dire
lExcutifetleParlement,puissentproposerdesmodifcationsleurstatut,leurs
attributionsetleursrelations?Peut-ontoujoursattendredeceuxquisetrouventau
coeurdusystmequilsprennentdesinitiativesquibouleverserontcesystme?
Dautantquelepouvoirdedclencherlaprocdureserasouvententreles
mainsdhommesappartenantaummepartiouunemmecoalition.Neserait-il
pasplusdmocratiquedepermettreaupeupledtreluiaussiloriginedune
rvision?Dimposerunchangementceuxquisaccommodentderglesqui
paraissentinadaptesouquiperptuentunsystmedevenuobsolte?
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
T hecoupofSeptember192006hasofficiallycalledtimeonThailandslatest
constitutionwhichwasintroducedin1997.Withyetanotherconstitutiononthe
horizon,theissueofconstitutionbuildingisonceagainrelevant.Theprevious
constitution,despitesomeseriousfailings,wasonbalanceasubstantialachievement.
Indeed,itcanbearguedthatthemainproblemsleadinguptotheserecentevents
relatetothenatureofthepoliticalcultureinThailand.Itwillbesuggestedthatthe
draftingofanyfutureconstitutionoughttobeaprocessofconsolidationfoundedon
theareasinwhichprogresshasalreadybeenmade.InthispaperIwillbereferringto
theUKconstitutionwhichhasbeenmodifiedmoreradicallyinthelastdecadethan
atanytimeforatleast100years.Theobjectiveisnottogointoindividualreformsin
anydepth,butrathertoconcentrateontheconstitutionalissuesthathaveariseninthe
UKinrecentyearsthataredirectlyrelevanttotheThaicase.
Aftermentioningthevirtuesofanincrementalapproachtoconstitutional
reform,thefirsttopicforconsiderationconcernstheprovisionsintheUKtoprevent
conflictsofinterestrelatingtotheroleofMPs,governmentministersandpolitical
ReformingUKconstitution

ConstitutionalProblems
andConstitutionalReform:
TheUK,Thailandandthecase
forpreservationaswellaschange
PeterLeyland
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
o
parties.Thesecondareaconcernsthemeasuresinplacetosecurefreedomof
expression,withthediscussionfocussingontheinstitutionalpositionandregulation
ofthepressandbroadcastingmedia.WenextreviewcertainfeaturesoftheUK
FreedomofInformationAct2000.Mostconstitutionalcommentatorswouldagree
thatgeneralaccesstoinformationinthehandsofgovernment,civilservice,armed
forces,policeandotherpublicandstateinstitutionsisthelifebloodofanyliberal
democraticsystem.Theeffectivenessoftheofficialoppositiongroupings,any
watchdogbodiesandthepopularmediainoverseeingtheintegrityofthesystem
ultimatelydependonthequalityofinformationmadeavailablebythoseinpower.
Anequallycrucialissueconcernsseparationofpowers.IntheUKtheancientoffice
ofLordChancellorhasfinallybeenmodified,ostensiblytocreateamuchclearer
separationofpowers,especiallybetweentheexecutiveandthejudicialbranch.
Despitetheintentiontodosounderthe1997constitution,theinstitutional
independenceofthecourtsandwatchdogbodieshasremainedanissueofgreat
concerninThailand.

ReformintheUnitedKingdom
Thediscussioninthispartofthepaperlooksattheprocessofreformrather
thanitsactualcontent.Animportantpointtostressattheoutsetisthatchangestothe
UKconstitutionwerenotbroughtinaspartofamasterplanandthereforms
mentionedbelowarenotdirectlyrelatedtoeachother
40
.ThegeneralapproachtoUK
constitutionalismhasalwaysbeenandcontinuestobe:Ifitaintbroke,dontfixit.
Itisworthmentioningthenatureofthesereformsinordertodrawattentiontotheir
importance.Inthefirstplace,theterritorialdistributionofpowerbetweencentral
governmentandthenations/regionsoftheUKwasadjustedthroughdevolution.An
asymmetrical(explainedlater)systemofdevolvedgovernmentwasintroducedin
Scotland,WalesandNorthernIreland.Secondly,theHumanRightsAct1998,in
effect,incorporatedtheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightswhichmeantthatfor
thefirsttimetheUKacquiredacharterofrights.ThecompositionoftheHouseof
Lordswaschangedsothatallbut92ofthehereditarypeerslosttherightto

40
D.OliverConstitutional Reform in the UK,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2003.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo

participateinthebusinessoftheHouseofLords.AFreedomofInformationAct
(2000)waspassedwhichgrantedcitizensageneralrighttoknowsubjectto
importantexemptions.Therehavealsobeenquiteextensivechangestolocal
governmentincludingtheintroductionofaMajorandAssemblyforLondonandnew
formsofexecutiveandmayorsforlocalauthorities.Finally,theConstitutional
ReformAct2005haschangedthesystemforappointingjudgesandwillresultinthe
judicialpaneloftheHouseofLordsbeingreplacedbyaSupremeCourt.Fewvotes
weretobegainedfromanyofthisconstitutionalreform.Thereweredifferent
reasonsfortheintroductionofeachofthesemeasures.TheLabourPartywhichhad
beenoutofofficefor18yearswasreceptivetothesereasonsandthereformswere
introducedduringtheLabourgovernmentsinitialtermofoffice.Thereformshave
beenassimilatedaspartoftheconstitutionbutnotwithoutsomecontroversy(thereis
insufficienttimetogointothishere).
Despitethesechangeswhich,aswehavejustobserved,werefarreaching,the
coredoctrinesandconventionsoftheuncodifiedUKconstitutionhaveremained
unaltered.Thebuildingblocksforsomeofthesereformsweretobefoundinthepre-
exisingsystem.Forexample,turningbrieflytoScottishdevolutionwhichgave
ScotlandanelectedParliament,butalsoanexecutivewiththecreationofnew
departmentsforthedevolvedcompetences.Thischangewaspossiblewithout
massivedisruptionbecausetheUKhasapermanentcivilservice.TheScottishcivil
serviceevolvedwiththeexpansionoftheScottishOfficeduringthetwentieth
century
41
.Itwastosomeextentadistinctivebureaucracywithconsiderable
aut onomy whi ch was abl e t o devel op a sensi t i vi t y t o l ocal condi t i ons of
government
42
.Thetransitiontodevolutionresultedinthemajorityofofficialswho
populatedtheScottishOfficebeingassignedtotheScottishExecutive.Aninformal
agreement(termedConcordat)betweentheCabinetOffice(thedepartmentwhich
41
R.Rhodes,P.Carmichael,J.McMillanandA.MasseyDecentralizing the Civil Service:
From unitary state to differentiated polity in the United Kingdom,(Buckingham,Open
UniversityPress,2003),chapter4.

42
ItisstronglyarguedbysomecommentatorsthatScotlandhasadifferentiatedpolity.R.
Rhodes,P.Carmichael,J.McMillanandA.Massey Decentralizing the Civil Service: From
unitary state to differentiated polity in the United Kingdom,(Buckingham,Open
UniversityPress,2003)concludingchapter.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
a
runsthecivilservice)andtheScottishAdministrationallowedformobilityof
officialsbetweenadministrationsnorthandsouthoftheborder
43
.Seniorofficialsin
theScottishexecutivehavesoughttoretainthesamecivilserviceethosinScotland
and,inconsequence,thebureaucraticcultureoftheWestminstercivilservice
embodiedinthecivilservicemanagementcodescontinuestoapplytothecivil
serviceinScotland
44
.Drawingontheoldinthecreationofthenew,permitteda
seamlesstransitionfromthestandpointoftheScottishcitizenryatthetime
devolutionwasintroduced.
Moreover,thereisasnow ball effecttotheintroductionofconstitutionchanges
onthisscale.LetmeexplainwhatImeanbythis.Constitutionsarenotendsin
themselves.Theyaremeansforachievingcertaingivenobjectives,andthe
consequencesofanymeasuresunderaconstitutionmayonlybepartiallyforeseen.In
consequence,thereformprocessmaygainitsownmomentum.IfwetakeUK
devolutionasanexample.Anasymmetricsystemwasintroducedforpragmatic
reasons.ItwasbecauseenthusiasmfordevolutionwasatitsgreatestinScotland.The
ScottishParliamentwasvestedwithlawmakingpowersandlimitedpowersto
imposeadditionaltaxation.Walesontheotherhand,wasonlygrantedanAssembly
withpowersoverdelegatedlegislation.Primarylegislationhadtogothroughthe
WestminsterParliament.Verysoonaftertheintroductionofdevolutiontherewere
callsinWalesforequivalentpowersandinresponsetotheRichardsreportthere
havealreadybeenmodificationstothesystemoflawmakingforWales.Theabsence
ofanyequivalenttierorlevelofdevolvedgovernmentforEnglandisamuchmore
difficultnuttocrack.PostdevolutionastrikinganomalyhasarisenwithScotland
andWalesabletodeterminemanyissuesthroughtheirownlocalrepresentativesina
ParliamentorAssemblywhereasinEnglandthematterstillisleftinthehandsofa

43
TheConcordatbetweentheCabinetOfficeandtheCabinetoftheNationalAssembly
forWalesconfrmsthat:StaffattheNationalAssemblyforWalesareCrownServants
andpartofaunifedcivilservice.TheWelshcivilserviceremainsunderthecontrolof
theCabinetOffcebuttheimplementationofpolicyisnowinthehandsoftheAssembly
whichmeansthatofficialsputtingintoeffectprimaryandsecondarylegislationare
accountabletotheWelshAssembly.

44
SeetheCivilService(ManagementFunctions)Act1992underwhichthecurrentcodeis
issued.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
a
nationalParliament.ThenationalparliamentincludingScottish,WelshandNorthern
IrishMPscontinuetodecidequestionsconcerningEngland.Thisanomalyhasledto
callsforanEnglishParliamentoraformofregionalgovernmentforEnglandwhich
isequivalenttodevolution.TheissueofrepresentationforEnglandmightnow
becomeanissue,butthereisnoneedtomodifyorabandonScottishorWelsh
devolutiontoanswertheEnglishproblem.Theneedtobuildonpastachievementsis
obviouslyanadvantage.
AnimportantpointcanbetakenfromtheUKexperiencewhichisthatfurther
reforminThailandmustbuildupontheachievementsofthe1997constitutionwhile
alsoaddressingsomeofitsobviousflaws.Althoughnowofficiallyinvalid,the1997
ConstitutioninThailandhadcertainclaimstolegitimacythatpreviousconstitutions
lacked.Itwasasophisticatedattemptattacklingmanyendemicproblems,andit
shouldbemadetohaveaveryimportantlegacy.IthasprovidedThailandwiththe
institutionalbasistotacklearangeofconstitutionalproblems.BythisImeanthatit
hasprovidedofficialbodiesthatareupandrunningwithtrainedpersonnelwhowork
forthesegovernmentorganisationsandwatchdogbodiesoperatingunderthe
constitution.Clearly,tooperateeffectivelythecompositionanddirectionofthe
existingThaibodiesneedstobeadjustedtoservetheinterestsdefinedunderthenew
constitution.Whatisneedednowistheconfidencethatinvestigatoryandsupervisory
bodieswilldischargetheirduty,andthattheywilltakedecisionstoprosecute
irregularitiesandcriminality,whichwillthenbeacteduponbytheauthorities
withouthesitationordeference.

MPs,Ministers,PartiesandConflictsofInterest
WenowconcentrateonarangeofconstitutionalproblemsundertheUK
systemthathavebeenaddressedinrecentyears.Ahighlytopicalissuewhichhas
aroseinthe1990sconcernedthecapacityofMPsandMinisterstosubvertorabuse
theirposition.Therehavebeennumerousexamplesoffiguresinpubliclifeactingin
waywhichmightberegardedasincompatiblewiththehigheststandardsofprobity.
Forexample,thecash for questions scandalmightbecitedasoneexampleof
pol i t i cal sl eaze.A met hod of keepi ng check on t he execut i ve i s t hrough
parliamentaryquestions.Althoughquestionsmaybeusedpoliticallytoembarrassthe
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<
government,mattersareroutinelyraisedonbehalfofconstituentsrelatingto
governmentdepartmentsconcerningtheprocessofadministration.Unlessthematter
raisedisinarestrictedcategoryoroutsidetheremitofthedepartment,thereisan
expectationthatresponseswillgenuinelyaddresstheissuesraisedandcivilservants
inthedepartmentworkbehindthescenesonprovidinganswerstoparliamentary
questionsbyundertakinginvestigationand/orresearch.Allegationsweremadein
1994thatsomeMPswereoperatingthroughconsultants,offeringtheirservicesas
MPs,includingaskingsuchquestionsforfinancialadvantage
45
.Itshouldbepointed
outthatitisnosecretthatasignificantnumberofConservativeMPs,andsome
LabourandLiberalDemocratshavelinkswithbusiness.Equally,theParliamentary
Labourpartywasformedtofurthertheaimsofthetradeunionmovementandother
affiliatedbodiesontheleftofpolitics.TheproblemwasthatanumberofMPswere
presentingthemselvesasconsultants,andwereactingthroughagentswithout
declaringthis role. In return for payments they promised to raise issues in
Parliament.Theconcernwasnotonlythattherehadbeennodeclarationofinterest,
butalsothatthishadthepotentialtointerferewithanMPsmainjob,namely,to
representtheinterestsoftheirconstituents.FollowingLordNolansreportithasbeen
establishedasamatterofprinciplethatMPsdeclareanypersonalinterestinamatter
broughtbeforeParliament.Thiswasregardedasanimportantissue,notonlybecause
itwasanabuseoftheirposition,butalsobecauseitraisedthewholequestionof
undeclaredinterests.
LordNolan,aseniorjudgefromthejudicialpanelintheHouseofLords,was
giventhetaskofinvestigatingthisissueandothermattersrelatingtotheroleofMPs.
Hewasgiventhetaskofreformulatingguidelinesinrespecttotheregulationofthe
conductofMPsandhewasresponsibleforsettingupTheCommitteeonStandards
inPublicLife.LordNolanidentifiedpublicduty,selflessness,integrity,objectivity,
accountabilityandopenness,honestyandleadershipasformingtheprincipleswhich
shouldunderpinthecodesofpracticethatshouldbeappliedtoMPs.Membersof
ParliamentarerequirednottobringtheirofficeasMembersofParliamentinto
disrepute.Forthispurposearegisterofmembersinterestsispublishedandthereare
strictrulesgoverningthefinancialintereststhathavetobedeclared.Failuretofully

45
AhandfulofConservativeMPshadreceivedcashforaskingquestionsinParliamenton
behalfofprivateindividuals,includingMohammedAlFayedtheownerofHarrods.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
disclosesuchinterestsisregardedasaseriousmatterwhichwillleadtodisciplinary
action
46
.
TheParliamentaryCommissionerforStandardshasaninvestigatoryroleand
MPsarerequiredtocooperatewithanyinvestigationthatisundertaken
47
.The
StandardsCommissionerperformsthefunctionspreviouslycarriedoutbyseparate
SelectCommitteesonMembersInterestsandonPrivileges.Thesecommitteeswere
combined in 1995, with the formation of a new House of Commons Select
CommitteeonStandardsandPrivileges.Itischairedbyarespectedmemberofthe
opposition(11Members,quorum5,withthepowertoappointsub-committees).In
July1996theHouseadoptedtheCommitteesproposalsforaCodeofConductfor
MemberswhichwasaccompaniedbyaGuidetotheRulesrelatingtotheconductof
Members.ThisCommitteeoverseestheworkofanewofficeroftheHouseof
Commons,theParliamentaryCommissionerforStandards,SirPhilipMawer.Heis
responsibleforthemaintenanceoftheRegisterofMembersInterestsandadvises
MPsontheregistrationrequirements,buthealsohasthetaskinvestigatingspecific
complaintsabouttheconductofMPs.TheCommitteeonStandardsconsiders
mattersrelatingtotheconductofMembers,includingspecificcomplaintsabout
MembersconductwhichhavebeenmadetotheCommissionerandreferredbyhim
totheCommittee.Inparticular,theCommitteehaspowertoordertheattendanceof
anyMemberofParliamentbeforethecommittee,andtorequirethatspecific
documentsorrecordsinthepossessionofaMemberrelatingtoitsinquiries,ortothe
inquiriesoftheCommissioner,belaidbeforetheCommittee.Inrecentyearsunder
Labourasteadystreamofcaseshavebeenreferredforinvestigation.Manyofthese
casehaveconcernedthefailuretoregisterinterests.Membershavebeendisciplined
fornotdoingso.Thereisahighlevelofcompliancewiththepublishedguidelines.
Forexample,in2006thefailureofDeputyPrimeMinister,JohnPrescott,todeclare
astayontheranchofanAmericantycoon(whohadpreviouslyexpressedabusiness
interestinagovernmentsponsoredproject)attractedmuchattentioninthepress.The
investigationandreportbytheCommissionerdemonstratethattheseproceduresare

46
SeeFirstReportoftheCommitteeonStandardsinPublicLifeCm2850,1995.

47
SeeP.LeopoldStandardsofConductinPublicLifeinJ.JowellandD.Oliver(eds.)5th
edn.The Changing Constitution, Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2004atp.423ff.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
strictlyenforced,butalsorevealsthecomplexityandambiguityofsomeoftherules
governingwhatministersareexpectedtoenterontheregister
48
.Thepublicationof
theproceedings/hearingsofthecommitteeanditsreportswhicharealsoroutinely
availableontheinternetactsasadeterrent.
TheuncodifiedUKconstitutionreliesentirelyonconventionsandcodesof
practicetodetermineministerialconduct.TheMinisterialCodeofPracticerequires
Ministerstobehaveaccordingtothehigheststandardsofconstitutionalandpersonal
conductintheperformanceoftheirduties.Ministersarepersonallyresponsiblefor
decidinghowtoactandconductthemselvesinthelightoftheCodeandfor
justifyingtheiractionsandconductinParliament.Itisclearthatthis:Codeisnota
rulebook,anditisnottheroleoftheSecretaryoftheCabinetorotherofficialsto
enforceitortoinvestigateMinistersalthoughtheymayprovideMinisterswith
privateadviceonmatterswhichitcovers.
49
Ministersholdofficesubjecttoretaining
theconfidenceofthePrimeMinister,butifsubstantialwrongdoingemerges,the
positionofaministermayrapidlybecomeuntenableandaresignationwilloften
follow.DavidBlunkettwhowasoneofPrimeMinisterBlairsseniorministers
servesasanexcellentexample.Heresignedtwiceoveraperiodoftwoyears.Onthe
firstoccasioninDecember2004itwasconfirmedfollowinganindependentreport
byasenioracademicthatasHomeSecretaryhehadimproperlyintervenedtospeed
upthepassportapplicationofhisloversmaid.Thisbecamearesignationmatternot
simplybecausehisinterventionwasaninappropriateuseofhisministerialposition,
butalsobecausehehadmadecategoricaldenialsinrespectofanyimpropriety.On
thesecondoccasionin2005,hehadfailedtorevealadirectorshipandinvestment
interest.ItwasallegedthatastheministerresponsibleforWorksandPensionswhich
includedtheChildSupportAgencyhisdirectorshipDNABiosciencecreateda
possibleconflictofinterest.Heshouldhavetakenadvicefromabodycalledthe
AdvisoryCommitteeofBusinessAppointmentsandmadethisinterestknownona
registerofinterests.ThematterwasinvestigatedbytheCabinetSecretary(Headof
theCivilService)whoconfirmedtheoversightandaresignation,onceagain
followed.GiventheconcernswithcomplianceraisedinrelationtotheThai

48
SelectCommitteeonStandardsandPriviliges,thirteenthreport,20July,2006.

49
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/propriety_and_ethics/ministers/ministerial_code/1.asp.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo

Constitution,aninterestingcontrastcanbemaderelatingtowhatmightbecalled
constitutionalisminaction.UKministersoverstepthemarkattimes.Iftheydoand
theirconductisdiscoveredaprocessofinvestigationfollows.Shouldthisreveal
wrongdoing(especiallywherepersonalintegrityisconcerned)aresignationfollows.
Indeed,adistinctionshouldbedrawnherebetweenpersonalintegrity,where
resignationwillbeprecipitated,andmattersofpoliticaljudgmentbecauseunderthe
conventionofindividualministerialresponsibility,althoughtheministeris
accountableandanswerabletoParliamentfortheshortcomingofherdepartment
resignationsrarelytakeplaceinresponsetopolicyfailureordepartmental
incompetence.

PoliticalParties,
PoliticalCultureandConstitutionalLimits
Thefundingofpoliticalpartieshasbeenamatterofconsiderableconcernin
recentyears.IntheUKtheLabourPartyhastraditionallyreceivedasubstantial
proportionofitsfundingfromtheTradeUnionmovementbutinrecentyearsithas
alsoraisedsubstantialamountsfromprivatebusinessdonations.Notwithout
accusationsofimproprietyarising.TheLabourgovernmentchangeditspolicyto
allowFormula1tocontinuebeingsponsoredbytobaccomanufacturers.Later,it
transpiredthatBernardEcclestonesorganisationwhichrunsformulaoneracinghad
donateda?1milliontotheparty.TheLabourPartyleadershipfacedstrongcriticism
whichledtothereturnofthedonoation.TheConservativeparty,ontheotherhand,
hastendedtoreceivemostofitssupportfrombigbusiness.Theconcernherewas
thattherewasnorequirementtodeclarethesourceofdonations,anditwas
suspectedthatsomeofthelargestbusinesssubscriberstothepartywerefrom
overseas.ThePoliticalParties,ElectionsandReferendumsAct2000regulatesthe
conductofpoliticalpartiesandestablishesanelectioncommissiontooverseethe
electoralprocess.TheActalsorequirespoliticalpartiestoberegisteredandit
imposesrestrictionsonthesourceofdonationstopreventforeignandanonymous
supportforpoliticalparties.TheActfurtherrequiresthatanydonationover?5000to
apoliticalpartyisdeclared.BoththeLabourandConservativepartieshavefaced
criticismfollowingthe2005electionforacceptingloansfromdonorsinorderto
circumventtheprovisionsofthisact.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e

BywayofcontrastIwouldliketobrieflyturntothesituationinThailand
regardingpoliticalparties,fundingandconflictsofinterest.Thevastmajorityof
constitutionssetoutaframeworkofruleswhich,ifappliedandinterpretedinthe
spiritintended,wouldproduceifnotaversionofliberaldemocracy,atleast
conditionsofgoodgovernance.Thepointtostressisthatanyconstitutionneedsto
besupportedbymechanismswhichallowthecommitmentsinthetexttobe
implemented.Inmanyconstitutionsthereisasignificantgulfbetweenthestatement
intheconstitutionandactualcompliance.Inthemajorityofcasesitisachieving
substantialconformitywiththerulesthatbecomesthecrucialissue.Inthecaseof
Thailandtherearecertainpreconditionstotheformationofanyfutureconstitution
whichhavetoberecognisedandwhichhavenotyetbeenreached.Someofthese
factorsfallwithintheremitofafutureconstitution,otherscannotbeachievedby
constitutionalmeansalone.Forexample,thefollowingissueswhichwerenotdealt
withsatisfactorilyunderthepreviousconstitutioncouldbeaddressedunderfuture
articles.
(1)Moreeffectiveprovisionstogovernthefundingofpoliticalpartiesand
politicians.Theobjectivewouldbetoaddressthisissueintheconstitution,
andthenintroducelegislationwhichimposedlimitsonthoseinvolvedinthe
politicalprocess.Thegoalwouldbetocreateanapproximatelylevel
playingfieldfortheplayersofthepoliticalgame.
(2)Proceduresmightbeintroducedtoovercomeproblemsofconflictsof
interestbetweenpolitician,mediaandbusiness.Aregisterofinterestscould
beintroducedandenforced.Inparticular,politicianswhoaccepthighoffice
ingovernmentwouldberequiredtoaccepttheeliminationofconflictsof
interest.Mechanismscouldbeintroducedforenforcingsuchmeasures(e.g.
theequivalenttotheideaofblindtrusts).Tostandarealisticchanceof
successprofessionalpoliticiansneedtobeadequatelyremunerated.
Itisnoteasytomakepartiesstablewithoutthemhavingfirmroots.The90day
ruleunderthe1997constitutioninonesensecontributedtostrongerparties,because
itrequiredacandidatefortheLowerHousetobeamemberofapoliticalpartyforat
least90dayspriortothenextelection.Thisrulewasdesignedtopreventparty-
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
hoppingpriortoanewelectionwhichhadbeenaseriousprobleminThailand.
Factionshadbeeninthehabitofsearchingforbestpoliticalopportunities.Any
factionthatsoughttochangepartywouldnowbedisqualifiediftheprimeminister
calledasnapelectionsoonafteritabandonedthecoalition.The90-dayrule
constrainedMPsintheiractionsanditensuredthatanygoverningcoalitionwould
remainintact.However,theproblemgoesmuchdeeperthanthis.Politicalpartiesin
Thailandneedtohavemuchgreaterlegitimacy.Theyneedagenuinepowerbase
allowingthemtobeabletochallengeeachother(perhapsincombinations)as
governmentandopposition.Innearlyallsuccessfulliberaldemocraticsystemsthe
effectivenessofparliamentarymechanismsdependsonahealthytensionbetween
governmentandoppositiongroupings.Inordertoachievesuchlegitimacy,parties
shouldbeestablishedaroundcoreprincipleswithacommitmenttoachieving
politicalendsandtheissueofstatefundingforpoliticalunderstrictcontrolcouldbe
considered.Theexistenceofpartiesmustreachbeyondtheagendaofsingle
individuals.Thelaunchandregistrationofpartiesinthefuturemightbebasedonthe
representationofinterestse.g.tradeunions,farmers,businesses,ethnicgroupsand/or
therealisationofsocialandeconomicgoals.Recognitionunderafutureconstitution
mightinvolveapapercommitmenttodemocraticprinciples,buttransforming
politicalpracticesisnotsimplyaregulatoryissue.Itisalsoamatterofpolitical
culture.Theexpectationofpoliticiansandvoterswouldhavetobeadjustedinorder
forchoicesattheballotboxtobebasedonselectedpolicypreferencesratherthanon
financialpledges.

ConflictsofInterestandtheMedia
Akeyhallmarkofliberaldemocraticsystemsistherecognitionoffreedomof
thepressandthebroadcastingmedia.Itisworthmentioningtheroleofpressand
broadcastingmediainrelationtothepoliticalprocessandobservinghowthisis
regulatedundertheUKconstitution.First,thereisarighttofreeexpression,
includedunderArticle10oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights,whichhas
becomeintegratedaspartofdomesticlawsincetheenactmentoftheHumanRights
Act1998.Althoughthisfreedommightbelimitedunderspecificlaws(e.g.
incitementtoracialhatredordefamation)freedomofexpressionmustallowfora
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
eo
generalrighttoprojectopinionsthroughthepublicationofnewspapers,pamphlets,
magazinesandthroughaccesstotelevision,radioandcinema.Themagnificationof
thepoliticalfunctionofthemediamightbeunderstoodintermsofits:capacity
todiscoverandpublishwhatauthoritywishedtokeepquiet,andtogiveexpression
topublicfeelingswhichwerenot,orcouldnotbe,articulatedbytheformal
mechanismsofdemocracy
50
.Itisthispotentialtoinvestigateandplace
informationinthepublicdomainwhichhasturnedthebroadcastingmediaandthe
pressintomajoractorsonthepublicscene.Politiciansemploythemassmediato
furthertheirendswithinstrictlimits,buttheyshouldalsobeextremelywaryofthe
capacityofthepressandbroadcastingmediatobringthemightydownbyrooting
outincompetenceandwrongdoing.ThedemiseofRichardNixonasPresidentofthe
UnitedStates,followingtheexposureoftheWatergatebreakin,anditscoverup,isa
classicexampleofinvestigatoryreportingprovidingthebasisforsubsequentofficial
actioneventuallyresultinginthePresidentsresignation.Ministerialresignationsin
recentyearshavebeenattributableinpartatleast,tocampaignspursuedinthepress
andbroadcastingmedia
51
.Inotherwords,inapositivewaythemediaiscapableof
actingasanimportantcounterweighttogovernmentinasystemwhere,theexecutive
organsofthestatearestrong.
Thiscapacityofthemediatoactasacheckonthedemocraticprocessis
clearlyveryimportant.RecentexperienceinThailandandalsoinItalyhavedrawn
attentiontopotentialproblemsiftheindependenceofthebroadcastingmediais
undermined.Ithasbeenpointedoutthatinanyliberaldemocracythecorruptionof
information-throughtheoverwhelmingcontrolofthemedia,especiallytelevision,
bothprivateandstate-isapre-conditionforthedebasementoftheentiresystem
52
.
Stateinstitutionsoperatingunderanyconstitutionwillnotabletowithstandthe
conflictsofinterestthatariseifpoliticiansareelectedwithsubstantialmedia
interestswhichareallowedtoremainintheirhands.Section39-41ofthe1997
Constitutionhadnoforceinasituationwheretheofficialoppositionwasdenieda
mouthpieceforitscriticismthroughthedominationofbroadcastingmediaby

50
E.HobsbawnThe Age of Extremes,London,Abacus,1994,p.581.

51
OnesuchexamplewastheresignationoftheSecretaryofStateforTransportinMay2002.

52
M.JacquesTheMostDangerousManinEuropeThe Guardian,5April2006.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
governmentinterests
53
.
IntheUKtherearenospecificconstitutionalsafeguardsbuttherearesome
clearrulesthatapplyinregardtothepoliticalgame.First,asMembersofParliament
ministersalreadyhaveadutytoactintheinterestsofthenationsasawhole,aswell
asspecialdutiestotheirconstituents.Second,aswehaveseenaboveunderthe
ministerialcodeofpractice,allministers,includingthePrimeMinister,mustensure
thatnoconflictarises,orappearstoarise,betweentheirpublicdutiesandtheir
privateinterests.Thelistofdeclaredpersonalinterestsmustcoverallkindsof
financialinterests,aswellasrelevantnon-financialprivateinterests,suchaslinks
withoutsideorganisations(includingbroadcastingorganisations).
Therehaveneverbeenanyformalrestrictionsonprivateownershipoftheprint
mediaandthepressissubjecttoaformofself-regulationcarriedoutbethePress
ComplaintsCommission.Manynationalnewspaperscontinuetobestronglypartisan.
Forexample,theDailyTelegraphandDailyMailhaveconsistentlysupportedthe
ConservativeParty,whiletheDailyMirrorhasendorsedLabour.Newspapersreflect
theviewsoftheirownersintheireditorials,andtheyseektoinfluencethepolitical
opinionsoftheirreaders,especiallyatelectiontimes.However,bywayofcontrast,
cinema,radioandtelevisionhavebeensubjecttovaryingkindsofstatutory
regulation.Technicalprogresshasmadethemediaincreasinglydifficulttocontrol.
Suchregulationhastoaddresstheconflictsofinterestthatinevitablyariseinthe
quest to open up markets by allowing bidding for broadcast channels.The
CommunicationsAct2003laysdowntheconditionsforthegrantingoflicencesand,
indoingso,itsetslimitsoncrossmediaownership(e.g.combiningprintmediawith

53
AccordingtoDr.SupongLimtanakoolwritinginthe Bangkok Poston4January2006
therearethreeverydistinctmethodsofcensorshipmostwidelyusedinThailand:(1)
Outrightpurchaseofthemedia.Directcontrolisutilizedtoblockoutanynegativenews
coverageofthepeopleinpower;(2)Partialcontrolbyrecruitingmajorshareholdersof
thatparticularmediatojointhegovernment.Thus,makingsurethatnopresscoverage
fromanti-governmentoroppositionparties;(3)Leveragecontrolbynotgranting
advertisingbudgetstoanti-governmentmedia.Most,ifnotallbudgetswillgotopro-
governmentmediadeprivingtheanti-governmentpresswithextracushionofeasymoney
iftheyBEHAVE.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ea
broadcastmedia)
54
.Equally,thelegislationseekstoprotectawiderpublicinterestby
controllingtheeditorialline.Itsetsoutspecialimpartialityrequirementsrelatingto
electionsandreferendums
55
.Further,itrequiresthatthenewsgenerallyonbroadcast
televisionandradioisreportedwithdueaccuracy
56
.Moreover,theOfficeof
Communications(OFCOM)asregulatorisunderastatutorydutytoensurethatits
licenseesdonotprojecttheirownviewsonpoliticallycontroversialmatters.Ina
democraticsystemthereneedstobeastrongpublicinterestdimensiontostate
regulationinthisfield.
In addi t i on, t here are mechani sms i n pl ace t o safeguard t he rel at i ve
independenceoftheBBCasstatebroadcaster.TheBBCisrequiredtobeimpartial.It
mustrefrainfromexpressingitsownopiniononcurrentaffairsoronmattersof
publicpolicy
57
.ThecorporationoperatesunderarenewableRoyalCharterwhich
requiresthegovernorsoftheBBCtoactasregulatorsandmakesthemultimately
responsibleforitsmanagement(Thedirector-generalappointedbythegovernorsis
responsiblefortheday-to-dayrunningoftheorganisation).Tominimisepolitical
manipulationtheappointmentprocessforBBCgovernorsisconductedundercertain
guidelines(Nolanprinciples)
58
bytheOfficeoftheCommissionerforPublic
Appointments(OCPA).Aftertheinterviewingprocessrecommendationsareput
forwardtotheSecretaryofStateforMediaandCulture,andthentothePrime
Minister
59
.

54
CommunicationsAct2003,chapter5.
55
Ibid.

56
CommunicationsAct2003ss.319and320.

57
G.RobertsonandA.NicolMedia Law,London,Penguin,2002,p.826.

58
Theseare:selflessness,integrity,objectivity,accountability,openness,honesty,leadership.

59
TheHuttonInquiry(2004)intothedeathofgovernmentscientistDavidKellyin2003
exposedthetensionwhichoftenexistsbetweentheBBCandthegovernmentoverthe
reportingofnewsandcurrentaffairs.SeeA.DoigandM.PhythianTheHuttonInquiry:
OriginandIssuesParliamentary Affairs Vol58,No.1,2005,104-108.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ea
Insum,inthedomainofbroadcastingtheBBCandotherbroadcasterscanact
asaconduitforcriticismofpoliticiansaslongasthiscriticismisnotpartofan
agendasetbythebroadcaster.Despitetheabsenceofaconstitutioncitizensare
generallyabletoexpressthemselvesandthefreedomofthepressandbroadcastersto
disseminateinformationintheUKisconstrainedbyanintricatecombinationof
formalregulationandinformalsafeguards.Arevisionofbroadcastingprovisionand
regulationisclearlygoingtobeoffundamentalimportancetothenextstageinThai
constitutionalreform.Anethosofindependentstatebroadcastingwouldbethegoal
toaimfor.Astatebroadcastingorganisationprotectedundertheconstitutionatarms
lengthfrominterference,withamandatetoreportnewsandcurrentaffairsfrom
differingviewpointsmightbeoneaspect.Constitutionalprovisionandstatutoryrules
limitingcrossmediaownershipandmonopolymediadominationisanothercrucial
element.Ageneralrequirementapplyingtoallbroadcastersrequiringbalancednews
reportingnomatterwhattheownershipoftheorganisationis.Strictrulesapplyingto
thecoverageofelectionstoensureallrecognisedpartiesreceiveafairdegreeof
coverage.SomereferencemightbemadetotheUKcasewhenconsideringthe
obviouspreconditionstoasuccessfuldemocraticsysteminThailand.

FreedomofInformation
ThecaseforaFreedomofInformationActiseasytomakeinoppositionbut
t he consequences of i mpl ement i ng a FOI regi me are di ffi cul t t o accept i n
government.AfarreachingFOIwasinprospectfollowingthe1997election.A
radicalapproachtodisclosurewasoutwiththepublicationofWhitePaperProposals,
buttheinterventionofthecivilserviceresultedinsignificantqualificationsbythe
timethelegislationreachedthestatutebook.ThepointisthatinThailand,asinthe
UK,thetransparencywithwhichtheentirepublicserviceoperateshasanimportant
impactondeliveringadequateconstitutionalaccountability.IntheUKthe
conventionofministerialresponsibilitywherebyministersareanswerabledirectlyto
Parliament,hingesonanobligationtoprovideinformation.Theoppositionparties
pickuponmismanagementandincompetenceandthepressgiveoxygentothese
mattersastheyareseentoarise.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e<
TheFreedomofInformationAct2000s.1providesageneralrightofaccessto
informationheldbypublicauthorities,includinggovernmentdepartments
60
.Aswith
alllegislationofthiskind,itistheextentofthelimitsthatarereallyimportant.
UnderPartIIoftheActprovisionismadefortwocategoriesofexemptions
61
.This
fallsintotwocategoriesastheeffectoftheprovisionsdiffersdependingonwhether
thesectionsconferabsoluteexemptionornot
62
.Inessence,adistinctionisdrawn
betweentheareaswhichhaveanabsoluteexemption,wheretheneedtobalancethe
publicinterestindisclosureagainstthepublicinterestinmaintainingtheexemption
doesnotarise.Thiscoversinformationrelatingtosecuritymatters
63
andnational
security
64
.ForthesecategoriesacertificatesignedbyaCabinetminister,the
Attorney-General,theAttorney-GeneralforNorthernIrelandortheAdvocate
GeneralforScotlandcertifyingthattheexemptionisnecessaryisregardedas
conclusiveevidence
65
.Althoughthereissomescopeforchallengebeforethe
InformationTribunalthegroundsareverynarrow.Forthesecondcategoryof
exemptions,theapplicationforinformationhastobebalancedagainstthepublic
interestinrefusingdisclosure.Atestofprejudicehastobesatisfiedtojustifynon-

60
Foracriticaloverviewsee:SPalmerFreedomofInformation:ANewConstitutional
Landscape?inNBamforthandPLeyland(eds)PublicLawinaMulti-LayeredConstitu-
tion,Oxford,HartPublishing,2003;RAustinTheFreedomofInformationAct2000-A
SheepinWolfsClothinginJJowellandDOliver(eds.)The Changing Constitution, 5th
edn.,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2004.

61
Informationisalsoexemptedifitisaccessiblebyothermeans,orifitisintendedfor
futurepublication.

62
Section26dealswiththeeffectoftheexemptionsinPartII.

63
Section23i.e.,thesecretintelligenceservices,thegovernmentcommunication
headquarters,thenationalcriminalintelligenceservice.

64
Section24.

65
AnyrightofappealtotheInformationTribunalwoulddependonestablishingthatthe
ministerdidnothavereasonablegroundsforissuingthecertificate.Thiswillbevery
difficulttoestablishiftheinformationremainsconfidential.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
disclosure
66
.Theareasthatareexemptedareverywideranging,asthefollowinglist
illustrates:defence;communicationswiththeRoyalfamily;allpoliticaladvice;
internationalrelations;relationsbetweentheparliamentsandassembliesoftheUK,
Scotland,WalesandNorthernIreland;theeconomy;investigationsbythepoliceand
customsandexcise;courtrecords;commercialinformation;healthandsafety;andall
personalinformationandinformationprovidedtogovernmentinconfidence.Under
theFOItheInformationCommissionercanrulethatmaterialshouldbeavailablein
thepublicinterestbutashortcominginthelegislationisthattheministerretainsan
ultimatevetooveranysuchdecision
67
.
AnimportantissueconcerningFreedomofInformationwhichrelatestothe
operationofthesysteminThailandunderSection59oftheConstitutionandtheThai
OfficialInformationAct1997(longdelaysbetweenapplicationanddisclosureisa
commonexperiencewithnoeffectivemeansofenforcement)isthattheUKAct
imposesastricttimeframefortheresponsetoinformationrequests,anditimposes
limitsontheamountthatcanbechargedfortheproductionofinformation.TheUK
FOIintroducestheideaofpublicationschemesforpublicbodies.Inotherwords,it
requirescertaincategoriesofinformationtobeplacedbygovernmentandlocal
governmentintothepublicdomainandtheInformationCommissionerintheUK,
whoisstrictlyindependentoftheexecutive,providesguidelinesandsupervisesthe
disclosureofinformationunderthesepublicationschemes.TheOfficialInformation
CommissioninThailandisunderthedirectionofthePrimeMinisterbutthe
InformationDisclosureTribunaltowhichappealsareaddressedismeanttobe
independentoftheexecutive.

66
Itwasarguedbyadvocatesoffreedomofinformationthata substantialprejudicetest,
asincorporatedintheFreedomofInformation(Scotland)Act2002e.g.s.28ands.30
enactedbytheScottishParliament,wouldhavemadethesuppressionofinformationby
governmentmorediffcult.Seee.g.,Austin2004atp.409.

67
PBirkinshawFreedom of Information: The Law, the Practice and the Ideal,London,
Butterworths,2001,seee.g.,p.171.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
SeparationofPowers
ThehistoricalofficeofLordChancellorwasanobviousanomalyintheUK
system.AtoneandthesametimetheLordChancellorbrokealltherulesconcerning
separationofpowers.Aseniorcabinetministerheadinganexecutivedepartment
withultimateresponsibilityforthecourts,likeallotherministerswithaseatin
ParliamentbutalsotheSpeakeroftheHouseofLords.AtthesametimetheLord
ChancellorwasajudgewitharighttositontheappellatecommitteeoftheHouseof
Lords,thehighestnationalcourt.Inareformedconstitutionwhichincluded
devolutionandtheHRAtheconflictofroleswasbecomingincreasinglydifficultto
reconcile.Forexample,followingtheintroductionoftheHRA1998which
incorporatedtheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsintodomesticlaw.Thefact
thattheLordChancellorasanactivevotingmemberoftheHouseofLordssaton
appealshispresencehadthepotentialpotentiallyinterferedwiththelitigantsright
underArticle6oftheconventiontofairtrial.Therehavebeensomechangestothe
terminologyi.e.theLordChancellorsdepartmenthasbecometheDepartmentof
ConstitionalAffairsbutthereformsareverysignificantintheirownright,andthey
havebeenconfirmedwiththepassageoftheConstitutionalReformAct2005.
(1)TheLordChancellorcanlongersitasajudgeandthejudgesintheHouseof
Lordswhopresentlyhavetherighttositasjudgeswillbethelastjudges
witharighttositinParliamentwhileservingasjudges.
(2)TheappellatejudicialpaneloftheHouseofLordswillbereplacedin2009
byanewappellatecourt.ItwillbecalledtheUKSupremeCourtwithanew
buildingandaswellasexistingeligiblelawlords,itwillcompriseapanel
ofjudgesnolongerentitledtositaspartofthelegislature.Thenewcourt
willnotbeaconstitutionalcourt.UndertheUKcommonlawsystemthe
highestcourthasacrucialroleinsettingprecedentsandinterpreting
legislationbutconstitutionalquestionscannotberoutinelyreferredtothis
courtforresolutionexceptdevolutionissueswhichariseundertheScotland
Act,GovernmentofWalesActandNorthernIrelandAct.TheSupreme
Courtwillnothaveenhancedpowerse.g.tooverrideParliament.
(3)TheHouseofLordshasanelectedSpeakerfromJuly2006.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
(4)AlthoughtheLordChancellorhastherighttointerveneonlimitedgrounds
toobjecttojudicialselection(nottoproposeanalternativecandidate)the
maintaskofselectingjudgeshasbeenhandedovertoanindependent
JudicialAppointmentsCommission.Specialcommitteeswillbeformedto
makethehighestjudicialappointmentsandthesecommitteeswillhavethe
functionofproposingcandidatesforfinalpoliticalapproval.
ThemeasurescontainedintheConstitutionalReformAct2005withthe
emphasisonseparationofpowersmightbeseentohavecertainparallelswiththe
situationinThailand.Theideabehindthe1997constitutionwastohaveaclear
separationofpowersbetweenlegislature,executiveandjudiciarybutalsowith
potentindependentwatchdogbodiesandcourtstopolicetheelectoralprocessand
the political game. If the decision of the NCCC had been allowed to stand
unchallengedintheConstitutionalcourtfollowingthe2001electioninThailandthe
resultwouldhavebeenaredcard,namely,automaticsuspensionfrompoliticsfor
fiveyearsoperatingwithimmediateeffect.Thaksinwouldhavebeendeprivedofthe
premiership.Theconstitutionwouldhaveprevailedovertheattemptstosubvertits
processes.Notwithstandinganyimproperinfluenceonthecourt,thiswasnotan
easydecisionfortheConstitutionalCourttotakebecausethePrimeMinisterhad
beenreturnedasthepopularchoiceinanelection.However,thedecisioninfavourof
ThaksindespitemanysimilarcasesbythecourtendorsingtheNCCCsdecisions
raisedquestionsastowhethertheConstitutionalCourtitselfhadbeensubjectedto
unduepressure.Fortheruleoflawtobeseentooperatethereisarequirementofa
clearseparationofpowersandfunctionsbetweentheexecutiveandjudicial
branches.

Conclusion
TherehavealreadybeentoomanydifferentThaiconstitutions.Itshouldbe
apparentthatre-draftingtheconstitutionwillnot,initself,providetheanswersto
whataredeepseatedproblemsassociatedwiththeexerciseofpoliticalpowerin
Thailand.Therearemanyconstitutionalists,academics,lawyersandquiteafew
politicianswhohaverecognisedthevirtuesofthepreviousconstitution,especially
whenitwasfirstpromulgated.Thechallengenexttimeroundistoreformthe
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
constitutionwherenecessarybut,aboveall,toembedaspiritofconstitutionalism
based on the acceptance of democratic principles and the rule of law.The
constitutionmustbeinterpretedinthesensethatanywrongdoingisprosecutedwith
equalvigournomatterwhoisresponsibleforit.Wehaveglancedattheradical
reformsoftheUKconstitutionandseenhowthesechangeshaveamomentumof
theirown,butitshouldbeequallyclearthatinthelastdecadeorsosettingoutcodes
ofpractice,guidelinesandregulatingabusehavebeenanequallyimportant
preoccupation.ForallitsimperfectionstheUKconstitutionisheldtogetherby
establishedlawsandconventions.Indeed,ithasoneexampleaboveallothersthatis
worthfollowing.Alltheparticipantsintheconstitutionalgame(government,
opposition,civilservants,military,policeetc.)acceptthesamerulesofengagement,
perhapssometimestheymaydosoreluctantly,butatsomelevelthereisadeep
respectforthespiritoftheconstitution.
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
I.INTRODUCTION
68
A ccordingtoanoldjoke,apatrongoesintoalibraryandasksforacopyofthe
FrenchConstitution,onlytobetoldthatthelibrarydoesnotstockperiodicals.The
jokecapturesatypicalAnglo-AmericanviewofFranceasacountrywithsuspect
democraticcredentials,moreconcernedwithfashionandformthansubstance.Yet
TheLifespan
ofWrittenConstitutions
TomGinsburg,
Zachary Elkins, James Melton
University of Illinois

68
Thispaperispartofalargerprojecttounderstandtheoriginsandcharacteristicsof
writtenconstitutions,bothpastandpresent,formostindependentstates(http://netfles.
uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions).Onecomponentoftheprojectisthecollectionofdataon
thecharacteristicsofconstitutionsformoststatesintheworld.Thedatawillbeuseful
inunderstandingtheoriginsandconsequencesofconstitutions.Inparticular,wewillbe
abledrawinferencesaboutlearninganddiffusionbasedonobservedsimilaritiesacross
Constitutions.Inordertodefinethesampleforthisproject,wehaveidentifiedthe
promulgationdatesofallconstitutionsandmajoramendmentsforthecountriesinthe
sample.Thoseconstitutionalchronologiesareourfocusinthispaper.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
eo
FranceismoretypicalofnationalconstitutionalpracticethantheUnitedStateswith
itsvenerable217-yearoldconstitution.Byourestimate,nationalconstitutionshave
lastedanaverageofonlysixteenyearssince1789.
69
Thisisanunsettlingestimateof
lifeexpectancyforadocumentwhosebasicfunctionsaretoexpressguidingnational
principles,establishbasicrules,andlimitthepowerofgovernmentallofwhich
presupposeconstitutionallongevity.
Ofcourse,theoptimallifespanofaconstitutionisnotobvious,andinsome
casesthereareverygoodreasonsforacomprehensivereview,ifnotreplacement,of
suchdocuments.Onbalance,however,constitutionsthatendureshouldbemore
likelytopromoteeffective,equitable,andstabledemocracy.Withthisbackground
assumption,whichweexamineinmoredepthbelow,weexploretheconstitutional
chronologiesofnation-statesinordertounderstandtheoriginsanddurabilityof
constitutionalsystems.Howdurableareconstitutionsandwhatfactorsleadtotheir
demise?Inparticular,ourconcerniswhetheraspectsofthe designofconstitutions
haveanysignificanteffectonconstitutionaldurabilitynetofotherriskfactors.
Thesequestionsarenotmerelyofacademicinterest.Recentconstitutional
draftingexercisesinAfghanistan(2003)andIraq(2004and2005)havebeencentral
milestonesofAmericanforeignpolicy.Eachoftheseeffortssoughttosolve
particularinstitutionalproblems,withdifferentlevelsofsuccess.
70
Itis,ofcourse,
tooearlytosaywhethereitheroftheseconstitutionswillsurvivetoadulthood,but
circumstancesdonotappearpropitiousineithercountry.Inafarlessvolatile
contextlastmonth,the1997ConstitutionofThailandconsideredbymanyamodel
ofinstitutionaldesignadoptedwithextensivecitizenparticipationdiedapeaceful

69
16.1tobeprecise.Themedianlifespanisonlyeightyears.

70
TheparticularapproachoftheIraqiconstitutionpostponingmostofthecrucialdecisions
untilafterapost-constitutionalelectionthattheSunnihadnohopeofwinningmayhave
exacerbatedthepoliticalconflictthere.MeanwhileinKabul,thenewAfghanconstitution,
adoptedin2003,appearedtobefaringmuchbetter.Althoughthesecuritysituationis
worseningasofthiswriting,PresidentKarzaihasexploitedconstitutionalpowerto
appointgovernorstoconsolidatehisholdonpowerandsidelinenumerousregional
warlordswhohadbeenconsideredthelargestthreattothecountrysstability.Onemight
seethegreatestthreattotheAfghanconstitutionisexogenoustotheconstitution,whilethe
greatestthreattotheIraqiconstitutionisendogenous.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
deathinabloodlesscoupattheageofnine.
71
Understandingwhatleadstosuch
instances,andinparticularwhetherdesignchoicesmatter,hasthepotentialtoinform
ascienceofconstitutionaldesign(Horowitz2001).
Thispaperproceedsasfollows.Thenextsectiondefinesconstitutionsfor
purposesofouranalysis,focusingonwrittenconstitutionaltexts.Thedefinitionis
necessarilyincomplete,butinourviewalimitedconceptisnecessarytoanswerthe
questionssetoutabove.Next,inPartIII,webrieflydiscussthenormativeissues
aroundconstitutionallongevity.PartIVprovidessomedataonconstitutional
durationinvariouscountriesandidentifiesregionalvariation.Italsoprovidessome
evidenceastotherelationshipbetweenpoliticalandconstitutionalchange.PartV
providesatheoryofdurability,identifyinginternalandexternalriskfactorsfor
constitutions.PartVIpresentsanempiricalanalysis.

II.CONCEPTUALIZINGCONSTITUTIONS
WhatisaConstitution?Thefloodofinstitutionalresearchoverthelasttwo
decadeshasexpandedanddilutedtheconceptsomewhat.Formany,constitutions
havebecomeshorthandforpoliticalinstitutionsmoregenerally(e.g.,Perssonand
Tabellini2004).RecentConstitutionslikethatofBrazils1988document,which
attempttoconstitutionalizenearlyeveryaspectofpubliclife,havenothelpedto
circumscribetheirmeaning.OthercountriessuchasBritainand,untilrecently,
SaudiArabia,haveunwrittenconstitutions.Toaddevenmoreconfusion,countries
likeNewZealandandCanadaaccumulateasetofimportantdocumentsoveraperiod
ofyearsuntilatsomepoint,scholarsdeterminethatthecollectionistooimportant
nottobeaConstitution(foracatalogofNewZealandsconstitution,see(Palmer
2006)).
Stillmoreconfusing,itisthecasethatinanyconstitutionalsystemthe
languageofconstitutionaltextismodifiedandinterpretedbypoliticalactors.Inthe
UnitedStates,forexample,judgesoftheSupremeCourthavefilledinthedetailsof
thevague18thcenturydocumenttomakeitsuitableformodernlife.Theyhave

71
OntheThaiConstitution,seeHarding,A.(2001).MayThereBeVirtue:NewAsian
ConstitutionalisminThailand.AsianLaw3:236-60.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ea
donesonotwithstandingthelackofexplicittextualbasisforconstitutionalreview.In
othercountries,politicalpracticesmayevolveandbeacceptedasconstitutional
evenifneverwrittenintolaw.ThescopeoftheUnwrittenConstitutionposes
dauntingchallengestocomparativeresearch.
72
We can move t owards a defi ni t i on by i dent i fyi ng exact l y what i t i s
Constitutionsdo.Arguably,themostimportant(anddefining)attributeof
Constitutionsisthattheylimitthebehaviorofgovernment.Thatis,theygeneratea
setofinviolableprinciplestowhichfuturelawandgovernmentactivitymore
generallymustconform.Thisfunction,oftensummarizedasconstitutionalism,is
vitaltothefunctioningofdemocracy.Withoutacommitmenttohigherlaw,thestate
operatesfortheshort-termbenefitofthoseinpoweror,atleast,forthatofthe
majority.Thosewhofindthemselvesoutofpowermayfindthemselvesvirtually
unprotected,whichinturnmaymakethemmorelikelytoresorttoviolence.By
limitingthescopeofgovernment,constitutionsmakegovernmentpossible(see
Przeworski1991andWeingast1997forabroaderdiscussionofthisrationale).
73
A
secondfunctionthatconstitutionsserveisthesymboliconeofdefiningthenation
anditsgoals.Constitutionsoperateasadevicethatdeclaresthelegitimacyofthe
perhapsfledgling,orotherwiserudderless,state.Thisfunctionisparticularly
importantforyoungstateswhosecitizenshavestrongethnicorcommunalidentities
thatmaycompetewithanidentitywiththestate.Athirdandverypracticalfunction
ofconstitutionsisthattheydefinepatternsofauthorityandsetupgovernment
institutions.Evenadictatorship,forexample,needsestablishedinstitutionsthrough
whichtogovern.(Whilethemereprocessofdefininganinstitutioninvolvessome
constraintsonitsbehavior,theseareconceptuallydistinctfromsubstantivelimitson
governmentactionincorporatedintothenotionofconstitutionalism).
72
Ofcourse,thevastmajorityofcountrieshavediscretedocumentsthattheaverage
observerwouldrecognizeasConstitutions.Ourfocusisonwrittenconstitutions(seealso
Elster1995:365).Weundertakethisdecisionforpragmaticreasons,butalsobecause
writtenconstitutionsarediscreteintentionalactsofinstitutionaldesign,andhenceof
qualitativelydifferentcharacterthangradualinterpretiveadjustments,eveniftheirformal
statusandpracticalimpactareidentical.
73
Ofcourse,inpractice,constitutionscanbeusedmorenarrowlytoannouncepolitical
programsoftheleadersratherthanserveasconstraintsongovernment(Nathan1988).
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ea
Itisthislastfunctionofdefiningauthoritythatcreatessomeconfusion.In
manycountries,aparallelsetoforganic lawsorinstitutional actsalsodefine
institutions.Arethesedocumentsconstitutional?Insomesense,yes,inthattheydo
sharewithConstitutionsanimportantfunction.Inacriticalsense,however,theyare
notatallconstitutional.Foronething,theyareusuallynotadoptedintheformaland
oftendeliberatemannerthattypically(althoughcertainlynotalways!)characterizes
theprocessofConstitutionmaking.Moreimportantly,eveninthosecountrieswhere
organiclawmakingisentrenched,theycanusuallybeabrogatedmoreeasilythancan
aConstitution.Thisideaofentrenchment,isanimportantcontributortoitsstatusas
higherlaw.WeseeConstitutionsasnotonlybeinghigherlaw(acharacteristicthat
theymaysharewithorganicactsandotherrules)butofbeinghighestlaw.
Inshort,itisimportanttodistinguishbetweenBig CConstitutionsandthe
little cconstitutionalstructureofacountry.Ourfocusisontheformer.Thelatter
mightincluderulessettingupfundamentalpoliticalinstitutions,suchaselectoral
systems,orauthoritativeinterpretationsofthewrittenconstitutionsuchassupreme
courtdecisions.Whileintheorytheseconstitutionalrulesoughttobeanalyzedas
well,theconceptualdifficultyofdeterminingtheprecisescopeofthesmall-c
constitution,aswellasthemethodologicalchallengeofidentifyingandfindingthe
variousactsthatcomposeit,argueagainstusingitforcomparativeanalysisatthis
stage.However,intheempiricalanalysisthatfollows,wedoattempttotakeinto
account the possibility of judicial amendment of the constitution through
interpretation
WeidentifyConstitutionsinthedatathatfollowbyasetofthreeconditions,
anyoneofwhichissufficienttoqualifythedocumentasaConstitution(seealso
Elster1995:364).Constitutionsarethosedocumentsthateither:
(1)areidentifiedexplicitlyastheConstitution, Fundamental Law,or
Basic Law ofacountry;
(2)containexplicitprovisionsthatestablishitas highest law,eitherbecauseit
isentrenchedorlimitsfuturelaw;OR
(3)changethebasicpatternofauthoritybyestablishingorsuspendingan
executiveorlegislativebranchofgovernment.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e<
Thissetofconditionshelpsustoresolveproblematiccases.Forexample,in
theIsraelicase,wetreattheconstitutionastheseriesofBasicLaws(condition1),
eventhoughtheyarepassedbyordinaryparliamentarymajorityandthusdonotmeet
condition2;mostofthemdonotmeetcondition3.InthecaseofSaudiArabia,the
holyQuranisthehighestlawandthereisnoformalconstitution;however,wetreat
thethree1992RoyalDecreesestablishingthebasicsystemofgovernment,provinces
andtheconsultativemajlis(assembly)asconstitutingthegovernment(Aba-Namay
1993).Thisisacasethatmeetscondition3butnot1or2.Fortunately,atleastfor
analyticpurposes,formalconstitutionsarethenormanddefiningastates
constitutionislargelystraightforward.
74
Toconducttheanalysiswehavecollecteddataontheconstitutionalhistoryof
everyindependentstate(asidentifiedbyWardandGleditsch)from1789to2005.
For eachcountry, we record thepromulgation year ofnew or interim
constitutionsandtheyearofanyamendments.Ofcourse,oneshouldnotethat
newconstitutionsandamendmentsaresometimesonlynominaldistinctions.
SomecountriesthoroughlyreviseaConstitutionwithasetofamendments,
75
while
otherswillmakeminorchangestoadocumentandthenchristenanewconstitution.
76

Werecordthenominalclassificationofthesechanges,butwealsomakeasummary
judgmentofwhetherthechange(howeveritisclassified)constitutesacomprehensive
shifttoanewconstitutionalsystem.Bothdistinctionswillbeusefulintheanalysis
thatfollows.
Reconstructingconstitutionalchronologiesforallindependentstatesisnota
simplematterandwerelyuponacollectionofcross-national,regional,andcountry-
levelsourcesinordertocompilethedata.ThemagisterialConstitutions of the
Countries of the World(FlanzandBlaustein1971-present)providesinvaluable
backgroundinformationformostcountries,butonlyforrecentyears.Otheruseful

74
TheUnitedKingdomisexcludedfromthescopeofthisproject.

75
An example is South Korea, whose six republics have each involved complete
constitutionaloverhaulsadoptedthroughtheformalprocessofamendmentoftheprevious
constitution.
76
Cambodias1989ConstitutionadoptedaftertheendofVietnamesemilitaryoccupation,
maybeagoodexamplehere.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
cross-nationalandregionalsourcesincludedMaddex(2001),Fitzgibbon(1948),
Peaslee(1950-1971),andthePoliticalDatabaseoftheAmericasatGeorgetown.Of
course,country-levelstudiesareattherootofthesemulti-countrysourcesandwe
use t hese more speci fi c st udi es when possi bl e (avai l abl e).We record t he
promulgationyearofbothnewconstitutionsandamendments.
77

Ourdefinitionofthelifespanofaconstitutionistheperiodoftimebetweenits
entryintoforceandeitheritssuspensionoritsformalreplacementbyanother
constitution.
78
Thisdefinitionhasthevirtueofclarity.Alternativelyonecould
examinewhenaconstitutionceasedtobeeffectiveasapracticalmatter.This,
however,wouldrequireawaytomeasureconsistentlythepracticalimpactof
constitutionalprovisions.Wemight,atsomepoint,beabletoobtaindatatoallowus
tomakesuchjudgmentsoverallcountriessince1789,butatthispointpreferthe
simplerdefinitionaseasiertooperationalize.

III.THEMERITSOFCONSTITUTIONALLONGEVITY
Beforeexaminingthecausesofconstitutionallongevity,wemustbriefly
considerthenormativequestion:howlongshouldconstitutionslastinademocracy?
ForthosewhousetheAmericandocumentasthestandard,theanswermaywellbe
forever.Surely,however,longevityisnotdesirableasanendinandofitself.
Constitutionsaredesignedtostabilizeandfacilitatepolitics,butthereiscertainlythe
possibilitythatconstitutionscanoutlivetheirutilityandcreatepathologiesinthe
politicalprocessthatdistortdemocracy.Suchconstitutionssurelydeserve
replacement.Onecanevenmakeaplausiblecase,asDahl(2001)andLevinson
(2006)have,foracomprehensivereviewifnotabrogation--ofthebargainsstruck

77
Whileweareconfdentthatwehaveidentifednearlyallnewconstitutionsintheworld,
itisquitepossiblethatwehaveoverlookedafairnumberofamendments,especiallyolder
ones,simplybecausetheyaredocumentedtoalesserdegree.

78
ThisisalsothedefinitionusedbyNegrettoinhisparallelstudyofrecentLatinAmerican
constitutions.Negretto2006:5.Negretto,G.(2006).TheDurabilityofConstitutionsin
ChangingEnvironments:AStudyonConstitutionalStabilityinLatinAmerica.Paper
PresentedatAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociationAnnualMeeting.Pennsylvania.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
inPhiladelphiain1787.SuchamovewouldsuitThomasJefferson,whofamously
deridedthosewholook at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem
them like the arc of the covenant, too sacred to be touched.
79
Indeed,by
Jeffersonsstandards,ourestimateofalifeexpectancyofsixteenyearsishardly
troubling.
80
Jeffersonsindictmentagainstendurancehasastrongbasisin
democratictheory.Totheextentthatthewillofsucceedinggenerationsischecked
bythedecisionsoftheirpredecessors,enduringconstitutionscomeattheexpenseof
representation.Moreover,itispossiblethatmorefrequentconstitutionalturnover
wouldengendergreaterlevelsofcivicparticipationandengagement,ascitizensare
calledontoconsiderfundamentalprinciplesmorefrequently.
Whatenduringconstitutionssacrificeintermsofrepresentation,theymore
thanmakeforwithrespecttostability,equality,andgovernability.
81
Indeed,these
outputsare,inourmind,ofutmostimportancefordevelopingdemocracies.
Contemporary constitutions,asGiovanniSartori(1962:862)somewhat
crypticallyasserted,are bad constitutions.
82
Sartorischargemakessensewhen
weconsiderthethreefunctionsthat,inthesectionabove,weascribetoconstitutions:
theirroleinestablishingthebasicstructureandrulesofgovernance,delimitingthe
powersofthestate,andservingasasymbolofnationalunityandsovereignty.Inthe
first case, itseems quite clearthat simply stipulating the organization and
rel at i onshi ps among governi ng i nst i t ut i ons i s not enough t o ensure t hei r
implementation.Acertaindegreeofhabituationandroutinizationmustoccurbefore

79
LettertoSamuelKercheval,July12,1816.
80
Jeffersonbelievedthateveryconstitutionexpiredafternineteenyears,afigurehebasedon
whenamajorityofadultsaliveatanyonetimewouldturnoveraccordingtoEuropeanlife
expectancies.ThomasJeffersontoJamesMadison,1789.ME7:459,Papers15:396.

81
Enduringconstitutionsmaywellhaveotherbenefits.Forexample,theymayencourage
foreigninvestmentandfacilitateeconomicstabilitybyprovidingasecureenvironmentfor
economicactivity.However,ourinterestinthispaperisintheireffectsonthestability
andperformanceofdemocracy,effectsthatweseeasquitecriticaltothesurvivalof
nascentdemocracies.

82
Sartorihasinmindthetrend(fromhisperspectivein1962)tooverloadconstitutionswith
excessivelyaspirationalprovisions.Weextendhischargetoincludenewconstitutionsof
anyera.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
theinstitutions--whethertheybetheCentralBank,interestgroups,orpolitical
parties--cantakeshape.Suchhabituationtakestime.TheMexicanconstitutionof
1917,oneofthemoreprogressivedocumentsofitstime,nevermatchedthede facto
politicsofthatcountryuntilthe1940sanddidnotdeliverpoliticalcompetitionuntil
amendmentsinthe1990s.OneofthereasonsthattheUSconstitutionworksis
thatAmericanpoliticallifehasgrownarounditandadaptedtoitsextremely
idiosyncraticedicts.Thissortofstabilityoftherules,aslongastheyarereasonably
democratic,canhaveaverypositiveeffectonpoliticalequality,nottomentionrule
oflaw.Periodicchangesinthefundamentalrulescanencourageopportunisticelites
toengineerinstitutionsfortheirshort-termbenefit.Ontheotherhand,tyingactors
handswithrespecttotherulesofthegamecompelsthemtocompetewithmore
democraticmethods.
Considerthesecondfunctionofconstitutions:thatofconstrainingpolitical
power.Constitutions,totheextenttheyaremeaningful,restrictsovereignpower
especiallyintimesofcrisiswhentheincentivesforabsolutepowerarestrongest.
Butintheend,constitutionsaremerelypiecesofpaper,andtheirenforceabilityisof
criticalconcern.Whatpreventstheexecutiveinmostconstitutionalsystems,withall
ofthepowervestedinthatoffice,fromtransgressingtheformalboundariesof
behavior?AsWeingast(1997;2005)andPrzeworski(1991)havepointedout,itis
ultimatelylefttocitizensprovidedthattheycanactcollectivelytoguardagainst
theusurpationofpowerbythesovereign.Ideally,thethreatcitizensposerenders
constitutionsself-enforcing(Ordeshook1992;Weingast1997,2005).Solvingthe
collectiveactionproblemisofcoursecritical.Citizens,intheWeingast(1997)and
Przeworski(1991)accounts,canonlyactcollectivelyiftheycanagreeuponwhat
constitutesaviolationlimitstothesovereignspower.Constitutions,inthissense,
serveasanimportantcoordinatingdeviceforcitizensbut only if constitutional
limits are well known and respected.
83
Thissortoffamiliaritywith,andattachment
to,foundingdocumentscomesonlywithtime.Assuch,democraticconsolidation
dependscriticallyonenduringconstitutions.

83
Thissuggeststhevalueofwrittenconstitutions:apublicdocumentthatrecords
expectationsofbehaviorcanhelptoestablishfocalpointsforcitizencoordination.Carey
2000:757.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
Finally,considerbrieflyaconstitutionsfunctionasnationalsymbol.In
democracieswithoutamonarchytoserveasthesymbolofthestatessovereignty
andnationalhistory,documentssuchastheconstitutionareimportantinthatthey
strengthennationalidentity.Astrongattachmenttothestate,whateverits
pathologies,iscriticaltodemocracy.Thisisespeciallyaconcerninmultiethnic
statesinwhichthestatecompeteswithothergroupsforloyalty.Ifcitizensdonot
haveacommitmentto,orcannotagreeon,thesovereigntyofthestate,thenthevery
basisforparticipationandcitizenshipunravels(Rustow1970;LinzandStepan
1996).AsDahl(1989:207)putsit,the criteria of the democratic process
presuppose the rightfulness of the unit itself.Instatesinwhichcommitmentto
thestateisinquestion(e.g.,Iraq),anenduringconstitutioncanbeanimportant
sourceofnationalunity.
Inmakingtheseassertions,itissomewhatembarrassingthatwecannotappeal
toanysystematicevidencefromtheliteratureintheirfavor.Indeed,despitethe
massivevolumeofworkontheenduranceofdemocraticregimes,therelationship
betweenconstitutionaldurationanddemocraticstabilityisvirtuallyundocumented.
Whileitisbeyondourmissioninthispapertoassemblesuchevidence,itseems
worthwhile to establish some of the basic empirical associations between
constitutionalchangeandregimechange.Ifournormativeintuitionsareeven
remotelysound,oneshouldseeanumberofempiricalpatterns.First,fromarather
broad perspect i ve we shoul d expect t hat count ri es wi t h a hi gh degree of
constitutionalinstabilitywillalsodisplayahighdegreeofdemocraticinstability.
FigureX(notshowncurrently)plotstheprobabilityofanewconstitutionbythe
probabilityofashiftof3pointsormorealongthe20-pointPolityscaleof
democracyforeachofXcountriessince1789.Theplotshowsastrongpositive
associationbetweenconstitutionalandregimestability.
Thestrengthofthisrelationshipinvitesthequestionofwhetherregimechange
andconstitutionalchangeareoneandthesame.Areconstitutionssimplythewritten
reflectionofrealpoliticalchangeontheground?Ifso,thenouranalysisreducesto
oneofexplainingregimedurability.Infact,aswillbecomeclear,thetwoconstructs
arecloselyrelatedbutnotsynonymous.Constitutionswilloftencoincidewith
regimetransition.However,itisequallylikelythatsuccessiveauthoritariansand
democratswillsharethesameconstitutionorthatthesameregimetypewillbe
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
responsibleformultipleconstitutions.Onecanbegintounderstandthesedynamics
byobservingtrendsinthelevelofdemocracyandtheincidenceofnewconstitutions
withinindividualcountries.Figure1presentssuchdataforfourcountries,Brazil,
Chile,Japan,andFrance.Politydemocracyscoresareplottedacrosstimeand
verticallinesmarkthepromulgationofnew constitutions.

Figure 1: New Constitutions and Shifts in Authority Structure

Proceeding of KPI Congress 8 (2006) / 89
Constitutional Reform : Comparative Perspectives
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Figure 1: New Constitutions and Shifts in Authority Structure
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Forthemostpart,newconstitutionsinthesecountriescorrespondwithmajor
shiftsinthestructureofauthority(i.e.,regime).ThedatesofeachofBrazils
constitutions,forexample,markthemilestonesofitsdemocratichistoryalmost
perfectly.Asonewouldimagine,however,mostcountriesexhibitexceptionstothis
rule.Chiles1980constitution,commissionedbyPinochet,dutifullyinstitutionalizes
theauthoritarianpracticesinitiatedbythecoupin1973.Curiouslyenough,however,
thePinochetdocumenthasenduredthroughthetransitiontodemocraticrule,albeit
with significant amendments.That phenomenon, as we shall see, is fairly
uncommoninLatinAmerica,wheremostmajorshiftsarecelebratedwithnew
constitutions.Sometimesconstitutionsarerearguardactions:theJapanese
Constitutionof1889servedtoconsolidateanauthoritarianstructurearoundtheMeiji
empireinthefaceofdemandsforgreaterdemocracy.ButJapansoverallhistoryhas
beenoneofpunctuatedequilibrium,withjump-shiftsinademocraticdirection
markedbyConstitutionalchange.Frenchhistoryalsoshowssignificantshiftsin
levelsofdemocracyaroundthetimeofconstitutionalchange,butitisnotalwaysina
moredemocraticdirectionsuggestingsomebasisforAnglo-Americanstereotypes.
90 / Proceeding of KPI Congress 8 (2006)
Constitutional Reform : Comparative Perspectives
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Year
For the most part, new constitutions in these countries correspond with major shifts in the
structure of authority (i.e., regime). The dates of each of Brazils constitutions, for example,
mark the milestones of its democratic history almost perfectly. As one would imagine,
however, most countries exhibit exceptions to this rule. Chiles 1980 constitution,
commissioned by Pinochet, dutifully institutionalizes the authoritarian practices initiated by
the coup in 1973. Curiously enough, however, the Pinochet document has endured through
the transition to democratic rule, albeit with significant amendments. That phenomenon, as
we shall see, is fairly uncommon in Latin America, where most major shifts are celebrated
with new constitutions. Sometimes constitutions are rearguard actions: the Japanese
Constitution of 1889 served to consolidate an authoritarian structure around the Meiji empire
in the face of demands for greater democracy. But Japans overall history has been one of
punctuated equilibrium, with jump-shifts in a democratic direction marked by Constitutional
change. French history also shows significant shifts in levels of democracy around the time
of constitutional change, but it is not always in a more democratic directionsuggesting
some basis for Anglo-American stereotypes.
Thailands experience of constitutional instability is exceptional. Since the establishment of
the constitutional monarchy, the county has had 19 coups and 16 constitutions. Although
many observers had hoped that the country had finally developed stable political institutions,
the inability of even well-designed institutions to withstand manipulation by populist
billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra prompted sufficient dissatisfaction to sustain yet another coup.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
o
Thailandsexperienceofconstitutionalinstabilityisexceptional.Sincethe
establishmentoftheconstitutionalmonarchy,thecountyhashad19coupsand16
constitutions.Althoughmanyobservershadhopedthatthecountryhadfinally
developedstablepoliticalinstitutions,theinabilityofevenwell-designedinstitutions
towithstandmanipulationbypopulistbillionaireThaksinShinawatraprompted
sufficientdissatisfactiontosustainyetanothercoup.Itcouldbearguedthat
underlyingThailandsformalinstabilityisaninformalconstitutionalstability:the
KingsstabilizingpresencehasmeantthatevenThailandsleastdemocraticperiods
aremildcomparedwiththecountrysneighborsinBurma,CambodiaandVietnam.
Oneaggregatemeasureofthecorrespondencedemocraticandconstitutional
changeistheincidenceofnewconstitutionsduringyearsofdemocraticchange,
thoseofauthoritarianchange,andthoseofnochange.Wedothis,morespecifically,
bymeasuringwhetheranewconstitutionwaspromulgatedintheyearof,theyear
before,ortheyearafterachangewasrecordedinthePolitydata.
84
Tables1and2
presenttheseprobabilitiesbyeraandbyregion.Foreachtable,weseparate
significantchangesinanauthoritarianordemocraticdirection(a4-pointshiftor
moreonPolity)frommoremoderatechanges(1-3units).
85
ThethreeerasinTable1
followroughlythethreewavesdemocracy(Huntington1991),althougheachof
thesecondandthirdperiodsincludetheantecedentauthoritarianregression.
ConsideringfirstTable1,themostimmediateimpressionisthat,formostyears,
authoritarianshiftsarejustaslikelytobecoincidentwithanewConstitutionasare
democraticshifts.Theexceptionisthepost-1964period,inwhichnearlyhalfof
majordemocraticshiftswerecappedbyaConstitution.Inotheryears,onlyaquarter
84
Wereasonthatthisthree-yearrangecapturesmostofthenewconstitutionsthatwouldbe
associatedwithashift,althoughwerecognizethatsome(e.g.,Brazils1967andChiles
1980documents)comeseveralyearsaftertheinstitutionalchange.Nevertheless,given
theprevalenceofconstitutionalchangewithinsomecountrieshistories,wealsowish
toavoidtheoppositeerror:pickingupconstitutionsthathavenothingtodowithpastor
futureevents.Thus,athreeyearspanmakessensebutonemightwellviewthese
measuresasunderestimatesoftheconnectionbetweenanewconstitutionandinstitutional
change.
85
Aswemeasurechangeyearly,largescalechangesthatoccurincrementallyshowuponly
asmoderateyearlychange.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
oa
toathirdofeitherdemocraticorauthoritarianshiftswerecoincidentwithnew
constitutions.Althoughthesearelikelytobeunderestimates,itisstrikingthata
clearmajorityoflarge-scaleshiftsareunassociatedwithnewconstitutions.Notonly
canchangeoccurwithoutaConstitution,butConstitutionscanappearwithout
alteringtheinstitutionallandscape:evenwhenauthoritystructuresarestatic,thereis
aboutatenpercentchanceofanewConstitutionbeingpromulgatedwithinayearfor
anygivencountry.

Table 1: Probability of a New Constitution Given a Shift in Authority Structure,

by Era

Institutional Change 1800-1926 1927-1963 1964-2002

SignificantAuthoritarianShift 0.31 0.39 0.24
36 51 87

ModerateAuthoritarianShift 0.18 0.37 0.23
65 82 123

NoChange 0.07 0.12 0.10
5,726 2,338 4,899

ModerateDemocraticShift 0.25 0.36 0.25
155 66 221

SignificantDemocraticShift 0.25 0.39 0.48
48 44 149

*Probabilityofnewconstitutioninuppercell;numberofobservationsisinlowercell
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
oa
Table 2: Probability of a New Constitution Given a Shift in Authority Structure,
by Region
Institutional Change Africa
Asia/
Pacific
Central/
Eastern
Europe
Middle
East
Latin
America
Western
Europe

Significant
AuthoritarianShift
0.27 0.21 0.42 0.40 0.29 0.35
41 24 24 15 49 17

ModerateAuthoritarian
Shift
0.39 0.18 0.42 0.11 0.34 0.12
46 33 31 35 73 34

NoChange 0.15 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.16 0.04
1,699 1,862 987 1,501 2,998 2,476

ModerateDemocratic
Shift
0.36 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.36 0.21
80 67 28 29 113 94

SignificantDemocratic
Shift
0.57 0.50 0.15 0.50 0.42 0.40
54 34 26 16 57 42

*Probabilityofnewconstitutioninuppercell;numberofobservationsisinlowercell.

Butcanstatessustainahighlevelofdemocracywhilewritingperiodic
Constitutions,orarethetwomutuallyexclusive?Ifourassertionsaboveareatall
correct,Franceshouldbeanexceptioninthisregard:asarule,weshouldnotsee
countriescharacterizedbylong-standingdemocracycyclingthroughmultipledrafts
ofConstitutions.FigureX(notcurrentlyshown)suggeststhatfrequentconstitution-
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
o<
makingisindeedassociatedwithlowaveragelevelsofdemocracy.Notethatthe
directionofcausationislikelymutual.Serialconstitution-makingprobablyleadsto
historicallylowlevelsofdemocracy(forreasonswestipulateabove)justaslow
levelsofdemocracyinspireattemptsto get the institutions rightagainandagain
andagain.Venezuelashistoryisillustrative.Fromtheyearofitsfoundinguntil
1961,Venezuelawasoneofthemostprolificproducersofconstitutions,producing
some25constitutions.Itscommitmenttodemocracyduringtheseyearswas
sporadic,andlargelynonexistent.Itsconstitutionof1961,however,lastedalmost40
years,aperiodcharacterizedbyahighlevelofinstitutionaldemocracy(ifsomewhat
exclusive).
Itmaywellbethat,asJeffersonsuggested,democraticstatescanfunction
effectivelywithahighdegreeofconstitutionalturnover.Ourdata,however,
suggeststhattheycannot,oratleasthavenot.Franceisoneofthefewstable
democraciestohavemaintaineddemocracythroughperiodicrevisionofitsfounding
document.Moreover,whilesomecountrieswithstrongdemocratictraditionsmay
beabletowithstandacertaindegreeofrevision,fragiledemocraciesinthe
developingworldlikelycannotaffordsuchaluxury.

IV.THEDURATIONOFCONSTITUTIONS
Epidemiological Patterns
HowlongdoConstitutionalsystemsusuallyendure?Asmentionedinthe
introduction,theirmeanlifespanisaboutsixteenyearsacrosstheworldsince1789.
Ofcoursethisvariesacrossgenerationsandacrossregions.Forexample,Latin
AmericanandAfricancountriesfitthejokeoftheFrench-constitution-as-periodical
muchbetterthandoesFranceitself.ThetypicalAfricanconstitutionlastsaroundten
years.LatinAmerica(sourceofalmostathirdofallconstitutions)doesnotmuch
betterat12.4years.TheDominicanRepublicandHaitihaveevenmanagedtowrite
oneeverythreeyearsorso.Indeed,theislandofHispaniolaishometoalmosta
tenthofthe736Constitutionswrittensince1789!ConstitutionsinWestern
EuropeanandAsia,ontheotherhand,typicallyendure32and19years,respectively.
OECDcountrieshaveolderconstitutionsat32yearsonaverage,suggestingsome
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
oe
economicbenefitsassociatedwithconstitutionalstability.
86

Table 3: Average and Median Lifespans

Sample Median Mean St. Dev
ALL 8 16.1 24.7
Non-OECD 7 13.8 20.5
OECD 14 32.3 40.7
Africa 6 10.5 14.3
Asia 11 19.4 25.6
CentralandEasternEurope 6.5 9.9 12.1
MiddleEast 9 22.2 29.5
NorthAmerica 9.5 42.4 63.1
SouthAmerica 7 12.4 16.6
WesternEurope 16 32.3 39.7

Unlikethatofnaturalpersons,thelifeexpectancyofconstitutionsdoesnot
seemtobeincreasing.ThroughWWI,themedianlifespanofaConstitutionwas21
years,versusonly12yearsintheyearssince.Ofcourse,theregionsoftheworldare
representedindifferentproportionswithinthesehistoricaleras.Table4givesasense
ofthedistributionofconstitutionaleventsacrosstimeforeachregion.Asonewould
suspect,theconstitutionalhistoryoftheAmericasandWesternEuropegoesback
considerablylongerthandoesthatofAfricaandAsia.

86
Wedonotyetconsiderthecausalquestion:itisequallyplausiblethatstabilityiseasierto
maintaininindustrializedeconomies.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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Table 4: Distribution of Events Across Time
Sample 25% of Events 50% of Events 75% of Events
ALL 1923 1961 1981
Non-OECD 1929 1964 1982
OECD 1867 1930 1961
Africa 1967 1979 1992
Asia 1959 1973 1987
CentralandEasternEurope 1935 1952 1992
MiddleEast 1956 1965 1981
NorthAmerica 1836 1851 1867
SouthAmerica 1867 1921 1957
WesternEurope 1864 1926 1953

87
Negretto(2006:8)providestheexampleofUruguays1830document,whichwasinforce
for77years.Sincethen,however,Uruguayhashadfvedifferentconstitutions.
Thecentraltendencyinlifeexpectancydoesnottellusmuchaboutthe
variationinmortalityacrossthelifespan.Doesthehazardrate(i.e.,theprobability
ofdeath)increase,decrease,orstaythesamethroughoutthelifespan?Ontheone
hand,onemightsuspectthatconstitutionsaremorelikelytowitherwithageastheir
provisionsandproclamationsbecomeincreasinglyoutofstepwiththepopulace.On
theotherhand,constitutionsmaybecomeincreasinglyinvulnerablewithtime,as
theygrowinstatureandbecomeenmeshedinthenationalcultureandpoliticsofthe
country.Ofcourse,theeffectoftimemaybenon-linear.Forexample,thehazard
ratemayincreasethroughtheearlyyearsbeforereachinganageatwhichit
crystallizesandbecomesrelativelyinvulnerable.
87
Anotherintriguingpossibilityis
thattherearecertainagesorthresholds(correspondingtogenerationalturnover
perhaps)thatareparticularlydifficultforconstitutions.Thissortofperiodicity
undergirdsthecriticaljunctureapproachtopoliticalandconstitutionaldevelopment
(e.g.,Burnham1970;Ackerman1993).

cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo

ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
o
Figure2belowpresentshazardratesfornewconstitutionsbytheirage
Figure 2: Probability of a New Constitution by Age
96 / Proceeding of KPI Congress 8 (2006)
Constitutional Reform : Comparative Perspectives
(.:.:.r..:. : :::a.z.:.::.::)
hazard rate may increase through the early years before reaching an age at which it
crystallizes and becomes relatively invulnerable.
87
Another intriguing possibility is that there
are certain ages or thresholds (corresponding to generational turnover perhaps) that are
particularly difficult for constitutions. This sort of periodicity undergirds the critical juncture
approach to political and constitutional development (e.g., Burnham 1970; Ackerman 1993).
Figure 2 below presents hazard rates for new constitutions by their age
Figure 2: Probability of a New Constitution by Age
The two-humped shape suggests that a constitution is most likely to be replaced in its early
forties and again should it make it to about 140 years (although the number of constitutions to
have lived past 100 is quite small, so estimates of their vulnerability are somewhat uncertain).
Figure 3 gives the density function.
Figure 3: Baseline Hazard by Age of Constitution

87
Negretto (2006:8) provides the example of Uruguays 1830 document, which was in force for 77
years. Since then, however, Uruguay has had five different constitutions.
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replacedinitsearlyfortiesandagainshoulditmakeittoabout140years(although
thenumberofconstitutionstohavelivedpast100isquitesmall,soestimatesoftheir
vulnerabilityaresomewhatuncertain).Figure3givesthedensityfunction.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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Figure 3: Baseline Hazard by Age of Constitution
MostcountrieswithmultipleConstitutionsmanifestafairdegreeofvariation
intheirdurations.ThemosttypicalpatternisofConstitutionsofashorterduration
earlyinastatesexistence,withlongerConstitutionaldurationsasthestateages.
Constitutions,itseems,havehighinfantmortality;oncetheysurviveagenerationor
so,theymaybestablefortwoorthree.However,evenanestablishedconstitution
canmoveoutofequilibriumatsomepoint.

V.EXPLAININGCONSTITUTIONALDURATION
Belowwesketchamodelofconstitutionaldurationandsuggestananalytical
strategythatwedescribemorefullyinthenextsection.Ourbeginningassumptionis
thatconstitutionsarebargainsamongelitesthataremeant--atleastbymanyoftheir
authors--tobemoreorlesspermanent.Ofcourse,allbargainsmaybetosome
degreeunsatisfactorytoatleastsomeoftheactorsinvolved.Moreover,oneneed
onlyglimpse attheprocessofconstitutionmakingtounderstandthattheresulting
documentisrarelytheproductofcarefuldeliberationandsocialandpolitical
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engineering.Wearenotundertheillusion,therefore,thatconstitutionsrepresentthe
essentialspirit,consensus,ormoresofthenation,evenatthetimeofthedocuments
promulgation.Nevertheless,theseagreementsare struckandanequilibriummay
result.Itfollows,then,thattheseagreementswillendureuntilsomeshock
typicallyaninternationalordomesticcrisisdisruptstheequilibrium.Upon
inspectionofpoliticalchronologies(seebelow),theseshocksseemtoincludewars,
regimechange,andshiftsintheboundariesofthestate(butnot,atleastuponbroad
inspection,financialcrises).
However,linkingaprecipitatingeventtothetimeofdeathdoesnotconstitutea
completeautopsy.Inretrospect,itiseasytoattachtoomuchexplanatorypowerto
eventssimplybecauseoftheircoincidence.Acivilwarwhichseemstohaveso
obvi ousl y foret ol d t he end of a const i t ut i onal syst em wi l l seem l et hal (t o
constitutions)onlyexpost facto.Manyconstitutionsmayindeedwithstandsuch
eventswhileothersmayfall.Also,someevents(e.g.,politicalcoup)areunlikelyto
beexogenoustotheconstitutionalsystem,butratheraresultofsomeunderlying
instabilityowinginparttoconstitutionalprovisions.Thesepossibilitiesimplya
clearsetoftheoreticalandanalyticalstrategiesinassessingcauseofdeath.Thefirst
is,ratherobviously,toidentifyandmeasuretheeffectofallcrises,notjustthose
eventsinperiodscoincidingwithconstitutionaldemise.Thesecondistoinvestigate
theunderlyingstructuralcausesofconstitutionalinstability.Thesestructuralrisk
factorsmaybeaspectsofconstitutionsthatrenderthemmoreorlessresilientthan
others,orsomepolitical,social,oreconomicconditionsofthestatethataremore
hospitabletoconstitutionalsurvival.Thus,webeginwithaverysimplemodelin
whichwepositthatcertainprecipitatingfactors(events)willincreasetheriskof
mortality.Someofthesefactorsweassumetobeexogenoustotheconstitutional
system,whilearesomeareatleasttosomedegreeendogenous.Wepositasetof
structuralriskfactorsthathavebothdirecteffectsonmortalityandindirecteffects,
viaprecipitatingfactors.Below,weidentifytheprecipitatingeventsaswellthe
structuralriskfactorstoconstitutionalmortality.
Precipitating Causes of Constitutional Death
Wehaveratherstrongintuitionsaboutwhatsortofeventswoulddestabilize
constitutionalsystems.Theyshouldbethosethatsignificantlyalterthebalanceof
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
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powerwithineithertheregimeorthestate.Itisnothardtoassemblealistofsuch
events,astheyconstitutethemilestonesofastatespoliticalhistory.Becauseweare
interestedintestingtheexplanatorypoweroftheseeventsagainstthatofmore
structuralfactors,weprefertoerrontheinclusivesidewithrespecttosuchalist.
Forthisreason,andforsheerhistoricalcuriosity,itmakessensetoreadcases.
Indeed,areviewoftheconstitutionalhistoriesofmajorcountriesgivesusagood
senseoftheimmediatefactorsthatleadtoadocumentsdemise.Conceptually,it
makessensetothinkofprecipitatingeventsasoneoftwobasicvarieties:thosethat
areexogenousandthosethatareendogenoustotheconstitutionalsystem.
Exogenous Precipitating Factors
1.Sometimes new constitutions reflect state birth, death, or merger.
Examplesincludevirtuallyeverycountrywhenitgainsindependence;state
mergersintheArabworld(e.g.theUnitedArabRepublicinthe1960s,Iraq
andJordanin1958,orNorthandSouthYemenin1991);andbreakupsof
federationssuchastheCzechoslovakiaortheSovietUnion.
2.Defeatinwarortakeoverbyanoutsidepowercanleadtooccupation-
imposed constitutions.WellknowncasesincludeJapans1946Constitution
andIraqs2005Constitution.LesswellknowncasesincludeAfghanistan
1979,Cuba1901,DominicanRepublic1907,1908and1924andHaiti
1918.Cambodia1981wassuchacase;onemightmorebroadlyconsider
CambodiasUNTAC-draftedconstitutionof1993asacaseofmultilateral
occupation,whentheUNTransitionalGovernmenthelpedeasethe
countrysendofthelongcivilwar.Afghanistan2003wasnotaformal
occupation,buthadelementsofheavyforeignadvice.Aspecialcaseofthis
ci rcumst ance may be a cri si s aft er a l oss i n war, even i f not di rect
occupation,asinParaguay1940.
3.Asmallnumberofconstitutionsmaybeadoptedsimplybecauseof
diffusioneffects,meaningthattheirtimingandpatternreflectsexternal
modelingmorethaninternalpressures.Newconstitutionstendtobewritten
inwaves(Elster1995:368),typicallyfollowingtheendofgreatconflicts
likeWorldWarIIandtheColdWar.Thereissomeanecdotalevidenceofa
diffusionprocessatwork.Forexample,themotivationfortheChavez-led
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo

Venezuelanreformin1999stemmedfromthe1990-91reforminColombia.
TheVeneuzuelanconstitutionhassinceinspiredreforminBolivia.Ina
recentinterview,Chavezrecalls:
Wediscussedhowtobreakwiththepast,howtoovercomethis
typeofdemocracythatonlyrespondstotheinterestsofthe
oligarchicalsectors;howtogetridofthecorruption.Wehad
alwaysrejectedtheideaofatraditionalmilitarycoup,ofa
militarydictatorship,orofamilitarygoverningjunta.Wewere
veryawareofwhathappenedinColombia,intheyearsof1990-
1991,whentherewasaconstitutionalassemblyofcourse!it
wasverylimitedbecauseintheenditwassubordinatedtothe
existing powers. It was the existing powers that designed
Colombias constitutional assembly and got it going and,
therefore,itcouldnottransformthesituationbecauseitwasa
prisoneroftheexistingpowers.[VenezuelanPresidentHugo
ChavezinaninterviewwithMartaHarnecker(2002)]

Figure 4: Temporal Clustering and Constitution Making

100 / Proceeding of KPI Congress 8 (2006)
Constitutional Reform : Comparative Perspectives
(.:.:.r..:. : :::a.z.:.::.::)
subordinated to the existing powers. It was the existing powers that
designed Colombias constitutional assembly and got it going and,
therefore, it could not transform the situation because it was a prisoner
of the existing powers. [Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in an
interview with Marta Harnecker (2002)]
Figure 4: Temporal Clustering and Constitution Making
Endogenous Precipitating Factors
4. The most common reason for new constitutions is some form of regime
change, such as democratization, military coups, or the death of monarchies. Regime
change may be accompanied by a social revolution that fundamentally changes the
organization of society and the economy (Iran 1979; Mexico 1917). Sometimes such
constitutional change is accomplished through extra-constitutional mechanisms; other
times it may be accomplished relying on internally legal constitutional means. When
it leads to a new constitution, however, the old one certainly dies.
0
.
0
5
.
1
.
1
5
1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
Year
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

o
f

a

N
e
w

C
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
a
Endogenous Precipitating Factors
4.Themostcommonreasonfornewconstitutionsissomeformofregime
change, such as democrat i zat i on, mi l i t ary coups, or t he deat h of
monarchies.Regimechangemaybeaccompaniedbyasocialrevolution
thatfundamentallychangestheorganizationofsocietyandtheeconomy
(Iran1979;Mexico1917).Sometimessuchconstitutionalchangeis
accomplishedthroughextra-constitutionalmechanisms;othertimesitmay
beaccomplishedrelyingoninternallylegalconstitutionalmeans.Whenit
leadstoanewconstitution,however,theoldonecertainlydies.
5. Ideological, programmatic and leadership transitions, following
constitutionalchangesingovernment,areresponsibleforanumberof
constitutionaldeaths.Forexample,thevariousSocialistconstitutionsseem
tofollowtheinstallationofnewleadersintheSovietUnion(1936,1977)
and Chi na (1982).The al t ernat i on of power bet ween l i beral s and
conservativesinmanyLatinAmericancountriestriggeredfrequent
constitutionalchangeinthe19thcentury.Jordans1951Constitution,
passedaftertheassassinationofKingAbdullahbyhissonandsuccessor,
reallyreflectapersonnelshift.
Another internalfactorismajorinstitutionalcrisis,irrespectiveofany
ideological,leadershiporregimechange.TheUnitedStatescaseisinstructivehere.
Asiswell-known,theArticlesofConfederationsufferedfromanumberofdefects
thathastenedtheirdemise.Theseconcernedpublicfinance,bywhichthenational
governmentcouldnotraisetaxestoprovideforthecommondefenseandotherpublic
goods;theinabilitytoovercomeinternalbarrierstotrade;andtheinabilitytoissue
currency.Withoutastrongcentralgovernment,theArticlesdidnotprovidefor
publicgoodgeneration,andprovokedthewritingoftheConstitutiontoremedythese
defects.Fromthepointofviewofthispaper,thissolutionwasthemostsuccessful
evercraftedtheoldestandlongestlastingConstitutionintheworld.Another
exampleofaninternalinstitutionalreformwasthedemiseofIndonesias1949post-
independenceConstitution,federalincharacter,whichwasdiscardedinfavorofa
unitaryconstitutionin1955.Besidescenter-peripherydisputes,therearecasesof
revisionofthepoliticalsystem,forexamplefromparliamentarytopresidential
(Philippines1973andFrance1958)
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
a
Structural Sources of Constitutional Resiliency
Theshocksthatwedescribeabovethreatentheexistingpoliticalorder,anditis
nosurprisethatthesubsequentorderisoftenmarkedbyanewsetofbasiclaws.
Someaspectsoftheconstitution,however,mayrenderthedocumentmorestable.
Wefocusbelowonaspectsoflegitimacyandadaptivemechanismsofthedocument
itself.Onemightalsospeculatethatthedesignofinstitutionsmaybepredictiveas
well.Forexample,alargedebateconcernstherelativemeritsofpresidentialismand
parliamentarism,andthechiefmeasureofsuccessifdrawnfromconstitutional
survival.
88
Electoralsystems,thoughrarelyconstitutionalizedwithgreatdetail,
certainlyhaveanimpactonselectionofleaders.Constitutionswithdividedpowers
maypreventinternalthreatstolibertybuthindertheabilityoremergenceofleaders
torespondquicklytoexternalthreats.Somehavesuggestedthatconsensual
democraticstructureswillbelongerlastingthanmajoritarianones,particularlyin
ethnicallydividedpolities.
89
Insum,certainkindsofinstitutionalconfigurationsmay
haveanimpactonriskfactorsforconstitutionaldeath.Wethuswanttoconsider
whethercertainprovisionsofconstitutionsormechanismsofconstitutionaladoption
leadtoagreaterprobabilityofsurvival.
90

88
Forexample,StepanandSkach(1993)foundthat,ofnon-OECDcountries,noneofthe36
newcountriesthatemergedafterWorldWarIIthatadoptedpresidentialismwere
continuouslydemocraticbetween1980and1989,while14of41ofsuchcountriesthat
adoptedparliamentarysystemsweredemocraticduringthatperiod.(Cheibuband
Limongi2002)notethatoneoutofevery23presidentialregimesdiedbetween1946
and1999,whereasonlyoneinevery58parliamentaryregimesdied.Arecentpaperby
Boixseemstoprovidefurthersupportforthepropositionthatparliamentarysystemsare
betterfordemocraticsurvival(Boix2005).Thelogicoftheargumentisthatpresidential
systemstendtoleadtominorityexecutivesandgovernmentgridlock;thisinturncan
encourageactorstotakeextra-constitutionalstepstogainpower,leadingtopolitical
instabilityandeventuallythedeathofdemocracy.

89
Lijphardt;Negretto(2006:11);butseeHorowitz2001.
90
Itisalsodifficulttountanglewhetherparticulareventsthatprecipitateconstitutionaldeath
aretheresultofinternalandexternalfactors.Economiccrisesandcoups,forexample,
mayresultfrominternalpoliticalweaknessorwhollyexogenousconditions,andsorting
outtheconnectionsisahighlycontext-specificendeavor.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<
Later iterations of this paper will test the various propositions about
presidentialversusparliamentarysystemsandelectoralsystems.Atthisstage,we
considertwocrucialfactorsconcerningtheconstitution:legitimacyofadoptionand
optimaladaptation.Thereare,ofcourse,myriadotherfactorsfromcomparative
politicsthatwecantest.
Legitimacy of adoption. Firstofall,thecircumstancesofaconstitutions
adoptionmaybeimportant.Thefactthatconstitutionsaretypicallyadoptedafter
crisessuggestsafundamentalparadoxofconstitution-making,identifiedbyElster
(1995).Ontheonehand,thesenseofcrisismayfacilitateeffectivebargaining,since
thealternativeofnobargainmaycarrywithitsignificantrisks.Ontheotherhand,
thecrisissituationmayhinderrationalconsiderationofoptimalinstitutions.We
shouldnotexpect,anddonotseemtoobserve,perfecttailoringofconstitutional
designtolocalconditions(seealsoHorowitz2001).Thisprovidessomeinsightinto
whysomanyconstitutionsfailtotakehold.
Regardlessofwhatinstitutionsarechosen,then,themannerinwhichtheyare
selectedmaybeimportant.Webelievethat,ceterisparibus,constitutionsadopted
withpublicinputorblessingaremorelikelytosurvive.Suchconstitutionshavea
largeendowmentoflegitimacyattheoutset,whichmaypreventsignificantgroupsof
citizensorelitesfromcoordinatingtodisrupttheconstitutionalscheme.Public
involvementintheadoptionprocessprovidesinformationtopotentialopponents
aboutthe(poor)likelihoodofcoordinationagainsttheconstitution,makingitmore
difficulttooverturn.Constitutionswithwidepublicsupportthusmaybemoreeasily
self-enforcing(Weingast2005)andalsobetterabletowithstandexogenousthreats.
Optimal Adaptation. Awell-adaptedconstitutionissuitedtothepolitical
environmentatthetimeofitsadoption.Societiesdonot,however,remainconstant.
Exogenoustechnologicalchangesoccur;differentinternationalconfigurations
develop;andinstitutionsalterthepoliticalmakeupofthesocietiestheyinhabit.
Evenaself-enforcingconstitutioncanfallintodisequilibriumifthedistributional
benefitsthatitproducesamonggroupschangeovertime(Ordeshook1992).We
shouldthusexpectthattheconstitutionaswrittenatT1willbeoptimallysuitedat
T2.Allconstitutionsmustadjustastheirsocietieschange.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
Therearetwoprimarymechanismsbywhichconstitutionalchangeoccurs:
formal amendments to the text, and informal amendment that results from
interpretivechanges.Toacertainextent,thesemechanismsaresubstitutes.Ifthe
methodsofsecuringformalamendmentaredifficult(asintheUnitedStates,withits
requirementsofratificationbyofstatelegislatures)theremaybepressurestoadap
ttheconstitutionthroughjudicialinterpretation.Ackermansfamousaccountof
constitutionalchangeinthe1930sintheUnitedStatesdrawsonsuchlogic
(Ackerman1992).If,ontheotherhand,constitutionalamendmentisrelatively
simple,theremaybelessneedforjudicialreinterpretationoftheconstitution.
Optimaladaptationthusresultsfromtheinteractionofamendmentrigidityand
thepossibilityofjudicialreinterpretationoftheconstitution.Theoptimallevelof
flexibilityisnotuniversalforallcountries,butdeterminedinanyparticular
constitutionalsituationbybothexogenousfactors(suchastherateoftechnological
or envi r onment al change) and endogenous f act or s ( such as t he l evel of
responsivenessofpoliticalinstitutionsundertheconstitution,andtheendowmentof
legitimacyattheoutsetoftheconstitutionscheme.)Arigidconstitutionthatfitsits
soci et y wel l at t he out set may be sui t abl e i f t he rat e of t echnol ogi cal or
environmentalchangeislow.Butthesameconstitutionmayperformpoorlyif
changeisrapid.
Constitutionsthatlackeitherflexibleformalamendmentsoreffective
mechanismsofinformalreinterpretationmaynotadapttochangingenvironmental
conditions.Wepredictthatsuchconstitutionswillforceactorstotakeextra-
constitutionalactiontosecurechangesandwillthusdieyoung.Ontheotherhand,
constitutionsthataretooeasytoamendareoflittlevalueinprovidingstablerulesfor
politicalaction.Theseconstitutionsmayalsodieyoungbecausetheydonotserve
oneoftheessentialpurposesofconstitutions.Webelievethereisanoptimallevelof
adaptabilityinanygivensituationthatisneithertooflexibleortoorigid.
Anotherfactorthatmayberelevanttotheneedforadaptationistheinitial
specificityoftheconstitution.Constitutionsvarysystematicallyintheirlevelof
detail.Brazilsconstitutionisfamousforhavingconstitutionalizednearly
everything;Thailandsrecentlydeceasedconstitutionmayhavebeenevenlonger,
with336articlesand142pagesinEnglishtranslation.TheAmericanconstitution,at
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
around7900words,isroughlyone-sixththelengthofthatofBrazil,andisseenas
providingaframeworkforpoliticsratherthanarepositoryofpolicies.Somehave
hypothesizedthatspecificitywillleadtofrequentamendments.(BerkowitzandClay
2005)showthatAmericanstatesthatwereinitiallycolonizedbycivillawcountries
providefarmorelevelofdetailthanthosecolonizedbycommonlawcountriesand
thatthesestatesalsohavemoreconstitutionalinstability.Theyconnectthesetwo
pointswiththeideathatconstitutionswithagooddealofdetailinvitefrequent
amendmentandriskexitoverrelativelyminorissues.Constitutionsthataremore
generalmayallowmoreflexibleadaptationovertime.
Hypotheses and Data
Tosummarize,weexpectthatconstitutionsthathaveagreaterstockof
legitimacyattheoutsetandprovideforsomeflexibility(eitherthroughamendment
processesorjudicialinterpretation)willbebetterabletowithstandexogenous
shocks.Totestthesehypothesesweintroduceasindependentvariablessome
internalfeaturesofconstitutionsthatmaypredictconstitutionalstability.Foreach
independentvariableweaddapredictedsigninparentheses.(Becausethedependent
variableweareinterestedinisconstitutionaldeath,thesepredictionsareframedin
termsoflikelihoodofdeath.Afactorthatproducesconstitutionalresiliencewillthus
berepresentedbyanegativesign)
Structural Factors
Public Involvement (-):Weassumethatpublicinvolvementintheprocessof
ratificationoftheconstitutionwillincreaseitslifespan.Thisvariableisadummyfor
whetherornotthereispublicpromulgationORaconstitutionalconventionwith
publiclyelectedrepresentativestodrafttheconstitution.
Constitutional Flexibility(-): Tooperationalizethisconceptintheempirical
analysiswedrewonthesmallliteratureonindicesofconstitutionalrigidity.The
initialcontributionbyLutz(1994)developedanindexofconstitutionalrigidity,
constructedfromobservedamendmentratesofAmericanstates.Hethentestedthis
cross-nationallytolearnifformalrigidityoftheamendmentprocesswasnegatively
correlatedwithobservedamendmentrates.Wearesomewhatskepticalabouthis
index,particularlybecausewedonotbelieveU.S.stateconstitutionalprocessesare
analogoustothosegoverningnationalconstitutions.Thereis,quitesimply,very
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo

littlecosttoamendingorrewritingstateconstitutionswhenthereisanational
constitutionalguaranteeofarepublicanformofgovernmentthatisnoriskof
regimechange.Inanationalcontext,exitinganoldequilibriummaycreaterisksof
seriousinstabilityandfundamentalregimechange.Lorenz(2005)criticizesLutz
measureondifferentgroundsanddevelopsherownindex.Weareintheprocessof
constructingourownindex.Intheanalysisthatfollowsinthisiterationofthepaper,
weusedobservedamendmentratesasaproxyforthedifficultyoftheamendment
process.
Judicial Review (-): Theprimarymechanismforinterpretiveflexibilityisthe
presenceofacourttoconductconstitutionalreview.Courtscananddore-interpret
textsinquiteprofoundways:ourassumptionisthatthiscanprovideforneeded
flexibilityinthefaceofexogenousshocks.Weutilizeadummyvariablefromour
owndataastowhetherthereisanybodyentitledtoconductconstitutional
interpretation.
91
Specificity (+):Weusethelengthoftheconstitutioninwordsatitsinitial
promulgationtocapturethelevelofdetailintheconstitution.
State Age (-): Becauseofinstabilityandgrowingpainsintheearlystagesofa
statesfounding,weexpectconstitutionsofolderstatestohavelongerlifespans.We
useadummyvariableforaninfantconstitution(onelessthanfiveyearsold)to
determineifthereisaspecialformofinfantmortalityatworkinconstitution-
making.
Economic Development (-): Countriescharacterizedbystableindustrialized
economieswillbemorelikelytoweathercrises.WeuseGDP/Capitahere;an
laternativespecificationmightuseameasureofenergyconsumptionpercapitato
capturewealth.
Democracy (-): Weusethemeanscoreforthecountryinthewidelyutilized
Politydatabasetomeasuredemocracylevels.Ourassumptionisthatdemocracies
willbebetterabletowithstandcrises.

91
Analternative,morerefinedvariablemightconsiderthepresenceofadesignated
constitutionalcourt,althoughwehavenotheorythatsuggestsdesignatedbodieswillbe
systematicallybetterinterpretersthanunifedsupremecourts.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
Common Law (-): Finally,weintroduceacommonlawdummy.Berkowitz
andClayprovidedsuggestiveevidencethatconstitutionswithcivillaworiginswere
lessstableandwoulddieyounger.Theirdata,however,wasdrawnexclusivelyfrom
USStates.Wewishtoexaminewhethertheirfindingsholdinthebroaderuniverse
ofnationalconstitutions.
Precipitating Factors
Defeat in War (+): Statesthathavesufferedmilitarydefeatwillbemorelikely
towritenewconstitutions.DataarefromtheCorrelatesofWarproject.
Imposed Settlement (+): Statesthathavenotsufferedafullmilitarydefeatcan
neverthelessbecoercedintoanimposedsettlementondisfavorableterms.The
CorrelatesofWarprojectrecordstheseseparatelyandweincludethemasaseparate
variable.
Regime Transition (+): Aregimetransition,asmeasuredbyashiftofthreeor
morepointsonthePolitydemocracyscale,willincreasetheprobabilityof
constitutionaldemise.
Occupation (+): Occupationbyaforeignpowertypicallyfollowsdefeatinwar
andalmostalwaysreflectsafundamentalcrisistostateinstitutions.Wethuspredict
thatthiswouldbeaprecipitatingfactorforstatedeath.
Coups (+): CoupsarequitelikelythemostlethalriskfactorforConstitutions.
Governmentsthatcometopowerbyextra-constitutionalmeans--thatis,bycoup
arebydefinitionlesscommittedtothestandingConstitution.Notsurprisingly,their
firstactisoftentoabrogatetheConstitutionandcommissionanewversion.Sucha
moveservestolegitimateanotherwiseillegal(unconstitutional)transferofpower.
OurmeasureofcoupsisfromBanks(2005).
Executive Change: Todetermineifthereisarelationshipbetweenleadership
changeandnewconstitutions,weintroduceavariabletocapturewhethertheheadof
statechanged.Byincludingthisvariableaswellasregimechange,weare
controllingfortheeffectofthelatterandexaminingexecutivechangewithinasingle
regime.ThedataarefromArthurBanks.

cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo

ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
VI.RESULTSANDDISCUSSION
Belowwesketchsomepreliminaryresultsoftestsofthehypothesesabove.
Westresstheexploratorynatureoftheseresultssinceweareintheprocessof
reevaluatingthemodelspecificationandsharpeningourmeasures.Nonetheless,the
resultsprovidearoughsenseoftheroleofthefactorswementionabove.
Wetestthehypothesesusinganeventhistory(orsurvival)model,auseful
methodforestimatingdurationasitexplicitlyincorporatestime-dependenceinthe
analysis.TheestimatesinTable5arefromaCoxProportionalHazardmodel,
althoughtheparametricmodels(suchastheWeibull)thatwetesteddeliver
approximatelythesameresults.

Table 5: Predicting Constitutional Transition

Cox Proportional Hazard Models Mean Imputation for Missing Data
Variable
Only External
Variables
Only Internal
Variables
Both Internal and
External Variables
AmendmentRate(ln)

-0.03***
(2.36x10
-3
)
-0.03***
(2.52x10
-3
)
Length(ln)

-0.07
(0.07)
-0.18**
(0.07)
PublicPromulgation

-0.11
(0.09)
-0.19*
(0.10)
JudicialReview

0.25***
(0.10)
0.22**
(0.11)
Infant(5YearsOld)

0.26
(0.25)

-
0.20
(0.26)
StateAge

2.34x10
-4
(1.28x10
-3
)
-1.27x10
-3
***
(1.36x10
-3
)
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ao
Variable
Only External
Variables
Only Internal
Variables
Both Internal and
External Variables
GDP/Capita

-8.34x10
-5
***
(1.14x10
-5
)
-8.7x10
-5
(1.41x10
-5
)
Polity

-6.78x10
-4
(9.69x10
-4
)
-1.41x10
-3
(1.27x10
-3
)
CommonLaw

-0.20*
(0.11)
0.23*
(0.13)
DefeatinWar

0.23
(0.23)

-
0.12
(0.24)
ImposedSettlement

0.18
(0.16)

-
0.11
(0.16)
RegimeTransition

-4.07x10
-3
**
(1.80x10
-3
)

-
-2.67x10
-3
(2.04x10
-3
)
Coup

0.87***
(0.15)

-
0.56***
(0.16)
ChangeinExecutive

0.21*
(0.11)

-
0.19
(0.12)
LogLikelihood
-2477.6 -2231.3 -1915.8
N
10731 8926 7746
*p<0.10
**p<0.05
***p<0.01

Severalresultsstandout.First,richercountriesandthosewithastrong
democraticlegacyaremorelikelytohaveenduringConstitutions,buttheresultsdo
notexhibitstatisticalsignificance.Intermsofourprimaryhypotheses,initialpublic
legitimacydoesseemtopredictlongevity,controllingforotherfactors.Flexibility
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
a
alsoappearstobeacrucialfeatureofconstitutionallongevity.Constitutionsthat
allowamendmentmoreeasilyaremoreabletowithstandexogenousshocks
associatedwithcoups,warsandcrises.Rigidconstitutionsareriskyconstitutions.
Formalrigiditycanbeovercome,ofcourse,throughflexibleinterpretation,but
interestingourdummyvariableforjudicialreview(anyexplicitmechanismof
constitutionalinterpretation)producedapositivesign,indicatingcorrelationwith
constitutionaldeath.Ourinterpretationisthattheremaybesignificantperiodeffects
causingthisresult.Constitutionalreviewhasbecomemuchmorepopularinrecent
wavesofconstitution-drafting(Ginsburg2003).Nodoubtourdummyvariableis
alsoinsufficienttocapturethepresenceofeffectivereinterpretation,sinceit
conflatesveryactiveconstitutionalcourtswithveryinactiveones.
Interestingly,ourmodelprovidescounterevidencetothatofBerkowitzand
Clay,whoarguethatshorter,frameworkconstitutionsandcommonlawheritagewill
correlatewithlegalandconstitutionalstability.Wefindtheoppositeinbothcases.
Onereasonspecificitymaymatterisbecausespecificityindicatesinvestmentinthe
document(CooterandGinsburg2003).Whenpartiestoaconstitutionalagreement
takethetimetonegotiateandspecifydetail,theyareindicatingabeliefthatthe
agreementisworthinvestingin,andsinkingcostsintothedocument.Thismay
meantheyarelesslikelytoscrapitandstartanew.
WithrespecttothespecificfactorsthatleadtothedemiseofConstitutions,we
canreportminimalsupportforseveralofourindependentvariables.Imposed
solutions,executivechange,anddefeatinwarareinsignificantlyassociatedwith
constitutionaldeath.Interestingly,regimechangedoesnothaveanindependent
effect in the predicted directionbut many of the factor which do lead to
constitutionaldeatharealsoaccompaniedbyregimechange,sotheresultsheremay
besensitivetothespecification.Theonlyvariablethatindicatesignificantrisk
factor,controllingfortheothers,aremilitarycoups.
Insubsequentversionsofthispaper,wewilldevelopamorerefinedmodel,
sharpenourmeasures,andtesttherobustnessoftheeffectsdescribedabove.
However,theresultsdoestablishsomeofthebasiccontoursofconstitutional
transitionthatwewillbuilduponinfutureanalyses.Atthispoint,wecanmakefour
generalclaimsaboutconstitutionalreformandconstitutionalduration.First,
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
aa
constitutionstrackinstitutionalchangeswithsomeleveloffidelity.Second,long-
termdemocracyandconstitutionalturnoverdonotappeartobecompatible.Third,
constitutionsarefragileandmajor lifeeventsarelikelytoinduceconstitutional
transition.Finally,publicpromulgationandflexibleamendmentproceduresseemto
beacrucialfactorinpredictingwhetheraconstitutioncansurviveexogenousshocks

VII.CONCLUSION
Constitutionsaremeanttounderpindemocraticpoliticsbyprovidingastable
environmentforpoliticalinteraction.Yetestablishingastableconstitutionalscheme
appearstoquitedifficult,particularlyinnewdemocraciesoutsideWesternEurope
andNorthAmerica.Thispaperhassetouttobeginidentifyinginternalfeaturesthat
canimmunizeconstitutionsfromexogenousshocks.Ourconclusion,thatsome
internalfeaturesmatter,opensupanimportantresearchagendaforourbroader
projectofunderstandingwrittenconstitutions.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
aa
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ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
a
1.Introduction
92
I nthe20
th
centurytheGermanPeoplelivedunderfivedifferentconstitutions:
TheConstitutionoftheGermanEmpire(Reichsverfassung)until1919
The Constitution of the so-called Republic ofWeimar (Weimarer
Reichsverfassung)(1919-1933)
TheBasicLaw(1949untilnow)
ThefirstConstitutionoftheGermanDemocraticRepublic(1949-1968)
ThesecondConstitutionoftheGermanDemocraticRepublic(1968-1990)
Constitutionaltradition
andconstitutionalreforminGermany
KlausMesserschmidt,Humboldt
University of Berlin

92
ThisisanoriginalcontributiontotheKingPrajadhipoksInstitute(KPI)congresson
ConstitutionalReform:ComparativePerspectives,tobeheld3-5November2006in
Bangkok.Duetoveryrestrictedtimeofpreparationtheshortcomingsofatextthatwas
writteninaforeignlanguagecouldnotbeeliminatedbyalanguageeditor.Ideliberately
tooktherisktoexpressmyideasinmyowninappropriatewords.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ae
Soa90yearoldperson,bornin1916andlivingallhislife-timeinWestern
Germany lived under three constitutions whereas his East-German fellow
countrymanevenlivedunder5differentconstitutions,endingwiththeBasicLaw
whichwasextendedtotheEasternpartofGermanyduetoreunification.
Fouroftheseconstitutionscorrespondedtodifferentpoliticalandsocial
systems:
The Constitution of 1871 was the instrument of government of the
constitutionalmonarchywhichendedduetoGermanysmilitarydefeatin
WorldWarI.
TheConstitutionof1919expressedtheideasofthefirstGermanRepublic
whichwasdestroyedbytheGermanFascistsandtheirallies.
TheBasicLawof1949isthelegalfoundationofmodernGermany.
Al t hough i t ori gi nal l y was vi ewed as a provi si onal i nst rument of
governmentitlastslongerthanitspredecessors.WhereasthefirstGerman
Constitutionlastedlessthan50yearsandtheWeimarConstitutiononly
survivedfor13years,thepost-warBasicLawisgoingstrongsince57years
andprobablyformanyyearstocome.Thissuccessstoryculminatedinthe
extensionoftheBasicLawtoEasternGermanyin1990.
LookingatthechronologyofGermanconstitutionalismtheperiodfrom1933
to1945mustbeexcludedbecausetheFascistThirdReichnotevenpretendedtolive
underaconstitution.TheWeimarconstitutionandtheruleoflawweresuspended
givingwaytothecommandsoftheFascistleadership.
ItshouldbenotedthatGermanyneverestablishedanewconstitutionfor
constitutionalartssake.Constitutionswerealwayswiththesoleexceptionofthe
GDRConstitutionof1968createdafterverydeeppolitical changes:The
Constitutionof1871wasprecededbytheunificationofGermany,theWeimar
ConstitutionwasprecededbyGermanysdefeatinWorldWarIandtherevolutionof
1918/1919,which,however,unlikeRussia,didnotleadtoasocialiststatebuttoa
politicalcompromisesymbolizedbythisconstitution.TheBasicLaw,finally,
contributestotherebuildingofGermanstatehoodaftertheBarbarianruleofFascism
whichleadtoWorldWarII,genocide,thedevastationoflargepartsofEuropeand
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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ae
Germanyitself.SothestoryofGermanconstitutionalismhasaverydifficult
background.Theworkoftheframersneverresultedfromtheideaitwouldbenice
tohaveanewconstitutionbutstartedfromauniqueturning-pointinhistory.
Asanexceptiontotherulethatmajorpoliticalchangesandtheframingofa
newconstitutionarelinked,themostimportantpoliticaleventofpost-warhistoryin
Germany,reunificationofWesternandEasternGermanyin1990,neitherrequired
norinitiatedanewconstitution.
Itmightbeinterestingtocomparetheconditionsleadingtonewconstitutions
indifferentcountries.Ipresumethatinmostcasestherehasbeenanurgentneed,
althoughlessdramaticthaninGermany.Sometimes,however,symbolicreasons,
maysuffice.Tomymindsymbolicreasonsarenotgoodenough,especiallywhena
constitutioninactionisaffectedandworkinginstitutionsmustbeadaptedtothenew
constitutionalrules.
MyreportwillconcentrateontheBasicLawbutwilltakeintoaccountits
constitutionaltradition.Thereforethefirstpartofmyreportwillconcentrateonthe
pathleadingtotheBasicLawwhereasthesecondpartwillanalyseconstitutional
reformwithintheframeworkoftheBasicLaw.Onemightalsosaythefirstparts
dealswithconstitutionalreformwritlarge(transcendentconstitutionalreform),
includingrevolutionarychanges,whereasthesecondpartdealswithconstitutional
reformwritsmallcoveringthebusinessofpiecemealamendmentsoftheconstitution
(immanentconstitutionalreform).

2.ChangingConstitutions
2.1 The path to modern German Constitutionalism
AsamatteroffactGermanconstitutionalismdidnotstartonlyin1871,butin
1849andevenearlier.In1849arevolutionaryConstitutionwasproclaimedbythe
firstGermanParliament,knownasPaulskirchenverfassungbecausetheMPs
assembledinachurchnamedPaulskircheintheheartofGermany,thethen
autonomoustownofFrankfurtwheretheMediaevalGermanEmperorswereelected
andcrowned.Idonotdealwiththishighlyinterestingdocumentbecauseitnever
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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ao
enteredintoforce.Sufficetoknowthatitwasliberalincharacter,lessradicalthan
theFrenchConstitutionsfrom1791to1795,butopposedtoreactionarygovernment
andthedominanceofthePrussianstatewhichabolishedtheconstitutionafew
monthslater.Other19
th
centuryGermanconstitutionsarealsoomittedalthoughthe
constitutionsofPrussiaandotherGermanconstitutionssuchastheconstitutionof
theNorthernUnionof1866(NorddeutscherBund)certainlydeserveattention.
93

ThesameistrueofthedoctrinalbackgroundoftheBasicLawwhichispartof
thegreattraditionofconstitutionalideasputforwardbyLocke,Montesquieu,
Abb Sieys, the Federalists, Kant, Wilhelm von Humboldtandmanyothers.
Whilenoneofthegreatconstitutionalshiftsmaybeaddressedasconstitutional
reformintheusualnarrowmeaningofthisnotion,theydonotonlyexpress
revolutionarychangesoftheconstitutionandthepoliticalsystem.Theyalsoprove
continuityofpoliticalinstitutionsandconstitutionaldoctrine,tosomedegree.
However,thequestforcontinuityisonlyinterestingfromthehistoricalandfromthe
doctrinalpointofview,whereasintermsoflegaltheorythenotionofcontinuity
mustbediscarded.
94
Referringtodifferentconstitutionsmeansthattheyarevalid,
applicableandlegitimateindependently.Nonederivesvalidityfromanotherone.
Otherwisethisconstitutionshouldnotbeaddressedasanewconstitutionbutonlyas
anewversionofthebasicconstitution.
95
Thedistinctionbetweenchanging
constitutions (transcendent constitutional change) and amendments to the
constitution(immanentconstitutionalchange)
96
consequentlyformsthebasisofthis
essayandistantamounttotheoppositionofpouvoirconstituantandpouvoir
constituant.
97
Fromthestrictlylegalpointofviewitdoesnotmatterwhethera
constitutioninvokessomeconstitutionaltradition.Thereisonlyoneultimatetestof
theautonomyofaconstitution:Aderivativeorrevisedconstitutionisenacted
accordingtotheprovisionsoftheprecedingconstitution,whereasanewconstitution
93
Cf.G?tz,p.149.

94
SeeespeciallyMerkl,p.1279etseq.who,however,takesadifferentview.
95
Cf.KelsenII,p.1389etseq.
96
Merkl,p.1284.
97
Schuppert,p.45.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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a
arisesfromlegal tabula rasacomingintoexistenceatzerohourrelyingonlyonthe
Grundnorm
98
thataconstitutiononcesuccessfullyestablishedshouldbeobeyed.
2.2 Comparison of Basic Structure and Contents
Inroughoutlinethecommonandthedivergentfeaturesofthethreesucceeding
constitutionsmaybepresentedinthefollowingway:

Constitution of 1871 Constitution of 1919 Basic Law of 1949

Formofgovernment
Constitutional
monarchy
Republic
Republic
constitutional
democracy
Headofstate Kingresp.Emperor President President
Dominantfactor King&Chancellor
Chancellor&
President
Chancellor
Democracy * *** **
Ruleoflaw * ** ***
Separationofpowers ** * *
Socialstate * *
Environmentalstate *
Federaliststate * * *
Sovereignstate ** * *
Declarationofrights * **
Independentcourts * ** **
ConstitutionalCourt (*) **
RigidConstitution * * **
Numberof
amendments
52
98
Cf.KelsenIII,p.1397etseq.&KelsenI,p.200etseq.
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aa
Constitution of 1871 Constitution of 1919 Basic Law of 1949
Legislationby
parliament
* * **
Regulationsby
administration
** ** *
Roleofpolitical
parties
* ** ***
Independentmedia * ** *
Repressionof
politicalenemies
** *
Emergencypowers King President shared
Publicsupportand
acceptance
** * **
Supporters
Nobilityand
bourgeoisie
Workers,bourgeois
andcatholics
(partially)
mixed
Adversaries
Socialistsand
Catholics
Traditionalistsand
right-wing
extremists,
anti-Semites,
Communists
Right-wingand
left-wingextremists,
Muslim
fundamentalists

TopresenttheevolutionofGermanConstitutionalisminsuchasimplisticway
isboundtomeetcriticism.However,theaboveschemegivesanideaofthe
characteristicsofthedifferentconstitutionswhenadditionalinformationissupplied.
Some of the items are evident and need no further explanation such as the
Kaiserreichbeingaconstitutionalmonarchy.Otheritemsandthedistributionof
pointsinparticularneedexplanation(sub2.2.3).
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aa
2.2.1 Form of Government
Qual i fyi ng t he Federal Republ i c of Germany as consti tuti onal
democracy may sound somewhat st r ange. Ever ybody knows t he wor d
constitutional monarchy. Constitutional democracy islessfamiliar.This
wordismeanttohighlightthebasicideaoftheGermanFundamentalLaw:The
powerofthepeopleshouldbelimitedinthesamewayasthetraditionalpowerofthe
monarchbyaconstitution.Theconstitutionrestrictsthecompetenceevenofthe
peopleandtheirlegitimaterepresentativesandpreventsdemocracytoturnto
totalitariandemocracy.Consequentlytheconstitutionnotonlyprevailsagainst
legislationandadministrationbutclaimssupremacy,evenwhenitcomesto
amendmentsoftheBasicLaw.

Constitutions which can be changed by the ordinary legislative authority in

the same way in which ordinary laws are enacted, and those which, because they
cannot so be changed, stand above ordinary laws.
Bryce

AccordingArt.79para1anyamendmenttotheConstitutioncanonlybe
effectedbyachangeofthewordingoftheConstitution.Thislookslikeatruism.
Onlythehistoricalbackgroundrevealsitsmeaning:WeimarConstitutionallowed
amendmentthroughlegislationpassedbyatwo-thirdsmajorityofParliament.Itdid
not,however,specifytheconceptofalterationsoftheConstitution.Thus,laws
adoptedinParliamentbyatleastatwo-thirdsmajoritywereregardedaslegal
departuresfromtheConstitutionandweregivenprecedenceoverit.
99
SoArt.79
para1servesbothtransparencyandconstitutionalsupremacy.
Art.79para2setsaproceduralstandardforanyamendmentoftheConstitution.
Anylawamendingtheconstitutionmustbecarriedbyatleasttwothirdsofthe
MembersofeachChamberofGermanParliament(BundestagandBundesrat).
Comparedtoordinarylegislation,theamendmentoftheconstitutionhasbeenmade
99
Gtz,p.151.
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a<
moredifficult.Thusasimplepoliticalmajoritycannotchangeconstitutional
decisions,commonlyarrivedatanearliertime.Thisproceduraldifficultyinfluences
decisionswhethermodificationsorwhichmodificationsshouldbeundertaken
100

sinceconstitutionalreformdependsonabroadconsensus.Inthiswayreticent
attitudevis--visconstitutionalamendmentsisguaranteed.
101

ThoughtheWeimarConstitutioncontainedasimilarprovision,duetoArt.79
para1,whichisunprecedented,Art.79para2hasadifferentimpact.
Art.79para3precludestheprinciplesofArts.1and20fromanyalteration
whatsoever.
Article 79 para 3
Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into
L?nder (states), their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the
principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.

Article1readsasfollows:
Article 1 [Human dignity]
(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty
of all state authority.
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable
Human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and justice in the
world.
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, the
judiciary as directly applicable law.

ThustheprinciplesofArt1alsorefertothebasicrightsbindingallpowersof
State.
100
Klein,p.32.
101
Klein,p.33.
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ae
Article20reads:
Article 20 [Basic institutional principles; defence of the constitutional order]
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.
(2) All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the
people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative,
executive, and judicial bodies.
(3) The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and
the judiciary by law and justice.
(4) All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this
constitutional order, if no other remedy is available.

Amendments,evenwhenpassedbytherequiredmajority,mustnotchangethe
identityoftheBasicLaw.Thehard,unalterablecoreoftheBasicLawincludesthe
freeanddemocraticconstitutionalsystem,respectforhumanrights,thesovereignty
ofthepeople,theseparationofpowers,governmentalaccountability,executive
legitimacy,theindependenceofthejudiciary,themulti-partysystem,andequal
politicalchancesaswellasfederalism.
102

TheclaimofArticle79para3thatacoreofmajorandfundamentalprinciples
oftheBasicLawareoutsidethescopeofpotentialamendment,whichisparaphrased
aseternityclause
103
resp.perpetuityclause
104
(Ewigkeitsgarantie),meetslittle
understandingoutsideGermany.Britishlawyers,inparticular,havestrong
objections.Asamatteroffact,thiskindofconstitutionalismistheveryoppositeof
parliamentary supremacy or sovereignty as expounded by Dicey
105
and his
adherents.
106
Inordertounderstandthisprovision,thehistoricalbackgroundofthe
102
Schuppert,p.48.
103
Stern,p.20.
104
Schuppert,p.47.
105
Dicey,p.37etseq.
106
Cf.Wade(introductiontoDicey),p.xlviii.&Messerschmidt,p.553.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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ae
GermanBasicLawmustbetakenintoaccount.TheBasicLawwasframedasa
reactiontothedarkyearsoftheFascistregimeandthebreakdownoftheWeimar
Republic.ObviouslythecollapseoftheWeimarRepublicwasnotproducedbya
coupdtatbutresultedfromelectionswhichsawtheNazipartyasthegreatwinner
.EvenHitlerpretendedtoactwithinthelimitsoftheWeimarConstitutionwhenhe
suspendedbythenotoriousEmpowering Law,whichentitledthegovernmentto
legislatewithoutparliament.
107
SotheframersoftheBasicLaw,thoughdedicated
democrats,concludedthatdemocracyshouldberestrictedinawaythattheeventsof
1933couldneverhappenagain.Thereforetheyestablishedseveralinstruments,first
ofallthebanonunconstitutionalamendmentseveniftheyarelaunchedbyavast
democraticmajority.
108

2.2.2 Head of state

AftertheendofmonarchythePresidentastheheadofstateofthefirst
Republicbecameasortofsubstituteemperor.Inresponsetothedestructiveroleof
thelastReichsprsidentwhocontributedtothedeclineoftheWeimarRepublicand
pavedthewayforNazidictatorshipthepositionofthepresidenthasbeenreduced
considerablybytheBasicLaw.WhereastheWeimarConstitutionprovidedthe
Reichsprsidentwithwideexecutivepowers,theBundesprsidentislimitedinfavo
urofthegovernmentandtheparliament.Hecanneithertaketheinitiativetodissolve
theparliamentnorappointanewchancellorwithoutpriormajorityvotebythe
parliament.
109
Hehasnoindependentroleinshapingpolicyandnoemergency
powers.
110
HeismainlyandsimplythefirstrepresentativeoftheState.
111
Incontrast
tothePresidentoftheWeimarRepublic,heisnotelecteddirectlybythepeople,but
byanassemblydrawnfromMPsandrepresentativesoftheFederalStates.Thusthe
BasicLawtakescarethatthePresidentneveragainmayovercomeparliamentary
government.ThedominantrolenowlieswiththeChancellor,theGermanequivalent
107
Cf.Karpen,p.82.
108
Cf.Schuppert,p.48.
109
Magiera,p.89.
110
Cf.Karpen,p.83etseq.
111
Ress,p.116etseq.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
a
ofthePrimeMinister.GermanhistoryalwayssawstrongchancellorslikeBismarck,
theWeimarConstitution,however,madeitextremelydifficultforChancellorstostay
inofficeforseveralyears.TheChancellorenjoysincreasedpowersundertheBasic
Lawandisviewedasthedemocraticleaderofthenation.Beingelectedbythe
ParliamenttheChancellor,insomeway,isalsochosenbythegeneralelectorate.All
inall,theFederalRepublicofGermanymaybecharacterisedasachancellor
democracy.
112

2.2.3 Explanatory remark

ThecomparisonofthedifferentGermanconstitutionsconcentratesonthe
fundamentalstructuralprinciplesandtheinstitutionalsettingontheonehandandthe
roleoffundamentalrightsontheotherhand.Althoughitisnotpossibletocoverall
notionsmentionedabove,someofthemneedtobecommentedinmoredetail.
It may be unusual to present the comparison in the form of a table.
Thereforetheappliedmethodrequiresashortexplanation.Inordertogiveyousome
ideaofthecharacteristicsofthesubsequentGermanConstitutionsandinorderto
comparethecontentsoftheBasicLawtoitspredecessors,Ichosethemost
importantfeaturesandattributedpointsaccordingtotheirroleandstrengthineach
constitution.Somepeoplemightobjectthatthismethodisonlyappropriateinahotel
gui de and does not l i ve up t o t he seri ous t asks of const i t ut i onal anal ysi s.
Neverthelessitmaybehelpful.Somepeoplemayalsowonderwhythescaleis
restricted.Itonlygoesfromzerotothreepoints.Soarentthereanyfivestar
institutionsinGermanconstitution?However,thesestarsarenotmeanttodetect
excellence.Zeroindicatesthefulloralmostfulllackofaspecificinstitutionsuch
asaConstitutionalCourtinMonarchistandWeimarConstitution.One pointsays
thataspecificinstitutionorsetofrulesexists.Additionalpointsupto3indicate
thattheconstitutionattributesabove-averageimportanceandstrengthtoaparticular
institutionorprinciple.Wemustdistinguishbecauseoneconstitutionmayimplement
aconstitutionalprincipleinabasicway,whereasanotherconstitutionmayputmore
stressonit.
112
Hailbronner,p.70.
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ae
TheschemeofconstitutionalevolutioninGermanysuffersfromanother
shortcomingaswell.Themethodofdiscerningpointsdoesnotallowtogointo
details.SothestatementthatfederalismisstronginMonarchy,WeimarRepublicand
modern-dayGermanydoesnotrevealtheimportantchangesofGermanfederalism.
Thesameistrueofothernotions,which,however,cannotbecommentedhere
becausewehavetoconcentrateonthemoregeneralaspectsofconstitutionalreform,
whichmeansthatsomespecificcontentsofconstitutionsmustbeneglected.Sothe
writtenreportconcentratesonthemostimportantobservations.Theexplanationof
otherfindings,containedintheabovetable,mustbelefttodiscussion.
2.2.4 Democracy
Contrarytopopularprejudice,democracyinGermanydidnotstartwiththe
RepublicofWeimar.TheGermanEmpireischaracterisedbothbytheso-called
principleofmonarchyanddemocracy.TheMembersofParliament(Reichstag)are
appointedbygeneralelectionsandParliamenthasasayinlegislationandbudget.
However,itcannotbedeniedthatdemocracyatthattimewasunderdeveloped.
Germany is not one of those states which made major contributions to the
developmentofdemocracy.
113
ComparingthelevelofdemocracyinWeimarConstitutionandBasicLaw
Weimarcomesfirst.Bothconstitutionsestablishrepresentativeparliamentary
democracy.Art.20para2BLreads:

All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the
people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative,
executive, and judicial bodies.

TheBasicLawembracestheideaofrepresentativedemocracyandconfines
directdemocracybyreferendumandplebiscitetoaverylimitedrole.
114
Weimar
Constitution,onthecontrary,wasmoreopentodirectdemocracyallowingthe
113
Robbers,p.60.
114
Robbers,p.61.
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ae
immediateresolutionofsubstantialissuesbyplebiscites(Arts.73and76).Moreover
thePresidentwaselectedbypopularvote(Art.41).TheframersoftheBasicLaw
heldthatunrestrictedWeimardemocracycontributedtothesuicideofthefirst
GermanrepublicandwerestillshockedaboutHitlersrisetopowerandNazi
referenda.
115
Therefore t hei r general at t i t ude t owards democracy may be
characterised as cautious optimism. Paramount importance is attached to
fundamentalrightsassafeguardsoftherightsoftheminorityresp.theindividual.
TheideaofinadmissibleamendmentsasexpoundedinArticle79para3reflectsthis
scepticattitude.Thusthedemocraticmajorityprincipleisrestrictedbyconstitutional
handicaps.
116
Anotherexpressionofscepticismareprovisionsrelatingtotheso-called
self-assertiveorcombativedemocracy(wehrhafteDemokratie)
117
whichallow
authoritiestofightenemiesofdemocracyandtoputabanonextremistpolitical
partiesandassociations.This,again,isalessonfromWeimar,butalsoanexpression
of Col d War anxi et y.Anot her char act er i s t i cs of t he Bas i c Law i s t he
acknowledgementofpartydemocracy(Art.21).Partypoliticsarenecessarybut
theirinfluenceonadministrationandpublicmediamustberestricted.
118
2.2.5 Rule of law
ThecomprehensiveGermanpubliclawnotionofRechtsstaat escapes
translationbyjustanotherword.Althoughruleoflawisatthebaseofthisconcept,
thenowuniversalideaofrule of law, not of mendoesnotcoverallaspectsof
legalstate.Germanlawandlegaltheoryassociatetheruleoflawwiththe
guaranteeoffundamental(human)rightsaswellaswithprinciplesofstate
organisationsuchasseparationofpowers(Art.20para3)andindependenceof
judges(art.87),andwithmoregeneralprinciplesofdueprocesssuchasthe
prohibition(Art.103)orrestrictionofretroactivelaws(Rckwirkungsverbot),
theprotectionoflegitimateexpectations(Vertrauensschutz),theprinciples
of l egal cer t ai nt y ( Bes t i mmt hei t s grunds at z) and pr opor t i onal i t y
115
Ress,p.125.
116
StarckI,p.11.
117
Klein,p.18.
118
Cf.Karpen,p.72etseq.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<o
(Verhltnismigkeitsgrundsatz).
119
Thetraditionbehindthesemaximsdatesb
acktothe19
th
century.
120
However,theBasicLawandconstitutionalevolution
reinforcedthoseprinciplesandappliedthemalsotolegislation.Thatiswhya
continuousincreaseoftheruleoflawcanbestated.
2.2.6 Separation of powers
Thisnotion(Gewaltenteilungsgrundsatz)islinkedtotheruleoflawin
thewaythatseparationofpowersisaprerequisiteofruleoflaw.Ruleoflawis
hardlyimaginablewhenlawsaremadeandexecutedbythesamepeople.Without
independentjudiciaryruleoflawwillneverprevail.Besides,checksandbalances
dependontheexistenceofdifferentpowers.Neverthelessthemeaningofseparation
ofpowershaschangedsincethetimesofconstitutionalmonarchy.Whereas
constitutionalmonarchyfacedarealdualismofcrownandParliament,
121
democracy
putanendtothatkindofseparationofpowersbecausenowallpowerresultsfrom
thewillofthepeople.Consequently,theclassicalantagonismoflegislativeand
executivepowersisbridgedbythemaximofparliamentarygovernment.
122
Therefore
itshouldbenotedthatseparationofpowersislessfundamentalthaninthe
constitutionalmonarchybutstillanimportantinstrumentofgoodgovernance.Owing
tothegrowingroleofjudicialreviewchecksandbalanceswillpersist.
2.2.7. Social state
ThisisanotherwordthatsoundsgoodinGerman(Sozialstaat)and
clumsyinEnglish.ThefamiliarEnglishwordwelfarestateistoonarrowtocover
themultipleaspectsoftheGermannotion.Sozialstaatgoesbacktothe19
th

centurywhenwelfareandsocialsecurity(i.e.nationalinsurance)startedunder
Bismarcksrule.Atthattime,however,almostnobodyrelatedsocialpolicytoa
principleofconstitutionallaw.Constitutionallawstillwasrestrictedtotheconflict
manvs.state.TheWeimarConstitutionintroducedseveralsocialrightsresponding
119
Gtz,p.152etseq.&Robbers,p.62etseq.
120
Gtz,p.144.
121
Ipsen,p.108.
122
Messerschmidt,p.523etseq.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<
tothedemandsofSocialDemocratsandtradeunions.However,theywerenot
legallybinding.Ittook30moreyearstoadoptthenotionofsocialstateinGerman
constitutionallaw.Asamatteroffact,theBasicLawattributedthewordsocial
twotimestoalreadywell-establishedconstitutionalnotions(Arts.20para1and28
para1),onetimetofederalstate(sozialer Bundesstaat),anothertimetolegal
state(sozialer Rechtsstaat).Theriseofsocialstateisanoutstandingexample
ofconstitutionalevolutionwhichshallbeexplainedlater.Thenotionwasconstrued
asanobjectiveprinciple,whichimposeddutiesonthestate,butdidnotgrant
correspondingrights.Thisrestrictionisreasonablebecausethecapacityofwelfare
statedependsonavailableresources.
123
Togetherwiththeordertorespectandprotect
humandignity,thisprincipleobligesallstateorganstoprovideforsocialconditions
whicharecompatiblewithhumandignity.Aboveall,thestatemusttakecareofthe
weak,byprovidingthematerialminimumforanacceptablestandardofliving.
124

However,thisdoesnotmeanthateverybodyisentitledtohousingorajob,as
proponentsofsocialrightswouldliketohaveit.Proposalstoinsertsuchrightsinto
theBasicLawwerefutileefforts.Mostpoliticiansandlawyerswereafraidthat
layingdownunattainablegoalsandemptyrightswoulddestroytheauthorityofthe
constitution,.
125
althoughsuchsecond generation rightsarenotunfamiliarin
Europeanconstitutions.
126
Inaddition,theprincipleofsocialstateisalsounderstood
asimposinganobligationonthestatetoworktowardsthecommongood.
127
Another
aspectofthesocialstateprincipleistheredistributionofwealthwhichmaybeeither
asideeffectofwelfareoragoalinitselfleadingtowardsmaterialequalityandsocial
justice.
128
Tomymind,themostimportantaspectofthesocialstateprincipleconsists
inthis:First,itmakesclearthatthestateundertheBasiclawmustnotbeconceived
asaminimalstatebutasanactivestatedisposingoftherightofintervention.
Secondly,theprinciplesconfersadditionalpowerstothestate.Thirdly,restrictionsof

123
Klein,p.27&KarpenII,p.108.

124
Robbers,p.64.
125
StarckI,p.12.
126
StarckII,p.19&KarpenII,p.101etseq..
127
Robbers,ibid.

128
Cf.Hailbronner,p.65etseq.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<a
fundamentalrights,suchasproperty(Art.14),maybejustifiedbyreferencetothe
socialstateprinciple.However,thesocialstatelargelydependsonlegislationwhich
isleftwithabroadmarginofdiscretion.Thereforeitshouldbemadeclearthatthis
principleislessbindingthanruleoflawanddemocracy.Notablysomefundamental
rightsareveryclosetothesocialstateprinciple.Thisisinparticulartrueofthe
freedomofassociation(art.9para3)whichalsoappliestotradeunionsandiseven
bindingprivatepersons(directhorizontaleffect,Direkte Drittwirkung).
129
Art.
9istheconstitutionalguaranteeofthefreedomandparityoftradeunionsand
employersassociationsandoftherighttocollectivebargaining(Tarifautonomie)
andstrike.
130
Moreovertheconceptofsocialstatetendstoreplenishthetraditional
defensiveconceptoflibertywithanaffirmativepositiveandequalopportunity
understandingoffreedoms.
131
Attheendofthedaythisreadingofthesocialstate
ideameanstoorganizestateandsocietyalongthesamelines(constitutionalization
ofsociety)
132
andtodenyself-determinationofthecitizen(Privatautonomie).
2.2.8 Environmental state
Article 20a [Protection of the natural bases of life]
Mindful also of its responsibility toward future generations, the state shall
protect the natural bases of life by legislation and, in accordance with law and
j ust i ce, by execut i ve and j udi ci al act i on, al l wi t hi n t he f ramework of t he
constitutional order.

Thetaskorstategoal(Staatsziel)toprotecttheenvironmentmaybe
viewedasacorollaryofsocialstate.Itwasintroducedonlyin1994.Admittedlythe
legislatorwhenamendingtheconstitutionwasafraidofadynamicconstitutional
evolutionbythecourts,thatcouldleadtoapreponderanceofecologicalrequests.
Thisattitudealsoexplainstheawkwardwordingofthenewarticle.Inthisspecial
caseitwouldbeunfairtoputtheblameonthetranslator.
129
Robbers,p.51etseq.&Karpen,p.67.
130
KarpenII,p.91.
131
Karpen,p.57etseq.
132
Klein,p.20.
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
143
2.2.9 Declaration of rights
TheBasicLawputstheFundamentalRightsatthestart,whereasboththe
FrankfurtConstitutionof1849andtheWeimarConstitutiondealwiththemlaterand
theimperialConstitutioncontainsnobillofrightsatall.Inviewoftheextreme
violationsofhumanrightsbyfascistdictatorshiptheBasicLawthusemphasizesthe
paramountimportanceoftherightsoftheindividual.Basicrightshaveachievedan
undisputedleadingpositioninGermanconstitutionallaw.
133
Neitherthespecific
rightsnortheconstitutionalevolutionofrightscanbeexpoundedhere.
134
However,
thegrowthoffundamentalrightsisevident.
2.2.10 Constitutional Court
TheestablishmentandworkingoftheConstitutionalCourtisanoutstanding
featureoftheBasicLaw
135
andacornerstoneofconstitutionalism.Theneedand
legitimacyofjudicialresp.constitutionalcontroloflegislationhasbeendiscussedin
Germanyoveraperiodofacentury.
136
Inthemid1920stheSupremeCourt
(Reichsgericht)claimedtherightofjudicialreviewvis--vislegislativeacts.
137
An
outlineofconstitutionalreviewinGermany
138
wouldgobeyondthescopeofthis
report.Sufficetosaythattheconstitutionaljurisprudenceassumesakeyfunctionin
theprocessofconstitutionalinterpretationandtheimprovementofconstitutional
law.
139
Thejudicialsupervisionofstateacts,inparticularstatutes,againstthe
constitutionalyardstickisthebackboneofthesupremacyoftheconstitution.
140
133
Stern,p.29.
134
Cf.Robbers,p.48etseq.
135
Klein,p.32.
136
Ipsen,p.108.
137
Ipsen,p.110etseq.
138
Cf.
139
Stern,p.21.
140
StarckI,p.9.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<<
2.2.11 Rigid constitution
Theconstitutionalnotion,underlyingtheBasicLaw,isbestcharacterizedby
theprincipleofconstitutional law as binding law
141
,bindinginparticulareven
uponthelegislature(cf.Art.20para3).Thefirstprerequisiteofthesupremacyofthe
constitutionisthedistinctionbetweenthepowertoissueandamendtheconstitution
andthepowerofstatutorylaw-makingasexpoundedabove.Thepredecessorsofthe
BasicLawlackedthisqualityeitherbecausetheydidnotdrawaclearline(Imperial
Constitution)orbecausetheyreducedtheconstitutiontoapoliticalprogrammeinthe
handsandatthediscretionoftheparliamentarymajority(WeimarConstitution).
142

Becauseoftheproceduralandsubstantivesafeguardsagainstundueconstitutional
amendmentstheBasicLawclearlybelongtothetypeofrigidconstitutions.
143
2.2.12 Conclusion
It is never easy, in studying the history of an institution, to determine how
much of its success or failure is due to its own character, how much to the
conditions, external and domestic, in the midst of which it has to work.
Bryce

AlthoughtheFramersoftheBasicLawintendedtolearnfromthemistakes
ofthepreviousconstitution,itishardtodeterminetheinfluenceoftheinstitutional
settingsonthecollapseoftheWeimarRepublicanditisevenhardertorelatethe
stabilityofmodernGermanytoitsConstitution.Someanalystsrejecttheformal-
legalapproachandattachmuchmoreimportancetosocialconditionsandcivic
culture.MostprobablytheWeimarRepublicdidnotdiebecauseofitsconstitution,
whichwaswellconceivedbutbecauseoftoolittlepopularsupport
144
andobstruction
byelitessuchasjudgesandcivilservants,thusturningoutasaRepublic without
Republicans.
141
Ibid.
142
Ibid.
143
Klein,p.34.
144
Cf.Limbach,p.3.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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<e
3.TheGermanBasicLaw
TheGermanBasicLawbeingthe supreme law of the Landfullyconforms
tothegeneraldefinitionofaconstitution.

A Constitution is a Frame of Government designed to describe the form

which the administration of a State takes, to define its powers over the citizen, and
the rights of the citizen against it.
Bryce

Itisbothabillofrightsandaninstrumentofgovernment.Bothpillarsare
linkedbythegeneralideaofprotectinglibertybyfragmentingpowerandmakingit
accountable.
145
Likeallmodernconstitutionsitisawrittenconstitution.
146
The
specificproblemsofconstitutionalreform,discussedinthisreport,resultfromthis
feature.
Judgingfromitscontents,whichhasalreadybeendiscussedabove,theBasic
Lawmeetsallcriteriaofaconstitution.Itsgenesis,however,isatypical.
147
The
creationoftheBasicLawin1948and1949requiredonlyafewmonthswhilethe
proceduredeviatedfromallacceptedstandardsofconstitution-making.TheGerman
peopleneitherelectedtheframersoftheConstitution,theParliamentaryCouncil,nor
didtheyapproveoftheBasicLawbypopularvote.Insteadthemembersofthe
ParliamentaryCouncilwereappointedbythegovernmentsoftheMembersStatesof
theFederation in statu nascendi andtheirfinaldraftwasapprovedbythemilitary
governorsoftheWesternPowers.
148
NeverthelesstheBasicLawwasnotrejectedas
anoctroi becausetheoverallmajorityoftheGermanpeopleunderstoodthatthetotal
145
Karpen,p.56.
146
Neverthelessmostscholarsassumethat,inaddition,unwrittenconstitutionalnormsand
principlesexixt,cf.Kube,p.199etseq.
147
Klein,p.23etseq.&Schuppert,p.44etseq.
148
Cf.Spevack,op.cit.
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
146
collapse of fascist Germany and the regime of occupation did not allow an ordinary
constitution-making process.
Because of these deficits in the constitution-making process, but even more due
to the fact that the new constitution did not come into existence in the Eastern part of
Germany the constitution was regarded as a transitional and temporary framework
only. In order to stress its provisional character the document was not called
Constitution, but the more neutral title of Basic Law was chosen.
149
However, the
Basic Laws meets all substantial standards of a constitution and soon was accepted as
the constitution of Western Germany and finally united Germany.
Although the German Reunification offered a perfect opportunity to make good
for the poor democratic origins of the Basic Law, the idea to hold a referendum on
the Basic Law
150
or even to create a new constitution was rejected. The last
Parliament of the vanishing post-revolutionary German Democratic Republic
preferred to join the Federal Republic of Germany by way of accession, thereby
accepting the Basic Law as the constitution of reunified Germany. Although the
Basic Law originally expected reunification to go along with the adoption of a new
constitution (Art. 146) it did not exclude the speedway to national unity (cf. Art. 23).
It should be noted, however, that this kind of pragmatism does not fit to the
notion of constitutional patriotism, elaborated by German political scientists.
151

Though it is true that the overall majority of the German electorate continuously gave
support to loyalist parties, the horror populi is a serious shortcoming of German
constitutionalism. I do not pledge that each amendment should be put to popular
vote. However, I prefer an explicit approval of the constitution by the people. In
Germany we have missed this chance.
149
Dolzer, p. 370.
150
Cf. in more detail M. Bckenfrde, p. 107 et seq.
151
Cf. Schrder, p. 29 et seq.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<
4.AmendmentsoftheBasicLaw
4.1 Constitutional Background
The mode of amending Constitutions () has become one of special
importance in modern times, and that for two reasons. The older Constitutions ()
are () capable of being varied by the ordinary legislative authority without any
special formalities. But nearly all recent Constitutions () are embodied in an
instrument which can be altered not by the legislature in the course of its regular
action, but only in a specially prescribed way, usually by a vote of the people. This
provision is intended to place obstacles in the way of any but well-considered
changes which the nation as a whole desire. () Hence the need for making
amendment a slow and comparatively difficult process.
Bryce

Asmentionedintheverybeginningofthisessay,constitutionalamendments
mustconfirmtoArt.79whichreadsasfollows:
Article 79 [Amendment of the Basic Law]
(1) The Basic Law may be amended only by a law expressly amending or
supplementing its text. ()
(2) Any such l aw shal l be carri ed by t wo t hi rds of t he Members of t he
Bundest ag [House of Commons] and t wo t hi rds of t he vot es of t he
Bundesrat [Senate, representing the German States].
(3) Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into
L?nder (states), their participation on principle in the legislative process, or
the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.

Due t o t hi s provi si on t he Basi c Law corresponds t o t he ri gi d t ype of
constitution.However,thisstatementdoesnotexcludeconstitutionalchange.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<e
That even a Ri gi d Const i t ut i on () cannot st and unchanged from
generation to generation is a truth which has become clearer now than it was a
century ago.
Bryce

Actuallythecomparisonofrigidandflexibleconstitutionsissomewhat
misleadingbecausethenotionofflexibilityonlyappliestotherelationshipbetween
constitutionandstatute,butdoesnotruleouttherighttochangetheconstitution
withinagivenframework.
4.2 Some Facts
BecauseoftheproceduralandsubstantivesafeguardstheBasicLawmaybe
calledarigidconstitutionalthoughithadbeenchanged52timessofar.Thismeans
thattheBasicLawhasbeenchangedonaveragealmostineveryyearofits
existence,whereastheAmericanConstitutionsawonly27amendmentsintwo
centuriesandonly6amendmentsduringtheyearscorrespondingtotheperiodof
validityoftheGermanBasicLaw.
152
Asamatteroffactconstitutionalreform
al t ernat ed bet ween years of act i vi sm and years of rest i ng posi t i on. So no
amendmentswerepassedfrom1976to1983andfrom1984to2000,whereas16
amendmentshavebeencarriedoutbetween1968and1972.Since1990generally
oneamendmentperannumispassed.Justfromlookingatthesenumberswearriveat
aquiteimportantconclusion:Constitutionalamendmentsreachedtheirpeakwhen
legislative activity was intense as well.This finding backs the thesis that
constitutionalreforminGermanyismostlyundertakeninordertofacilitate
legislationbymeansofputtingconstitutionalhandicapsaside.Majorandminor
amendmentsalternate.
Therecentreformoffederalismmaybeaddressedasthebiggestandperhaps
mostimportantreformever.Itaffects20Articles(outofca.170)adinserts4new
152
Cf.http://www.ashbrook.org/constitution/amendments.html;http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/amend1.htm;moreinterestingdetailsinhttp://www.lexisnexis.com/constitution/
amendments_factoids.asp
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
<e
Articles.Sinceitintendstofacilitatedecision-making,whichsufferssofarfrom
federalism,changesarevitalforlegislationinGermany.
Theconstitutionalreformof1994onlycomessecond.Thereformof1994was
meagrewhencomparedtoitsoriginalgoalsandreflectedaverycautioushandlingof
constitutional reform. Owing to the UnificationTreaty, which called for a
const i t ut i onal reform wi t hi n t wo years, t he above-ment i oned Common
Constitutional Commissionwasestablished.Itsuggestedsomemodifications,but
nofundamentalrevisionoftheBasicLaw,whichconsequentlywereadoptedthrough
thenormalprocedureofamendmentswithoutanyreferendumbeingheld.
Furthermoretheamendmentof1956relatingtothereinstallationofmilitary
power(
Wehrverfassung
)deservesmention.
Anotherimportantamendmentistheintroductionofemergencypowers
provisions(
Notstandsverfassung
)in1968,whichwereextremelycontroversialatthattime,
causingconsiderableunrest.
153
Therisksofthisreformwere,asweknownow,
largelyoverstated.
4.3 Evaluation
ThefactthattheBasicLawhasbeenamended52timesdoesnotturnitintoan
unstableconstitution.
154
Neitherasingleamendmentnoramendmentsintotal
changedthecharacteroftheconstitution.The substance of the Constitution
remained untouched.
155
Mostoftheamendments
156
concernedfederalismtryingto
makeitmoreefficientwithoutchangingitsbasicidea.Thegeneralrelationsbetween
thecitizensandthestatewerenotsubjecttomajorchanges,althoughsingle
fundamentalrights,suchastherighttoequalprotection,asenshrinedinArt.3(in
1994),therightofpoliticalasylumunderArt.16(in1993and2000)andtherightof
theinviolabilityofthehomeinArt.13(in1998).Restrictiononasylumandthe
introductionoftheenvironmentalprotectionclause(Art.20a)markextremely

153
Karpen,p.83etseq.&Ress,p.131.
154
Cf.Stern,p.20.

155
Klein,p.34.

156
Cf.Hailbronner,p.55etseq.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
eo
importantgovernanceproblems.Nosubstantialmodificationscanbenotedwith
respecttotheinstitutionalframeworkandtheparliamentarysystem.
157
Many
amendmentsdemonstratebytheirtechnicalwording
158
aratherspecificmeaningand
littleimpactonstructuresandprinciplesoftheconstitution.
Thefrequencyofamendmentsindicatesinnowaygeneraldiscontentaboutthe
BasicLaw.Amendmentsweremadebecauseofspecificproblemsthathadtobe
solved,butnotoronlyoccasionallyforprincipleorsymbolicreasons.Onthe
contrary,theoverallattitudetowardstheBasicLawiseitherdown-to-earthor
enthusiasticbutalmostneverovertlycritical.Self-praiseandfishingforcompliments
arepredominant.TheBasicLawhasbeencelebratedasastrokeofluckforGerman
history.
159
AccordingtoanotherscholartheBasicLawhasonthewholeturnedoutto
beanextraordinarystablefoundationforthenational,economicandsocietal
developmentoftheFederalRepublicofGermany.
160
The extraordinary esteem
which the Basic Law has gained, even in international comparison, in its
development in recent years reflects the stable and just order of the community
which has arisen on the foundations of the Basic Law.
161
Almostnobody
contradictsitsassessmentasasuccessfulanddurableconstitution.
162
AnAmerican
scholarwaspoliteenoughtoagree:The Basic Law has stood the test of time, and
it is likely to survive in perpetuity.
163
Heconcludes:In terms of its prestige and
influence around the world, the Basic Law stands today on an equal footing
with the United States Constitution.
164
Notsurprisingly,boththeConstitutional
157
Schrder,p.37.
158
OnsheertechnicalmodificationSchrder,p.27.

159
Stern,p.21.
160
Dolzer,p.366.
161
Dolzer,p.386.
162
Stern,p.31etseq.AlsocompareStarckII,p.15:Ithasbeenrepeatedlyaffirmedthatthe
BasicLawhasproventobeanextraordinarilysoundfoundationforthestateorderandan
excellentpoliticalframework.
163
Kommers,p.65.
164
Kommers,p.67.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
e
ReformInquiryCommission,establishedin1971toreassesstheBasicLaw,
165
and
theCommonConstitutionalCommissionsetupin1992madenosuggestionsfora
thoroughrevisionoftheBasicLaw.
166
ThoughthelatterCommissiondiscussed
numerousproposals,itmadeonlyfewsuggestionswhichhavebeenmodifiedand
finallyadoptedbythelegislatorintheprocedureaccordingtoArt.79.Therecentfar-
reachingreformoffederalismprovesthatthepreviousreformswereinsufficient.
Moreoveritconfirmscriticswhobemoanedthelackofcourageandvisionof
constitutionalreform.
167
Themoderatestep-by-stepwayofconstitutionalreform
168

maybetootimid.SotheconservativeattitudetowardstheBasicLawisopento
differentinterpretations:Itmayexpressasenseofharmonyandloyaltytothe
constitutionor,onthecontrary,astateofself-congratulation,paralysisand
petrification.Presumablythereissometruthinbothviews.
4.4 Constitutional reform by informal evolution
QuitesimilartotheAmericanexperience,theDelphiccharacterofthemost
importantprovisionsoftheBasicLawmadeitpossibletoreformtheconstitution
primarily through caselawrather than byformal amendments and explicit
constitutionalrevision.
169
Inaddition,thenotionofanobjective(value)order
providedthejudgeswithaconvenienttooltoreinterpretthefundamentalrightsina
moreflexibleway.
170
Soevolutionary change of the constitution (informeller
Verfassungswandel)
171
resp.qualifiedreinterpretationoftheconstitutionbythe
judiciarymayhavesimilareffectstoformalconstitutionalreformbyparliamentary
bodies.Becauseoftheevidentfactthatinformal,tacitevolutionisnotsubjectedto
anyformal,inparticularproceduralrestrictionsitisbothappealingandfrightening.
Contrarytoconstitutionalreform,neitherabroadconsentnortextualtransparency
165
Stern,p.27.
166
Kloepfer,op.cit.
167
Kloepfer,p.148etseq.
168
Klein,p.35.
169
Durham,p.38.
170
Kommers,p.67.ScepticalKarpenII,p.99etseq.
171
Schuppert,p.49etseq.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ea
arerequired.Formalandinformalreformalsodifferseenfromthepointof
separationofpowers.Whereasformalconstitutionalreformremainswiththe
Parliament,informalevolutionaryreformisinthehandsoftheConstitutionalCourt
commandingofthemostimportantvehicleofconstitutionalchange.
172
Fromthe
pointofviewthatconstitutionalreformmustbemademoredifficultthanotheracts
anddecisions,precautionarymeasuresarerequestedinordertocurbcircumventions
oftheproceduralrulesgoverningconstitutionalreform.Thereforeinformalevolution
i s onl y accept abl e, when speci fi c cri t eri a are met whi ch must be defi ned
meticulously.Soasingleadjudicationisnotenoughtostateevolutionaryreform.
Onlyprecedents,i.e.constantjudicialdecisionscontainingthenewruleorprinciple,
maybeacknowledgedasevolutionaryreformoftheconstitution.Furthermore,
formalconstitutionalreformandevolutionaryinformalreform,asarule,applyto
differentareasoflaw.Preciseprovisions,whichprevailintheinstrument-of-
governmentpartoftheConstitutionandwhichareexpectedtodemarcatepowers
(competences)intheclearestpossibleway,areaboveallsubjecttoformal
constitutionalamendments,whereasvaguesubstantiveprinciplesoftherights
catalogueallowamoreflexibleapproachtoconstitutionalreform,asprovidedby
informalevolutionbythejudiciary.
Therisksofuncontrolledconstitutionalevolutionshowedupintherecent
decisionoftheGermanConstitutionalCourtontheconstitutionalityofthelast
nationalelections.Contrarytoothercountries,theGermanconstitutionrestrictsthe
dissolutionofParliamenttoexceptionalsituations.Noneofthesecouldbe
ascertainedwhentheformerChancellorSchrderaskedforprematureelectionsfor
reasonsofpoliticalstrategy.TheConstitutionalCourtshutitseyestothepolitical
farceandacceptedadissolution-orientedvoteofconfidence,makinguseof
argumentsthatareeitherbizarreornotinlinewiththerepresentativetypeof
democracyestablishedbytheBasicLaw.
173
Inthiscaseitwouldbeinadmissibleto
readthishighlydebatablejudgmentasacontributiontoconstitutionalevolution
towardsamoreplebiscitariantypeofdemocracy.Theconstitutionisjustdifferent
fromwhattheCourtsaiditis.
172
Schuppert,p.52.
173
Cf.Apel/Khler/Wihl,op.cit.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ea
Finallyevolutionaryreformitselfmaybesubjecttoevolution.Unlikethe
UnitedStatestheGermanconstitutionaladjudication,however,hasnodistinct
turningpointssuchasLochnerandtherevolutionof1937,
174
althoughattitudes,
preconceptionsandmethodsmayvary.OnceadjudicationoftheConstitutionalCourt
gaverisetotheideathatsubstantialjudicialreviewmightgivewaytoreinforced
scrutinyofdueprocessandproceduralrationality.
175
Variedjudgments,however,do
notallowsuchaconclusion.
4.5 Constitutional reform by trans-national higher
law-making authority
Lastbutnotleast,asortofconstitutionalreformresultsfromtheimpactof
EuropeanlawmakingonthelegalsystemofMemberStates,whichevenaffectsthe
nationalconstitution.
176
Itisimpossibletodealwiththisdifficultproblematlength
withoutgoingbeyondthescopeofthisreport.ThereforeIconfinemyremarkstotwo
theses.First,theadjudicationoftheGermanConstitutionalCourtbasicallyaccepts
or,atleast,shouldaccepttheideathatthemeaningandtheimpactoftheBasicLaw
are modified byEuropeanlaw. Secondly, the traditional notion of German
constitutionaltheoryofVerfassungsdurchbrechung
177
,whichmeans,roughly
speaking,departurewithoutviolation,(neitherderogationnoroverride),mighthelp
tounderstandthisprocessbeyondjudicialmainstreamcomprehension.

5.LessonsfromGermanconstitutionalreform
Arethereanylessonslegalscholars,politiciansandcitizensinGermanyand
abroadmaytakefromthewaysandthecontentsofconstitutionalevolutionin
Germany?InmyconclusionIwillmakesomegeneralsuggestions.
174
Cf.Messerschmidt,p.611etseq.
175
Cf.Messerschmidt,p.817etseq.
176
Cf.Hailbronner,p.81etseq.&Geiger,op.cit
177
Cf.Anschtz,p.401etseq.
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
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e<
5.1. Preliminary remarks
ExplainingtheGermanconstitutionabroaddoesnotmeantoenticeother
peopledofollowtheGermanway.Itisjustaninvitationtolegalcomparison.This
shouldbeclearfromtheoutsetbecauseinternationaldialoguesometimessuffers
fromanarrogantattitudeborderingonlegalandhumanitarianimperialism.
Democracy,ruleoflaw,solidarity,andrespectofhumanrightsarecommonvaluesof
mankind,buttheydonotrequiretheGermanorAmericantypeofdemocracyorrule
oflaw.EvencomparingthelegalculturesofWesternculturesshowsthereare
differentwaystoattaingoodgovernance.Itiscertainlyhelpfultostresstheassetsof
theGermanconstitution,butweshouldnotdenyitsshortcomings.
5.2. Some suggestions
Nouniformdirectionofconstitutionalevolutionexists.Itismereideology
to assume that constitutions get ever closer to a pre-existent ideal
constitution.Progressandset-backshappenandsometimesitisdifficultto
saywhichiswhich.SobycomparisonofWeimarconstitutionandBasic
Lawwecannotsayingeneralwhichisthebetterone.ObviouslytheBasic
Lawismuchmoresuccessfulthanshort-livingWeimarConstitutionwhich,
however,doesnotonlygobacktoitsinherentqualities,butowesalotto
benevolentpoliticalandinternationalconditions.Lookingattheprinciples
heldinbothconstitutionsitmustbestatedthatWeimarConstitutionwas
moreadvancedinmattersofdemocracywhereastheBasicLawtaking
constitutionalismalmosttoextremes.
Themainprinciplesofconstitutionalismarecloselylinked.However,trade-
offsbetweenrivallingprinciplessuchasdemocracyvs.supremacyofthe
constitution,legalminimalstatevs.socialactiviststate,unityvs.pluralism,
andinternational,esp.Europeanintegrationvs.nationalsovereignty,
pacifismvs.interventionismjusttonamethemostimportantmattersare
indispensable.AlthoughpoliticiansandConstitutionalCourtmanagedsofar
tokeepallelementsofGermanconstitutionalisminbalance,itsfurther
evol ut i on i s open.The need t o reform Germanys wel fare syst em,
immigration,internationalisationoflawaspartoftheglobalisationof
economy,andgrowingalienationofthepopulacefrommainstreampolitical
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
155
parties are items which put the Berlin Republic to a serious test. The
future will show whether Germanys rigid constitution allows sweeping
reforms or whether it will hamper and slow-down adaptation to political and
social imperatives in an ever quicker changing world.
A const i t ut i on shoul d be ri gi d but fl exi bl e enough t o al l ow bot h
constitutional evolution by the judiciary and amendments by parliament
or popular vote.
The success of German constitutionalism owes a lot to the Constitutional
Court who mostly took wise decisions and did not give rise to a major
constitutional crisis. However, there is no legal remedy to prevent the
guardian of the Constitution to abrogate from the path of constitutional
and political moderation (Quis custodiet custodes ipsos?).
178
On several
occasions the Constitutional Court could have created a severe crisis.
Imagine the consequence if the Court takes sides against European
integration. On several occasions the Court found it difficult to approve of
the supremacy of European law but gave in with a caveat. Post-war
Germany onl y once came near t o a const i t ut i onal cri si s when t he
Constitutional Court in the 1970s abolished several progressive Laws by the
then social-liberal majority which proposed to modernise Germany. When
everybody expected that the Court would also interfere with German foreign
policy of reconciliation with our neighbours to the East, it took a turn back
to judicial restraint. The German example shows that it is possible, though
difficult and not for granted to have a constitutional court with wide powers
of judicial review which is independent and irresponsible, but does not
act in an irresponsible and unreasonable way.
Once a Constitutional Court is established it can reduce the need for
constitutional reform. Constitutional evolution through interpretation by the
Court may substitute to some degree and on many occasions formal
constitutional reform. However, the Constitutional Court should only be
allowed to do the fine-tuning. A government of the judiciary is a serious
threat to democracy.

178
Cf. Karpen I, p. 86. On the problem of guarding the guardians Tribe, p. 12 et seq.
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Democracycanonlyrelyonconstitutionalcontrolifthejurisdictionandthe
peoplesharecommonvalues.TheRepublicofWeimaristhesadexampleof
astatewhichcouldnotevenrelyonitsofficialsandjudges.Hardtotell,
whetheraConstitutionalCourt,composedoftrueRepublicans,couldhave
preventedthedeclineoftheWeimarRepublic.Itisevident,however,thata
ConstitutionalCourtmustbecomposedofmenandwomenwhoareboth
independentandloyal.TheGermanBasicLawmanagedtoreconcilethese
requests.Althoughjudgesarequiteclosetopoliticalparties,professional
training,constitutionaltraditionandpeergroupreviewontheonehandand
mutualcontrolbypoliticalpartisansintheCourtontheotherhand
contributetodecentwork.Oncethereisapredominanceofonepartyor
influencebypressuregroupsgetsstronger,theConstitutionalCourtcould
degenerateandmisshistaskasguardianastheconstitutionandpromoterof
constitutionalreform.TheConstitutionalCourtshouldtakeadvicefromthe
AmericanpubliclawscholarJohn Hart Elywhosuggestedthatoneofthe
maintasksofjudicialreviewisclearing the channels of political
change.
179
Therepresentation-reinforcing approachtojudicialreview
seemstobemorepromisingthantheattemptoftheConstitutionalCourtto
improveonlegislationaccordingtoownunaccountableideas.
OnemorelessonhasbeensuggestedbyaGermanpubliclawteacherwho
anal ysed t he creat i on of t he Basi c Law and forei gn const rai nt s on
Constitution-makinginparticular:Legitimation deficits within the
const i t ut i on- maki ng process may hamper t he l egi t i macy of a
constitution at the outset, but if the constitution is accepted by the
people as the legally binding framework of their society and political
system, these deficits will be overcome, and at the end of the day, the
constitution will enjoy full and undoubted legitimacy. By contrast, if the
substance of a constitution lacks crucial elements like a sufficient
guarant ee of human ri ght s and democrat i c deci si on- maki ng
procedures, these failures cannot be cured.
180
Icannotfullysubscribeto
179
Ely,p.77etseq.
180
Lorz,p.165.
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this.OnlytheuniquesituationofthecomingintoexistenceoftheBasic
Lawjustifiesthegravedeviationsfromgenerallyacceptedstandardsofthe
pouvoir constituant.
181
Itisself-contradictorytoaskfordemocratic
decision-making procedures, but not to apply this yardstick to the
constitution-makingwhichprecedestheestablishmentofdemocracy.
Astoamendments,Germanpoliticianandexpertsholdthefollowingviews,
tonameonlyafew:
Newconstitutionalprovisionsaresuperfluousiftheircontentswillnotesse
ntiallydifferfromthepresentstateoflaw.
ConstitutionalprovisionsmustnotcomprisepromisestheStatecannotkeep.
Oneobservationmightbeadded:Left-wingpartiesaremoreinclinedto
amendtheconstitutionthanmoderateandright-wingparties.Whetherthisis
acoincidenceoraruleremainstobeseen.
181
Cf.Schuppert,p.37.e
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References
Iconfinedreferences,wheneverpossible,tobooksandessaysavailablein
English.ReadersshouldbeawarethatmostsourcesaresummariesoftheGerman
literature.DecisionsoftheFederalConstitutionalarenotindicatedinthistextbutin
thecitedreferencebooks.
Anschtz, G.: Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs vom 11. August 1919, 14
th
ed,
1933, Reprint Aalen 1987 (Scientia)
Apel, S./K?rber, C./ Wihl, T.: The Decision of the German Federal Constitutional
Court of 25
th
August 2005 Dissolution of the National Parliament, in:
German Law Journal 2005 No. 9 (available via internet)
Bckenfrde, M.: Constitutional referendum in Germany Country report, in: Riedel
, op. cit., p. 107 125
Bryce, J.: Constitutions (1905), Reprint Aalen 1980 (Scientia)
Dicey, A. V.: An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10
th
ed.
1959, Reprint 1987 London (Macmillan Education)
Dolzer, R.: The Path to German Unity: The Constitutional, Legal and International
Framework, in: Kirchhof/Kommers, op. cit., p. 365 - 387
Durham, W. C.: General Assessment of the Basic Law An American View, in:
Kirchhof/Kommers, op. cit., p. 36 64
Ely, J. H.: Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge/Mass. 1980 (Harvard U. P.)
Geiger, R.: EU Constitutionality and the German Basic Law, Jean Monnet/Robert
Schuman Paper Series Vol. 5 No. 1A January 2005 (available via internet)
Gtz, V.: Legislative and Executive Power under the Constitutional Requiremen
ts entailed in the Principle of the Rule of Law, in: Starck II, op. cit., p. 141 -
166
Hailbronner, K./Kau, M.: Constitutional Law, in: Reiman/Zekoll, op. cit., 53 - 85
Ipsen, J.: Constitutional Review of Laws, in: Starck I, op. cit., p. 107 - 137
Karpen, U.: Application of the Basic Law, in: Starck I, op. cit., p. 55 88 [Karpen I]
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
ee
Karpen, U.: The Constitution in the Face of Economic and Social Progress, in: Starck
II, op. cit., p. 87 110 [Karpen II]
Kelsen, H.: Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed. 1960, Reprint Vienna 1983 (Deuticke)
[Kelsen I]
Kelsen, H.: Was ist ein Rechtsakt? (1951/52), Reprinted in: Klecatsky et al. (ed.), Die
Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, vol. 2, Vienna 1968 (Europa Verlag),
p.1395 - 1416 [Kelsen II]
Kelsen, H.: Der Begriff der Rechtsordnung, (1958), Reprinted in: Klecatsky et al.
(ed.), Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, vol. 2, Vienna 1968 (Europa
Verlag), p.1381 1393 [Kelsen III]
Kirchhof, P./Kommers, D. (ed.): Germany and its Basic Law, Baden-Baden 1993
(Nomos)
Klein, E.: The Concept of the Basic Law, in: Starck I, op. cit., p. 15 - 35
Kloepfer, M.: Verfassungs?nderung statt Verfassungsrevision, Berlin 1995 (Berlin
Verlag A. Spitz)
Kommers, D.: Comments on Part I, in: Kirchhof/Kommers, op. cit., p. 65 - 67
Kube, H.: Unwritten Constitutional Norms and Principles in Germany, in: Riedel, op.
cit., p. 199 - 215
Limbach, J.: How a constitution can safeguard democracy: The German Experience
(internet resource)
Lorz, R. A.: International Constraints on Constitution-Making, in: Riedel, op. cit., p.
143 - 165
Magiera, S.: The Interpretation of the Basic Law, in: Starck I , op. cit., p. 89 - 105
Merkl, A.: Das Problem der Rechtskontinuit?t und die Forderung des einheitlichen
rechtlichen Weltbildes (1926), Reprinted in: Klecatsky et al. (ed.), Die
Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, vol. 2, Vienna 1968 (Europa Verlag),
p. 1267 - 1300
Messerschmidt, K.: Gesetzgebungsermessen, Berlin 2000 (Berlin Verlag A. Spitz)
Reimann, M./Zekoll, J. (ed.): Introduction to German Law, M?nchen 2005 (C. H.
Beck)
cooeieueio noro-. coo-oei.o =o-oooei.oo
ip =-ojoaio<o |oeieueo
eo
Ress, G.: The Constitution and the Requirements of Democracy, in: Starck II, op. cit.,
p. 111 - 140
Riedel, E. (ed.): Constitutionalism Old Concepts, New Worlds, Berlin 2005 (BWV)
Robbers, G.: An Introduction to German Law, 3rd ed., Baden-Baden 2003 (Nomos)
Schr?der, M.: Strengthening of Constitutional Law: Efforts and Problems, in: Starck
II, op. cit., p. 25 - 41
Schuppert, G. F.: The Constituent Power, in: Starck I, op. cit., p. 37 - 54
Spevack, E.: Allied Control and German Freedom, M?nster 2001 (LIT-Verlag)
Starck, C. (ed.): Main Principles of the German Basic Law, Baden-Baden 1983
(Nomos) [Starck I]
Starck, C. (ed.): New Challenges to the German Basic Law, Baden-Baden 1991
(Nomos) [Starck II]
Stern, K.: General Assessment of the Basic Law A German View, in: Kirchhof/
Kommers, op. cit., p. 17 36
Tribe, L. H.: American Constitutional Law, 2
nd
ed., Mineola N. Y. 1988 (Foundation
Press)
AllConstitutionsreferredtointhisreportandallamendmentstotheBasic
Law from 1951 t o 2000 may be l ooked up i n German l anguage i n ht t p: / /
www.documentarchiv.de/da/fs-verfassungen.html.ForWeimarConstitutionin
Englishtranslationseehttp://www.zum.de/psm/weimar/weimar_vve.php;forBasic
LawinEnglishseehttp://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/StatischeSeiten/
br eg/ bas i c- l aw- f or- t he- f eder al - r epubl i c- of - ger many, l ayout Var i ant =
Druckansicht.html.Unfortunatelynoup-to-datetranslationseemstobeavailable.
Theabovementionedtextcorrespondstothestateof2002.Recentdecisionsand
someleadingcasesoftheFederalConstitutionalCourtofGermanyareavailablein
Englishlanguageaswell,seehttp://www.bverfg.de/en/index.html.
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ProfessorAndrewHarding
ProfessorAndrewHardingoftheUniversityofVictoria,Canada,drewonhis
paper,NewAsianConstitutionalism:MythorReality,todiscussimportantaspects
ofconstitutionaldevelopmentandissuesinconstitution-drafting.Heassertedthat
constitutionaltextsareveryimportant,anddraftersshouldtryhardtogetthemright,
butevenaperfecttextwillnotbetheanswertoallconstitutionalproblems.Healso
suggestedthatnewconstitutionsbecomecomfortableovertime,socountriesshould
notbetooquicktodiscardthem;inadditiontotheobviousneedtowritean
alternative,citizensmaybecomecynicalisconstitutionsarechangedtooquickly.
Whileconstitutionscanchangesocialrealities,theprocessisnotnecessarilyquickor
smooth,soconstitutionsshouldautocthonous,meaninghome-grownandgrounded
inlocalpoliticalandsocialrealities.Thailands1997constitutionwasanambitious
attempttochangesocialreality.Whenconsideringitsfailings,oneshouldthink
abouttheextenttowhichitwasappropriatetothecountryssituation,butatthesame
PanelSummaryandDiscussions
TheProcessofConstitutionalReformfrom
ForeignComparativePerspectives
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timerememberthattherewasmuchaboutitthatdidworkandthusshouldnotbe
discarded.Balanceidealismandrealism.Theroleofcourtsininterpreting
constitutionaltextsisimportant,andThailandshouldconsiderwhatwentwrongwith
itsConstitutionalCourtratherthandiscardtheinstitutioncompletely.

ProfessorAndrRoux
ProfessorAndrRouxthedirectoroftheInstitutLouisFavoreu,France,review
edFrancesconstitutionalhistory,focusingonthe1958constitution.Hedescribed
themixedparliamentary/presidentialsystemtheconstitutioninstalled,anditsaimto
reinforceexecutivepower.Subsequentconstitutionaldebatehascenteredon
rectifyingimbalancesemergingfromtheconstitution,notablytheweaknessofthe
judiciaryandparliamentinrelationtotheexecutive,andthebalanceofpower
betweenthepresidentandtheprimeminister.Inadditiontherehavebeenattemptsto
increasethepowersofthepeople,whichwerelargelyunaddressedinthe1958
constitution.TheneedtoadapttoconditionsofmembershipintheEuropeanUnion
hasalsobeenadrivingforceforrevision.Theconstitutionamendmentprocesswas
describedasdifficulttopursuethroughparliament,soparliamenthasbeenbypassed
onoccasionthroughreferendum.

ProfessorPeterLeyland
ProfessorPeterLeylandoftheLondonMetropolitanUniversity,UK,drew
lessonsfrom recent UKexperience inconstitutional change that may have
implicationsasThailandconsidersanewconstitution.Hebrieflyaddressed
devolution,pointingoutthatpre-existing,functioningmechanismsandstructures
makemovingforwardeasier.Leylandobservedthatconstitutionalchangeisa
dynamicprocess,withchangesraisingnewissuesoftenleadingtofurtherdemands
forreform.ConflictofinteresthasbeenamajorissueintheUK.Ratherthantrying
topreventpoliticiansfromhavinginterests,itisimportantthatthoseinterestsare
declaredinatransparentmanner;theprocessisonlymeaningfulifthepubliccansee
it.Fundingofpoliticalpartiesisalsoimportant.ThekeyconcernforThailandshould
bethecreationofalevelplayingfieldwhereallgroupscanengageinthepolitical
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processwithoutonegroupdominating.Regardingthemediaandbroadcasting,UK
experiencesuggeststhevalueofhavinganindependentpublicly-fundedbroadcaster,
themanagementofwhichisappointedinarelativelyneutralmanner.

ProfessorTomGinsburg
ProfessorTomGinsburgoftheUniversityofIllinois,USA,discussedthe
lifespansofwrittenconstitutions,partofthefindingsofabroaderresearchprojecton
theoriginsandcharacteristicsofwrittenconstitutions.Heobservedthatsuccessful
orlong-livedconstitutionsareself-enforcingpoliticalbargains,whichallinterest
groupsfeelbettertohavethantobewithout.Ginsburgraisedthequestionofshould
constitutionsbelong-lived.Astheyagetheymaybecomeinappropriatetosocial,
technologicalorotherconditions,andtheymaybeanti-democraticinthatold
constitutionsmaynotrepresentnewgenerationsofcitizens.Ontheotherhand,they
stabilityprovidedbyanenduringsetoffundamentalrulesmayallowotherimportant
institutionstodevelop.Adistinctionwasdrawnbetweenconstitutionalstabilityand
regimestability,thoughitwasacknowledgedthattheyoftenaccompanyeachother.
Constitutionalresiliencyseemstodependonthemechanismsbywhichaconstitution
isadopted(publicinvolvementseemstogenerategreaterlongevity)andthe
constitutionsabilitytoadjustoradapteitherformallythroughamendmentor
informallythroughinterpretation.

Dr.KlausMesserschmidt
Dr.KlausMesserschmidtofHumboldtUniversity,Berlin,Germany,discussed
Germanconstitutionalhistory,focusingontheBasicLawof1949.InGermany,
constitutionalchangeshavecomeonlyafterdeeppoliticalchange,neversimplyout
ofadesireforchange.TheBasicLawwasshapedbythecountrysreactiontothe
breakdownoftheWeimarRepublicandadesiretoavoidrepetitionoftheeventsof
1933.Thusthepowerofthepeoplewaslimitedtopreventtotalitariandemocracy.
Amendmentmechanismswerealsodesignedtobedifficulttoexercise,andsomekey
featureswereprotectedfromanyamendmentwhatsoever.Minor,technical
amendmentsarerelativelyeasy,butfundamentalchangesaredifficult.Evolutionis
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animportantmeansofchangeratherthanamendment.SuccessoftheBasicLaw
showstheimportanceofcompromisesortrade-offs.Italsoshowsthataconstitution
shouldberigid,yetflexibleenoughtoaccommodateadaptationwithoutcrisis.
Constitutionsmustnotmakepromisesthestatecannotkeep.

Discussions
Discussionsfromtheflooraddressedseveralissuesincludingthepublic
participationinaconstitution-draftingprocess,theroleofpoliticiansandpolitical
partiesinconstitution-draftingandadministeringoversightmechanisms,thebalance
ofpowerbetweenthelegislatureandtheexecutiveandtheneedtoconsiderreasons
forthefailureThailands1997Constitution.

PanelDiscussion2

TheProcessofConstitutionalReform
FromThaiComparativePerspectives
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J ustasinthetaleofthemouseandthecat,itisstilltooearlytodebatethemain
contentsofthenew Constitution.Itisfutiletodiscusswhethertouseabigor
smallbellandhowloudwillitbeaslongasthemousecannotcomeupwiththe
strategytoputthebellonthecat.
Theimportanceofthecurrentpoliticalreform(September2006)restson(1)
whichmousehasenoughcouragetoputthebellonthecat;and(2)howthemouse
willdoit.
Thefirstquestion:Whichmousewillputthebellonthecat?Theansweristhat
nomousealonecanputthebellonthecatbecausethecatwouldbeabletoeatany
mousefirst.Butifallmicetacklethecat,somemicemaysurvive,butitwhetherthey
couldputthebellonthecatisanothermatter.
Thesecondquestion:Howwillthemouseputthebellonthecat?Theanswer
isifthemiceusetheoldparadigm,thatiseachmouseholdsabellandrunsinan
attempttoputthebellonthecat,themicemaynothavetheopportunityorhaveless
opportunitytojumpupthecatsnecktoputthebellonit.However,ifthemiceusea
FeaturesforthenewConstitution
Prof.Dr.AmornChandarasomboon
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newparadigm,thatisclimbingoneachothertoformaladderandthelastmouse
putsthebellonthecat,themicemayhaveachanceofsuccess.
Likewiseforthissecondpoliticalreform,ifThaipeopleusetheoldparadigm,
thatisifelectedmembersoftheHouseofRepresentativeslosetheirpowerfromthe
politicalreform,politiciansmaydistorttheirpowerandpoliticalreformwillnotbe
successful.
IfThaipeoplefindanew paradigmandgiveeligiblevoters(allmice)the
righttoexercisetheirrightsbynotvotingforpoliticalpartiesthatfollowtheold
paradigm(betheynationalcapitalistpoliticalpartiesorlocalcapitalistpolitical
parties)andinsteadvotingonlyforpoliticalpartiesthatproposeanewparadigm,
Thaipeoplewouldthenbesuccessfulinthesecondpoliticalreform.
Ifthe mouseinthetaleusesanewparadigmandsuccessfullyputsthebell
onthecat,thenextquestionishowlargeandhowloudshouldthebellbeinorderto
effectivelywarnthemice.
IfThaipeoplehaveinfactfoundanewparadigm(statesman+experts+
public),theauthorbelievesthatthestructureofthenewconstitutionwillobviously
appearinaccordancewiththestrategyofdraftingtheconstitutionunderthenew
paradigmwiththeapprovalofThaivotersthroughreferendum.
However,intheauthorsopinion,thedraftingofthenewconstitutionundera
newparadigmwithouttheinfluenceofbusinesspoliticianswhopreviouslyheldtight
reignoverstatepowerwillleadtoanewconstitutionthatisrationalizedandmeets
presentacademicstandards.
ProvisionsofthenewConstitutionspecificallyconcerningpolitical
institutionsandadministrative mechanisms (without mention of provisions
about individual rights and liberties, state policy, etc.) shouldbebasedonthe
followingprinciples:
1.Thailandadoptsademocraticregimeofgovernment(parliamentarysystem).
ThailandisoneandindivisibleKingdomwiththeKingasHeadofState.
2.Themaincharacteristicsofthenewconstitution(partsconcernedwith
political institutionsand administrative mechanisms should
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comprisethefollowing:
MembersoftheHouseofRepresentativeswillhaveindependenceintheir
workfollowingtheirownconscience.Inaccordancewiththeprinciplesofa
democraticsystem,MembersofParliamentwillnotfallunderthemandatesof
politicalpartyresolutionsandwillhavetherighttostandforelectioneither
representingapoliticalpartyorasanindependentcandidates.
TheexecutivebranchwillembraceastrongPrimeMinisterwhoisresponsible
asheadoftheexecutivebranch.ThePrimeMinisterwillberesponsibleforbothhis
workandhisMinistersworkcarriedoutinaccordancewiththerationaleofa
parliamentarysysteminwhichthenationaladministrationneedsaleaderwhen
interestgroupsarecomplicated.
Atthesametime,thestrongPrimeMinister(asheadoftheexecutivebranch)
mustnothaveinfluenceovermembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,whichisthe
institutionresponsibleforcheckingandbalancingtheexecutivebranch.Also,
measurestoensurethePrime Ministers stabilityinofficeandtheabilityproceed
withthepoliciesdeclaredtothepubliccontinuouslyandinatimelymanner(aslong
asnocorruptionisdetected)mustbeinplace.
ThePrimeMinistermustbeelectedthroughamajorityvoteinParliamentbut
doesnotneedtobeanelectedMP.
IftheSenateisrequiredtohavesimilarqualificationsasMembersofthe
HouseofRepresentativeandistobeelected,thenthereisnoneedfortwoHousesin
Parl i ament , especi al l y si nce t here i s a part y l i st syst em for t he House of
Representativesthatprovidestheopportunityforacademicstoenterpolitics
withoutfinancialbackingandcampaignfunding.ButiftheSenatesrequirementis
differentfromtheHouseofRepresentatives,suchasrepresentationfromlocal
politicians(membersoflocaladministrationsorlocaladministrators)thenthere
needstobeatemporaryclauseinthenewconstitution.
Judicialcriminalproceduresforpoliticiansshouldbeamendedtobemore
effectivebystipulatingquick and clear measuresthatareequivalenttothosein
developedcountriesinordertoreplacepoliticalchecksandbalancesbytheHouseof
Representativesthatarereduced.ThemethodofchecksandbalancesofParliament
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dependsonthebehaviorofpoliticianscompetingforpositionsratherthanbeinga
processforfindingthetruefacts[Theamendmentofjudicialproceduresisa
technicalityofpubliclawwhichistoocomplicatedforexplanationinthisforum.]
IndependentagenciessuchastheElectionCommissionandtheNational
CounterCorruptionCommissionmustrevisetheirmembernominationregulationsto
bemoretransparentandopentothepublic,asinthecaseofappointingajudgetothe
SupremeCourtindevelopedcountries.
Nominationofcivilserviceofficialstoimportantgovernmentofficessuchas
theGovernoroftheBankofThailandandtheAttorney-Generalmustbecheckedand
approvedbytheHouseofRepresentativesorParliamentinordertoreduce
interventionfromtheexecutivebranchandtoensurestabilityandneutralityin
carryingoutduties,whichissimilartothepresentpositionoftheAuditor-General
andtheSecretary-GeneraloftheSupremeCourtCommission.
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TableofContents
Document 1: Principlesofdemocracy(independence of MPs in their
conscientious disposition of own duties)
(1.1) Constitutionsinothercountries(Germany/France/South
Korea/Denmark/Spain)
(1.2) EvolutionofThaiconstitutiontowards despotic regime by
political partiesfromthe1974constitution(10
th
version)
tothepresent1997constitution(16
th
Version)
Document 2: Despotic constitution2groups
(2.1) DespoticconstitutionbytheCommunist Party(China/
SouthVietnam/NorthKorea/Cuba,etc.)
(2.2) Despot i c const i t ut i on by pol i ti cal parti es owned by
capitalists (Thailandistheonlycountry)
Part1
FundamentalConstitutionalDrafting
for the Second Political Reform 2006
Supplementary Academic Paper
With the Discourse of Prof. Dr. Amorn Chandarasomboon
In Round-Table Discussion
Organized by the Law Association, Thammasat University
(13 September 2006)
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Document 3: Roles of the king in the parliamentary system two types
(3.1) Thekingexercises administrative powerunderbalanceof
powerbytheparliament(Denmark/Belgium/Sweden/
Norway/Netherlands/Luxembourg)
(3.2) Thaiconstitution(firstversion)of1932(thePeople
Assembly group refused not to accept the kings roles in
democratic development)
(3.3) Manuscript of King Rama VII relinquishing his royal
possessions(1934)
Document 4: Constitutional drafting techniques (design)ofthepresent
Constitution(rationalization of constitutional draftingaround
mid-20
th
centurytoovercomedespotismintheparliamentary
systemdespoticstatepower(executivelegislative)
(4.1) Semi-parliamentarysystem:theGermanconstitutionof1948
(4.2) Semi-presidentialsystem(SouthKorea/France/Russia,etc.)
Document 5: UnderdevelopmentofThaiacademiccirclesinconstitutional
draftingpriortothechangeoveroftheadministrativesystemin
1932
(5.1) JapaneseconstitutionintheMeijiera(1889)
(5.2) Constitutional draft of Thailand during the reign of King
Rama VII(1925-1934)
* First Charter in 1926(constitutionaldraftofPhraya
Kalayanamaitri(12sections)
* Second Charter in 1931(9March)Constitutionaldraft
ofRaymondB.StevensandPhrayaSriwisarnwacha
(memberoftheconstitutionaldraftingcommittee)
[Note:KingRamaVIIplannedtopresenttheconstitution
on6April1932.)
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Document 6: SuccessorfailureinThailandspoliticalreform
(6.1) Old paradigm in the past(1996)
* Cons t i t ut i onal Dr af t i ng As s e mbl y ( t he 1991
constitution;amendedcharter6
th
versionin1996
[Failureinthefirstpoliticalreform(1997):Thepresent
1997constitutioncontributedtothebirthofthedespotic
regimebycapitalistpoliticalparties]
(6.2) Old paradigm in the future(proposedbypoliticalparties
foranelectionduring2006-2007)
* (Draft)PoliticalReformAssembly,proposed by the
Thai Rak Thai Party
* ( Dr af t ) Speci al Commi t t ee f or Cons t i t ut i onal
Amendment,proposed by the Democrat Party
(6.3) New paradigm for political reform
* (Draft)SpecialCommitteeforDraftingoftheNational
Constitution,proposed by academics (some group)

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T he current situation signifies an outcome stemming from shortcomings
in the design of the 1997 constitutionwhichisinforcenow,givingrisetothe
despoticsystembypoliticalparty andprovokingcapitalistscumbusinessmento
jointlyinvestinformationofapoliticalparty(andwontheelectionbyusing
moneyandinfluencewhileThaisocietywasweak).Eventually,thesepoliticians
couldtakeabsolutecontrolofstatepowerintheparliamentarysystem.Atthesame
time,theycouldcontrolamajorityintheparliament.,rendering the House of
Representatives,whichisaninstitutiondesignedtocounterbalancethepowerofthe
executivebranchandexamineconductofthoseinpower,vulnerable to become a
tool for exercise of power by the businessman cum capitalist group in the
government,regardlesswhetheritbeabsolutecontrolofstatepoweriscarriedoutby
a single political partylikethepresentsituationorpolyarchy formed by 2-3
political partieslikeinthepast.
Therefore,thepolitical parties (new parties)whichwillfieldintheupcoming
election,aimingatresolvingthecountrysproblemsmusthaveavisionand
Part2
PrescriptionMethod
PoliciesofPoliticalParties(NewParties)
(Prof.Dr.AmornChandarasomboon)
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comprehension of the present predicaments.Indefiningpoliciesofthesepolitical
parties(newparties),thepartiesmustreckontwocriteria,thatis,(1)policy
formulationmustbebased on the reality as discerned from the actual situation;
and(2)presentsolutionsforThaipeopleandtheymustbepracticalsolutions.
(1) Policy formulation must be based on the reality.Thepresentreality
includesdeteriorationofthepoliticalinstitutionsystem(governmentandtheHouse
ofRepresentatives)anddeteriorationinconducts(drivenbyself-interest)ofthe
politicians.
Despotic system by a political party (businessmen cum capitalist)amid
t he envi ronment wherebyThai soci et y was weak (poor and l ack pol i t i cal
experiences)andwherestateadministrativemechanismisdisoriented(exploitedasa
toolbypoliticians)createdopportunities and avenuesforbusinessmencum
politiciansinthedespoticsystembypoliticalpartiestowieldstatepowerforself-
interestexploitationandpursuecorruptiondirectlyandindirectlylikeneverbefore.
Direct corruption,includingcorruptionandexploitationbyviolating laws.
However,politiciansreliedonpowerandinfluencetocoverupthetruthwithmass
mediaandgeneralpublic;towreckmechanisminthelawenforcementprocess;to
impedehonestbureaucratsfromfulfillingtheirduties;andtorewardtheseofficials
withlumpsumandpositionforhelpingthemelusivefromprosecutionandlawful
punishment.
Indirect corruption,includingcorruptionandexploitationforowninterestby
seeking legal loopholes or enacting lawsforself-interestandownclansbenefits
throughdistortionoftheirwill,citingthattheiractionswereoverallinterestofthe
nation.However,intheprocesstheycoveredupconflictofinterestandturned over
the rights and resources of general publictobecomeenterprisesandbusinesses
ofthemselvesandownclanandlatersoldtheseenterprisesandbusinessesto
foreigners,etc.Insomecountries,this sort of conditional actionsisconsideredan
offenceknownastreasonbecausetheoffenceisallegedasexerciseofstatepower
whileinthehighestofficeforself-interest,reckonedasseriousdamagestothe
country.

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As discerned,indispositiontocoverupcorruption,politicians(businessmen
cumcapitalists)sengagementisdividedintotwosides,thatis,brightside(exposed)
anddarkside(concealed)
Besidepresentingthemselvesascompetentleaderswitheloquentspeechthat
givethemcredibility,thebright sideincludesutilizingpopulist policiesthrough
exploitation of national resources in discount/ trading/ giveaway/ premium
schemes forgeneralpublicwithoutlimitedscope.Theirobjectivewastobuyvotes
andcreatepopularityforthemselvesasmuchaspossibleinordertostayinpower
throughthemeanofelection.Essentially,theydidnotconcernthatthesediscount/
trading/giveaway/premiumpolicieswithoutanyscopewouldadverselyaffectthe
countryoverthelongtermwhenoverall national resources became personal
rights of politicians and foreignerswithoutpossibilitytobringthemback,orin
somecasetheymightbedifficulttoretrieve.
Dark side,includingcorruptionandseekingdirectandindirectself-interest,
whetheritbeaclearviolationofthelaworanadministrativecorruptionthrough
impositionoflegitimateauthority(thatisdisoriented);concealment of the truthin
massmediaandgeneralpublicwithvariousmethodssothatcommonpeoplehadno
wayofgettingtothetruth;intimidation with litigation,alibelsuitinvolving
compensationworthhundredsandthousandsofmillionbaht.(eventthoughitisthe
governmentsdutytopursuepublicdisclosureandtransparencyandthegovernment
mustexplainthefactstopeople.)Themost obviouscaseistheexerciseofpowerby
theexecutivebranchtodissolve the House of Representativestoevadeacensure
debateintheHouseofRepresentativesdespitethefactthatthegovernmentparty
obt ai ned more t han 377 seat s out of t he t ot al of 500 seat s i n t he House of
Repr esent at i ves. Thi s conduct i s r eckoned a devi at i on of t he i nt ent of
parliamentary dissolution.Essentially,theyhopedtohaveanewelectionheld
andanticipatedthatwiththepopulistpolicies(discount/trading/giveaway/
premium)withoutlimitedscope,theirpartywillresumepoweragain.Intheend,
theycanuseconsentingvotes(fromtheelection)towipeouttheirallegedcorruption
without having to explain and prove anything.
(2) Policy formulation of political parties (new parties) must have clear
and practical criteriaindefiningtheirpolicies,thepartiesmustexplainsothat
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peoplecandiscernandunderstandthatpolicypresentationofthepoliticalparties
(newparties)isaimedatresolvingproblemsforthecountryanditmustinclude
measuresthatareappropriatetodealwiththeproblems.Inthisregard,thepolitical
parties(newparties)muststipulatethepoliciesbydividingintothreeparts,ranked
byorder of the importanceofproblemsfacedbythecountry,thatis(1)political
reform2short-termpolicyduringpoliticalreform;and(3)modificationofthe
existingpopulistpoliciesusedbythecurrentgovernment
(a) Political reform must rank first on the list. Political reform i. e.
transformationofthepoliticalinstitutionsystem(executiveandlegislative
branches)
Thepoliticalinstitution(executiveandlegislativebranches)isthehighest
organizationofthecountry,orthesourceofpowerwielding.Therefore,
ifthepoliticalinstitution((executiveandlegislativebranches)doesnot
workinaccordancewiththeintentoftheconstitution,thatis,not exercising
state power for overall interest of the country, overall national
problems, whethertheybesocial,economic,administrativeproblems,or
otherproblems,cannot be solved.
Inpoliticalreform(modificationofthepoliticalinstitution),political
parties(newparties)mustbeconsciousofthefactsconcerninghuman
behavior(sociology)whichdescribethatpresent politicians who have the
power in their hands have no desire and are not sincere in pursuing
political reformbecausepoliticalreformwillstripthemofpower,
includingpoliticians in the opposition wingwhowaitedtoresumestate
powerbyoldmeans.
Politicalreformis like a tale ofmouseandcatconcerningwho will hang a
bell on the cats neck.
Politicalreformisnot beginning by askingwhatessencewillthenew
constitutionhave?;orwhichissuesinthepresentconstitutionshouldbe
dealtwith?(somethingthatpoliticiansareguidingnow)
At the meeting held by the mousewhowantstohangabellonthecats
neckshouldnotbeginbyreviewingissues,includingwhetherthebellis
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bigorsmallorhowfarthebellsoundwillreach.Inthemousesmeeting,
initial considerations should bewho (which mouse)willhangthebellon
thecatsneckandhowwill(thatmouse)handthebell?Thisbecauseifthe
mousecannotfigureoutananswerforthebasicquestion,itispointlessto
figureoutwhetherthebellshouldbebigorsmallandhowfarthesoundwill
reach.
Political reform problems are similar.Themeeting(mouse)should
considerwhowillmakebusinessmen cum politicians (cat)whoheld
absolutestatepowerandexercisestatepowertocorruptwithoutgetting
caughtrelinquishingowninterestanddraftinganewconstitution(forThai
people)whodonthaveabsolutepowerinordertoinstallanoversight
mechanismtocatchcorruptpoliticians.Simply put it, who will convince
the cat to stop catching mouse.Ifnot,we have to think further,thatis,
whowilldraftanewconstitutionforThaipeople(whichmousewill
volunteerhangingabellonthecatsneck).Forthesetupofconstitutional
dr af t i ng body, what st r uct ur e i t shoul d be i n or der t o el i mi nat e
opportunities(orhavefeweropportunities)ofpoliticians(businessmencum
capitalists)ininterferingconstitutionaldrafting(directlyandindirectly)so
thatconstitutionalmechanismwillbenefitthemselves.(whichmethod
doesthatmouseresorttohangthebellonthecatsneck?)
Thaipeopleexperiencedthisonceduringthefirstpoliticalreformbythe
ConstitutionalDraftingAssembly(CDA)in1996.Theoutcomeofthat
constitutionaldraftingwasatotalfailurebecausethepresent1997
constitutionestablishedthedespotic system by political parties of
businessmen cum capitalistsforeveryThaipeople.
ThaipeoplemuststudywhatstructureandconstituentstheConstitutional
DraftingAssembly-CDA(1996)had.Why did 99 members of the
Constitutional Drafting Assembly wrotethedespoticsystembypolitical
parties,causingbusinessmencumpoliticianstotakecontrolofstatepower
andrampantcorruptioninpresentdays.
Thaipeoplemustrealizethatinthefuture,whetherpoliticalreformwill
succeedornotdependsontheconstitutionaldraftingbody,andwemust
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examinehowtheconstitutionaldraftingbodyworkingonanewconstitution
will structure its organization and how constitutional drafting
methodol ogy wi l l be executed.The ai m i s t o el i mi nat e or reduce
opportunitiesofthepresentpoliticians(businessmencumcapitalists)that
presentlycontrolstatepowerto sneak in to wield influence and disorient
politicalreform(constitutionaldesign)inordertomaintainsourcesof
theirpowerandtocausepoliticalreformtofailtomeetitsobjectives.
TheauthorfeelsthatifThaipeoplewantstomakethesecondpolitical
reformasuccess,theymustreviewtheframeofmindorparadigmpertinent
totheformatoftheconstitutionaldraftingbodytoeliminateold
paradigmandmovetowardsnewparadigm.Otherwise,Thaipeoplewill
definitelybedisappointedwithpoliticalreformagain.(Note:Forwhatisold
paradigmandwhatisnewparadigm,pleasereadPart3)
(b) Short-term policy:Short-termpolicyisthepolicywhichpoliticalparties
canimplementsuccessfullywithinthedesignatedtimeofthepolitical
reform(aroundoneandahalfyear).Thepartiesmustpromisetovotersthat
ifthepartieswin,howtheywillimplementitsuccessfullywithinashort
time.
Inpresentationofshort-termpoliciesfortheupcomingelection,political
parties(newparties)mustpresentdefinite measurestofulfillvarious
goalssuchashowtheywillmakestateadministrationtransparent/how
theywilldealwithpovertyissuesofThaipeoplewithinashortperiodof
time.Essentially,politicalpartiesmustreviewthereal problems that occur
todayandsurveyandexaminepertinentlegalprovisions,andshould
proposeamendmentoflawsorconcrete measures that is coherent and
pragmatic.(Note:PleasereadPart4)
(c) Modification of populist policiesandexistingpoliciesofthepresent
governmentTosolvetheflawsofpopulistpolicies(withoutanyscope)
whichthepresentgovernment(despotic)isusing.The political parties
(new parties) must admitthatpopulistpoliciesusedbythepresent
businessmencumpoliticianstoholdabsolutecontrolofstatepower(with
theintenttoconcealandcoverupcorruption)havebeenquitesuccessful
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eventhoughoverthelongterm,thesepolicieswillwreakhavoconthe
country.ThisisbecauseThaisocietyisweak(poorandlackingpolitical
experiences).Therefore,futurepotentialdamagestothecountrydoes not
seem far-fetchedforalotofpeopletoday.

Thepopulistpolicies(withoutanyscope)hasgainedpublicpopularityforthe
governmentpartywhichhasabsolutecontrolofstatepower.Thisissomethingwhich
isoftenclaimedbythisparty.Therefore,wheneverpoliticalparties(newparties)
desiretomodifytheexistingpopulistpolicies(withoutanyscope),thepeople who
have been receiving the benefits would be hard-pressed.
Theauthordiscernsthatpoliticalparties(newparties)shouldcarefullydefinea
policypertainingtomodificationofpopulistpolicies(withoutanyscope),and
shouldbebroadlydefinedthatpoliticalpartieswillcontinuethembutwillexamine
potential corruption concealedindispositionofthepopulistpoliciesindifferent
aspects.Also,theywillmodifydispositionofthesepoliciessotheyaremoresuitable
andinaccordwiththerealitypertainingtostaterevenuegenerationcapabilities
throughintegrationofoverallnationalinterestinthelongtermandpublicinterest
(individuals)intheshortterm.
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Prof.Dr.BorwornsakUwanno
Prof.Dr.BorwornsakUwanno,memberoftheNationalLegislativeAssembly,
beganbyspeakingabouttheaimsbehindthe1997constitution.Hementioned
promotingpoliticsofthepeopleratherthanbypoliticians,expandinghumandignity,
politicalrightsandfreedoms,preventingcorruptionthroughcompulsoryvotingand
assetdeclarationrequirementsforministers,andaddressingtheproblemofshort-
livedgovernments.Whendraftingthenextconstitution,itisimportanttoconsider
thelessonsfromthe1997constitution.Aconstitutioncannotchangepolitical
culturetheequalityprescribedbythe1997constitutiondidnotmatchwiththe
clientelismandinequalityembeddedinThaiculture.Consequently,Western
approachesbasedontheideaofcontractualrelationshipsdidnotapply.Thepublic
sectorwaschangedbymarketmechanismstocreateasysteminwhicheverything
wasexchangeableandsubjecttobargaining,anditwaspossibletoabusethesystem
PanelSummary
TheProcessofConstitutionalReform
fromThaiComparativePerspectives
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forpersonaladvantage.Thereshouldbestronger,enforceablemeasurestoensure
thatpeoplecancontroltheirresources.NGOsshouldhavearoleasrepresentatives
ofthepeople.Thevoicelessmustbegivenvoice,forinstancethroughcommunity
radio.TheSenatemechanismmustbeimprovedbecausethesystemofelecting
senatorsbrokedownperhapsamixofappointmentandelection.Thereshouldbea
greaterroleforreferendums.Politicalaccountabilitymechanisms,especially
concerningpoliticalfinancing,shouldbestrengthened.Reformingthewritten
constitutionwillnotbeenoughtosolveproblems;thepoliticalculturemustalso
change.

Prof.Dr.Chai-AnanSamudavanija
Prof.Dr.Chai-AnanSamudavanija,memberoftheNationalLegislative
Assembly,discussedissuesthatwillbeimportantasThailanddraftsitsnew
constitution.Hepointedoutthattherewouldbeproblemsofcompatibilitybetween
foreignmechanismsandThaiculture.Butwhilepoliticalculturemustbeaccounted
for,itshouldnotbeabarriertoexpressingaspirationsinthedesignandstructureof
theconstitution.Thailandhadhopedthatpoliticalpartieswoulddevelopinto
institutions,butafailuretoachievethatledtothe19Septembercoup.Something
mustbedonetoaddressproblemsintheelectionsystem,togetpeopletovotefor
reasons other than money.Thailands parliamentary system did not work.
Alternativesshouldbeconsidered,likehavingmorechambers,orexpandingpublic
participationinthelegislativeprocess.Whendraftingtheconstitution,itwouldbe
bettertoseekconsensus,andnotgetboggeddownintheminutedetailsofeachand
everyarticle.Groupsinsocietymusthavechannelsforexpression,whichthe
governmentshouldnotstifle.

Prof.Dr.AmornChandarasomboon
Prof.Dr.AmornChandarasomboon,formersecretary-generaloftheCouncilof
State,talkedabouthisconferencepaper.Hesaidthattherearetwocomponentsto
constitutionalreformthecompositionandstructureoftheorganizationthat
undertakesthereformandtheactualcontentsofthenewconstitution.Afoundation
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forpoliticalreformisneeded.Dr.Amornmentionedseveralissues.Membersof
parliamentmustbefreetoexercisetheirdutiesthe1997constitutionsparty
membershipqualificationsforHousemembershipunderminedthatfreedom.
Dictatorshipofcapitalistsshouldbeprevented.Theroleofthemonarchymustbe
considered.Thecharacterofthepoliticalsystemshouldbere-considered.Any
reformsshouldbeappropriatetotheThaiculture.Whenaddressingtheseissues,itis
importanttorememberthatthechoiceofwhotodevisethereformswillaffectthe
characterofthereforms.Heofferedprescriptionsforthecharacterofsomereforms.

Dr.BhokinBalakula
Dr.BhokinBalakula,formerSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,talked
aboutwhatisnowneededintermsofpoliticalreform.Hebeganwithabrief
overviewofThaiconstitutionalhistory.HeassertedthatThailanddoesnothavethe
samelegalcultureasWesternstates,socaremustbetakeninconsideringlessons
fromoverseas.HeobservedthetraditionofastrongjudiciaryinThailand.Amajor
challengeisfindingabalanceinthestrengthoftheexecutiveshouldbeneithertoo
strongnortooweak.Otherinstitutions,includingtheSenatetheOmbudsmanand
parliamentarycommitteeswerediscussed.Democracyasasystemofgovernment
maynotbeperfect,butatleastitoffersprotectiontothepeopleandhelpsprevent
particularindividualsfromcapturingpoliticalpower.Peoplespoliticsisimportant
becausethestatecantoverseeeverything.Themanygoodfeaturesofthe1997
constitutionshouldberetained,andtheweaknessesaddressed.Whenworkingout
thedetails,weshouldthinkintermsofwhatworksandwhatdoesntratherthanin
theemotionaltermsofgoodandbad.

Assoc.Prof.Dr.TeeraphatSerirangsan
Assoc.Prof.Dr.TeeraphatSerirangsan,MinisterattachedtothePrime
MinistersOffice,beganbyobservingthatpowercorruptsandthatdemocracyisnot
easilycreated.Thaisocietyisnotdemocratic,soitisnotconducivetodemocratic
systems.Theconstitutionmaybeattheapexofthedemocraticsystem,butthere
mustbeafoundationbasedonpeoplewhohavetheeducationandpoliticalcultureto
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takepartinthedemocracy.Ifthisisabsent,coupswillcontinuetooccur.All
stakeholdersshouldbeconsideredinthedraftingofthenewconstitution.Termlimits
forholdersofpublicofficeshouldbeconsidered.Effortsshouldbemadetobuild
equalityinThaisociety.Thisinvolvesmeasuresforaccesstoinformationand
promotingafree,butresponsiblemedia.Inparticular,thereisaneedforstatemedia
thatisfreetocriticizethegovernment.

Group 1
Political Parties, Elections
and the Exercise of Legislative Power
King Prajadhipoks Institute
189
T haipoliticalpartiesarenotbornofbeliefsorsharedpoliticalideologyasare
politicalpartiesinwesterndemocracies.ThemajorityofThaipoliticalpartiesare
formedbygroupsofpeoplewhowishtosupporttheirleadertoattainstatepowerso
thatpartymemberswillreapbenefitsbyheadingthegovernment.Thaipolitical
partiesusuallyaimtobecomethegovernmentorformcoalitiongovernmentswithout
r egar d t o per f or mi ng as t he opposi t i on i n moni t or i ng t he gover nment s
administrationofthecountryinordertoprotectthepublicandnationalinterestasa
whole.AcommonpairofsayingsamongThaipoliticiansisbe the opposition and
starve and be the government and fill your belly.
Thaipoliticalpartiesarebornoftherelationshipbetweenpatronand
clientthathasbeenpartofThaipoliticalcultureandhasnotchanged.The
influenceofthecultureofpatron-clientrelationshiphasbecomethesourceof
justificationforpoliticalpowerunderdemocracy.Thepatronandtheclient
reciprocatebenefitstothosethatsupportoneanother.ThisiswhymostThaipolitical
partieslackaccountabilitytowardstheirmembersandthegeneralpublic.Afterthe
changefromabsolutemonarchytoademocracyon24June1932,theKhanaRath
Political Parties,
Elections and the Exercise
of Legislative Power
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Preecha Hongkrailert
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
190
politicalpartymonopolizedadministrativepower.Althoughothergroupsofpeople
whohelddifferentbeliefsandpoliticalideologiesfromtheKhanaRath,including
PhrayaDonavanikmontri,LouisKiriwatandLuangWichitWathakarn,wantedtoset
uptheKhanaChartpoliticalparty,theKhanaRathrefusedbyarguingthatitmaybe
dangerousfordemocracy.Nevertheless,leadingmembersoftheKhanaRathwere
divided,withconservativesandtheprogressives.Theconservativeswereledbythe
thenPrimeMinisterPhrayaManopakornNitithada,ColonelPhrayaSongsuradej,
ColonelPhrayaRithiAkanayandLieutenantColonelPhraPrasartPithayayuth.The
progressiveswereledbyColonelPhrayaPahonponPhayuhasena,Lieutenant
ColonelLuangPibunSonggramandPridiPhanomyong.Hadtheseleadersagreedto
lettheirgroupsetuppoliticalpartiescorrespondingtotheirideologies,Thailandmay
havehadatwopoliticalpartysystem.
Thaipoliticalpartiesdonotmakeestablishingpartybranchesintheprovinces
nationwideaprioritybecausethepartiesaregenerallybasedonatop-downstructure.
Politicalpartybranchesareakintomirages.Politicalpartybranchesareusuallyset
uptorespondtocommandsfromthehighlevelpoliticalorder.Partybranchesarein
generalweakandinefficient.Thaipoliticalpartiesfocusmoreonquantityratherthan
qualityoftheirmembers.Also,thebondbetweenthepoliticalpartyanditsmembers
isloosebecauseitisnotrootedincommonbeliefsorideology.Thisoftenresultsin
partymemberslackingdiscipline.Whenapoliticalpartyisdissolvedoraleader
losespower,anumberofpartymembersusuallymovetoanotherpoliticalpartyto
supportanewleader.Manypoliticalpartiesandtheirmembersdonothaveethicsin
mind.Theydoconsiderthegeneralpartyconferenceorpartybranchconference
importanteventhoughsuchconferencesareconsideredthe heartoftheparty
system.Furthermore,Thaipoliticalpartiesdoputimportanceondevelopingand
supportingprofessionalpoliticians,whichresultsinaninstitutionalizationproblem
inotherwords,Thaipoliticalpartiesarenotinstitutionalized.
ConflictsofideasamongtheconstitutiondraftersandvariousPoliticalParty
Actshavebeenapparentfromthebeginning.Eventhoughtherighttoestablish
politicalpartiesisconsideredabasicdemocraticright,theissueofsettingup
politicalpartieshasbeendebatedextensively.Underthe1997Constitution,Thai
peoplehadthelibertytoestablishpoliticalpartiesforthepurposeofmaking
political will of the people.However,underthe1998PoliticalPartyActconditions
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
191
andregulationsconcerningpoliticalpartiesmadeitdifficulttosetupapoliticalparty
buteasytodissolveit.Hence,theprincipleandpracticeofsettingupanddissolving
politicalpartiescontradictthemselvescreatingaparadox.Moreover,party-list
memberstendtobepartyleadersandpartylistplacesaregenerallysetasidefor
thosewhopreparetobecomeministers.Thusbusinessmenwhoprovidefinancial
supporttothepartyareoftenplacedontheparty-list.
Politicalpartieshavenotdissolvedandintegratedonthebasisofcommon
politicalbeliefsorideologies.Instead,suchdissolutionsandmergershavebeen
ai med t o i ncr eas e t he number of member s a par t y has i n t he Hous e of
Representativestoensuregovernmentstabilitywithouttakingintoconsideration
politicalstability.Forexample,from2001-2003theNewAspirationParty,SeriTham
PartyandChartPattanaPartyweredissolvedandformerpartymembersjoinedthe
ThaiRakThaiParty,whichincreasedthegoverningpartysnumberofseatsin
parliament.WithfewerseatsintheHouseofRepresentatives,theoppositionparty
wasunabletoeffectivelycarryoutitsdutyinmonitoringtheworkoftheprime
ministerasstipulatedundertheConstitution.Thisledtodivisionswithinthenation
andwasthemajorcontributingfactorpromptingtheCouncilforDemocraticReform
tostageacoupdtaton19September2006.
Inelections,mostThaisstilldonotunderstandwhethertheyshouldchoosethe
individualpoliticalcandidateorpartypolicies.Underthe1997Constitution,
electionsfortheSenateandHouseofRepresentativeswereheldseparately.
However,voterscannotdistinguishtheprinciplesonwhichtheyshouldbasetheir
choicesforeachelection.Mostpoliticalpartiesemphasizetacticsoverstrategiesto
gainpopularity.Thisiswhyvariouspopulistprojectshavebeenproposed.Also,
interferencebythegoverningpartyintheElectionCommissionpromptedthe
AdministrativeCourtandConstitutionalCourttoannulthe2April2006general
electionbecauseitwasdeemedunfairandnotindependent.Theproblemofredand
yellowcardsissuedtopoliticalcandidatesinthe2April2006generalelectionalso
createdconflictsthataffectedthecredibilityoftheElectionCommission.However,
evenbeforetheElectionCommissionwassetupunderthe1997Constitution,the
MinistryofInteriorwasinchargeofholdingelectionsandgovernmentsinterfered
withtheworkofofficialsinordertopursuetheirowninterests.Votebuyingwas
rampantandhasbecomeaThaipoliticalnorm.
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
192
Underthe1997Constitutiontheexerciseoflegislativepowerbymembersof
theHouseofRepresentativesusuallyreflectedorders frompoliticalpartiesrather
thannationalandpublicinterests.Thisresultedincorrupt policies,revealingthe
lackofmoralsofpoliticalpartiesandpoliticians.Theexerciseoflegislativepower
hasbeenusedtoadvancegroupinterestthatsupportsthegovernment.Thevarious
politicalfactionstendtopressuremembersoftheHouseofRepresentativeswithin
theirfactiontoexerciselegislativepowerfortheirowninterests.Also,theexerciseof
l egi sl at i ve power, such as t he appoi nt ment of commi t t ees of i ndependent
constitutionalagenciesortheapprovalofimportantlegislationinwhichthe
governmenthasstronginterests,tendstobeinterferedwithbythegovernment-led
party.
Inconclusion,Thailandlacksapoliticaldevelopmentplanthatcanbetruly
enforced,thereforeresultingintheproblemofpoliticalparties,electionsandthe
exerciseoflegislativepowerthatarenotinaccordancewithdemocraticrule.
Democracydoesnotcompriseonlyofaformofgovernmentbutitmustembody
ideologyandthepublicswayoflife.
King Prajadhipoks Institute
193
Abstract
E ffects of electoral structures on political parties and elections are well
understood by scholars. This paper surveys some of the most important effects and
their relevance for Thai democracy. Thailand incorporates three different electoral
systems for electing the National Assembly and the paper shows impacts of these
structures in two elections under the Constitution of 1997, in terms of their
implications for democracy, organization of political parties, and pluralist
instruments of government.
There are three very different systems for electing members of the National
Assembly. Each of these methods has significant impacts on the way that body is
constituted:
1. 400 members of the House are chosen in single-member, winner-take-all,
constituency districts. The structure of these elections as plurality rather
Constructing Democratic Institutions:
Structures of Political Parties
and Elections in Thailand
Prof. Robert B. Albritton
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that majorityelectionsmeansthatmany,ifnotmostelectionsarewonby
lessthanamajorityvote.Onefeatureofsingle-memberpluralitydistrictsis
thattheminorityinadistrict(orevenamajoritywhenthewinnerreceives
onlyaplurality)receivesnorepresentationatall.
There are three major impacts of this system: 1) representation in a legislative
body is more disproportional than in some alternative systems; 2) the number of
parties is highly curtailed, sometimes a desirable effect in politically unstable
systems; 3) constituency representatives are closer to the people and are able to
work for the interests of citizens in their legislative districts than under alternative
systems.
2. 100 members of the House are elected under a party-list ballot that achieves
proportional representation. Proportional representation virtually
eliminates disproportionality, except for those parties receiving less than 5
percent of t he vot e. Thi s f orm of represent at i on encourages more
development of political parties, even more if the party lists are regionally
based. The question is whether this is a desirable outcome, as it creates
regional parties that might be at variance with national party development.
3. 200 members are elected to the Senate from multi-member, single-non-
transferable voting districts (changwat). One result of this system is that, in
Bangkok, the winner receiving the highest number of votes polled less than
12 percent in 2006 elections. 13 of the 18 winners polled less than 3 percent,
clearly not a majoritarian system.
On the other hand, the Senate constitutes a very impressive example of
pluralist democracy. Groups or constituencies in Bangkok that would not receive
representation in a plurality representation or proportional representation system
have a voice in the National Assembly. Several reformist minorities are represented
in the Senate. Pluralist features of the Senate are also evident in the Pattani vote,
where, in a changwat that is over 70 percent Muslim, a Buddhist candidate has been
elected in both the 2000 and 2006 elections.
The Senate has been criticized as having too many politicians or relatives of
politicians among its members. This is a fault of election laws that forbid
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campaigning, leaving voters to make their choices by name-recognition alone,
thereby giving prominent figures, including politicians, an advantage.
The paper concludes that most weaknesses of the current system lie not with
the Constitution, but with the election laws. There is, however, a fundamental choice
apparent in the rhetoric about constitutional reform, and that is whether Thailand
will be governed by democratic elections or by non-elected elites who achieve their
offices by other than democratic means. Those who seek constitutional reform should
remember that the perfect is the enemy of the good.

Introduction
Atwo-pagearticleinaThainewspaperafewmonthsagoprovidedarelatively
detaileddescriptionofpoliticalpartiesinThailand.Mostofthediscussioncovered
history,aswellaspeopleandpersonalities,butthearticlenevertoucheduponthe
muchmorecriticalstructuresofpoliticalpartiesandelectionsastheyhaveevolved
underthe1997ConstitutionandlawsgoverningelectionsinThailand.AstheIDEA
analysisofelectionsystemsframesit:The choice of electoral system is one of the
most important institutional decisions for any democracy,andtheIDEAgoeson
tosaythattraditionally, it has been rare for electoral systems to be consciously
and deliberately selected.
182

Aconsiderablebodyofscholarlyliteratureindicatesthatstructuresofelections
areanoverwhelmingfactordeterminingtheshapeofpartysystemsinallcountries.
183

Thisliteraturearguesessentiallythatdifferencesinelectoralsystemscreate
correspondingvariationsinstructuresofrepresentation,sothatconfigurationsof

182
InternationalInstituteforDemocracyandElectoralAssistance.2005.Electoral System
Design: The New International IDEA Handbook.Stockholm:IDEA,1.
183
ArendLijphart.1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems. NewYork:OxfordUniversity
Press;ArendLijphartandBernardGrofman,eds.1984.Choosing an Electoral System:
Issues and Alternatives. NewYork: Praeger; Douglas Rae. 1971. The Political
Consequences of Electoral Laws. NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress;ReinTaageperaand
MatthewS.Shugart.1989.Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral
Systems.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.
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partysystemsreflectchoicesmadeinprocessesofconstitution-buildingandelection
lawadoption.Thesechoicesgenerallyexpressvaluesassociatedwithrepresentative
democracy, and i t i s cl ear t hat t he l i nkage bet ween el ect i on syst ems and
configurationsofpoliticalpartieswasknowntotheframersofthe1997Constitution
andelectionlaws.ManyThais,however,includinganumberofscholars,seem
surprisedatthewaytheThaipartysystemhasdevelopedduringthepastsixyears;
thus,thepurposeofthiscontributionistosurveyexistingstructuresofelectionsin
ThaidemocracyandtoexaminetheirimpactsonThaidemocracywiththeviewof
hindsight,aswellastoreassessvaluesandgoalsforelectoraldemocracyinthe
processofconstitutionalreform.

Impacts of Election Structures on Party Systems

Therelationshipbetweenstructuresofelectionsandtheshapeofpartysystems
iswellknowntomostpoliticalscientists.Thereisawidevarietyofelectionpractices
thatnationschoose,eachreflectingoutcomesdesiredbythosewhowritethe
constitutionsandlaws.Unfortunately,whenpoliticalcrisesoccur,thereis
momentumforelectoralsystemchangethatisaffectedbytwofactors:
1. Politicalactorslackbasicknowledgeandinformationregardingoutcomes
of al t er nat i ve st r uct ur es so t hat el ect i ons ar e of t en f r aught wi t h
unanticipatedconsequences;
2. Politicalelitescanusetheirknowledgeofelectoralsystemstocreateor
enhancepartisanadvantages.
184
Actually,outcomesofalternativesystemdesignsarequitepredictableand,
althoughdesignsofelectoralsystemscanservemanypurposes,thisanalysisis
limitedtohowthreecomponentsofdemocraticgovernmentareaffectedby
alternativechoices:promotingdemocracy,representationofcitizens,andparty
government.
184
Ibid,1.
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PromotingDemocracy.Aseveryoneknows,theword,democracy,means
rule by the people,yettheconceptraisesmanyquestionsthataredifficultto
resolve.Whoarethe people?Doesdemocracyimplyrulebyamajority?As
RobertDahloncenoted,If the majority does not rule, then who does?Clearly,
rulebyunanimousconsentisaformofdemocraticgovernment,butnosystemfor
arrivingatsuchanoutcomehasbeendevisedforlargesocieties.
185
Thealternative,
forvirtuallyallnations,issomeformofrepresentativegovernmentand,inthis
regard,thereisgeneralconsensusthatwhateverelsedemocracymightmean,the
minimumfordemocraticgovernmentisrelativelyfreeandfairelectionsthat
determinewhowillgovernonbehalfofthepeople.
TheThaiConstitutionof1997,providesatleastthreedifferentmodesof
choosingrepresentativegovernment.Inacademicjargon,theseinclude:single-
memberplurality/majoritariandistrictsforthe400membersoftheNational
Assembly,proportionalrepresentationthroughparty-listballotingforanadditional
100seats,andmulti-memberdistrictswithsinglenon-transferablevotesforthe200-
memberSenate.
Singlememberdistrictsposeaspecialproblemforelectoraldemocracies.
ClintonRossiteronceobservedthatsuchdistrictsarehardonminoritypartiesand
deathtothirdparties.
186
Single-memberschemesofrepresentationhavetwo
strengths:first,theyreducethenumberofeffective parties inthelegislaturesand,
second,byreducingthenumberofparties,theyworkagainsttheneedforcoalition
governments,therebyproducingmorestabilityinthegovernmentandallowingthe
governmenttimetoaccomplishprogramsandgoals.Inotherwords,ifthedesireisto
reducethenumberofpartiesandtocreatestabilityingovernment,singlemember
districtsconstituteanelectoralmechanismforaccomplishingthisobjective.
185
Thereisahighlymistakenviewthatreferendaapproximatethepeople.Thiscanhardly
bethecaseifthereferendumattractslessthanhalfoftheeligiblevoters.Victorsin
referendaseldomwinamajorityoftheeligiblepopulationunlessthereisgenuinelya
consensusontheissue.

186
ClintonRossiter.1960.Parties and Politics in America. Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,
p.9.
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Clearly,thearchitectsofthe1997Constitutionunderstoodtheirtasktocreate
morestablegovernment.Ireviewedamanuscriptofapaperafewmonthsagothat
nostalgicallysuggestedtheprevioussystem,underblock voting representeda
strong and vibrant party system.Irecallwritingmyownpapersintheearly
1990sinwhichIattemptedtodefendthatformoftheThaielectoralsystem,by
pointingoutthattheoldsystemwasmorerepresentative(withmultipleparties),
althoughlessstable,thanasingle-memberdistrictsysteminwhichthevaluesof
representationandstabilitywouldbereversed.Thearchitectsofthecurrent
constitutionunderstoodthisdilemmaquitewellandoptedforamorestableparty
system,producingthelongestcontinuousdemocraticgovernmentbyapartyinThai
history.
187
Thereare,however,otherdisadvantagesassociatedwithasingle-member-
districtsystem.Undersingle-member-districtelectoralsystemsitisoftenthecase
thatmany(ifnotmost)representativesareelectedbyaminorityofthevoters.In
districtswithmanycandidates,votesarefragmentedtosuchadegreethatawinning
pluralitycanbeobtainedwithlessthan40percentofthevote.Iftherepresentatives
choseninthisfashionaresupposedtorepresent the people,itisnotclearhow
suchaconstituencyisdefinedintheabsenceofmajoritysupport.
Evenmoretroublingisthefactthat,inpluralitydistricts,amajorityofthe
votershasactuallyvotedagainstthewinningcandidate.Conceivedinthisway,the
claimthatthewinnersrepresentthe peopleappearsevenmorespurious.
Furthermore,supportersofthewinningcandidateareawarded100percentofthe
representation,whiletheloserssupportersreceivenone.Thus,anotherwayof
referringtothisformofelectionisasawinner-take-allsystem.Thisliabilityis
mitigatedsomewhatinsystemsthatprovideforrun-offelectionsbetweenthetoptwo
candidates.Atleast,inthefinalvote,thewinnerreceivesamajoritybydefinitionand
thevotecanbesaidtorepresentthe people,byvirtueofthefactthatthefinalvote
isamajority.Onlyarelativelyfewelectoralsystems(someinstateelectionsinthe

187
Bangkokisfullofconcretemonumentstothemorevibrantpartysystem.Wecallthese
monumentstheremainsoftheinfamousHopewellproject.Rapidchangesinthegovern-
mentmadeitnecessaryforHopewelltonegotiatenewcontracts,sometimeseveryfew
months,asgovernmentsroseandfellwithamazingrapidity.Finally,thecompanygaveup
andleftThailand,leavingthesemonumentstogovernmentbycoalitions.
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UnitedStates)arewillingtoaffordthetimeandexpenseofrun-offelections,but,in
thelongrun,itmightbelessexpensivethanrepeatedelectionsinacontesteddistrict
andmightprovideamorelegitimizedoutcomewhenseatsarefinallyawardedonthe
basisofanunambiguousmajority.Unlikethecurrentsystem,itwouldconstitute
electionatleastbyamajority.
Representation.ArchitectsoftheThaiconstitution,awareofsomeofthe
negativeeffectsofconstituencydistricts,alsochosetoincorporateproportional
representationinselecting100membersoftheNationalAssembly.Thisis
accomplishedbytheparty-listballotwherevoterschooseapartysimultaneously
withtheirchoiceofarepresentativesinsingle-memberconstituencies.One
differenceinthetwoballotingsystemsisthatwhilethedistrictsystemisorientedto
localvaluesandinterests,theparty-listconstituencyisnationwide.IntheThai
adaptation,theentirecountryconstitutesasingle,multi-memberdistrict,makingthe
issueofdistrict magnitudelessconsequential,andalsomitigatingagainst
regionalfactionalism.Whendistrictmagnitudesarebaseduponregionsorother
smallerunits,ListPRencouragesregional-basedpartiesmorerepresentativeof
regionalinterests,butfactionalizinggovernanceatthenationallevel.
Proportionalrepresentationhastwonotableeffects:first,itprovidesmore
proportionalityinrepresentation,therebyrepresentingvariouspartyconstituencies
morecloselythanwinner-take-alldistrictsystems,and,second,itgenerallysupports
developmentofmulti-partysystems,especially,asintheThaicase,wherevoters
chooseamongparties,ratherthanindividualcandidates.Inprinciple,ListPR
systemsprovidebetterrepresentationofinterestsinsociety,especiallytothedegree
thatthoseinterestsarerepresentedbypoliticalparties.Wherepartiesdonotrepresent
clearlydefinedinterests,asintheThaicase,apurelyList-PRsystemcanbecome
vulnerabletosomeofthedisadvantagesassociatedwithencouragementofminor
parties,suchasdependencyonthesepartiesinordertosustainagoverningcoalition.
Coalitiongovernmentsareroutinelyplaguedbytheproblemthatamajorityparty
may be required to buy off the coalition partner in order to govern.The
monumentstothedefunctHopewellprojectstandasareminderofthedisabilitiesof
coalitiongovernments.Multi-partysystemsalsoencouragepartyfactionalizingand
shiftingoflegislativealliances,notbecauseofinterestsorideology,but,usually,in
theThaicase,forobtainingpowerbypersonalitiesandleadersoffactions.
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(Non-)Party Government. Likemanyanalystsofdemocraticsystems,the
IDEAassumesthatpoliticalpartiesarenecessarycomponentsofdemocraticsystems.
Experienceswithnon-partisanelectoralsystemsareoftenoverlookedasalternatives
forelectoralsystemdesignandreform.Thailandhasexplicitlyincorporatedtheidea
ofnon-partisansystemsintothethirdelectoralstructure,theSenate.Outcomesof
thissystemrequireabitmoreattention,becausethereislittleliteratureon
advantagesanddisadvantagesofnon-partisansystems.
Non-partisanelectionsclearlyfocusattentiononpersonalitiesofcandidates
andawayfrompartiesandissuesthatmayrepresentpoliticalagendas.Thistendency
isenhancedbytherequirementthatcandidatesdemonstratethattheyhavenotbeen
associatedwithapartyforfiveyearsandprohibitionsagainstcampaigningfor
election.
188
Apparently,theseprovisionsrepresentadesiretomaketheSenatea
watch-dogbodyasacheckonthemajoritarianParliament.Underthese
conditions,votingwouldbebasedonreputationswithinchangwatcommunities,so
thatwinnerswouldrepresentpersonswhosereputationscommendedthemtotheir
communitiesindependentlyoftheirpoliticalviews.
TwofeaturesoftheSenateelectionsmayseempeculiartonon-Asianscholars.
First,identificationofacandidatewithapoliticalparty(includingmembership)is
prohibitedbytheConstitutionforcandidatesfortheSenate;second,campaigningis
restrictedtopostersofalimitednumberbytheorganiclawimplementingelection
provisionsoftheConstitution.Inthecaseofthelatter,candidatesareprohibited
frommakingpolicystatementsoridentifyingwithpolicypositions-thepurpose
beingtocreateabodyrelativelyfreefrominterest-grouppoliticsandattachmentto
platformsofpoliticalparties.
TheSingle-Non-transferableVotesystemusedforelectingtheSenatehassome
remarkableeffects.Mostimportantisthefactthatcandidatescanwinelectionswith
relativelysmallproportionsofthevote.ThepeculiarstructureofSenateelections(in
the2000electionvotingforonlyonecandidateoutof265inBangkok,with18
Senatorstobeelected)meantthatelectiontotheSenatewasguaranteedwithaslittle

188
OnecandidatefortheSenatewasaccusedofcampaigningbecausehewasactively
involved in assistance to victims of a major food in his region.
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as5.6percentofthepopularvote.Clearly,thiswasnotamajoritariandemocratic
solutionandthefearwasthatpoliticalorpatronagetieswouldproduceenoughvotes
toelectSenatorswhorepresentedApoliticsasusual.@Instead,mostofthe18
candidatesreceivingthemostvotescouldbeclassifiedas(reformers@orpersonsof
considerablestatureintheBangkokcommunity-everythingthearchitectsofthe
constitutionhopedforfromtheelectoralprocess.But,13Senatorswereelectedwith
lessthan3percentofthepopularvoteand7Senatorswereelectedwithlessthan2
percentofthevote.HowAdemocratic@wasthiselectionwhensomanysuccessful
candidatesreceivedsolittlesupportfromthevoters?
Theanswerrequiresanexaminationofoutcomes,ratherthanprocess.Judged
onlybymajoritarianstandards,thiswasnotanunequivocalexpressionofdemocratic
governance.Instead,theelectionproducedastrikingexampleofpluralistdemocracy
atwork.Structuresoftheelectionproducedacombinationofwinnersnotonlywith
broad-basedconstituencies,butalsopersonswithisolatedorspecialconstituencies-
AIDSactivists,childrightsactivists,andaMagsaysayawardwinner-evena
constituencylinkedtoorganizedgambling.Representationisnotbasedupon
individuals,butuponconstituencies-ifacandidaterepresentsaconstituencyinterest
andthatconstituencypassesathreshhold,thatconstituencyisrepresentedinthe
Senate.TheSenateis,thus,apluralistbodyofconstituencyinterestsinsteadofan
expressionofmajoritariandemocracy.
189
TheSenateelectionof2006producedsimilaroutcomes.Thirteenofthenewly
electedSenatorsfromBangkokwerechosenwithlessthan3percentofthevote,and
thecandidatewhoreceivedthehighestnumberofvotesgarneredonly11.52percent
oftotalvotes.Nevertheless,the18SenatorselectedfromBangkokrepresenteda
diversityofconstituencies:anewspapercolumnist,ananti-privatizationNGO
member,abrotherofasocialactivist,aProfessoratKasetsartUniversity,aBangkok
Muslim,andarepresentativeofPhysiciansAgainstGovernment.

189
Somepoliticalanalystsusethetermpluralismtorefertoelite-dominatedinterest-group
systems.Itsusehereisthemoreclassicalformthatallowsminorityconstituenciestobe
representedandminorityintereststakenintoaccount.Forexample,guaranteesoffree
speechinthefaceofamajoritariandesiretosuppressspeechisapluralisticsystem,
butclearlynotamajoritariansystemand,forthosewhobelievethatdemocracymustbe
majorityrule,perhapsnotevendemocratic.
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AnotherexampleofpluralistrepresentationoccurredinPattani.Thisprovince
isroughly75percentMuslim.Ofthetwocandidateselectedin2000,onewas
MuslimandonewasBuddhist.(TheMuslimcandidatereceivedover100,000votes,
whiletheBuddhistcandidatereceivedlessthan46,000votes.)Basedupon
majoritariannorms,Buddhistswouldbeconsideredover-representedinthis
changwat.But,pluralistconsiderationssupportrepresentationofminority
constituenciesandtheelectoralmechanismproducedrepresentationfortheminority,
aswellasforthemajority.Ironically,thisresultwasrepeatedin2006.Despitethe
continuingconflictinthesouthernmostchangwat,onceagainthevotersofPattani
electedaBuddhistasoneoftheirtwoSenators.InSongkla,whereMuslimsareina
minority,aMuslimwaselectedasaSenator.
Whetherthisoutcomewasintendedorunintended,theconstitutionalprocess
hasproducedaremarkableexampleofpluralistdemocracyforonebodyofthe
bicamerallegislature.ThisbecomesparticularlyimportantbecausetheHouse
elections,withsingle-member,winner-take-alldistricts(andparty-listvoting),are
decidedlyplurality/majoritarianinprinciple.InservingasacheckontheHouse,the
Senateoffersaradicallydifferent,non-majoritarianbasisofrepresentation.

Impacts of Structures of Thai Electoral Democracy

WhathavebeentheimpactsofthesevariedstructuresonThaielectoral
democracy?Dataonelectionoutcomesofferabasisforevaluatingthesestructures
on t wo di mensi ons: 1) i mpact s on st ruct ures of t he part y syst em, and 2)
representationofpoliticalpartiesintheParliament.
Number of Effective Parties.
Thediscussionabovesuggestedthatthemovetosingle-memberdistricts
shouldhavetheeffectofdramaticreductionsinthenumberofeffective partiesin
government.Table1showsthedramaticdeclineineffectivepartiesunderthe
single-member,pluralitysystem.Asanticipated,thenumberofeffectiveparties
declinessharplyatthe
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Table 1: Effective Parties in the Thai System of Parliamentary Elections:
Selected Years
Year Effective Parties (Seats) Effective Parties (Votes)
1983 5.6 7.2
1986 6.1 8.0
1988 7.6 9.8
2001 3.1 4.4
2005 1.6 2.6
Formula for computations from: Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera. 1979.
Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe,
Comparative Political Studies, 12: 3-27.
firstparliamentaryelectionundertheConstitutionof1997,whetherbasedupon
seatsorvotes.Bytheelectionof2005,thenumberof effectivepartieshas
declinedtosuchadegreethat,intermsofparliamentaryrepresentation,thereis
virtuallyatwo-partysystemand,asRossitersuggested,eventheminorityparty
(Prajadhipat)hasdifficultymakingthetwo-partythreshold.
Theseconditemtonoticeisthatminoritypartiesareatleastmarginallymore
effectiveifvotesareusedratherthanseats.Thismeansthatpartiesmaybeabit
moreeffectiveinwinningvotes,butthesevotesarenotnecessarilytranslatedinto
parliamentaryseats.Thedifferencebetweencalculationsbasedupon votesrather
thanseatsisadirectresultoftheplurality,winner-take-allcharacterofelection
structures,whichbothallowcandidatestobecomewinnerswithlessthanamajority
voteandalsodiscountthevoteforminoritypartiesinthewinner-take-allsystem.
Disproportionality of Representation
Anotherwayofcomparingstructuresofelectionsisintermsofhowwell
par t i es ar e r epr es ent ed i n l egi s l at ur es . Thi s r equi r es cal cul at i on of a
disproportionality indexoftenusedwhencomparingrepresentativenessof
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electionsystems.
190
Thereis,ofcourse,anunderlyingassumptionthatpolitical
partiesfaithfullyrepresentconstituenciesofinterest.Withoutsuchanassumption,it
isnotclearwhatpurposepoliticalpartiesserveinrepresentativedemocracy.

Table 2: Representation of Thai Political Parties in Constituency and

Proportional Electoral Systems, 2001 and 2005
2001
Constituency Districts Party List
Party % Votes %Seats Votes-Seats % Votes %Seats Votes-Seats
ThaiRakThai 36.64 50.00 -13.36 40.64 48.00 -7.36
Prajadhipatthai 25.81 24.25 1.56 26.58 31.00 -4.42
ChartThai 8.55 8.75 -0.25 5.32 6.00 -0.68
KwamWangMai 9.57 7.00 2.57 7.02 8.00 -0.92
ChartPattana 8.85 5.50 3.35 6.13 7.00 -0.87
Seritam 4.07 3.50 0.57 2.82 0.00 2.82
Rasadorn 3.39 0.50 2.89 1.25 0.00 1.25
Tinthai 1.20 0.25 0.95 2.11 0.00 2.11
Kisangkom 0.08 0.25 -0.17 0.16 0.00 0.16
Others 1.83 0.00 1.83 7.97 0.00 7.97
Index of Disproportionality: Constituency = 10.29 Party List = 8.75

2005
Constituency Districts Party List
Party % Votes %Seats Votes-Seats % Votes %Seats Votes-Seats
ThaiRakThai 55.49 77.50 -22.01 61.17 67.00 -5.83
Prajadhipatthai 24.95 17.50 7.45 23.22 26.00 -2.78
ChartThai 10.53 4.50 6.03 6.64 7.00 -0.36
Mahachon 7.51 0.50 7.01 4.34 0.00 4.34
Other 1.51 0.00 1.51 4.63 0.00 4.63
Index of Disproportionality: Constituency = 17.72 Party List = 6.40

190
Forpurposesofthisanalysis,theformulaistakenfromMichaelGallagher.1991.
Proportionality,DisproportionalityandElectoralSystems,ElectoralStudies,10:33-51.
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Table2illustratesseveraleffectsoftheThaielectoralsystemthatcanserveas
guidesformodificationsofconstitutionalstructuresgoverningelections.First,the
tableshowsthatsingle-memberdistrictsarebiasedconsiderablyinfavorofdominant
parties,exactlyasRossitersuggests.ThaiRakThai,forexample,received
substantiallymoreseatsintheParliamentthanitsproportionofvoteswouldwarrant,
and,asthenumberofpartiesdeclined,thatproportiongrewbetweenthe2001and
2005elections.
AnevenmoreimportantlessontobelearnedfromthesedataisthatPartyList
votingisconsiderablymoreproportionaltoactualsupportforpoliticalpartiesthan
single-member,constituencydistricts.ThedatainTable2understatestheactual
proportionalityofseatsasaresultofparty-listvoting.Infact,oncepartiesreceiving
lessthan5percentofthevoteareeliminated,theproportionsofseatsexactlymatch
theproportionofthevotereceivedbyeachparty.
191

Effects of the Single, Non-transferable Vote

Table3indicateseffectsofthesingle,non-transferablevoteinthemulti-
memberdistrictofBangkok,whereover200candidatescontestedtheSenate
electionsin2006.Thekeytounderstandingthesystemisthatinafieldof18,voters
areallowedtocastvotesforonlyonecandidatefromthelistofover200.(Inthe
2000election,forexample,thismeantthatanycandidatereceivingmorethan5.6
percentofthevotewasguaranteedelection.)Totheextentthatsomecandidates
receivemorethanthisthresholdnumber,thethresholdforothercandidatesis
reduced.Asaresultofthissystem,only4winningcandidatesreceivedmorethan5
percentofthevotein2006,and13candidatesreceivedlessthan3percentsupportby
theelectorate.(Onewinnerreceivedlessthan1percent.)Afinalconsiderationisthat
all18candidateswereelectedbyatotalofroughly56percentofthevote.
191
Thisexplainstheseemingover-awardingofseatstothepartiesreceivingthelargest
numberofvotes.Infact,thisdisparityistotallyafunctionofeliminatingpartieswith
lessthan5percentofthevoteandawardingtheseatstothepartiesreceivingmorethan5
percent.
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Table 3: Vote Shares of Winning Candidates in the 2006 Senate Elections in
Bangkok Under the Single, Non-transferable Vote
Candidate Votes % of Total Votes
1 257,420 11.52
2 240,312 10.75
3 146,525 6.56
4 118,332 5.29
5 100,211 4.48
6 53,562 2.40
7 45,715 2.05
8 35,505 1.59
9 30,271 1.35
10 29,589 1.32
11 26,604 1.19
12 25,407 1.14
13 25,089 1.12
14 24,290 1.09
15 23,132 1.03
16 22,673 1.01
17 22,491 1.01
18 21,449 0.96
Total 1,248,577 55.86%

Thefactthatthe18successfulcandidatescollectivelyreceivedamajorityof
theBangkokvoteshouldbeasourceofsatisfaction,buttheresultswerenotso
sanguineintherestofThailand.Table4showsthataminorityofvoterschose
Senatorsinallbut15ofthe76 changwat,andnocandidatereceivedamajorityof
thevote.Theproportionsoftheindividualvotesaregenerallyhigherthanin
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Bangkok,butthisispartlyanartifactofthetotalnumberofseatsinthemulti-
memberdistricts.Closerconsiderationofthenumbersindicatesthatthepercentof
totalvotesrequiredtoelectanindividualSenatorisdependentonthreefactors:
turnout,numberofSenateseatsinthedistrict,butalsoonthenumberofcandidates
contestingfortheseat.Inthelarger changwat,thewinnerwiththemostvotesoften
receivedlessthan10%oftheballotscast.

Table 4: Proportion of Total Votes Electing Senators by Changwat in 2006

Changwat Number of Senators % of Total Votes % for Leading Candidate
1.Bangkok 18 55.86 11.52
2.Krabi 1 27.04 27.04
3.Kanchanaburi 3 47.61 22.67
4.Kalasin 3 40.76 19.65
5.KampangPhet 2 65.42 32.80
6.KhonKhaen 6 45.55 12.55
7.Chantaburi 2 39.03 21.11
8.Chaochaengsao 2 58.06 40.76
9.Chonburi 4 46.93 14.06
10.Chainat 1 34.28 34.28
11.Chaiyaphum 4 48.84 14.88
12.Chumphon 1 25.50 25.50
13.ChiangRai 4 46.07 21.71
14.ChiangMai 5 47.58 17.09
15.Trang 2 42.11 27.30
16.Trat 1 40.33 40.33
17.Tak 2 55.82 30.20
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Changwat Number of Senators % of Total Votes % for Leading Candidate
18.NakornNayok 1 29.70 29.70
19.NakornPathom 3 43.57 15.20
20.NakornPanom 2 30.75 15.48
21.NakornRatch. 8 48.54 9.21
22.NakornSritham. 5 33.11 8.12
23.NakornSawan 3 52.41 19.86
24.Nonthaburi 3 33.27 14.23
25.Narathiwat 2 43.10 32.94
26.Nan 1 21.74 21.74
27.Buriram 5 74.12 28.23
28.PathumThani 3 43.46 15.53
29.PrachuabKiriK. 2 36.96 26.93
30.PrachinBuri 1 43.58 43.58
31.Pattani 2 40.84 23.52
32.Ayutaya 2 48.99 31.38
33.Payao 2 25.51 14.05
34.Phangnga 1 22.02 22.02
35.Pattalung 2 42.55 26.03
36.Pichit 2 63.14 34.88
37.Pitsanulok 3 40.06 16.90
38.Petchaburi 1 39.22 39.22
39.Petchabun 3 64.72 28.44
40.Phrae 1 21.71 21.71
41.Phuket 3 64.72 28.44
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Changwat Number of Senators % of Total Votes % for Leading Candidate
42.Mahasarakam 3 53.37 20.76
43.Mukdahan 1 34.29 34.29
44.Maehongsohn 1 41.92 41.92
45.Yasothon 2 31.28 17.07
46.Yala 1 23.24 23.24
47.RoiEt 4 42.70 12.09
48.Ranong 1 21.14 21.14
49.Rayong 2 40.31 28.34
50.Ratchaburi 3 46.55 15.68
51.LopBuri 2 23.85 12.37
52.Lampang 2 29.71 17.66
53.Lamphun 1 25.22 25.22
54.Loei 2 33.87 17.05
55.Sisaket 5 60.91 17.27
56.SakornNakorn 3 37.61 14.31
57.Songkla 4 28.38 8.85
58.Satun 1 24.87 24.87
59.SamutPrakarn 3 40.13 16.52
60.SamutSongkram 1 25.96 26.96
61.SamutSakorn 1 34.67 34.67
62.Sakhaeo 2 71.12 35.93
63.Saraburi 2 38.54 20.92
64.Singburi 1 48.63 48.63
65.Sukhothai 2 48.71 31.39
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Changwat Number of Senators % of Total Votes % for Leading Candidate
66.SuphanBuri 3 62.35 25.91
67.SuralThani 3 28.63 12.27
68.Surin 4 42.10 12.09
69.Nongkhai 3 53.04 18.40
70.NongbhuaLamp. 2 53.67 33.06
71.Angthong 1 39.27 39.27
72.AmnatCharoen 1 32.43 32.43
73.UdonThani 5 39.97 9.57
74.Uttaradit 1 45.72 45.72
75.UthaiThani 1 40.58 40.58
76.UbonRatchath. 6 54.02 14.19
Total = 41.75 24.14

Clearly,theSenateelectionsystemdoesnotproduceeitherthe voice of the

people orevenmajorityrule.Yet,asnotedabove,othervaluescomeintoplayin
constructingtheinstitutionoftheSenatethatareimportantforthedevelopmentand
survivalofdemocracy.Asinalmostanyscenario,therehavebeencriticsofthe
Senateconstituency.Mosttellinghavebeenchargesthatrepresentativesofpolitical
parties,especiallyfamilymembersofpartypoliticians,havebeenabletowin
electionswithintheirdistricts.Thisoutcomeappearstosometoexplicitlydefeatthe
avowedpurposeofSenateelectionstructures.
Theproblemisthat,whetherwelikeitornot,themostimportantfactor
determininghowapersondecidestovoteisnotpolicy,orevenprinciple,butname
recognition.Wevoteforwhomweknow.Howarevoterssupposedtocomplete
thevotingdecisionifcandidatesareprohibitedfromcampaigningandforbiddento
communicatetothevotingpublicwhotheyare,orevenwhattheystandfor?One
canimagineavoterinanisolatedruralareaapproachingaratherlongballot
containingnames,mostofwhichareunfamiliar.Finally,thevoterspiesanamethat
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isfamiliar,oneverysimilartothatofalocalpoliticianwithwhichthevoterisalso
familiar.Thevoter,intheabsenceofanyotherinformation,castsavoteforaname
thatisatleastknowntohimorher.Inotherwords,thestructuresofthesystemof
campaignsandelectionsthataresupposedtoisolateSenatorsfrominfluencesof
partisanpoliticsactuallyworktomakenamerecognitionofpartyelitesoneofthe
mostimportantfactorsindeterminingthevotingdecision.

Summary Implications of Electoral Structures

Structuresofelectoralsystemshavesignificantimplicationsforthetypeof
democracythatcharacterizesanypoliticalsystem.Aconsiderationofthese
implicationsallowsarchitectsofdemocraticsystemstochooseamongalternative
outcomes,beingawareofthenuancesattachedtoeachsystem.
1. Plurality/Majority Systems.Single-member,winner-take-allsystemsdonot
necessarily(andinmostcasesdonot)providemajorityruleunlessrun-off
electionsfollowtheinitialballoting.Neitherdomulti-memberdistrictsoffer
asureremedy,althoughtheywillencouragemorepartiesthansingle-
membersystems.Themajordisadvantagesofpluralitysystemsarethatthe
winnerusuallyissupportedbyaminority,implyingthatamajorityvoted
againsthimorher,makingthewinnerslegitimacyindoubt,andthatthose
supportingtheminoritypartiesorcandidatesareeffectivelydiscountedto
zerorepresentationintheNationalAssembly.Furthermore,winningparties
tendtobeover-representedintheparliamentasafunctionofdiscounting
votesoflosers(Table2).
Inaddition,amajoreffectofsingle-memberdistrictsisaseverehandicapfor
minorityparties.Onewayofviewingthiseffectisthatvotersmayrealizethatathird
partytheysupporthaslittleornochanceofwinningandtheydecidetocasttheir
ballotsforastrongerparty.AnexamplemightbetheformationofaMuslimparty
insouthernThailand.Ifthepartywins,itcouldbargaineffectivelyfortheinterestsit
represents.Ontheotherhand,itcouldsplitthevoteofanti-Thai-Rak-Thaivoters
withthePrajadhipatthaiParty.BecausethelatterislargelyaBuddhistpartyinthe
South,aMuslimpartymightforsakealloftheBuddhistvoters,andendupina
contestwithThaiRakThaithatitcouldnotwin.Correspondingly,Prajadhipatlikely
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couldnotwinelectionswithBuddhistvotersalone.Theresultwouldbeanoutcome
that neither supporters of the Muslim party nor Prajadhipat would find
satisfactory.Suchascenarioisadirectresultofsingle-member,winner-take-all
systemsthatareharsh on minor parties and death to third parties.
Finally,onecharacteristicthatdistinguishessingle-memberdistrictsfrom
proportionalsystemsisthatdistrictrepresentativesarefarmorelikelythanparty-list
candidatestoplacelocalinterestsabovenationalones.Ononehand,representatives
aremorelikelytorepresent constituencyinterests,butthisalsomeansthatthey
aremorelikelytobeorientedtoapork-barrelstyleofpoliticsthatplacesa
premiumonwhatarepresentativecandoforthepeopleinalocaldistrict.National
policyperspectivesmaybeofsecondaryimportanceiflocalconstituenciesplacea
higherpriorityonwhatrepresentativescandoforlocalcommunities.Single-member
districtsthusplacerepresentativesclosertothe people, attheexpenseofwhat
someregardasbroaderinterests.
192
2. Proportional Representation (Party-Lists).AsTable2indicates,
proportionalrepresentationoffersrepresentationclosertothedistributionof
partysupportthanplurality/majoritysystems,especiallyifthelatterare
winner-take-all.Nationalpartylists,asinThailand,however,tendto
concentratepoliticalpowerincentralizedelites,inthiscaseassociatedwith
Bangkok.AsAnekLaothamatasputsitsowell,ruralThaisalreadytendto
feelthatBangkok-basedrepresentatives(andperhapsevenBangkok
residents)arealientoruralelectoratesintermsoftaste,culture,andoutlook,
who(failtostayclosetothevotersinbothaphysicalandculturalsense.
One way of evadi ng t hese consequences i s t o make t he proport i onal
representationrelatedtomulti-member,morelocalizeddistricts.Suchastructure
wouldencourageariseinlocal-basedpartiesattheexpenseofamorenational
constituency.Eventhissolutionisvulnerabletotheissueofhowwellpolitical
partiesrepresentissuesofconcerntolocalresidents.UnlessanduntilThailand
approachesaresponsible party system,allsolutionsbaseduponpoliticalparties
192
AnekLaothamathas.1996.ATaleofTwoDemocracies:ConflictingPerceptionsof
ElectionsandDemocracyinThailand,inR.H.Taylor,ed.ThePoliticsofElectionsin
SoutheastAsia.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,208.
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willbelargelyillusory.Inaddition,alocalizedsolutionwouldseverelyfragmentthe
partysystem,totheextentoneexistsinThailand.
3.Non-Partisan Elections in the Senate.StudentsofAmericandemocracyare
wellawarethatthearchitectsoftheAmericanconstitutionalsystemhad
seriousreservationsregardingpurelymajoritarianrule,although,bythe
earlytwentiethcentury,theSeventeenthAmendmentlargelytransformed
theSenateintoamajoritarianbodyinadditiontotheHouse.Whether
intendedorunintended,theThaiconstitutionhasproducedatrulypluralistic
chamberasanalternativetothemajority-basedHouse.
Tosummarizeitseffects,asanalternativetomajoritariandemocracy,the
Senateprovidesrepresentationofconstituencyinterests.Tore-iterate,ifaninterest
canmobilize sufficient support,itcangainrepresentationingovernmentevenifit
representsonlyaminority,sometimesonlyasmallminority.Sofar,theresulthas
beenamixtureoffamous people,butalsorepresentationofhighlyworthy
intereststhatwouldnotberecognizedingovernmentatallinaplurality/majority
system.Forbetterorforworse,Senateelectionshaveresultedinasystemof
constituency-basedrepresentationthatwillbetheenvyofpluralistdemocracy
advocateseverywhere.Fornow,atleast,itisanachievementthatshouldbe
celebratedasalandmarkonthepathofdevelopinguniqueexpressionsofThai(or
Asian?)democracy.
Asnotedabove,however,prohibitionsagainstcampaigninghavebrought
aboutunanticipatedconsequencesinthevoterdecisions.Theseprohibitionsmakeit
extraordinarilydifficultforvoterstoacquireinformationnecessaryforthevoting
choice.Perhapssuchrestrictionscouldberelaxedwhile,atthesametime,preserving
constraintsagainstpoliticalpartyaffiliations.Inanycase,itisurgenttotakeactions
tomakethevotingdecisioninelectionofSenatorsbetterinformed.

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Conclusions
Itisnotthepurposeofthiscontributioninthinkingaboutconstitutionalreform
tomakerecommendationsastowhatoughttobedonetoamendthecurrent
constitution.Thepurposeofapolicyanalystshouldbeonlytosuggestandclarify
alternatives,leavingittopublic,democraticprocessestomaketheappropriate
choices.Inthisregard,Ihopethatthisstudyhasbeenhelpful.
Inthemidstofwhatseemstooutsideobserversasapassionforre-writingthe
Constitution,Iwouldsuggestseriousconsiderationsoftheimplicationsofsucha
project.TheConstitutionof1997isanextraordinaryandexcellentframeworkfor
constitutionalgovernment.Manyoftheflawsinitsoperationarelocatedinthe
organiclaws,ratherthanintheconstitutionaldocumentitself.
Clearly,itemsintheelectionlawsneedtobeaddressed.I,forone,havenever
understoodtheutilityofthered card-yellow-cardprocess.Furthermore,asI
readtheConstitution,itseemsapparentthattheNationalAssemblyshouldbeseated
immediatelyfollowingtheelection.Ifseatshavenotbeencertified,therestofthe
bodyshouldbeseatedwithoutdelayandabletoactforthewholebody,especiallyin
thecaseoftheSenate.Thecurrentsituationlendsitselftoraisingchallengeswithout
proofbyloserswhohopetoforceanotherelectioninwhichtheymightprevail.One
avenueofconsiderationwouldbetoseatthebodyaccordingtotheprevailingvoting
returnswithintheconstitutionallymandatedtimeframe.Challengescanbe
investigatedandwinnersinasuspectelectionde-certified later.Norisitclearto
methataBachelorsdegreeisessentialforeffectiverepresentation.Buttheseare
minorissuescomparedtotheoverallweightoftheConstitution.Inmanyrespects,it
isamodelforothernationstofollow.
TherehavebeenmanyproposalsforconstitutionalconventionsintheUnited
States.Infact,thereisaprocedurewrittenintotheU.S.Constitution,butsucha
conventionhasneveroccurred.Ihavealwaysopposedaconstitutionalconventionin
theUnitedStates.SomeofyoumaynotrealizethattheConstitutionalConventionof
1787wascalledsolelyforthepurposeofamendingtheArticlesofConfederation
thathadbeentheU.S.Constitutionsinceindependence.Infact,theArticleswere
grievouslyflawedinmanyrespectsandtheConstitutionof1787gaveAmericansthe
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formofgovernmentthathaslastedforover100years.Amendmentshavebeen
adopted,27inall,tocorrectdemonstrableflaws,buttherightsandfreedomswe
haveunderthisconstitutionwouldbeputinjeopardyifaconstitutionalconvention
actuallyconvened.
PerhapsThailandisinasimilarposition.TheConstitutionof1997isa
prodigiousachievementunlikeanythingthathasgonebeforeinThaihistory.My
hopeisthatthistrulyamazingachievementwillnothaveitsbasicframework
jeopardizedbyapassionforconstitutionalreform.Wewhostriveformore
democraticsystemsinoursocietiesneedtorememberalways:The perfect is the
enemy of the good.

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216
Constitutional Reform
without Constitutionalism:
The Politics of Legal Adaptation
of Chinese Authoritarianism
Assoc. Prof. Guoguang Wu
T hispaperreviewsthemeasurestakingplaceinrecentChinesereformpractices
whichtheChinesestateclaimsasconstitutionalreforms,andarguesthatsuch
reformsarenotconstitutionalistifconstitutionalismisunderstoodastheprinciple
thatlawcontrolsthestateratherthanthestatearbitrarilycontrolslaws.TheChinese
practicesofconstitutionalreformsunderscrutinyincludethe2004constitutional
amendments,structuralandproceduralreformsofthelegalsystem,andtheSun
Zhigangcase,inwhichthestatepolicyofdetainmentofurbanvagrantswas
challengedbylawexpertsandeventuallymodifiedthroughlegislation.The
discussionwillfocusonthepoliticsbehindtheselegalreformmeasures,as,inthe
authorsobservation,suchpoliticsprevailsovertheconstitutionintheso-called
constitutional reformprograms.Itismoreproper, thepapersuggests,to
comprehendtherecentconstitutionalandlegalchangesofChinainthecontextof
regimeadaptationratherthanconstitutionalreforms,astheregimeismakinggreat
effortstomaintainitsmonopolyofpoliticalpower,ratherthanevenruleoflawwith
authoritarianconstitutionalism,togovernthepost-economicreformChina.

Group 2
Balance of Power and Relationships between
the Legislative and Executive Branches

King Prajadhipoks Institute

219
Balance of Power
and Relationship between the Legislative
and Executive Branches
193
Montri Rupsuwan
194

O nevitalintentoftheconstitutionisseparationofpowersbetweenthe
legislativeandexecutivebranches,desiringthateachbranchsdutieswouldbe
distinctivelyseparated.Assuch,eachbranchcanfunctionefficiently.Nonetheless,
despitehavingdutiesofthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesseparated,both
branchesstillmaintaininteractiverelationshipasprescribedintheconstitutionso
thatbothbranchescanoverseeandmaintainbalanceofpower.Asaresult,the
executivebranchcandulyandefficientlyconductstateadministration.
193
The study team fnished this research in December 2002. Thus, some information might be
outdated.However,theresearcherupdatedthecontentsoitcanbeusedasasupplementary
documentforKPICongressVIIIinNovember2006.
194
B.S.inLawfromThammasatUniversity,Barrister-at-Law(ThaiBar),OfficeofLegal
StudiesoftheBarAssociation,Docturde3ecycle(DroitPublic)fromParisUniversity,
formermemberoftheConstitutionalDraftingAssembly,formerSecretariatoftheSenate,
Political,Administrative,andManagementAdviser,Grade11,oftheSecretariatOfficeof
theSenate
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Basedonthestudy,historicallybalanceofpowerandrelationshipbetweenthe
legislativeandexecutivebranchesmaybedefinedintwoways,thatis,controlofthe
executivebranchbythelegislativebranchandcounterbalanceofthelegislative
branchconductedbytheexecutivebranch.

1. Control of the executive branch

by the legislative branch
Accordingtothepreceptofdemocracyunderparliamentarysystem,the
executivebranchiscontrolled,examined,andcounterbalancedbythelegislative
branch. Objectively, this will prevent the executive branch from wielding
administrativepowerforself-interestorpersecutingpoliticalopponentsforown
advantage.Withrespecttothecontroloftheexecutivebranchsexerciseofpowerby
thelegislativebranch,Thaiconstitutionshoweddevelopmentintermsofprescription
ofcontrolmechanismsandmeasuresandmanifestationofimprovementand
modificationofsomecontrolmechanismsandmeasuresforbetterrelevanceand
flexibility.Bydoingthis,theexecutivebranchwillbeabletoperformitsdutiesmore
flexibly.Inconformitywiththeaforesaidprecept,thecontroloftheexecutivebranch
bythelegislativebranchbasedontheprescribedmechanismandapproachescanbe
carriedoutbyfourmeasures,includingquestioning,motionforcensuredebate,
appointmentofcommittee,andexpenditurecontrol.Theessenceofeachmeasureis
asfollows:
1) Questioning
Questioningisameanofthelegislativebranchtocontroltheexecutivebranch.
Thismeasureisusedtoexertbalanceofpowerandoversightoftheexerciseof
powerbytheexecutivebranchinordertoexaminewhethersuchexerciseconforms
toitspolicyaddressintheparliament.Thequestioningofaministerconcerning
officialfunctionsconstitutesthemostlenientcontrolmechanismandtechniqueof
stateadministrationoftheparliamentandsignifiesaprocesswhichfostersconstant
contactandconnectionbetweenthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesasquestioner
andresponder.Asthequestioningofparliamentariancanbecarriedoutatanytime
duringaparliamentarysession,wecanlearnwhichdirectiontheexecutivebranchs
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administration is heading, what progress and contribution for national interest it
serves, and whether and how unduly state administration serves self-interest or the
interest of own clan.
The control of state administration of the executive branch through such
questioning mechanism of the legislative branch is widely accepted in parliamentary
democracy. Especially in Thailand, questioning measure was prescribed in the
Constitution of the Kingdom of Siam B.E. 2475 which was the second charter of
Thailand. In Section 40, it stipulated that The House of Representatives is
empowered to control state administration. At a convention, every member has the
right to raise any question to a minister regarding any matter of official functions.
However, the minister has the right to refuse responding if he discerns that it
deems inappropriate to disclose such matter due to national security or interest.
195

Moreover, similar provision has also been included in every Thai constitution,
including the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540, which was
originated from the people who cried out for political reform that installed
transparent and efficient administrative mechanism of the executive and legislative
branches. For that reason, a novel questioning principle or essence called
impromptu questioning was later added.
In accordance with the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540, a
provision pertaining to questioning stipulates two types of questioning. The first one
is typical questioning. This is a questioning provision which is based on the
original principle adopted since the Constitution of the Kingdom of Siam B.E. 2475
until the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540. The second one is so-
195
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Siam B.E. 2475 (later Siam was changed to Thai-
land after promulgation of the Amended Constitution Governing the Country Name B.E.
2482 on 6 October 1939. Thus, we had two charters i.e. 1-2, referring to Siam as the
country name). The Constitution prescribed Thai parliamentary system under a format of
a single parliament i.e. House of Representatives. For that reason, no word like prukthi
sapha or senate appeared in Section 40 of the charter. Subsequently, after the
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2492 prescribed Thai parliamentary system
under a dual parliament under prukthi sapha (later called the Senate) and the House of
Representatives, since then clause pertaining to the Senate was mentioned every time
under questioning.
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calledimpromptu questioningwhichisanovelprincipleaugmentedinthe
ConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540.Itisaimedatenhancing
efficiency of the House of Representatives control and oversight of state
administrationoftheexecutivebranch.Typicalandimpromptuquestionings
demonstrateanalysisofsources,difference,andefficiencyintermsofcontrolofthe
executivebranchsadministrationasfollows:
1.1 Typical questioning
Thecontrolandoversightmeasureofstateadministrationofthe
executivebranchviaquestioningprocessisprescribedinthesecondversionofthe
ConstitutionoftheKingdomofSiamB.E.2475andthismeasurehadbeenineffect
untiltheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540.Theaimistoprovide
anopportunityforparliamentariantoquestionthegovernmentaboutofficial
functions,andatthesametimetheexecutivebranchcanhaveanopportunityto
explainanddiscussdetailsandrationalespertainingtostateadministration.Asa
result,parliamentarianswillbetterunderstandworkingtechniquesoftheexecutive
branchanditisameantorelievetensionorpressureandmitigateoppositionfrom
thelegislativebranchagainsttheexecutivebranch.Forthatreason,theexecutive
branchhastobecarefulwitheverymovebecausethelegislativebranchconstantly
controlandmonitortheirworks.
However,whenoutcomesofthecontrolofstateadministrationthroughsuch
questioningprocessareanalyzed,itwasfoundthattheprocessisinefficientbecause,
throughout 70-year history ofThai democracy, such control and oversight
mechanismofstateadministrationhasfailedtoefficientlyperformitsdutiesin
preventionandsuppressionofcorruptionandmisconductoftheexecutivebranch.
Moreover,Thaipoliticshasbeenrifewithfraudulentpractices,corruption,and
misconductwhichrepeatedlyinstigatedcoupdtat,seizureofadministrativepower,
andannulmentofthecharters,theneventuallyleadinguptoanalyzinganddrafting
processofanewconstitution.
Basedonstudyandanalysisofdetailspertainingtocontrolandoversight
mechanismoftheexecutivebranchthroughquestioningmechanism,itwasfound
thatagreatdealofobstaclesandlimitationsrenderedfeebleenforcementofthe
provisionpertainingtostateadministrationcontrol.Theseissuesare
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(1) The executive branch does not recognize its importance
Asquestioningoftheexecutivebranchisaparliamentaryactivitythat
doesnotaffectstabilityoftheexecutivebranchanditisonlyaquestion
concerningsomeproblemordoubtabouttheexecutivebranchsworks,
onceaministerrespondstosuchquestion,whethertheresponseisclear
ornot,suchquestionisdeemedfinal.Assomequestionispolitically
motivatedormerelysatisfiescuriosityofgeneralpublicandmassmedia
inordertoattackordiscreditthegovernment,theexecutivebranchthen
doesnotpaymuchattentionorsufficientlyrecognizesthevalueof
quest i oni ng. Even when t he execut i ve branch at t ends t o such
questioningoragreestorectifythematter,itwillbemerelyjustgetting
thingoutoftheway.Moreover,whenthequestionisnotlongerahot
issueorbecomesinsignificant,suchtopicorissuetabledinquestioning
tendstofadeoutasifquestionerandresponderfulfilltheobjectiveof
suchquestionandanswer.Forthatreason,abigquestioncomestomind
Can the linkage between the executive branch and legislative
branches t hrough s uch ques t i oni ng proces s enhance t he
governments concern for prudent state administration which may
lead to reinforcement of governments stability and how?
(2) Questioning regulation and procedure
Normally,mostissuesortopicsraisedinquestioningoftheexecutive
branchtendtobeamatterofconcernontopofeveryonesmind,
whetheritbetheexecutivebranchorgeneralpublicormedia,whichis
currentlyappearinginnewsarticleormaybewidelydebated.The
periodoftimewhichgeneralpublicpaysattentiontoanissueora
mattermostlyfallsbetween2-3weeks.Ifsuchnewsworthyissueor
problemisnotfiledorsubmittedasaquestionduringthatperiodof
time,valueandinterestofsuchquestionwilldissipateautomatically.
(3) Parliamentary officials handling lacks flexibility
Parliamentary official responsible for questioning process and
procedurelacksflexibilityinfilingofaquestionthroughrankandfilein
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ordertoinsertitinanagendasothatconcernedministercanappearto
answerthequestionintheparliament.Itcanbesaidthattheresponsible
officialoverlyadherestothecriteriaandregulationwithoutrecognizing
thatwhichquestioningisurgentandrequiresconcernedministerto
respondduringrushhoursorwhichquestioningshouldbeputintoan
agendainwhichtimeperiodsothateachquestioningissuitableand
beneficialforsolvingproblems.(Eventhoughitisanurgentquestion
thatrequirespromptresponsefromconcernedminister,nomatterhow
urgentitis.Itissuggestedthatquestionsbearrangedsequentiallyin
conjunctiontosubmissiontimingandfilingprocedure.Forinstance,if
thereare500questionslodgedinthepipelineforconsiderationbythe
parliament.Anewquestionmustbethe501
st
questioninthelist.
Evidently,itisquitedifficultforthe501stquestiontosatisfyregulatory
requirementandpassthroughproceduralstepswithin2-3weeks.
Thisproblemresultsindisruptivequeuingprocess.Sincethememberwho
submi t a quest i on i s wel l aware t hat i f hi s quest i on proceeds t hrough t he
parliamentarychannelasusual,valueandimportanceofhisquestionwillfall.So,
seniorofficialempoweredtomakeadecision,includingbureaucratandpolitical
official,isnormallylobbiedsothatownquestioncanmoveupfromthe501stand
cutinthequeue.Ifthatisthecase,hisquestioncanthenbeputintoanagendaatan
instant.Atpresent,suchpracticeinquitecommonintheparliament.
However,asfortheissueoflackingflexibilityinthedispositionorlacking
properdiscretionofparliamentaryofficialinthisrespect,thedispositionearnssome
sympathybecausetheregulationandpracticesdonotallowtheofficialtodojust
that.Eveniftheofficialdarestotakethematterinhisownhandorprudently
determinesthatanewquestionreceivedtodayissignificantenoughtodeserveurgent
inclusionintotheagenda,sohedecidestomoveupthequestionandcutsinthe
queueonaspecialbasis,thereisnoguaranteewhethertheactingofficialwillnotbe
complained andpunished.Therefore, toresolve the issuesconcerning late
submissionofanurgentquestionthroughthenormalprocessoramoreflexibleor
discretionaryapproach,thesupportandconsentofthePresidentoftheParliament
(whohasthehighestauthorityaccordingtothemeetingregulation)isrequired.At
the same time, parliamentary official responsible in this function must be
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knowledgeable,competent,andmostfluentincurrentevents;andalsomustbe
impartialinsuchengagement.
(4) Inquired minister does not want to answer the question himself.
Theissueconcerningtheministerbeinginquiredinthequestioning
processwhohasdirectdecision-makingpowerdoesnotwanttoanswer
thequestionposedbyamemberbyhimselfisanotherproblemthat
causesinefficiencyinaprocessaimedatcommunicatingproblemsto
theexecutivebranchviaquestioningprocessorpartiallydebilitates
oversightmechanismoftheexecutivebranch.Aministeroradeputy
ministerdesignatedbytheprimeministertoansweraquestioninhis
absencedoesnothavegenuinedecision-makingpower,especially
pertinentdecision-makingpoweratthepolicylevelwhichdefines
policiesordirectionsforproblem-solvingattheoperationallevel.
Basedonfactualinformation,parliamentaryquestioning,whetheritbethe
HouseofRepresentativesortheSenate,itcanbediscernedthatdespitetherelevancy
ofthesesubmittedquestionstotheprimeministeroraconcernedminister,theprime
ministerorsuchministerwillinvariablycitethatheisnotdirectlyresponsibleforthe
posedquestion.Nonetheless,fromtheperspectiveofstateadministration,theprime
ministerortheministerisresponsibleforanymatteroragencyunderhisjurisdiction,
whetheritbepolicyoroperationallevel.Practically,theprimeministeroraminister
willallocateordesignateaministeroftheOfficeofPrimeMinisterordeputy
ministeroftheconcernedministrytooverseeandcommandworkingunitsonhis
behalf,ondejurebasistheprimeministerandtheministerismostaccountable.
Furthermore,basedontheregulationandguidelinesofparliamentaryofficial,
topursuethismatter,theparliamentarysecretariatmustsignonadocumentsothat
thesecretariatoftheprimeministerwillbeinformedandtheprimeministerorthe
ministerwillappeartoanswerthequestion.Intheprocess,onlythenameofthe
primeministerortheministersolicitedforaddressingthequestionwillbestipulated.
Thisisbecausethequestioningprocessrequirestopbrasswithdecision-making
poweratthepolicyandoperationalleveltoanswerthequestionsothattheissueand
recommendationcanbeutilizedtorectifythesituationandputineffect.Thefactthat
theprimeministerandconcernedministerdoesnotrecognizeitsvalueandneglects
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toappear foransweringthequestion in personunavoidably debilitates the
questioningsvalueandefficiencyandpartiallyweakenscontrolandoversight
mechanismoftheexecutivebranch,notinaccordwiththeintentoftheconstitution.
Toretainitsefficiency,problemanalysismustthenbeimplementedtoseek
modificationofthiscontrolmechanismoftheexecutivebranch.
1.2 Impromptu questioning
Impromptuquestioningisanovelprinciplewhichwasprescribedinthe
ConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540,therebystipulatingthatonly
parliamentarianisentitledtotableaquestionfortheprimeministerorconcerned
ministerresponsibleforrelevantmatterinstateadministration.
Objectively,theintentofthisprovisionistocreateamechanismto
controlstateadministrationthroughquestioningoftheHouseofRepresentatives,the
parliamentthatchoosealeaderoftheexecutivebranchwhoisefficient,fast,andup-
to-date.Withgrowingproblems,theprimeministermustbereadyforrespondingto
anyquestionorallegationpertainingtoresponsiblefunctionsatalltime.Since
impromptuquestioningpursuanttotheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.
2540isdesignedasaquestionposedtoaconcernedministerandtheministermust
verballyrespondtosuchquestiononthesamedayaswhenheisinformedbya
writtendocumentfromthePresidentoftheParliament.So,hecannotassignother
ministertorespondtoimpromptuquestioningonhisbehalf.
However,afteranalyzingtheintentoftheimpromptuquestioning,which
isanovelprinciple,indetail,theremaybetwomainreasonsforitsintroduction,
thatis,

1)Toenhanceefficiencyofthecontrolmechanismofstateadministration.
Thefactthattypicalquestioningwhichhasbeenusedforaverylong
timedidnotdemonstrateconcreteoutcome;andsimilarly,thepast
government s al so di d not pay much at t ent i on t o i t . For t ypi cal
questioning,theprimeministerorconcernedministerwhofaces
parliamentaryquestioninghasanoptiontorespondtothequestion,
whetheritbeassigningaministerordeputyministertorespondto
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tabledquestioninsteadofexercisinghisrightofavoidinganyresponse
toquestioningbycitinginappropriatediscussionoftheinquiredmatter
forthesakeofnationalsecurityorvitalnationalinterestorpublication
ofresponsetothequestioningintheGovernmentGazette,andsoforth.
Withsuchalternativesorconditions,progressofthequestioningprocess
concerningstateadministrationoftheexecutivebranchisquiteslowor
inefficient.Insomecase,itmighttakeseveralmonthsbeforetheprime
ministerordesignatedministerappearsforresponsetoaquestioninthe
parliament,thuslesseningvalueofsuchquestionandrenderingitoutof
date.
2)Tobeconsistentwithaministerseducationalqualificationsrequiringa
minimumofbachelordegreeandtheconditionstipulatingthatprime
mi ni st er and mi ni st er must not be a member of t he House of
RepresentativesortheSenateatthesametime.Inthepast,prime
ministerorministermightclaimthathedoesnothavetherightskillor
relevantexperienceinadministrationofthedesignatedoffice.Thus,it
wouldtakeaconsiderabletimetoacquainthimselfwithresponsible
taskssothathecanrespondtoquestioningofaparliamentarian.The
reasonwhytheconstitutionstipulatesthatministermustgraduatewith
atleastabachelordegreeoranequivalentandcannotconcurrentlytake
upmembershipofboththeHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenateis
thatpersonnelwhoacceptsaministerialpostmustattainstandard
educationalqualificationandhaveknowledge,competence,andtime
that can be fully devoted to the works in the designated office.
Moreover, t hey must be al ways ready for exami nat i on by t he
parliament,includingrespondingtoimpromptuquestioningfroma
memberoftheHouseofRepresentatives.
AfterreviewingtheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540
whichhadbeenfullyinforceduringtheadministrationofPol.Lt.Col.Thaksin
Shinawatra,itwasobservedthatcontrolprocessofstateadministrationthrough
impromptuquestioningmechanismpursuanttoSection184oftheConstitutionofthe
KingdomofThailandB.E.2540didnotfulfilltheintentoftheConstitutionas
anticipatedthatmuch.Moreover,theoutcomeofimpromptuquestioningwasnot
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reallydistinguishableascomparedtotypicalquestioningtabledagainstaminister
pursuanttoSection183oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540.
Forthatreason,itmightbeconclusivethatthecontrolprocessofstateadministration
throughquestioningmechanismasprescribedintheConstitution,whetheritbe
t ypi cal or i mprompt u quest i oni ng, does not produce any i mpact on st at e
administration.Atthesametime,stipulationofimpromptuquestioningisalsonota
factorthatsupportsorfostersthegovernmentsstabilityinanyway.Thequestioning
orrespondingprocessintheparliamentisreckonedasatypicalactivitywhichis
carriedoutontypicalbasis.Wheneverprimeminister,concernedminister,ora
ministerdesignatedtorespondtoaquestionrespondedtoquestioning,whetherornot
suchquestioningwaspoliticallymotivatedorensuingresponsewasclearorsatisfied
thequestioner,thatquestioningwasfinished,withoutanyresolutionorfollow-up
mechanismorexaminationoftheresponseoftheministerwhatsoever.Theissuethat
isworthconsideringishowtoexecutetheparliamentaryquestioningprocesstotruly
satisfytheintentoftheConstitution.Bydoingthat,thequestionerwillactasa
representativeofthepeopletoreflectpublicdemandandadministrativeshortcoming
oftheexecutivebranch.Inthemeantime,theexecutivebranchwillrecognizeor
valuethequestioningprocessandusetheopportunityandsuchchannelasa
mechanismforexplanationanddisseminatingadministrativeinformationinthe
parliament.Assuch,generalpublicwillbeinformedaboutadministrativedirections
theexecutivebranchistaking,whatpositiveandnegativeoutcometheyproduce,and
howthegovernmentwilladministerorresolvethecountrysproblemsinthefuture.
Ifallthesecanbedone,consequentlytheexecutivebranchsadministrationwillbe
transparent,andthegovernmentwillknowhowtouseparliamentarymechanismasa
channeltopublicizeitsaccomplishmentandshrewdlymitigatepressureimposedby
theoppositionpartiesandanti-governmentgroups,includingbothpoliticalandcivic
pressuregroups.Intheend,thegovernmentsadministrationwillbestablesomuch,
thusenhancingitsabilitytoadministerandsolveproblemsefficientlyand
continually.

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2. Filing a motion for censure debate
Filingamotionforcensuredebatetoprovokevoteofno-confidenceagainstthe
executivebranchisconsideredthemostpowerfulandvigorouscontrolandoversight
measureofthelegislativebranchinabatteryofcontrolandoversightprocessesof
theexecutivebranchsadministration.Moreover,itisacontrolandoversight
techniquetowhichtheexecutivebranchinanyerasomewhatattachesgreat
importancebecausethismechanismcanaffectthegovernmentsstability.Inthepast,
someleaderintheexecutivebranchdecidedtodissolvetheparliamenttoevadea
censuredebate.Forinstance,whenGeneralPremTinsulanondwastheprime
minister,hedissolvedtheparliamenttoevadecensuredebatethreetimes,thatis,on
19March1983,4May1986,and29April1988respectively.Inothercase,aftera
censuredebatefinished,someleaderoftheexecutivebranchcouldnotclearly
respondtotheoppositionsqueriesandwaslaterpressuredbycoalitiongovernment
partiesandgeneralpublictoeitherdissolvetheparliamentorresign.Forinstance,
BanharnSilapa-achawaspressuredbycoalitiongovernmentpartiesandfinallyhe
chosetodissolvetheparliamentinsteadofresigning.
196
Inaddition,duringthebaht
devaluationcrisis,GeneralChavalitYongchaiyuthchosetoresignfromprime
minister.
Despitethefactthatthelegislativebranchscontroloftheexecutivebranch
throughthecensuredebatemotionmechanismisreckonedaneffectiveoversight
techniquethatcanimpactonstabilityoftheexecutivebranchasmentionedabove.
However,iftheprocessandoverallrepercussionsofthecensuredebateare
scrutinizedandanalyzedthoroughly,itcanbediscernedthatsinceThailandhad
196
Afterthecensuredebatewasoverandwhileparliamentariansarewaitingforno-
confdence vote casting in the House of Representatives, Banharn Silapa-acha, the prime
minister,wasrigorouslypressuredbycoalitiongovernmentparties,ledbyGen.Chavalit
Yongchaiyuth(leaderoftheNewAspirationParty),thedeputyprimeministerandthe
Defence minister. Finally, Banharn agreed to hold a press conference before no-confdence
votecastingtoannouncehisresignationwithinashortperiodoftime,providedthat
thecoalitiongovernmentpartiesvotedagainsthim.However,afterhesurvivedvoteof
no-confidence,Banharndecidedtodissolvetheparliamentinsteadofresigningas
announcedearlier.
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transformedfromabsolutemonarchyregimetodemocracyon24June1932untilthe
finaldayoftheenforcementoftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.
2540,Thailandwitnessed56cabinetsand24primeministers;29censuredebate
motions;11parliamentarydissolution;and,additionally,therewasresignationofone
leaderoftheexecutivebranch,thatis,RearAdmiralTawanThamrongnawasawat.
Basedontheseinformationandstatistics,itcanbediscernedthatcensuredebate
motionor repercussionsof censure debate against the executivebranch or
governmentarenotefficientandconsistentinaccordancewiththeintentofall16
versionsoftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailand.
197
Instead,itisusedeither
asatooltodestroyandtopplepoliticalfoesorcreatesomepoliticalmaneuveror
gainreputationwithoutanyrealizationofitstrueintentinrespectofoversightofthe
execut i ve branch, t hus cont rol l i ng t he execut i ve branch t o conduct st at e
administrationfunctionsindecentmanner.Atthesametime,theexecutivebranch
tendstounitewiththeirclanormustervotesamongcoalitionpartiestosailthrough
voteofno-confidencewithoutrecognizingorattendingtoissuesortheessenceof
censuredebateortryingtogettothetruthofthematter.Forthisreason,thesehave
setinaspoliticalcyclesthatdonotfosterdevelopmentofqualityofbothpolitician
and pol i t i cal syst em. It woul d not be a mi st ake t o say t hat t he fai l ure and
unsustainableanddisruptivedevelopmentofThailandsadministrativeregimeinthe
pastarepartiallycausedbyrecurrentandoutmodedpoliticalcyclesandfailureofthe
controlandoversightregime.Suchconclusionfocusesonthelegislativebranchs
controlsystemoftheexecutivebranchcalledcensuredebatemotion,whichisanew
principleinaccordancewiththeConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540.
Thestipulationofanewcriteriaofthecensuredebatemotioninaccordance
withtheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540ledtoprescriptionofa
newprinciplepertainingtopetitionofcensuredebatemotion.Thisnewprincipleis
basedonapresumptionthatifcontrolandoversightofstateadministrationofthe
executivebranch,especiallytheprimeminister,canbecarriedoutsystematically;
motionandallegationfilingpracticesaredefinedprecisely;andconcreteregulation
andprocedureconcerningpunishmentareinplace,allthesewillreinforcestabilityof

197
Thailand has been under enforcement of 16 charters, starting from the frst charter i.e. the
ProvisionalConstitutionalLawofSiamB.E.2475tillthe16thcharter,theConstitutionof
theKingdomofThailandB.E.2540(amendedonce).
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theexecutivebranchandalsoenhanceleadershippotentialofthechiefofthe
executivebranch.
Underthenewprinciple,filingofthecensuredebatemotionistroublesome,
inconvenient,ornotassimpleasthepreviouspractice.Iftheoppositionwantstofile
suchmotion,theyhavetospendmuchmoretimeonreviewandanalysisofpertinent
informationandevidence.Theycannotmakeadecisionwithoutspendingmuchtime
ondetailedandprudentreviewlikeinthepastwhentheyusedtopetitioncensure
debateofanindividualministerorthewholecabinet.
Essentially,theprocessinvolvingcensuredebatemotioninaccordancewith
theConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540clearlydescribesallthesteps
andtechniques,systematicallylinkpunishment(relevanttoallegation),andclassifies
degreeofimportanceofthecensuredebateintwolevels,thatis,theintricatelevel
involvingtheprimeminister,whichrequirestwo-fifthofallmembersoftheHouse
ofRepresentatives;theconventionallevel,thatis,censuredebateofanindividual
ministerwhichrequiresonlyone-fifthofthetotalnumberofexistingvotes.
Basically,thenumberoffavorablevoteswouldvaryindegree.Theimportance
oftheexecutivebranchsofficeisnottheonlyfactorthatmakesthecontroland
oversightprocessofstateadministrationthroughcensuredebatecomplicatedand
restrictiveifcensuredebatemotionprocessissystematicallylinkedandpertinentto
theimpeachmentprocessandcriminalprosecutionofpoliticalofficeholderpursuant
toSection303-311oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540.In
otherwords,whilsttheoppositionfilescensuredebatemotion,whetheritbeprime
ministerorindividualminister,withthePresidentoftheHouseofRepresentatives,if
theallegationaccordswithSection303oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomof
ThailandB.E.2540,thatis,usuallywealthyconduct;conductwhichisindicativeof
corruption,malfeasanceinofficialduty,malfeasanceinjudicialduty,orintentionto
exercisethepowerinbreachwithconstitutionalprovisionorlaw,theopposition
mustfilesuchallegationmotionwiththeNationalCounterCorruptionCommission
(NCCC)forsetupofanotherinquiry.Whatevertheoutcomeofaninquiryorganized
bytheNationalCounterCorruptionCommissiontodetermineagroundofalleged
offencemaybe,suchresultwoulddirectlyaffectbothaccuser(opposition)and
allegedoffender(executivebranch).
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IncasetheNationalCounterCorruptionCommissioncontemplatesan
allegationandresolvesthatthereisagroundofoffenceinconjunctionwithcensure
debatemotionpetitionedbytheopposition,therulingwillimpactonthealleged
offenderinstantly.Essentially,theallegedoffenderwillberelievedofthedutiesuntil
theSenatepassesaresolution,andsuchinvestigativeproceedingwillcontinueuntil
theSenatepassesaresolutionorthepoliticalcrimesectionoftheSupremeCourt
willadjudicatethecase.However,iftheNationalCounterCorruptionCommission
cannotfindagroundforanywrongdoingfromtheinquiryandeventhoughthe
impeachmentprocesshascometoanend,theoppositioncannotavoidnegative
ramificationsdawningonthem.Mostobviously,credibilityandcensuredebate
initiatedbytheoppositionwilldiminishandtheoppositionsperformanceinfuture
controlandoversightoftheexecutivebranchwillalsobeadverselyaffected.With
respecttotheconditionoffavorablevotesincensuredebatemotionandlinkage
betweencensuredebateandimpeachmentofpoliticalofficeholderpursuantto
Section303-311oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540,thereare
twoobservationsasfollows:
1.Theoppositionwillbemorecarefulandprudentwhentheyconsiderfilinga
censuredebate,andtheyshouldnotoperateonagroundlessallegation.If
theNationalCounterCorruptionCommissionrulesthattheoppositions
grievanceisgroundless,theoppositionwillfailtomaintaintheirreputation
andcredibility.Asidefromthat,theconditionpertainingtotwo-fifth
requirementoffavorablevotesforacensuredebateoftheleaderofthe
executivebranchisanotherconstraintthatmakesoversightoftheleaderof
theexecutivebranchisevenmoredifficultbecausetheyhavetomuster200
favorablevotesoutofthetotalof500parliamentarians.
198
Ontheother
hand,iftheoppositionseeksfavorablevotesfromtwo-fifthasrequiredby
theConstitution,theymustbeabletocomeupwithasolidevidenceto
provethattheleaderoftheexecutivebranchengagesinunusuallywealthy
conduct;conductthatisindicativeofcorruption,malfeasanceinofficial

198
ThegovernmentheadedbyPol.Lt.Col.ThaksinShinawatrawasformedafterthegeneral
electionon6February2005whichwasfieldedbyasinglepoliticalparty.Atthattime,
ThaiRakThaiPartyhas377MPs.Therearethreeoppositionpartiesi.e.Democratwith96
MPs,ChartThaiwith25MPs,andMahachonwith2MPs,totaling123MPs.
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duty,malfeasanceinjudicialduty,orintentiontoundulyexerciseitspower
inbreachwiththeconstitutionalprovisionorlaw.So,heshouldbegrilled
bythecensuredebate.Iftheoppositionhasconcreteinformationand
evidencetobacktheallegation,theymaygainsomesupportingvotesfrom
thegovernmentcoalitionparties(incasetheoppositionpartieshaveless
thantwo-fifth)foracensuredebateoftheprimeminister.However,when
thesystemisscrutinized,historically,basedonthepoliticalcustomand
cultureofThailand,itisratherdifficultfortheoppositionpartiestosolicit
supportfortheoppositionsmotionfrommembersofthegovernment
coalitionparties.Forthatreason,withouttwo-fifthofvotes,itismostlikely
thattheoppositionpartiescannotfileacensuredebateoftheprimeminister
throughoutthefour-yearparliamentarysession.
2.Afteracensuredebateoftheprimeministerorministerconcludes,no
matterwhattheoutcomewouldbe,theimpeachmentprocess(incasethe
NationalCounterCorruptionCommissiondiscoversthattheallegationthat
theoppositionpartiesresortsasabasisforfilingacensuredebatehassome
groundforwrongdoing.)willcontinuetheinquiryprocess,includingthe
partoftheSenatesimpeachmentresolution
199
andthepartoftheAttorney-
Generalsefforttofileacomplaintatthepoliticalcrimesectionofthe
SupremeCourt.Wecannotletthesegowithoutpursuinganymeasurelikein
thepast.
Theissueconcerninglinkagebetweencensuredebateandimpeachment
measurewillensurethatthecontrolandoversightsystemoftheexecutivebranch
runssystematicallyandefficiently.Theoppositionpartiescannotuseaparliamentary
mechanismthroughthecensuredebatetopersecuteorallegeanybodyinthe
executivebranchwithoutconcreteevidence.Onthecontrary,iftheoppositioncan
providesolidevidencetosupportitsclaimofallegationandtheNationalCounter
CorruptionCommissionresolvesthatsuchallegationisprimafacie,thealleged
offendermustceaseperforminghisdutiesimmediately.Then,theimpeachmentand
199
PursuanttoSection307oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540,itis
stipulated that an impeachment resolution requires a minimum of three-ffths of favorable
votesfromallexistingsenatorsintheSenate.Outofthetotal200senators,thenumberof
supportingvotesstandsat120.
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criminaltrialofthepoliticalofficeholderwillpromptaninquiry,regardlesshow
manysupportingvotesthegovernmentcanmuster.

Potential problems and impediments

EventhoughtheConstitutionstipulatestherequirementsofthecensuredebate
indetailedstepsandsystematicallydescribeslinkageandrelationshipwiththe
impeachmentprocessandcriminalprosecution,inpractice,itissomewhatdifficult
toperfectlyexecutehypotheticalconceptorprovisionderivedfromconceptualizing
processandsystematicplanningintherealsituation.Besides,suchrequirements
stemmedfromanewprincipleandwereenforcedwithThaksinadministrationforthe
firsttime.Therefore,wecannotreallydecideordeterminewhetherthisnew
principle,onceenforced,canreachthetargetaspreviouslythoughtandwhetherthe
intentoftheConstitutionthatdesirestoemploythecontrolandoversightprocessto
partiallyfostertheexecutivebranchsperformanceforbetterstability.
However,basedonanalysisandmonitoringoftheenforcementofthe
Const i t ut i on of t he Ki ngdom of Thai l and B. E. 2540 under t he Thaksi n
administration,especiallytheissueofthecontrolandoversightoftheexecutive
branchthroughcensuredebate,itwasfoundthattheenforcementoftheConstitution
concerningcensuredebatewhichisanovelprinciplewasnotinaccordwiththe
intentoftheConstitutionanditisproblematicandcomplicatedinmanyways.
Implicitly,thisisconveyingthattheoversightconceptwhichwascarefullythought
outandsystematicallyplannedinaseriesofstepscouldnotreachitsgoalinthereal
worldasanticipatedearlier,andtheprovisionandrequirementsunderthenew
principlefailedtomeettheintentoftheConstitution.Theissuesandcomplications
reckonedasimpedimentsabovearediscussedseparatelyasfollows:
1. Stipulation of two-fifth requirement for censure debate
motion against the prime minister
PursuanttoSection185oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailand
B.E.2540,censuredebatemotionagainsttheprimeministerrequiressubscriptionof
at least two-fifth of the total number of existing members in the House of
Representatives.Thetwo-fifthof500MPscometo200MPs.Afterreviewingthis,
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theprincipleoftwo-fifthrequirementshouldnotadverselyimpactorcauseany
difficultyontheoppositionsoversightoftheexecutivebranchsactivitiesbecause
two-fifthoftotalnumberofmembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesequals200
MPs.,lessthanhalfofafullhouse.Ifthegovernmentpartyorcoalitionparties
comprisehalfofthetotalnumberofparliamentariansorifmorethanhalf,butnot
higherthan300MPs,theoppositionpartiesstillhavetherightorsufficientvotesto
filecensuredebatemotionagainsttheprimeminister.Furthermore,thefactthat
Section201oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540prescribes
thatacabinetmustcomprise36ministers(includingtheprimeminister)playsarole
insqueezingcoalitionpartieswhicharenotthatmanysothattherewouldnot
bickeringoverallocationofministerialposts,whichisacrucialissueinnegotiation
everytimeagovernmentisformed.
However,whensuchassumptionsarecomparedwiththerealsituation,the
actualoutcomecontradictswiththis.Inthegeneralelectionheldon6January2001,
theThaiRakThaiPartyundertheleadershipofPol.Lt.Gen.ThaksinShinawatra
madeahistoryinThaipoliticsbywinningalandslideelection,sweepingtheseats
frombothpartylistandconstituencycontest.Essentially,theycouldforma
governmentwithoutsolicitingotherpoliticalpartiestoformacoalitiongovernment.
AsasinglepartywhichdomineeredThaipolitics,theyenjoyedseveraladvantages.
Forinstance,implementationofpartypoliciesdoesnotrequirecombiningor
aligningwiththoseofcoalitionparties,unityinstateadministrationofthe
government,andallocationofministerialposts.Furthermore,inthelastgeneral
e l e c t i o n h e l d o n 6 Fe b r u a r y 2 0 0 5 , t h e Th a i Ra k Th a i Pa r t y, l e d b y
Pol.Lt.Gen.ThaksinShinawatra,againwontheelectionandgrasped377seatsinthe
HouseofRepresentatives.Thetriumphantpartyformedasingle-partygovernment,
andthenagaintheoppositionpartiescouldnotfilecensuredebatemotionbecause
theydidnothavetwo-fifthofthevotes.
Inothercountries,amajoritypartyonceformedagovernmentwithonlyone
votemarginovertheopposition,thatis,inIsrael.ThathappenedwhentheLikud
PartyofMenahemBeginwontheelection,garnering61seatsintheHouseof
Representativesoutofatotalof120seats.Nevertheless,theBeginadministration
functionedefficientlyandtherewasnotmuchproblemsinrunningthecountry
despitehavingenemiesallaround.
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Theconditionsorpredicaments inthesetwocitedincidents reflect
Thailandspredicamentwhichwasbrandedparliamentarydictatorshipwherebythe
oppositioncouldnotemploythecontrolandoversightmeasurethroughthecensure
debatemotionforvoteofno-confidenceagainsttheprimeminister.Themainreason
wastheoppositioncommandedlessthantwo-fifthoftotalvotesoftheexisting
membersintheHouseofRepresentatives.Regardingthisissue,proponents
recommendedamendingfromtwo-fifthrequirementtoone-fifthoftotalnumberof
parliamentariansinstead,similartotheconditionofthecensuredebateagainst
individualminister.Inessence,thiswillensurethatthecontrolandoversight
measureofthegovernmentarereallypractical.
Therefore, it is conclusive that the provision of Section 185 of the
ConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540thatrequiressubscriptionofno
lessthantwo-fifthoftheexistingmembersintheHouseofRepresentativesforfiling
acensuredebatemotionagainsttheprimeministerisratherimpractical.Inother
words,theprovisioninthissectionwillnotbefeasibleaslongastheleaderofthe
executivebranchstillhaspoliticaltrumpsandisstillunderaconstitutionalproviso
requiringsubscriptionofatleasttwo-fifthofthenumberofMPs.Ifthatisthecase,it
willthenberatherdifficulttoholdacensuredebateagainsttheprimeminister,or
possiblyacensuredebateagainsttheprimeministermayneverhappenagain.
However,asidefromthefactthattheConstitutionpresentssomeloophole
forpoliticianstoevadecensuredebate,politicalcultureandcustomsofThailand
havenotchangedatall.Inessence,themostambitiousgoalforestablishmentofa
politicalpartyisnotpresentationofpartypoliciesasalternativesforgeneralpublicto
chooseforstateadministration.Onthecontrary,itismerelyanopportunitytoattend
orjoinagovernmentparty.Inaddition,politiciansalsoperceivethatattainmentofa
ministerialpostorpoliticalofficeisachannelforownenterprisesorextrabusinesses
orevenanopportunitytoswindlethebudgetaswellasearnreputationforthe
family.Onthecontrary,theoppositionintheparliamentdoesnothaveanypoweror
charisma;theyworkwithoutreputationorservants;andtheyalsocannotexploit
opportunitiesforpersonalgain.Asonereputedprofessionalpoliticianputit,the
oppositionstarveswhilecarryingonwiththeirlivesintheparliamentasmostorall
politicalpartiesinThailand,especiallyadhocpartiesormid-sizedparties,behave
likethis,politicalmaneuversintheparliamentwouldlackideologyandfirmpolitical
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orientations.Onthecontrary,thesepoliticalpartieswillalwaystrytojointhe
government.Eventhoughtheyareintheoppositionside,theywouldmaintaintheir
neutralstanceandavoiddoinganythingtodamagethegovernmentEssentially,these
partiesbecomeanopportunityandpoliticaltoolofgovernmentleadershipwhocan
getthemonboardthegovernmentatanytimetoattainmorethan301seats.
However,despitetradinganinsignificantministerialpost,intheendtheycannotget
theirpartypoliciesimplementedasannouncedinelectioncampaigns.Forthese
reasons,someconsiderationsaretabledasfollows:First,isthefactthatSection185
oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540prescribesthatthe
oppositionpartieswishingtofileacensuredebatemotionagainsttheprimeminister
mustattaintwo-fifthsupportingvotesprovidessupportandloopholefortheleaderof
theleadingpoliticalpartyforsetupofagovernmentstrugglingtoformagovernment
withover301seatsinthebagdespitehavingonly36ministerialpostssothathecan
evadeacensuredebateandturntheparliamentintoparliamentarydictatorship,
therebyimpedingtheoppositionincontrolandoversightoftheprimeminister?
Secondly,thefactthattheConstitutionprescribesthattheoppositionpartieswishing
tofileacensuredebatemotionagainsttheprimeministeroranyindividualminister,
iftheallegationisconsistentwiththeallegationconcerningimpeachmentofpolitical
officeholderorhigh-levelofficeholderpursuanttoSection303,theoppositionmust
filesuchallegationwiththePresidentoftheSenate.Issuchconductinconsistent
withpoliticalcultureandcontrolandoversightprinciplesofstateadministration?
Thirdly,doessuchpredicamentconstituteafactorthatencouragesorcausespolitical
officeholder,especiallytheleaderoftheexecutivebranch,totrytoevadeacensure
debatebyformingagovernmentbackedupwithoverwhelmingvotes.Lastly,does
definitionofthislinkageinsuchmannerrenderthecontrolandoversightprocessof
stateadministrationsodifficultandcomplicatedthatthecontrolandoversight
processdoesnotfunctionaccordingtotheintentoftheConstitutionthatdesiresto
controlandoverseeexerciseofstatepowerrestrictivelyandthoroughly?
Committee appointment
Committeeappointmentisanothertaskoftheparliamentdestinedtocontrol
andmonitorstateadministrationoftheexecutivebranch,thusensuringthatit
generallyconformstoitspolicyaddressintheparliament.Thecabinetmustexecute
stateadministrationinaccordancewiththeconstitutionalprovisionandlawand
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policyaddress.Moreover,itmustbeaccountabletotheHouseofRepresentativesin
itsdesignateddutiesandtheparliamentasstipulatedinitsgeneralpolicystatement.
However,thecontrolofstateadministrationthroughtheoversightofsuch
committeeisreckonedasindirectcontrolofstateadministrationintheleastforceful
andintensivemanner.Theoversightoutcomedoesnotimpactonstabilityofthe
executivebranchorworrytheexecutivebranchasmuch.Inprinciple,itconstitutes
examinationorstudyofanymotionorotherissuespertainingtotheexecutivebranch
whichisconductedintandemwiththeexecutivebranchsperformance.Itisa
reflectionandrecommendationofproblem-solvingapproach.Forinstance,the
HouseLaborCommitteecontemplatesthecaseofThailaborersluredtowork
overseaandproviderecommendationoroptionsconcerningcountrydevelopmentin
variousfieldsinaformofreport,studyfinding,orresearchoutcomeofvarious
projectssuchasthefeasibilitystudyoftheconstructionofHinKrudpowerplant,
PrachuabKirikhan,oftheSenateScience,Technology,andEnergyCommittee,and
soforth.Thereisnoobligationforthegovernmenttoimplementthesestudies,and
theyarejustrecommendationwhichthegovernmentorexecutivebranchcandecide
whethertoimplementornot.
Theappointmentofacommitteeforthepurposeofdeliberationorstudyofa
motionmustbeinaccordwiththeintentoftheparliamentwhichdesirestoconduct
detailedstudyforaccuracyandcompletionbeforepreparinganddeliveringsuch
studyinaformasummaryreporttoconcernedagency.Suchcommitteeisregarded
asavitalmechanisminthefunctionsoftheparliamentarysystemandplayscrucial
rolesinensuringthateachissueorstudyfindingreviewedbytheparliamentis
completeanddiscreet.Thepresentcommitteesystemiswidelyacceptedand
extensivelydebatedinvariousdemocraticcountriesthroughouttheworld,whether
theregimeisparliamentarydemocracy,presidentialorsemi-parliamentarysystem,
withregardtoitsconcisenessandversatilityintacklingparliamentaryissues.In
Thailand,theparliamentaryfunctionsarequitesimilar.Severalcommitteesaresetup
tocontemplateandmonitorvariousissuescomprehensivelyandextensively.Asa
parliamentarymechanismorproxydesignatedtocontrolandoverseetheexecutive
branch,anothermissionofacommitteeistoinvestigateorstudyanymotion
concerningstateadministrationoftheexecutivebranch.Inessence,theprovision
concerningtherolesofcommitteeinthecontrolofstateadministrationofthe
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executivebranchinaccordancewitheveryThaichartersisnotdifferentinany
mannerthatmightincreasesoraltertherolesanddutiesofacommittee.
Duetothefactthattheoutcomeofacommitteesstudyorinvestigationis
merelyutilizedtoindirectlycontrolandexaminetheexecutivebranchsperformance
withoutanyimpactonthegovernmentsstability,therebythegovernmentdoesnot
attachmuchimportancetocommitteesworks.Furthermore,meetingregulationsof
boththeHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenatestipulateincreasednumberof
standingcommittees.
200
Asaresult,ministershaveincreasedburdentoattend
committeeshearingsessions.Inpractice,committeepreferstoinviteconcerned
ministerinsteadofseniorbureaucrattoexplainthematter.Inaddition,thefactthat
theparliamenttendstosetupastandingcommitteeforaspecificissueincreasesthe
burdenofministerinattendinghearingheldbyconcernedcommittee.Pursuanttothe
ConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540,ministerisobligatedtorespond
toquestioningintheHouseofRepresentatives(includingadditionalimpromptu
quest i oni ng) and t he Senat e every week duri ng a parl i ament ary sessi on.
Consequently,accountabilityoftheexecutivebranchfortheparliamentmultiplies
andanyaccountabilityfortheparliamentthatinsignificantlyimpactsonthe
ministersworks,itsimportancewillbereducedautomatically,thatis,theworksof
theconcernedcommittee.However,whenthemeritsoftheworksystemof
committeearecontemplated,weobservedthatitsmeritscontributetotheexecutive
branchsworksinseveralways.
Expenditure control
In the democratic system, control and oversight of the governments
expenditureisratherimportant.Especiallyinthecountrieswithmoderndemocracy
liketheUnitedKingdom,UnitedStates,andFrance,theywillstrictlycontrol
administratorortheexecutivebranchtoassurethatthebudgetcollectedfromtaxes
200
AccordingtotheMeetingRegulationsoftheHouseofRepresentativesB.E.2544andthe
MeetingRegulationsoftheSenateB.E.2544,whicharethelatestversionsbutpresently
theyhadnotbeenineffecttogetherwiththeConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailand
B.E.2540,theyrequiredincreasednumberofstandingcommittee.IntheHouseof
Representatives,thenumberofstandingcommitteesincreasedfrom23to33,andinthe
Senate,thenumberofstandingcommitteeincreasedfrom16to21.
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leviedonpeopleisnotspentastray.Thus,manyindependentbodiesormechanisms
areinvolvedincontrolandoversightineverystep.
PursuanttotheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540,a
provisionisstipulatedtotightlycontrolbudgetexpenditureoftheexecutivebranch,
includingdirectcontrolthroughparliamentarymechanismandoversightofan
independentbodyi.e.theOfficeofAuditor-General(OAG)andindirectcontrolvia
publicoversightthroughtheimpeachmentprocess.Inthisreport,theessenceof
proposedparliamentaryexpenditurecontrolmeasureswhichareprincipalmeasures
prescribedintheThaiconstitutionisasfollows:
Parliamentary control
Expenditurecontrolthroughparliamentarydeliberationprocesshasbeenused
foraverylongtimetilltoday.Inotherwords,itisdeliberationoftheannual
expenditurebudgetforthefiscalyearbill,additionalexpenditurebudgetbill,and
expenditurebudgettransferbill.Thesemeanpriortoformalspendingofanyannual
expenditurebudgetoftheexecutivebranch,itmustbedeliberatedandapprovedby
theparliamentbeforehand.However,regardingtheparliamentarycontrolasthe
grantoroftheannualbudget,iftheeffectofthecontrolisconsidered,suchcontrolis
somewhatinefficientanddoesnotoverseespendingatoperationallevel.Thus,itis
reckonedthatthispartofthespendingcontrolmechanismisnotsufficienttoassure
thatspendingisappropriateandtrulybenefitsgeneralpublic.Indeliberation
proceduresoftheAdHocCommitteeoftheHouseofRepresentatives,thereare
vigorouseffortstobringdowntheexpenditurebudgetofvariousministries,bureaus,
anddepartmentsasmuchaspossible.Then,thetotalamountofthereducedbudget
orso-calledMP budgetisallocatedasprovincialdevelopmentbudgetforevery
parliamentarians.Ifthistotalsumisreviewed,wewillobservethatthisisahuge
budget.Moreover,thisbudgetisspentcarelessly,lackingstringentandclearcontrol
andoversightmechanism.Itturnsoutthattheparliamentworksamicablywiththe
executivebranchtoapprovespendingofthisbudgetforownbenefits.
Pursuant t o t he Const i t ut i on of t he Ki ngdom ofThai l and B. E. 2540,
deliberationproceduresofsuchannualexpenditurebudgetbillstillexistbutthe
additionalconditionswereincorporatedtopreventtheAdHocCommitteeGoverning
DeliberationofAnnualExpenditureBudgetBill,withconsentfromtheexecutive
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branch,fromconsiderationofdownwardadjustmentorfilingamendmentmotionor
takeanyactionwhichwillallowparliamentarian,committeemember,andsenatorto
gainbenefitsfromthebudgetspending.Moreover,theseadditionalconditionsalso
prescribeexaminationmethodstoprobewhethersuchdeliberationofthebudgetbill
violatestheprovisionbystipulatingparliamentariansorsenatorsofatleastone-tenth
oftotalnumberoftheexistingmembersinbothchambersmayfiletheircommentsto
theConstitutionalCourtforadjudication.IftheConstitutionalCourtdecidesthat
suchactionviolatestheprovision,itwillthenrecommenddownwardadjustment,
filingamendmentmotionortakeanyactionthatallowsparliamentarian,committee
member,andsenatortogainbenefitsfromthebudgetspending.Inaddition,
oversightmethodsareprescribedtoexaminedeliberationofthebudgetbillwhether
suchwhethersuchdeliberationofthebudgetbillviolatestheprovisionbystipulating
parliamentariansorsenatorsofatleastone-tenthoftotalnumberoftheexisting
membersinbothchambersmayfiletheircommentstotheConstitutionalCourtfor
adjudication.Then,iftheConstitutionalCourtdecidesthatsuchactionviolatesthe
provision,itwillthenrecommenddownwardadjustment,filingamendmentmotion,
andsuchactionwillbedeemedinvalid.ItcanbediscernedthattheConstitutiondoes
notstipulatepenaltyprovisioninconjunctionwiththeprovisiongoverningcontrol
andpreventionofbudgetspending.Asaresult,thosewhowanttoswindlestate
budgetforself-interestorownclanwillnothaveanyregardforthatprovision.
Moreover,therequirementpertainingtofilingofagrievancefortheConstitutional
Courtsadjudicationalsorequiresinitiationofsuchgrievancefrommembersofthe
HouseofRepresentativesandsenators.Thus,iftheinterestofbudgetdeliberation
fallsintothehandofthemembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesandsenators,it
wouldnotdifficultfortheseMPstoexamineamongthemselves.
2. Balance of power between the legislative and executive
branches
Whilststateadministrationoftheexecutivebranchiscontrolledbythe
legislativebranchthroughmonitoringandoversightmechanismviaquestioning,
censuredebatemotion,committeeappointment,andbudgetexpenditurecontrol,
essentiallytheobjectiveofthecontrolprocessistoensurethatstateadministrationof
theexecutivebranchconformswithpolicyaddressdeliveredintheparliament,to
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prevent the executive branch from exercise its power inappropriately and
illegitimately,ortoseekunscrupulousgainforthemselvesandownclan.Similarly,
thelegislativebranchsconductsarecontrolledorcounterbalancedbytheexecutive
branchwithacrucialtool,thatis,parliamentarydissolutioninnegotiationorbalance
ofpowerinpractice.Thesetoolsareprovidedinaccordancewithadministrative
principlesoftheparliamentarysystemwherebytheparliamentmustcarryoutthe
legislativebranchsdutiesdulyandequitably.Thelegislativeandexecutivebranches
musthavesomelinkageandmutuallycounterbalanceexerciseofpowertodefine
frameworksorconditionsforeachothersothateachbranchwilllegitimately
exerciseitspower.Assuch,theadministrativeregimeisreckonedasmutual
oversightandchecksandbalancessystem.Theparliamentarydissolutionsignifies
theexecutivebranchsdirectmeanofbalanceofpowerandthistoolisprescribedin
theThaiconstitution.However,theConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.
2540stipulatesthattheexecutivebranchhasbothdirectandindirectapproachto
counterbalancethelegislativebranch.Theindirectapproachisparliamentary
dissolutionbutanovelprinciplewasaugmented,stipulatingthattheexecutive
branchcannotdissolvetheparliamentifacensuredebatemotionhasbeenfiled.
Essentially,thisclauseisaimedatpreventingevasionoftheexecutivebranchfrom
thelegislativebranchsoversight.Atthesametime,aprincipleoftheexecutive
branchsindirectbalanceofpowerweighingonthelegislativebranchwasalso
added,thatis,balanceofpowerexercisedbypoliticalparties.Theessenceofthis
newprinciplecomprises
1. Direct balance of power: parliamentary dissolution
Thebalanceofpowerofthelegislativebranchexercisedbytheexecutive
branchconstitutesthebalanceofpowerprinciplebasedonthepowerseparation
conceptofJohnLockwhodiscernedthatasingleindividualshouldnotprescribea
lawforself-enforcementbut,onthecontrary,shoulddefineseparationofeach
branchofpower-wieldingbodyorindividual.Thismeansthelegislativebodies
exercisethepowerofthelegislativebranch;thecabinetoradministrationexercises
thepoweroftheexecutivebranch;andtheCourtofJusticeorjudicialbodies
exercisethepowerofthejudicialbranch.Thepowerofeachbranchwillbe
examinedandcounterbalancedmutuallyandsystematicallyinordertocontroland
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preventanybranchfromundulyexercisingitspowerbeyonditsjurisdiction.
201
However,inprinciple,eventhoughitisprescribedthattheexerciseof
powerbyboththelegislativeandexecutivebranchesbelinkedtobemutually
accountableandtocounterbalanceeachotherinsystematicway,inpractice,such
balanceofpowerdoesnotconformtotheconceptthatencouragescontroland
preventionofexerciseofpowerofanybranchbeyondownjurisdiction.Nonetheless,
thepastparliamentarydissolutioncontradictedtheconcept.Thedissolutionwasnot
intendedtoevadetheinquiryorcensuredebatemotion,whichisanessentialtool
usedbythelegislativebranchtocounterbalancetheexecutivebranch,orexecutedin
suchamannerthatmightcauseinternalriftorbickeringintheexecutivebranchor
amongcoalitionparties,sothattheexecutivebranchcannotmusterneededvotesin
theparliament.
ThroughoutthehistoryofThailandsadministrationundertheparliamentary
system,theexecutivebranchneverresortedtoparliamentarydissolutionbecause
theyconcludedthatthelegislativebranchexerciseditspowertopersecuteand
destroytheexecutivebranch,therebydisruptingitsadministrativefunctions.Onthe
contrary,inmostcasestheexecutivebranchdecisivelycommandstheirvotesinthe
parliament,andonlytheminoritymustfulfillitsdutiesincounterbalancingand
oversightoftheexecutivebranchsworks.Theparliamentarydissolutioninthepast,
however,wascausedbyinternalriftorbickeringintheexecutivebranchbecauseof
unsettledbenefitsharingamongthemselves.Forinstance,theparliamentary
dissolutionorderedbytheBanharnadministrationoradissolutionmotivatedbya
desiretoevadeacensuredebateaimedatexaminingtheexecutivebranchsworks
suchasthedissolutionorderedbyPrimeMinisterGen.PremTinsulanond,andso
forth.
Dueto theaforesaid issues, anovel principle was supplemented to
counterbalancethelegislativebranchbytheexecutivebranch.Essentially,theleader
oftheexecutivebranchcannotdissolvetheparliamentifacensuredebatemotionhas
201
JeerasakChuaychoo,ConstitutionalOversightIssues:CaseStudyofCensureDebate
MotionsAgainstthePrimeMinisterPursuanttotheConstitutionoftheKingdomof
ThailandB.E.2540,(Graduatethesis,M.S.inLaw,RamkhamhaengUniversity,2000),
page10
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beenfiled.Section185oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540
stipulatesthatnolessthantwo-fifthofatotalnumberofexistingmembersofthe
HouseofRepresentativesareentitledtosubscribetheirnamescallingforacensure
debatemotionforvoteofno-confidenceagainsttheprimeminister.Suchmotion
mustalsonominateanindividualdesignatedtobecomethenextprimeminister,and
suchindividualmustalsobequalifiedinaccordancewithSection201,Paragraph2.
Afteramotionhasbeenfiled,parliamentarydissolutioncannotbeordered,unless
suchmotioniswithdrawnorvoteofno-confidencedoesnotreachtherequired
numberofvotesinaccordancewithParagraph3.
Pursuanttosuchprovision,theleaderoftheexecutivebranchortheprime
ministercannolongerdissolvetheparliamenttoevadeacensuredebatelikeinthe
pastafteracensuredebatemotionhasbeenfiled.Furthermore,Section185,
Paragraph2alsostipulatesthatinfilingacensuredebatemotion,ifitconcernsthe
primeministersunusuallywealthyconduct,orconductsindicativeofcorruption,
malfeasanceinofficialduty,malfeasanceinjudicialduty,orintentionalviolationas
prescribedbyconstitutionalprovisionorlaw,petitionercanappealtothePresidentof
theSenatetoengagetheSenatetopassaresolutionpursuanttoSection307for
expulsionfromtheoffice.Moreover,sucheffortcanalsobeextendedtocriminal
prosecution,providedthattheNationalCounterCorruptionCommissionresolves
thatthecomplaintisprimafacieandfilethecasewiththeAttorney-Generalforcase
proceedinginthepoliticalcrimesectioninaccordancewithSection308ofthe
ConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540.
2. Indirect balance of power: political parties
ThefactthatSection107(4)oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailand
B.E.2540stipulatesthatanindividualwishingtoapplyasacandidateinageneral
electionmustbeamemberofonlyasinglepoliticalpartynoless90consecutive
daysfromtheapplicationdateofcandidacysignifiesincreaseofapoliticalpartys
bargainingpowersoastocontrolmembersactivitiesandadherencetothepartys
policyandresolution.Thisisreckonedasameasurethatstrengthenspoliticalparties.
Intheeventthatapoliticalpartywinsanelectionandgarnersenoughseatsfor
formingagovernment,suchmeasureplaysrolesinreinforcingfirmnessofthehead
ofthegovernmentandalsocontributingtogreaterstabilityofthegovernmentinthe
countrysadministration.
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Furthermore,Section118(8)oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomof
ThailandB.E.2540alsostipulatesthatexpiryofmembershipofamemberofthe
HouseofRepresentativesislinkedtomembershipofapoliticalparty.Inessence,
membershipofamemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesisterminatedimmediately
ifthepoliticalpartywhereheisamemberpassesaresolutionwithnolessthan
three-fourthoftotalvotesatageneralmeetingofthepoliticalpartysexecutive
committee,mandatingthatthatitsmemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesbe
expelledfrommembershipofthepoliticalpartywherehebelongs.Thisprovision
willcontributetogreaterunityofpoliticalpartysactivitiesbecausethepartycan
controlandoverseeitsmemberssothattheirpoliticalactivitiesandexpressionare
consistentwiththepartysresolutionandpolicies.Ifsuchpoliticalpartyisacore
partyinformingagovernmentorparticipatesinthegovernmentasacoalitionparty,
theprovisionplaysrolesinsecuring greaterstabilityforthegovernments
administration.Thisisduetothefactthataresolutionofthepoliticalpartythat
mandatescompliancefromitsmembersisatleastanassuranceinanyresolutionin
theparliament,especiallythematterconcerningwiththegovernmentssecurity,
whetheritbedeliberationofthegovernmentsbudgetbill,orvoteofconfidenceor
no-confidenceinacensuredebatefortheprimeministerorindividualministerwhich
i s support ed by t he opposi t i on part i es pursuant t o Sect i on 185-186 of t he
ConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540,andsoforth.
Thepoliticalpartysresolutionwhichbindsitsmembersisreckonedanother
mechanismprescribedbytheConstitutionsothattheexecutivebranchcanfully
functionwithoutworryingaboutsupportingvotesbeinglostorsnatchedbythe
oppositionparties,thusensuringstabilityandcontinuityofthegovernments
administration.Bydoingthis,thegovernmentwillnotstumbleliketheprevious
coalitiongovernments.Asaresult,administrativepolicyandnationaldevelopment
plan,especiallyeconomicdevelopment,lackscontinuity,andforeigninvestorsand
confidenceinnationalpolicyandcompetitivepotentialagainstforeigncompetitors
dwindles.Furthermore,generalpublicwillbeindirectlyaffected,thatis,peoplelose
confidenceandaretiredoftheadministrativeregime.Consequently,theoldpowerful
clanmayexploitthesituationbycitingthisasareasontotoppletheadministrative
regimeaswitnessedseveraltimesinthepast.
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Inprinciple,thelegislativebranchscounterbalancecontrolledbythe
executivebranchthroughthepoliticalpartyprocessasmentionedaboveisdeemed
fruitfulbothintermsofenhancementoftheexecutivebranchsstabilityand
credibilityforpoliticalparties.However,inpractice,thereareseveralconstraintsand
loopholesthatrendertheenforcementofsuchprovisionineffectiveinaccordance
withtheprincipleandintentoftheConstitution.Essentially,theConstitution
prescribesframeworksandmeasuresforoversightofexerciseofpowerofexecutive
committeeofapoliticalpartyandmembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesin
expulsionofapartymember,includingtheonewhoisandisnotamemberofthe
HouseofRepresentatives.Inthisrespect,theConstitutionstipulatesthatparty
membershipofsuchexpelledmemberwillterminateinaccordancewithSection118
(8),andtheexpelledmembercanfileanappealwiththeConstitutionalCourtin
accordancewithSection47,Paragraph3andParagraph4.Then,iftheConstitutional
Courtadjudicates that the political party that expels its member violates a
fundamentaladministrativeprincipleofthedemocracyunderconstitutional
monarchy,suchresolutionwillbenullified.Subsequently,suchexpelledparty
memberisentitledtore-applyformembershipofotherpoliticalpartywithin30days
aftertheadjudicationdateoftheConstitutionalCourt.
Eventhoughitseemslikethisprovisionisbasedonagoodprinciple
becauseexercisepowerbyapoliticalpartytoexpelitsmemberwillbemore
equitable,inpractice,howeverdeliberationwhetheraresolutionofpoliticalparty
violatesafundamentaladministrativeprincipleofthedemocracyissomewhatafar-
reachingissueandtocomeupwithaprecisedefinitionisdifficult.Also,thefactthat
theConstitutionalCourtdecidedthatthepoliticalpartysresolutionviolatessuch
principlepartiallydeemphasizestherolesandstrengthofpoliticalparties,thereby
adverselyweighingdownpoliticalpartycounterbalanceoftheexecutivebranch
againstthelegislativebranch.Forinstance,inthecaseoftheCobrafactioninthe
PrachakornThaiParty,ledbyWattanaAsawahem,whichviolatedthepartys
resolutionbygarneringvotesofconfidencefrom12membersforPrimeMinister
ChuanLeekphai,theexecutivecommitteeofthepartyandthree-fourthoftotal
PrachakornThaiMPslatervotedtoexpelall12memberswhovotedforthe
DemocratParty,therebyterminatingpartymembershipofthemembersoftheCobra
faction.Nevertheless,these12expelledPrachakornThaimembersdecidedtofilea
grievancepursuanttoSection47,Paragraph3oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomof
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ThailandB.E.2540,requestingtheConstitutionalCourttoadjudicatewhetherthe
resolutionofthePrachakornThaiPartytoterminatetheirmembershipviolateda
fundamental principle of their groups duties as a member of the House of
Representatives.ThegroupreasonedthattheyvotedforChuanLeekphai,theleader
oftheDemocratParty,foroverallinterestofthecountry,andthepeoplewantedto
chooseaknowledgeable,competent,andexperiencedleadertorestorethecountry
amidtheeconomiccrisis.Subsequently,theConstitutionalCourtadjudicatedthatthe
resolutionofthePrachakornThaiPartytoexpel12membersfromthepartyonthe
groundthattheyviolatedthepartyresolutionbysupportingtheDemocratPartywas
inbreachofthefundamentaladministrativeprincipleofthedemocracyunder
constitutionalmonarchy.
Inthiscase,suchoutcomeadverselyimpactedpotentialconductofa
politicalpartyintwoways.First,theresolutenessofapartyresolutionpursuantto
Section118(8)oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540governing
expulsionofapartymemberwhoviolatesapartyresolutiondiminished.Secondly,
membersofanypoliticalpartywillnotberespectfulorattachanyimportancetothe
partyresolutionwhichexpelsthemfromthepartybecausetheycanindependently
performparliamentarydutiesunderthefundamentaladministrativeprincipleinthe
democracy(whichisdifficulttodefineordescribepreciselywhatthefundamental
administrativeprincipleinthedemocracyentails)byadheringtotheprecedent
judgmentoftheConstitutionalCourtregardingtheCobrafactionofthePrachakorn
ThaiPartyasabenchmark.Therepercussionsonpotencyandimportanceofsuch
partyresolutionwouldcertainlytainttheintentoftheConstitutionthatdesiresto
equippoliticalpartieswithmechanismandmeasuretocontrolpartymembersto
adheretothedisciplineandruleandregulationofapoliticalparty.Generally,ifa
politicalpartycancontrolmembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,thegovernment
formedbypoliticalpartieswillthenbemorestable.
Regardingrefusaltoobeypoliticalpartysresolutionasaforementioned,
anothercasestudycanbecitedforfurtherclarification,thatis,thecensuredebate
probing15ministersintheThaksinadministrationpursuanttoSection186ofthe
ConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540during22-28May2002.After
thecensuredebatefinished,governmentcoalitionpartiesclearlyresolvedthatparty
members,whoarealsomembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,mustvoteinfavor
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ofthe15ministers.However,thefactofthematteristhenumberofvotesawardedto
eachministerdiffered,therebyindicatingthatactualvotesdidnotaccordtothe
resolutionofthegovernmentcoalitionpartiesrequiringpartymemberstovotein
favorofallministersgrilledinthecensuredebate.Basedonthisfact,theoutcome
indicatedthatsomememberoftheHouseofRepresentativesdidnotraisedtheir
handsforvoteofconfidence.Itcouldbebecauseofthepresentationofopposition
partiesorpersonaldislikeorbias.However,thefirstissuethatshouldbeaddressed
hereisifapoliticalpartyallowsmemberstodisobeythepartyspreviousresolution
withoutimposinganypenalty,andjustletbygonesbybygoneslikepartyresolution
isjustatypicalagreementwithoutanyenforceablelaw,unavoidablyresoluteness
andpotencyoftheconstitutionalprovisiongoverningpoliticalpartieswillbe
undermined.Secondly,ifmemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesdoesnotobeytoa
partyresolutionwithoutanynegativeconsequence,doesthisconstitutean
opportunityformembersofotherpoliticalpartiestofollowsuitwithoutworrying
aboutanypenaltyfromthepartyasprescribedbytheConstitution?Ifamemberofa
politicalpartywhoisamemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesandtheonewho
enactstheenforceablebilldoesnotadheretothedisciplinaryprovisoandruleand
regulationofthepartyinaccordancewiththeConstitution,suchactisnotonly
consideredlackofsupportandenhancementofthepartysstrengthandpotential,but
alsoseemslikeaninappropriateconductinaccordancewiththeintentofthe
Constitution.
Inconclusion,basedonthestudyaboutbalanceofpowerandrelationship
betweenthelegislativebranchandexecutivebranches,itwasobservedthatreal
practicesdonotaccordwiththeintentoftheConstitutionoftheKingdomof
ThailandB.E.2540.Therefore,thedraftingofanewcharterpursuanttothe
ConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailand(Provisional)B.E.2549thatdesignatedthe
ConstitutionalDraftingAssemblytopursuedraftingofanewconstitutionshould
recognizetheimportanceofbalanceofpowerandrelationshipbetweenthe
legislativebranchandexecutivebranchesbystudyingfactualinformationconcerning
practicalexperiencesandThaipoliticalsociety.Assuch,balanceofpowerand
relationshipbetweenthelegislativebranchandexecutivebrancheswillbetrulyin
accordwithadministrativeconceptoftheparliamentarysystem.
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Approaches for Solving Corruption
and Conflict of Interest
Wiitayakorn Chiangkun
Rangsit University

T houghthisresearchfocusesonconflictofinterestwhichisoneformof
corruption,discourseonapproachesforsolvingconflictofinterestproblemsmust
alsoaddresssolutionsforoverallcorruptionproblemsbecausebothtopicsare
relevantandoverlapping.Ifoverallcorruptionproblemscanbepreventedand
suppressed,conflictofinterestproblemswouldalsobepreventedandsuppressed.
Thischapterpresentsandsynthesizesacollectionofapproachesforsolving
corruptionfromexperiencesofothercountriesandrecommendationsfrom
internationalorganizations,academics,professionals,andcivicorganizations.
Regardingexperiencesofothercountries,twocountriesi.e.SingaporeandHong
Kongwerechoseasresearchsubjects.BothcountriesarelocatedinAsia,similarto
Thailand,andpresently,theyobtainhighertransparencyimagescoresthanThailand.
Ironically,over30-40yearsago,bothcountriesalsoencounteredrampantcorruption
problemsjustlikeThailand.
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1. Anti-corruption experiences of Singapore
Prior to the era of Lee KuanYiews prime ministership back in 1959,
Singaporewastroubledwithcorruptionbypoliticiansandbureaucratslikeother
Asiancountries.However,afterPrimeMinisterLeeKuanYiew,awell-educated
leaderandconsciousnessforcountrydevelopment,tookovertheadministration,the
campaignforpreventionandsuppressionofcorruptionbecameanecessitythatmust
bedoneforthesakeofeconomicandsocialdevelopmentandsurvivalofSingapore,
whichisatinycountry.Duringtheearlynation-buildingyears,Singaporemust
confrontamultitudeofproblems,forinstance,beingasmallcountrywithoutany
naturalresources;andthecitizensaremulti-racial,comprisingChinese,Malay,and
Indian.Inthepast,thecountryusedtobeapartofMalaysia,butitsplitofffrom
MalaysiabecauseofconflictsandsuspicionbetweentheChineseandMalay.
Therefore,educatedpeopleandotherSingaporeanswerehighlyconsciousofa
necessitytobuildastrongnationforsurvivalofthepeople.
TheCorruptPracticesInvestigationBureau(CPIB)ofSingaporeisastrong
independentbody.Duringtheearlyperiod,theagencycarriedoutaninvestigation
andimpeachedaministerinLeeKuanYiewadministration,butLeeKuanYiewwas
adamantdespitehavingtoloseafriendorcreateanewenemy.Onecorruptminister
committedsuicidebecauseoftheshame.Anotherministerfledprobationduringthe
investigationandsettleddowninaforeigncountrywithoutmuchhappiness.Thefact
thatSingaporehasahard-workingleaderwithsimplelifestylesandapassionfor
solvingcorruptionproblemsrenderedpreventionandsuppressionofcorruptiona
greatsuccess30-40yearslater.NowSingaporeanadministrationobtainsthehighest
transparencyscoreinAsia.
Oneanti-corruptionapproachofSingaporeiseducational development and
adjustment of salaries of politician and bureaucrat to be on par with the private
sector so that public officials can devote themselves to public works without
worrying about extra income.However,prescriptionofhighsalaryforpublic
officialsmustbedoneintandemwithdevelopmentofpublicofficialssothatthey
canfeelproudofthemselves.Improvementandoversightofefficiencyandhonesty
inthefunctionsofthreebranchesi.e.executive,legislative,andjudicialwerealso
undertakenbecauseresearchstudiesdoneinothercountriesindicatedthatraising
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salariesofpoliticianandbureaucratdoesnotalwaysreducecorruption.Moreover,if
agovernmentinanycountrywantstoraisepublicofficialssalariesashighasthose
oftheprivatesector,suchgovernmentmustdeveloppublicofficialstobeso
competentandsogoodthattheycancontributetosufficienteconomicdevelopment
somuchsothatthegovernmentisbeabletocollecttaxesandearnadequaterevenue.
Singaporecoulddoitbecausetheleadershipandpeopleareeducatedand
realizethatsolvingcorruptionisanecessityandapartofeconomicandsocial
developmentforthecountryssurvivalandgrowth.Corruptionproblemsdont
concernonlyethicsandmoralityissues.Eventhoughtheseissuesaresolved,itmight
notmakemuchdifference.Inaddition,theyalsorealizedthat to solve corruption
successfully, they must try to reform the entire bureaucratic and legal system as
well as economic and social development at the same timesuchasmakepeople
educated,providejobs,achievefairincomedistribution,introducesocialsecurity
system,andmaintainwelfareservicessothatpeoplecanattainfournecessitiesinlife
andsecuredlife.Allthesearefactorsthatwillencouragepeopletofindanhonestjob
andworkhardbecausepeoplediscernthattheseapproacheswillbenefitthemmore
thancorrupt,whichmightleadtoharshpunishmentthatisnotworthatall.Working
hardinsteadofcorruptiongivesthemhighercompensation.
Anothersuccessfulfactorisintroduction of anti-corruption law and robust
enforcement. TheCorruptPracticesInvestigationBureau(CPIB)wasdevelopedand
joinedbyknowledgeable,competent,andethicalemployeeswhoobtainhighsalary,
and it has sufficient budget tooperate efficiently. Moreover, the agency is
empoweredtoseekinformationaboutpoliticianandbureaucrataswellastheir
spouseandchildrenfrombanks,theDepartmentofRevenue,andotherconcerned
agencies;cansoliciteverypublicofficial,includinghigh-levelofficial,foraninquiry
withoutexception;andhasalawwhichmaybereferredtosothatthecourtcan
scrutinizethefactthatpublicofficialhaspersonalassetsworthmorethanownsalary
andcannotexplainthesourceofsuchassetasanevidenceofcorruption.Essentially,
thecourtcanusetestimonyofotherofficialasanevidencewithoutcharginghimas
anaccomplice.Inaddition,thecourtcanorderseizureofassetsacquiredfrom
corruption.
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With introduction of the pertinent law, it is evident that Singaporean
government intends to solve corruption problems in earnest. They dont just enact a
non-specific law and set up an anti-corruption agency which cannot work effectively
because it is not actively supported or it rarely finds an evidence to prosecute an
alleged offender.
202
Singaporean experiences should be a good case study for Thailand so that Thai
people will realize that corruption problems can be resolved and we dont have to
live with them forever.
Key factors that enable Singapore to solve corruption
successfully
1.Determinationandpoliticalwillofpoliticalleaders,especially Lee Kuan
Yiew, the prime minister of Singapore, who took the helm when he was still
young and he is an idealist with strong professional drive. Meanwhile,
Singapore was just granted independence and later split off from Malaysia.
She was a small emerging nation without natural resources, and her citizens
were multi-racial. She had to overcome various problems to efficiently
pursue economic and social development. Essentially, it was imperative to
suppress corruption for the countrys survival. Then, the Peoples Action
Party, Lee Kuan Yiews party, could promote the accomplishment by
emphasizing on continual growth in terms of economic and social
development and the distribution of wealth was rather far-reaching. For
these reasons, his party has won every election and has been the government
over 40 years till today.
2.Legislative enactment, law enforcement, and far-reaching and
comprehensiveanti-corruptionmeasurearepertinenttocurbing
necessityandopportunitiesforcorruption.Diminishingnecessity

202
Fred De La Rosa. Lee Kuan Yews Prescription For Clean Government, manila Times
August 13, 2004
Muhammed Ali. Eradicating Corruption The Singapore Experience, SeminarOn
InternationalExperiencesOnGoodGovernanceandFightingCorruption,17 Feb,
2003 Bangkok.
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connotesincreaseofsalaryandwelfareforpublicofficials,politicianand
bureaucratalike,sotheirsalariesarehighenough.Therefore,theycanmake
theirlivelihoodwithincomefromgovernmentservicesaloneandtheydont
havetogowaywardtoseekextraincome,whichisalsohighlyrisky.
Diminishingopportunitiesconnotesamendmentofthepertinentlawfor
clarityandlessambiguity,reducinginterpretationpowerofpublicofficial,
andincreasingoversightandpenaltyofcorruptioncase,especiallyagencies
whichinteractwithpeoplemostextensively;educatingandproviding
informationtothepeoplewhocooperateinopposingbriberyandare
vigilantforthestatesector.Alltheseeffortswillconvincepeoplewhothink
aboutcorruptionthatcorruptionishighlyriskyandprovidesasmallreturn;
andessentially,thereisnothingbetterthancompetinginanhonestjob.
3. Creation and development of a strong anti-corruption agency with high
capability and it is independent enough in order to work impartially
without giving exception to anyone. Thisagencywillrecruitcompetent
andethicalpeopleandgivethemahighsalary.Ithasadequatemanpower
andbudgetandsubstantialinvestigativepoweranditreportsdirectlytothe
primeminister.Atthesametime,activeoversightandseriouspenaltyare
i mposed upon t he offi ci al s so as t o prevent t hem from corrupt i ng
themselves.Inmanycountries,therearesimilaragenciesbuttheywork
underamorelimitedscopeofresponsibilities.Somecountriesalsofailed
becauseofpersonnelsqualificationsandpoliticalinterference.Most
importantly,whentheheadofthegovernmentcorrupts,hemustdwellon
othercorruptpoliticians.
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Lessons from corruption suppression in Singapore
There must be conscientious political leaders who do not want to corrupt
and do not have to dwell on other corrupt politicians or heavy investment on a
new election campaign. Theleadersmustsupportanti-corruptionunittoworktothe
fullestcapacitywithoutprotectingownrelativesorclan.Othersupplementaryfactors
mustalsobeexpedited.Forinstance,educationalreform;publiccampaigndesigned
203
ChuaCherYakDirectorCPIB,Singapore,CorruptionControl:WhatWorks?Seminar
OnPromotingIntegrityAndFightingCorruptionInGuiyang,China19-21NOV2002.
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toencouragepeopletoobtaingoodeducation;consumenewsandinformation;attend
moretopolitics;increasesalaryforpoliticalofficeholderssohighthattheydonot
needtoseekextraincomefromotherchannel;economicdevelopmentpolicymust
thoroughlyandfairlydistributeasset,income,education,andemployment;collect
inheritancetax;collectincometaxwithprogressiverate;providegoodsocialsecurity
andwelfaresystem;andinstillvaluethatadmiresandacceptsgoodpersonmorethan
richperson.
The engagement of prevention and suppression of corruption must be
done as a huge project which is comprehensive, integrative, and holistic.Itisnot
asmallprojectofwhichactivitiesaredoneseparatelyandgraduallysuchas
amendmentoflaws,setupofagency,committeeappointment,etc.Ifthisisthecase,
theprojectwillhavealimitedscopeandloopholes.Corruptionisahugeproblemso
itmustbedealtwiththroughareformofthesystemandstructure.Thereformmust
encompasslegalsystem,bureaucraticsystemandfairdistributionofassetand
income.Itisnotasmallprojectwhichdealswithsomeproblemathandsuchas
inquiry,arrest,andprosecutionofsomeexposedofficial.Theagencyshouldtracethe
evidencetotheringleaderandtrytopreventthisfromhappeningagain.Theremust
beregularevaluationofitsperformance.Itmustbeversatileandcapableof
overcomingloopholesandobstacles.
The anti-corruption agency must be highly independent, capable, and
ethical and its officials must not corrupt themselves.Itmustcarefullyrecruit
personnel,providesubstantialcompensationandwelfare,trainpersonnelfor
continualdevelopment,andhavegoodinternalauditsystemtopreventtheofficials
fromcorruptingthemselves.Ifanyofficialinthisagencycorrupts,hewillbe
punishedmoreharshlythanofficialinotherunitsanditmusthaveagoodinternal
auditsystemtopreventsuchact.Itmustbesupportedwithsufficientbudget;obtain
goodcooperationfromotheragencies;andisempoweredtoconductinvestigation
andexamineinformationfromahostofotheragenciessuchastheDepartmentof
Revenueandcommercialbanks.Recruitmentofadirectorintheanti-corruptionunit
whoisbothcompetentandethicalisdifficultandalsolinkedtodomesticpolitical
structure.SomecountrylikeSingaporeandHongKonginwhichthistypeofagency
canworkwelltendstoresultfromdirectappointmentanddirectreporttoanhonest
leaderandthedirectormustbeverydeterminedtofightcorruption.Somecountry
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placesthisagencyundertheparliament.SomecountryauthorizestheSupremeCourt
judgestoselectacandidateforthedirectorposition.Essentially,eachcountrymust
seekasuitablemethodwhichmaybedifferentfromothers.Animportantpointisthe
selectionprocessmustbetransparentandgeneralpublicmustacknowledgeand
consenttothis.Checksandbalancesareundertakenbyotheragenciesandgeneral
public.Iftheanti-corruptionunithasthepoweranditsofficialscorruptthemselves,
theunitmayhaveanofficialwhoexploitsitspowertoextort.Ifthisisthecase,the
situationwillbeevenmoreprecarious.
Opportunitiesforcorruptionofpublicofficialmustbecurtailedsuch as
reformi ng the work system of the uni t of whi ch offi ci al s have greater
opportunities to corrupt. Suchoperatingunitincludesagencythatdealswith
licenseapproval,taxcollection,finecollection,andvariouspublicservicessuchas
theCustomDepartment,theImmigrationDepartment,theDepartmentofRevenue,
theExciseDepartment,andtheNationalPoliceBureau,andsoforth.Suchreform
mayinvolveamendmentofvariouslawsandregulationssotheyaresimple,clear,
standardized,transparent,lessambiguoussothatnotmuchinterpretationisrequired.
Moreover,abatementofauthorityofofficialsindeterminingeducationprogramsand
disseminationofnewsandinformationforgeneralpublicisneededsothatpeopleare
knowledgeableoflawsandregulationsasmuchastheofficials.Thepeoplemustbe
encouragedtohelpoverseeandimprovetheoversightsystemwhichexaminesthe
officialsonregularbasis.Inaddition,itisadvisabletoreformrecruitmentand
developmentofpersonnel,andsystematicallyincreasesalaryandwelfareintandem
withintroductionofreportingandoversightsystemtokeepclosewatchonpersonal
assetsofpublicofficials,especiallyagencyofficialsandpositionswhichhave
opportunitiestocorrupteasily.Alawmustbeprescribedtorequiresubmissionof
personalassetreportonannualbasis.
Diminishingnecessityofcorruptionduetopoorsalaryandwelfareofpublic
officialsascomparedtotheprivatesector.Thisisasupplementarymeasurewhich
mustbeenforcedalongwiththeaforesaidfourmeasures.Onlyhighsalarymaynot
directlycontributetoabatementofcorruption,especiallythosewhoarefamiliarwith
corruption.However,thefactthatpublicofficialsearnlowersalarythantheprivate
sectorencouragescorruptionbypublicofficialssuchaslower-rankingpoliceofficer.
Evenpoliticalofficesorexecutivepositioninstateagenciesinmanycountriestend
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to earn less salary than management executive of a private company. If this is the
case, on one hand, the private sector can snatch well-qualified personnel to work
with them, and on the other hand, management and other officials of the state sector
must corrupt so they can maintain the same level of economic and social standing as
executive and employee of the private sector. Singapore emphasizes offering a high
salary and welfare package for public officials and consistently raising public
officials salary. The prime minister and deputy prime minister of Singapore receive
higher salary than the counterparts in other countries and so are public officials. The
fact that Singapore has been successful with economic and social development,
resulting in improved income and living standards of her citizens, and Singapore has
been known recognized as the least corrupted country in Asia can be discerned that
maintaining higher salaries for public officials is worthwhile.
204

2. Prevention and suppression
of corruption in Hong Kong
Before the High Commissioner of Hong Kong established the Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974, Hong Kong was a country which
was rife with corruption among public officials, especially the police. However, after
the government intensely conducted an anti-corruption campaign which was
spearheaded by the ICAC. Within 30 years, corruption problems has diminished
considerably as discerned from statistics derived from an attitudinal survey
concerning corruption of public officials. Based on the survey, people felt that
corruption problems have subsided and peoples attitudes towards corruption also
changed dramatically. In the past, people used to think of corruption as common and
acceptable practices, but now they feel corruption is vicious and adversely impacts
on the society as a whole. Moreover, people are more willing to report corruption
cases that they encounter and dare to expose themselves more, compared to 30 years
ago.
204
Jon S.T. QUAH Corruption in Asia with Special Reference to Singapore : Patterns and
Consequences A Paper Presented at the International Political Science Associations
Research Committee on Political Finance and Political Corruption Conference at
Managgio, Italy May 19-24,1987
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Anothersignificantchangewasthatinthepasttheprivatesectordidnotattend
toorrealizethedetrimentaleffectsofcorruptionandacceptedthatgreasemoneywas
partofbusinesses.Nowtheirattitudeshavechangedforthebetterandbetter
cooperatedwithanti-corruptioneffortsbothinsidetheirorganizationsandthestate
sector.Reportedly,anincreasingnumberofprivateenterprisesturnedupatthe
IndependentCommissionAgainstCorruption(ICAC)foradvice.In1994,theICAC
commencedacampaignonbusinessethicsand18monthslatermorethan1,800
companiesandtradeassociationsannouncedtheircodeofconductcredos.
Key successful factors of Hong Kong in prevention and
suppression of corruption
1. Problem recognition and strong determination of the government to
combat corruption
Thefirstingredientofsuccessthatrenderedanti-corruptionefforts
successfulwashigh-levelpublicofficialsrecognizedtheevilofcorruption
andweredeterminedtosolvetheseproblemsinearnestbyemphasizingthat
corruptionisastructuralproblemthatrequirespersistenteffortstosolveit
andshort-termmeasureisnotappropriate.IntheHongKongcase,theHigh
CommissionertookaninitiativetosetuptheIndependentCommission
AgainstCorruption(ICAC)whichwasdesignedtobeanindependentbody
freeofpoliticalinterventionforthetrustofthepeople.Thegovernment
pouredinabudgettoensurethatthisbodycouldworkefficientlythrough
qualityrecruitmentandscreeningofitspersonnelandhighsalaryand
welfarepackages.Theaimwastomaintainitsexistenceoveralongperiod
oftimewhichistheoppositeofshort-livedanti-corruptioncampaignin
manycountries.Suchcampaignismoreofapoliticalcampaignratherthan
sincerityinfightingcorruption.Asaresult,peopledonottrustand
cooperatewithanorganizationcreatedbythegovernment.
2. Efficient and transparent anti-corruption agency
The second fact or i s t he ICAC has a very st ri ngent pol i cy of st aff
recruitment.Itspersonnelmustbehighlycompetent,ethical,andhonest.
Despitehighsalaryandwelfarepackages,ICACofficialsmustadheretothe
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codeofconductandthebodyhasastringentinternalauditsysteminorder
todetertheofficialsfrombeingtemptedtocorruptthemselves.Insome
countries,anti-corruptionofficialsareverypowerfulandthismightbea
double-edgedsword,enticingthemtoexercisethepowerunduly,thereby
failinganti-corruptionefforts.
3. Long-term strategies and good planning
Thethirdfactoriscarefullyplannedlong-termanti-corruptionstrategies.
Thewaroncorruptionmaynotbewonwithonlyarrest,punishment,and
improvedmechanismsofthestatealone.Animportantelementisbasic
attitudesofthepeoplemustbechanged.
Theanti-corruptionstrategiesofHongKongiscombatingcorruptionon
threefrontsinintegratedmanner,encompassinginquiry,prevention,and
publiceducation.Thefirstfrontiscreationofanoperatingunitwhich
handlesinquiryoffactsbasedonreceivedinformationorfiledcomplaints.
Thesecondfrontiscreationofananti-corruptionunitwhichisdesignatedto
focusonpreventiontoreduceopportunitiesforcorruptioninboththestate
andprivatesector.Thethirdfrontiscreationofacommunityrelationsunit
whicheducatesandraisesawarenessamonggeneralpublicsothatthe
peoplerealizetheevilofcorruptionandseeksactivesupportfromher
citizens.
TheCommunityRelationsDepartment,whichemploys200staffs,was
establishedwithavisionthatpublicattitudesaboutcorruptionmustbe
changed in order to genuinely solve a complex, huge problem like
corruption.Thisunitsworksinvolveexplainingandraisingpublic
awarenessoftheanti-briberylaw,educatingstudentsinschools,and
inducingcommunityparticipationincorruptionsuppressionbyreporting
corruptioninformationorsuspiciontotheICAC.
Todoallthese,theofficialsmustdeployaspecificstrategyandwork
closelywithvariouscommunitygroupsuntiltheycangainpublictrust.The
ICACisatransparentandefficientorganizationsopeoplewillbeamain
constituentinraisingethicalstandardandreformingmanagementsystemof
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privateenterpriseswhichcanlendsupportinfightingcorruption.Another
successfulstoryoftheICACisthesuccessinturningpublicattitudesby
instillingperceptionthatbriberyofpublicofficialreinforcesunfair
competition,increaseexpense,reduceprofit,anddamagesfreeeconomy
system.
Theworksinvolvinginquiriesandpunishmentalsoplayrolesingaining
credibilityfortheICACamonggeneralpublic,inducinganincreasing
numberofreports,andgainingmorecooperationincorruptionprevention.
Thoughthesethreeoperatingunitsareresponsiblefordifferenttasks,they
cooperateandsupporteachotherbecauseeachunitssuccesscanexpedient
otherunitsworks.
4. Attention to every corruption complaint
Afactorthatwillwinpublictrustandcooperationinreportingcomplaintsis
theICACwillreceiveandfollowupeverycomplaintreportedbygeneral
public.Nomatterhowtrivialitmaybe,theagencywillreporttothepeople
abouttheprogressofsuchcomplaintaswellasensuinginquiryand
outcomesothatpeoplecanrestassuredthattheircomplaintsdonotgetlost
inthesystem.Consequently,nexttimepeoplewillbevigilantandcontinue
toreportcasestotheICAC.Eventhoughsomecomplaintmightconcern
withstateagencysinternalproblemsmorethancorruption,theICACwill
notthrowthefileintoatrashcan,butinsteadwillreferthecomplainttothe
concernedagencyforfurtherimprovement.Bydoingthis,peoplebelieve
thattheICACisanorganizationthattheycantrust.
5. Protection of complainers anonymity
ThefifthfactoristheICACwillstrictlymaintainanonymityofcomplainer.
Sincefilingcomplaintisrisky,complainermustbedaringenoughand
confidentthattheICACwillnotdisclosecomplainersidentityandputthem
inprecarioussituation.Recordingofcomplainersreportwillbesafely
storedincomputerandfilingsystemthatiswellguardedagainstdata
leakage.Onlyconcernedstaffscanhaveaccesstotheinformationandother
staffswhoarenotdirectlyinvolvedwiththecasedonotgetsuchaccess.
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Utilizedinformationwillbedestroyed.AHongKonglawalsogivesthe
righttotheICACtowithholdidentityofitsinformationsource.
6. Favorable environment
TheIndependentCommissionAgainstCorruption(ICAC)issuccessful
becauseofseveralinter-dependentfactorsthatfacilitatesuppressionof
corruption.TheHighCommissionerofHongKongpersonallyappointed
Secretary-GeneralandDeputySecretary-GeneraloftheICAC.Then,the
Secretary-GeneralappointsotherICACofficialsanddirectlyreporttothe
HighCommissionerinordertodeteranyinterferencefromotheragency,
politician,andbureaucrat.ICACSecretary-Generalnegotiatesdetailsof
annualbudgetwiththegovernmentandparliamentICACofficialsmust
adheretotheemploymentregulationofpublicofficialbuttheirworksare
fullyautonomous.
TodeterundulyexerciseofICACpower,oversightsystemintheICACis
quitestringentandICACworksfollowguidelinesoffouradvisory
committees. Members of these committees, appointed by the High
Commissioner,comefromacross-sectionofvariousgroupsinthesociety.
Moreover,thereisalsoafifthcommitteewhichcomprisesrepresentatives
fromparliamentaryadministration.Thiscommitteeisresponsiblefor
reviewingpubliccomplaintsabouttheICAC.Thechairpersonofallfive
committeesisnotICACSecretary-Generalbutisoneofthemembersinthe
advisorycommittees.Essentially,thiswillassurethatadvisorycommitteeis
trulyindependent.
AnotherfavorablefactoristhelegalsystemofHongKongsupportstheICAC
tofightcorruptionefficiently.TheICACisauthorizedtoblockassettransferby
allegedoffenderincorruptioncase;topetitionthecourttoissueanordertoprohibit
allegedoffenderfromleavingthecountry;toexaminebankaccountandsafetyvault
of alleged offender; to order alleged offender to submit detailed financial
transactions;andtosearchallegedoffendersresidence.Moreover,iftheinquirycan
betracedtootherindividual,theICACcanpursuethatindividualsothattheentire
corruptioncasecanbepiecedtogether.
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AvitaltoolprovidedbythelegalsystemofHongKongistheICACcanfile
chargeagainstpublicofficialwhohasalotofassetswhichcannotbetracedtotheir
originorenjoysanextravagantlife,notlikelyaffordablebythesalaryalone.Ifsuch
publicofficialcannotexplaintothecourthowtheseassetsareobtained,hewillbe
trialedforcorruption.ThislawassuresthatpublicofficialofHongKongwillwork
morehonestly.
205
Summary and trends
RampantcorruptioninbureaucraticcirclesofHongKong30yearsagohas
beeneliminated.However,thereisanewproblem,thatis,perplexingcorruptionin
theprivatesectorwhichrequiresapproachesbefittingwithcomplexproblemsand
morecross-bordercooperationamongvariousgovernments.ThefactthatHong
KongtransitionedfromBritishadministrationtoSpecialAdministrativeRegion
(SAR)ofChinasince1997,politicsherehasenteredanewchapter.ThoughHong
KongslegalsystemcontinuedtorecognizetheexistenceoftheICACasan
independentbody.DependingonChinasdomesticpolitics,generallycorruption
suppressioncontributestoHongKongsdevelopmentforfuturesecurityand
prosperity.Moreover,cooperationwithcounterpartagenciesinKwantungandother
regionsofChinawillalsobenefitdevelopmentofChina.Suppressionofcorruption
ofpoliticianandbureaucratwillcontinue,exceptcorruptionisrampantamongtop
brass.Nonetheless,itislikelythatHongKongsexperienceswillbeagoodcase
studyforothercountries.Eventhecountrieswheregreasemoneyisacommon
culture,thiskindofculturecanbechangedwithintensecampaign.

3. Approaches for solving corruption problems

from international organizations viewpoints
3.1 Recommendation of the World Bank
TheWorldBanksuggests thattransparent administration andgood
governanceorgoodgovernmentplaysrolesinalleviatingcorruptionproblems.
Armedwithallthese,thecountrywillenjoybettereconomicdevelopmentandmore
205
B.E.D.DESpevilleTheExperienceofHongKong,ChinainCombatingCorruption
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prosperitycomparedtocountrieswithrampantcorruption.Thecountrydesiringto
solvecorruptionproblemsshoulddothefollowings:
1.Publiclydiscloseinformationconcerningassetsandincomeofcandidates
runningforpoliticalofficeandpublicofficial,includingpolitician,
bureaucrat,militaryandpoliceofficer,prosecutor,andjudgeaswellas
spouseandchildren.
2.Publiclydiscloseinformationconcerningdonationcontributedtoapolitical
partybyindividualandcompaniesandalsopoliticalcampaignexpenses
incurredineachelection.
3.Disseminateinformationconcerningvoting,billdrafting,anddebateof
parliamentariansamonggeneralpublic.
4.Enactandoverseeenforcementofalawgoverningpreventionofconflictof
interestpragmaticallyandefficiently.Separatebusiness,politics,enactment
oflaw,andgovernmentservicesfromeachother.Also,provisionalaw
governinglobbyingofpublicofficial.
5.Discloseablacklistofcompanieswhichusedtoinvolveinbriberyin
submissionoftenderofferforgovernmentcontract.Publiclydisclose
concessionfeeofmulti-nationalcompanyofwhichbusinessesinvolveoil
andgasexploration,mining,andpublicresources.
6.Enactandresolutelyenforcealawgoverningfreedomofinformation.
Ensurethatpeoplehavethoroughandconvenientaccesstonewsand
informationofthegovernment.
7.Enhancefreedomofmassmedia,includinginternet.
8.Fiscalinformationandbudgetoffederalandlocalgovernmentmustbe
disclosedtothepublicandtransparent.Organizepublicmeetingtoinduce
participation.
9.Discloseinformationconcerningstructure,shareholdingratioandfinancial
statusofcommercialbanks.
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10.Tenderofferofgovernmentprojectmustbedisclosedandtransparent.
Peoplemustbeabletoaccesstheinformationeasilye.g.thruinternet
network.
11.Conductevaluationsurveyorattitudinalsurveyamonggeneralpublic
regardingbudgetexpenditure,goodgovernance,andcorruptionproblems.
12.Promoteaprojectaimedatupliftingtransparencyincityandprovincial
administration.Supportdisclosureofbudgetallocationforvariousprojects
andorganizepublicmeetingtogaincooperate.
206
Recommendation of the Asian Development Bank
Preventionofcorruptioninthestatesectormaybedonebyfocusingon
overcomingweaknessesinthesystemandenhancedeterminationandmoralityof
publicofficial.Forinstance,selectionmethodanddevelopmentofpublicofficial
mustbepubliclydisclosedandadministeredwithtransparency.Selectionof
personnelbasedonmeritandraisingpublicofficialssalaryconstitutessome
techniquetomotivatecompetentapplicanttoapplyforthejobandallowthese
peopletomaketheirlivelihoodwithoutinvolvingincorruption.Promotionofhigh-
levelofficialmustdwellonfairandefficientevaluationmethodandoversightto
detercronyism.
Somecountriesencourageissuanceofaclearcodeofconductforpublic
official.Forinstance,donotacceptgiftorentertainmentfromothers;donotaccept
bribeandusepublicpropertyforownbenefit.Moreover,somecountriesissuea
regulationprohibitingpublicofficialsinvolvementineconomicandpolitical
activitiestodeterconflictofinterestproblemsandpreventofficialinsomeagencies
e.g.revenueofficialandofficialdealingwithapprovaloflicensefromexercising
powerarbitrarily.Somecountriescentralizedecision-makingpowerandresorttoIT
systemsuchasinternettopromotetransparencyandreducecorruption;andintroduce
anti-moneylaunderinglaw.
Asidefromtheaforementionedanti-corruptionmeasures,anotherimportant
factoriscorruptionsuppressionmustbedoneinearnest.Forinstance,theremustbe
206
DanielKaufmann.FINANCEANDDEVELOPMENT,September2005,V.42NO.3.
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attachmentandseizureofpublicofficialsassetsallegedlyacquiredfromcorruption;
enactmentofalawgoverningprotectionofwitnesswhoshedstip-offoncorruption,
especiallylower-rankingpublicofficialswhoknowtheinformationbutmaybe
apprehensiveaboutfilingreporttotheOfficeofCounterCorruptionCommission
becausetheyfearofbeingcharged,persecutedbysuperior,orharmed.
Tobeeffectivewithcorruptionsuppression,theremustbecomplementarylaw.
Forinstance,alawstipulatingthatcommercialbankmustdiscloseinformation
concerningwithfinancialstatusandincomeofsuspectedofficialwheneverthe
CounterCorruptionCommissionrequestsandrequiringcooperationfromother
countriesincasetheofficialtransfersmoneytooverseaaccount.Tosuppress
corruptioneffectively,cooperationfrompoliceandprosecutormustalsobeobtained.
Therefore,reforminthepoliceandprosecutorsystemshouldbeontopinthethings
todolistinafightagainstcorruption.
Lastly,cooperationinkeepingwatchfuleyesoncorruptionmustbemobilized
fromcivilsociety,civicorganization,massmedia,academic,laborunion,
professionalorganizationetc.sotheycanassistinexamining,providinginformation,
andsupportingtheworksoftheCounterCorruptionCommission.Toensureeven
greatersuccessagainstcorruption,somecountriesapportionabudgettosupport
civicorganizationofwhichaimistocombatcorruption.
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Recommendation of the Center for International Private Enterprise
(1) Emphasize resolving structural problems of economic, political, and
social institutions, rather than punishing only individuals.
Inmanycountries,corruptionsuppressionwhichaccentuatesonpunishment
ofindividualpublicofficialdoesnotreduceoverallcorruptionproblems.
Suchactionoftensignifiescompromisebychoosingtosentenceonlylower-
rankingofficialorwrongdoercaughtred-handedorpublicopinionpointing
tothatofficial.Then,thereisneitheranattempttolinkthecasewithabig
fry nor improvementof the structure which opens up a channel for

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PACIFIC,2004
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corruptioninthefirstplace.Corruption is a superficial symptom of the
problem, rather than the problem itself.Thus,wemustseekasolutionto
addresstherootcauseoftheproblem,ratherthanjustcuringthesymptom.
Thereal problemsincludethefollowings:theelectionsystemrequiresa
huge i nvest ment on t he par t of pol i t i ci ans; l ack of coher ent and
unsophisticatedlaw;lackoflawwhichcanbeeasilyunderstoodoraccessed
bygeneralpublic;weaklawenforcementmechanism;inefficientstate
agency;lackofoversightandbalanceofpowersystem;privatesector
cannotinvestandcompeteonthesamelevelplayingfieldsotheymust
dwellonpublicofficialspower;publicofficialshavetoomuchpowerto
approveandpunish;peopledonothavetherightandlibertytoaccess
informationanddiscourseaboutcorruption;publicofficialsreceivepoor
salary,etc.
Inconclusion,corruptionisnotjustaproblemaboutbadguyorpeoplewith
taintedmind,butitisastructuralproblemofeconomic,political,andsocial
institutionsinnatureoraninstitutionalproblemwhichfostersandprovides
anavenueforgrowthofcorruption.Therefore,solutionstotheseproblems
liewithinstitutionalreformtoobstructandwipeoutcorruptionfrom
existence.
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(2) Encourage the pri vate sector to parti ci pate i n preventi on and
suppression of corruption of public official
Sincetheeconomicsystemispresentlyfreeeconomywheretheprivate
sectorplaysvitalrolesintheeconomicsystem,solutionstopreventionand
suppressionofcorruptionbypublicofficialrequirescooperationfromthe
privatesector.Inthepast,mostprivatesectorstendedtocooperatewith
publicofficialtogainsomebenefits.Despitebriberyandpaymentofall
sorts of commission, they think it is just one type of cost of which
consumerscanbepickedupthetabintheend.Eventhoughsomeprivate
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sectorsaretreatedunfairlyinsubmissionoftenderofferorbiddingbystate
agencies,andthegovernmentpasseslawormeasuretobenefitcompanies
ofownclan,theseprivateenterprisestendnottodisclosesuchinformation
orcryoutforjusticeinpublic.Itmightbebecausetheyhavelimitedavenue
todothatorareafraidthatiftheyexposethethieforputoutdemand,they
mightexposethemselvesasanenemyofthegovernment,leavingthem
vulnerableformorepersecution.
However,thefactthatcorruptionisboomingintheglobaleconomyinthe
globalizationerathatisintenselycompetitive,corruptionwillhavemorenegatives
thanpositivesforprivateenterprises.Monopoly, cronyism, and commission
payoff, etc. are pushing up the cost of doing business and does not promote
domestic competition to further enhance efficiency. Subsequently,private
enterprisesinthecountrywillfindithardtocompeteagainstforeignenterprises.
Furthermore,thecountrieswhichareratedasmostcorruptonesalsoshunforeign
companieswithgoodgovernmentfrominvestmentprospectsbecausetheydontlike
uncertaintiesassociatedwithextortion,bribery,andunfairtreatment.Asaresult,
domesticprivateenterpriseswillbedeprivedofopportunitiesforjointinvestmentor
potentialtransferoftechnologyandmanagementtechniquesfrommulti-national
companies.
Therefore,weshouldurgebusinessownersandmanagementofprivate
enterprisestoappreciatelong-termbenefitsmorethanshort-termonesiftheywant
t hei r busi ness t o grow heal t hi l y and acqui re capabi l i t y t o compet e i n t he
globalizationeramoreeffectively.They should collaborate to develop trade
associations and chamber of commerce to attain high professional standard for
self-control and use as bargaining with public official in order to reduce
corruption. Furthermore,theyshouldworkwithcivicorganizationsinajoint
campaignbetweenthestateandprivatesectorforpreventionandsuppressionof
corruptionbecauseintheendthebenefitswillfallintothehandsofeverybodyinthe
countryoverthelongterm.
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209
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4. Prevention and suppression
of corruption pertaining to briber
Inthepast,itwaslikelythatpreventionandsuppressionofcorruption
emphasizedbribetopublicofficial.Forinstance,seekingsolutionstoreduce
incidencesinvolvingpublicofficialtakingbribeorbenefitingownclan.Infact,
corruptioninvolvesgivingandreceivingbribe.Essentially,aprivatecompanyoffers
bribetopublicofficialtoobtainconcessionandcontractaswellasexclusiverights
whichothercompaniesarenotentitledto. Therefore, prevention and suppression
requires solutions designed to deal with bribers or private companies at the
same time.
Somecountriesresorttopunishmentorfilingchargeagainstbriber,notlimited
toonlybribe.Dutiespertainingtocontrolandchargingprivatecompaniesoffering
bribenotonlylimittoanti-corruptionagency,butstrong professional association
and chamber of commerce should also play roles in defining standard criteria
and controlling violators by expelling them from the association, reducing
membership rights, imposing boycott, levying fine, etc.Inaddition,massmedia
andcivicorganizationshouldalsobevigilantandreadytoboycottthemsocially.For
instance,disseminatinginformationandurgingpeoplenottobuygoodsandservices
fromtheprivatecompanywhoisabriber.Thegoalishowtoreducethechancefor
privatecompaniestoofferbribery.
Strategies for prevention and suppression of corruption
pertaining to briber
(1) Promote private companies to develop good corporate government or
good governancesothatcompaniescanimproveefficiencyandbecome
morecompetitiveintheglobalizationera.Thecorevalueofthecompany
withgoodgovernanceisequitability,transparency,accountability,
responsibility,andmechanismfordefininggoodrelationshipbetween
companyowner,managers,employees,andotherstakeholders.Managers
mustworkfortheinterestofthecompany,notowninterest.Company
directorsmusthavegoodjudgment.Stockholdersmustreceivedpertinent
reportontimelybasis.Theremustnotbesneakydecision-makinginorder
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topreventspendingofcompanymoneytobribepublicofficial.Forthis
issue,domesticprofessionalassociationorchamberofcommerceshould
playrolesinthedevelopment.Nonetheless,aprivatecompanymay
prescribeself-regulatedcodeofconductlikewhatinternationalchamberof
commerceisdoingforitsmembers.
(2) Improve accounting standard: Improvementofaccountingstandardand
auditingproceduresofthecompanymaybeamethodthatmakessecretive
spendingandillegitimateservicesmoredifficult.
(3) Enforce code of conduct for intermediaries such as sales agent,
distributor,exporterwhichmulti-nationalcompanymustcontactsothat
intermediariesarehonestassanctionedbytheTransparentAgentsand
ContractingEntities(TRACE),anon-profitinternationalassociation.
(4) Enforce and strengthen the anti-bribery law similartotheConventionon
CombatingBriberyofForeignPublicOfficialsinInternationalBusiness
TransactionwhichwassignedbytheOECDcountriesin1999.And
considertheBusinessPrinciplesforCounteringBriberyissuedbythe
TransparencyInternationalOrganizationandtheSocialAccountability
International(SAI).

5. Strategies for prevention and suppression

of corruption pertaining to briber
(1) Disposition of coherent commercial laws and business regulations for
ease of understanding and leaving no room for arbitrary interpretation
by public official for they can demand bribe from private company. For
instance,the NationalEntrepreneurAssociation of Ecuador held a
brai nst ormi ng sessi on among chambers of commerce, i ndust ri al
associations,theDepartmentofLabor,laborunions,stateagencies,and
NGOstocollaborateonamendmentofcommerciallawsconcerningwith
production,foreigntrade,costdetermination,andtechnologytransferto
obtainacoherentlawwhichwouldnotbeeasilyexploitedbypublicofficial.
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(2) Support bureaucratic administration with the computer system,
replacing the old document-based system.
Animportantissueisthegovernmentmustdiscloseinformationconcerning
budget,projects,andvariousworksinawebsitewhichpeoplecaneasily
accessthroughinternetnetworkatanytime.Electronicrecordingwhich
substitutesconventionaldocumentationsystemwillmakethegovernments
hidingofinformationmuchmoredifficult,thusreducingachancefor
corruptionandsavingdocument-relatedexpensesandstoragecost,
improvingspeedandefficiency.Intheend,thecountrywillhaveincreased
budgetforotherpublicinterest.
(3) Reform tax system for better simplicity and clarity
Oneofthegovernmentsproblemsisseekingtaxcollectionschemesthat
yieldmaximumrevenue.However,complicatedtaxcollectionschemestend
tohandpowertothetaxevaluator,andtaxcollectionatahighrateinduces
corruptioninordertoexemptorevadetaxpayment.Consequently,money
goestothepocketsofpublicofficialandprivatecompanymorethanthe
public.Inthemeantime,theprivatesectorismotivatedtopaybribetoevade
taxcollectionbecausetheyareafraidthattheircostwouldbehigherthan
competitorsortheysimplydonotwanttopaytaxtoomuch.
Byreformingthetaxsystemforsimplicityandclarityandavoidingtax
paymentatahighrate,itisanticipatedthattaxevasionandcorruptionwill
bereducedandthegovernmentwilloptimizetaxcollection.
Thereformofthetaxsystem,boththefederalandlocalizedsystem,should
attendtoopinionsoftheprivatesector.Thestatesectortendstoforman
attitudelikepolicecatchingathiefandperceivesthatprivatecompanies
alwaystrytoevadetaxes.Thus,thegovernmentdesignsacomplicatedtax
systemtoplugallloopholesbut,infact,complicated tax system does not
only plug loopholes but also creates opportunities for corruption.
The arrangement of brainstorming meeting with the private sector
concerningtaxsystemreformwillencouragemodernmanagerswhoknow
allthefactstorecommendreformofthetaxsystemreformwhichismore
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pragmaticthanacademicsmullingoveraplanintheoffice.If the reform
produces a tax system which is coherent and comprehensible and does
not impose too high rate. For instance, levying tax of a small company
at the same rate, instead of using public official as a tax assessor. By
doing this, private companies will rather pay taxes straightforward
than paying under-table money, whichsometimesishigherandthe
paymentdoesnotgotothetreasury.Themeetingattendedbytaxauthority
andtheprivatesector,especiallylocalbusinesses,willconvincepeoplethat
everybahtandsatangoftaxcollectionissomethingthatgeneralpublic
shouldensurethatitisusedformaximumbenefits.
(4) Make business registration and engagement easier so that applicant
does not have to seek a special channel, thus stifling public official from
corrupting like before.
Withburdensomeandcomplicatedbusinessregistrationandinefficient
conductofpublicofficial,investorshavetowastealotoftime.Iftheydont
bribe,theirworkwillbedelayed.Forthatreason,somebusinessesoptto
stayoutsidethesystembecausetheydonotwanttogothroughcomplicated
registrationprocess.Thesebusinessesmustpaybribeandillegitimatetax,
insteadofpayingtothecentralauthority.The reform of commercial laws
pertaining to registration, business engagement, labor law, and other
pertinent laws for simplicity and coherence and so that the steps are
reduced and the private sector does not have to pay tax at a very high
rate. As a result, corruption will be reduced substantially.
(5) Reform of the oversight system that controls private companies
Theoversightsystemusedtocontrolprivatecompaniesgivestoomuch
authoritytopublicofficial.Forinstance,theycanordershutdownof
businessfoundtobeviolatingregulation.Inthissituation,publicofficial
hasmoreopportunitiestocorrupt,anditisunlikelythatprivatecompanies
willcomplywiththeregulation.Sometimesadherencetoregulationis
burdensomeandmorecostlythanbribery.Somesolutionsareamending
regulationssotheyaremorecoherentandcomprehensible,educatingand
disseminatinginformationtoprivatecompaniesandgeneralpublic.
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Consequently,theywillrealizethatadherencetoregulationisnecessaryand
beneficialtothepublicanditisalegitimatewaytoconductandimprove
business,insteadofresortingtobribery.
BasedontheexperiencesofsomeEuropeancountries,politicians,public
officials,privatecompanies,academics,organizations,andcompany
employeeswereinvitedtoattendmeetingsaimedatreformingtheoversight
systemusedtocontrolprivatecompanies.Bydoingthis,theauthoritycan
formulate oversight approach overseen by concerned officials and
potentiallyreducecorruptionandtheneedtorecruitahugenumberofaudit
staffs.
(6) Reform of the custom system
Theburdensomeandcomplicatedcustomsysteminducescorruptionand
smugglingofimportedandexportedgoodstoevadeduties.Thegovernment
tendstodealwiththeseproblemsbyaddingnewruleandregulationaswell
asauditofficial.However,theseeffortsproducelittlesuccessbecausethey
givemoreopportunitiesforpublicofficialtocorrupt.Thesolutionswould
betoreformthecustomsystemsuchaspermissionforexportingand
importinggoods,reducingstepsinthedutypaymentprocess,makingthe
dutysystemsimpleandcoherent,notlevyingtoohighdutyrate,and
exemptingdutyofsomebasiccommodityorinconjunctionwiththefree
tradeagreementswithothercountries.
ThemanagementsystemoftheCustomDepartmentshouldbereformedfor
deploymentofqualitypersonnelandtoolsandequipment,transparent
administration,stringentoversightsystem,bettersalaryandwelfare
packages,andincreaseworkmotivationforofficials,etc.Basedonthe
experiencesofYugoslaviawhichheldaseminartoreformthedutysystem
andtheCustomDepartmentsoperations,reportedlytheycouldreduce
corruptionandenhanceefficiencyofexportandimport,andallthese
contributetofurtherdevelopmentofthecountry.
(7) Reform of other state agencies
TheexamplesofthereformoftheCustomDepartmentandthedutysystem
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shouldbeappliedwithotherstateagencies.Opportunitiesforcorruption
happenbecauseofweakservicesysteminorganization,lackofinitiatives,
andlackofappreciationfororganizationaldevelopment.Thereform
measureforstateagenciesshouldincludeenforcementofcodeofconduct,
transparentrecruitmentandworkevaluationofindividualofficial,oversight
systemusedtoexamineworksregularly,salaryadjustmentfortheofficial,
enactmentofalawrequiringpublicofficialtofilepersonalassetreport,
recruitingcompetentandethicalofficial,andsetupofanindependentanti-
corruptionbody.
(8) Ref orm of concessi on grant i ng syst em and t he government s
procurement system
The l aws concer ni ng concessi on gr ant i ng and t he gover nment s
procurementdwellonopened,transparentbiddingprocesswhichmustfully
discloseinformationaboutvariousstepsandconditionstogeneralpublic.
ReformmeasurestrialedbyBrazilentailedannouncementofcoherent
biddingcriteriatogeneralpublic;curbingdecision-makingpowerofthe
authority;definingmorecoherentdecision-makingpowerofthestatesector;
fosteringcompetitionamongbidders;prescriptionofbroaderreviewcriteria
forbidders;prohibitingpublicofficialinrevokingsomeconditionsfor
bidders,exceptinarealemergencycase;andenactmentofalawgoverning
deterrenceofcollusionamongbidders.InColumbia,thegovernment
campaignedtosolicitcollaborationamongprivatecompaniestocreatefair
biddingcompetition,insteadoffightingtoofferbribery,therebycreating
highcostandcompromisingpublicinterest.

6. Overall strategies for combating corruption

(1) Raise public consciousness acknowledging that corruption has
detrimental effects and the country needs to resolutely deal with these
problems
Inessence,publicofficialsandprivatecompaniesorgeneralpublicdonot
realizethatcorruptionhasdetrimentaleffects.Somepeoplediscernthat
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puttingalittlegreasewillhelpthejobcompletedfaster,andintheendthe
authorityandprivatecompaniesasawholewillreceivebenefitsandthe
economywillprosper.Somepeoplethinkcorruptpoliticianiscommonand
ifsomeonecangrowtheeconomy,itisquiteacceptable.Withmodern
corruptionpracticeslikeadministrative-levelcorruptionorillicitgainfrom
conflictofinterestinvariousprojects,itisevenmoredifficultforpeopleto
realizethatthisisaformofcorruptionwhichisverydamagingtothe
societyintermsofadvantagesgainedbyahandfulofpeople,inefficient
competitionintheeconomy,lackofjustice,andlessdemocratizationin
politics.
Therefore,disseminationofinformationandraisingpublicawarenessby
activelyorganizingpaneldiscussiononcorruptionproblemsarecrucial
methodsinmobilizingeveryonessupportinmorepotentpreventionand
suppressionofcorruption.
(2) Promote freedom of journalists and enhance their investigative
capabilities for presentation of in-depth corruption report
Thelegislativereformwillguaranteefreedomofjournalists,allow
journaliststowithholdidentityoftheirsourceofinformation,andstipulate
thatcriticalcommentsaboutpublicofficialdoesnotconstitutecriminal
offence.Journalistsmayavoidalibelchargefiledasacivilcaseby
reportinghowcorruptiondamagestheeconomyandsociety,insteadof
zoominginonindividuals.InLatinAmerica,qualityofinvestigativenews
reportingwasupliftedthroughasetupofaregionalorganizationcalled
JournalistAgainstCorruption(PFC).InSoutheastAsia,theCenterfor
MediaFreedomandResponsibility(CMER)wasestablishedwitha
headquarterlocatedinthePhilippines,anditsobjectiveistodisseminate
informationtothepublicaboutcorruptioninsixSoutheastAsiancountries,
includingThailand.

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7. Measures for prevention and suppression
of corruption in Thailand
Theresearcherwillsummarizetheconceptspertainingtopreventionand
suppressionofcorruptionsuggestedbyacademicsandvariousorganizationsfirst,
andwillthenpresentasummaryoftheresearchersconceptsinthenextchapter.
7.1 Recommendation of the working group of NGOs or
thaitopic.com
(1)Publicdisclosureofinformationaboutgovernmentagenciesandlocal
administrativeorganizations,especiallyconcerningwithbudget,concession
project,procurement,recruitmentofpersonnel,etc.
(2)Enforcementofanti-corruptionlawsandempowermentorstrengthening
agencieswhichoverseepreventionandsuppressionofcorruptionsothat
theycanoperateindependently.
(3)Propellingenactmentoflawsthatplayrolesinreducingcorruptionsuchas
anactgoverningimpositionofpropertyandinheritancetaxeswhichlevya
progressivetaxrate.So,thosewithalotofpropertiesandhighincomewill
fallinahightaxbracket.
(4)Fosteringmoralisticboldnessindisclosing,uncoveringunscrupulous
schemesandcorruptiontechniquesalongwithenforcementofinformant
andwitnessprotection.
(5)Impositionofharshersentenceandpenaltiesforcorruptauthorityand
extensionofarelevantprescriptionsothataninquirycanbeprolonged
further(notinterruptedaftertheexpiryof20-yearprescription).
(6)Reformofeducationandmassmedia,aimingatchangingattitudesand
perceptionfromrespectingthosewhohavealotofassetsorpowerto
respectingethicalindividuals.
(7)Creationofsomemechanismforpublicparticipationinoversightofa
projectsuchasorganizingpublichearingonaproject.
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(8)Prescriptionofcodeofconductandfosteringenforcementofprofessional
codeofconductinboththestateandprivatesector.
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7.2 Recommendation of Professor Prawes Wasi
(1) Set up an independent inquiry committee.Inothercountries,whenpublic
officialiscomplainedofcorruption,anindependentinquirycommitteewill
besetup.Protectionorappointmentofgovernmentproxiestoparticipatein
aninquirywillnotsolvetheproblem.WhentheChuanadministrationwas
taintedwithcorruptionallegationintheMinistryofPublicHealth,initially
therewasanintentiontoappointaninspector-generalintheministryasthe
chairpersonofthescrutinycommittee,butthisactionwouldbepointless.
Later, Chuan appointed Banlu Siripanit M. D. to chair the scrutiny
committee,andtheoutcomewassomethingelsebecausethealleged
ministerwasjailed.Sinceadministrativeandpoliticalstructureofthe
countryareauthoritarian-oriented,ifcorruptionaccusationspopuphereand
there,theprimeministercannotcoverupallofthembyhimself.Itwouldbe
abigwasteoftime,andpeoplewillnotbelievehim.So,anindependent
inquirycommitteeshouldbesetup.
(2) Foster freedom of mass media in oversight: Aresearchfundformass
mediashouldbeestablishedtocoverexpensesofreportersincurredfrom
informationgathering.Whilstthoseinpowertrytoobstructandinterfere
massmedia,thesocietyshouldsupportmovementstoreinforcemassmedia
ineverypossibleway,whetheritbemoralsupport;orsocial,intellectual,
andfinancialresources.Generalpublicshouldpourdonationintheresearch
fundformassmedia,therebyformingsocialpowerinvolvingincorruption
inquiry.Themostpotenttoolincorruptiondeterrenceismassmediawhich
areautonomous,daring,andsubjectedtoexamination.
(3) Get out of the authoritarian structure:Itisimpossibleforthosewith
absolutepowertodonowrong,butauthoritarianstructurewilldefinewhat
tofollow.Oncedrawnintothedeadly structure,thoseusedtobeagood
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Modifed/augmented from the article titled Genesis of Corruption, written by a working
groupofWWW.THAITOPIC.COM/CORRUPT.
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personmaybedefamedandloseallthevirtues.Inthecomplexsociety,
exerciseofpowernotonlysolvesproblems,butensuingproblemswill
occurinachainreactionandthoseinpowerwillbedrawnintothedeadly
structure.Duetootherforcefulpowers,whencomplexanddifficultsocial
issuesaredealtwith,socialandintellectualspacesmustbeexpanded
extensively.Then,interrelationshipamongvariousorganizationsmustbe
arrangedasanticipatedbythesociety,primarilybackeduptheconstitution.
If this is the case, those in power can remove themselves from the
authoritarianstructureorcorruptivestructure.
(4) Revolution of conscience and virtue: Thecorruptioncrisisisapartofa
largercrisis,thatis,crisisofethics,startingfrommoralindignationwhich
propelsdevelopmentbygreed,whichissimilartothewordmoha-phum
usedinPhra Maha Chanok,thebookwhichwasauthoredbyHis
Majesty. Moha-Phumortheessenceofindignationgivesrisetothe
city of ignorance.Thecityofignoranceconnotesasocietytroubledby
crisisofmorality.Mostpeopleregardself-interestasutmostimportance;
whoeverwantstograsp,justgrasp;whoeverwantstocheat,justcheat;
whoeverwantstotakeadvantageofchildren,women,underprivileged
person,willdoit.Moreover,suchsocietypromotesgamblingandother
formsofvice;destroysenvironment,culture,andvirtues,alldeedsarefor
themoney.Thedevelopmentcomesaboutbyworshipping money.
Whilstthereligionteachespeoplethatfrugalityisvirtuousandself-
sufficiencyismoralistic,currentdevelopmentencouragespeopletospend
more,consumemore,usemobilephonemore,andsendmoreSMS.Theaim
istoemptypeoplespockets.Thedesiretoattainabsolutepowercomes
fromgreed,sinfuldeeds,orsourcesofallthewickedness,thatis,greed,
indignation,andfoolishness.Greedconnotesmoney;indignationconnotes
power;andfoolishnessconnotesself-will.Whenthesocietyisdrivenby
sinfuldeeds,wecannotescapefromcrisisofmorality.Thecorruptioncrisis
isapartofcrisisofmorality.Todetachourselvesfromcorruptioncrisisand
othermajorcrisis,wemustinstigatearevolutionofconsciencewhichwill
leadtoarevolutionofvirtue.Withoutmorality,howcanwesolveany
problems?Notonlywecannotsolvethem,theproblemswillgeteven
worse.
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ProfessorPrawesWasiconcludedthatCurrent,therevolutionofconscienceor
implantationofanewconscienceisquiteabigtrendintheworldwhichisgrowing
gradually.Toimplantanewconscience,theprocessisnotpainfulatall.Onthe
contrary,itwillbringenormoushappinessandrapportwhichwilleventuallyleadto
peacefulcorruption-existence.
Thenewconscienceandmoralisticawarenesswilltakeusoutofthestructure
whichcausescorruptionandmoralcrisis,andwilleventuallyleadtoanequitable
andpeacefulsociety.
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7.3 Recommendation of other academics
Prof. Dr. Preedee Kasemsup, formerrectorofThammasatUniversityand
guestlectureroftheFacultyofLaw,ThammasatUniversity,proposedaconceptina
discoursetitledCorruption A Social Problem.Anexcerptofsuchconceptisas
follows:
Corruptionismoremeaningfultothegovernmentthanthebusiness
becausethebusinesshasaclearsenseofownershipbutthegovernmentisnotowned
byasingleindividual;onlypeopleownthegovernment.Inthedemocraticsystem,
wehavetodependonthelegislativebranchforoversightofcorruption.However,
todaythelegislativebranchisalameduckandshutoutcompletely.
So,wemustfigureoutwhattodotoarousepublicinterestsoeveryoneis
vigilantofcorruptionproblems.Wecannothopethatall70provinceswillbethe
same,butBangkokshouldsetanexamplebecausemostuniversitiesarecluttered
there.Therefore,Iwouldliketoinstigateallthemassesinuniversitiestoclosely
attendtocorruptionproblems.Thosewhoareuniversitylecturersshouldnotattend
toteachingorseekknowledgeforownbenefits,butyoumustcontributeyour
knowledgeasacontributiontothesociety.Sincethesocietyisdisorientedand
worshiptherichwithoutbeingmindfulhowhegetsrich.
Ifwemakepeopleconsciousthattheycanmakeownlivelihoodwithout
relyingonothers,withoutadesiretogetrich,andtheycanjustbeself-sufficient.

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PrawesWasi,CorruptionKarmaofAbsolutePowerSearchfromtheinternetatWWW.
GOOGLE.CO.THbyenteringakeywordPrawesWasi.
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Andifwecanconvincethemthatcastingvotesinapollingstationisadefining
momentforthecountrysdestiny;politicsisnotonlyaboutpower,butitalso
concernswithmoralityoragoodsocietyconnotesavirtuoussociety;andcorrupt,
unscrupulouspersonisnotadmirable,corruptionproblemswillthenbesubsided.In
theend,noonewillbeabletouseauthoritariansystemwithpeople.
Universitiesmusttaketheleadinimplantingthesevaluesinthesociety.This
eraisdemocracy.Lecturersandteachers must notbe wearied of speaking.
Sometimeswhenyouspeak,youmightbeconsideredasanagitatorandtraitor.But,
indemocracy,wemustlistentoopposingviewpointsofotherpeople.Also,wemust
recognizethatpoliticallyeveryoneisequalandentitledtotherighttoexpress
differentopinions.
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Prasit Piwawattanapanit,alecturerattheFacultyofLaw,Thammasat
University, wrote an article titled International Law and Measures for
Prevention and Suppression of Corruption,andgavesomeadviceforThailand
asfollows:
Asidefromcompliancetovariousmeasuresproposedbyinternational
organizationsliketheUnitedNationsandWorldBank,thegovernmentshould
prepareabillgoverningprotectionofpublicofficialwhogivesinformationandlead
pertainingtoundueexerciseofpowerorcorruptionofpublicofficialinthesame
agency.Forinstance,insomecountriesliketheUnitedStates,thereisalawcalled
Whistle Blower Act (alawgoverningprotectionofwitnesswhoactsasan
informantoncorruptionofthoseinpowerinanorganization)anddispositionof
codesofconductineveryagencies.Inessence,wemayfollowguidelinesofthecode
ofconductpreparedbytheInternationalCodeofConductforPublicOfficialsin
1996.
Thaigovernmentshouldinitiatedispositionofaninternationalagreementor
organizeaninternationalconferenceinaworkshopformatforparticipationof
governmentrepresentatives,academics,andNGOsfromASEANcountries
pertainingtocooperativemeasuresforcombatingpreventionandsuppressionof
corruption.
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WWW.THAIINSIDER.COM5August2005
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Furthermore,corruptionindexshouldbecreated.Presently,therearemany
methodsliketheCorruptionPerceptionIndex(CPI)whichisencouragedbythe
TransparencyInternationalwhichdirectlymonitorscorruptionorthesurvey
techniqueproposedbytheWorldBankaswellastheVictimizationMethodology
which is a methodology for data collection of individuals who have direct
experienceswithpublicofficialrequestingabribeorcorruptofficial.
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Conclusion
Theexperiencesevolvingaroundanti-corruptionschemesbypowerful
prevent i on and suppressi on organi zat i ons i n Si ngapore and Hong Kong,
recommendationsfromWorldBank,AsianDevelopmentBank,theCenterfor
InternationalPrivateEnterprises,andanumberofThaiacademicsreflectthatthere
arevariousapproachesandmeasuresthatcanbeappliedforfruitfulpreventionand
suppressionofcorruptionandconflictofinterestinThailand.Currently,Thaisociety
hasconsiderableopeneddebateandcriticismaboutwhosdonewhatandwhere
theyvedoneit,butpresentationofconcreteinformation,recommendations,and
problem-solvingapproachesisquitelimited.Theseinformationshouldbefurther
digestedanddisseminated.Sinceonefactorthathasavitalbearingonprevention
andsuppressionofcorruptionispublicawarenessofpertinentnewsandinformation,
realizationofpotentialdamages,andchangesofattitudes.Insteadoflettingallthese
driftalongthemainstream,weshouldcollaborateinincreasedsurveillanceand
oversightactivitiesforpreventionandsuppressionofcorruption.

213
PrasitPiwawattanaphanit,InternationalLawandMeasuresforPreventionand
SuppressionofCorruption,Matichon daily newspaper,12October2004,page7
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Dynamics and Problems
of Constitution-making in
Asia and Beyond
Prof. Andrew Harding
214

Democratic constitutions do not guarantee democracy the

reform process can often be (at least) as critical as the final
constitutional or institutional blueprints.
215

214
ProfessorofAsia-PacificLaw,UniversityofVictoria,BritishColumbia,Canada.This
paperisgivenaspartoftheprojectLaw,GovernanceandtheConstitutioninThailand,
directedbyProfessorPeterLeylandandmyself,forwhichseehttp://www.law.uvic.ca/
seals/lgcrt.htm.
215
Bastian,S.andLuckham,R.,Can Democracy be Designed? The Politics of Institutional
Choice in Conflict-Torn Societies (LondonandNewYork:ZedBooks,2003),304,316.
35Pp.3,9.
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Introduction
I nthispaperIwishtodiscussinbriefasubjectwhichisoftenmentionedbut
rarelyanalysedinanydetail-theprocessesofconstitution-making.InThailand2007
willseeanotherepisodeinalongtraditionofconstitution-makingprocessesgoing
backto1932.Giventhatanysuchprocessisboundtobecontroversial,itisusefulto
seehowothercountrieshaveapproachedthetaskandwhatcanbelearnedfromthem
aswellasfromThailandsownpreviousexperiences.Letmebeclearthatthispaper
doesnotattempttoaddressthedistinctquestionofwhatthenewconstitutionshould
looklike,orwhatrulesorinstitutionsaregoodones,whichisfartoolargeand
complexaquestiontopursuehere.Nonetheless,thepaperdoesrecognisethatin
practiceviewsoftheappropriatecontentoftheconstitutionareinsomewaybound
toaffecttheprocessbeingundertaken:thecausallinkisinpracticeunavoidable.
Oneobviouspoint,lookingatthedevelopmentofconstitutionalisminthe
worldgenerally,isthatmostoftheworldscurrentconstitutionsweredrafted
recently,duetotherapiddiffusionpost-1990ofmulti-partydemocracy,liberal-
democraticideals,andrule-of-law-basedinternationaldevelopmentpolicyand
assistance.Whilethisfactshouldmeanthatthereisadequateevidenceavailableto
drawsomeconclusions,itappearsthattherehasbeensomuchconstitution-making,
andsomuchconcernwiththesubstanceofconstitutions,thatlittleresearchhasbeen
doneontheprocessesofconstitution-making.Thisisparadoxical,sincepresumably
thebetterwecanmakeourprocessesofconstitution-making,thebetterwillbethe
constitutionsproduced.Currentlywedonothaveanyestablishedtheoryastowhat
processesarebetterthanothers,orwhatpitfallsaretobeavoided,orwhethereach
processisboundedbytheparticularpoliticsorjurisprudenceorcultureofthesociety
inquestion.Currentpracticeappearstobebasedonthenotionsthataspecial
representativebodydistinctfromparliamentisadesirablebodyfordraftinga
constitution,andthatagreatdealofpublicparticipationisdesirable,andalsoa
referendumtolegitimisethedraft.Itisnotquiteclearthatthetermconstitution-
makingprocessappliestoonetypeofexerciseorseveraldifferentones,(for
exampledoesitapplytomajorrevisionoracompleterewrite),orthattheprocesses
aredesignedtoanswerpreciselythesamequestionoreventypeofquestion,given
thatconstitutions,whilebroadlyservingthesamepurpose,oftendealwithpurely
localproblemssuchaswhatroletogivetotraditionalrulers,howtostopcorruption,
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orhowtoprovideforequalrepresentationofdifferentethnic,religiousorlinguistic
groups.Aswewillseebelow,
35
inthePhilippinesamajorchange(referredtoas
cha-chaorcharterchange)fromapresidentialtoaparliamentarysystemisthe
subjectofthereportoftheNationalConstitutionalConsultativeCommission,which
hasalsoexaminedeconomicpolicyquestions.Bycontrast,PeterLeylandhassetout
thewaysinwhichdiscreteprocesseshavebroughtaboutlargeconstitutionalchanges
intheUK.
216
AndinKenyathecomprehensivedraftproducedbytheConstitutional
ReviewCommission,basedonpublicconsultation,hasactuallybeenrejectedina
referendum,
217
afatewhichtheEUConstitutionhasalsomet.
Afurtherproblemisthatconstitution-makingprocessesareobviouslyhighly
political,itbeing(Ithinkreasonably)assumedthatthosewhohavemostcontrolover
theconstitution-makingprocessaremostlikelytohavetheirinterestsprotectedand
theiragendasfulfilledintheendproducttheconstitutionitself.Itisofcoursealso
truethatthepoliticsofsuchprocessesaredeeplyintertwinedwiththeongoing
generalpoliticalnarrative,sothatitseemsunavoidablethattheconstitutionwillin
somesensereflectthepoliticsofthemomentevenasanattemptisbeingmadeto
providerulescontaininganddirectingthepoliticalprocessesofthefuture;this
probablyexplainsaparadoxicaloutcomeinKenya.
218
Thismaywellbeaproblem
whererapidpoliticalchangeissought;butexperiencetendstoconfirmthat
constitutionalchange,ofitsverynature,tendstoreflectratherthandirectsocial,
economicandpoliticalchange.
Onefundamentalissuewhichhasabearingonallofthesepointsiswhether
constitution-makingisatechnicaltaskforexperts,orapoliticalandideally
participatoryexerciseforallcitizens?Whiletheanswertothisisprobablyclearly
thatitisprofoundlyboth,thequestionstillrequiresustothinkabouthowthese
processesshouldbestructuredandhowbothlegitimacyandefficacycanbecaptured
atthesametime.
216
Leyland,P.,ConstitutionalProblemsandConstitutoinalReform:theUK,Thailand,
andtheCaseforPreservationaswellasChange,GeneralSession,KPIVIIIthAnnual
Congress,2006.

217
FortheConstitutionofKenyaReviewCommission,seehttp://www.kenyaconstitution.org/
docs/06ad082.htm.

218
Seeabove.
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The Legal Basis of Constitution-making Powers
Oneissueinconstitution-makingisworthconsideringfirst,becauseithas
implicationsforthelegitimacyoftheconstitutionaloutcome:whohastherighttolay
downwhattheconstitution-makingprocessshouldbe?
Herethereisalegalconundrum,becausewhile,bydefinition,constitutional
powersarelaiddownbytheconstitution,thereis,againbydefinition,inthisinstance
noconstitutiontodefinewhatthosepowersmightbe.Anexceptiontothisisof
coursethecasewheretheexistingconstitutionprovidesforitsown replacement
219
byacertainprocess,ashappenedwhenthe1997ConstitutionofThailandemerged
fromaprocesslaiddowninthe1996amendmentstothe1991Constitution.
220
One
cansayinthiscasethatthenewconstitutionisbornfromthewomboftheold
constitution,andthatalineoflegalityextendsthroughconstitutionaldevelopment,
justasgenespassfromonegenerationtothenext.In2006,however,(asopposedto
1997)thisappearsonthefaceofitnottobethecase,asthe1997Constitutionwas
abrogatedon19September2006andreplacedwithanInterimConstitution,creating
ineffectalegalrevolution.However,aswewillsee,thepositionismorecomplex
thanthat.
Constitution-makingpowersarethereforeintheordinarycaseinsomereal
senseextra-constitutional,orevenpotentiallyinasenseunconstitutional.The
powertodecidewhattheconstitution-makingprocessshouldbeisapowerwhich
liesattworemovesfromtheconstitutionitself:weneedfirstsomeonetodecidewhat
theprocessshouldbetolaydownthetermsofreferenceoftheconstitution-making
bodyorbodiesandtoactuallyputitortheminplace,andtheproceduretobe
219
Idonotconsiderherethecaseofconstitutionalamendment,wheretheprocessis
alreadyprovidedbytheconstitution.Evenhere,theprocessmaybeinadequatetocaterfor
major changes. See, further, Harding, A. J. , The Creation andAmendment of
ConstitutionalNorms:aComparison,ch.17ofAndenas,M.(ed),The Creation and
Amendment of Constitutional Norms(London:UKNCCL,2000).
220
BowornsakUwanno,ThePoliticalReformProcessandtheMakingofthePeoples
Constitution(KPIResearchPaper),http://www.kpi.ac.th/en/kpi03-1-res-03.asp;Harding,
A.J.,MayTherebeVirtue:NewAsianConstitutionalisminThailand,[2001]
AustralianJournalofAsianLaw24-48.
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followed;andsecondly,weneedsomeonetoactuallycarryoutthoseinstructions
faithfullyandconscientiously.Theimportanceofthisisverygreat,becausethe
legitimacyofthenewconstitutionitselfwilldependonhowitwasdrafted,by
whom,andonwhatbasis.
Thereappeartobebroadlytwodifferenttypesofsituationthatmaybe
involved.Oneiswherethepowerbeingexercisedisconstituentratherthan
constitutional.Hereweenvisageabodywhichexistsbyvirtueofprecedent,
tradition,oractualhistoricalconstitutionalauthority,andhasongoing,ifinfrequently
exercised,powertolaydowntheconstitution.Theformthatthisconstituentpower
mighttakewilldiffer.InAfghanistan,forexample,thereisaLoya Jirga,whichhas
metninetimes,mainlyatpointsofconstitutionalchange,inthelast80years;itmay
beasmuchas1000yearsold.ThepresentConstitutionwas,andIwouldarguehad
tobe,laiddownorapprovedbyaLoya Jirga.IntheUnitedKingdomParliamentis
supremeandthereforecanmakeconstitutionalchanges,includingtheredefinitionof
Parliamentitself,asoccurredin1707whentheScottishandEnglishParliaments
merged.Againthispowerhasbeenexercisedformanyhundredsofyears.In
Germanytheconstitutionissupposedtobeentrenched,butalsoenvisagesthatthe
exerciseoffreewillofthepeoplecouldreplaceit.
221
Theothertypeofsituationisonewecancallarevolution.Heretheterm
revolutionmeansalegalrevolutionwhichmayormaynotbeaccompaniedby
force.InCeylonin1972itwasdecidedtocreatedeliberatelyalegalrevolutionto
expressade-couplingoftheconstitutionfromcolonialhistory,whereeventhename
ofthecountrywaschangedtoSriLanka.ThesamethingoccurredintheRepublicof
Ireland,whenanewconstitutionwasde-linkedfromtheBritishCrownandaffirmed
byplebiscitein1937.InthePhilippinesin1986PresidentAquinodeclaredshewas
Presidentbythewillofthepeople,notundertheprovisionsofMarcosself-serving
amendedconstitutionof1973,andthustherewasalegalrevolution.InSouthAfrica
apoliticalprocessderivingfromthereleaseofNelsonMandelalaiddownthe
principlesandprocedurefornewinterimandpermanentconstitutionsin1993and
1996,butthisprocesswaslegallyarevolution;oneinterestingfeaturewasthatthe
ConstitutionalCourtwasgivenpowertoruleontheconstitutionalityofprovisions
ofthedraft permanent constitution.

221
Art.146,BasicLaw.
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Moreusually,thereisanactualmilitarycoupwhichdispenseswiththe
constitutionbytheuseofforce.Lawyersusuallyanalysethisbysayingthattherehas
beenashiftinthe grundnorm orbasiclaw.
222
Accordingtothisview,alegalsystem
cannotultimatelysimplydependonlaw.Touseananalogy,aweighingmachine
cannotweighitself.Thegrundnorm isthusabasiclegalnormwhichfunctionsalso
asasetoffacts,andthereforefacestwoways,beinginasensebothlawandfact.If
weweretoapplythistothe19Septembercoup,wemightsaythatthegrundnormis
t o t he effect t hat t he const i t ut i on may be l ai d down by popul ar assent as
acknowledgedbytheKingwhenheaffirmedthecoupandtheInterimConstitution.
Thisfunctionsasfactbutalsoaslaw,orasanormwhichisthebasisoflaw.Ifone
looksatthePreamblestothe1991and1997Constitutions,itisclearthatthatthese
ConstitutionsweregrantedbytheKing:
In 1991 the King was (in English translation of the 1991 Preamble)
graciouslypleasedtoproclaimthatHewasadvisedbytheNational
LegislativeAssemblythatsincethegrantoftheConstitutionofthe
KingdomofThailandB.E.2475[1932]byHisMajestyKingPrajadhipok
,therehadbeenamendmenttotheConstitutionandpromulgationofnew
ConstitutionsandConstitutionfortheAdministrationonseveraloccasions
dependingonthechangesofsituationinthecountry.AllConstitutionsand
ConstitutionsfortheAdministrationoftheKingdomthathadbeen
promulgatedwereinunitywithoneanotherinadheringtothedemocratic
regimeofgovernmentwiththeKingasHeadofStatewhoshouldexercise
thelegislativepowerthroughtheNationalAssembly,theexecutivepower
throughtheCouncilofMinisters,andthejudicialpowerthroughtheCourts.
Theessentialdifferencebetweenthemlayintherelationshipbetweenthe
legislativeandtheexecutivepowers,dependingonthechangingsituationof
thecountryforthetimebeing.Thisrevealedthefaithfuladherenceofthe
ThaipeopletothedemocraticregimeofgovernmentwiththeKingasHead
ofState,whichwasinaccordancewiththewillofKingPrajadhipok
ingrantingthepowertoadministertheStateaffairstotheThaipeople.The
adherencetothedemocraticregimeofgovernmentwiththeKingasHeadof
222
Kelsen,H.,GeneralTheoryofLawandState(1945).
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Statehadbeeninheriteduntilthepresenttime.
In 1997 the King was (in English translation of the 1997 Preamble)
graciouslypleasedtoproclaimthatwhereasConstitutionshavebeen
promulgatedastheprincipleofthedemocraticregimeofgovernmentwith
theKingasHeadoftheStateinThailandformorethansixty-fiveyears,and
therehadbeenannulmentandamendmenttotheConstitutionsonseveral
occasions,itismanifestthattheConstitutionischangeabledependingupon
thesituationinthecountry.Inaddition,theConstitutionmustclearlylay
downfundamentalrulesastheprincipleoftheadministrationoftheState
andtheguidelineforthepreparationoftheorganiclawsandotherlawsin
conformitytherewith;andwhereastheConstitutionoftheKingdomof
Thailand,B.E.2534[1991]asamendedbytheConstitutionAmendment
(No.6),B.E.2539[1996]establishedtheConstituentAssembly,consisting
ofninety-ninememberselectedbytheNationalAssembly,chargedwiththe
dutytoprepareadraftofanewConstitutionasthefundamentalofpolitical
reformandHisMajestytheKinggraciouslygrantedanaudienceto
membersoftheConstituentAssemblyfortakingHisRoyalspeechesand
receivingblessingsincarryingoutthistask,and,thereafter,theConstituent
AssemblypreparedthedraftConstitutionwiththeessentialsubstancelying
inadditionallypromotingandprotectingrightsandlibertiesofthepeople,
providingforpublicparticipationinthegovernanceandinspectingthe
exerciseofStatepoweraswellasimprovingapoliticalstructuretoachieve
moreefficiencyandstability,havingparticularregardtopublicopinionsand
observingproceduresprovidedintheConstitutionoftheKingdomof
Thailand,B.E.2534asamendedbytheConstitutionAmendment(No.6),
B.E.2539(1996)ineveryrespect;HavingcarefullyconsideredtheDraft
ConstitutionpreparedbytheConstituentAssemblyinthelightofthe
situationofthecountry,theNationalAssemblypassedaresolution
approvingthepresentationofthedraftConstitutiontotheKingforHis
RoyalsignaturetopromulgateitastheConstitutionoftheKingdomof
Thailand;HavingthoroughlyexaminedthedraftConstitution,theKing
deemeditexpedienttograntHisRoyalassentinaccordancewiththe
resolutionoftheNationalAssembly;Beit,therefore,commandedbythe
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KingthattheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandbepromulgatedto
replace,asfromthedateofitspromulgation,the[1991]Constitutionofthe
KingdomofThailand.
IfweweretostitchtogetherallthePreamblessincethatof1932,wewouldsee
thattheyconstitutesomethinglikeadevelopingessayonThaiconstitutional
jurisprudence.ThesePreamblescouldhardlybeclearerasastatementofthe
grundnorminThailand.Ifweparaphrasetheminclearandsimplelanguage,wewill
obtainsomethinglikethefollowing:
In1932therewasagreatconstitutionalchangewhenthemonarchywas
changedfromanabsolutetoaconstitutionalmonarchy.Althoughtherehavebeen
manyconstitutionssincethen,whichrevealsomedifferences,thereisathread
runningthroughthem,whichinvolvesthefollowingmajorpropositions.First,the
constitutionmaychangefromtimetotime,astheKingdeemsexpedientonthe
adviceofthelegislatureorotherbodydraftingtheconstitution,andreflectingthe
changingneedsofthekingdom.Second,thesechangesdo,andmust,alwaysreflect
thefactthatthereisademocraticregimewiththeKingasHeadofState,andthatthe
previouslyexclusivelyroyalpowertolegislate,execute,andjudgeisnowexercised
bytheNationalAssembly,theCouncilofMinisters,andthejudiciary.
IwouldinfacthazardtheviewthatallofSiamese/Thaiconstitutionalhistory
since1932couldbeexplainedintheseterms,despitethefactthattherewereperiods
ofdictatorshipundervariousmilitaryleaders.Theconsequenceofthiswouldbethat,
consistentlywiththegrundnormorbasicnorm,neithertheconstitutionalmonarchy,
northedemocraticandparliamentaryformofgovernment,northeindependenceof
thejudiciary,canbeabolishedinaconstitution-makingprocessnotatleastwithout
forfeitingallformsoflegitimacybasedonThaijurisprudenceandhistorical
experienceandprecedent.However,thepreciserelationshipbetweentheexecutive
andthelegislaturecouldbechangedfromtimetotime,providingdemocracyis
maintained.Bythismeanswecanseethatdespite17constitutionsthereare
fundamentalprincipleswhichhavecontinuedtoapplysince1932andwhich
themselvesrepresentalineardevelopment,throughthereformsinthereignsof
KingsRamaIV,RamaV,andRamaVI,toRamaVII,whenthe1932revolution
occurred.
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Technique and Participation
Inthe1950sand1960sitwasfelt,touseGeertzswellknownphrase,there
werenewstatesandoldsocieties,
223
andthereforeconstitution-makingtendedto
beverymuchaninstrumental,top-downexercise.Thisreflectedatheoryoflawand
developmentwhichrelateddemocracytoeconomicgrowth.Movingtothe1980sand
beyondAndersonsphrasehasbeenturnedonitshead
224
andwearefacedwithstates
whichareold(wornoutbyrepressiveandcorruptgovernment),andsocieties
whicharenew(prosperousandaspiringtojusticeanddemocracy).Inasensethis
situationisalsoareflectionofthechangedrelationshipbetweendemocracyand
economicgrowth.
ForthisreasonandThailandisnoexceptionconstitution-makingepisodes
inrecenttimeshavebecomemoreparticipatory.Thisispartlyanaspectofchanging
politicalideas,butalsoreflectsadeeplogicofconstitution-makingprocessesthat
insiststhataconstitutionisonlylikelytobedemocraticifthereiswideparticipation
initsdrafting.Aconstitution-makingprocesshastobeadialoguebetweenthepeople
andtheconstitution-makers,sothattheconstitutionwillreflectprinciplesandideas
thatpeopleactuallybelievein,andcruciallywhichtheybothunderstandandfeelthat
theyhaveownershipof.Publicparticipationdoesnotalwaysrevealunderstandingof
guidingprinciplesandthenatureofconstitutions,andoftendemandsaremadewhich
arepartisan,transient,unrealistic,banalorevenbizarre:theydonotallhavetobe
takenseriously.Ontheotherhanditcanalsorevealdeep-seatedopinions,fears,
problemsandpreferenceswhichneedtobeaddressedconstitutionally.Constitution-
makersinPoland,forexample,weresurprisedtofindthatthemostimportanthuman
rightintheeyesofthepublicwasonetheyhadneverevenconsideredtherightto
shelterandheating.Whetherthiscouldactuallybeaddressedinhumanrightsterms
wasquestionable,butIhavenodoubtthatbothsideslearnedsomethinginthe
processinwhichthiswasdiscussed.RecentAfricanexperience(inSouthAfrica,
Namibia,UgandaandKenya,forexample)hasshowntheimportanceofpublic
223
Geertz,C.,Old Societies and New States: the Quest ofor Modernity in Asia and Africa
(FreePress,1963).
224
Anderson,B.,OldState,NewSociety:IndonesiasNewOrderinComparativeHistorical
Perspective(1983)42Journal of Asian Studies477.
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participation as an exercise in legitimation, comprehensiveness, realistic
implementation,andpubliceducation.
225
Onlybyreachingouttothepeoplecanwe
hope t o cr eat e a cons t i t ut i on whi ch i s , t o us e my own f avour ed t er m,
autochthonous.
226
Kenyasrecentexperienceishighlyinstructiveinthatitisclear
onemajorreasonforrejectionoftheconstitutionisthattheelectoratewasunhappy
withanythinglessthanhighlycircumscribedpresidentialpowers.Itcanbe
concludedonthisthemethatinThailandthelackofpublicparticipationinthe
draftingprocessmayinitselfinclinevotersagainstthedraft,asoccurredrecentlyin
thereferendaontheEuropeanConstitution.
Atthesametimeitisalsotruethatconstitution-makingisbothverydifficult
judgmentallyandverytechnicalwhenitcomestotranslatingideasintolaw(inthe
parallelpaperIhaveaddressedextensivelytheroleandthelimitsoftextsandtheir
interpretation).Itseemsthereforerightthatanyconstitution-makingprocessshould
integrateeffectivelyandindeeddynamicallythevarioustypesoftasksitinvolves
principallyconsultation,information-gathering,education,deliberation,judgment,
drafting,criticism,moderation,affirmation,andimplementation.Thereisan
importantroleforlawyers,buttherearealsoimportantrolesnotjustforthepeople,
aswehaveseen,butforotherprofessionalssuchasstatesmen,officials,public
servantsandacademics,andpossiblyevenexpertsincomparativepoliticsor
comparativelaw.
225
Ndulo,M.,Constitution-makinginAfrica:AssessingboththeProcessandtheContent,
21 Public Administration and Development (2001),101-117;Hatchard,J.,Establishing
PopularandDurableConstitutionsinCommonwealthAfrica,ch.1ofAndenas,M.(ed),
The Creation and Amendment of Constitutional Norms (London,UKNCCL,2000);Read,
J.S.,NigeriasNewConstitiutionfor1992:theThirdRepublic,35Journal of African
Law 174(1991).Hatchard,J.,andSlinn,P.E.,ThePathTowardsaNewOrderinSouth
Africa,XVInternationalAffairs1(1995);seealsoHatchard,J.,andSlinn,P.E.,Namib-
ia:theConstitutionalPathtoFreedom,X International Affairs137(1990);seealsoSlinn,
P.E.,AFreshStartforAfrica?NewAfricanConstitutionalPerspectivesforthe1990s,
35 Journal of African Law1(1991);Venter,F.,TheEmergenceofConstitutonalismin
SouthernAfricaintheLate20
th
Century,inVergottini,G.(ed),International Conference
on African Constitutions, Bologna, November 26-7
th
, 1998 (Torino,GiapichelliEditore,
2000).

226
SeeHarding,A.J.,NewAsianConstitutionalism:MythorReality?,GeneralSession,KPI
VIIIthAnnualCongress,2006.
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The technical task of drafting is highly specialised; it should be treated both as
a separate exercise but also one which is deeply informed by higher-order decisions,
and practical experience and insights. In teaching a course entitled Law, Governance
and Development, which, typically of public law courses, tends to deal with
apparently quite discrete topics, I am always impressed in discussing with students
issues of constitution-making, the extent to which it appears that decisions on one
issue impact very heavily on decisions on other issues; and this is confirmed in actual
experience: constitution-making is a remarkably organic exercise which involves
careful attention to architecture and landscaping, as well as interior design. Therefore
a good constitution-making process should translate large decisions into positive and
justiciable, or at the very least clear, law; it should also allow this positive law to be
critiqued against practicalities such as other, possibly competing or complementary
aspects of positive law and legal tradition, political and legal culture, financial and
other resources, and administrative structures and techniques. It is in fact useful to
structure a constitution-making body into a series of committees looking into
different areas such as human rights, corruption, regional autonomy, judicial review,
and so forth; and their decisions have to be integrated imaginatively. The role of the
chair is therefore very crucial.
Naturally the political and complex nature of these processes tends to make
constitution-making an elite preserve, even where there is extensive participation. It
is I believe therefore important to ensure that the constitution-making body is itself
representative of society, in terms of regions, ethnicities, religions, genders, life
experiences, economic sectors, social classes, and political persuasion or allegiance.

Asian Experiences
I have outlined what seem to me the desirable principles at least of good
constitution-making process. What of actual experience in Asia?
The Indian Constituent Assembly
227
sat for two and a half years from
227
Barua, B.P., Constitution-Making in India, ch.6 of Politics and Constitution-Making in
India and Pakistan (New Delhi, Deep and Deep, 1984); Rau, B.N., Indias Constitution in
the Making (1960); Misra, P., The Making of the Indian Republic (1966), ch.1.
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December1946,anddespitethefactthatitwassplitintotwobyforceofgeopolitical
circumstanceswhenPakistanseparatedfromIndiain1947,itsexperiencecanstill
tellusalotabouttheseprocesses.Ithad296members,allocatedproportionallyto
provincesandwithinprovincestocommunalgroups,astheconstitutionwas
principallyanissueofreligion.Thesememberswerelocallyelectedforthepurpose,
butsincetheelectoratewasonlyatthatpointabout11%ofthepopulation,therewas
clearlyademocraticdeficit.AlthoughtheCongressParty,with212seats,dominated
theAssembly,especiallyaftertheMuslimLeaguedepartedintoPakistansequivalent
Assembly,
228
thedebatesanddecisions,undertheinfluenceofGandhi,Nehruandthe
DraftingCommitteeChairmanDrAmbedkar,wereserious,thorough,andhighly
principled,involvingconsiderationoftheconstitutionalphilosophyforthenew
Indianstate;whetherthereshouldbeapresidentialoraparliamentarysystem;
whetherthereshouldbealoosefederalsystemoracentralizedstate;whatprotection
shouldbegiventominorities;andtheofficiallanguage.Carefulattentionwasgiven
tobothinternationalexperienceandlocalrelevanceandpracticality.Modelsfromthe
UnitedStates,theUnitedKingdom,Ireland,France,Switzerland,Australia,and
Canadawereconsidered.
229
SeveralCommitteeswerecreated:UnionConstitution,
ProvincialConstitutions,FundamentalRights,andthemostimportantinmany
ways-Drafting.
230
Itisinterestingthattheresultsofthesedeliberations,deeplybasedonlocalised
judgments,werealsodeeplyrevolutionaryinmanyrespects;thustheresulting
democraticandegalitarianconstitutionabolished562monarchiesandthecaste
system,andcreatedtheunionitself,asasecularstate,fromtheconstitutional
patchworkthatwasIndiaduringtheBritishraj.TheConstitutionofIndiawhich
cameintoeffectin1950wasprobablythemostsuccessfulandenduringexperience
everofconstitution-making,atleastanywhereoutsidePhiladelphia.Totheextent
thattheConstitutionofIndiahasdepartedfromtheoriginal,suchdeparturewas
228
HamidKhan,8thAmendment:ConstitutionalandPoliticalCrisisinPakistan(1994);
Kukreja,V.,ContemporaryPakistan:PoliticalProcesses,Conflicts,Crises(Thousand
Oaks,Califonia:Sage,2003).

229
NoAsiancountrysexperiencewasavailableatthattimesavethatofJapanwhichwas
probablytoorecentanddifferenttobereallyhelpful.

230
DrAmbedkarscontributionsaremorefrequentlycitedthananyotherparticipant.
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eitherjustified(forexampletheamendmentstotherighttopropertywhichhad
preventedlandredistributioninthe1950s),orwasultimatelyrejected(forexample
IndiraGandhisemergencyruleinthelate1970s).
UnhappilythesamehasnotbeentrueinmostoftherestofAsia.InPakistan
theConstituentAssemblysatforsevenyears(1947-54)beforebeingdissolvedbythe
HeadofState.Militarycoupsthenbecamearegularfeatureofpoliticallifeforthe
next50years,civiliangovernmentbeingtheexceptionratherthanthenorm,and
interspersedwithperiodsofineffectiveandcorruptcivilianrule.Asecond
ConstituentAssemblydraftedthe1972Constitution,butotherwiseconstitutionshave
beendraftedbymilitarydictatorssincethattime.AswithThailand,thesevarious
constitutionsrevealapatternofthought,buttheyhavenotprovedcapableofbeing
consistentlyapplied,andtheexperimentinwhichthePresidentwasgivenpowerto
dismissthegovernmentforcauseproveddisastrousintheextreme.
231
ExperienceinIndonesiawaslittlebetter.Theconstitutionalbasisofthe
Indonesianstateisstilltheprovisional1945constitution,promulgatedthedayafter
theproclamationofindependence.In1950,rejectingafederalconstitutionwhichhad
been earlier imposed by the departing Dutch, a unitary, and again interim,
constitutionwasestablishedwhichrequiredthesettingupofanelectedConstituent
Assembly,whichsat1955-9butwasdeadlockedoverwhetherIndonesiashouldbea
federalorunitarystateandwhetheritshouldbeIslamicorsecular.In1959President
SukarnodissolveditandbyPresidentialDecree
232
revivedthe1945Constitution.
Under t he I ndonesi an Const i t ut i on,Ar t . 37, t he upper house, t he Maj l i s
PermusyawaratanRakyat(MPR)haspowertoamendtheConstitution,andduring
1999-2002itpassedfourmajoramendmentswhichhavetotallytransformedthe
IndonesianConstitution,introducinganewelectoralsystem,anewbalanceofpower
betweenthelegislatureandtheexecutive,humanrightsprovisions,regional
autonomy,andaConstitutionalCourt.TheMPRismadeupofthemembersofthe
lowerhouse,theDewanPerwakilanRakyatandtheHouseoftheRegions,the
DewanPerwakilanDaerah.

231
Thispowerunderthe8thAmendmenttotheConstitution,wasexercisedthreetimes,and
washighlycontroversialandactuallylitigatedoneachoccasion:Kukreja,aboven16.

232
Howthispowerwaslegallyderivedremainsobscure.
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InthecaseoftheFederationofMalaya/Malaysiaadifferentapproachentirely
wasadopted.TheBritishgovernmentappointedfiveCommonwealthjuristsunder
thechairmanshipofaBritishjudge,LordReid(thedraftingexercisewasclearlyseen
aspurelytechnical),asaConstitutionalCommissiontodrafttheconstitutionforthe
independentFederationofMalaya.Inthisexamplefairlyexplicitanddetailedterms
ofreferenceweredrawnupin1956byaConstitutionalConference,comprising
BritishofficialsandMalayanpoliticians;anditwasinfacttheCommissionitselfthat
carriedoutextensivepopularconsultationbeforeproducingadraftwhichwas,
amendedslightly,adoptedbytheMalayrulers,andthefederalandstatelegislatures.
Interestinglyenough,forreasonsexplainedintheparallelpaper,theoutcomewasa
constitutionwhichwassufficientlybasedonautochthonousideas,beingineffecta
meldingofAnglo-Indianexperiencewithlocaltraditionsandsocio-economic
realities,thatithasenduredfor50years,despitemanyproblemsandgeopoliticaland
otherchanges.
233
InthePhilippinesfollowingthefallofPresidentMarcos,PresidentAquino,
actingunderaProvisionalConstitution,appointedaConstitutionalCommission
whichdraftedthe1987Constitution.
234
Duetoproblemsofpresidentialcorruption
andcontinuingpeoplepowerepisodes,andsomedisenchantmentwithherown
presi dency,
235
Presi dentArroyo i n 2005 appoi nt ed a 50-member Nat i onal
ConstitutionalConsultativeCommission(referredtoasCon-Com)
toconductconsultationsandstudiesandproposeamendmentsandrevisions
tothe1987Constitution,principallytheproposalstoshiftfromthepresidential-
unitarysystemtoaparliamentary-federalsystemofgovernment,torefocus
economicpoliciesintheConstitutiontomatchthecountrysvisionforglobal
competitiveness,andtorevieweconomicpolicieswhichtendtohinderthe
countrysglobalcompetitiveness,andadverselyaffectthepeopleswelfare.
233
Harding,A.J.,Law,GovernmentandtheConstitutioninMalaysia(1996),pp.21-39.

234
Feliciano,M.S.,TheLegalSystemofthePhilippines,inASEANLawAssociation,
ASEAN Legal Systems(1995),PartIV,pp.141-9,153-61.
235
She was accused of having interfered with the Election Commission during the
presidentialelection.Thisisaninterestingexampleofhowconstitutionalchangemaybe
mandatedbywhatIhaveabovereferredtoasthecontinuinggeneralpoliticalnarrative;
herecha-chaisseenasaconcessionmadebythePresidenttosaveherpresidency.
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Com-ConreportedwithrecommendationsinDecember2005afterathree
monthpublicconsultationperiod.Itsrecommendationsweremadebyamajorityand
remaintobeactedupon.
236
Recently(25October2006)theSupremeCourthas
rejectedthevalidityofaPeoplesInitiativetoamendtheConstitution,andatthe
timeofwritingtheconstitution-makingprocessisbothuncertainandhighly
controversial.

Lessons for Thailand

InThailandtheconstitution-makingepisodeof1996-7wasimpressiveby
internationalstandardsandbystandardspreviouslyadheredtoinThailand.The
Constitution DraftingAssembly(CDA) comprised 76 provincially elected
representativesand23experts,whichreflectedagoodbalancebetweenthe
participatoryandthetechnical.MoreovertheCDAconsultedverywidelywiththe
public.Thusthe1997Constitutionwasthemostcomprehensiveandwellthoughtout
constitutionthattheKingdomhaseverhad.Thedraftingofthe2007Constitution,
undertheprovisionsoftheInterimConstitution,willtakethefollowingform,and
willtakeaboutninemonthstocomplete.
First,theCouncilforNationalSecurity(CNS,actuallytheCouncilfor
DemocraticReformunderanotherguise)willappoint2,000memberstoaNational
Assembly, which will nominate 200 of its own members as candidates for
membershipoftheConstitutionDraftingAssembly(CDA).TheCNSwillthenselect
100ofthese200toformtheCDA.TheCDAwillhaveaConstitutionDrafting
Committeeconsistingof35members(25membersoftheCDAplus10members
selectedbytheCNSfromCDAmembersandnon-members.Theresultingdraft
constitutionhastobeformallyjustifiedbytheCDAintermsofhowandwhyit
differsfromthe1997Constitution.Itwillthenbeputtotheelectorateina
referendumafteraperiodof30days.Ifitisapprovedbyamajorityitwillbecome
operativeonreceivingtheroyalassent.Ifitisnot,thentheNSCcanreviseany
previousconstitution(probablythe1997Constitution)andpresentthatfortheroyal
assent.
236
AnevenmoreextensiveexerciseinKenyaresultedinanimpressivedraftwhichwas,
however,rejectedinareferendumin2005.
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Whilethisprocedurecombinesbroadrepresentationwithtechnicalskill,ithas
beenalreadyobserved
237
thattheprocessisnotatallparticipatorywhencompared
withtheprocessleadingtothe1997Constitution,whichwassoparticipativethatit
wasreferredtoasthePeoplesConstitution.Itisofcoursearguablethat,theCDA
havingin1997gonetoallthattroubleandexpense,nottomentionhavinghadthat
degreeofingenuity,thereisperhapsnotmuchtobelearnedbeyondthe1997CDAs
experienceintheforthcomingconstitution-makingexercise.However,inviewofthe
tumultuouseventsofthelastyearorsoandtheunderminingoftheConstitutionby
thepreviousgovernment,onewouldimaginethatthepeoplewouldhavemuchon
thatscorethattheywishtosayaboutthenextconstitutionandhowtoavoidsuch
episodes.
Itisimportantinreformprocessestokeepinmind,inthewordsofthe
ConstitutionalCourtofSouthAfrica,
238
thattheConstitutionretainsfromthepast
onlywhatisacceptableandrepresentsaradicalanddecisivebreakfromthatpartof
thepastwhichisunacceptable.HopefullyindraftingThailands18thconstitution
theconstitution-makerswillbuildontheachievementsoftherecentpast.AsBastian
andLuckhamhavesaid,ahistoricalperspectiveisneededbothtooffsetdemocracy
triumphalismandtocounterpessimism.
239
Muchinthe1997Constitutionhasbeen
seentoworkanddemocracycomestoeverycountryinfragmentsandparts;each
fragmentbecomesanincentivefortheadditionofanother.
240
Injugglingthe
constitutionalfragments,theconstitution-makersneedtoholdtightlytothethreadof
constitutionaldevelopment,otherwisetheentirenotionoflawandtheconstitution
willbeunderminedevenfurtherthanithasbeenalready.
237
Kuhonta,E.,ConstitutionattheHeartofThaiCoup,6Oct.2006,http://www.atimes.
com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HJ06Ae02.html(Accessed9Oct.2006).
238
Shaballala and Others v AG of th e Transvaal and Another,1996SA725(CC).
239
Aboven2,at306.
240
Sklar,R.,DevelopmentalDemocracy,29 Comparative Studies in Society and History 4
(1987).
Group 3
Oversight of the Exercise of State Power by
Independent Organizations
According to the Constitution
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Issues to be Considered for
Constitutional Amendment
Charan Pakdithanakul
241

T heCouncilforDemocraticReformstagedacoupdtaton19September200
6andinitsAnnouncementNo.3abrogatedthe1997Constitutioninordertopave
thewayforconstitutionalamendmentsaimedataddressingcurrentpolitical
problems.Thefollowingissuesaredirectlyrelatedtotherootsoftheproblemsand
shouldbeaddressed.
1.AlthoughtheSenatewaschangedfrombeingappointedtobeingelected,
thedesiredkindofrepresentationdidnotmaterializebecausecandidates
affiliatedtocertainpoliticalpartiesareoftenelected.Thedutiesofthe
Senatearetoprovidechecksandbalancesonthegovernment,consider
legislationandnominatepeopletoindependentagenciesthatmonitorthe
exerciseofstatepower.IthasbeensuggestedthattheSenateshouldinclude
representativesofallsocialsectorsinordertobetrulypoliticallyneutral.
ThedissolutionoftheSenate,leavingonlytheHouseofRepresentatives,
wouldonlyincreasethelegislativeworkloadbornebytheHouseof
Representatives.IftherewerenoSenate,therewouldbelesscareful

241
PermanentSecretaryoftheMinistryofJustice
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considerationinthelegislativeprocess.Therefore,theauthorviewsthatthe
Senateshouldremainbuttheprocessofselectingsenatorsshouldbe
changedtoensurethatsenatorswhopasslegislationandexercisechecks
andbalancesarepoliticallyneutral.
2.Politicalreformofagenciestoprovidechecksandbalancesonstatepower
shouldfocusontheproblemofcorruption.Underthe1997Constitution,
independentagenciessuchastheNationalCounterCorruptionCommission,
theAuditCommission,theHumanRightsCommissionandtheOmbudsman
wereresponsiblefordealingwithcorruption.Ifsuchindependentagencies
havetoomuchpower,itwillbeabletocontrolstatepower.However,if
suchindependentagencieslackeffectivenessorfallintothehandsofstate
power,itwouldbemoredangerousthannothavingindependentchecksand
balancesatallbecausenoothermechanismwouldbeabletoprovidethe
checksandbalances.Usurpersofstatepowermayusetheinvestigation
processtolegitimizetheirownactsandtoattackopposition.Inthepast8-9
yearsindependentagencieshavenotbeenabletoconducttheirworkin
accordancewiththesetprinciplesandobjectives.
Theaboveconditionshavepavedthewayforcorruptpeopletoenteroffice.
Howcanthenominationprocessformembersofindependentagenciesbereformed?
Normallythenominationcommitteewouldbedrawnfromthreegroups:the
judiciary,politiciansandstateacademics.Ithasbeenfoundthatpersonsfromthe
judiciaryareabovepoliticsandareneutral;therefore,theauthorsuggeststhatthe
nominationcommitteeincludesmorepeoplefromthejudiciary.Atpresent,only
threepeopleareonthecommittee,i.e.,thePresidentoftheSupremeAdministrative
Court,PresidentoftheSupremeandPresidentoftheConstitutionalCourt.Asforthe
politicalbranch,politicalpartiesselectfournominees.Thisleadstothesituationof
thewinnertakesallbecausethegroupwiththemajorityinparliamentwillnominate
peoplefromtheirsidetotheindependentagencies.Thisobviouslyinterfereswiththe
nominationprocessbecausethesepeoplecansettherulesforthenomination
committeeorblockvotesinordertoallowtheirownpeopletositonindependent
agencies.
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Intheauthorsopinion,nominationcommitteesmustbepoliticallyneutraland
neednotincludestateacademicsbecausethereareacademicsfromprivate
institutionswhoarepoliticallyneutral.Thecompositionofthenomination
committeeshouldincludeequalrepresentationfromthegovernmentandthe
opposition.Moreover,thejudiciarysrepresentationshouldbeincreasedbyincluding
onerepresentativefromtheConstitutionalCourt,twofromtheAdministrativeCourt
andthreefromtheCourtofJusticesincetheCourtofJusticeismoredistancedfrom
politicalinterventionthantheothertwocourts.
3.ThemostimportantqualificationforConstitutionalCourtjudgesispolitical
neut ral i t y. Judges need not be expert s i n l aw but must have good
consciencesandbetrulyindependent.ThisissobecausetheCourtmustin
principlemaintainneutralityandindependencefrompoliticalintervention,
beitfromdarkinfluences,economicpowerorstatepower.
TheJudicialCommitteeundertheConstitutionalCourtneednotbecomposed
of15members.ItcouldbereducedtosevenorninefromtheCourtofAppeal,three
fromtheSupremeAdministrativeCourtandonefromotheragenciessuchasa
nomineeproposedbytheSenateortheNationalEconomicandSocialAdvisory
Council.Also,thequalificationrequiringJudicialCommitteememberstohaveeither
alaworpoliticalsciencedegreemustbemorespecific.
4.Presently,theElectionCommissionhastheauthoritytodeclareelection
fraudandissueredandyellowcards.Theauthorviewsthisastherootofthe
current probl ems, whi ch must be addressed because t he El ect i on
Commissionisgiventotaladministrative,legislativeandjudicialauthority.
Tosolvethisproblem,theauthorsuggeststhattheElectionsCommission
exerci se t he same aut hori t y but i ssues coul d be submi t t ed t o t he
AdministrativeCourt,theCourtofJusticeortheConstitutionalCourt,orall
threecourtscouldjointlyexaminecases,ortheECjudicialpowercould
giventothecourts.TheElectionCommissionmemberscouldalsoactas
investigativeofficersandsubmitappealstothefourcourts,i.e.,the
ConstitutionalCourt,theAdministrativeCourt,theCourtofJusticeand
Military Court;the Constitution allows for suchan option through
legislation.Anotheroptionistoestablishadivisionforpoliticalcrimes
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withintheCourtofAppealordesignatespecificcourtstooverseeappeals
onlocalandnationalelections.
5.InthepasttheCourtofJusticehascreatedasystemthatpreventedoutside
interventionthroughitsownsystemofchecksandbalancesandrespectfor
seniorofficials.Seniorjudgeswouldsuperviseinexperiencednovicejudges
andscreenrulingsbeforetheyweredeliveredpublicly.However,the1997
Constitutioncreateda system of junior officials governing senior
officials, referringtothetotalindependenceofthejudgeinthedecidingof
eachcase.Thisledtoanincreasednumberofcasesbeingsubmittedtothe
CourtofAppealandtheSupremeCourt.Also,thesystemofjuniorofficials
governingseniorofficialsisreflectedinthecompositionofthe12-member
CourtofJusticeCommittee,forwhichSupremeCourt,theCourtofAppeal
andtheTrialCourteachelectfourmembers.Thesenovicejudgesexhibit
partialityandmanifesttheirloyaltytotheirgroup,cliqueandinstitutions,so
theydonotpossessmaturequalifications.Thishasresultedinthelobbying
ofjudicialmembersoftheCourtofJusticeCommitteeandhascreateda
systemoffavors.
6.Atimeframeshouldbestipulatedfortheenactmentoforganiclaws
mandatedbyanewconstitution.Underthe1997Constitution,organiclaws
andlegislationoncertainissuesstillhadnotbeenpassedaftereighttonine
years,resultinginthestagnationofcertainrightsandprinciples.Therefore,
atimeframeshouldbesetandidentifiedinthenewconstitution.
7.Politicalethicsshouldbeaddressedinthenewconstitution.The1997
ConstitutionstipulatedinSection77thatasetofethicalstandardsfor
peopleholdingpoliticalofficebepreparedinordertopreventcorruption.
TheauthorproposesthatasecondparagraphbeaddedtoSection77stating,
In the consideration of appointing persons to assume the various
offices in paragraph one, including holding and vacating office, the
persons ethical and moral behavior together with his/her capability
should be evaluated.
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303
Inquiry and Impeachment Process
for High-Level Office Holder
Niyom Rathamarit
King Prajadhipoks Institute

T heimpositionofimpeachmentmeasureapplicableforhigh-levelofficeholder
mandatedbytheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540hastwomain
objectives.First,toacquireamoreefficienttooltopreventandsuppressrampant
corruptioninpoliticalandbureaucraticdomains.Secondly,toinstallformidable
oversightmechanismformaintainingchecksandbalancesamongpowerfulfactions.
Thesetwoobjectivesarereflectedintheessenceofimpeachmentmeasure,
especiallyconcerninggroundsofoffenceinimpeachmentcase,allegedauthority
facingpossibleprosecution,andjurisdictionauthoritiesresponsibleforenforcingthe
impeachmentmeasure.
PursuanttothepresentThaiconstitution,groundsofoffencewhichmay
promptimpeachmentofapoliticianorahigh-levelpublicofficial,includingany
singleormultipleconductsoractionsasfollows:1)unusuallywealthyconduct2)
actionthatisindicativeofcorruption3)actionthatisindicativeofmalfeasancein
office4)actionthatisindicativeofmalfeasanceinjudicialoffice;and5)actionthat
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304
isindicativeofwillfulexerciseofauthorityinbreachofconstitutionalprovisionor
laws.
242
Regardingtheissueconcerningindividualswhomaybeprosecutedinan
impeachmentcase,thelistofindividualsencompassesofficeholdersinthe
executive,legislative,andjudicialbranches,includingprimeminister,minister,
memberoftheHouseofRepresentatives,senator,presidentoftheSupremeCourt,
presidentoftheConstitutionalCourt,presidentoftheSupremeAdministrativeCourt,
andattorneygeneral.Asidefromofficeholdersintheaforesaidoffices,thelistalso
includesofficeholdersintheindependent,constitutionallymandatedbodieswho
performcontrolfunctions,includingelectioncommissioner,parliamentary
ombudsman,auditor-generalcommissioner,constitutionaltribunal,andotheroffice
holdersinboththejudicialandexecutivebranches,includingjudgeorarbiter,
prosecutororhigh-levelofficeholderinaccordancewithconstitutionallaw
governingpreventionandsuppressionofcorruption.
243
Theorganizationsaccountableforcaseproceedingofanimpeachmentcase
comprisetheNationalCounterCorruptionCommission(NCCC),whichconducts
preliminaryinquiryanddeterminesgroundofoffence;andtheSenate,regardedas
non-partisan,whichisempoweredtodeliberateandadjudicatethecase.Judging
fromthestatusoftheorganizationsinvolvingincaseproceeding,itcanbediscerned
thattheConstitutionhastheintenttoimposetheimpeachmentmeasureasoversight
andcheckandbalancemechanismbetweentheexecutive,legislative,andjudicial
branchesasoverseenbyanon-partisanbodyi.e.theSenateandaconstitutionally
mandatedbodyi.e.theNCCC.
Theobjectiveofthisstudyistoexaminethebackground,approaches,and
processoftheimpeachmentmeasureofThailand,therebyillustratingstrengthand
weaknessofsuchmeasure,inordertocompareourimpeachmentmeasurewiththat
offoreigncountriesandoffersomerecommendationtobolsterourimpeachment
measure.
242
Section303oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540

243
Samesection
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305
Background of the impeachment measure
Afterthepoliticalupheavalin1992,theNationalPeacekeepingCouncil
(NPKC)juntaledbyGeneralSuchindaKraprayoon,RoyalThaiArmyCommander-
in-Chief,wasforcedtodisbandinthepoliticalarenaandreturntoarmybarracks.
Then,theformerPrimeMinisterAnandPanyarachun,whowaspubliclyrecognized
asaliberalistandwellrespectedinThaisociety,receivedaroyalcommand
appointinghimastheprimeministerinhissecondterminordertoleadaninterim
government
244
underamoreopenpoliticalatmosphere.Atthattime,severalsocial
andpoliticalmovementgroups,includingthoseassociatingwithPilotOfficerChalad
Worachat,PrawetWasiM.D.,PalangDharmaParty,andConfederation for
Democracyaswellasuniversitystudentsandlecturers,weresetuptolodgedemand
andpressurethegovernmenttopursuepoliticalreform.Thesepoliticalmovement
groupscitedthatThaisocietyhadbeenindegradedconditionsandahostof
problemshadbeenpilingupforalongtime.Moreover,anurgentreformwas
imperativeandsignifiedthecountryssurvival.Oneassertedclaimzoomedinon
rampantcorruptionamongpoliticiansandbureaucrats,causedbypoliticalpatronage
systeminThaisociety.Anothercitedreasonblamedpoliticalstructureasapartof
theproblems.
245
Thus,onesuggestedsolutionwasannulmentoftheexisting
constitutionandreplacementofthepresentonewithanewcharterwhichwould
remedyoldpracticesandencouragerighteouspractices.
Despiteintensepressurefromvariouscivilmovementgroups,theDemocrat-
controlledgovernmentledbyChuanLeekphai,whichrosetopoweraftertheAnand
Panyarachunadministration,didnotkeenlysupportsuchnotions.Instead,the
gover nment chose t o mi t i gat e t he pr essur e by consent i ng t he House of
RepresentativestoappointacommitteeinJuly1994tostudy,research,examine,
gatheropinions,andproposesolutionstothecountryspoliticalproblems.This
committee,calledtheDemocraticDevelopmentCommittee(DDC),comprised
academics,politicians,bureaucrats,andleadingbusinessmen,totaling58members.

244
PrasongLertrattnawisut,AccountofEventsaftertheElectionon22March1992untilthe
1992PoliticalUpheaval,ReporterDiary,pp.199-208
245
LikitTeerawekin,Democracy:VisionoftheNextTwoDecades,pp.414-417
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DDC,chairedbyPrawaseWasi,accomplisheditstasksandsubmittedaproposalto
thePresident
246
oftheHouseofRepresentativeson28April1994.
247
Amidpoliticalatmospherestirredbyaflurryofdemandsfromvariouscivil
movementgroupstopressaheadforpoliticalreform,BanharnSilapa-acha,theleader
oftheChartThaiParty,whoenvisionedhimselfasaheadofthegovernment,started
backingpoliticalreformandtoutedpoliticalreformagendaasacorepartypolicyin
thegeneralelectioninJuly1995.Later,theChartThaiPartywonamajorityinthe
HouseofRepresentativesinthatgeneralelectionandtooktheleadinaneffortto
formacoalitiongovernment.Ontheotherhand,theDemocratParty,wellknown
withamoreliberalstance,wasdefeatedinthatgeneralelectionandbecamethe
opposition.
The ChartThai Party, the leading party in the coalition government,
commencedpoliticalreformprocessin1995.Aftertakingthehelm,theBanharn
administrationinstalledthePoliticalReformCommitteeandChumphonSilapa-acha,
Banharnsbrother,wasassignedtotakechargeofthemission.Later,theCommittee
proposedcreationoftheConstitutionalDraftingAssembly,comprising99elected
members,ofwhichmissionwastodraftanewconstitution.However,Banharn
administrationwasnotinpowerlongenoughtofinishdraftinganewconstitution
anditwasforcedtodisbandin1996afterdissolvingtheparliamentthen,the
ConstitutionalDraftingAssemblywasmandatedtocompletethemissionwithoutany
repercussionfromparliamentarydissolution.Finally,theconclusionofthedrafted
constitutionwasreachedbytheConstitutionalDraftingAssemblyandthedraftwas
ratifiedbytheparliament,includingmembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesand
theSenateintheChawalitadministration.
248

246
DemocraticDevelopmentCommittee,ProposedFrameworkforThailandsPolitical
Reform(Bangkok,KledThai,1995)pp.117-119
247
Samepublication,pp.5-7
248
PrawaseWasi,AnOverviewofPoliticalReform,editedbyMcCargo,ReformingThai
Politics(Copenhagen:NordicInstituteofAsianStudies,2002),pp.21-25
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Impeachment method and process
Theimpeachmentmeasureimposedonhigh-levelofficeholderisprescribedin
theConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540underChapterXconcerning
oversightofstatepower.Part3,Section303-307stipulatedimpeachableoffice
holdersaswellasimpeachmentmethodandprocedureasfollows:
Theimpeachmentmeasureisatoolforpreventionandsuppressionofcorrupt
politicianandseniorbureaucrat.Politicalofficesapplicableundertheenforcementof
theimpeachmentmeasureareclearlydescribedinSection30ofthepresent
constitution.Forseniorbureaucrat,howeveronlysomeofficesarestipulated.Whilst
foraremnantofotheroffices,opportunitiesforfurtherinclusionintheprovision
wereleftopenforsupplementaryconstitutionalactsgoverningpreventionand
suppressionofcorruption.TheseofficesincludetheheadoftheMilitaryJudicial
Office(forjudicialofficial);chiefofdepartments,specializedagencies,orministries
(forcivilservant);commander-in-chiefofarmedforcesorsupremecommander(for
militaryofficial);director-generaloftheNationalPoliceBureau;deputygovernorof
theBangkokMetropolitan;boardmemberandtopexecutiveofstateenterprises;
headofindependent,constitutionallymandatedbodieswiththestatureofjuristic
person;orotherofficeholdersasprescribedbythelaw.
249
Theimpeachmentprocessmaybeinitiatedbyapetitionsubmittedbymember
oftheHouseofRepresentatives,eligiblevoter,orsenatortothePresidentofthe
Senate.IncaseofmemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives,animpeachmentpetition
requiressubscriptionofnolessthanone-fourthofthetotalnumberoftheexisting
members.Incaseofeligiblevoter,subscriptionofnolessthan50,000namesmustbe
gathered.Incaseofsenator,senatorsareonlyentitledtofilingapetitionfor
senatorialimpeachment.Indoingso,senatorsrequiresubscriptionofnolessthan
one-fourthofthetotalnumberoftheexistingmembers(Section304).
Asfortheimpeachmentprocedure,oncethePresidentoftheSenatereceives
animpeachmentpetition,hewillforwardthepetitiontotheNCCCforaprompt
inquiry.Aftertheinquiryincompleted,theNCCCwillreporttheoutcometothe

249
SupplementaryConstitutionalActGoverningPreventionandSuppressionofCorruption
B.E.2542,Section4,Paragraph3
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Senate(Section305,Paragraph1and2).
Thethirdstepinvolvesreportingoftheinquiryandactionstaken.Incase
impeachmentiscalledfor,theinquiryreportpresentedtotheSenatemustclearly
stipulatewhethertheallegationisprimafacieandtowhatextentthechargeentailsas
wellasthegroundforoffence.(Section305,Paragraph2)
Incaseseveralcountsareinvolved,theNCCCwilldeliberatewhichallegation
asdescribedinthepetitionismostserious.Then,theywillprepareaseparatereport
for each allegation and submit only the most serious one to the Senate for
deliberationfirst.(Section305,Paragraph3)
WhenevertheNCCCresolveswhichallegationisimpeachable,fromthatday
on,theallegedofficeholdercannotperformhisdutiesuntiltheSenatepassesa
resolution.
Thenext step concerns with the case proceeding. Not only the NCCC
chairpersonisrequiredtosubmitareport,documentsonhand,andremarkstothe
PresidentoftheSenateforimpeachmentdeliberation,theNCCCmustalsosubmita
reportandotherevidencetotheAttorney-Generaltofurtherlodgethechargeatthe
politicalcrimesectionoftheSupremeCourt
IncasetheNCCCisledtobelievethatanyallegationisgroundless,such
allegationisthendropped.(Section305,Paragraph4)
IntheeventtheAttorney-Generalconcludesthatthereport,documents,and
remarksoftheNCCCareincompleteandnotadequateforthecaseproceeding,he
willnotifytheNCCCforfurtheractionandrequirethatinformationberefinedfor
completenessinasingleshot.IntheeventtheNCCCandtheAttorney-Generalset
upaworkingcommitteewhichisattendedbyanequalnumberofrepresentatives
frombothsidestogathercompleteevidencessothattheAuditor-Generalcanpress
aheadwiththeprosecution,iftheworkingcommitteecannotresolutelyresolveon
theprosecution,theNCCChastheauthoritytopresschargesbythemselvesor
appointalawyertoenteralegalactioninproxy.(Section305,Paragraph5)
RegardingtheSenatesrolesintheprosecution,whenthePresidentofthe
Senatereceivestheinquiryreport,heisrequiredtoconvenesenatorspromptly.In
casetheNCCCdoesnotsubmitthereportduringasession,thePresidentofthe
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SenatemustinformthePresidentoftheParliamentsothathecansummonaroyal
commandtoconvenetheSenateinanextraordinarysession.(Section306)
Next,senatorsmustcastasecretballotwithoutanyinterferencefromother
bodies.Toreachanimpeachmentresolution,castvotesmustnotbelessthanthree-
fifthofthetotalnumberoftheexistingmembersintheSenate.Anyimpeachedoffice
holderisrelievedofdutiesorexpelledfromtheofficefromthedatewhentheSenate
resolvesontheimpeachment.Moreover,suchimpeachedofficialwillbedeprivedof
therighttoenteranypoliticalofficeforfiveyears.Suchsenatorialresolutionis
deemedfinal.Furthermore,anygrievancetoimpeachthesamepersononsimilar
groundwillnolongerbepossible.However,ongoingtrialatthepoliticalcrime
sectionoftheSupremeCourtwillnotbeaffected.(Section307)

Legislative flaws
Theenforcementoftheimpeachmentprovisionisproblematicfromlegal
perspectives.Theseissuesareasfollows:
(1)Tofileapetitionforimpeachmentofapoliticianorabureaucrat,one-fourth
oftheexistingmembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesoratleast50,000
eligiblevotersmustbesubscribed.Whethersuchrequirementcanbe
fulfilledornotdependsonpoliticalpredicament.
Inthefirstcase,ifanypoliticalpartyiselectedwithoverwhelmingvotes
whiletheremnantofotherpoliticalpartiescouldmusterlessthanone-fourth
oftotalvotes,consequentlymembersoftheHouseofRepresentativescould
notlodgeanyimpeachmentmotion.Suchcircumstancemayoccurunderthe
Thai RakThai government of whi ch popul i st pol i ci es are gai ni ng
remarkablepopularity.
Thesecondcaseisquiteimpractical.Thisisduetothefactthatthe
provisionrequiressubscriptionoftoomanyeligiblevoters.Asidefromthat,
tolodgeanimpeachmentgrievance,theinitiatormustsubmitpersonal
detailsofeachsubscribedindividualwhofavorstheimpeachmentsuchas
name,address,citizenIDcardnumberalongwithacopyofcitizenIDcard,
expiredcitizenIDcardorotherofficialIDcardoranevidencewithphoto.
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Aside from the aforesaid requirements, petitioners calling for the
impeachmentmustsignandlegiblyindicateday/month/yearofsigning,and,
inaddition,theymustclearlyoutlineconductsallegedascorruptionorillicit
actsothattheNCCCcanlaterproceedwithaninquiry.Furthermore,the
initiatormustgatherpersonaldetailsandrelevantdocumentswithin180
daysfromthedatewhenthesubscriptioninitiatorappearsbeforethe
PresidentoftheSenate.
250
Ifthesubscriptioninitiatorcannotfulfillthe
requirements,alleffortswouldbefutile.
Notonlysuchsubscriptionisdifficulttoimplement,subsequentengagement
beyondsatisfactorysubscriptionisalsoverycomplicatedwherebyrelevant
governmentagenciesmustverifythevalidityofthepetitioners.Inthis
respect,theMinistryofInteriorisresponsibleforverificationofthe
existenceoftheindividualsinhouseholdregistrationdatabase.Then,the
ElectionCommission(EC)mustfurtherexaminewhethertheindividuals
areeligiblevotersandarenotdeprivedofvotingright,andtheECmustalso
verifywhetherwrittencomplaintsareinconsistentwiththeimpeachment
grievance.Evidently,suchsubscriptionisadifficulttaskwhichcannotbe
simplycarriedoutbyanordinaryperson,exceptapoliticianwhohasan
extensivesocialnetwork.Assuch,thisprocesscontradictstheintentofthe
Constitutionthatdesirestokeepimpeachmentmeasurefreefrompolitics.
(2)Asabodyresponsibleindispositionofaninquiryoncorruptioncase,the
NCCCisnotauthorizedtoarrest,search,detain,ortemporarilyreleaseany
allegedoffender.Theseconstraintshindereffectivenessinitsundertaking.
Withoutsuchauthority,iftheNCCCwantstoarrest,search,detain,or
temporarilyreleaseallegedoffender,itmustrequestcooperationfromthe
CourtofJusticeforissuanceofawarrant
251
andcoordinatewiththepolice
forexecutionofthewarrant.Asaresult,theNCCCisinconvenientinits
engagementandsometimesitcouldnotcompletethetaskintime.

250
SupplementaryConstitutionalActGoverningPreventionandSuppressionofCorruption
B.E.2542,Section61

251
Samelaw,Section26(2)
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(3)AftertheNCCCholdsaninquiryandfilesacomplaint,itmustcoordinate
wi t h anot her t wo bodi es, t hat i s, t he Senat e f or del i ber at i on and
impeachmentresolution,andtheCourtofJusticeforjudgmentonthe
criminalcase.
252
Intheaforesaidcases,theinquirystandardoftheNCCCfor
guiltychargemaybeproblematicsincetheconstitutionalprovisionusesthe
wordindicativeassufficientevidenceforensuingimpeachment
deliberation.Nevertheless,fortheCourtofJustice,suchextentofevidence
maynotbeasufficientgroundforcriminalcasetrialwhichrequiresaproof
ofevidencebeyondanyreasonabledoubt.
(4)Theadoptionofthewordindicative asacriteriainsentencinganindividual
inimpeachmentcasecreatesnever-endingproblemsinsuchtrialforthe
NCCCduetolackofprecisecriteriainadjudication.Thus,eachNCCC
membermayusedifferentcriteriainadjudication.

Administrative flaws
Intermsoftheadministration,theimpeachmentmeasureimposedonwith
high-levelofficeholderfacesdifficultiesbythefollowingproblems:
(1)TheNCCChandlesanoverwhelmingnumberofcaseswhichenterinto
inquiryproceeding.In2000,3,873caseswerefiledbuttheNCCConly
completed1,275cases.Therewere2,598pendingcasesinthebacklog.
In2001,4,938caseswerefiled;1,099caseshadinquiriescompleted;and
therewere3,839pendingcases.In2002,6,176caseswerefiled;1,201cases
hadinquiriescompleted;and4,975caseswerestillpendinginthebacklog.
(2)TheNCCChasasmallteamofstaffwhomustberesponsibleforan
overwhelmingnumberofcasesininquiryproceeding.Atpresent,theNCCC
hasninecommissionersandpermanentstaffingof469persons.Intermsof
educationalbackgroundofthese469staffs,theOfficehas252staffs
graduatedwithlawdegree;53staffswithpoliticalscienceandrelated
di sci pl i nes; 132 st affs wi t h economi cs, account i ng, and busi ness

252
TheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540,Section305,Paragraph4
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managementdegree;13staffswitheducation,liberalarts,orartsdegree;8
staffswithmasscommunicationandjournalismdegree;and11staffswith
otherdisciplines.
(3)Theconstraintregardingappointmentofasub-committeeforcorruption
inquiryproceedingwhichrequiresanNCCCcommissionertochairsuch
sub-committeeseriouslyhinderstheNCCCspotential.Thisisduetothe
factthatthereareonlynineNCCCcommissionersandeachofthem,except
NCCCchairperson,mustchairinahostofsub-committees.Accordingtoits
methodology,onecaserequiressetupofoneinquirysub-committee.So,if
therewere100cases,100sub-committeesmustbecreated.Forthatreason,
itmeansthatNCCCcommissionerswouldbeoverwhelmedwithassigned
tasks.
(4)Incaseanimpeachmentcaseisassignedtoacommissionerforinquiry
proceeding,thiscommissionermustdelayother inquiryof regular
corruptioncaseanddevotehiseffortontheimpeachmentcase.Inthiscase,
thereisalsooneirregularity,thatis,forinquiryofimpeachmentcase,staffs
cannotreceivespecialallowancelikeatypicalcorruptioncase.This
compensationpracticethusdemoralizesthestaffstoacertainextent.

Political flaws
Intermsofpolitics,theimpeachmentmeasureimposedonhigh-leveloffice
holderencountersahostofproblemsasfollows:
(1)DrasticchangesinThaipoliticallandscape,transcendingfrommulti-party
systemwhichcomprisesalargenumberofmid-sizedandsmallparties
towardsasingledominantpartywhichhasoverwhelmingstatepower,
considerablydebilitatethemechanismrelatingtotheimpeachmentmeasure.
If pol i t i cal dynami cs are st i l l headi ng t owards t hi s di rect i on, t he
impeachmentmeasuremaybefutilemeasureforoversightoftheexecutive
branch.Inthisscenario,oppositionpartieswillnotobtainenoughseatsfor
filingamotiontoimpeachapoliticianinthegovernment.Topetitionan
impeachment,one-fourthofthemembersintheHouseofRepresentatives,
orequivalentto125members,isrequired.
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(2)IfthegovernmentpartycontinuestogainmoreseatsintheHouseof
Representatives,oppositionpartieswouldbemeaningless.Political
atmosphereandresourceswouldfavorthegovernmentparty.Insuch
scenario,thegovernmentpartywouldextenditsinfluencetoclobberthe
nominationprocessoftheNCCCcommissioners.Consequently,the
NCCCsworkandjudgmentwouldbeinfluencedbythegovernment.
Recently,therehasbeenwidespreadcriticismaboutthegovernments
interventioninnominationofpotentialNCCCcommissionercandidates.It
ispossiblethatanumberofcandidateswhosupportthegovernmentsstance
willsuccessfullyenterthelastround.
(3)Foranordinaryperson,filinganimpeachmentgrievanceofhigh-level
officeholderseemslikeanimprobabletaskwithoutanybackingfrom
leadingpoliticianswithsomeclout.Asubscriptioncampaigntogather
namesofindividualsforfilinganimpeachmentgrievanceisnotonlylife-
threateningbutisalsooverwhelmingforanordinarypersonastheeffort
requiresagreatdealofmoneyandphysicalendurance.Recently,social
activiststriedtoorganizeasubscriptionrallyforimpeachmentofaminister
intheChuanadministrationandChuanLeekphaihimselfbuttheywere
unsuccessful.Untilnow,theonlysuccessfulcaseofimpeachmentfilingvia
asubscriptionrallyofeligiblevoterswascampaignedbyMaj.Gen.Sanan
Kachornprasart,formerSecretary-GeneraloftheDemocratPartyand
InteriorMinisterintheChuanadministration.
253
(4) Eventhoughsomepoliticiancouldsuccessfullygathernamesofeligible
votersforimpeachmentfiling,theendorsementprocessofsubscribednames
maytakeaverylongtime.Later,impeachmentgrievancewillbefiledatthe
NCCCsothattheNCCCcanfurtherproceedwiththeinquiryandfilingofa
complaint.
254
253
The Offce of NCCC, Annual Report on Oversight and Achievements and Observation of
theNCCC,2002(Bangkok,Amarin2003),page31

254
TheimpeachmentsubscriptioninitiatedbyMaj.Gen.SananKachornprasartwasfiledat
theNCCC.However,therewasanissuewhetherimpeachmentpetitionwasacceptable
sinceanumberofsubscribedindividualswereeitherdeadornon-existent.
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(5)Basedonanattitudinalsurveyprobingthepeopleinthefourregionsofthe
countryandBangkok,itwasfoundthat40%ofThaipeoplebelievethat
corruptionstemsfrompoliticalandsocialpatronagesystem.Over50%of
therespondentsdonotknowthattheycanfileagrievanceagainstunusually
wealthygovernmentofficial.Lessthan30%oftherespondentsthinkhighly
ofprovincialpoliceofficeroradministrativeofficialasthemostsuitable
mechanismforcorruptionsuppression.Moreover,over 60%ofthe
respondentsbelievethattheNCCCisthemostsuitablemechanismfor
combatingcorruption.Inthisattitudinalsurvey,itwasobservedthatthe
peoplethinkgeneralpublicisnotqualifiedenoughastheonewhois
responsibleforfilingagrievanceforimpeachmentofahigh-leveloffice
holder.
(6)Basedonobservationofresearchersinfieldvisitsandinterviewof
respondents,itcanbediscernedthatgovernmentofficialsputupsome
barrierwhichthwartspubliccooperationinpreventionandsuppressionof
corruptioninpoliticalandbureaucraticcircles.Thereisatendencythat
peoplearenotattentivetothisandbelievethattheycannotdoanything
aboutit.Ontheotherhand,throughconversationwithlocaladministrative
organizationspersonnelorthoseworkingwithNGOs,weobservedthat
thesepeoplehavegreatinterestinpoliticsandareawareofanagency
dealingwithpreventionandsuppressionofcorruptionandchannelstogain
cooperationinthisregard.
Inconclusion,theConstitutionsendeavortostrengthentheexecutivebranch
adverselyproducesdebilitatingeffectontheNCCCandtheSenateinfulfilling
impeachmentmission.Ontheotherhand,generalpublicarenotreadytoplayroles
inpublicactivitiesunderthecircumstancesthatstillnecessitateoversightandcheck
andbalancemeasureaswellastheimpeachmentmeasure.

Comparison with foreign countries

ThailandsimpeachmentmeasuremaybemodeledfromthatoftheUnited
Stateswherethepoweroftheexecutiveandjudicialbranchesissubjectedto
oversightandchecksandbalancesbythelegislativebranch.Historically,the
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impeachmentmeasurefirstevolvedfromEnglandanditwasatoolusedthe
parliamenttoexamineandengageinchecksandbalancesagainstthekings
overwhelmingpower.SuchmeasurewasbroughttotheUnitedStatesinthe
eighteenthcenturywhenthefoundersoftheUnitedStatesdraftedtheConstitution.
255

Theimpeachmentmeasureisanessentialmechanismfortheadministrativesystem
oftheUnitedStateswheretheexecutivebranchissopowerfulinthecountrys
administration.Thus,itisimperativethatanoversightmechanismbecreatedto
conductoversightagainstexerciseofthepresidentialpower.
256
Thenotionthattheimpeachmentmeasureisusedasatoolofthelegislative
branchforchecksandbalancesagainsttheexecutiveandjudicialbrancheshasbeen
wellreceivedinmanycountriessuchasFrance,Germany,Philippines,Indonesia,
andKorea.Nonetheless,inEngland,thecountryoforigin,suchimpeachment
measurehasgraduallylostitsedgebecausethemonarchysexecutivepowerwas
stripped.Ontheotherhand,theparliamentbecameaverypowerfulinstitution.Itis
empoweredtonominate,control,andstriptheexecutivebranchspower.Underthe
parliamentarysystem,theexecutivebranchmustbeaccountablefortheparliament
andtheparliamentcanimpeachtheexecutivethroughvoteofno-confidenceor
rejectionofgovernmentpoliciesaddressedintheparliamentorabillinitiatedbythe
government.
Whencomparedtoimpeachmentpracticesofhigh-levelofficeholderinthe
U.S.,France,andGermany,Thailandsimpeachmentpracticesdiffervastlyinterms
ofstructureandprocessasfollows:
(1) Indictment jurisdiction:IntheUnitedStates,theHouseofRepresentatives
hasjurisdictionoverindictmentorgrievancefiledagainstthefederal
governmentsofficial.
257
InThailand,theauthorityresponsibleforfiling
chargesismemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives(one-fourthofthetotal

255
AnnCoulter,High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Case Against Bill Clinton
(Washington,D.C.:Regnery,2002),pp.9-13.

256
CharlesDoyle,ImpeachmentGrounds:ACollectionofSelectedMaterials,in
CongressionalResearchService,TheLibraryofCongress,CRS Report for Congress,
UpdatedOctober29,1998,p.9.

257
U.S.Constitutionof1787,Chapter1,Section2,Paragraph5
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numberofexistingmembers)andeligiblevoters(nolessthan50,000
persons).InFrance,theHouseofRepresentativesisempoweredtoenter
actionagainstthePresident,butincaseofindictmentagainstprimeminister
andminister,injuredpartyhastherighttofilecharges.InGermany,
impeachmentgrievanceagainstthePresidenthingesuponthemajorityin
boththeHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenate.
(2) Adjudication jurisdiction:IntheUnitedStates,onlytheSenatehasthe
powertoholdinquiryanddeliverjudgmentonanimpeachmentcase.
258
In
casethePresidentfacesanimpeachmentinquiry,theChiefJusticewillchair
theinquiry.Toseekaresolutionofguiltychargeoftheallegedoffender,at
leasttwo-thirdsofthetotalnumberofmembers
259
favoringimpeachmentis
required.Besides,forgivenessorpardonisnotpermissibleforsuch
impeachmenttrial.
260
InThailand,anindependentbodysuchastheNCCC
hasjurisdictiontostageapublicinquirywhiletheSenateisempowered
withjudgmentofguiltycharge.InFrance,jurisdictionforholdingan
i nqui ry agai nst t he Presi dent rest s wi t h a fact -fi ndi ng commi t t ee
(commissiondinstruction),comprisingfiveSupremeCourtjudges.Incase
primeministerorministerfacesimpeachmentgrievance,acommittee
comprisingthreeSupremeCourtjudgeswillconductaninquiryand
adjudicationofguiltychargewillbeunderthejurisdictionoftheSupreme
CourtofJustice(HauteCourdeJustice),comprising24judgeswhoare
selectedbytheHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenate.Eachchamberis
requiredtoselect12judges.Incaseprimeministerorministerfaces
impeachmentgrievance,theCriminalCourtoftheRepublic,comprisinga
quorumof15judgesselectedbytheHouseofRepresentativesandthe
Senate.Sixjudgesareselectedbyeachchambersmembers.Theotherthree
j udges are seni or Supreme Court j udges who are sel ect ed among
themselves.
261
InGermany,thePresidentwillfaceimpeachmentgrievance,

258
U.S.Constitutionof1787,Chapter1,Section3,Paragraph6
259
U.S.Constitutionof1787,Chapter1,Section3,Paragraph7
260
U.S.Constitutionof1787,Chapter2,Section2,Paragraph1

261
RefertotheConstitutionoftheRepublicofFranceof4October1958
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providedthattheHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenategiveaconsent.
TheadjudicationjurisdictionbelongstotheConstitutionalCourtofthe
Republic.
262
(3) Alleged offender and ground of offence:IntheU.S.,individualswhoare
subjectedtoimpeachmenttrialincludethePresident,VicePresident,civil
servantandjudgeemployedbythefederalgovernment.Thegroundfor
impeachmenttrialincludescrimeagainstthestate,treason,bribery,or
violentcrimeandoffence.
263
InFrance,allegationconsideredagroundfor
trialofthepresidentistreasonwhilethegroundfortrialoftheprime
ministerorministeriscriminaloffence.InGermany,theonlygroundfor
trialofthepresidentistreason.InThailand,memberoftheHouseof
Representatives,senator,primeminister,minister,seniorbureaucrat,both
civilianandmilitary,stateenterpriseexecutive,andjudgemayface
impeachmentgrievance.Thegroundfortheindictmentincludesunusually
wealthyconductwhichisindicativeofcorruption,malfeasanceinduty,
malfeasanceinjudicialduty,orintentionallyexercisepowerinbreachofthe
constitutionalprovisionorlaw.
IntheU.S.,impeachmentprocessmaybeinitiatedbyanysinglememberofthe
HouseofRepresentativeswhotakesowninitiativebyfilingagrievanceagainstan
individual,alleginganindividualinanattestedmemorandum,anddroppinga
statementforaresolutioninanenvelopeaddressedtoaconcernedcommitteeofthe
HouseofRepresentatives.Theimpeachmentprocessmaybeinitiatedbyan
individualoutsidetheHouseofRepresentatives.Forinstance,ameetingofjudges
employedbythefederalgovernmentmayrecommendtheHouseofRepresentatives
toconsiderimpeachingajudgeoraspecialprosecutormaygiveanadviceortip-off
totheHouseofRepresentativeswithinformationaboutanoffenceorthePresidents
guidelines,allegationforwardedbyastatelegislativeassemblyorjuryorgrievance
filedbygeneralpublic.
264
262
BancherdSinghaneti,ComparativeConstitutionalCourt,AdministrativeCourtJournal,
April1998,pp.133-141
263
U.S.Constitutionof1787,Chapter2,Section4

264
T.J.Halstead,anOverviewoftheImpeachmentProcess,inCongressionalResearch
Service,CRS Report for Congress, November3,1998,p.2.
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However,therearesomeobservationsfromcomparisonwiththeU.S.casesas
follows.First,intheU.S.parliament,whichisintheseparationofpowersystem,
parliamentariansareratherindependentandfreefromthegovernmentsinfluenceas
comparedtoThaiparliamentarians,whichisintheparliamentarysystem.Secondly,
filingcomplaintmaybedoneaslongasmembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives
giveaconsent.Lastly,thereisanappointmentofaspecialprosecutororindependent
attorneytoconductaninquirywhileaninquiryinThailandmaynotassurethata
chairpersonofinquirycommitteemustbeaprofessional.

Recommendation
Basedonstudyfindings,itcanbediscernedthattherearemanyflawsand
weaknessesintheimpeachmentprocessfromlegal,administrative,political,and
socialperspectives.Tosolvetheproblemsandovercomeweaknesses,itisimperative
thatwemustresorttosomestrategiesandmeasures.

Legal provision and enforcement

Theeffectivenessinenforcingtheimpeachmentlawdependswhetherlegal
provisionisconcise,coherent,andpractical.Tomeettheaforesaidobjective,
additionalmeasureandfurtherelaborationofthefollowingissuesarenecessary.
(1)InSection303oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540
andSection58oftheSupplementaryConstitutionGoverningPrevention
andSuppressionofCorruptionActB.E.2542,thewordindicative
connotestheextentofanevidenceingroundfortakingaction.Thisword
must be el abor at ed because i t i s a sour ce of conf l i ct and var i ed
interpretationinjudgment.Academically,determiningwhetherapertinent
actsatisfiesprescribedlegalconditionrequireskeenunderstandingofsome
pointsconcerningtheindicativedegree.Incivilcase,whenthereisalackof
concreteevidencetoprovewhoisrightorwrong,anormalprocedure
allowseachpartytopresentevidenceforsubstantiationofownclaim.The
partythatpresentsevidenceinmoreconvincingmannerwillbeinfavorable
positioncomparedtotheoppositionandwillwinthecasedespitelackinga
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concreteevidence.Suchprocedureshouldbeestablishedasanormfor
seekingafinaljudgmentinimpeachmentinquiry.
(2)InaccordancewiththeConstitution,aninquiryfilepresentedtotheSenate
withanevidenceindicativeofanoffenceissufficientforadjudication.
However, for an inquiry file delivered to theAttorney-General for
prosecutionatthepoliticalcrimesectionoftheSupremeCourt,anevidence
indicativeofanoffencemaynotbesufficientgroundforthecourtto
sentenceallegedperson.Therefore,inthelattercase,itisessentialthatthe
NCCCmustprepareacasefilebackedbyconcreteevidencebeyondany
reasonabledoubt,thecourtwillthenbeabletoimposeasentence.
(3)In the eyes of westerners, they may thinkThai people can tolerate
corruption.Thisnotioncomesfromdifferentperceptionaboutwhat
constitutescorruption.Someactmaybeconsideredcorruptionbysome
peoplebutnotbyothers.Therefore,adefinitionmustbesoughttoclearly
distinguishbetweencorruptibleandnon-corruptibleact.
(4)IntheNCCCsinquiryprocess,standardregulationorpracticehasnotbeen
laidoutforallegedoffenderwhoneedstodecidewhethertosubmit
evidenceorappearbeforeinquirycommitteeorNCCCcommissioners.
Inexistenceofsuchstandardpracticesrenderguiltychargeresolutionnot
sufficientlyacceptableforallegedoffender.Forthatreason,standardinquiry
proceduresarenecessary.
(5)Similarly, incaseoftheSenate,there are nostandardpractices for
impeachment proceedingand resolution;and,fortunately, fornine
grievancesreferredtotheNCCCforaninquirybythePresidentofthe
Senate,noneofthesecaseswasfoundtohaveanygroundfortakingaction.
Thus,theSenatecouldavoidacommotioninvolvingimpeachmentcase
proceedingwithoutstandardprocedures.Nonetheless,theSenatemust
establishstandardproceduresassoonaspossiblebecauseanimpeachment
casewithguiltychargemayhavetobedeliberatedbytheSenateanytime.
(6)Regardingfilingofimpeachmentgrievanceagainsthigh-levelofficeholder
byeligiblevoters,eachofthe50,000subscribersmustprovidepersonaldata
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andacopyofcitizenI.D.cardorothertypesofI.D.cardissuedbya
governmentagency.Inaddition,agreatdealoftimeisspentonverification
ofauthenticityofthosenamesinthesubscriptionlist.Thisproblemmaybe
resolvedbypubliclyannouncingthelistofnamessothatthepeoplecan
examine,endorse,orobjecttheirnameswithinalimitedperiodoftimesuch
as15days.Ifsuchperiodexpiresandnoobjectionarises,thelistednames
arethendeemedaccurate.Itcanbediscernedthatthecountrieswithinthe
scopeofthisstudyempoweronlytheHouseofRepresentativesorboththe
HouseofRepresentativesandtheSenatetofilegrievance.OnlyinThailand,
eligiblevotersareentitledtotherighttofilegrievance.Bymakingthis
channelavailable,thereisatendencythatthistypeoftrialwouldbemore
politicized,ratherthanbasedonsolidinformationorfactsalone.

Recommendation on administrative aspects

The objective of the NCCCs establishment is not to pursue only the
impeachmentinquiryofhigh-levelofficeholder,butingeneralitissetuptooversee
preventionandsuppressionofcorruption.Withthelattermission,theNCCCis
overwhelmedwithworkload.Furthermore,thelawalsorequireschairpersonshipof
NCCCcommissionersineverysub-committee.Therefore,theNCCCishighly
capableofadministeringimpeachmentinquiryofhigh-levelofficeholder.Toresolve
suchproblems,itisnecessarythat
(1)TheNCCCshouldlimititsrolestodealwithonlyimpeachmentinquiryof
high-levelofficeholder.Forothercasesinvolvingpoliticianorlower-
rankingbureaucratorothercasesofsecondaryimportance,NCCCofficials
orotherstateagenciesshouldbeempoweredtohandletheminstead.Such
practice will considerably reduce the workload, and in turn NCCC
commissionerscandevotemoretheirtimeandacumeninhigh-profilecases.
Insomecountries,adhoccommitteeisspecificallysetuptoinvestigatefor
thepurposeofevidencegathering.
(2) TheNCCCshouldbeempoweredtoappointindependentexpertand
professionaltoconductinvestigationforevidencegatheringinimpeachment
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321
caseofhigh-levelofficeholder.Thismeasureisnecessarybecausethereisa
limitednumberofNCCCcommissionersandthenominationprocessdoes
notensurethatcompetentpersonwillalwaysbechosen.However,this
practicemaybedisturbingorproblematicfortopbrass.

Recommendation on political aspects

Atthattime,Thaipoliticsevolvedfromthemulti-partysystem,comprising
smallandmid-sizedpoliticalparties,towardsthedomineeringsinglepartysystem,
and t hat part y i s Thai Rak Thai . The const i t ut i onal mechani sm ai med at
strengtheningtheexecutivebranchshiftedcheckandbalancesystemamongvarious
powersinfavoroftheexecutivebranch.Thisconditionrenderedcheckandbalance
systeminthepoliticalsystemimbalancedandthispredicamentseemstodragon.If
thesituationinthecountrymaintainsitscourse,theNCCCmaybeanineffective
mechanismintheoversightofpoliticianswhodomineertheexecutivebranch.To
resolvetheaforesaidproblems,amendmentofthepertinentlawsisnecessary,
especiallythosegoverningnominationandselectionofNCCCcommissioners.

Recommendation on social aspects

Itisimperativetofosterandstrengthencivilsectorinpreventionand
suppression of corruption, and, at the same time, this will also bolster the
impeachmentmeasureofhigh-levelofficeholder.Changesinadministrative
structureandeducationallevelofthepeoplearealsonecessary.Inthelongrun,self-
governmentoflocalauthoritieswillarouseinterestamongthepeopleandasaresult
theywillplaymoreactiverolesinpublicactivitiesatthenationallevel.Bythesame
token,providedwithbettereducation,peoplewillbemoreself-confidentandcapable
offulfillingtheirrolesanddutiesasprescribedinthelaw.Lessonspertainingtogood
civicdutiesandadministrationaswellasdamagescausedbycorruptioninpolitical
andbureaucraticcirclesmayhelpreducecorruptionandimpeachmentofhigh-level
officeholder.
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323
Investigative Study of
Independence of the Constitutional
Mandated Bodies under
the Constitution of
the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540
Asst. Prof. Dr. Chalad Chongsuebphan
and Team

1. Problems and importance of research issues

1.1 Necessity of state powers oversight
A nunderlyingprincipleinpublicadministrationunderthedemocraticsystem
reckoningpublic administration belongs to the people, by the people, and for
the peoplederivesfromabasicnotionthatpeoplehaverightsandlibertywhichare
underlyingpoweracquiredfromtheintrinsicnatureofmankind.Statepowerand
governmentaresubsequentcreationofmankindafterpartiallyrelinquishingsome
powertothestateascompelledbythebeliefthatthiswouldbebeneficialtogeneral
publicandentailpersonalblissfulness.Thus,legitimatelypeoplehavetherighttobe
supremeadministratorofthestateandthestateandcivilrepresentativesexercising
statepoweraremerelyvehiclesfortheexerciseoftherightsofpeople.
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
324
Anessentialguaranteethatwillpreservestatepowerofpeopletendstobe
definedbasedonanadministrativetheoryasaformofstate governed by rule of
law,meaningtheexerciseofstatepowermustbepursuedonlytoprotectpublic
interestwithinlegallydefinedscopes,conditions,andmethods.However,inreality
sincetheexerciseofstatepowermustbeconductedthroughcivilrepresentative
systemandtheserepresentativesarejustregularpeoplewhomaynottakeactionsin
accordwiththeobjectivesofthelawormayattempttoabusestatepowerdeviated
fromthewillofpeoplewhoreallypossesssuchpower.Consequently,itisimperative
thatwemustresorttocontrolmechanismandoversightoftheexerciseofstate
power,orinotherwords, supervision of the exercise of genuine poweror
supervision of the power wielded by individuals exercising state power.
Regardingthedispositionofoversightofstatepower,basedontheseparation
ofpowerprinciplewhichtypicallydividesstatepowerintolegislative,executive,and
judicialpower,eachbranchperformmutualcheckandbalancefunctions.For
instance,intheparliamentarysystem,adoptedapproachesmaybequestioning,setup
ofinquirycommittee,orpetitionforcensuredebate.Nonetheless,politicalcontrol
andoversighthaveanumberofconstraintssuchasexecutivebranchcommanding
majorityintheparliament,oroversightpursuingonlymajorpolicyissues.Assuch,
moreoversight bodies areencouragedinamoderndemocraticstate,mainly
becauseorganizationscreatedundertheseparationofpowerprinciplecannot
immaculatelyfulfilltheirintendedfunctions.Furthermore,someoversightprocesses
impactingupongeneralpublicmustbefastandflexible,andalsorequireexpertise
andneutrality.
Controlandoversightfunctionsperformedbytheseoversightbodiessignifya
mandatetoempowerthesebodiestoindependentlyconductoversightwithintheir
ownjurisdiction.Forinstance,ombudsmanisempoweredtoexaminepublic
officialsconductandauditor-generalisempoweredtoauditaccountingandfiscal
practicesofstateagencies.
Inthisrespect,Thailandattemptedtoestablishseveraloversightbodiespriorto
1997suchastheCounterCorruptionCommission,theAuditor-GeneralOffice,and
theConstitutionalTribunal.Nonetheless,thesebodiesstilllackindependence
imperativeforoversightoftheexerciseofstatepowerandarenotpowerfulenough
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
325
tofulfilltheirduties.Thus,duringthedraftingofthe1997constitution,oversightof
theexerciseofstatepowerwasdesignatedasaframeworkinthedraftingofthe
Constitution.Itwasdiscernedthatexistingbodiesmustbeimprovedandnewbodies
mustbecreatedtoconductoversightinallfacetsofstateactivitiesandassurethatthe
exerciseofstatepowerisuntarnished,impartial,transparent,unbiasedandfreefrom
interventionofboththeexecutiveandlegislativebranches.Fivekeyprinciplesfor
effectiveoversightoftheexerciseofstatepowerareasfollows:
1.Guaranteeindependenceofoversightbodies,includingstipulationofa
lengthytermandlimitingtenuretoonlyasingleterm,independencein
personnelmanagement,independenceinfinancialandbudgetmanagement,
independenceindeterminingownrulesandregulations,andmaintaining
autonomousadministrativeunit.
2.Setupoversightbodiestooverseeallfacetsofstateactivitieswithout
overlappingfunctions.
3.Ensurethatoversightbodiestrulyhavepowerforeffectiveness.
4.Empoweroversightbodiestoexaminepoliticiansandbureaucratswhohave
closetieswithpoliticians.
5.Encouragemutualoversight,forgingaprinciplestatingthatnosingleentity
isinstalledatthetopaloneandnoonecanevadeoversight.
Overhauledorganizationstranscendingfromthepreviousoversightbodiesand
newlyestablishedbodiesthatareaccountableforcontrolandoversightofthe
exerci se of st at e power i n accordi ng wi t h such pri nci pl es are cal l ed the
constitutionally mandated body pursuant to the Constitution of the Kingdom of
Thailand B.E. 2540,including
1.CourtofJustice
2.ConstitutionCourt
3.AdministrativeCourt
4.ElectionCommission
5.NationalCounterCorruptionCommission
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
326
6.Auditor-GeneralCommission
7.Parliamentaryombudsman
8.NationalHumanRightsCommission
1.2 Necessity of the study on independence
of the constitutionally mandated bodies
AftertheenforcementoftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.
2540andtheestablishmentofindependentbodiestoexercisepowerpursuanttothe
constitutionalmandateandconstitutionallaw,itcanbediscernedthat,allinall,
independentbodiescanperformtheirrolesandsuccessfullyexerttheirpowertoa
certaindegree.However,duetothenoveltyofoversightmechanismwhichwas
appliedormodeledfromothercountries,despitesomemodificationtoensurethatit
isbefittingwithintheThaicontext,afteractualenforcement,itwasfoundthatthere
areahostofissuesorobstacleswhichpreventfulfillmentaccordingtotheintentof
theConstitution,especiallyindependenceoftheconstitutionallymandatedbodies,in
termsoftheprinciplesandtechnicalaspects.Therootcausescanbetracedto
provision,constitution,law,andruleandregulationaswellaspracticesofconcerned
parties.Ifsuchproblemsarenotpreventedorproperlyresolvedintimeandthe
assuranceoftheindependenceoftheseoversightbodiesappearstobeonlyjusta
constitutionalprovision,theywouldnotbetrulyindependent.Itisalmostcertainthat
reformoftheoversightsystemaimedatscrutinizingtheexerciseofstatepower
throughconstitutionalmechanismwillnotbesuccessfulasintendedbythe
Constitution.
Therefore,itdeemsappropriatetoconductaninvestigativestudyofthe
independenceofoversightbodiesmandatedbytheConstitutionoftheKingdomof
ThailandB.E.2540aswellasrelatedproblemsandobstaclesinconductofsuch
independentbodies.Theaimistoutilizestudyfindingstoimproveandsolve
problemswhichimpactontheconstitutionallymandatedbodiessothattheycan
achievetheirtasks,thussatisfyingtheintentoftheConstitution.

Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives

King Prajadhipoks Institute
327
2. Research objectives
1. Toinvestigateindependenceofindependentbodiesmandatedbythe
ConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540,includingtheElection
Commission,Ombudsman,theNationalHumanRightsCommission,the
ConstitutionalCourt,theAdministrativeCourt,theCourtofJustice,the
NationalCounterCorruptionCommission,andtheAuditor-General
Commission.
2.Tostudyproblemsandobstaclesandproviderecommendationpertainingto
independenceofindependentbodiesmandatedbytheConstitutionofthe
KingdomofThailandB.E.2540.

3. Scope of the research

3.1 The scope pertaining to the constitutionally mandated bodies:Dueto
thefactthatprovisionsintheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.
2540prescribeahostoftheconstitutionallymandatedbodies,thisstudy
willdwellontwomainreasonsfordefinitionoftheconstitutionally
mandatedbodies.Assuch,considerationsarefocusedonorganizational
structureandindependencefromthelegislativeandexecutivebranches,and
theprovisionoftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540
underSection75,Paragraph2,describesabouthavingautonomous
administration.Therefore,thestudyteamdecidedtostudyindependenceof
eighttheconstitutionallymandatedbodies,including:
3.1.1 CourtofJustice
3.1.2 ConstitutionalCourt
3.1.3 AdministrativeCourt
3.1.4 ElectionCommission
3.1.5 NationalCounterCorruptionCommission
3.1.6 Auditor-GeneralCommission
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
328
3.1.7 Parliamentaryombudsman
3.1.8NationalHumanRightsCommission
3.2 The scope pertaining to respondents: Basedontheessenceofthisstudy,it
isnecessarytostudythepeoplewhoaredirectlyinvolved.Therefore,the
studyteamdividedrespondentgroupsintoeightgroups,including
3.2.1 MemberoftheConstitutionalDraftingAssembly
3.2.2 Academic
3.2.3 Jurisdictionauthority
3.2.4 Secretary-General/headoftheconstitutionallymandatedbody
3.2.5 MassmediaandNGO
3.2.6 Universitystudent
3.2.7 Generalpublic
3.2.8 Politician
3.3 The scope pertaining to study phases:Thestudyphaseisdividedinto
threephases.
Phase1:Studyindependencebasedonconstitutionalprovisionsand
academicresearch.
Phase2:StudythefindingsfromPhase1aboutindependencebasedon
viewpointsoftherelevantgroups.
Phas e 3: Synt hes i ze r es ear ch f i ndi ngs on i ndependence of t he
constitutionallymandatedbodiesobtainedfromPhase1and2.

4. Research constraints
The const rai nt s are bot h t hose ant i ci pat ed t he st udy t eam and t hose
encounteredduringtheresearch.
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
329
4.1 Political dynamics: Duringtheresearch,changingpoliticalsituationhad
directrepercussionsondatacollectionandbrainstorming.
4.2 Timing constraint: Sinceeighttheconstitutionallymandatedbodiesare
requiredasresearchsubjects,one-yearwindowoftheresearchisregarded
asavitalconstraintandobstacleofthestudy.
4.3 Directly involved groups or respondents or unit of measurement:Since
alleightrespondentgroupsorunitofmeasurementplaymajorrolesinthe
organizations,therefore
4.3.1Appointmentfordatacollectionandinterviewposedanimportant
conditionandobstacle.Inanumberofcases,manyappointmentsmust
bemadewithanindividualatleasttwomonthsinadvance;and
importantly
4.3.2Giveninterviewtimewasratherlimited.
4.4 Limited budget:Duetotheconstraintsidentifiedin4.2and4.3and
repercussionsfrompoliticaldynamicsasdescribedin4.1,theappropriated
budgetwasratherhinderingandproblematictotheconductoftheresearch.

5. Research methodology
To ensur e t hat t he st udy addr essed r esear ch i ssues eff i ci ent l y and
comprehensivelybasedonthespecificobjectives,thestudyteamthusdesignedthe
researchandprescribedtheresearchmethodologyassummarizedinthefollowing
tables:
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
330
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Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
331
3
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Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
333
6. Research findings
Sincethestudyhasnotyetreachedtoitslastphase,whichissynthesisof
researchfindingspertainingtoindependenceoftheconstitutionallymandatedbodies,
thefindingsfromPhase1and2arepresentedbelow.
Phase 1: Basedondocumentanalysiswhichemployscongruentanalysisand
congruenceanalysistechniqueswhichproduceaconceptualmodelofindependence
oftheconstitutionallymandatedbodiespursuanttotheConstitutionoftheKingdom
ofThailandB.E.2540asshowninFigure1and2.
Phase 2: Thestudyofindependence,problems/obstacles,andproblem-solving
approachesoftheconstitutionallymandatedbodiessharedbyconcernedindividuals
basedonthefactoranalysisshedsomelightonthesubjectasfollows:
(1)Independenceoftheconstitutionallymandatedbodiesbasedonviewpoints
ofconcernedindividuals(quantitative)
(1.1) Hypotheticalindependencebasedonconstitutionalprovisionand
academicresearchoftheconstitutionallymandatedbodies.
(1.2)Empiricalindependencebasedontruenatureoftheconstitutionally
mandatedbodies
(1.3)Congruencebetweenhypotheticalindependencebasedonconstitutional
provisionandempiricalindependencebasedontruenatureofthe
constitutionallymandatedbodies
(1.4)Conceptualmodelofindependenceoftheconstitutionallymandated
bodies
(1.5)Issuesconcerningindependenceoftheconstitutionallymandated
bodies
(2)Independenceoftheconstitutionallymandatedbodiesbasedonviewpoints
ofconcernedindividuals(qualitative)
(2.1)Hypotheticalindependence
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
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(2.1.1)Fundamentalindependence
(2.1.2)Methodologicalindependence
(2.1.2.1)Independenceinneutralitydimension
(2.1.2.2)Independenceinthedimensionofjurisdictionauthoritys
risetopower
(2.1.2.3)Independenceinpolicydimension
(2.1.2.4)Independenceinbudgetdimension
(2.1.2.5)Independenceinadministrativedimension
(3)Compilationofproblems/obstaclesandproblem-solvingapproachesofthe
constitutionallymandatedbodiesbasedontheaccountofconcerned
individuals(qualitative)
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
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6.1 Conceptual model of independence based on constitutional provision
and academic research is shown in Figure 1
Figure 1: Conceptual model of independence based on constitutional provision
and academic research
Independence of the constitutionally
mandated bodies
Fundamental independence Methodological independence
Trulyindependent
Performdutiesinaccord
withtheauthority.
Tasksareconsistentwiththe
authority.
Notinterferedbyotherpower
Notintervenedbyotherpower.
Encompassallfacetsofstate
activities.
Notoverlapping.
Nogenuineoversightpower.
Oversightpowerisnotinterfered
andintervenedbyotherpower.
Empoweredtoexaminealllevel
ofpoliticians.
Empoweredtofullyexamine
bureaucrats.
Mutualexamination
Haveclosetieswithpoliticians Independence
from
management
perspective
Independence
frombudgetary
perspective
Independencein
policydimension
Independencein
thedimensionof
jurisdiction
authoritysriseto
power
Independence
inneutrality
dimension
Kor.1
Kor.7
Or.1
Or.7
Nor.1
Nor.7
Ngor.1
Ngor.7
Bor.1
Bor.7
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
336
Methodological independence
Independence in neutrality dimension
Kor.1 Empoweredtoprescribecoherentruleand
regulationsystematically
Kor.2 Adheretoruleandregulationin
straightforwardmanner.
Kor.3 Performdutiesinaccordwithsocial
demand.
Kor.4 Notdirectlybiasedtoanyparty.
Kor.5 Notfavoranypartyintentionallyand
unintentionally.
Kor.6 Unbiasedinallcases.
Kor.7 Steadfastinupholdingneutralityasacore
principle.
Independence from the dimension
of jurisdiction authoritys rise to power
Or.1 Theprocessmusthavecheckandbalance
features.
Or.2 Theprocessmustbeconsistentwith
nominationcriteria.
Or.3 Nomination criteria are determined by
nominationcommittee.
Or.4 The process must not be i nt erfered or
intervenedbyotherpower.
Or.5 Nomination/appointmentproceduresmust
beclear,continuous,andsystematic.
Or.6 Each st ep must pr oceed accor di ng t o
nominationcriteria.
Or.7 Thecriteriamustbeconsistentwiththe
constitution.
Independence from policy dimension
Nor.1 P o l i c y r e f l e c t s p r i ma r y r o l e s a n d
responsibilities.
Nor.2 Exhibittrueindependenceinfulfillingits
duties.
Nor.3 Have i ndependent power i n def i ni ng
strategiesandtask-orientedmeasures.
Nor.4 Implementstrategicmovewithoutsupport
fromotherpower.
Nor.5 Actionmustleadtoorganizationsgoal
achievement.
Nor.6 Haveindependentpowertofulfillitsduties
accordingtomeasuresandstrategicplan.
Nor.7 Policyisunwavering.
Independence from budget dimension
Ngor.1Havebudgetaryindependence.
Ngor.2Budgetreflectsgoalanddirectionofthe
primarymission.
Ngor.3Budgetarydeterminationapproachmust
accordwithorganizationsprimarymission.
Ngor.4Independenceinbudgetdeliberationand
approvalprocess.
Ngor.5Budgetarystructuremustbeconsistentwith
t ask st ruct ure based on organi zat i ons
primarymission.
Ngor.6Independenceinbudgetarydisposition.
Ngor.7Administerbudgetflexibly.
Independence in administrative dimension
Bor.1 Empoweredtoengageinpersonnelmanagement.
Bor.2 Determineruleandregulationindependently.
Bor.3 Chairpersoncanworkindependently.
Bor.4 TheOfficeanditsnetworkmustdirectlyreporttoChairperson.
Bor.5 TheOfficeperformsitsdutiesindependentlyaccordingtopolicy.
Bor.6 Secretary-GeneralmanagestheOfficeindependently.
Bor.7 Administrationmustconformtogoodgovernanceprinciples.
Bor.8 Rolesandresponsibilitiesofjurisdictionauthoritymustnotinterfereoroverlapwiththoseofthe
Office.
Bor.9 Organizationmusthavetransparentandexaminableworksystem.
Bor.10Worksystemmustnotencourageinterferenceandinterventionbyotherpower.
Figure 2: Conceptual model of the methodological independence
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
337
6.2 Evaluation of independence of the constitutionally mandated bodies
based on viewpoints of concerned individuals (quantitative)
6.2.1 Hypothetical independence based on constitutional provision and
academic research of the constitutionally mandated bodies: The
findings are categorized as follows:
(1) Forfundamentalindependence,itwasfoundthat
(1.1)Hypothetically,theconstitutionallymandatedbodieshavea
very hi gh degree of fundament al i ndependence i n al l
dimensions(averagevalueranges7.71-9.34fromatotalof
10.00points),withanexceptionofpoliticallinkages,the
onlyasinglesub-dimensionoutofatotalof13dimensions,
attainsmedium-lowdegreeofindependence.
(1.2)Afterreviewingoveralldistributionofconcernedindividuals
ineverygroup,itcanbediscernedthatopinionsregarding
nearlyallsub-dimensionsoffundamentalindependenceof
everyconcernedindividualineverygrouparequitecluttered
(C.V.valueisintherangeof0.0912-0.1579).Onlythreesub-
dimensions,includingpoliticallinkages,mutualoversight,
andextensivenessofstateactivities,yieldvariedopinions,
especiallypoliticallinkageswhichattainsahighdegreeof
oscillation.(C.V.value=0.5784)
(2)Formethodologicalindependence,itwasfoundthat
(2.1)Hypothetically,theconstitutionallymandatedbodieshavea
high-veryhighdegreeofmethodologicalindependenceinall
sub-dimensions(averagevalueranges8.00-9.66fromatotal
of10.00points),whetheritbesevensub-dimensionsof
objectivity,jurisdictionauthoritysrisetopowerdimension,
policydimension,andbudgetdimension,andtensub-
dimensionsofadministration.
(2.2)Int erest i ngl y enough, i n al l sub-di mensi ons of every
dimension,itcanbediscernedthatgeneralopinionsofall
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
338
concernedindividualsineverygrouparequitestableand
cluttered(C.V.valueranges0.0595-0.1893).Onlythesub-
dimensionofselectioncriteriadeterminedbyagroupof
individualsinvolvinginselectionprocessofthejurisdiction
authoritysrisetopowerdimensionattainsvariedopinions
(C.V.value=0.2810)
6.2.2 Empi ri cal i ndependence based on t he real i t y f aced by t he
constitutionally mandated bodies.Thefindingsarecategorizedas
follows:
(1)Forfundamentalindependence,itwasfoundthat
(1.1)Empirically,theconstitutionallymandatedbodieshavea
rathermediumdegreeofmethodologicalindependence
(averagevalueranges5.34-6.10fromatotalof10.00points).
(1.2)Interestinglyenough,generalopinionsofallconcerned
individualsineverygrouparerathervariedwidely(C.V.
valueranges0.-3907-0.5200),consideredaratherhigh
relativedistributioncoefficientvalue.
(2)Incaseofmethodologicalindependence,itsfindingsshowed
characteristicallysimilarindependenceascomparedtothe
findingspertainingtofundamentalindependencein1.1and1.2
above.
6.2.3 Congruence bet ween hypot het i cal i ndependence based on
constitutional provision and empirical independence based on the
reality faced by the constitutionally mandated bodies
(1)Forfundamentalindependence,itwasfoundthat
(1.1)Onthewhole,theconstitutionallymandatedbodieshavea
ratherhighdegreeofhypotheticalindependencebasedon
constitutionalprovisionandacademicresearch.Moreover,
opinionsofallconcernedgroups,whetheritbememberof
constitutionaldraftingassembly,academic,jurisdiction
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
339
authority,secretary-general,massmediaorNGO,university
student,general public, orpolitician group, arerather
cluttered,analyzedbothintermsofeachindividualgroupor
allgroups.
Atthesametime,empiricalindependenceshowsmedium-
low level as compared to hypothetical independence.
Notably,opinionsofallconcernedindividualsineverygroup
aresomewhatvaried.
(1.2)Interestinglyenough,rankingofindependenceinvarious
sub-dimensionsshowscontradictoryoutcome,meaninga
sub-dimensionthatattainsahighrankingofimportance
undermethodologicalindependencetendstobeatthebottom
ofthelistunderempiricalindependence.Viceversa,asub-
di mensi on ranked l ow i n t erms of i mport ance under
methodologicalindependencetendstoattainahighranking
underempiricalindependence.
However,therearesomesub-dimensionsofwhichranking
areconsistentinsomeaspectse.g.mutualoversightor
extensiveoversightofbureaucratdimension.
(1.3)Whenreviewingconcernedindividualsineachgroup,the
findingsrevealedthat
(1.3.1)Incaseofhypotheticalindependence:Concerned
i ndi vi dual s ranked t he i mport ance of 13 sub-
dimensionsinwavypattern.
(1.3.2)I n case of empi r i cal i ndependence: I t can be
discernedthatperceptualpatternofjurisdiction
authority, secretary-general, mass media, and
universitystudentgroupdifferfromothergroups
ratherdistinctively,andnotablyallfourgroupshave
diverseperceptualpattern.
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
340
(2)Formethodologicalindependence,thefindingsaresimilarto
fundamentalindependenceineveryaspect,whetheritbeoverall
considerationof6.2.3(1.1)orrankingofindependenceinvarious
sub- di mensi ons of hypot het i cal i ndependence based on
constitutional provision or empirical independence of the
constitutionallymandatedbodiesasstatedin6.2.3(1.2)or
separateconsiderationofconcernedindividualscategorizedunder
eachgroupasstatedin6.2.3(1.3).
6.2.4 Conceptual model of the independence of the constitutionally
mandated bodies
Thistopicconcernsdeterminationofclassificationofvarioussub-
di mensi ons of f undament al i ndependence, met hodol ogi cal
independence,andhypotheticalindependencebasedonconstitutional
provisionorempiricalindependence.Then,aconceptualmodelofthe
independencebasedonviewpointsofconcernedindividualsisthen
createdtodefinesuitableKPIsformeasurementofindependenceof
theconstitutionallymandatedbodiesbythefactoranalysistechnique.
Thefindingsareasfollows:
(1)Forfundamentalindependence
(1.1)Incaseofhypotheticalindependencebasedonconstitutional
provision,threeconstituentsareclassifiedasfollows:
(1.1.1)Theconstituentusedasguaranteeofindependence
comprisessevensub-dimensions.
(1.1.2)Theconstituentusedtodefinepower,duty,and
admi ni st rat i ve st ruct ure compri ses four sub-
dimensions.
(1.1.3)Theconstituentusedtodefinelinkagescomprise
twosub-dimensions.
(1.2)Incaseofempiricalindependence,twoconstituentsare
classifiedasfollows:
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
341
(1.2.1)Theconstituentusedasguaranteeofindependence
andpoweranddutystructurecomprises12sub-
dimensions.
(1.2.2)The l i nkage const i t uent compr i ses one sub-
dimension.
(2)Formethodologicalindependence,thefindingsarecategorizedas
follows:
(2.1)Forindependenceinneutralitydimension,itwasfoundthat
(2.1.1)Intermsofhypotheticalorempiricalindependence,
onlyoneconstituentcanbeclassifiedasstatusquo.
(2.1.2)Have di fferent fact or l oadi ng of vari ous sub-
dimensions.
(2.2)Forindependenceinthedimensionofjurisdictionauthoritys
risetopower,itwasfoundthat
(2.2.1)I n cas e of hypot het i cal i ndependence, t wo
constituentsareclassifiedasfollows:
(1) Cr i t er i a const i t uent compr i ses t wo sub-
dimensionsinindependence.
(2) Conduct const i t uent compri ses fi ve sub-
dimensionsinindependence.
(2.2.2)Incaseofempiricalindependence,onlyasingle
componentcanbeclassifiedasstatusquo.
(2.3)Forindependenceinpolicydimension,thefindingsare
describedin6.2.4(2.1).
(2.4)Forindependenceinbudgetdimension,thefindingsare
describedin6.2.4(2.1).
(2.5)Forindependenceinadministrativedimension,itcanbe
discernedthat
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
342
(2.5.1)I n cas e of hypot het i cal i ndependence, t wo
constituentsareclassifiedas
(1) Worksystemandrolesanddutiescomprise
foursub-dimensionsofindependence.
(2) St r uct ur e and cr i t er i a compr i se si x sub-
dimensionsofindependence.
(2.5.2)Incaseofempiricalindependence,twoconstituents
areclassifiedas
(1) Worksystem,rolesandresponsibilitiesand
administrationcomprisesixsub-dimensionsof
independence.
(2) Structureandcriteriacomprisesfoursub-
dimensionsofindependence.
6.2.5 Issues concerning independence of the constitutionally mandated
bodies
The pr esent at i on of t hese i ssues i s based on t he anal ysi s of
quantitativeindependenceasdiscussedin6.2.1-6.2.4.Theissuesare
summarizedasfollows:
(1)Intermsofthecoverageofhypotheticalindependencebasedon
constitutionalprovision,itcanbediscernedthathypothetically
independenceoftheconstitutionallymandatedbodiesinvarious
aspectsstillattainsamediumdegreeofcoverageclassifiedas
(1.1)Fundamentalindependencehas70.102%coverage.
(1.2)Formethodologicalindependence
(1.2.1) Theneutralitydimensionhas63.608%coverage.
(1.2.2)Thedimensionofjurisdictionauthoritysriseto
powerhas73.853%coverage
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
343
(1.2.3)Thepolicydimensionhas76.952%coverage.
(1.2.4)Thebudgetdimensionhas72.037%coverage.
(1.2.5)The admi ni st r at i ve di mensi on has 75. 980%
coverage.
(2)Intermsofactualpracticesoftheconstitutionallymandated
bodies,thestudyrevealedthat
(2.1)Eventhoughtheconstitutionallymandatedbodieshave
medium-highdegreeofempiricalindependence,including
(2.1.1)86.482%offundamentalindependenceisactually
practiced.
(2.1.2)Formethodologicalindependence
(1) 86.482%ofneutralitydimensionisactually
practiced.
(2) 82. 128% of the dimension of jurisdiction
authoritysrisetopowerisactuallypracticed.
(3) 87.987%ofthepolicydimensionisactually
practiced.
(4) 75.460%ofthebudgetdimensionisactually
practiced.
(5) 81.144%oftheadministrativedimensionis
actuallypracticed.
(2.2)Interestinglyenough,ineveryaspectandsub-dimension,
rankingofthesequenceofsub-dimensionsintermsofactual
practicesvaries,therebyconversingfromhypothetical
sequence.Forinstance,
(2.2.1)Forfundamentalindependence,itwasfoundthat
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
344
(1) Hypothetically,sub-dimensionpertainingto
lackofinterferenceandinterventionfromother
powerisrankedhighintermsofimportance.
(2) Inactualpractices,theimportanceissomehow
as s i gned t o a s ub- di mens i on wi t h non-
overlappingcharacteristicsandactionsmust
alignwithsimilarlyrankedauthorityandduties.
Inturn,lackofinterferenceorinterventionby
otherpowerisrankedatthebottomofthelist.
(2.2.2)Formethodologicalindependence,thefindingsareclassified
asfollows:
(2.2.2.1) Forneutralitydimension,itwasfoundthat
(1) Hypothetically,thedimensionconcerning
impartialityfollowedbynon-conformanceto
socialdemandwillattainimportance.
(2)Empirically,eventhoughthesequencestarts
fromimpartialitysimilartothehypothetical
case.Followinginthesequenceisinsteadthe
neutralitydimension,thussignifyingareversal
fromthehypotheticalindependencecase.
(2.2.2.2)Forjurisdictionauthoritysrisetopower,policy,and
budgetdimension,similarfindingsareobserved,
thatis,
(1) Even t hough hypot het i cal or empi r i cal
independencebeginswithasub-dimensionthat
similarlyattainshigh-rankedimportance,its
sequencewillbereversal.
(2) Inthemeantime,asequencewithmedium-low
importancewillbegintodemonstratereversing
sequence.
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
345
(2.2.2.3)Foradministrativedimension,twodifferentissues
areobserved,thatis,
(1) Thereisanarrangementoftheconstituentsof
worksystemandrolesandresponsibilitiesas
wellastheconstituentsofdifferentcriteria
b e t we e n h y p o t h e t i c a l a n d e mp i r i c a l
independence.
(2) As i d e f r o m t h a t , i n e a c h c o n s t i t u e n t ,
sequencingofsub-dimensionsissomewhat
different.
6.2.6 Issues identified in 6.2.1-6.2.5 are summarized as follows:
1. I ncompl et e cover age of t he essence of hypot het i cal
independenceoftheconstitutionallymandatedbodies.
2. Notably,theessenceofvariousfacetsofindependence
presentinaformofdefinedsub-dimensionsstillfacecertain
issuesconcerning
2.1Structuringconstituentsofindependence;
2.2Andthesequenceofconstituentstructureandthe
importanceofdetailsinsuchstructure.
3.Underlackofcoverageasstatedin1andstructuringof
constituentsandrelevantdetailsasstatedin2above,itis
observedthatthemeasureddegreeofindependenceyieldsa
valueatahigh-veryhighdegree;and,allinall,opinionsof
allconcernedindividualsineverygroupareratherstable.
Onl y some di mensi on shows medi um- l ow degr ee of
i ndependence. Moreover, opi ni ons of al l concerned
individualsinthesesub-dimensionsareratherdiverse,
showingdistributivepattern.
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
346
4. Eventhoughthedispositionofhypotheticalindependence
withlackofcoverageinactualpracticesoftheconstitutionally
mandatedbodiesissomewhatextensive,buttheoutcome
f r om act ual pr act i ces demonst r at es t hat Empi r i cal
independenceisatmedium-lowdegree.Notably,empirical
independencestilloscillates.
5.ItisworthnotingthatDispositionofconstituentstructureof
independenceisactuallyputinplace.Andthesequenceof
actualimplementationstilldoesnotalignandconformtothe
hypothesis,reckonedasamajorrootcauseoftheproblems
describedin4.
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
347

6
.
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Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives

King Prajadhipoks Institute
348
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.

Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives

King Prajadhipoks Institute
349
V
a
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d
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.

Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives

King Prajadhipoks Institute
350

6
.
4


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.

Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives

King Prajadhipoks Institute
351
V
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1
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1
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3

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v
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s
.

Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives

King Prajadhipoks Institute
352
V
a
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1
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4

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1
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2
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f
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s
u
c
h

c
o
n
d
u
c
t
.

Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives

King Prajadhipoks Institute
353
V
a
r
i
o
u
s

d
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m
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3
.

I
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-

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H
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M
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E
x
t
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n
d

n
o
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n

p
e
r
i
o
d

Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives

King Prajadhipoks Institute
354
V
a
r
i
o
u
s

d
i
m
e
n
s
i
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o
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P
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R
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c
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a
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N
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3
.

I
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d
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p
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S
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S
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S
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p
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I
n

c
a
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t
h
e

S
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n
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s
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r
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b
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o
d
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.

4
.

I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
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n
c
e

i
n

p
o
l
i
c
y

d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n

Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives

King Prajadhipoks Institute
355
V
a
r
i
o
u
s

d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
s

o
f

i
n
d
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p
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d
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n
c
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P
r
o
b
l
e
m
s

R
e
c
o
m
m
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n
d
a
t
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o
n

N
o
t
e

5
.

I
n
d
e
p
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n
d
e
n
c
e

i
n

b
u
d
g
e
t

d
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s
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n

B
u
d
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t

a
p
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s

m
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d

b
y

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a
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d

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S
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t
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I
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n
d
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p
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n
d
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.

F
o
r

i
n
s
t
a
n
c
e
,

1
.

A
l
l
o
c
a
t
e

b
u
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g
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t

t
o

c
o
n
s
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t
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n
a
l
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y

m
a
n
d
a
t
e
d

b
o
d
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e
s

w
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t
h

c
e
r
t
a
i
n

p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e

o
f

a
n
n
u
a
l

e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e

b
u
d
g
e
t

b
y

e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
i
n
g

n
o
n
-
p
a
r
t
i
s
a
n

c
o
m
m
i
t
t
e
e

t
o

s
p
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c
i
f
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c
a
l
l
y

d
e
l
i
b
e
r
a
t
e

b
u
d
g
e
t

a
p
p
r
o
p
r
i
a
t
i
o
n

f
o
r

t
h
e
s
e

b
o
d
i
e
s
.

2
.

A
p
p
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o
v
e

b
u
d
g
e
t

t
o

c
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
l
y

m
a
n
d
a
t
e
d

b
o
d
i
e
s

b
y

s
e
t
t
i
n
g

u
p

f
u
n
d

a
n
d

s
t
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p
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l
a
t
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n
g

t
h
a
t

c
o
m
m
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t
e
e

f
r
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m

t
h
e

c
o
n
s
t
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t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
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y

m
a
n
d
a
t
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d

b
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d
y

a
n
d

s
u
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t
a
b
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o
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g
a
n
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z
a
t
i
o
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s

b
e

a
p
p
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t
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d

a
s

a
n

a
d
m
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s
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r
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v
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c
o
m
m
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o
f

s
u
c
h

f
u
n
d
.

T
h
e

f
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n
d

m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t

c
o
m
m
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i
s

r
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s
p
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b
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f
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r

b
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d
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Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives

King Prajadhipoks Institute
356

V
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.

King Prajadhipoks Institute

357

Courts and Watchdog Bodies:

Appointment Processes
Reviewed and Compared
265
Prof. Peter Leyland

Abstract
A s wel l as l eadi ng t o t he i nt roduct i on of a const i t ut i onal court , t he
administrative courts and ombudsman, the 1997 Thai Constitution launched a
battery of watchdog bodies which where designed to oversee the effectiveness of the
constitutional apparatus. This included the Electoral Commission, NCCC, the
Human Rights Commission, Anti-Money Laundering Commission. In each case
complex preconditions were set in place relating both to the eligibility of candidates
and the procedures to be followed before the confirmation of any appointments.
Despite such requirements allegations of interference with the process of
appointment have continued to be voiced. Further, there is evidence that the work of
at least some of these bodies has been compromised by changes in their direction. In
this paper there will be a critical discussion of the procedures that were adopted in
making such appointments. For comparative purposes reference will be made to the

265
IwouldliketothankJustinFrosiniforhishelpinpreparingthispaper.
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
358
appointment process recently introduced for senior judges in the UK under the
Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The issue of appointments will be set in a wider
constitutional contextincludingtheroleofParliamentandtheMonarch.

Introduction
Thailandslatestconstitutionadoptedin1997butfinallysuspendedin
September2006meriteditsreputationforbeingbyfarthemostcertainstepinthe
directionofliberaldemocracyinthenationshistory.Aswellassettingout
individualrightsanddutiesanddescribingtheinstitutionalframeworkoflawand
government,thisconstitutionprovidedmanydifferenttypesofbodywhichwere
specificallydesignedtoeliminatethecorruptionandabusesencounteredunder
previousconstitutions.Theconstitutionmadeanimpressivestartwithevidencethat
thenewindependentbodiesweretacklingtheproblemsthatwerereferredtothem,
andtakingdecisiveactionagainstmiscreants.However,followingthe2001election
thepositiondeteriorateddramatically.Althoughtheinstitutionalbodieswereinplace
changestothecomposition ofthese bodies had an obviousimpact ontheir
effectiveness.Theappointmentmechanismsdidnotadequatelysafeguardthe
independenceofinstitutionssetupundertheconstitution.Theprocessesthatwere
setinplacetomakeappointmentsarereviewedinthelightofotherconstitutional
models,mainlytheUK,ItalyandtheUSA.ArevisedconstitutionforThailandisin
prospectandtheweaknessesintheprevioussystemwillneedtobeaddressedaspart
oftheprocessofredrafting.However,itisemphasizedattheoutsetthatthesuccess
ofanyfutureconstitution,andtheeffectivenessofitscourtsandoversightbodies,
willprimarilydependuponthepoliticalwilltomakeanysucharrangementssucceed.

Separation of Powers
and Judicial/Institutional Independence
in Constitutional Terms
Whatdowemeanbyjudicialindependenceinaconstitutionalcontext?The
originatorsofmodernconceptualisationsofseparationofpowerssoughttoconceive
asystemofcheckswhichwouldensurethatpowervestedingovernorscannotbe
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
359
turnedtopersonaladvantageandthatthepersonalisedrulebymenisreplacedbythe
impersonal rule of rules. It was further recognised that this required . . . an
independentjudiciaryinactingasabulwarkagainstexecutivepower.Itisthisaspect
oftheruleoflawwhichiscriticalindistinguishingbetweenliberalanddespotic
regimes
266
.Inpracticalterms,theresultisthatthejudiciaryrequirefirstly:asetof
relativelyclearandgeneralruleswhichcanestablishanimpartialsystemand,
secondly,independencetoapplythelawwithoutfearorfavour
267
.Therearea
numberofwaysinwhichjudicialindependenceisrelevant.Inamacro-constitutional
sense,thisindependenceismostapparentwhenthejudicialbranchisseentobe
separatedfromandthusindependentoftheexecutivebranch.Sinceundermost
constitutional and legal provisions in the vast majority of nations judicial
appointmentshavetobeapprovedbytheexecutivebranchatsomepointandthe
judiciaryareremuneratedfrompublicfunds,itisobviousthatentirelyisolatingthe
judicialbranchfrompoliticalandeconomicconsiderationsisneverentirely
straightforward
268
.
Therationalebehindtheprescriptivedoctrineofseparationofpowersisto
avoidtheconcentrationofpowerinthehandsofasinglepersonorbody.The
diffusionofauthorityamongdifferentcentresofdecision-makinghaslongbeen
regardedasasafeguardagainsttotalitarianismandameansofpreventingtheabuse
ofpower.Modernviewsoftheseparationofpowersareaproductofeighteenth
centurythought.InTheSpiritofLaws
269
Montesquieustatedthatallwouldbelost:
ifthesamemanorthesamerulingbody,whetherofnoblesorofthepeople,wereto
exercisethesethreepowers,thatoflawmaking,thatofexecutingthepublic
resolutions,andthatofjudgingcrimesandcivilcauses.TomPainehadwrittenin
266
M.LoughlinSword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship Between Law and
Politics, Oxford,HartPublishing,2000,p.183.
267
ibid.p.185
268
SeetheBritishConstitutionalReformAct2005whichsetsupaJudicialAppointments
CommissionforEnglandandWaleswhoserecommendationsmustthenbeapprovedby
theMinisterofConstitutionalAffairs;andseeArticle64,65and66oftheFrench
Constitutioninregardtojudgesbutthe Conseil DEtatconsistsofwhatarereallyspecially
civilservantsschooledinadministrationandrecruitedbyexaminationorexperience.
269
De LEsprit des Lois,(BookXI,ch.6,1748).
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
King Prajadhipoks Institute
360
1792
270
:FromthewantofaconstitutioninEnglandtorestrainandregulatethewild
i mpul se of power, many of t he l aws are i rrat i onal and t yranni cal , and t he
administrationofthemvagueandproblematical.TheConstitutionoftheUnited
StatesofAmericaisfoundedontheideaoflimitingandcheckingpowerandthese
ideashavebeenstronglyinfluentialinthedraftingofmanyotherconstitutions.
AlthoughtheUSconstitutionestablishesaclearseparationbetweenthe
legislativeandexecutivebranches,almostfromitsinceptiontherehasbeena
problemconcerningtheinsulationoftheUSSupremeCourtfrompolitics,andthe
appointmentoffederaljudgesontherecommendationofthePresidentintroducesa
furtherpoliticalelement.TheSupremeCourtmayappeartooccupyastrongly
independent position. From one standpoint, there is some insulation from
interference.SupremeCourtjusticesareappointedforlifeandcannoteasilybe
removed,nomatterhowcontroversialtheirdecisionsmayprovetobe,andthereis
littleevidencetosuggestthatimproperpressurehasbeenorisexertedonSupreme
Courtjudges.However,eversinceitwasestablishedinMarbury v Madison(1803)
thattheSupremeCourthasthefinalwordonconstitutionalissues,thecomposition
ofthiscourthasbecomeamatterofgreatimportance.Justicesareselectedbythe
Presidentandpresidentialnomineeshavetendedtobeselectedtoreflectthepolitical
viewpointoftheincumbentpresident.AlthoughthenomineesfortheSupremeCourt
arevettedandfinallyapprovedbytheSenate,theSenateisnotempoweredto
substituteitsowncandidates,itcanonlyrejectnomineesfromthePresidenton
specifiedgrounds.Ifseveralvacanciesariseduringapresidencythepolitical
complexionoftheSupremeCourtcanbefundamentallyalteredandthismight
impactonthenatureofitsdecisionmakingforyearstocome(i.e.untilfurther
vacanciesarise).Incidentally,the1997ThaiConstitutionpreventedthisproblem
arisingbylimitingappointmentstotheThaiConstitutionalCourtto9years.The
mechanismforappointingSupremeCourtjudgesintheUSAhasclearlyfailedto
eliminatepoliticalbias.Infact,thedecisionin Bush v Gore
271
followingthe2000
presidentialelectionmightbecitedasevidenceofthecourtdividingonstrictly
politicallines.GlancingbacktotheThaiConstitutionof1997wefindthatitrelied
heavilyonaConstitutionalCourtwhichwasvestedwithultimateauthorityon

270
T.PaineRights of Man,London,Pelican,1969p.217.

271
531US9(2000).
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constitutionalmatters.Theperceivedroleofthiscourtwasobviouslygoingtobe
crucial.
Asweshallseebelow,theUKConstitutionbywayofcontrastwiththeUSA
andThailand,isuncodifiedanditneverembodiedaclearseparationofpowers.
Rather,thereisalimitedseparationoffunctionsandaconsiderablenumberof
overlappingpowers.Thisdoesnotmeanofcoursethatlegalprocessisnotemployed
asmeansofsubjectinggovernmentalpowertolegalcontrol.Butatleastuntil
recently,itwouldbemoreaccuratetocharacterisetheconstitutionasincludinga
numberofchecksandbalances.Thelatestbatteryofconstitutionalreformse.g.
devolutionandtheHumanRightsAct1998haveraisedseparationofpowersnearer
tothetopoftheagenda,and,asweshallseebelow,thegovernmenthasresponded
byintroducingsubstantialreformsaspartoftheConstitutionalReformAct2005
whichunderlinetheneedforaclearerseparationbetweentheexecutiveandjudicial
branches.

Judicial Appointments and Institutional Independence

Aneffectiveseparationofpowersbetweentheexecutiveandjudicialbranches
dependsuponestablishingastrongdegreeofjudicialindependence.Iwouldsuggest
thattheproblemsencounteredbytheThaiConstitutionalCourtinmakingdecisions
whichcarriedfarreachingpoliticalconsequenceshasservedtodemonstratethe
prioritythatneedstobegiventotheissueofitsindependence.Indeed,inThailand
sincethecourtsstructurewasintroducedin1908judicialindependencehasbeen
recognisedasaconstitutionalimperativeandpublicprotesthasresultedfrom
attemptstounderminesuchindependence,evenduringperiodsofmilitaryrule
272
.As

272
In1972adecreethattheMinisterforJusticewouldbecomeinvolvedintheadministration
ofthejudiciarywaswithdrawnfollowingprotests.The1991Constitutionapartfrom
explicitlyrequiringthatjudgesactshallbeindependentintheirjudicialcapacity,safe-
guardsjudicialindependencebydisqualifyingpoliticalofficialfrombecomingjudges,
prohibitingtheestablishmentofspecialcourtstoreplaceexistingcourtsandpreventingthe
enactmentofanylawtakingawaythejurisdictionofacourtinrelationtoanycase(seess.
188-191).SeeT.McDormanThe1991ConstitutionofThailandin(1995),3Pacifc Rim
Law and Policy Journal (UniversityofWashington)257-298.
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onecommentatorobserves:Appointmentsareamongthemostcrucialofdesign
issues.Constitutionaldesignersareunlikelytoadoptconstitutionalreviewunless
theybelieveitwillbecarriedoutimpartialappointees
273
.Predictably,theThai
Constitutionof1997paysconsiderableattentiontothisissueandthemethods
prescribedfortheappointmentofjudgesandotherwatchdogbodiesisdefinedat
considerablelength.
IfweturnfirsttotheConstitutionalCourt.Underthe1997Constitution7
membersofthepaneloffourteenjudges(plusaPresident)oftheConstitutional
Courtiscomprisedofjudgesfromtheothersuperiorcourts
274
.Thiselementconsists
of5judgesoftheSupremeCourtand2judgesoftheSupremeAdministrativeCourt
electedbysecretballotfromamongtheirgroupoffellowjudges.Theadditional8
membersofthecourtmustcomprise5legallyqualifiedindividualsand3political
scientists.AcommitteehastobeformedincludingthePresidentoftheSupreme
CourtofJusticeandtheDeansoflawandpoliticalsciencefromtheUniversitiesand
highereducationinstitutionswhichhasthetaskofdrawingupashortlistof10
qualifiedpersonsinthelawcategoryand6qualifiedpersonsinthepoliticalscience
category.ItisfromthisshortlistthattheSenateselectthefinalcandidatesbysecret
ballotgoingthroughseriesofconsecutivevotesuntiltherequirednumberof
candidatesemergefromtheprocess.Inpractice,theSenatehasnotonlyvotedon
candidatesforthecourtbutbecomecontroversiallyinvolvedinvettingcandidates
(e.g.objectionsvoicedconcerningAmphornThongprayoon)
275
.Onceappointed
judgesoftheConstitutionalCourtserveforasingletermofnineyears.
Theresultoftheselectionprocessundertheconstitutionwastoproducea
cohortofsuitablyqualifiedConstitutionalCourtjudges,butthecourthasnot
managedtoestablishareputationforindependence.Tothecontrary,someofits
decisionshavebeenattheforefrontofcontroversy.Oneproblemthathasarisen

273
T.Ginsberg Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases,
Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2003,p.42.
274
ConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailand1997ss.255-257.
275
J.KleinTheBattlefortheRuleofLawinThailand:TheConstitutionalCourtof
Thailand,inFive Years of Political Reform, TheAsiaFoundation/KPICongressIV,2003
p.646.
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concernsthecourtsvotingsystem.Thecourtdecidesacasebyamajoritydecision
butthemajorityviewdoesnotnecessarilyprevail
276
.Ratherthanvotingonthecase
asawhole,thedissentingvotesmaybeaddedtogetherontheissuesthatthecourt
decides.ForexampleinthefamousThaksinruling
277
hewasfoundtohaveviolated
Section295oftheConstitutionbya7/4majoritybuttheoverallvotewas8/7.This
outcomewasreachedbecause4ofthejusticeschosenottodeliberateontheissue,
andthevotesofjusticeswhohadfailedtomakearulingwereaddedtothedissenting
opinionstoreachamajorityforacquittal.Ofcourse,therewasnorightofappeal
fromtheConstitutionalCourt.Thepartieswhohadtakenthecasewereobviously
dissatisfiedwiththeoutcome.Thereweresubsequentattemptstoimpeachthejudges
whoweresuspectedofhavingactedinapartisanmanner.Despitetheoverwhelming
powerofthePM,theConstitutionCourtdeclaredtheApril2006electionstobe
invalid,butthisoutcomemightberegardedasadirectresponsetotheinterventionof
theKingwhofearedstreetviolenceiftheresulthadbeenallowedtostand.Withouta
directappealfromHisMajestytherewaslittleconfidencethatthecourtwouldhave
dischargeditsconstitutionalroleonthebasisoflegalprincipleestablishedunderthe
constitution.
Aswiththewatchdogbodiesdiscussedbelow,themostimportantissuehas
concernedtheroleoftheSenateintheselectionprocess.Undertheconstitutionitis
assumedthatnon-declarationofpartisanshipbySenatorswouldequalanupper
housewhichwaspoliticallyneutral.Thisgoalhasnotbeenachievedandisnotlikely
tobeachievedinthefuture.Therefore,theroleoftheSenateintheselection
procedureshouldberestrictedtovettingtheprobityofcandidatesplacedbeforethem
accordingtocriteriasetoutinadvance.
Similarly,underthe1997Thaiconstitution(coupledwiththerelatedorganic
law)therewereelaborateprovisionsto establishan independentcohortof
276
Anotherissuerelatestothefactthatanychangetotheprocedureswhichthecourtchooses
tofollowissubjecttotheunanimousapprovalofallfifteenjustices.Therulerequiring
unanimitymakesiteasyforasingledissentingjudgetoundermineanyproceduralchange.
277
20/2544:August3,2001.

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professionaljudgesintheAdministrativeCourts
278
.Judgeshavebeenappointedto
theadministrativecourtbytheJudicialCommissionoftheAdministrativeCourts
untiltheirretirement.Thesalariesofjudgesareprotected
279
.Judgescannotbetaken
offacaseoncetheyhavebeenassignedtoit.Theapplicationrequirementstothe
courtarerigorous.InordertobenominatedasanAdministrativeCourtjudge
candidatesmustbeThainationalsover35withappropriateacademicqualifications.
Inaddition,theymusthaverelevantexperience
280
.Therearecomplexproceduresfor
thedismissalofjudgeswhichareplacedinthehandsofajudicialcommission
281
.For
theSupremeAdministrativecourttheagelimitis45andcandidatesmusthave
servedasalawcouncillor,petitioncouncillororcouncillorofstate
282
.Conflictsof
interestareprohibitedundersection14
283
.Suchstringentrequirementslimitthepool
278
SeegenerallyAct on Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Court
ProcedureBE2542(1999)ss.12-30.
279
SeetheConstitutionandthe1999Actsection30.
280
Toqualifyacandidatemustshowserviceforatleast3yearsas:petitioncommissioneror
secretarytolawcouncillorsintheOfficeoftheCouncilofState;administrativecourt
official;judgeofthecivilcourt,criminalcourtorcentralmilitarycourt;provincialpublic
prosecutor;level-8governmentofficial;associateprofessorinhighereducationinlaw,
politicalscience,publicadministrationorsocialscience.Alsomastersgraduatesofwith10
yearspublicserviceanddoctoralgraduateswith6yearspublicserviceandattorneyswith
12yearsexperienceareeligibleascandidates.
281
See1999Act,Section24.
282
InFrancejudgesoftheadministrativecourtsarerecruitedintwoways,thepredominant
methodisfromtheNationalSchoolofAdministrationwhichhasactedasatraining
groundbuttheyarealsorecruitedfrom le tour exterieure.Thesearejudgesthathave
distinguishedthemselvesasadministratorsandlatterlybycompetitiveexamination
283
Judgescannotbe:permanentgovernmentofficial;employeesofastateagency;holdersof
politicalposition,directorsofastateenterpriseorstateagency;director,manageror
consultantwithapartnershiporcompany;actingasattorneyorotherprofessional
capacity.Ledtachementdanslecorpsdestribunauxadministratifsetdescoursadminist
rativesdappelsadresseauxfonctionnairesappartenantuncorpsrecrutparlavoiede
lENA,auxmagistratsdelordrejudiciaireainsiquauxprofesseursetmatresde
confrencestitulairesdesuniversitsetauxadministrateursterritoriaux.
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365
of possible appointees to suitably qualified candidates. The judges staffing the
French and Thai Administrative courts must not only meet certain age requirements
and qualifications, but they also need to demonstrate relevant experience.
Furthermore, administrative judges are specialists who only hear cases in the
Administrative Courts. The system thus differs from the situation in England and
Wales where the panel of High Court judges who staff the Administrative Court have
legal training and experience but are not specialists in public administration and
these judges for part of the year will also hear a range of cases with entirely different
subject matter as part of their assigned workload.
Susceptibility to political interference crops up at a higher stage in the
appointments process because the appointment of President of the Supreme
Administrative Court requires that a candidates is first nominated by the Commission
after which approval by the Senate is required before the name is submitted to the
King for final approval
284
. At this stage interference might be possible in the form of
opposition to particular candidates from private individuals or business interests
exerting an influence. For example, a nominated candidate with a reputation for
protecting the natural environment could find resistance from businesses who
consider their interests might be affected by environmentally friendly judgments.
Cases in the Administrative Courts of first instance are heard by a panel of 3 judges
and in the Supreme Administrative Court by 5 judges
285
.
In order t o perform i t s rol e effect i vel y t he Const i t ut i onal Court and
Administrative Courts depend on a cohort of judges that are insulated from direct
influence
286
. They must also be of sufficient calibre to perform their role effectively.
In order to form a professional cadre of judges that are unlikely to be tempted
into corrupt practises, and, at the same time, attract candidates of sufficiently high
calibre, it is essential that the incumbents are adequately remunerated. The salary
levels for Administrative Court judges at 550,200 bt p.a. (8500 sterling) and supreme
court judges at 709,080 bt p.a. (11,000 sterling) may appear relatively modest by
284
Section 278 of the Constitution.
285
1999 Act, Section 54.
286
Appointment system: Section 259 judges only serve one 9 year term.
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European standards, but these figures represent a substantial salary in terms of the
cost of living and the levels paid in the public domain to high ranking Thai
officials
287
. Nevertheless, public sector salaries are a sensitive subject in Thailand and
it should be stressed that the alleged self-award of pay increases by independent
watchdog bodies without obtaining parliamentary approval (including the
Constitutional Court and the Administrative Courts) has been subject to far reaching
and continuing controversy which has encouraged an emerging scepticism over the
constitutional reform programme
288
.
To secure independence it is also important that the court administration is
clearly separated from the executive and made independent from any government
department
289
. A Judicial Commission of the Administrative Courts is responsible for
disciplinary matters and promotion. Any resolutions for dismissal, for malfeasance in
office, gross disciplinary breach or imprisonment for a serious offence (section 23)
can only go ahead after an investigation by specially formed committee comprising,
amongst others, four judges of the Supreme Administrative Court has reported on the
matter
290
.

Reforming Judicial Appointments in the UK
Any comparison between Thailand and the UK must take account of the fact
that the UK lacks a constitutional court and no court, including the Supreme Court,
which will take over the jurisdiction from the judicial panel of the House of Lords in
2009, has the power to override legislation coming from Parliament. However, the
UK courts have an important role determining the legality of the actions of public
bodies under the judicial review procedure and the Human Rights Act 1998 which
can result in a strong political dimension in the cases coming before them. The
287
Salary levels for judges are openly published. See the English version of the Act of
Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Courts Procedure BE 2543
(1999).
288
See e.g., Constitutional Court Pay Rise: Give it Back The Nation, 25
th
October 2004.
289
Section 280, Thai Constitution 1997.
290
1999 Act, Section 23.
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rationaleforthereformofthesystemofjudicialappointmentsandtheintroduction
ofaSupremeCourtmeetingoutsideParliamenttoreplacetheHouseofLordswasto
createaclearerseparationofpowers.Inparticular,itremovesapreviousanomaly
whichhadallowedtheLordChancellortositasajudgeintheHouseofLordswhile
alsobeingaCabinetministerandSpeakeroftheHouseofLords.Thisanomalyalso
resultedinLawLords(i.e.thosejudgeswhowereappointedtothehighestappellate
court)havingtherighttositintheHouseofLordswhilealsoactingasserving
judges.ItshouldalsobepointedoutthatthereisadebateintheUKamongsome
judgesandlegalacademicsconcerningtheextentoftheroleofthecourtsintheir
capacitytochallengelegislatione.g.ifoppressivelawsarepassedbyParliament
whichthreatencivilliberties,wouldthecourtsthenbeabletointervenetolimitthe
applicationofsuchlaws?Inanyevent,ifthisinterventionistviewprevailedandthe
courtsweretoassumesucharole,itwouldobviouslypoliticisethecourtsandmake
itmuchmoretemptingforpoliticianstobecomeinvolvedinthejudicialappointment
process.
ThetaskofselectingjudgesintheUKhasbeenplacedinthehandsofa
JudicialAppointmentsCommissionforEnglandandWaleswhichhasbeen
establishedundertheConstitutionalReformAct2005asanindependentnon-
departmentalbody.Thepreviousmethodformakingappointmentstohigherjudicial
officeinvolvedinformalsoundingsbytheLordChancellorsDepartment(now
renamedDepartmentofConstitutionalAffairs)toascertaintheprofessional
competenceofpossiblecandidates,butdespitethelackoftransparency,itwas
generallyacceptedthatjudicialpromotionwasmainlyongroundsofprofessional
competence.Theannouncementofasubstantialchangefollowingtheappointmentof
anewLordChancellorin2003causedconsiderabledisquietfromseniorjudicial
figures,butalsofromthelegalprofessionmoregenerally.Therewasconcernfirst
thatthereformprocesswasbeingpursuedwithunduehasteandinadequate
consultation,andsecondlythatasystemmightbeintroducedthatcouldpoliticisethe
appointmentprocess.Infactseniorjudgesandacademicswereconsultedbeforethe
draftingofthelegislation,andtheviewsexpressedweretosomeextentincorporated
intheproposals.Somepoliticiansandconstitutionalistsfavouredtheintroductionof
anelementofparliamentaryinvolvementaspartoftheratificationprocess.However,
thebalanceofjudicialopinioncamedownstronglyinfavourofinsulatingthe
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368
process from political debate as much as possible, and this view has prevailed. The
role of the Lord Chancellor and the Prime Minister in the selection process under the
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is meant to be only marginal. The final approval of
the Monarch is a mere formality.
The Judicial Appointments Commission which takes over the role as the main
appointing body is itself largely appointed by open competition and it is responsible
for sel ect i ng j udges up t o and i ncl udi ng t he Hi gh Court . It compri ses 15
commissioners in total. The Judges Council, which is a body broadly representative
of the judiciary
291
, nominates 3 of the judicial members of the JAC after a request
from the Lord Chancellor (LC) to make one or more selections. The LC subsequently
recommends the candidate(s) that have been selected. The remaining members of the
JAC will be appointed by a panel set up for the purpose by the LC, but the LC must
accept t he r ecommendat i ons of t he panel and cannot subst i t ut e hi s own
preferences
292
. There are 5 lay members, 5 judges (three from the Court of Appeal or
High Court, one Circuit Judge and one District Judge) two professional members
(one barrister and one solicitor) one lay magistrate and one tribunal member. The
chair must be one of the lay members. Commissioners serve for between 3 and 5
years. The initial appointments to the Commission include seven women and two
from ethnic minorities one of whom chairs the Commission. The capacity to set up
such a system depends upon having a large enough pool of potential candidates of
sufficient distinction and experience to act as serving members of the JAC.
The weight attached by the LC to recommendations by the JAC for England
and Wales is of central importance, especially for appointments to the higher
judiciary. This issue comes down to whether the power to select which is given to the
JAC can be undermined by the ratification process. For appointments up to and
including the High Court the Secretary of State i.e. LC will inform the JAC when a
vacancy arises. After the selection and interviewing process has been carried out by
the JAC, a single name for each vacancy, together with reasons for the selection, will
be forwarded to the LC. The LC can accept the recommendation and indeed in the
vast majority of cases selections will be approved. However, the LC can ask the JAC
291
http://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk/about/aboutus.htm
292
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, Schedule 12.
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369
toreconsider,ifitappearsthattheevidencesubmitteddoesnotdemonstrate
suitability.TheLCcanrejectacandidateorrequirereconsiderationbutonlyifthere
issomeevidencethatthenominatedcandidatecannotbeconsideredforjudicial
appointment,orifheconsidersthatthecompetitionhasnotbeenconductedproperly.
InsituationswheretheinitialchoiceisnotacceptedthemattergoesbacktotheJAC.
Theoriginalcandidatecanbeconfirmed,oranalternativecandidatecanbeselected
withreasons.TherecommendedcandidategoesbacktotheLCwhocanonlyrejecta
candi dat e i f t here i s some evi dence maki ng t he candi dat e unsui t abl e for
consideration.Anysuchreasonsmustbesetoutinwriting.Ifacandidateisrejected
theLCisobligedtoacceptthenextrecommendedcandidate.Asystemhasbeen
devisedwhichincludesanexecutiveelementtotheappointmentsprocess,butwhich
leavesthechoiceofpossiblecandidatesentirelytotheselectionprocessandwhich
makesitverydifficultfortheLCtointerferewithchoicesarrivedatusingthe
specifiedproceduresunlessstrongevidencecomestolight.Inotherwordsitisvery
difficultfortheLCtoobjecttoanycandidatewhomeetstherequirementsofjudicial
officetothesatisfactionoftheJAC.
FortheappointmentofjudgestothenewSupremeCourt(andalsoforjudicial
headsofdivision)aselectioncommissionwillbespeciallyconvenedforthepurpose
whichmustincludethePresidentandDeputyPresidentoftheSupremeCourtand
membersofthejudicialappointmentscommissionsforEngland,Scotlandand
NorthernIreland
293
.ToensurethatallpartsoftheUnitedKingdomhaveappropriate
representationintermsofexpertiseconcerningtheirjurisdictionsontheSupreme
CourtthecommissionmustconsulttheFirstMinisterinScotland,theWelsh
Assembly and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland before making a
recommendationofasuitablyqualifiedpersontotheLC.TheLChasthentoconsult
furtherwithseniorjudgesandrepresentativesfromthedevolvedpartsoftheUnited
KingdombeforereachingadecisionontheCommissionsrecommendation.Ifthe
LCapprovesoftheCommissionschoicehecanapprove(notify)theselection
whichthengoesontobefinallyapprovedbythePrimeMinister.AtthispointtheLC
alsohastheoption,ifcertainspecifiedgroundsaresatisfied,ofrejectingthe
selectionorrequiringareconsideration buts/hehasnopowertochoosean
293
ConstitutionalReformAct2005,Ss.26and27.
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alternativecandidate.FortheappointmentofHeadsofDivisionofcourtsandAppeal
CourtjudgestheJACmustsetupaselectionpanelwhichreportsitsselectiontothe
LCwhohasbroadlysimilaroptionsregardingacceptance,rejectionoraskingfor
reconsideration.Onefurtherpointtomakeisthatbecausethereisincreased
transparencyinrelationtotheentirejudicialappointmentsprocess,itbecomesmuch
moredifficultforanyofthepoliticalplayerstooverstepthemark.

A Register of Judicial Interests?

Al t hough t he Const i t ut i onal ReformAct 2005 i nt roduces a Judi ci al
AppointmentsandConductOmbudsmantooverseethejudicialappointments
processandtheactcoversjudicialdiscipline,conflictsofinterestwhichmightaffect
judgesarenotdirectlyaddressedaspartoftheserecentreforms.Conflictsofinterest
havearisenfromtimetotimeintheUKcaselaw.Forexample,inthefamouscaseof
Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Proprietors(1852)3HL759adecisionwasset
asidebecausetheLordChancellorhadfailedtodeclareashareholdinginterestina
companywhichwaspartytotheproceedings.Muchmorerecentlyandevenmore
prominently,inR v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte(No.2)[1999]2WLR272LordHoffmanwhowasoneofthe
HouseofLordsjudgeshearinganextraditioncaseagainsttheex-Chileandictator
Pinochet,neglectedtodeclarehiscloseassociationwiththehumanrightscharity,
AmnestyInternational
294
.Amnestywererepresentedasaninterestedpartyinthe
proceedings.InanunprecedentedstepthejudicialcommitteeoftheHouseofLords
(thehighestUKdomesticappellatecourt)decidedtosetasideitsowndecisionon
thebasisofthisoversightbyLordHoffman.Thereisanexpectationthatajudge
hearingacasewillmentioninadvanceanypreviousassociationwiththepartiestoa
caseoranypotentiallyconflictinginterestsandoffertostandasideunlesstheparties
havenoobjection.ApublishedregisterofinterestswhichappliedtoseniorUK
judgesandwhichwouldberoughlyequivalenttothatwhichnowappliestoMPsand
294
Achallengebywayofjudicialreviewwaspossibleonthegroundsthatthedecisionwas
inconflictwithnaturaljustice/fairnessandinparticular,theruleagainstbias.Seee.g.
P.LeylandandG.AnthonyTextbook on Administrative Law,5thedn,Oxford,Oxford
UniversityPress,2005p.397.
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371
Peerswouldbeamethodofformalisingthisprocessandminimisingthisproblemin
thefuture.Equally,inrelationtotheThaicasetheintroductionofacompulsory
registerofinterestswhichappliedtojusticesoftheConstitutionalCourt(and
possiblytootherseniorjudgesandmembersofwatchdogbodies)couldreduceany
potentialconflictsofinterestandleadmoregenerallytogreateropenness.Ofcourse,
theregisteritselfwouldhavetobepolicedtoensurecompliancewiththerules.A
registerofinterestsmightalsobeanewrequirementapplyingtothesenior
appointmentstoalltheotherwatchdogbodies.

The Independence of the Thai Watchdog Bodies

A great deal of effort was put i nt o securi ng t he i ndependence of t he
constitutionalwatchdogs.First,ineverycaseaformalprocedurehasbeensetoutto
securetheappointmentofthesewatchdogbodies.Ifweturnfirsttoelections:In
ordertobuildasystemthatallowscleanelectionstotakeplace,anindependent
ElectionCommissionwasformed:gonewerethedayswhentheadministrationand
supervisionoflocalandgeneralelectionswereundertakenbythepowerfulminister
oftheinterior
295
.InordertoappointtheElectionCommissionaselectioncommittee
oftenmembershasbeensetup.Thecommitteemustinclude:thePresidentofthe
ConstitutionalCourtasChairmanandthePresidentoftheSupremeAdministrative
Court,fourRectorsofStatehighereducationinstitutions;fourrepresentativesof
politicalpartiesfromtheHouseofRepresentatives.Atthisstage,therearefive
qualifiedandsuitablenamesputforwardtothePresidentoftheSenate.The
nominationmustthenbeapprovedbyatleastthreequartersofmembersofthe
SelectiveCommittee.Also,atthispreliminarystagetheSupremeCourtarerequired
toputfivenamesforward.Forthenextstage,thePresidentoftheSenateholdsa
secretballotintheSenatetochosefromamongthetennominatedcandidates.The
fivepersonswhoreceivethehighestvotesareelectedasElectionCommissioners.
TheirelectionisthenconfirmedbytheKing
296
.Furthermore,commissioners
appointedtothesebodiescanonlyberemovedifaspecifiedprocedureisfollowed
295
SombatChantornvongThe1997ConstitutionandthePoliticsofElectoralReforminD.
McCargo(ed) Reforming Thai Politics,NIAS,2002,p.204.
296
ThaiConstitution,Section138.
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whichinvolvesthematterbeingplacedbeforeParliament
297
.
Asweturntotheotherwatchdogbodieswefindabroadlysimilarprocess.For
example,selectionformembersoftheNationalCounterCorruptionCommission
involvesatwostageprocessbuttheselectioncommitteewhichisoffifteenmembers
includesthePresidentoftheSupremeCourtofJusticeaswellasthePresidentofthe
ConstitutionalCourtandthePresidentoftheSupremeAdministrativeCourt
298
and
theCommitteearerequiredtosubmitalistofeighteennamesforavotetobetaken
intheSenate.TheHumanRightsCommissionispre-selectedbyanevenlarger
Senateappointedcommitteeoftwentysevenmemberswhichmustinclude
PresidentsoftheSupremeCourtandtheSupremeAdministrativeCourt,theattorney
general;chairmanofthelawsociety;10representativesofhumanrightsNGOs;5
frompoliticalparties;fivefromacademicinstitutions;andthreefromthemedia.The
committeeselects22candidatesfromwhichthe11humanrightscommissionersare
electedtoserveasingletermof6years.
Second, i t was envi saged by t he framers of t he const i t ut i on and i t s
accompanyinglegislationthatthewatchdogsweretobeheadedandpresidedoverby
suitablyqualifiedandwellrespectedindividualsofintegrityandsothereare
stringentcriteriathatneedtobefulfilledbypotentialcandidatesforconsiderationto
allposts.TheappointmentsystemisasrigorousasforjudgestotheConstitutional
CourtandAdministrativeCourts.TakeforexampletheNationalCounterCorruption
Commission,acandidatemustbeaThaicitizenover45yearsofagewithexperience
as a mi ni st er, j udge of t he Const i t ut i onal Court , El ect i on Commi ssi oner,
Ombudsman,memberoftheNationalHumanRightsCommission,memberofthe
StateAuditCommission,orwithexperiencenotlowerthanDeputyProsecutor-
General,Director-Generaloritsequivalent,orholdingthepositionnotlowerthan
297
Forexample,underSection142oftheConstitutionacomplaintthatanyElection
Commissionershouldbedisqualifiedorhasactedincontraventiontoanyprohibitions
requiresthesupportofatleast10%ofmembersofbothhousesbeforethePresidentofthe
SenateisrequiredtoreferthatcomplainttotheConstitutionalCourtforitsdecisionasto
whether that Election Commissioner has vacated his or her offce.
298
OrganicActonCounterCorruption2542(1999)Section7.
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Professor.Undersection10oftheActalistofexcludedcategoriesaresetout
299
.An
obviousdisadvantageinsettingoutinadvancerigorousconditionsforpotential
incumbentstomeetistoreducethepoolfromwhichpotentialofficeholderscanbe
drawn.Thepoolofpotentialcandidatesisreducedfurtherbecause,incommonwith
mostpublicsectorformsofemployment,thesepostsreceivedrelativelymodest
salariesandapersonelectedasaNCCCcommissionerisnotpermittedtocarryon
anyprofessionorconductbusinessoutsidehis/herofficialcapacity.Manypostshave
beenfilledbyhighrankingformermembersofthemilitaryorthepoliceforce,and
thesameindividualshavecirculatedfromonewatchdogbodytothenext
300
.These
positionsarelikelytoattractsuitablyqualifiedinsidersandparticularlypersons
approachingretirementoralreadyretiredandinreceiptofapension
301
.
Anotherfeaturewhichwascrucialinordertoestablishadifferenttypeof
independenceforeachofthesebodiesconcernedtheirfundingallocationand
organisationalstructure.Typically,thesettingupofeachbodyrequiresthe
establishmentofadistinctofficeandadministration
302
whichisnotdependentonany
partoftheexecutivethroughagovernmentdepartment.Oncecreated,each
commissionisaninstitutionititsownrightwhichformsauniquestructuretoenable
ittoperformitsstatutoryduties.Forexample,theECTissub-dividedintofourmain
divisions:InvestigationandAdjudicationOffice;ElectionAdministrationOffice;
GeneralAdministrationOffice;PoliticalPartyAffairsandReferendumOffice.The
HouseofRepresentativesDivision,theSenateDivisionandtheLocalElections
Departmentaresub-departmentsoftheElectionAdministrationOffice
303
.Likewise,
299
These include: existing offce holder, drugs, bankrupt, criminal record, suspended right to
vote,Buddhistpriest,dismissalfromservice,dismissalforcorruption.
300
Forexample,PolGen.VasanaPuemlarpthecurrentchairmanoftheECTpreviously
servedasSecretary-Generalofoneoftheotherwatchdogbodies,namely,theAnti-Money
LaunderingCommission(AMLO).Theothercommissionerscompriseaformerjudge,a
formergeneralandtwoformerseniorcivilservants.
301
ThecurrentECTcommissionersrangeinagefrom66to62yearsold.
302
Seesection302oftheConstitutioninrelationtotheNCCC.Insomecasethisinvolved
takingoveranexistingstructureandgivingitafreshremit.Forexample,theElection
commissionunderthe1991constitution.
303
AstructuralplanoftheECTisavailablefromthewebsite:http://www.ect.go.th/english/.
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theNCCChasanindependentsecretariatandtheOfficeoftheNationalCounter
CorruptionCommissionisgivenautonomyinthewayitorganisespersonnel,
administrationandbudget
304
.ThesebodiesarerequiredtoreporttoParliamentonthe
resultsoftheirinvestigationsandthustheprocessofrootingoutcorruptionwas
placedinthepublicdomainastheNCCCmustreportannuallyonitsfindings
305
.
EachCommissionisrequiredtooperatewithinthelimitsofabudgetwhichhastobe
approvedbyParliament.Workingwithintheseparametersallofthesebodieshavea
broadscopetodeterminenotonlytheirorganisationalstructure,butalsothe
conditionsofserviceandsalaryoftheirstaffincludingthecommissioners.Aswe
shal l see l at er t he NCCC was heavi l y cri t i ci sed and di scredi t ed aft er t he
Commissionersawardedthemselvesandtheirstaffsubstantialpayriseswithoutfirst
gainingparliamentaryapproval.Oncetheeffectivenessofany(orall)ofthesebodies
iscalledintoquestiontheirfundingmightberegardedasmerelydeadweightforthe
systemtocarry.
Theisolationoftheselectionprocessofpublicbodiesfromanydirectpolitical
influencewasundermined.Thiswasbecauseagreatdealhingedontheroleofthe
ThaiSenateasanimpartialconstitutionalarbiter
306
.Underthe1997constitution
candidateswishingtostandfortheSenatewerepreventedfromdeclaringanyparty
politicalaffiliation.Theideawastodesignasecondchamberwithadistinct
constitutional role which would provide wider representation and greater
independenceinoverseeingtheotherelectedhouse,theexecutiveandthebatteryof
watchdogbodies.However,ThaiRakThai,thegoverningpartyfrommid2001,
managedtobuildamajorityintheSenate
307
whichmeantthatoncethenamesofthe
PrimeMinistersassociateswereonthelist,theywerelikelytobeelected.Among
304
SeeThaiConstitutionSection302.
305
SeeThaiConstitution,Section301.Section7,OrganicActonCounterCorruption1999
providesthattheNCCCmustsubmitaninspectionreportandareportontheperformance
ofdutiestogetherwithremarkstotheCouncilofMinisters,theHouseofRepresentatives
andtheSenateannuallyandpublishthesereportsfordissemination.
306
P.PhongpaichitandC.BakerThaksin:The Business of Politics in Thailand, Silkworm
2005p.174.
307
Thisoutcomewasallegedlyachievedbymakingillicitpaymentstoindividualsenators.
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thereplacementsselectedtotheECTwasGeneralSirinThoopklamwhohadhimself
beendisqualifiedfromelectiontotheSenate
308
.Hewassoonappointedchairmanof
t he ECT. However, i n t he meant i me t he mat t er had been r ef er r ed t o t he
ConstitutionalCourtandinmid2002thecourtruledthatthisappointmenthadbeen
technicallyflawedandorderedhisremoval.Onceagain,theappointmentprocessfor
theThaiAuditorGeneralwasdeclaredunlawfulbytheConstitutionalCourt
309
.

Appointment Procedures for

Non-Departmental Public Bodies in the UK and Italy
Incontrasttothesystemapplyingtojudicialappointmentswhichisdesignedto
minimisepoliticalinvolvement,ministersaremoreactiveintheprocessfor
appointmentstootherpubliclyfundedbodiesintheUK.However,inmakingsuch
appointmentsthereisastrongpublicinterestinensuringthatsuitablyqualified
candidatesareselected.TheCommissionerforPublicAppointmentswhoisan
officialindependentofthegovernmenttogetherwiththeOfficeoftheCommissioner
forPublicAppointmentsoverseestheprocessofpublicappointmentstoNon-
DepartmentalPublicBodies(NDPBs)madebyministers
310
.Thesebodiesareoften
referredtoasQuangos,andincludenationalisedindustries,publiccorporations,
NHSbodiesandutilityregulators.Inmostcasesthesebodiesacttoagreateror
lesserextentatarmslengthfromMinisters,althoughMinistersmaybeaccountable
fortheperformanceofthesebodies.TheCommissionerregulates,monitors,reports
onandadvisesonsuchappointments.Thefinaldecisionrestswiththeminister,but
sincetheintroductionoftheCommissionerin1995followingthereportbyLord
Nolanacodeofpracticeintroducesaregulatoryframeworktodetermineprocedures
308
AlsoappointedwereajudgewhoseapprovalhadbeenrejectedbytheKing,anofficial
who was under investigation for corruption and another offcial who had been accused of
printingfakeelectionballots.
309
TheConstitutionCourtfoundinJuly2004thattheselectionprocessleadingtoJaruvan
Maintakasappointmenthadbeenillegal.Noagreementoveranalternativecandidatewas
reachedleadingtoaperiodofuncertainty.AuditPaneltoConsideritsLegalOptionsThe
Nation,27September2005.
310
http://www.ocpa.gov.uk/the_code_of_practice.aspx.
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formakingsuchappointments
311
.Theguidingprinciplesspecifythatpublic
appointmentsshouldbegovernedbytheoverridingprincipleofselectionbasedon
merit.Anappointmentspanelshouldbesetupwhichmakeswell-informedchoices
onthebasisofabilityandexperiencematchingtherequirementsofthepublicbody
inquestion.Theprocessofappointmentshouldbescrutinisedbyanindependent
panel.Itisassumedthatboardmembersofpublicbodieswillbecommittedto
principlesandvaluesofpublicservice.Theappointmentprocessforsuchpostsmust
betransparent.Therewillbegeneralcommitmenttoequalopportunitiesinmaking
suchappointments.
TurningnexttobrieflymentiontheItaliancase.Theissueofappointmentshas
recentlyariseninanewconstitutionalcontext
312
.Atthebeginningofthe1990sItaly
beganaprocessofprivatisationandliberalisationofstateownedcompanies.To
facilitatethischangeanewseriesofpublicauthoritiesorwatchdogbodieswereset
upinordertopromoteandprotectafree,competitivemarket.Thesebodiesare
generallydefinedundertheItaliansystemofconstitutionallawasIndependent
AdministrativeAuthorities (autorit amministrative indipendenti).Thenewauthori
tiesareexpectedtoperformaregulatoryfunctioninaparticularsectorofthe
economyandtheyarechargedwithensuringafreecompetitivemarketinconformity
withtheprovisionsofEUlaw.However,particularlyrelevanttothediscussionin
thispaper,theyareconceivedasoperatingindependentlyfromgovernmentandfrom
thegoverningparty.Inordertosecureindependencefromtheexecutivebranchof
governmentnoneofthemembersofthesebodiesareappointedbytheGovernment.
Ifwetakeforexample
313
theAutorit garante della concorrenza e del mercato
311
Seethereportsofthe Committee on Standards in Public Life andinparticularthefirst
report of this committee CM 2840 (1995) which set out general principles of selfessness,
integrit,objectivity,accountability,openness,honestyandleadership.Theseprinciples
havesincebeenwidelyembeddedinparliamentarycodesofpracticeandtheprocesses
adoptedfortheappointmentandmanagementofpublicbodies.Alsoforanoverviewsee
P.LeopoldStandardsofConductinPublicLifeinJ.JowellandD.Oliver(eds.)The
Changing Constitution,5
th
edn,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2004.
312
R.BinandG.PitruzellaDiritto Publico,2nded.,Giapichelli,Torino,2006p.444ff.
313
TwootherauthoritieswhichareappointedbyasimilarprocessaretheAutorit per le gar
anzie nelle telecomunicazioni (TVandradiowatchdog)andtheGarante per la privacy
(overseesrighttoprivacy).
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(setupin1990)commonlyknownastheAnti-trustwatchdog,thisauthorityisa
collegialbodycomposedoffiveboardmembers,oneofwhomactsasChairman.The
Authorityisrequiredtoactwithtotalautonomyandindependenceofjudgmentand
assessment.Thelegislationprovidesthatfourmembersshallbepersonsofwell-
knownindependence.Theselectionprocessisconductedbyapanelcomprisedof:
judgesservingontheSupremeAdministrativeCourt(CouncilofState),theCourt
ofAuditors,theCourtofCassation,fullprofessorsofEconomicsorLaworrespected
businessexecutivesofparticularlyhighprofessionalrepute
314
.Thecandidates
emergingfromthisprocessareconfirmedjointlybythePresidentsoftheItalian
ChamberofDeputiesandSenateandtheyserveforafixednon-renewabletermof7
years
315
.Therearestrictrulesconcerningconflictsofinterestwhichapplytothe
boardandofficialsoftheauthority
316
.Itisworthdrawingacomparisonbetween
thesewatchdogbodiesandthestrongpoliticaldimensiontotheappointmentofthe
BoardofAdministrationofRAI(ItalianStateTelevision).Amatterwhichcaused
particularconcernunderthepreviousgovernmentasthePrimeMinisteralreadyhad
extensiveprivatebroadcastinginterests,butwasalsoinapositiontoinfluencethese
appointments.Aswithwatchdogbodiesinothercountries,thereisadebateamong
Italiancommentatorsastothedemocraticlegitimacyoftheseauthorities.

Conclusion: Evaluating Methods of Appointment

Itwillbeapparentthataformulaforkeystrategicpublicappointmentswith
onlylimitedvariationswasadoptedunderthe1997ConstitutioninThailand.Inmost
instancesthisinvolvedatwostageprocess.Thefirststagerequiringarepresentative
appointingcommitteetobesetupwhichbroadlyrepresentedanappropriaterangeof
interests.Thecommitteewasgiventhetaskofselectingfromthepotentialfield
doublethenumberofcandidatesrequiredtofillthevacancies.TheSenatewasthen
requiredtomakethefinalselectionbyasecretballotvoteuntiltherequirednumber
ofcandidateswereelected.Ithasalreadybeenpointedoutmorethanoncethatthe
314
Section10(2),Law287,October10,1990.
315
http://www.agcm.it/
316
Law215ofJuly20,2004.
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reasonforgrantingthisroletotheSenateunderthe1997constitutionwasbecause
theSenatewasmeanttobeanon-partisanbody.Inpractice,theAchilleshealofthe
systemwasthattheThaiSenatebecamepoliticised.Inturn,thepoliticaldimension
tothevotingcalledintoquestiontheroleofthesenateintheappointmentsprocess.It
wouldberelativelystraightforwardtomodifytheproceduretoeliminatethis
particularproblem.Insteadofvotingontheselectionssubmittedbytheappointing
committeetonarrowdownthenumberofcandidatestheSenatesrolemightbe
confinedtovettingsuitablyqualifiedcandidates.Forexample,theemphasisonthe
selectionpanelorcommitteeselectingthecandidateforratificationisoneaspectof
theUKsystemforappointingjudgeswhichmightbeapplicableinThailand.The
Senatewouldonlybeabletorejectnomineesonnarrowlydefinedgrounds.The
resultwouldbethatinmostcasestheoriginalchoicewouldbeconfirmed,but,asin
theUKwithjudicialappointments,ifachoiceoftheappointingcommitteeis
rejectedtheeffectwouldbetoasktheappointingcommitteetosubmitanothername
forministerialapproval.
Itwouldhoweverbeamistaketoimaginethatthischangewould,initself,
solvetheproblemofdeliveringnonepartisancandidates.Ifthesystemwaschanged
inthiswaythepressurepointwouldshiftfromtheSenateandinsteadfocusonthe
appointmentoftheselectioncommitteeresponsibleforreferringcandidatestothe
Senateforratification.Onceagain,withreferencetotheUKandItaliansystemstwo
recommendationcanbemade.First,theselectionprocessofsuchappointing
committeesmustbetransparent.Anyattempttoimproperlyinfluenceselection
wouldthusbeexposed.Second,itwillbeimportantthatclearguidelinesaresetout
concerningthecompositionofthecommitteesandtheprinciplesadoptedforthe
selectionofcandidates,withanenforcementprocesstoensurethattheseguidelines
arefollowed.Whateverfuturesafeguardsareinplacethepoliticalplayersmust
recognisetheimportanceofnotsubvertingthemechanismscreatedunderthe
constitutiontopreventabuse.
Incertaincasestheselectionprocesshasmorethanoneelement.Itwasalso
notedabovethatalmosthalftheConstitutionalCourtjusticesareelectedfromthe
judiciary.Thismethodisinconformitywithaninternalappointmentssystem.Some
expertshavearguedthatanadvantageofasystemofpeergroupappointmenttoa
ConstitutionalCourtisthatthejudiciaryhaveavestedinterestinselectingthebest
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possiblecandidatesandthatsuchasystemismostlikelytoproduceaccurate
constitutionalreview.Thisisbecausetherewillthenbeanassumptionofjudicial
neutrality.Astanceof(relative)neutralitysuitstheagendaofprofessionaljudges
who will be concernedto foster their reputation for impartialityunder the
constitution
317
.
Theconstitutionwill,ofcourse,alsohavetoaddressmanyotherrelatedissues.
Oneobviousproblemthataroseunderthepreviousconstitutionconcernedthesalary
levelspaidnotonlytojudgesbutalsotothemembersoftheWatchdogbodies.To
attractcandidatesofsufficientcalibre,andtoreducethelikelihoodofanyfinancially
basedtemptation,itiscrucialthatadequatelevelsofpaymentareinprospect.The
proposalfortheintroductionofastrictlyenforcedcompulsoryregisterofinterestsis
anotherissuethatwasbrieflymentioned.Theregisterwouldhelpeliminateconflicts
ofinterestsfromarisingbyforcinganyindividualjudgetostanddownfrom
involvementinacaseswhereaconflictofinterestmightactuallyoccurorbe
perceived.
317
Ginsberg2003p.44.
Group 4
Oversight of the Exercise State Power by the People
King Prajadhipoks Institute
383
Inspection of the State Power
by the Public
Boonlert Changyai
Senior reporter, Matichon Newspaper

A ninspectionoftheuseofstatepowerisanadministrativetheorythatbring
abouteffectiveandhonestadministration.Althoughtherearelawsandorganizations
toregulateandcontroltheuseofstateauthorityandpowerofadministrativesector
andothersectors,thesesectorsoftenusetheirpowerbeyondscopeofworkand
authorityandoverusethepowerwhichleadstoerrorsandmistakesingovernment
serviceadministration.Moreover,thepowerisusedwrongfullytoseekfortheir
benefits.Duringthewholeof9yearssincethebeginningoftheConstitutionalofthe
KingdomofThailandB.E.2540(1997)(promulgatedon11
th
OctoberB.E.2540
(1997))until19
th
SeptemberB.E.2549(2006),theCoupdEtatdonebythe
DemocraticReformCouncilanddepletetheConstitutiontowritethenewone.
Peoplehavelearntthefollowing:
1. Theuseofstateauthorityandpowerofgovernmentandotherorganizations,
inspectionofstateauthorityandpowerbygovernmentorganization
(independentorganizations)accordingtotheprovisionsoftheConstitution,
governmentwillbeexaminedbyoppositionpartiesandthesenate.Thisis
consideredaspoliticalinspectionwhichachievedbothsuccessandobstacle.
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So,thereisasayingthatindependentorganizationisbeingintervenedby
governmentsomuchthatitisnolongerhasindependency.
2. Stateauthorityandpowerinspectionbythepeople,althoughanoriginal
constitutionwasabrogated,therearemanythingsthatappearedand
recordeddownduringthepast9yearswhichisworthbeingstudied,
analyzedandcriticizedasasummaryoflessonlearnedwhichwillbringto
betterimprovementespeciallyforthemakingofthenewConstitutionafter
CoupdEtatbytheCouncilforDemocraticReformundertheConstitutional
Monarchyandthepublicsdrivetocomprehensivelyexamineandverifythe
useofstatepoweraswellasscopeofstateauthority.
Somemayunderstandthatstatepowermeansadministeredgovernment;and
administeredgovernmentmeanspoliticianswhobecomePrimeMinisterorcabinet
memberswhousetheirpowertoformulatepolicies,allocatebudgetandexpenditure,
appointandtransferseniorandjuniorgovernmentofficials(however,thelawsstate
thatministersareprohibitedtointervenetheappointmentandtransferofgovernment
officerrankedbelowlevel11becauseitistheauthorityoftheministerialpermanent
secretariesanddirector-generals),aswellasregulate,controlandcommand
governmentofficialsandstateenterpriseofficerstofollowcommandsandordersof
thePrimeMinisterandcabinetmembers.Theyclaimthatthesearepoliciesinwhich
whoeverviolates,dissatisfies,orrefusestoobeythecommandsmaybetransferred.
Infact,statepowercoverswiderscopethanthat.Besideslegislativepower,
executivepower,andjudicialpowerwhicharethe3mainsovereigntypowersto
check-balanceeachpower,italsoincludeslocaladministrationandvarious
independentorganizationsestablishedbytheConstitutionB.E.2540(1997);andthe
InterimConstitutionB.E.2549(2006)hasallowedtomaintainindependent
organization.
WhentheConstitutionDraftingAssemblyfinishesmakingnewConstitution,it
willneedtogetpublicopinionbeforethepromulgation.Butitwillmaintainexisting
independentorganizationsoritwouldbechangedoraddedunderthestatepower.
Whenthereareorganizationsandinstitutions,thereareusers of state power
ineachorganizations.Thesesusersofstatepowerareasfollows:
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1.Users of l egi sl at i ve power consi st of t he Speaker of t he House of
Representatives,SenateSpeaker,membersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,
senators.
2.UsersofexecutivepowerconsistofthePrimeMinister,theDeputyPrime
Ministers,ministers,andsecretarygeneralofprimeminister,secretarytothe
ministers,thePrimeMinistersadvisors,andministersadvisors.
3.Usersofjudicialpowerconsistofpresidentofthecourt,andjudges.
4.Usersofstatepowerwhoarethegovernmentofficialscomprisecivil
official,militaryofficers,policeofficers,andstateenterpriseemployees
bothincentralandmunicipalareas.High-rankinggovernmentofficialswill
havehighauthoritysuchasministerialpermanentsecretary,director-
general,militarycommander,policecommander,andgovernor.
5.Users of state power in local administration consist of sub-district
administrationorganization,municipality,provincialadministration
organization,BangkokMetropolitanAdministration.Eachorganizationhas
administrativebodysuchassub-districtmayors,mayors,provincialmayors,
togetherwithlocalexecutivesandcouncilssuchaschairmanofsub-district
council,chairmanofmunicipalcouncil,chairmanofprovincialcounciland
memberofthecouncils.
6.UsersofstatepowerintheinspectionorganizationconsistofConstitutional
Court,theCourtofJustice,SupremeCourt(theCriminalProsecution
Sectionforthosewhoholdpoliticaltitles),AdministrativeCourt,Officeof
theNationalCounterCorruptionCommission,ElectionCommissionof
Thailand,theOmbudsmanofThailand,theAuditorGeneralofThailand
(Governor),theNationalHumanRightsCommission.
Theseusersofthestateauthorityandpowercannotutilizethepowerfreelybut
ithastobeunderthescopeprescribedintheConstitutionandlawsaswellas
notification,rules,regulations,codeofconducts,orders,andministerialregulations.
RulesandregulationscannotopposeoragainsttheConstitution(fortheactual
practiceoraction,theprovisionoflawsunderconstitutioncreatesargumentsand
differentinterpretationregardingmeaningofthewrittenwordswhichmayallow
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lawsandregulationstooverwritetheConstitution.Thisalsoincludesproblemofthe
judgmentbymajorityvoteoftheConstitutionalCourt,whetheritmeetsthetrue
intentionoftheConstitutionalornot).
Throughout9yearsundertheConstitutionB.E.2540,theuseofstatepower
thatimpactmoreorlessonthenationalsecurityandstability,economic,rightsand
freedom,andhumandignity.Theinspectionoftheuseofstatepowerbythepublic
hasbothachievedsuccessfulresultwithsmoothoperationandencounteredmany
obstaclestogetherwithreasonsandnecessitythatthepublicneedtoexamine.
Mechanismfortheinspectionofstatepowerbyotherorganizations,tocontrol
andtocheckandbalance,hasbeensetintheconstitutionB.E.2540andsubordinate
legislation.Throughout5yearsofThaksinsgovernment,(February2544-September
2549),theinspectionbalancewascompletelydestroyedduetointerventionand
predominationofstatepowerbythegovernment.Thereisalsotheuseofmoney
power.Forexample,membersoftheHouseofRepresentativesfromthegovernment
sidealwaysprotectthegovernmentandthesenatorsarealsoactlikeslavesof
government,somebodyinNationalCounterCorruptionCommission,Election
CommissionofThailand,andjudgesofConstitutionalCourtmakepeoplefeelthat
theytakessidewiththegovernmentbynotconsideringrightnessandfairness.
WhenusersofstatepoweroftheorganizationsundertheConstitutiondonot
actaccordingtotheConstitution,violateandexploitthelawsunethically,donot
utilizepowerfreely,thepublichavetoplayimportantroleinexaminingand
verifying the use of state power to be in conformity with objectives of the
ConstitutionB.E.2540.Themainobjectivesareasfollows:
1.Tomakeusersofthestatepowerforadministration(government)govern
andadministercountryopenly,transparently,effectively,andbenefitthe
publicalloverthecountryandhavesustainabledevelopment.Thisalso
includeseradicationofcorruptioninvariousforms.
2.Tomakeusersofstatepowerintermsofindependentorganizationsperform
theirdutyfreelywithhonestyandeffectiveness.
Itisaimedatleadingthecountrytowardtherightdirection.Also,thecountry
hasusersofstatepowerwhoareequippedwithseveralkindsofgoodnesssuchas
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nobleness,honesty,dedication,unselfishness,alwaysconsiderbenefitofcountryasa
whole,respecthumanrights,andawareofhumandignity.
Theformatofinspectionconductedbythepublic:thepublicwhoplayarolein
verifyingtheuseofstatepowermeansgeneralpeopleundertheConstitution,under
theadministrationofgovernmentwhichutilizeexecutivepower,underthesenate
usinglegislativepower,underjudicialcourtusingjudicialpowertoconsiderand
makeadecisionoflawsuits,underindependentorganizationswhoisresponsiblefor
theinspection.
Thepublicmeanspeopleinallgroups,alloccupationswhohaverightsand
freedomstoargueagainst,suggest,demand,disagree,refuse.Itcanbeacademics,
scholars,students,businessmen,non-governmentalorganizations(NGOs),
democraticorganization,etc.Itcanbedividedinto2maingroupsasfollows:
1.TheindividualmeanstheactofpersonsuchasDoctorPravetWasi,Senior
ResidentwritealettertothePrimeMinister(PoliceLieutenantColonel
ThaksinShinawatra),writearticlesinthenewspaper,beasguestspeakerof
varioustopicsfocusingoncriticizingtheperformanceofthegovernment
andprovidingrecommendationsandsuggestions.Mr.TeerayuthBoonmee,
LecturerofSocialandhumanstudiesfacultyatThammasartUniversity,
makestatementscriticizingsocietyandThaipolitics,criticizinggovernment
andgivenicknametotheThaksinsgovernmentetc.
2.Thegroup,organization,orcommitteemeansunificationofvarious
organizationssuchastheThirtyOrganizationsNetwork,clubsand
associations,DemocracyFederation,CampaignforPopularDemocracy-
CPD,MediaReformCommission,PeoplesAllianceforDemocracy-PAD,
ScholarsNetworkforDemocracy,groupsofpeoplewhosentpetitionstothe
government,andindependentorganization,etc.
Theinspectionimplementedbyindividualororganizationsaretheuseofrights
inthenameofthepeoplewhoownthecountry,theownerofsovereignpower,and
taxpayerswhosemoneyisusedtopayforsalariesandwagesofthosewhousestate
power.TheyareprotectedandsupportedbytheConstitutionB.E.2540(1997)to
involveinpoliticalactivities,andtoparticipateintheinspectionoftheuseofstate
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powerwhichisthemainfactorfortheestablishmentofnewpolitics.Inthenew
politics,usersofstatepowershouldnotperformanythingthatwoulddestroythe
countrybycommittinganyseveremistakesanderrorsandshouldnotseekunlawful
andwrongfullybenefits.
Theuseoftheabove-mentionedrightsandfreedomswouldbepublicizedby
massmediabecausetohaveinformationisabasicrightofpeople.Peopleandmass
mediahavefreedomtoexpressideas,write,speak,print,andadvertiseetc.
Massmediaisnottheusersofstatepowerbutitisaprofessionwhichcan
presentinformation,knowledge,andentertainmentthroughseveralkindsofmediain
theformofprinting,electronicmedia(radioandtelevision)byusingfreedomsinthe
nameofthepeople.Therefore,massmediaisclassifiedaspartofthepublicandis
aninstitutethatplayaroleintheinspectionoftheuseofstatepowerdirectly
(printingmediaistheonlymediawhichhasoutstandingrolewhereasradioand
televisionmediasarenotdaretoverifyastheyarecontrolledbytheusersofstate
power.So,theyarefocusingonentertainmentprogramssuchassoapopera,game
shows,music)etc.
Themaininspectionsoftheuseofstatepowerbythepublicduringthepast9
years(morethan3yearsinChuanLeekpaisgovernmentandmorethan5yearsin
Thaksinsgovernment)thathavebeenaccomplishedarethatofgovernments
policies,corruptionofgovernmentbodies,andinterventiontotheindependent
organizationetc.
Thereareseveralformsandtopicsoftheinspectionofstatepowerutilization,
forexample:
1.Thedisclosureofthecorruptionof1,400millionbathsintheprocurement
ofmedicinesandmedicalsuppliescommittedbyministersandgovernment
officialsinPublicHealthMinistry.ThepublicrequestedtheNational
CounterCorruptionCommissiontoseriouslyexaminethecase.Finally,
AdvisortotheDeputyMinisterofPublicHealthMinistrywassentencedto
6yearsinprisonfortaking5millionsBahtbribefrommedicalcompanyby
theSupremeCourt.PublicHealthMinisterwassentencedto15yearsin
prisonformalpractice.Hewasruledtohavebecomeunusually rich
whileinofficeandhisassetsweresubjecttoseizure.
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2.To petition to theAdministrative Court to stop privatization of the
ElectricityGeneratingAuthorityofThailandbyrequestingtheCourtto
immediatelystopstockselling.
3.TopetitiontotheAdministrativeCourtforthecaseofimproperselectionof
NationalBroadcastingCommissionmembers
4.Movementtocollectnamesofnolessthan50,000peopletodemotePol.Lt.
Col.ThaksinShinnawatra
5.TopetitiontotheAdministrativeCourtandConstitutionalCourtforthecase
thatthenationalelectionon2and29April2006organizedbytheElection
CommissionofThailanddidnotcompliedwiththeelectiveconstitution.
Theelectionwasnotconfidentialbecausethechangeofelectionformatthat
thevotershadtoturntheirbackstowardthepublicandelectioncardwas
easytobeviewbyotherpeopleandtheuseofstampinsteadofpen.
6.Setuppressrelease,forumfordiscussion,dialoguesamongdifferent
platforms,submitlettertorequest,protest,andwritearticleinnewspaper,
etc.
7.TopetitiontotheSupremeAdministrativeCourtthecasethattheRevenue
DepartmentabdicatetheirdutytocollecttaxfromthesellingofShinCorp
sharestoTemasekFundofSingaporegovernment.
8.ToappealagainsttheElectionCommissionofThailandtotheCriminal
Courtforunlawfulperformanceandabdicationofduty.Finally,theCourt
sentencedtoimprison3membersoftheElectionCommissionofThailand
9.ToprotestanddismissmembersoftheElectionCommissionofThailandat
theoffice
10.To form ademonstration to protest and expel Pol. Lt. Col.Thaksin
Shinawatratostophisinvolvementinpoliticsandresignfromtheprime
ministerposition
Inconclusion,theformsofinspectionofstatepowerutilizationbythepublic
compriseinterview,discussion,petitiontoindependentorganizationssuchas
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Administrative Court and Constitutional Court, file charges to the Court of Justice,
demonstration, protest, expel, etc.
The inspection of state power utilization by the public can be implemented by
these important inspectors as follows:
1. University teachers, who are equipped with knowledge and expertise on the
facts and information regarding problematic issues, can write complaints.
Apart from having clear understanding of problem, they must write
complaints that cited and referred to the provisions of law that ordinary
people cannot.
2. People organizations established based on the groups interests on any issues
that they want to follow up and monitor such as malfeasance, environmental
conservation, protest against the privatization of state enterprises, protest
against the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), protection of consumers rights
and privileges, etc.
3. Labor groups such as state enterprises unions
4. Student groups such as student association and student leagues
5. Mass media, especially newspaper, present news and information to the
public for the inspection of state power utilization and initiate news
presentation for the inspection of the use of state power in several sectors
such as disclosure of malfeasance, abdication of duty, avoidance to act
according to the provision of laws, vicious implementation of policies and
incorrect problem solving. Moreover, mass media also can write down the
analysis and critics of unlawful or wrongful behavior and performance that
cause destructive impacts on the country and the public.

Achievements Obstacles from the Inspection
There were both achievements and obstacles in the inspection of state power
utilization. The achievements were the follow-up of the drug corruption, determent
of the privatization of the Electricity Generating of Thailand, determent and
cancellation the election on the 2
nd
April 2006, lawsuit against 3 members of the
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ElectionCommissionofThailand,etc.Theobstaclewasthereisnoactionfrom
responsible organizations.They did not even receive the case for further
implementationandfinallynothinghappened.Forexample,anindependent
organizationrefusedtoreceivethecomplaintbecausethedocumentswereincorrect
andincompleteortheseorganizationsmadeonlydecisionsthatbenefitusersofthe
statepowerortheoneswhowerechargedagainst.
Theinspectionofstatepowerutilizationbythepeoplefacedseveralproblems
andobstaclessuchas
1. Theinspectionwasreportedtothepolicetakelegalactionsagainst
i nspect ors such as t o fi l e defamat i on sui t i n cri mi nal case, t o fi l e
infringementsuitincivilcase,andtorequestforagreatamountof
compensationsbyPol.Lt.Col.ThaksinShinawatra,theformerPrime
Minister,membersofShinawatrafamily,andministersortheusersofstate
powerinthesamegovernment.
PersonswhowereontrialareMissSupinyaKlangnarong,Mr.Teerayuth
Boonmee,Mr.SangsitPiriyarangsan,leadersofthePeoplesAlliancefor
Democracy,andnewspapers.
2. Theinspectionwasreportedtothepoliceandfiledchargesaccusingof,for
example,trafficobstruction,publicdisturbancebyusingamplifier
microphoneorloud-speaker,mafiaorgangster,lese-majeste,etc.Persons
whowereontrialareleadersofthePeoplesAllianceforDemocracy.
3. Itwasdifficultandwastedtimesandexpenses.Forexample,aninitiator
mustidentifyhimself/herselftotheSpeakeroftheSenatetocollectnames
ofthe50,000voters,alongwiththeircopiesofidentitycards,whousethe
righttocasttheirvotesinthepreviouselectioninordertodemotepersons
whoholdhighpositiontitles.Theinitiatorsalsomustbepenalizedor
punishedifthereareanyerrorsormistakesderivedfromtheactionsthat
contradicttheprovisionsoflaw.
4. Theinspectorswerethreatened,frightened,andhurtbygovernmentofficials
andgangsters.Thepoliceofficersthreatenedthembyinterrogating,
informing,andsendinglettersorsummonorarrestwarranttotheirparents
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livingupcountry.Thisfrightenedtheirparentssomuchandfearedthat
theremaybesomethingdangerousandharmfulhappentothemselvesand
theirchildren.Theywerehurtbygangsterssuchastocrashwithfoots,hit,
rummage,scoldwithrudewords,etc.
DuringthedemonstrationtodeposePol.Lt.Col.ThaksinShinawatraand
membersoftheElectionCommissionofThailand,policeofficersdidnot
stoportakelegalactionagainstanyonewhoinfringedthelawsbecause
policeofficersaremechanismoftheusersofstatepowerandtheonewho
breakthelawswerethetoolstoprotectandhelpholdersofstatepower.
5. Theverificationofstatepowerintermsofpolicies:projectsimplementedby
theholdersofstatepower(government)thatpointedoutthedamagethat
wouldhappentothecountryandthepublic,forexample,policyon
popularism,freetradepolicy,policyonprivatizationofstateenterprises,
WaronDrugpolicywiththeuseofsevereviolencethatleadtokillings
(extrajudicialkilling),policyonthesolvingofdisturbancesandviolencein
the3southernThaiprovincesTherewereseveralactionsthatshowed
inefficientandineffectiveadministrationofthecountrysuchastoallow
killingofinnocentpeople,allowpeopletokilleachotherwithdeadly
weaponwithoutcontrollingmeasuresforharmony,peaceandorderlinessof
country,etc.Therewerenoresponsetoimprove,correct,orpunishedthe
oneswhousestatepowerindamagingthecountry.
6. Governmentofficialwhichisagovernmentmechanismdidnotperform
their duties legally and straightforwardly such asthe Anti-Money
Laundering Office(AMLO)secretlyandlawfullyinvestigatedbusiness
transactionofjournalists,NGOs,andsoon.However,theAMLOofficers
didnotbepunishedbecauseofassistancefromhigh-rankingpeoplefrom
politicalside.TheRevenueDepartmentdidnotleviedtaxfromthestocks
sellingofrelativesoftheusersofstatepoweranddidnotdaretotakelegal
actionagainstnomineecompanywhotakecareofbuyingandsellingshares
ownedbyrelativesoftheusersofstatepower.Policeofficerwould
acceleratecasesthatbenefitpersonswhohadstatepower.Forexample,an
assassinationattemptofPol.Lt.Col.ThaksinShinawatra,thehigh-ranking
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officialsoftheRoyalThaiPolicewhowereresponsibleforthecaseseemed
torushtoconclusionthatthosebadguysreallywantedtokillthePrime
Minister,provideevidences,andworkedextremelyquick.Eventhough,
manypeoplethoughtthatitwasaprofessionalplottocreateasituationand
newstosolvepoliticalgame.OncetherewasaCoupdEtaton19
th
September2006,thecaseandpoliceslegalactionswerechanged.
Inaddition,thecasethattheusersofstatepowerorgroupsofpeople,whoact
asgangsters,causedtrouble,threatened,andhurtpeople;policeofficersdidnottake
anyactionabruptly.Butthepublicwhoactedasinspectorswouldbeunfairly
chargesforseveralaccusation.
Allkindsofinjusticeandunfairnesshappenedtothepeoplereflecteddefects
andweaknessesinlaws,lawenforcement,andmoralityoftheusersofstatepower.

Recommendations Methods for

Solving Problem and Protecting the People
Roleofthepeopleintheverificationofstatepowerinawhole9yearsunder
theConstitutionB.E.2540(1997)(5yearsunderthePol.Lt.Col.Thaksins
government)couldberegardedasprominentpowerandpotentialthatseverely
affectedtheusersofstatepowersuchaserroneouspolicyimplementation,several
formsofcorruption(thecorruptpoliciesandconflictofinterests).Although,thePol.
Lt.Col.Thaksinsgovernmenttriedtosolvepoliticalproblemstostayinpowerby
severalapproachessuchasmobilizationofpeopletosupportPol.Lt.Col.Thaksin;a
groupofpeoplewhosupportedPol.Lt.Col.Thaksinreviledthecourt,cursedand
severelyhurtagroupofpeoplewhowantedtodeposePol.Lt.Col.Thaksin.It
reflectedthedisharmonyandconflictofpeopleinthecountry.Ifthissituationisstill
goingon,noonecanguaranteethatthebloodyriotsanddisturbancesarisingfrom
destructionandkillingofeachotherwillnothappen.Whiletheonewhowantedto
deposetheuserofstatepowerrefusedtostopandtheuserofstatepower(Pol.Lt.
Col.Thaksinsgovernment)wasreadytofighttotheendwithoutsurrender.
Independent organi zat i ons such as t he Nat i onal Count er Corrupt i on
Commission,theElectionCommissionofThailand,andtheConstitutionalCourt
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wereviolentlydefiedbythepeople.Theirreputationsweredestroyedandhad
derogatoryimagethattheywerenotreallyindependentbecausetheyweredominated
andintervenedbystatepower.Therefore,theydidnotverifiedorinspectedthestate
tomakethepeoplesatisfied;anddidnotbenefitthewholecountry.
TheSenate,asstatedintheConstitutionthatallsenatorsmustbeelectedby
peopleandtheareaofprovinceshallberegardedasoneconstituency,becomesthe
slavewhoservetheownerofstatepowerinadministration(Pol.Lt.Col.Thaksins
government).Therewasalsoareportfromthedisclosureofsenatorsthatsomeof
themreceivedmonthlypaymentfromtheonewhohasstatepower.
Formorethan6years,theSenatehadoftenwrongfullyappointedindividuals
tobecomecommitteemembersandgovernorsofindependentorganizationssothatit
becomesindependentorganizationcrisis.Thissituationmustnotbeletgo,there
mustbesolutioninvariousdimensionssuchasstructure,lawsandregulations,and
moralityoftheofficersintheorganization.
TheinspectionimplementedbythepeoplemadetheCoupdEtaton19th
September2006becamerighteousandacceptedbythepublic,althoughsomepeople
mightnotacceptthisCoupdEtat.BecauseitmeanttoteardowntheConstitution
andpausedthedemocracy.However,thecontinuallyinspectionofthepeopleonthe
caseofcorruptioncommittedbyusersofstatepowerinadministrationanditsfailure
tocopewithdishonestusersofstatepowerwereusedasreasonsfortheCoupdEtat.
TheCouncilforDemocraticReformundertheConstitutionalMonarchyhadchanged
andadjustedcommitteemembersinindependentorganizationalongwithcommittees
fortheinspectionofanyactionsthatcauseddamagetothestate.Theseorganizations
andthecommitteesarenowmoveontoinspectandinvestigatethenotorious
corruptioncasesinthepastwhichhaveagoodtendencythatthepeopleinvolved
wouldbetakenintolegalactionsandmightbepunishedaccordingtothelaw.
However,inordertopermitthepeopletoverifythestatepowereffectivelyand
tocounterbalancestatepowerinadministrationandindependentorganizationsby
usingsituationshappenedinthewhole9yearsaslessonlearnedforfurther
improvementandcorrection,therearerecommendationsasfollows:
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1. ToclearlywritetheConstitutionandenactsubordinatelegislationsin
accordancewiththerealintentionandpurposeoftheConstitutiontoprotect
freedomsofthemassmediaandthepeopletospeak,givetheiropinions,
write,print,publicize,andexpressothermeaningthataffectpublicpersons
(theoneswhousethestatepower)inpublicissues,personalbehaviorthat
affectthewholesociety.Alltheseactionsmustnotbesued,prosecutedin
criminalandcivilcourts,paycompensationfortheviolationsforthe
amountofmillionsorbillionsBahttotheusersofthestatepowerwho
claimedthattheirhonorandreputationaredisgraced.
Tospeak,giveonesopinions,write,print,andpublicizearefundamental
rightsofhumananditwasthewaytoinspectthestatepowerinthelast6
years(20012006).UnderthegovernmentofPol.Lt.Col.Thaksin
Shinawatr,alotofpeopleandmassmediawereprosecuted;somecases
werewell-knownallovertheworld.Thailandhasnegativeimageinthe
eyesofforeignersthattheownerofstatepowerbullyandtreatthepeople
badly.
Anypublicpersonwhousesstatepowermustalwaysbereadytobeverified
andinspected.Also,theymustopentheirmindtolistentobothnegative
andpositivevoicesofcomment.Ifthevoiceisincorrect,theycanexplain
anddescribe.Iftheycannotstandsuchaverificationandinspection,they
shouldnotbetheusersofthestatepower.
2. ToclearlywritetheConstitutionandenactsubordinatelegislationsin
accordancewiththerealintentionandpurposeoftheConstitutioninterms
oftheuseofrightsinassembleofthepeople.Section44ofthecanceled
ConstitutionB.E.2540(1997)statedthatapersonshallenjoythelibertyto
assemblepeacefullyandwithoutarms.Therestrictiononsuchlibertyunder
paragraphoneshallnotbeimposedexceptbyvirtueofthelawspecifically
enact ed for t he case of publ i c assembl i ng and for securi ng publ i c
convenienceintheuseofpublicplacesorformaintainingpublicorder
duringthetimewhenthecountryisinastateofwar,orwhenastateof
emergencyormartiallawisdeclared.
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But,inreality,alotofpeopleassemblebecausetheyareunsatisfiedanddo
notwanttoseecrookedusersofstatepowercommitthecorruptionandany
seriousmistakesincountryadministration.
Anassembleofpeopleofaboutormorethanthousandscansurelymake
noisesthatannoyotherpeople.Anassemblecanmaketroubletopeople
becausepeoplecannotdrivethroughtheplaceswherethepeopleassembled
suchasinfrontoftheEquestrianStatueofKingRamaV,RoyalPlaza,and
infrontofSiamParagonShoppingCenter,etc.Theprevioususeof
freedomcausedpoliceofficerstofileseveralchargesagainsteachofthe
coreleader.Itseemedthatthepoliceofficerstriedtopersecutethepeople
andmakethemstopinspecting(deposing)theusersofstatepowerwhoare
theircommander.
Besides,itistheresponsibilityofpoliceofficerstotakecare,protectand
preventtheassemblyofthepeoplefromanyaccidentsorconvulsioncaused
bytheopponentorthethirdparty.Atthesametime,thelawsshouldprotect
thepeoplebyprohibitingpoliceofficerfromunfairlyfilingchargesagainst
people.Itiswrongtothinkthatifthepolicesaccusationisnottrue,the
courtwilldismissthecasebecause,inprinciple,policeofficersmust
performtheirdutyfairly.Ifpoliceofficersperformunfairly,thereshouldbe
somekindsofmechanismtocounterbalance andthatpoliceofficer
includinghiscommandershouldpledgeguiltyandbepunished.
3. Theuseofrighttoinspectusersofstatepowerbythepeopleaccordingto
theConstitutionandlawmustnotbecomplicatematterandbecomeheavy
burdenforthepeople.Forexample,tocollectthenameofpeopletosubmit
thedraftoftheAct;tocollectthenameofpeopletodemoteapersonwho
holdhigh-rankingposition,etc.Thenumberofthenameshouldnotbetoo
much(50,000namesisconsideredtoomuch).Thesupplementevidenceof
thenamecollectionshouldbemadeeasily.Thereshouldbeaguaranteeof
protectiontothepeoplewhoexercisetheirrightstoinspecttheuserofstate
powerfrombeingreportedtothepoliceandbeingsuedfromtheholderof
statepowerfordefamation.Thecaseusedtohappentosomejudgesofthe
ConstitutionalCourtwhotrytohidetheamountoftheirsharesinbusiness.
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Ifsomeonereportsthecasetothepolice,thenafterthatthereporteriseasily
suedback,thereisnowaythatthepeoplecaninspecttheuserofstate
power.
4. Demandsandqueriesofthepeopleandmassmediaarisingfromanyclues
incountryadministrationandthecorruptionofuserofstatepowerinany
casesmustberapidlyelucidatedandverifiedfrompublicandindependent
organizations.Theuserofstatepowershouldnotkeeprefusingwithout
providinganyprooforexplainindetailandnotdoinganything.Thiscanbe
regardedthattheusersofstatepowerhasuntrustworthybehaviorsand
shouldnotallowcontinuingperformingtheirduty.Forexample,thecase
thatMr.KraisakChunhawan,ActingSenatorofNakhonratchasima
province, gave his speech on the stage of the PeoplesAlliance for
DemocracyatLumpiniParkthatheheardthatPol.Lt.Col.Thaksin,Acting
PrimeMinister,sentlettertoMr.GeorgeW.Bush,PresidentoftheUnited
States.ThepeopleandmassmediademandedPol.Lt.Col.Thaksinand
MinistryofForeignAffairstopresentinpublicbutwasrefused.Letthe
societydoubtedwhetherthecountryleaderdidsomethingthatmightcause
damagetothecountryornot.UntilMatichonNewspaperreceivedletter
fromthesource,thenpublishedthatletterandmadeeveryoneknowabout
theletter.Thusthefactrevealed.Contentofthatletteristheincorrect
informationofthesituationinThailand.Userofstatepowershouldbe
responsibleforsuchabehavior.However,therewasjustalameexcuse,no
apologyforthataction.NotonlysendingthelettertoPresidentofthe
UnitedStates,butPol.Lt.Col.Thaksinalsosentletterswiththesame
contenttoleadersofASEANcountry.
Whenthepeopleandmassmediawanttoknowofficialinformationand
documentrelatedtothecountryandpublicbenefit,itistheresponsibilityof
governmentagenciestodisclosetheinformationrapidly.Infact,the
conceal ment of i nformat i on i s al ways happened even t hough t he
ConstitutionB.E.2540(1997)andlawontheRighttoInformationfor
OfficialDocumentsalsoaffirmedthatbutitseemedthatitisjustletters.
Therearesomanyregulationsandprocesseswithlongperiodoftimewhich
greatlyaffecttheinspectionofstatepowerbythepeople.Thisproblem
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mustbesolved,improved,andtheremustbepenaltyfortheusersofstate
powertoconcealinformationthatshouldberevealedtothepublic
5. Localadministrativeorganizations,suchassub-districtadministrative
organizations,municipalitiesincludingTambon,Muang,andNakhon,and
provincialadministrationorganizations,arenotmuchinspectedbythe
peopleandmassmediaeventhoughthelocaladministrativeorganizations
haverevenuefromtaxescollectingwithinthelocalityandreceivesupported
revenueorsubsidyfromthegovernment.Therearealwaysthecorruptions
intheprocurement,biddingprocessandcontractmakingwhichleadto
severalkillingcases.Thereshouldbetheestablishmentoflegalmechanisms
ormeasurestomaketheadministrationoflocalauthoritytransparentand
accountable.Localadministrativeorganizationsshouldnotbeinaccessible
andthepublicshouldknowhowtoinspectitsauthority.Thisproblem
shouldbesolvedrapidlybeforeitbecomestoobigandcannotbesolvedlike
the national politics that the people and mass media always watch
attentivelyandcannotdonothingmorethanthat.
6. Independent organi zat i ons shoul d not be i nvest i gat ed i n t erms of
unusually rich,havesignofmalfeasanceorwrongfuluseofauthority
andpositiontitlethatcontradicttheConstitutionandlawswhichisthe
authorityoftheorganizationsprescribedbytheConstitutiontoconsider.
However,ineffectiveadministrationofthecommitteemembersshouldbe
evaluatedbythepeopleandshouldbethereasonforthecommittee
memberstoresignfromtheposition.Thereshouldbetheestablishmentof
mechanismsthatisthepeoplesorganizationtoformallyinspectandverify
theimplementationandperformancesofindependentorganizations.
Ot herwi se peopl e may want t o become commi t t ee members of t he
independentorganizationwithouthavingworkingskillandproficiency.
Sometimes,theymaywanttoseekforunlawfulbenefitasseveralcasesthat
canbeseeninthelastnineyears.

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Summary
Theinspectionandverificationofthestatepowerutilizationishighly
important.Theinspectionandverificationbygovernmentagenciessuchas
parliamentaryorganizations,independentorganizations,thecourtofjustice,would
notbeeffectivewithouttheroleofthepeopleandmassmedia.
PreviousconstitutionthatwasjustcanceledbytheDemocraticReformCouncil
enactssection76ofChapterontheDirectivePrinciplesofFundamentalState
Policiesasfollows:
Section76:TheStateshallpromoteandencouragepublicparticipationin
layingdownpolicies,makingdecisiononpoliticalissues,preparingeconomic,social
andpoliticaldevelopmentplans,andinspectingtheexerciseofStatepoweratall
levels.
StatementintheConstitutionlookssplendidbutinpracticeitisonthe
contrary.Anygovernmentorusersofstatepowerinanyorganizationsarethesame
whichmeanstheydonotwantanyonetomonitor,inspect,andwatchcloselytotheir
useofpowerbecausetheycannotseekbenefitforthemselves,theirfamily,relatives
andfriends.
Therefore,thepeopleandmassmediashouldfight,callfor,andencourage
continuinginspectionandverificationofstatepowereffectively.Also,thereisa
needtohavetheConstitutionandlawsthatsupporttheinspectionandverificationof
the users of state power who are crooked and incapable; make mistakes in
administration;andlackofmorality.Theymustbestrictlyverifiedbythepeople.
Theoneswhodowrongwouldbepunished.Thiswillmaketheusersofstatepower
bemorecareful.Anyonewhoisunsureofsuppressingthegreedforhimselfandfor
hispartiesmustnotdaretousethestatepowerbecausesomehowhemightbeputin
jailorwerecursedorthepersonalassetsmightbeseized.
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People Sector s
Inspection against Corruption
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nuannoi Treerat

Abstract
T hecontextsandpatternsofcorruptionhavebeensubstantiallychanged.There
arenewformsofcorruption.Andnowadays,majorcorruptionusuallyinvolves
politiciansandconflictsofinterest.Therefore,considerationoncorruptionissues
mustbemadeonwiderandmoreuniversaluseofstatepowerinseekingonesown
benefitfromthepublic,thatis,byvariouswaysofbribery.Besides,corruptioncan
alsobeinaformoftheabuseofpower,whichincludestheuseofmoney,assetsand
timeforpersonalbenefits,ortheuseofpositiontopromotecertainindividualsand
groups.Suchabuseofpowercanalsobeappliedinestablishingpolicies,or
allocatingthestateresourcesinfavorofcertaingroups,orforpoliticalsupport.
Thesekindsofbehaviormaybelegalorillegal,buttheycertainlycontradictto
moralsorthestandardofthepublicsexpectationtowardspublicfigures,including
politiciansandgovernmentofficers.
Thefactorsleadingtocorruptioncompriseculture,attitude,andvaluesthat
supportcorruption.Besides,therearealsocorrelationofeconomic,social,and
politicalfactorsindicatingpatronageandhighlevelofdisparity.Similarly,economic
andpoliticalfactorsalsoreflectmonopolynatureofproductsandservices,aswellas
ofpoliticalpower.Therefore,measuresusedforpreventionandsuppressionagainst
corruptionmustbeintegrated.Suchmeasuresinclude:Socialmeasure,topromote
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ethicalvalues,education,awareness,andparticipation;Legalmeasure,including
lawsandseriouslegalenforcement;Marketmeasure,whichdeterminetherolesof
thegovernmentinappropriateeconomicintervention topreventeconomic
monopoly,and;Politicalmeasure,whichmustincludepromotionofdemocratic
process,decentralization,andpeopleparticipation.
Peoplesparticipationininvestigatingtheexerciseofstatepowerindicatesthat
itisamechanismthatisabletocreatedrivingforceforproblemsolutionandto
seriouslypunishthewrongdoers.Thus,apartfromlegalmeasuresandeconomicand
politicalreforms,peoplesparticipationcanalsoenhancethefightagainstcorruption.
However,peoplesparticipationinvolves3majorfactorsnamely:theaccesstothe
publicinformation;creationofproblemacknowledgementandawareness,and;
reductionoftheinspectioncost.These3factorscanbecomeobstaclesagainst
peoplesparticipation.
Therefore,inordertoencouragepeoplesinspectionontheuseofgovernment
power,itisnecessarytodoasfollows:
1.Improvetheaccesstopublicinformationsothatitwillbemoreconvenient
andrapid.Moreover,punishmentmeasuresmustbedeterminedforthe
governmentauthoritiesofwhichtheoperationsimpedeordelaytheaccess
tosuchinformation.
2.Attemptsshouldbemadetochangetheattitudetowardsmoralsystem.
Besides,itisalsonecessarytocreateawarenessontheaffectsofthe
problemsandtherolesofpeopleinparticipatinginsolvingcorruption
problems.
3.Attemptsshouldbemadetoreducecostofparticipation.Forexample,there
shouldbeaneffectiveandseriouswitnessprotectionprogram.Besides,the
governmentmustpayattentiontovariouskindsofthreats.
4.Thereshouldbemoreopportunitiesforpeoplesinspection.Forexample,
peopleshouldbeabletosubmitthecaseofcorruptedpoliticiansto
inspectingorganizationsdirectly.Moreover,publicforumsshouldbe
increasedforreceivingcomplaints.
5.Themediamusthavefreedominpresentinganddisseminatinginformation,
aswellasininspectingthegovernmentsuseofpower.
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People Sectors
Inspection against Corruption
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nuannoi Treerat

C orruptionisamajorconcreteissuethatreflectsthefailureofthegovernmentin
managingthecountrysresourcesforthemaximumbenefitsofthesociety.
Corruptionleadstoinefficiencyinresourceallocation,anditisconsideredasinister
phenomenonofthesociety.However,corruptioncanbeseeninalllevelsofsociety
atthedifferentextents.InThailand,corruptionhaslongbeenrooted,andithas
expandedanddevelopedintoallsectors,bothgovernmentandprivate.
Theattemptsforpoliticalreformshaveoccurredcontinuouslywithmore
emphasisontheinvestigationofthegovernmentsuseofpower.Themostconcrete
effortisthe1997Constitution,inwhichtheinvestigationofthestatepoweris
prescribedin2issues.First,severalindependentorganizationsareestablishedto
investigatetheuseofstatepower.Andsecond,thepeoplesectorisencouragedto
participateininvestigatingtheuseofstatepower.Themajormechanismforsuch
issuesistherighttohaveaccesstothegovernmentsinformation.Besides,the
Constitutionalsoallows50,000tosignintherequestforremovalofpoliticalfigures.
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However,inconsideringthecorruptionimageindexofThailandconductedby
theInternationalTransparencyOrganization,onlyslightchangeshavebeenmade
(Table1).Thatis,thepointsof3.33in1996increasedto3.80in2005.Suchpoints
indicatethatThailandstillhasconsiderablecorruptionproblems.Intheotherwords,
thesuccessfrompoliticalreformsinthepast8-9yearsisnotsignificant.Thisis
becausecorruptionbyitselfalsobecomesmorecomplicated.Atthesametime,
previouslawenforcementaccordingtotheConstitutionwasstillinefficientand
ineffective.
Thisarticleaimsatdiscussingthecontextanddevelopmentofcorruption,
factorsinfluencingcorruption,measuresforpreventionandsuppression,aswellas
problemsandobstaclesagainstpeoplesparticipationininspectingcorruption
problems.

Meaning and forms of corruption

Corruptionhasbeendeeplyrootedinhumansocietyforalongtime.Itmight
havebegunwhenhumanbeinggatheredtogetherintheformofsocietycomprising
rulersandthosewhowereruled.Corruptionisinallformsofsociety.Therefore,the
definitionsofcorruptionaredifferentaccordingtotimeandsocialconditions.
Additionally,corruptionalsoinvolvessocial,economic,cultural,andpoliticalissues
ofthecountry.Therefore,corruptionisusuallydefinedbyacademiafromvarious
fields,namelylegal,political,economic,psychological,historical,etc.Such
definitionmaybeslightlydifferentaccordingtorelevantperspectiveandsocial
contexts.
Severalacademicshaveaccumulatedanddividedthedefinitionsofcorruption
intogroups.Forexample,thedefinitionsofcorruptionaredividedinto3groups.The
firstgroupofdefinitionemphasizesoncorruptionthatisrelatedtodutiesofmodern
governmentauthorities.Thatis,thisconceptemphasizesonAdministrative
corruption.Thesecondgroupofdefinitionfocusesoncorruptioncausedbymarket
monopolypowerthatleadstoRent Seeking process.Andthethirdgroupof
definitionrelatesthemeaningofcorruptiontopublicinterests.Thisgroupattempts
togivewiderandmoredimensionaldefinitionstocorruptionwithregardstopublic
interests.Therefore,corruptioninthispointofviewreferstocorruptionoccurringin
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thegovernmentsystemandcorruptionmadebypoliticians,whichincludetheissues
ofpowerandpublicexpectation.
However,despitetheslightdifferences inthefocuses oremphases of
corruption,allthesedefinitionshavecommonissuesonpersonalinterest,public
interests,andpowerastherepresentativeofthestate.
SangsitPiriyarangsarn(2006a)concludedthatthe3groupsofconceptshad3
commondimensions:
1.Thedimensionofpowerandduties:Thisdimensionsfocusesontheabuse
oflegalpoweranddutiesofpublicfigurestobringpersonalinterestfor
oneselforcertaingroups.
2.Thedimensionofethicandmoralsofpublicfigures:Certainconductsof
publicfiguresmaynotbeagainstthelaw,buttheycontradicttoethicaland
moralprinciplesorexpectationofthepublic.Suchconductsareconsidered
dishonestyaswell.
3.Thedimensionofconductordecisionmakingprocessofthepublicfigures,
whetherornotithasnegativeeffectsonpublicinterest.
Therefore,corruptionisnotonlytheviolationofofficialregulationson
allocationofpublicresourcesinresponsetomonetaryoffersorpoliticalsupports.It
shouldalsorefertotheabuseofstatepowerforpersonalbenefitsorthebenefitsof
certaingroups.Suchconductscanbedoneinaformofbribery,orrequestingmoney
frompeople.Moreover,theyalsoinvolvetheembezzlementofstateresources,which
includestheuseofmoney,propertyandtimeforpersonalbenefits,ortheuseof
positiontopromotethemselvesortheirparties.Suchabuseofpowercanalsobeused
inestablishingpolicies,orallocatingthestateresourcesinfavorofcertaingroups,or
forpoliticalsupport.Thesekindsofbehaviormaybelegalorillegal,butthey
certainlycontradicttomoralsorthestandardofthepublicsexpectationtowards
publicfigures,includingpoliticiansandgovernmentofficers.
Someacademicsdividedcorruptioninto2types.Thefirstoneiscorruption
fromStateCapture.Thiskindofcorruptionisconductedbypersons,orgroupsof
persons,whoareabletoinfluencethelaws,regulations,andvariouspoliciesofthe
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government.ThistypeofcorruptioncomprisesPolitical Corruptionand
Economic corruption.
Withreferencetothestudyoncorruptionindevelopingcountries,inwhich
patronagenatureisstillappliedintermsofeconomy,society,andpolitics,itisfound
thatunderthepatronagesystem,corruptioncanbeconductedin4patterns:
1.Governmentofficialsattempttofindawaytoreducecostsforbusiness
enterprisesbyrefrainingfromusingcertainregulations.Afterwards,the
obtainedinterestsarethendividedamongprivatesectorandgovernment
officials.
2.Theuseofpoweroftheauthoritiestoenablethemonopolyofcertain
privateenterprisesovereconomicrent.
3.Governmentofficialstransferpublicrightsandbenefitstocertaingroupsin
exchangeforemutualgains.
4.Government offi ci al s seek benefi t s from t he operat i on of cert ai n
governmentagencies.
Corruptionisoftenthecooperationbetweenpoliticiansandgovernment
officials.Thelaterpartyisusuallythemechanismortoolsfortheuseofpoliticians.
Ontheotherhand,politiciansoftenaimatrespondingtothebenefitsofcertain
groups,whichareusuallythebusinessgroupsthatgivefinancialsupporttopolitical
parties.Moreover,conflictofinterestisfoundmoreindevelopingcountriesthanin
developedcountries,becauseinthelatercase,businessenterprisesprefertojoin
politicsdirectly.
Therefore,inthestudyaboutcorruption,substantialconsiderationmustbe
giventopoliticalfactorsandrelationshipbetweenthepoliticiansandgovernment
officials.Ifpoliticiansareabletocontroltheoperationsofgovernmentofficials,the
politicalpartieshavemorechancetointerveneandmanipulatetheofficials
discretiontobeinaccordancewiththeirrequirement.Ifpoliticiansdonothave
completecontrolovergovernmentofficials,therewillbehigherriskofbeing
exposed.Thebestwayforinterventionisthroughtheprocessofappointing
governmentofficialsinmajorpositions,whichwillfacilitatethecooperation
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betweengovernmentofficialsandpoliticiansinobtainingpersonalinterest.Besides,
the carrots and stickssystemisanotherwaythatpoliticiansusetomanipulate
governmentofficials.
WithreferencetothestudyoncorruptioninThailand,variouskindsof
corruptionhavebeenfound,rangingfromseekingforeconomicrentthrough
monopolizedconcession,seizingpublicresourcesforpersonalbenefitsthrough
facilitatingpolicies,aswellasmisconductintheformsofprocurementandbribery.
Additionally,politicalpowerhasalsobeenusedtoavoidtaxandtoseekinterest
fromthestockmarket.Similarly,thereistheuseofpoliciesforpoliticalinterests,
preferenceforcertaingroups,andcheatinginelectiontogainstatepower,etc.These
casesreflectthatcorruptioninThailandcomprisesadministrativecorruption,
economiccorruption,andpoliticalcorruption.
However,themajorpatternofcomplicatedcorruptionthathasbeendeveloped
isthePolicyCorruption.Thiskindofcorruptionisconductedthroughthepolicies
thatfacilitatetheearningofinterestforindividualsorgroupsofindividuals.Itis
thereforeconsideredtheconflictofinterestbetweenthepublicandpersonalinterests.
Conflictofinterestisasituationwhentheestablishmentofpoliciesforpublic
interestisintervenedbytheinterestsofcertainindividualsorgroupsofbusiness
enterprisesrelatingtothepoliticalgroupsthatestablishsuchpolicies.
Thistypeofcorruptionisthemostproblematicone,anditiswidelypracticed
inbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Itisdifficulttoinvestigateandtoput
chargesagainstthemisconduct.Accordingtothestudyandcomparisonsamong47
countriesaroundtheworld,businesscorporationswithpoliticalconnectionhavea
tendencytopaylowertax.Onthecontrary,theytendtohavehighermarketshare
(thankstohighlevelofmarketmonopoly)andlowerstandardofaccountingwhen
comparedwithothernon-politicalconnectedcompanies(Faccio,2002).
InThailand,severalstudiesindicatethatthestockvaluesofbusiness
corporationsthathavedirectpoliticalrelationwithmajorpoliticiansusually
increasesatahigherratewhencomparedtocorporationswithoutpoliticalrelation.
Besides,itisalsofoundthatmarketmonopolypowerintheindustryofsuch
companies(consideredfromthemarketshare)willalsoincrease.Thisisbecausethe
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marketisexpectedtoimplementnewpoliciesinfavorableoftheinterestofsuch
corporations.Inaccordancewithacademicremarks,fromtheyear2001,therehave
beenseveraleconomicpoliciesthataredirectlyfavorabletocertaincompaniesthat
havecloserelationswithpoliticiansinthegovernmentparties,especiallyatthe
ministeriallevel.Thesepoliciesincludetherightfortaxreductionorreductionof
concessioncost,limitationorobstructionagainstnewrivalsinthemarket,andthe
delayofotherpoliciesthatmayhavenegativeimpactonthesecorporations(Pasuk
Pongpaijit,2006).
Itisthereforedifficulttogiveuniversalcoveragedefinitionofcorruption
becauseitinvolveshistoricalandculturalcontextsofeacharea.Atthesametime,
corruptionisrelatedtothedivisionbetweenoperatingforpersonalgainsandfor
publicgains.

Factors affecting corruption

Verner(1983)explainedthatsupportingfactorsforcorruptionwererelevantto
economicandpoliticalfactors.Themajorfactorsthatfacilitatecorruptioncanbe
categorizedasfollows:Beingpatronagesociety;Highlevelofeconomic,social,and
politicalstatuses;Problemsfrompoverty;Excessiveorinadequatestatepowerover
t he economi c syst em or monopol y; Excessi ve or i nadequat e regul at i ons;
Considerablenumberofdishonestpoliticians,and;Weaksystemsininvestigation
andcorruptioncontrol.Allthesefactorsresultintheoccurrenceofhighlevelsof
corruption.
Johnson(1996)indicatedthatfactorssupportingcorruptionwerenotlimitedto
economicorpoliticalfactors,butcultureorvalueofthesocietyisoftheutmost
importanceaswell.
1.Valuereflectingthecultureandconscienceinthesocietiesororganizations
thatindicateacceptanceorarefavorabletowardstheideaofcorruption.For
example,thebeliefthat,It is fine to corrupt to a certain level if one can
still create good outcomes.Suchvaluealsoincludesmorerespecttowards
therichthanthegoodpeople,ortheacceptanceofprivilegeasnormal
practice,etc.
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2.Patronagenatureofeconomic,social,andpoliticalrelations,whichyields
personalbenefitsforin.Forexample,theallocationofbudgettotheareasof
majorityvotesinhopeforpolitical benefits, andtheassemblingof
governmentofficials,businessmen,andpoliticianstojoinillegallyinthe
publicprocurementproject.Inthelattercase,externalpartiesareprevented
fromparticipationoracknowledgement.
3.Monopolyinthemarketofproductsandservice,aswellasinpolitical
power,leadtoeconomicrent-seekingandtheexerciseofpowerwithout
beingmonitored.
Atthesametime,accordingtoKlitgart(1988),corruptionisanactcausedby
governmentofficialswhohaveabsolutepowerinconductinganypublicactivity(M)
thatleadtoindividualdiscretionorjudgement(D)inchoosingordecidingto
conducttheactivityinresponsivetotheneedtoseekpersonalbenefits.Theextentof
suchconductdependsontheindividualsresponsibilitiestowardsthepublic(A).
Therefore,thesocietywithhighlevelofeconomicmonopoly,andwithambiguous
rulesandregulationsandlittletransparencyandaccountabilityisthesocietywith
highlevelofcorruption.
PasukPongpaijit(2006)adjustedJohnsonsdescriptionofcorruption(1975)by
purposingthatcorruptioncouldbeexplainedfromtheconsiderationofnetbenefit
fromcorruption.Netbenefitofcorruptionreferstothemajorincomeobtained
throughcorruptionintheformofbribeorcorruptiontaxandeconomicrent,minus
thecostinvestedinacquiringpowerorpositionsofadministrativepowerandthecost
ofavoidancefrominvestigation.
Incomefrombriberyreferstocorruption tax.Thatis,politiciansand
governmentofficialscollectbribefromgovernmentprojects,commissions,orother
typesoftributes.
Rentalincomereferstotheincomethatpoliticiansandpoliticalpartiesobtain
fromconductingbusinessesthattheyreceivepermitorconcession.Theseareusually
monopolizedbusinessesorsemi-monopolized,therefore,itispossibletosettheprice
atahigherlevelthannormalcompetitivemarket(suchasmobilephonebusinessat
theinitialperiodpriortoliberalization).Somebusinessesinvolveillegalactivities,
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suchastradingofillegaloilandweapon,prostitution,anddrug.Therefore,thistype
ofincomeisearnedbyconductingmonopolizedorsemi-monopolizedbusinesses
withconcessionfromthegovernment,orthebusinessesthatareprotectedbythe
government.Inaddition,somepartsofincomeareobtainedfrompolicycorruption.
Thecostofcorruptionorrent-seekingcanbedividedinto2parts.Thefirstone
istheinvestmentmadetogainpower,suchastheexpensesusedinelection
campaign.Thesecondpartisthecostusedtopreventbeingcaughtofcorruption.
Thelatterexpensesmaybepaidtopolicemen,judges,massmedia,ortoconceal
academicresearches,aswellasthelawyerfeesforinsultingcases,orothernecessary
actiontopreventthedisclosureofmisconduct.
Therefore,whenpoliticianshaveanaccesstopowerthroughtheappointment
ofnewgovernments,theyusuallyattempttoincreasetheirincomefrombriberyand
economicrent.Atthesametime,theyalsotrytoreducecostsbycontrollingjudicial
processanderodingtheoperationofindependentorganizationsbeingestablishedto
monitorpoliticiansbehaviors.Besides,thesepoliticiansalwaystrytocontrolthe
organizationsthatoftencriticizetheworkofthegovernment,forexample,by
controllingmassmedia,oppositionparties,orcivilsocietiesthatarealertintermsof
democracyandprinciplesofhuman-rights.Atthesametime,theyalsotrytodistort
thepublicunderstandingaboutcorruption.
Pasukalsogavesomeexplanationaboutthedevelopmentofcorruptionin
Thailandunderbureaucraticpolity.Duringthe1960s,dictatorialgovernmentswere
establishedthroughcoupsdetats.Themajorsourcesofincomewerefromcorruption
intheformofbriberyorlevyfrombusinessmenorprivateenterprises,whichwere
separateidentityfrompoliticians.Companieswereestablishtoactasthemiddlemen
inacquiringthejobsfromthegovernmentandthencollectagencyfeesfromother
privateenterprises.Besides,thetaxescollectedfromgeneralpeoplewerealso
embezzled in the form of secret state operation. Other incomes were from
governmentlottery,commissionfromarmpurchase,andprotectionofillegal
business.Similarly,statepropertieswerealsotransferredforprivategains,suchas
thetransferofpubliclandtobeinpossessionofcertainindividualsorgroups.During
thattime,therewasnoinstitutiontomonitorthebehaviorsofpoliticians.Inaddition,
massmediawascontrolledandtheirlibertywaslimited.Therefore,thecostof
corruptionwasratherlow.
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Inthe1980s,Thailandwasundersemi-democracyandlaterondevelopedinto
morefulldemocracy.Duringthattime,thecorruptionpatternsofthepreviousera
stillexistedalthoughtheywereslightlychanged.Budgetforsecretoperationstill
remaineduntilaftertheendoftheColdWar.Similarly,protectionofillegaltrading
continued,andevenexpanded.Briberiesandcommissionsforseveralpermitsand
concessionswereincreasedbecauseoftherapideconomicgrowth.Privatizationof
publiclandtocertainprivateindividualswaswidelypracticed,aswellasthe
misconductinprocurement.Rent-seekingandreceiptofincomefromrentalso
increased.Butatthesametime,highercostwasrequiredfortheaccesstopolitics.
Thechanceofbeinginvestigatedalsoincreasedbecausethemassmediahadmore
freedomandwasmorealertinconductingitsdutiesinrevealingcorruptionandin
seriouslycriticizingthegovernment.Inaddition,non-governmentorganizations,
academia,andpublicprocessesbecamemoreactiveinfightingagainstcorruption
andinencouragingthegovernmenttoconductitsdutieswithtransparencyand
accountability.
The distinctive change was made after the establishment of the 1997
Constitution.Increasingnumberofinspectingsystemswasmade,whilethepatterns
ofcorruptionwerealsodevelopedaswell.Atthesametime,theoldpatternsof
corruptionstillexisted.Thatis,severalprojectswereinitiatedinordertoget
commissionthroughpurchasing.Besides,thenewpatternsofusingpoliciesinfavor
ofcertainindividualsorgroupswerealsoappliedaswellastheuseofpoliciesfor
politicalpurpose.Ontheotherhand,attemptsweremadetoreducethecostof
corruption.Theseattemptsincludestrictmonitoringoverthemassmedia,threatening
byenteringchargesagainstthemassmediaandcivilorganizations.Thisindicatesthe
highlevelofcorruption.

Measures relevant to the fight against corruption

Academicsorthosewhoseworkinvolvespreventionandsuppressionof
corruptionusuallyagreethatthemeasuresrelevanttothefightagainstcorruption
requireintegratedimplementation.Thatis,onlyoneaspectofmeasuresisnot
sufficient,butitisnecessarytohavevariouskindsofmeasuresalltogether.Thisis
becausecorruptionisusuallyconductedinprocesswithcomplicatedpattern
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developmentthatimpedessimpleinvestigation.Therefore,inresponsetocorruption
problems,participationofallsectorsinthesocietyisrequiredin4aspectsasfollows:
1.Socialmeasure:Thisinvolvestheestablishmentofpracticalstandardson
ethics,education,publicsurveillance,andmoralsystem.Itisnecessaryto
createthevaluesandattitudesagainstcorruption.Thatis,corruptionmust
beperceivedasasocialproblemthatdestroysthecountryseconomy,
societyandpolitics.Besides,allsectorsmustcooperateinmonitoringand
solvingproblems.Meanwhile,mechanismmustbeestablishedtoenablethe
peopletoactivelyparticipateininvestigating.Additionally,massmedia
musthavefreedominconductingthedutiesofmonitoringandinvestigating.
2.Legalmeasure:Thelawsrelatingtosuppressionofcorruptionmustbe
continuouslyimproved.Moreover,itisalsonecessarytohavethelawsthat
areuptodateandresponsivetothedevelopedpatternsofcorruption.
Regulatoryreformsmustalsobemaderegularlytoreducepersonal
discretionofthegovernmentofficials.Besides,lawsmustbeseriously
enforced.
3.Marketingmeasure:Thegovernmentsinterventionineconomicactivity
mustbedoneatanappropriatelevel.Onlytheemphasesonliberalization
andreductionofgovernmentinterventiondonotensurethedecreasein
corruption.Forexample,privatizationisaimedtoincreasetherolesofthe
privatesector.Butifsuchattemptisnotmadecarefully,privatizationcanbe
atooltoseekpersonalbenefitsforcertaingovernmentofficialsand
politicians.Theadjustmenttoliberalmarketwithoutpoliticalreformsofthe
governmentmayresultintheriskfactorsallowinggovernmentofficialsand
politicianstoseekpersonalinterest.Onthecontrary,theemphasison
excessiveincreaseofthegovernmentsrolemayalsoleadtoprivatebenefits
ofgovernmentofficialsandpoliticiansaswell.Therefore,itisnecessaryto
putappropriateframeworkofthegovernmentsrolesinthemarketand
economy.Thegovernmentstillhastoplayrolesintheeconomicissuesthat
arerelevanttopublicproductsortheproductsthatcreateexternalaffects,or
certainproductsthatarerelevanttosocialfairness.
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4.Politicalmeasure:Itisnecessarytohavepoliticalreformstopromote
democr acy and t o pr event monopol y of deci si on maki ng power.
Decentralizationmustalsobepromoted,aswellasdemocraticprocessesat
alllevelsofthesociety.Peoplesparticipationmustbeenhanced.Moreover,
attemptsmustbemadetocreatehonestandfairelectioninorderto
eliminatethemajorrootcauseofcorruption.
Attheconcretelevel,measuresagainstcorruptionofseveralcountriesusually
comprisethefollowing8majorissuesasfollows:
1.Countercorruptionstrategiesofthegovernmentsector:Ingeneral,the
measures used attempt to solve the problems fromAdministrative
Corruption.Thesesstrategiesincludethemeasuresusedinprescribing
ethicalrules,improvingcompensation,aswellasreformsofadministrative
systememphasizingonflexibility,transparency,andjobaccomplishment.
Besides,rewardandpunishmentintheadministrativesystemmustalsobe
developed,aswellasprocurementsystem,disclosureofincomeand
propertiesofseniorexecutivesandpoliticians,andrevelationofinformation
onvariousdecisionmakingprocesstothepublic.Itisalsonecessaryto
havesensibleprojectscreeningprocessandprocedure,andindependent
counter-corruptionorganizationsmustalsobeestablished.
2.Establishmentofindependentagenciestomonitortheoperationofthe
government:Thismeasurehasbeensuccessfulinseveralcountries.Since
corruptionisanimportantproblem,severalcountrieshaveestablished
speci fi c organi zat i ons t o seri ousl y operat e t he moni t ori ng. Such
organizationsmustbeindependentandfreefrominterventionofholdersof
statepower.Examplesoftheseorganizationsincludethestatefinancial
inspectingorganizationandcountercorruptionorganization.
3.Enhancement of peopl es part i ci pat i on process and promot i on of
democracy:Inthisregard,theessentialfoundationofdemocracyis
decentralization.
4.Continuousprovisionofeducationtothepublicregardingtheproblemof
corruptionanditseffectsonsociety,economy,andpolitics.Itisalso
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necessarytoenhancepeopleawarenessandrulesofcivilsociety,aswellas
topromotenewvaluesagainstcorruption.
5.Createtransparenceoperationalmechanismofthegovernmentsector.
Peoplemusthaveaccesstothegovernmentsinformation.Ontheother
hand,publicaccountabilityofgovernmentofficialsandpoliticiansmustalso
bestrengthened.
6.Establishmentoffreemassmedia.Therolesofmassmediamustbe
enhancedwithregardstothesystemusedtomonitortheworkofthe
government.
7.Reinforcementoftherolesofprivatesectorbypromotingthebusiness
operationsthatareresponsibletothesocietyandbyestablishingcorporate
goodgovernanceinconductingbusiness.
8.Strengtheninternationalcooperation.
Thesemeasuresmustbeputtogether.Severalacademicscriticizethecounter-
corruptionmeasuresthatemphasizeonspecificissues,suchasthemeasuresthataim
touselawsasatooltofightcorruption.Thesemeasureswillbeineffectiveifthe
moralofthepeopleisnotdevelopedtotheextentthatitcanmakepeoplerespectthe
laws.Besides,theselegalmeasuresmaybeexploitedtoseekforothernewwaysof
corruptionthroughmorecomplicatedadministration.Insuchcase,itwillbemore
difficultforcivilsocietytounderstandthenewmechanismormethods.Asaresult,
thiskindofexploitationforpersonalbenefitsmaybecomelegitimateandmore
difficulttoinvestigate.Ingeneral,theseissuesusuallyinvolveconflictofinterests.
Inthesametoken,themeasurethatemphasizesonindependentorganizations
tomonitortheexerciseofstatepowermayhaveproblemsbecausethestakeholder
groupsorcivilsocietiesareusuallyimpededtoparticipate.Withoutvarietyof
mechanismsinprovidingmessageandinformationfromthepeople,theworkof
these independent organizations will be delay and the counter-corruption
effectivenessandefficiencywillbedecreased.Atthesametime,itishighlylikely
thattheseorganizationscanbeintervenedbypowerholderstoweakentheinspection
attempts.Besides,theinspectionisoftenbasedonlegalissues.Butasamatterof
fact,personalandpublicinterestsareusuallyobscureandhardtoinspect.Examples
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canbeseenintheuseofpoliciesforthebenefitsofcertainindividualsorgroups,or
tobuildpoliticalsupports,etc.Theuseofpoliciestostrengthenpoliticalbaseleads
totheoccurrenceofanewpatronagepractice.Theexistenceofthissystemrequires
politicalsupportthroughtheuseofthegovernmentsresources.Therefore,power-
holderstendtousecorruptionasawaytomotivateorcreatepoliticalsupportfor
themselvesandtheirpartiesthroughallowingtheirsupporterstohaveaccesstothe
stateresources.
Inaccordancewiththestudyoncounter-corruptionlessonsfrom6Asian
countries,sixmeasuresareconsideredtheBestPractice.Theyare:
1.Availabilityofapparentcounter-corruptionorganizations,andsuch
organizationsmustnotincludePoliceDepartment.Thisisbecausepolicein
severalcountriesareusuallyinvolvedwithcorruptionproblem.Policeare
responsibleforcreatingandmaintainingpeaceinthesociety,sotheyhave
considerablepower.However,therearealargenumberofpolicewhouse
theirlegitimatepowerforpersonalgains.
2.Counter-corruptionlawsmustbeenforceduniversallyandefficiently.
Corruptionhasbeenconsiderablydevelopedintomorecomplicated
patterns,therefore,itisnecessarythatseriousandeffectivelawenforcement
bemade.
3.Counter-corruptionorganizationsrequiresufficientmanpowerandbudgetto
supporttheiroperation.Ingeneral,theallocationofmanpowerandbudgeis
usuallyunderthediscretionofpoliticians,whoalsohavetobeinvestigated.
Therefore,itpossiblethatthesepoliticiansmaytrytolimittheresources
allocatedtotheseorganizations.
4.Administrativereformstoreduceprocessesandtimeingivingpermission
andtoincreaseconvenience.Asaresult,corruptionwillbecomemore
difficult.
5.Reducethechancesofcorruptionintheagencieswithhighprocurement
budgetortheagenciesthatarerelatedtoactivitieswithhigheconomic
valuesorwithalargenumberofpopulations.
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6.Seriouspunishmentmustbegiventotheoffenderssothatcorruption
becomestheconductwithhighcostandlowoutcomes,henceitdoesnot
worthanattempt.
AccordingtotheconclusionofWitayakornChiangkul(2006)regardingthe
experienceofthecountrieswithlowlevelofcorruption,thesecountrieshavesimilar
componentsintermsofeconomic,social,culturalandpoliticalfactors.Theyare:
1.Efficientadministrativesystem.
2.Existenceofdemocraticpolitics,inwhichpeoplecanparticipate,andhave
therights,liberty,equality,andjustice.
3.Policydecision-makingprocessandsystemaretransparentandaccountable.
Peoplehaveaccessestothegovernmentinformation.
4.Availabilityofefficientlegalsystemandlawenforcement.
5.Peoplehavetrustandareconfidentinpoliticiansandgovernmentofficials.
6.Peoplehaveattitudesthatemphasizeonmoralsystemandpublicinterest.
Sincecorruptioncreatenegativeimpactstothepublic,therefore,peopleare
responsibletoreportandprevent.
7.Averageincomeofthepeopleishealthy,andthereisnotmuchdifferencein
thedistributionofincome.
Therefore,itisevidentthatthefightagainstcorruptionrequiresvarious
importantfactors,namelytheavailabilityofefficientpoliticalandadministrative
systems,aswellasefficientandfairlegalsystem,fairdistributionofincome,and
strongsocialandculturalsystem.

People sectors inspection against corruption

Themostevidentroleofpeoplesectorthatcreatedgreatimpactinexamining
corruptionwasinthecaseofcorruptioninthe Ministryof PublicHealths
procurementofmedicalsuppliesin1988.Thiscaseresultedintheimprisonmentof
politicianswhoweretheninthepositionsofPersonalAdvisortotheMinisterandthe
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MinisterofPublicHealth.Therewasalsotheinvestigationforunusualhealthofthe
minister,whichledtotheorderforseizingofover200millionBahtproperty.Thisis
thefirstcaseinwhichthecorruptingpoliticianswerepunishedaftertheenforcement
ofthe1997Constitution(PleaseseethedetailsinAppendixA).
Themovementtoinvestigatethecorruptiononprocurementofmedicineand
medicalsuppliesintheMinistryofPublicHealthwasanewphenomenonin
Thailand.Itledtobrainstormingandmobilizationofresourcesaswellasphysical
andmentaleffortsofseveralnon-governmentorganizations.Thecooperationof30
NGOs,togetherwiththeRuralDoctorClubandRuralPharmaceuticalClub,resulted
inacollectiveactionfortheanti-corruptioncampaignusingpoliticalmechanisms
underthe1997Constitution.Finally,thiscasebecameapublicissue.Several
mechanismsandtoolsoftheConstitutionwereapplied,suchastheaccumulationof
50,000signaturestoremovetheMinister.Atthesametime,thiseventhelped
intriguetheconsciousnessandtherolesofpeoplesectorwithregardstopolitical
participationinmonitoringandcontrollingthebehaviorsofpoliticiansandhighlevel
governmentofficials.Inaddition,therewasmorepressureontheworkofrelevant
governmentorganizationssuchastheOfficeofCounterCorruptionCommission,the
Parliament,andMinistryofPublicHealth.Asaresult,thegovernmenthadtosetup
acommissiontoinvestigatethecaseandtopunishtheinvolvedgovernmentofficials.
Andfinally,afterseriousoperationoftheinsvestigatingagencies,theoffenderswere
senttothecourtandwereimprisoned.
InthejudgementoftheSupremeCourtCriminalDivisionforHoldersof
PoliticalPositionsforthecaseofMr.RakkiatSukthana,thereisasentenceindicating
thatinordertoeffectivelysuppresscorruption,itisnecessarytoadjustthethinking
andworkingprocesstoenhancesystematicandholisticviewsandanalysisofthe
problems.
Nowadays,corruptioninThailandhasbeendeeplyrooted.Therefore,the
currentConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandhastoestablishanindependent
organizationtoconductefficientandeffectiveinspection.Eventhecourthasto
adjustitsrolesinthetrialsystem.Section332oftheConstitutionstipulatesthat(2)
criminalprocedureforholdersofpoliticalpositions,whichshallbefoundeduponthe
inquisitorialsystemastowhichthefile-briefpreparedbytheNationalCounter
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CorruptionCommissionshallprincipallybereliedonandtheprinciplesofequal
hearingandrightofdefenceoftheaccusedpersonsshallbeobserved.Therefore,
theCourthastoadheretotheintentionofseekingandrevealingthetruth.Ina
corruptioncase,ifthereisanyevidence,itisnecessarytotracebacktotheoriginso
thatthefactsfromevidencescanbecompiledandconsidered.(Thejudgementin
thecaseofMr.RakkiatSukthana,Page35)
Anotherlongcaseoffightandinvestigationthatinvolvespublicissueisthe
fightagainsttheconstructionofKlongDanWasteWaterTreatmentTank.Asaresult
oftheattemptsfromthepeoplesector,theformerprimeministerThaksinShinawatra
mentionedinthe Prime Minister Talks to the Peopleradioprogrambeing
broadcastnationwideonMarch1
st
,2003,thatthiswasc a classic case.Upon
investigation,itwasfoundthateachstepreflectedclearevidenceofcorruptionwith
alargenumberofpeopleinvolvedfrompolitical,civilservants,andprivatesectors.
The prolonged and withstanding fight of Klong Dan people led to the
investigationoftheprojectsinallpossiblechannels.Someofthosechannelswere
successful, while others were not. However, such attempts resulted in the
discontinuationofthecurrentproject.Moreover,courtproceedingsbetweenthe
governmentandprivatesectorsweremade.Andmoreimportantly,theprojectwas
investigatedinseveralissues,amongthemweretheissuesidentifiedbythepeople
fromthebeginning.Althoughthiscasehasnotbeenfinalized,butKlongDanis
consideredtheclassiccaseofthefailureofgovernmentsoperationontheprojects
thatareinvolvedwithconflictsofinterests(PleaseseethedetailsinAppendixB).
WastewatertreatmentprojectinthepollutioncontrolledareaofKlongDan
Sub-district,Bang-borDistrict,SamutPrakarnProvince,hadadecentinitiationin
attempttosolvewaterpollutionwhichisamajorenvironmentalprobleminSamut
Prakarn.However,itbecameamega-projectrequiringthebudgetofover20,000
MillionBahttoconstructthelargestwastewatertreatmentplaninthecountryandin
SouthEastAsia.Thisprojectrequiredtheloansthathadtoberepaidbythetaxes
fromallcitizensofthecountry.Thisisoneofthedistinctiveexamplesofpolicy
corruption.Forexample,therewasadistortionoftheconstructionsitesothatthe
plantwouldbebuiltonthelandofcertainprivateindividualsthatweresoldtothe
governmentabove the marketprice.There were also problems concerning
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constructionbudget,disbursement,andselectionofconstructioncompanies,etc.In
particular,thechangeoftheprojectsiteledtodrasticchangeintherationalesor
studiesthathadbeenmadeinthepast.Suchchangewasnottransparent,andit
certainlyinvolvedorwasunderpoliticalinfluence.
Atthesametime,thisprojectalsoreflectsthestrongwilloflocalpeoplewho
observedalltheprojectpossibility.Theinitialprotestbasedontheenvironmental
issueonthecommunityledtotheaccumulationofdataforprojectinvestigation.This
resultedinthefindingofseveralcluesoffrauds.Therefore,itisfairtosaythatthe
announcementforterminationofKlongDanWasteWaterTreatmentProjectwas
directlyresultedfromtheworkoflocalpeople.Thisresultwascausedbythetrue
dedicationofunitedattemptsupportedbythoroughstudyandconsideration.This
kindofworkisanewreliableandtrustworthydimensionofthepeopleprocessin
fightingagainstunfairprojectofthegovernment.
Thereisalsoacaseconcerningtheoppositionagainsttheconstructionofthe
bridgeacrossMoonRiverandthefour-lanestreetinSatuekDistrict,Burirum
Province.Inthiscase,peopleassembledintheformofSatuekConservationClub
toleadtheprotestandtheinvestigationoftheunclearandunfairprojectsofthe
DepartmentofHighways.Inthisattempt,thepeoplehadtoaccumulatedatawiththe
supportfromacademicsofseveralinstitutionswhoprovidedknowledgeonthe
standardandqualityoftheprojects.Afterwards,petitionsweresubmittedtoseveral
governmentagenciesincludingtheOfficeofNationalEconomicandSocial
DevelopmentBoard.AftertheinvestigationofdatafromtheSatuek Conservation
Club,itwasfoundthattheMoonRiverBridgeProjectwasinitiatedwithout
sufficientacademicrationalanditwasnotworthinvestment.Besides,theproject
requiredwastefuluseofresourcesandwouldyieldnegativeimpactsintermsof
changinglifestyleofthecommunityandincreasingairpollution.Althoughthe
resistanceofthepeoplewasnotsuccessful,itstillinducedalertandunityamong
peopleandencouragedthemtoobtainknowledgeontechnicalandlegalissues,
channelsforsubmittingcomplaints,aswellastogatherandinvestigatevariouskind
ofinformation.Thatis,itstrengthenedthepeopleprocessininvestigatingthe
exerciseofstatepower.
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PrasongLertratanawisut(2004)indicatedthatinordertoachieveeffective
investigationagainstcorruptioninaccordancewiththeoccurringproblemsorfacts,
itisnecessaryforthemassmediatodoasfollows:
1.Itisnecessarytolookatcorruptionatthewidermeaningthantheprevious
ornormalwaysoffrauds.Thisisbecausecorruptionhasbeendeveloped
intomorecomplicatedforms.Variousnewmethodstocorrupthavebeen
inventedtoavoidinvestigation.Thesemethodsincludethecreationof
policiesforthebenefitsofcertainindividualsorgroups,orthediscontinuation
oflawsthataffecttheinterestofpoliticiansandtheiralliances,forexample,
thetransferofstockstofullagedchildrenorothercloserelativesor
individuals,etc.
2.Considerationmustbemadeonthepersonalbenefitsagainstthepublic
benefits.Thatis,itisnecessarytoconsiderwhomakesthepolicies,such
policiesarefavorableforwhom,andwhetherthosewhoareinvolvedin
policymakingreceiveanybenefits.
3.Establishmentofpublicmotion:Thatis,onlythedisclosureoffactsmay
notbesufficienttoleadtoinvestigation.Buttheissuemustbepushedtobe
apublicissueforwiderrangeofdiscussion.Thiswillputpressureto
systematicmechanismsorrelevantagenciestostartinvestigation.
Suriyasai Katasila (2004) also provided similar opinions:
The forms and nature of corruption have been changed. They are more
complicated. Therefore, the investigation or opposition against new forms of
corruption must start from adjusting the definition and paradigm to be on par with
complexity of the problems. (SuriyasaiKatasila,2004:73)
Forpeoplesectortoinvestigatetheexerciseofstatepower,thefollowing3
factorsmustbetakenintoconsideration:
1.Accesstothegovernmentsinformation:The1997InformationAct
stipulatesthatpeoplehavetherighttotheinformationofthegovernment,as
longasdisclosureofsuchinformationdoesnotaffectthemonarch,stability,
internationalrelation,nationaleconomy,andfinancialsecurity.However,
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lawenforcementtofacilitatethepeoplesaccesstothegovernments
informationisnoteasyandquickly.Onthecontrary,attemptshavebeen
madetomaketheinformationobtainmentprocessfullofdelayand
inefficiency.Thisresultsinthedifficultyofpeoplesparticipationin
investigatingtheuseofstatepowersinceitisnecessarytohavetimely
accesstotheinformation.
2.Alertandawarenessoftheproblems:Inordertoparticipateininvestigating
thegovernmentsuseofpower,itisnecessarythatpeoplearealertand
awareoftheimportanceoftheproblems.Inthepast,peopledidnothave
muchopportunitytoinvestigatetheuseofstatepower,sotheydidnot
understandthatitwasnecessaryforthemtobepartsofproblemsolution.
Additionally,theexistingattitudeandvaluedonotencouragepeopletojoin
intheinvestigation.Ingeneral,peopledonotawareoftheproblem.They
stillbelievethatitisacceptabletocorrupt,aslongaspeoplewhocorruptare
stillabletoperformandbringaboutpublicbenefits.Somepeoplealso
believethatallpoliticianscorrupt.Soitisuselesstoinvestigateanybody,
becauseallpoliticiansarethesame.Besides,thereisalsoabeliefthat
corruptionisaculturethatcannotbecorrectedinThaisociety.
3.Transactioncost:Inparticipatingininvestigation,apartfromtimeand
expenses,peoplearealsothreatenedbyinfluentialpeople,government
officialsandpoliticians.Therefore,somepeopleareintimidatedanddonot
wanttogetinvolvedintheinvestigationprocess.
InthecaseofinvestigationforcorruptionattheMinistryofPublicHealth,it
wasfoundthatthemovementleadersweredirectlyaffected:
Ms.RosanaTositrakul,leaderof30organizations,togetherwiththemass
media, including Matichon Newspaper, were sued by Dr. Prakrom
Wudhipong,PermanentSecretaryoftheMinistryofPublicHealth,inthe
defamationofcharacterchargefrompresentingtheinformationthataccused
Dr.Prakromofhisinvolvementinthecorruption.
Dr.WichaiCHokewiwatwassuedbyDr.PrakromWudhipong,inthe
defamationofcharacterchargefromwritinganarticleaboutcorruption.
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ACommissionwasestablishedtoinvestigatethemisconductandcredibility
ofDr.YongyodDharmawudhiandDr.PrawitLeesathapornpongsa.
Similarly,theorderforinvestigationwasmadeagainstDr.Sa-nguan
Nitayarampongbasedontheaccusationintheleaflet.
Mr.SuraseeKosolnawin,DirectoroftheOfficeoftheOfficialInformation
Commission,wastransferredtotheOfficeofAttorneyGeneralwithoutany
clearreason.Butsuchtransferorderwasmadeafterhedecidedtodisclose
theinformationaboutNCCCsinvestigation.
InthecaseofKlongDanorSatuek,peoplewhoparticipatedininvestigation
werealsothreatenedandintimidatedcontinuously.Therearealsoseveralothercases
inwhichpeoplejoinedininvestigatingandopposingtheexerciseofstatepower,and
finallyendedupwithdeath.ExamplesincludethecaseofJurinRachapol,who
opposedtheviolationofamangroveforestinPhuketProvince,NarinPo-Daeng,
leaderofoppositionagainsttherockmillplantinRayongProvince,PitakTonewud,
leaderofoppositionagainsttherockmillplantinPitsanulokeProvince,Suwat
Wongpiyasatit,leaderoftheoppositionagainstRaja-DhevaWasteTreatmentPlantin
Samut-prakarnProvince,orChaorenWat-aksornmleaderoftheoppositionagainst
Bor-nokHinkrudPowerPlant.
Additionally, several mass media and people who participated in the
investigationwerealsothreatenedbyinsultingchargeatconsiderableamountof
money.Thesephenomenaareconsideredawaytoerodethepeoplesinvestigation
againstthegovernmentsabuseofpower.

Conclusion
Thecontextandpatternsofcorruptionhaveconsiderablybeenchanged.There
arevarietiesofnewformsofcorruption.Atpresent,corruptionofteninvolves
politiciansandconflictsofinterests.Therefore,inconsideringaboutcorruption
issues,itisadvisablethatwideanduniversaldefinitionsbetakenintoaccount.
Corruptionincludestheexerciseofstatepowerinwaysthatbringspersonalgainsfor
individualsandgroupsofindividuals.Itrangesfromseekingbenefitsbycheating
people,suchasbyrequiringunder-tablemoney,toobtainingstateproperties,suchas
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423
byembezzlingpublicmoney,properties,time,andusingpowerintheobtained
positionfortheadvancementofcertainindividualsorgroups.Corruptionalso
involvestheuseofpowerandpositiontosetuppoliciesortoallocatepublic
resourcesforthebenefitsofcertaingroups,orforpoliticalsupport.Suchactivities
maybeeitherillegalorlegitimate,buttheycertainlycontradictwiththeethical
principlesandexpectationthatthepublicholdtowardspublicfigures,including
politiciansandgovernmentofficials.
Factorssupportingcorruptionincludeculturalfactor,attitude,andvaluethat
areinfavorofcorruption.Besides,therearealsoeconomic,social,andpolitical
factorsthatreflectpatronagenaturewithhighlevelofdisparity.Asforeconomicand
politicalfactors,theyindicatemonopolyinbothproductandservicemarkets,aswell
monopolyinpoliticalpower.Therefore,themeasuresforpreventionandsuppression
mustbecomprehensive.Thesemeasuresmustinclude:Socialmeasurepromoting
ethicalvalueandeducationtocreateawarenessandparticipation;Legalmeasure,
includinglawsandlawenforcement;Marketingmeasurethatprescribesthelawof
thegovernmentinappropriateinterventionofeconomicsystemtoavoideconomic
monopoly,and;Politicalmeasurethatpromotesdemocraticprocess,decentralization
andpeoplesparticipation.
Peoplesparticipationininspectingtheexerciseofstatepowerisamechanism
thatcancreatethedrivingforceforproblemsolvingandtoseriouslypunishthe
wrongdoers.Thus,apartfromlegalmeasuresandeconomicandpoliticalreforms,
peoplesparticipationcanalsoenhancethecombatagainstcorruption.However,
peoplesparticipationinvolves3majorfactorsnamely:accesstothegovernment
information;provisionofproblemacknowledgementandawareness,and;reduction
oftransactioncostininvestigation.These3factorscanbecomeobstaclesagainst
peoplesparticipation.
Therefore,inordertoencouragepeoplesinspectionontheuseofgovernment
power,itisnecessarytodoasfollows:
1.Improvetheaccesstopublicinformationsothatitwillbemoreconvenient
andrapid.Moreover,punishmentmeasuresmustbedeterminedforthe
governmentauthoritiesofwhichtheoperationsimpedeordelaytheaccess
tosuchinformation.
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2.Attemptsshouldbemadetochangetheattitudetowardsethicalsystem.
Besides,itisalsonecessarytocreateawarenessontheaffectsofthe
problemsandtherolesofpeopleinparticipatinginsolvingcorruption
problems.
3.Attemptsshouldbemadetoreducecostofparticipation.Forexample,there
shouldbeaneffectiveandseriouswitnessprotectionprogram.Besides,the
governmentmustpayattentiontovariouskindsofthreats.
4.Thereshouldbemoreopportunitiesforpeoplesinspection.Forexample,
peopleshouldbeabletosubmitthecaseofcorruptedpoliticiansto
investigatingorganizationsdirectly.Moreover,morepublicforumsshould
bemadetoreceivecomplaints.
5.Themediamusthavefreedominpresentinganddisseminatinginformation,
aswellasininspectingthegovernmentsuseofpower.

Table 1 The index of corruption in Thailand during 1995-2005

Year Points
Numberof
datasources
Ranknumber
Numberof
countries
1995 2.79 7 34 41
1996 3.33 10 37 54
1997 3.06 6 39 52
1998 3.00 11 61 85
1999 3.20 12 68 98
2000 3.20 11 60 90
2001 3.20 12 61 91
2002 3.20 11 64 102
2003 3.30 13 70 133
2004 3.60 14 64 146
2005 3.80 13 59 159
Source:www.transparency.org
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Appendix A
Investigation on the Ministry of Public Healths procurement
of medicines and medical supplies in the fiscal year 1998
Onthedateof28October2003,theSupremeCourtCriminalDivisionfor
HoldersofPoliticalPositionsannouncedtheverdictof15yearimprisonmentforthe
formerMinisterofPublicHealth,Mr.RakkiatSukthana.Thetrialhadbeenmadefor
theabuseofpowerinthepositiontoseekpersonalgainssincetheMinisterhadtaken
5millionBahtbribefromamedicalcompany.Previously,Mr.RakkiatSukthanahad
beensentencedguiltybySupremeCourtCriminalDivisionforHoldersofPolitical
Positionsforthechargeofunusualwealthandhispropertiesof233.88Bahtvalue
wereseized.Furthermore,Mr.Rakkiatreceivedtheguiltyverdictfromthe
ConstitutionalCourtforsubmittingfalseaccountstatementandwasrefrainedfrom
politicsfor5years.
ThecaseofMr.Rakkiatscorruptionoccurredin1998,aftereconomiccrisisin
Thailandandsubstantiallydecreaseinthebudgetfor1991.Intheearly1991,the
governmentallowedadditionalbudgetforsomeministriestoalleviatedifficultiesof
thepublic.Asaresult,theMinistryofPublicHealthreceivedadditionalbudgetof
1,400millionBahttopurchasemedicineandmedicalsupplies.Thisisthebeginning
ofthe1,400millionBahtcorruptioncasethatinvolvedtheprocurementofmedicine
andmedicalsuppliesfordozensofprovinces.Itisalsothebeginningofthefight
againstcorruptionprocessbyRuralDoctorForum,RuralPharmaceuticalForum,in
coordinationwith30non-governmentorganizationssupportedbytheuseofvarious
mechanismbeingcreatedbythenewConstitution.Attheheightofsocialpressure
againstthecorruption,thegovernmentestablishedacommitteetoinvestigatethe
case.Initially,severepunishmentwasmadeforthecorruptionofmedicinein5
provinces,namelyNarathiwas,Pang-nga,Cha-cheung-sao,Nakornpathom,and
Ayudhaya.Twoseniorgovernmentofficialsbeinginvolvedinthiscasewerefired,
andChiefProvincialPublicHealthOfficeinallthese5provinceswereremoved.
Moreover,thethenMinisteredandDeputyMinistersresigned,whilePermanent
SecretaryoftheMinistrywastransferred.Lateron,Mr.JirayuCharatsathien,
AdvisortoMinisterofPublicHealth,receivedguiltysentencefromtheSupreme
CourtCriminalDivisionforHoldersofPoliticalPositionsandserved6yearsin
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prisonforthechargeofabuseofpower.Thisledtothedisclosureofsecretfinancial
recordandbanktransactionthatfinallyhelpedconvictMr.RakkiatSukthana.
TheCounterCorruptionCommittee(CCC)sinvestigationintothematterwas
separatedinto2parts,namelyPermanentOfficialsandPoliticalOfficeHolder.The
investigationresultofCCCconfirmedtheresultofinvestigationmadebyMr.Banlu
Siripanichandhisteam,thatis:
1.PermanentOfficials:ItisfoundthatMr.YingkiatPaisarnachapong,Deputy
PermanentSecretarytotheMinistryofPublicHealthandMr.Vorayuth
Jiarasathawong,inchargeoftheDirectorofProvincialHealthDepartment,
tookadvantageofthecancellationofthemediansetpriceofmedicineand
theirknowledgeontheadditionalbudgetallocationforprovincialpublic
healthoffices.Theyorderedtheirdeputiesinvariousprovincialhealth
officestousenormalbudgetandadditionalbudgetfortheyear1998to
purchasemedicineandmedicalsupplyfromthecompaniesthatbothof
themwereinvolvedwith.Therefore,bothwerefoundtobeguiltyof
corruption.
2. PoliticalOfficeHolders:ItisfoundthatMr.JirayuJarasatien,whohadbeen
appointedAdvisortoDeputyMinisterofPublicHealthonNovember18th,
1997,tookadvantageofthecancellationofthemediansetpriceofmedicine
andhisknowledgeontheadditionalbudgetallocationforprovincialpublic
healthoffices.Mr.JirayuJarasatienrequesteddoctorsinSongkhaland
NakornsrithamarajProvincialHealthOfficestopurchasemedicinesat
unusualhighpricefromthecompanieshesenttomeetthesedoctors.
Besides,healsodemanded15%ofthe1998additionalbudgetfrom
SurathaneePublicHealthOffice.Butduetothemediaexposureofthe
corruption,theprocurementandtransferofmoneywerenotfollowed
throughasrequested.However,Mr.Jirayusconductwasconsideredthe
abuseofpowerinhispositionforthebenefitsofhimself andother
individuals.
Thecorruptioninprocurementofmedicineandmedicalsupplywasmadein
thefollowingchannels:
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HealthCenterHospitals,generalhospitals,andcommunityhospitals
orderedthemedicinefromthecompaniesthatweredeterminedbycentral
authorities.
ProvincialHealthOfficesorderedthemedicineandthecompaniesdelivered
theirproductstobecheckedandreceivedbythehospitals.
The purchase was made t hrough t he Government Pharmaceut i cal
Organizations,whilethecompanieswereprescribedbythecentral
authority.
TheProvincialHealthOfficestransferredmoneytoallowcommunity
hospitalstoarrangedtheprocurementasrequiredbeforesendingback5-
50%ofthemoneytotheProvincialHealthOffices.
Medicineandmedicalsupplyweredeliveredwithoutanypurchaseorder.
Supplementfundwasusedforprocurement,andthenthebudgetin
Category300wasusedinplaceofthesupplementfund.
Inaddition,severalcommitteeswereestablishedtoinvestigatetheGovernment
PharmaceuticalOrganizationandtheprocurementofmedicineandmedicalsupplyin
other34provinces.However,theestablishmentsofcommitteeswereredundant,and
finally,onlyslightpenalties,suchasreprimandandwarning,weremade.Thisissue
ledtoseveralquestions.Forexample,wasthepunishmentmadeonlytoalleviatethe
oppositionofthepeople?Whenthescandalwasover,wouldthegovernmentstillpay
attentiontothismatter?Besides,thosewhogotinvolvedinfightingagainst
corruptionorwhowerewitnessesofthecaseweretreatedunfairly,suchasby
variouskindsofpressure,threatening,orbeinginvestigatedortransferred.
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Appendix B.
Waste Water Management Project
in the Pollution Controlled Area of Samut Prakarn Province
(Klong Dan)
Thedisclosureofcorruptioninasizableprojectofthegovernmentwasmad
fortheconstructionofthecentralwastewatertreatmentplantinKlongDan,Samut
PrakarnProvince.Thevalueoftheprojectwas23,701millionBath,whichwas
adjustedfor70%increasefromtheinitialvalueof13,612millionBaht.Despitethe
sizeofthisdevelopmentproject,localpeopleinthecommunitydidnothavean
opport uni t y t o part i ci pat e i n deci si on maki ng.Thi s l ed t o t he prot est and
investigationagainsttheirregularitiesoftheprojectbypeopleintheareaofKlong
Dan.Disclosuresandpetitionsweresubmittedtovariousagenciesandorganizations
regardingnon-transparencyoftheproject,resultingintheinvestigationprocessesof
severalagencies,ragingfromtheHouseofSenate,MinistryofNaturalResources,
theOfficeoftheNationalCounterCorruptionCommission,andFBI.Finally,the
governmentorderedcancellationoftheconstructionthatwasnearlycompleted.The
revealedinvestigationresultsindicatedthatprocurementoftheprojectlandwasnot
transparent,aswellastheemploymentofsub-contractorswhoareinvolvedwith
politicians.
Thelackoftransparencyappearedinlandmanagementofajointventurecalled
RuamKijakranRuamKarCompany,orNVPSKG,whichpurchasedthelandfrom
KlongDanMarineandFisheryCo.Ltd.ThelandhadpreviouslybelongedtoPalm
BeachDevelopmentCompany,theshareholdersofwhichalsohadsharesinKlong
DanCompany.Thatis,therewasanissueofconflictofinterestsincetheindividuals
whoheldpoliticalpositionshadinterestorrelativesinthecompanythatconducted
thegovernmentproject.Besides,aftercompletionoftheproject,theprojectarea
wouldnotbefullyutilizedsinceindustrialfactoriesdidnotparticipateintheproject
andthehouseholdincomeofpeopleinSamutPrakarntoolittletoaffordadditional
expenses.Inaddition,thisprojectalsoledtolegaldisputesinceitdidnotprepare
environmentalassessmentreportasrequiredbytheNationalEnvironmentPromotion
andConservationAct,B.E.2535(1992),nottomentionitsunavailabilityofpermit
forconductingmanufacturingfactory.AsforgeographicalfeaturesofKlongDan
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area,thesoftsoilontheriverbankcouldbeerodedandfloodedafterconstruction.
Moreover,thisareaisalsoasourceofaquaticanimals.Thetechnologyusedin
constructionmightcreateproblemsfromwidespreadsmellandthelargeamountof
residuewouldaffectthehealthofpeopleinKlongDanandnearbycommunities.
TheoperationofKlongDanwastewatertreatmentprojectdidnotallowpeople
toparticipateindecisionmakingandinenvironmentalimpactassessment(EIA).
Furthermore,informationandpublichearingwerenotarrangedforlocalpeoplesince
thebeginning.Ifthewastesystemreleased525,000cubicmetersofthetreatedwater
intothesea,itwouldaffectmarineecologyandlivelihoodoflocalpeople,the
majorityofwhomwereinfishery.Asforthestructureofthewastewatertreatment
plantanddistributionpipes,whichwererenewedafterdiscontinuationof90%
completionwork,itisfoundthatsubstantialareasoflandweresubsided,bothinthe
partsoftreatmentplantanddistributionpipe,althoughtheyhaveneverbeenused.
Iftheprojectistobecontinued,considerablerepairisrequired,aswellasalarge
amountofbudget.
AccordingtothenewsfromMatichonNewspaperonJanuary19th,2004on
thetopicofTheresultofinvestigationonKlongDancasereachedthehandsof
PrimeMinistry,convicting3formerMinistersinvolvedincorruption.Accordingto
theinvestigationresultfromtheCommissionforInvestigationofCorruptionin
KlongDanWasteWaterTreatmentProject,togetherwiththeDepartmentofSpecial
Investigation(DSI)andinvestigatingofficialsfromtheCrimeDivisionSuppression,
corruptionwasconductedamongpoliticalofficeholdersandpermanentgovernment
officialsfromtheDepartmentofPollutionControl.Besides,thecorruptionwasalso
supportedbyajointventurecalledKijakarnRuamKar,orNVPSKGGroup,
concessionaireofthisgovernmentproject.Theconclusionoftheinvestigationwould
besenttoPol.Lt.Col.ThaksinShinawatra,PrimeMinister,onMonday,January
19th,2004,sothatthePrimeMinistercouldconsiderthedisciplinaryproceedings
priortosubmittingthecorruptioncasetotheNationalCounterCorruption
Commission(NCCC).
Therewere8governmentofficialsand3politicianswhowouldbecharged
withthecourtproceedings.ThelistofpoliticiansthattheCorruptionInvestigation
CommitteesenttothePrimeMinistercomprises:
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1.FormerMinisterS.,whowasbenefitedfromtheapprovalofconstruction
projectanditsexpansion,aswellasfrombeingapartofthejointventureto
conducttheconstructionprojectandestablishmentofafactorytosupply
wastewaterpipestoKlongDanProject.
2.FormerMinisterY.,whobenefitedfromexpansionofbudgetallowance.
Therewasalsotheevidenceindicatingthatheconcealedtheproject
adjustmentintheagendaoftheministerialmeetingbymakingitanagenda
forconsiderationofincreasingbudget.
3. FormerMinisterW.,whowasbenefitedfromthesaleofland.Healso
plannedtodemandfurtherbenefitfromwastewatertreatmentafter
completionoftheproject.
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Appendix C
Construction project of a bridge across the Moon River and
a four lanes street in Satuek District, Burirum Province
ThisprojectaimstoexpandthebridgeandthehighwayNo.219.Thecurrent
bridgeacrosstheMoonRiver,orSatukBridge,connectsSatukDistrictofBurirum
ProvinceandChumpolburiDistrict,SurinProvince.Thisbridgewasbuiltin1968,
togetherwiththe219Highway,whichisanimportantstreetforpeopleinSatukand
acenterofmarket,schools,andgovernmentoffices.Inthisarea,therearealsothe
PublicParkinMemorandumofthe75
th
AnniversaryofHisMajestytheKing,and
PhraBuddhaPatimasaypiromSatukUdomraj-nimitmanin,aBuddhiststatuethatis
theotherdistinctivelandmarkofSatukDistrict.
Inconstructionofthebridge,AsianCo.Ltd.,ownedbyMr.KanaenSupha,
fatherinlawofMr.NewinChidchorb,amajorpolitician,wontheprojectbid.The
contractstartedonOctober27
th
,2000,andendedonSeptember26
th
,2002,withtotal
periodof700daysandtheconstructionbudgetof281,644,030Baht.Besides,
previousagreementhadbeenmadeamongthebidderstoproposeslightlylowerprice
thanthemedianpricesothatthewinnercouldgetthehighprice.
Furthermore,thebridgedesignwasnotsuitableforthearea.Thatis,thenew
bridgewasgoingtobe6metershigherthanthepreviousone,withthelengthof275
meters,andwouldcertainlyaffectthecommunicationbetweenSatukDistrict,
BurirumProvinceandChumpolbureeDistrict,SurinProvince,andthetransportation
ofagriculturalproductsbetweenthetwodistricts.Thesurveywasmadetoobtain
opinionsoflocalpeopleaffectedbytheproject.However,itwasfoundthatpeople,
communities,localadministrativeorganizations,lackparticipationbecausethe
surveywasmadeonlyamongthecommunityinthemunicipalareaofSatukDistrict,
butnotincludedpeopleinChumpolbureeDistrict,SurinProvince.
TheconstructionofSatukBridgewasopposedbySatuk Conservation
Club,arepresentativegroupofpeopleininvestigatingthelackoftransparencyof
theproject.Meetingswereheldforbrainstormingandevaluatingtheimpactofthe
bridgeconstruction,whichwouldyieldadverseimpactofthecommunitiesofSatuk
Districtandnearbyareas.Thetrafficandlivelihoodofthepeoplewouldbe
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separated,affectingthetradeandsafetyofthepeople.TheClubsubmittedpetitionto
theNationalEconomicandSocialAdvisoryCouncilrequestingtheimpact
assessment.Andfinally,inresponsetothepetitionoftheSatuk Conservation
Club, theOfficeofthePrimeMinistersenttheordertotheHighwayDepartment,
MinistryofCommunication,tohalttheconstruction.
Duringtheprotest,theGovernorofBurirumorderedSatukDistrictChief
OfficertoconductasurveytogetpeoplesopiniononJune19th,2001.Thetotalof
2200questionnairesweresenttothepeople,and987werereturned.Accordingtothe
poll,704households,or71.3%,agreedwiththebridgeconstructionproject,while
181householdsdisagreed,and101householdhadnocomment.Therefore,the
constructionprojectwasrestarted.However,the Satuk Conservation Clubis
nowobservingtheconstructionofthefourlanesroadtocheckwhetherthereisany
operationthatisnotuptoengineeringstandardandmaycauseproblemsinthe
future.
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Stiglitz, Joseph. 2002. Transparency in Government. in The Right to Tell: The Role
of Mass Media in Economic Development, The World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
Werner, Si mcha B. 1983. New Di rect i ons i n t he St udy of Admi ni st rat i ve
Corruption. Public Administration Review. March/April, pp. 146-152.
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Peoples Inspection on the State Power
318
Rosana Tositakul
Network of 30 Non-Government Organizations
against Corruption

1. Introduction
T hesayingPower leads to corruption, and absolute power leads to absolute
corruptionisthetruth.Inthesametoken,powerinpoliticalcircleandgovernment
systemalwaysleadstocorruptionamongpoliticiansandgovernmentofficials.The
politicalhistoryofThailandafter1932hasreflectedthereplacementofstatepower
holdersthroughthecoupdetats.Amongthereasonsoftencitedbythecoupswas
thatthepreviousgovernmentcorruptedconsiderably,makingthecoupsunableto
allowsuchsituationtocontinue.

318
ThearticletobepresentedinagroupmeetingonTheinspectionoftheexerciseofstate
powerbythepeoplesectorduringthe8
th
ConferenceofKingPrajadhipoksInstitutein
2006onthetopicofConstitutionalReforms:ComparativePerspectives,November3
rd

5
th
,2006Conferencetheacademicconferenceof,attheUnitedNationsConferenceCenter.

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However,almostallcoupsinthepastpoliticalhistoryusuallyendedupas
personswhocorrupted.Thenanewcycleofcoupdetatstatedonceagain.Therefore,
state power is the possession to be exchanged among successive power holders.
Noneofthecoupsreallyattemptedtoestablishtheinspectionprocessagainstthe
abuseofgovernmentpowertoseriouslyindicttheformergovernmentaccordingto
theaccusation.Noneofthepoliticiansweresentencedwithcriminalpenaltyto
imprisonment.Themaximumpunishmentwasonlytheseizureofpropertyof
politiciansintheformergovernmentonly.
Thefirstseizureofpropertiesfromunusualwealthypoliticianswasthecaseof
FieldMarshallSaritThanarat,formerPrimeMinisterofThailand.Inthiscase,Field
MarshallThanomKittikajornusedthepowerinaccordancewithSection17ofthe
1959Constitutiontosetupaninspectioncommittee.Thisinspectionresultedinthe
seizureof604millionBahtvalueofSaritspropertiesinNovember1964after
Saritsdeath.
DuringtheeraofFieldMarshalThanomKittikajorn,thecountrywasunder
militarydictatorship.Democracydidnotexist.Therewasnoparliamentfromthe
election.Theexerciseofstatepowerwasnotexamined.Consequently,theproblems
fromcorruptionwerenolessthanduringthetimeofFieldMarshalSarit.Afterwards,
therewereprotestsrequestingaconstitution,andtheupsurgeofdemonstrationfrom
severalhundredsthousandsofstudentsandpeopletoevictthedictatorialand
corruptingleaders.Aftersuchpoliticalchange,thegovernmentunderMr.Sanya
DharmasakproceededwithinvestigationonthecorruptionofFieldMarshalThanom
basedonSection17ofthe1972Constitution.Thisinvestigationresultedinthe
seizureof434millionbahtvalueofpropertiesfromFieldMarshalThanom
KittikajornandFieldMarshallPrapasJarusathienandtheirfamiliesintheyear1974.
TheoccurrenceoftheOctober14th,1973event,ontheonehand,istherequest
forconstitutionbythepeoplesector,whichisthedemocraticrulesofcountry
administration.Ontheotherhand,itisthegreatestexaminationoftheabuseofstate
powerinthepoliticalhistoryofThailand.Afterthisevent,theCounterCorruption
CommitteewasestablishedbythegovernmentofMr.SanyaDharmasak.Thiswasan
attempttocreatethemechanismfortheinspectionofcorruptionamongthe
governmentofficials.However,itdidnotincludethecorruptionamongpoliticians
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sincethiscommitteewasnotdesignedtophavepowertoinvestigatecorrupt
politicians.
Beforetheyear1997,therewasonlyonecaseindealingwithcorrupt
politiciansthroughthemechanismofthecourtofjustice.Thiscasewaschargedby
thebribingtraderagainsttheMinisterofAgriculture,GeneralSurajitJaruseranee,for
receivingbribefromtradersinvolvedintheforestcorruptioncaseduringtheeraof
FieldMarshalSaritThanarat.Thecourtproceedingswereconductedthroughallthe
3courts.Andfinally,GeneralSurajitJaruseraneereceivedimprisonmentverdictthe
SupremeCourtthroughMr.SanyaDharmasak,thejudgeinthiscase.
Problemsfromcorruptiondooccurandexistamongpoliticians,especiallyat
theministeriallevel.However,thereisnoeffectivemechanismtopreventand
examinecorruptionandtosuppressthebehaviorofthesepeople.Thisfactis
confirmed by thespeech ofMajor General Sanan Kajornprasart, Leader of
MahachonParty,giveninapublicseminaronSeptember3rd,2006,atThammasart
University:In terms of politics, I can guarantee that professional politicians are
more able to perform their duties than those who are from business sector.
Although professional politicians corrupt, the amount of corruption does not
exceed 3-5%. They do not dare to get involved in higher amount. But as for
politicians who used to be businessmen, I can guarantee that they take at least 20-
30% of the project for their gains. They perceive that they have to get profit as
much as they have invested.
319
Corruptioninthegovernmentisthereforetheonlyexcuseforcoupsdetats,
whichoccuralternativelywiththeuprisingsofthepeopleagainstdictatorial
government.AlongthepoliticalchangeinThailand,someconfrontationmayresult
inbloodanddeath.Atthesametime,corruptionproblemamongpoliticiansisthe
essenceoftheadministrativeproblemsfromthelackofgoodgovernance,lackof
transparency,andlackofjusticeforthepeople.Thesefactorsarethedrivingforce
forthefightofpeopleinrequestforpoliticalreform,whichhasConstitutionasa
symbol.
319
KrungthepTurakijNewspaper,September4
th
,2006.
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Themovementofthepeopleforpoliticalreformsafterthebloodshedprotest
againstdictatorshipoftheNationalPeaceKeepingCouncil(NPKC)in1992ledto
thedraftof1997ConstitutionofThailand.Themajorissueforthedraftofthis
constitutionwastostrengthenthestabilityofpoliticalpartiesandthegovernment.
Therefore,emphasiswasmadeonlargescalepoliticalparties.Besides,inattemptto
reachthepoliticalbalance,theconstitutionwasalsodesignedfortheavailabilityof
considerablenumberofindependentorganizationstomonitorthegovernments
exerciseofstatepower.Althoughthe1997Constitutioncomprisedmechanism
allowingpeopletoparticipateinmonitoringthestatepower,butthosewhodrafted
thisconstitutiondidnotgivehighprioritytoallowthepeoplesectortoplayrolesin
examiningtheexerciseofstatepower.Therefore,themechanismallowingthepeople
sectortoinspecttheholdersofpoliticalpositionsexerciseofstatepowerbasedon
Section303and304ofthe1997Constitutionwasthencomparedtoanappendixof
Thaipolitics.Thatis,allthroughthe9yearsofthis1997Constitution,noneof
politiciansorholdersofpoliticalpositionswereremovedbythemechanismofthe
listingof50,000peopleorbythelistingofonefourthofmembersofparliament
basedonthecauseofcorruption.Inthesametoken,thegovernmentofPrime
MinisterThaksinShinawatrawasaccusedofgiganticcorruption.Butthemechanism
ofvariousindependentorganizationsdesignedtodealwithcorruptionamong
politiciansfailedtofindfaultfromthisgovernment.Therefore,thepeoplesectorhad
tomakeamovementtomonitortheabuseofstatepower.Suchmovementwas
conductedoutsideoftheparliament,andoutsideoftherepresentativemechanism,
hence,therewasafearthatitmightleadtobloodshedconfrontationbetween
protestorsandsupportersofThaksingovernment.Thisincidentopenedan
opportunityfortherevivalofthearmygrouptoconductanothercoupdetatbasedon
thecommonexcuseofcorruption.However,whetherthiscoupdetatwillendinthe
samewayasinthepastisstillunknown.Onlytimecantell.
Atpresent,corruptionbecomesaninstitutionofThaisociety,sinceithaslong
beeninexistencetogetherwithThaisociety.Furthermore,currentcorruptionis
highlysystematicanddynamicsothattherulesoflawsthatlagbehindcannotcatch
upwith.Therefore,inordertofightagainstsuchinstitutionalcorruption,itis
necessarytounderstandthecomponentsofbeneficiarygroupscalledthe three
poles of power,whichcomprise:
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1.Politicians
2. Governmentofficials,militaryandpolice
3.Businessmen
These3groupsarebeneficiarieswhoalternativelycontrolthegameofstate
power,eitherastheleadersorsupporters.Intheageofbureaucracy,thegroupsof
governmentormilitaryofficialsactasheadofthegovernment.Onthecontrary,
duringtheperiodofbusinessorientedgovernmentledbyPol.Lt.Col.Thaksin
Shinawatra,themajorityofpowerwasinthehandofbusinessmen,whiletheother
twogroupsweresupporters.These3polescausethealternationbetweenmoneyto
power,andpowertomoney.Thatis,thestate powerleadstomoney and
benefits,whilemoneyleadstoseizure of state powerconsecutively.
Thefightagainstorthemonitoringofthestatepowerthatisunderthe
Corruption Institutionisthereforedifficultandunabletoconductonlybyeither
oneofthe3poles,sinceitiseasiertobedominatedbypowerorinterests.Asforthe
peoplesector,itisthebiggeststakeholdergroupofthesociety,andistheownerof
sovereignty,althoughinrealitythepeopleareilltreatedandaretakenadvantageof
byotherpoliticalstakeholders.Therefore,onlyinspectionofstatepowerconducted
bythepeoplewhoarenotunderinfluenceofmoneyandpowerofthebeneficiary
groupcancreatetherealbalanceagainstcorruption.
AfterthecoupdetatofSeptember19
th
,2006,attemptshavebeenmadeto
snatchtheopportunitytoestablishthecentralrulecalledConstitution.However,
ifthereisnorealparticipationofthepeople,bothintermsofpatternsandcontext,or
ifthemechanismofconstitutiondraftingisinfluencedbythebeneficiarygroupsor
powerholder,itwillbedifficulttocreateeffectivemechanismtomonitortheuseof
statepowerbothbythepeopleandbytheinternalmechanism.Thismechanism
aimsatmonitoringtheholdersofpoliticalpositionsexerciseofstatepowerinorder
topreventcorruptionandtocreatetransparencyinadministrationthroughgood
governance.Withoutsuchmechanism,itwillbeimpossibleforThailandtobefree
fromthecycleofcorruptionandcoupdetatinthefuture.

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2. The mechanism of the 1997 Constitution
and the inspection of the state power by people sector
The1997Constitutionemphasizesontheinspectionofthepoliticians
dishonestexerciseofstatepowermoreconcretelythanpreviousconstitutions.
Severalindependentorganizationswereestablishedtodotheirdutiesofmonitoring
andtobalancetheadministrator.Thisarticlewillmentiononlytheorganizationsthat
havethechannelsforpeopletoparticipateinmonitoringthestatepower.
2.1 The National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC):
ThisCommissionwasadjustedfromthepreviousCounterCorruption
Commission(CCC).Thenewlyestablishedcommissionisempoweredtoinspectthe
politicians.Inthisrespect,the1997Constitutionrequiresholdersofpolitical
positionstodeclaretheiraccountsshowingparticularofassetsandliabilities.
Besides,italsostipulatestheadditionofinspectionrolesforNCCCregardingthe
removal from position.Theremovalcanbemadeinthecasethattheholdersof
politicalpositionsareunderthecircumstanceofunusualwealth,indicativeofthe
commissionofcorruption,malfeasanceinoffice,malfeasanceinjudicialofficeoran
intentionalexerciseofpowercontrarytotheprovisionsoftheConstitutionorlaw.
TherolesofNCCCregardingtheremovalfrompositionareconnectedwiththeroles
oftheSenates.
Additionally,inthecasethattheholdersofpoliticalpositionsareguiltyin
accordancewiththecriminalcode,theresultofinvestigationbyNCCCwillbe
submittedtotheProsecutorGeneral.Thenthecasewillbefurtherprosecutedatthe
SupremeCourtCriminalDivisionsforPersonHoldingPoliticalPositionstotryand
adjudicatethecase.
Peoplesectoralsoplaysrolesintheinspectionoftheexerciseofstatepower
throughNCCC.Accordingtothe1999OrganicActonCounterCorruption
320
,incase
320
Section59:MembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesofnotlessthanone-fourthofthe
total number of the existing members of the House or voters of not less than ffty thousand
innumberhavetherighttolodgewiththePresidentoftheSenateajointrequestthatthe
Senatepassaresolutionremovingthepersonsholdingpositionsundersection58from
offce.
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ofcriminalchargeagainstholdersofpoliticalpositions,thenumberofnotlessthan
fiftythousandofvotershavetherighttolodgeajointrequestwiththePresidentof
theSenateajointrequestthattheSenatepassaresolutionremovingthepersons
holdingpositionsundersection58fromoffice.Thentheaccusationwouldbe
transferredtoNCCCforfurtherinvestigation.Ifsuchholdersofpoliticalpositions
werefoundguiltyasaccused,theywouldberemovedfromthepositionbythe
Senate,andwouldbefurtherprosecutedattheSupremeCourtCriminalDivisionsfor
PersonHoldingPoliticalPositions.
InthecaseoftherequestforthepropertytodevolveontheStatesinceany
holderofpoliticalpositionsorgovernmentofficialsisunusualwealthy,thepeople
areabletomakeallegationtotheNCCCinaccordancewithSection75,76ofthe
1999OrganicActonCounterCorruption
321
.
Senatorsofnotlessthanone-fourthofthetotalnumberoftheexistingmembersofthe
SenatehavetherighttolodgewiththePresidentoftheSenateajointrequestthatthe
Senate pass a resolution removing a senator from offce.
321
Section75:Inthecasewhereanallegationismadethatanypersonholdingapolitical
positionor any Governmentofficialhasbecomeunusuallywealthy,theN. C. C.
Commissionshallmakeapreliminarydeterminationastowhetherthecircumstanceorthe
matterputintheallegationfallswithinthematterscapableofacceptancebytheN.C.C.
Commission.Iftheallegedculpritisthepersonwhohasalreadysubmittedanaccount
showingparticularsofassetsandliabilities,theN.C.C.Commissionshallalsotakesuch
accountintoconsideration.
Theallegationofunusualwealthshallbemadeatthetimetheallegedculpritisa
GovernmentofficialorhasceasedtobeaGovernmentofficialfornotmorethantwoyears
Section76:Theallegationundersection75shallatleastcontainthefollowingparticulars:
(1)thenameandaddressofthepersonmakingtheallegation;
(2)thenameorpositionoftheallegedculprit;
(3)theallegationandcircumstanceunderwhichtheallegedculprithasallegedlybecome
wealthy
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2.2 Administrative Courts:
Thisinstitutionisanindependentorganizationinaccordancewiththe1997
Constitution.TheAdministrativeCourtshavethepowerstotryandadjudicatecases
ofdisputebetweenanadministrative(government)agencyorgovernmentofficial
andthepublicoraprivateindividual.Suchdisputemaybeaconsequenceoftheact
oromissionoftheactthatmustbe,accordingtothelaw,performedbysuch
governmentagency,andtheactoromissionoftheactcausesinjuriestothepeople.
Inthecasethatsuchinjurieshaveanimpactontheright,liberty,orlegitimate
interestofthepeople,thepeopleareabletosubmitallegationtotheAdministrative
Courtforconsideration.Insuchcase,theAdministrativeCourtshavepowertogive
ordertoabrogatetheaction,theministerialresolution,orthelawsissuebythe
administration.
AccordingtoSection9ofthe1999ActonEstablishmentofAdministrative
CourtsandAdministrativeCourtProcedure,theAdministrativeCourthasthe
competencetotryandadjudicateorgiveordersinthefollowingmatters:
(1)The case i nvol vi ng a di sput e i n rel at i on t o an unl awful act by an
administrativeagencyorgovernmentofficial,whetherinconnectionwith
theissuanceofaby-lawororderorinconnectionwithotheract,byreason
ofactingwithoutorbeyondthescopeofpowersanddutiesorinconsistently
withthelawortheform,processorprocedurewhichisthematerial
requirementforsuchact,orinbadfaithorinamannerindicatingunfair
discriminationorcausingunnecessaryprocessorexcessiveburdentothe
publicoramountingtoundueexerciseofdiscretion;
(2)Thecaseinvolvingadisputeinrelationtoanadministrativeagencyor
governmentofficialneglectingofficialdutiesrequiredbythelawtobe
performedorperformingsuchdutieswithunreasonablydelay;
(3)Thecaseinvolvingadisputeinrelationtoawrongfulactorotherliabilityof
anadministrativeagencyorgovernmentofficialarisingfromtheexerciseof
powerunderthelaworfromaby-law,administrativeorderorotherorder,
orfromtheneglectofofficialdutiesrequiredbythelawtobeperformedor
theperformanceofsuchdutieswithunreasonabledelay;
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(4)Thecaseinvolvingadisputeinrelationtoanadministrativecontract;
(5)The cas e pr es cr i bed by l aw t o be s ubmi t t ed t o t he Cour t by an
administrativeagencyorgovernmentofficialformandatingapersontodoa
particularactorrefrainingtherefrom;
(6)Thecaseinvolvingadisputeinrelationtothemattersprescribedbythelaw
tobeunderthejurisdictionofAdministrativeCourts.
2.3 Ombudsman:
TheOmbudsmanisanindependentorganizationinaccordancewiththe1997
Constitution.Itisanothermechanismtowhichthepeopleareabletolodgepetition
whentheydonotreceivejusticefromtheperformanceofthegovernmentofficials.
TheOmbudsmanhavethepowersanddutiestoconsiderandinquireintothe
complaintforfact-findingsinthefollowingcases:
Failuretoperformincompliancewiththelaw,orperformancebeyond
powersanddutiesasprovidedbythelawofagovernmentofficialoran
officialinthegovernmentagencies;
Performanceoromissiontoperformdutiesofagovernmentofficial,which
unjustlycausesinjuriestothecomplainantorthepublicwhethersuchactis
lawfulornot.
ThepeoplespetitiontotheOmbudsmandoesnotlimittherightofthe
petitionertoproceedwithotherlegalissues.
2.4 Inspection of the state power by people sector:
Thisactioncanbeintheformofdemonstrationsagainstauthoritative
government,whichhaveoccurredseveraltimesinthepoliticalhistoryofThailand
whenthegovernmentcannotbeinspectedbytheinternaladministrativemechanism.
The demonst rat i on of peopl e i s usual l y t he l ast resol ut i on used t o creat e
transparency,goodgovernance,andcorruption-freeatmosphereinthegovernment.
However,suchdemonstrationisalsousuallysuppressedwithviolencebydictatorial
governmentinthebloodshedconfrontation.
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Section44ofthe1997Constitutionprescribestherightandlibertyofthe
peopleinassemblingpeacefullyandwithoutarms.AndaccordingtoSection65of
thesameConstitution,apersonshallhavetherighttoresistpeacefullyanyact
committedfortheacquisitionofthepowertorulethecountrybyameanswhichis
notinaccordancewiththemodesprovidedinthisConstitution.

3. Experience from people sector in using

the mechanism in inspecting
the exercise of state power
3.1 Inspection through the mechanism of the National
Counter Corruption Committee (NCCC)
3.1.1Forthemechanismoflistingof50,000peoplerequestingtheremovalof
holdersofpoliticalpositions,thismechanismhasbeenappliedfor8casesduringthe
year1998-2006,butnoneofthecaseswassuccessful.Thesecasesare:
1. ThepetitionforremovalofMr.RakkiatSukthana,MinisterofPublic
Health,forthecaseofmedicinecorruption,bytheNetworkof30Non-
GovernmentOrganizationsagainstCorruption.Thiswasthefirst
petitionforremovalpriortotheexistenceofthe1999OrganicActon
CounterCorruption.Inthiscase,thePresidentoftheHouseofSenate
di d not submi t t he case t o t he Nat i onal Count er Cor r upt i on
Commission;
2. Thepetitionforremovalof4judgesoftheConstitutionCourtbyMaj.
SanunKhajornprasart;
3. The petition for removal of Mr. Chuan Leekpai and Mr.Tharin
Nimmarnhemin, in the case of a special Buddhistrobeoffering
ceremonytohelpthenation,byMr.Thong-kornWongsamut,follower
ofLuantaMahaBua,aseniorandwellrespectedBuddhistmonk;
4. ThepetitionforremovalofDr.SurapolSueb-wonglee,forthecaseof
closingthenetworkofRaknarokGame,byon-linegameplayers;
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5. ThepetitionforremovaloftheBasicEducationCommission,forits
separationofsecondaryschools,bytheAssociationofSecondary
SchoolAdministration;
6. ThepetitionforremovaloftheDirector-GeneraloftheDepartmentof
Agriculture,forthecaseofrubberplantcorruption,bytheFederationof
RubberPlantationAssociation;
7. ThepetitionforremovaloftheElectionCommission,forthecaseof
corruptionintheelection,bythenetworkofCivilizedResistant
AlliancesofSongkhlaprovince;
8. ThepetitionforremovalofPrimeMinisterThaksinShinawatra,bythe
StudentOrganizationofThammasartUniversity,forthecaseof
corruptionagainsthispositionasaPrimeMinisterinsellingthestocks
ofShinCorporationCo.,Ltd.,whichisagovernmentconcession,to
TemasekFundofSingapore(PleaseseeAttachment1).
3.1.2InthecaseoftherequestforthepropertytodevolveontheState,the
requestwasappliedonlyin1caseagainstMr.RakkiatSukthana,MinisterofPublic
Health,whowasallegedofunusualwealth.ThisrequestwasmadebytheNetwork
of30Non-GovernmentOrganizationsAgainstCorruptionafteritsfailureinusingthe
mechanismoflistingofapprovalsfrom50,000peopletoinspectandremoveMr.
Rakkiat.
TheNationalCounterCorruptionCommissioninvestigatedthefactsand
reachedconsensusagreementthatMr.RakkiatSukthanawasunusualwealthyfrom
theassetvalueof233.8MillionBaht.ThiscasewasthensubmittedtotheAttorney
GeneralforfurtherprosecutionintheSupremeCourtCriminalDivisionsforPersons
HoldingPoliticalPositions.Afteradjudication,theSupremeCourtorderedthe
seizureofMr.Rakkiatsassetsatthevalueof233.8MillionBahttodevolveonthe
stateonSeptember19
th
,2003.
IntheinvestigationofMr,Rakkiatsunusualwealth,theNationalCounter
CorruptionCommissiondiscoveredthatMr.Rakkiatreceivedthebribeof5Million
BahtfromThaiNakorn-pattanaCo.Ltd.,whichwasinvolvedinthemedicine
corruptioncaseintheMinistryofPublicHealth.TheCommissionthereforeresolved
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toproceedthecasetotheSupremeCourtCriminalDivisionsforPersonHolding
PoliticalPositions.Andfinally,onthe28
th
ofOctober2003,theSupremeCourt
sentencedMr.RakkiatSukthanato15yearsimprisonment.
ApartfromMr.RakkiatSukthana,Mr.JirayuJarasathien,Advisortothe
DeputyMinisterofPublicHealth,wasalsosentencedto6yearsimprisonmentbythe
SupremeCourtformalfeasanceofpositioninthecaseofmedicinecorruption.
3.1.3Theallegationagainstholdersofpoliticalpositionsbytheinjuredpartyis
anotherchannelforinspectionofpoliticiansthroughtheNationalCounter
CorruptionCommission.Thiswasinthecaseofcorruptionintheconstructionof
KlongDanwastewatertreatmentinSamut-prakarnProvince.Inthiscase,the
DepartmentofPollutionControl,MinistryofNaturalResourcesandEnvironment,
filedpetitionagainst3politicians,namelyMr.WatanaAsawahem,Mr.Yingpan
Manasikarn,andMr.SuwatLipatapallop,totheNationalCounterCorruption
Commission,inMarch,2004.
3.2 The inspection of state power through Administrative
Court
AdministrativeCourtisanewconstitutionalorganizationthatbecomesamajor
supporterofthepeopleintheinspectionoftheadministrativeagenciesexerciseof
statepower.Inthepast,thepeoplewerenotabletorequesttheabrogationofthe
orderfromthegovernmentagencies,oroftheactthatviolatetherights,liberty,or
interestsofthepeopleaccordingtolaws.Therefore,theAdministrativeCourt
becomesapowerfulinspectiontool.Therearemoreandmorecasesthatpeople
proceedtotheAdministrativeCourt.Amongthesecasesare:
The pet i t i on of t he Foundat i on for Consumers and i t s net work for
abrogationofthe2RoyalDecreesinprivatizationofEGATandinhalting
theinitialpublicofferinginthestockmarket.TheSupremeCourtissuedan
ordertoabrogatethe2RoyalDecreesonMarch23,2006.Thiswasthe
victoryofpeoplesectorthatunderminedthegovernmentsexerciseof
power.Italsodelightedallpeopleinthecountryandgavehopethatthe
peoplecanhaveeffectivetooltobalancethestatepower.
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The pet i t i on of t he Foundat i on for Consumers and i t s net work for
abrogationofthe2RoyalDecreesofPetroleumAuthorityofThailand
(PTT).ThecaseisnowunderconsiderationoftheSupremeCourt.
ThepetitionoftheMr.SastraTo-orn,lectureroftheFacultyofLaws,
RangsitUniversity,forabrogation ofShinCorporation Co.Ltd.s
concessionthatwassoldtoTemasekFundofSingapore.TheCentral
AdministrativeCourtrevokedthepetitionforthereasonthatitwasnot
withinthejurisdictionoftheCourt.However,Mr.SastraTo-ornappealedto
theSupremeCourt,whichreceivedthepetitionforfurtherconsideration.
TheallegationmadetotheElectionCommissionconcerningunlawful
electionafterPol.Lt.Col.ThaksinShinawatrasannouncementtodissolve
theHouseofRepresentativesonthe24thofFebruary,2006.Therewerethe
totalof19casesthatwereproceededtotheAdministrativeCourt(Pleasesee
Attachment2).
3.3 The Ombudsman
Dr.BanjerdSingkhaneti,lectureroftheFacultyofLaws,Thammasart
University,requestedtotheOmbudsmanfortherevokeofelectiononApril2
nd
,
2006.Thiscasewasbasedonthefactthattherepositioningofthevotingboothsthat
violateprivacyofthevoters,andhenceresultedinunfairelectionwhichcontradicted
totheConstitution.
TheOmbudsmansubmittedtheallegationofDr.BanjerdSingkhanetiforthe
adjudicationoftheConstitutionalCourt.Andfinally,theConstitutionalCourtissued
thesentencetovoidtheelectionofApril2nd,2003,andtorevoketheelectionof
membersofparliament(PleaseseeAttachment3).
3.4 Assembling peacefully without arms:
Thisisanothertoolofthepeoplesectortoinspecttheexerciseofstatepower
when no other mechanism can be used to inspect the accusation of lack of
transparencyandlackofgoodgovernance,aswellasofthegovernmentscorruption.
The1997Constitutionwasconsideredthebestconstitutionever.Nevertheless,
itcouldnotbeusedtoinspectthegovernmentofPol.Lt.Col.ThaksinShinawatra,
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althoughthegovernmentwasgenerallyconsideredthemostcorruptedgovernment.
Therefore,thepeoplehadtodependondirectinspectionoutsidetheparliamentina
waysimilartothemovementofpeopleinthepast.TheeventstartedfromSondhis
phenomenon,tothedemonstrationofpeopleledbythenetworkofPeopleAlliance
forDemocracy.ThedemonstrationaimedatevictingPol.Lt.Thaksinafterhesold
hisstocksinShinCorp.toTemasekFundofSingaporewithoutpayinganytaxbased
onhisclaimthatitwaslegitimate.Thiscase,togetherwithmanyothercorruption
casesoccurringduringthetimeofthisgovernment,andtheobstructionagainst
inspectionsystem,resultedintheanti-Thaksinoperation.Therewasalsoarequest
forthenewpoliticalreformsbeforetheoccurrenceofthemilitarycoupdetaton
September19
th
,2006.

4. Impediment against peoples inspection

of the state power
Thepeoplesectorsinspectionoftheexercisedofstatepowercanbeimpeded
throughseveralmeans,themostsevereoneisthroughabduction.Examplescanbe
seeninthecaseofMr.SomchaiNinpaijit,alocallawyer,andlocalpeoplewho
combatedcorruptioninvolvedwithlocalpoliticiansandconnectedwithcentral
politicians.DuringthetimeofThaksinsgovernment,nolessthan25localpeople
whofoughtagainstcorruptionandsnatchingoflocalresourceswerefounddead.
AmongthesepeopleareCharoenWat-aksorn,BuddhistMonkSupojSuwajo,etc.
Anothermeanofimpedimentagainstpeoplesinspectionisthroughpressing
defamationofcharacterchargebypoliticianswhoareinspectedorcriticized.During
thetimeofThaksinsgovernment,severalchargesweremade.Forexample,Ms.
SupinyaKlangnarongwassuedfordefamationandwasdemanded400MillionBaht
injuryfeesforacivilcasefromShinCorpsinceshehadcriticizedtheconflictsof
interestsbetweenthestateandcompaniesownedbythePrimeMinistersfamily.
Inanothercase,thepoliceputachargeandissuedasummonagainstthe
leadersofPeoplesAllianceforDemocracyandsomestagespeakersonthe
AlliancesforumforJoining in demonstrating to the people through speech,
writing, or other means that are not in accordance with the intention of the
Constitution, or that are not expressing opinion or criticizing honestly.Thisisa
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severecharge,referringtorebellion.Thewriterofthisarticleisoneoftheeight
accusedtowhomPol.Maj.Gen.ChatchavalSuksomjit,DeputyDirector-Generalof
theRoyalThaiPolicesentasummontoreceivetheaccusation.However,these8
personswhowereissuedwiththesummon(apartfrom5leaders)deniedthe
accusationandrefusetocomplytothesummon,butallowedthepolicetorequestthe
warrantofarrestfromthecourt.Suchactionaimedtocheckthelegitimacyand
justiceofthepolicesaccusation,becausethecasewasrelatedtothecriticismagainst
theperformanceofthegovernmentandPrimeMinister,whowasthedirect
supervisoroftheRoyalThaiPolice.Theseaccuseddidnotconductanymalfeasance
againsttheConstitutionorrebellionintheKingdom.Therefore,thepolicerequeste
thewarrantofarrestfromtheCourt,buttheDirector-GeneraloftheCourtdidnot
approvedthewarrantafterinvestigatingthese8accused(PleaseseeAttachment4).
Thiscaseistheestablishmentofanewstandardsothatthepoliceofficials,
whoarethebeginningofthejudicialprocess,mustbemorecarefulinexercising
theirpowerwhentheyputachargeagainstthepeople.Thepeopleareabletodeny
thechargeandrequestjusticefromtheCourt.Thisisanotherchannelthatthepeople
usetocombattheimpedimentagainstinspectionfrompoliticianswhodependonthe
statepowerasinthiscase.

5. Corruption Inspection Process: The outdated tool

Corruptionisahighlydynamicprocess.Therearevarioustechnicalchangesso
thatitisdifficultforthelawswithlimitedframeworkwillbeabletodealwith.This
canbecomparedtoridingacarttocatchupwitharocket.
Nowadays,bothlegalconceptandtechniquebecomethetoolsthataretoo
outdatedtodealwiththecomplicatedpolicycorruption.
Legal limitation for inspection is caused by the following
factors:
1)Corruptiondoesnotneedareceipt.Therefore,itisimpossibletouseitas
evidencetoprovethemisconductofthepoliticians.
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2)Theexaminationofassetsandliabilitiesoftheholdersofpositions,their
spouse,andunder-agedchildrenisnotsufficient.Thisisbecausedishonest
personsareabletotransfertheirassetstotheirfull-agedchildren,orevento
theirservants,drivers,orrelatives.Inaddition,theymayhidetheirassetsin
theplacescomparedtotheheavenofthosewhoavoidtaxesandmoney
launders.Suchplacescannotbereachedbythelaw,anditisimpossibleto
findfaultunderthecurrentlaw.
3)Thereareseveralcasesinwhichpoliticianusednomineeintradingwiththe
state,butsuchconductcouldnotbefoundguiltybythelaw.
4)Itisdifficulttofindwitnessestoassurecorruptionofthepoliticians.Thisis
becausecorruptionisoftenconductedinaprivateplace.Theaccomplices
areusuallythestakeholders,orabusinessmenwhohavetopayundertable
moneytothepoliticians.Andhencetheyareunabletobethewitnessesfor
fearoflosingtheirbusiness.
5)Policycorruptiondependsontheissuanceofregulationsandlawsforthe
gainsofpoliticiansnetworkandrelatives.Insuchcase,theactionmaybe
legitimate,butitisnotright.However,thecurrentlawsareunabletoinspect
ortochargeagainstthepolicycorruption,ortheuseofstatepowerfor
privateinterest.Examplesofsuchcaseare:ThepurchaseoflandinRachada
areabyKhunyingPojamarnShinawatra;theexemptofincometaxissuedby
BOUtoShinSatelliteCompany,and;Theministerialresolutionallowing
the Ministry of Finance to guarantee the loan to the government of
Myanmar.
6)ThecaseofsellingstocksofShinCorpwithoutpayingtaxisconsidered
unethical,althoughitisnotillegal.Thequestioniswhetherornotthelegal
techniqueinthefuturewillbeabletocoverethicalmisconduct.

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6. Recommendations:
6.1 Increase of efficiency in the inspection by people sector
through:
6.1.1Thelawsallowingpeoplewhoaretheinjuredpartyinthecaseofstate
corruptiontotakelegalactiontothecourtinthecasethattheinjuredgovernment
agencydoesnottakecharge.
6.1.2Thewideuseofgovernmentinformationsothatpeoplecanhaveaccess
totheinformationconcerningthebudgetmanagement,procurement,hiring,and
biddingforbetterinspection.Thiswillhelpreducecorruptioninthegovernment
agencies.
6.1.3Budgetshouldbeallocatedtothepeoplesectorfortheirmovement,and
toencouragepeopletoparticipateincorruptionprevention.
6.1.4Availableofliberalmedia,suchasfreeTVtoprovideknowledgetothe
people.
6.1.5Establishmentofdemocraticcultureandnecessaryethicalstandardsfor
thepoliticians.Besides,peoplemustbeencouragedtousesocialmechanismin
eradicatingunethicalpoliticians.
6.2 Laws about corruption cases of the holders of positions
6.2.1Theprescriptionofthecorruptioncasesshouldbeequaltothecriminal
case,whichis20years.
6.2.2 Thecorruptioncasesofholdersofpoliticalpositionsandgovernment
officialsmustnotbepending,andthepenaltymustnotbereduced.
6.2.3Therewardforarrestshouldbeprovidedtothepeoplesothatthepeople
areencouragedtohelpinspectholdersofpoliticalpositions.
6.2.4Newlegalprinciplesshouldberegularlyconsideredtobeabletokeep
pacewiththecorruptioncases.
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The Codification of Rights
in the Thailand Constitution:
A Comparative Point of View
Tania Groppi
University of Siena, Italy

1. Thailand 1997: a constitution with constitutionalism

T heConstitutionof1997isabreakpointinthehistoryofThailand.
Theenactmentofanewconstitutionisnot,initself,anoveltyforThailand;
thisis,afterall,thesixteenthconstitutionwhichthecountryhashadinquiteabrief
periodoftime(since1932).
Nevertheless,aseverybodyknows,Constitutionisoneofthewordswiththe
mostambiguousandwide-rangingmeaninginpolitical/legallanguage.Objectsthat
areverydifferent,bothincontentandinfunctions,canbeconcealedbehindit.
Itisalsoawell-knownfactthattheconstitutionswhichcanbetracedbackto
theculturalandphilosophicalmovementofconstitutionalismwhichdeveloped
originallyinFranceandtheUnitedStatesofAmericaattheendofthe18thcentury
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andthenspreadinirregularwavestootherpartsoftheworldinthe20thcentury,in
connect i on wi t h democr at i zat i on pr ocesses pr esent t wo f undament al
characteristics.
Intermsoffunction,asfundamentallaws,expressionsofahigherlawmaking
whichtakesitsdistancefromthepoliticsofeveryday,ornormallawmaking
[Ackerman1991],theyareorientedatlimitingpowerandcreatingaframeworkof
rulesforcoexistenceamongthemembersofthesociety.
Thecontent,asaconsequence,isconstitutedbothbyregulationswhichaimto
organizetheseparationofpowersandbyregulationswhicharespecificallydirected
atprotectingrightsandatdefiningsharedprincipleswithinwhichordinary
constitutionallifecandevelop.
Theseareconstitutionswhichlooktothefuture,whichdemandtobeexpanded
andenforced,whichoutlineaprogramforthedevelopmentoftherulesand
regulations.
TheConstitutionof1997represents,intheconstitutionalhistoryofThailand,
thefirstconstitution of constitutionalism .Thepreceding[past?]constitutions
canbepositionedinthecategory,fairlycommonlyusedinreferencetoAsian
constitutionalexperiencesofconstitutions without constitutionalism[T.L.
McDorman,M.Young1998].Theywere,infact,documentsconceivedessentiallyto
legitimatethepowerstructure,andtothisendtheircontentwaslargelydedicatedto
theorganizationoftheState,withtheexceptionofthosefewreferencestorights
whicharebynowrequiredforthelegitimacyofpower,especiallyinaninternational
perspective.
Thesequencecoupdtat-constitutionwhichhasconnotedtheThaiexperience
inthe20
th
centurywelldemonstrateshowearlierConstitutionsweremerelytoolsfor
maintainingthestatusquoofpower,andthereforedestinedtolastonlyuntilanew
requestforlegitimizationinthewakeofyetanotherinterruptionofconstitutionallife
madetheapprovalofanewConstitutionnecessary.
TheConstitutionof1997interruptsthiscycle,astheprocessfollowedforits
adoption demonstrated in the first place: it is referred to as the Peoples
Constitutioninordertounderlinetheparticipatorynatureofitsorigins.The
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processwasinlargepartremovedfrompoliticiansandentrustedtoanalliance
amongtechnicians(jurists)andorganizedcivilsociety(NGOs-nongovernmental
organizations)[v.Laird2000;Nannakorn2002;BureekuleThananithichot2004].It
wasalsodrawnupnotfollowingatraumaticevent,withtheobjectiveofstabilizinga
newregime,alreadyinpower,butasanelementofanongoingprocessoftransition
[Ghai2005].Itisnota constitution-balance sheet[noncredosiacorretto],
whichlooksatthepast,butaconstitution-program,whichlookstowardsthe
future.
TheConstitutionisorientedatanewfoundationofthelegalorder,ina
palingeneticandanti-politicalway:tothatend,fundamentalrightsandtherulesof
democracyarepositionedinthecentreforthefirsttime.
Inspiteofthis,nearlytenyearsaftercomingintoforce,theConstitutionstill
hasdifficultyassertingitselfwithallitsinnovativepower,andthedistancebetween
law (constitution) on the booksandlaw (constitution) in actionisstillvery
wide.Theeffectivenessoftheconstitutionalregulationsappearsproblematic,as
happensinmanydemocraciesduringtheconsolidationphase,especiallyinareasof
theplanetwhichhavenohistoryofconstitutionalism.
The recent event s of Sept ember 2006, t he ease wi t h whi ch t he 1997
Constitutionwassuspendedandyetanother interim Constitutionproclaimed,
seemtodemonstratethatitsrootsarenotyetdeepenoughtoguaranteestability.
Therearemanycausesofthisweaknessintheconstitutionalorder,andmany
economic,social,politicalandculturalfactorscanbeinvokedtoexplainit.
Theaimofthispaper,muchmorelimited,istoexaminethebillofrights
containedintheConstitutionof1997,comparingitprincipallytootherconstitutional
experiencesinthearea,especiallythosethatbelongtothesameconstitutionalcycle,
identifiableasthethird wave of democratizationofHuntington(thePhilippines,
SouthKorea,Cambodia,Indonesia).
The compari son wi l l be made taki ng i nto account the
following conceptual grid:
1.Techniquesofconstitutionalizingrights:thepresenceofapreamble;the
systematic collocation of rights in the text of the constitution; the
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proclamationoftheinviolabilityofrights;holdingrights/eligibilitytohold
rights;thelengthofthecatalogueofrights;thedegreeofspecificationofthe
regulations;theopenorclosedcharacterofthecatalogueofrights;the
existenceofahierarchyamongthedifferentrights;
2.Content:civilandsocialrights;programmaticrules;equality;human
dignity;collectiverights;theroleofduties;typesoflimitationclauses.
3.Formsofguarantee:institutionalguarantees(constitutionalrevision,
independenceofthejudiciary;positionofinternationallaw;emergency
suspensionclauses);judicialguarantees(constitutionaljustice:decentralized
orcentralizedsystem?Isthereaspecificdirectcomplaintfortheguarantee
ofrights?);presenceofacommissiononhumanrightsorofanombudsman.
Icanspeakinadvanceaboutsomeofmyconclusions,foritseemspossibleto
saythattherearestilltwoweakpointsinthe1997Constitutiondespitethe
considerableprogressmadecomparedtotheoneof1991.
Oneweaknessiscloselylinkedtotheformulationoftheprovisionsabout
rights,whichleaveexcessiveroomtothegeneralinterest,thusopeningthedoorto
typesoflimitation,onthepartofthelawmakersthatareinevitablyremovedfrom
legalcontrols.
Asecondweaknessisconnected,morebroadly,tothenotionofconstitution
whichseemstoprevailandwhichemergesespeciallyfromtheamendingformula.
Thisallows,byabsolutemajority,themodificationofeachsinglearticleandalsoof
theentireconstitution.Thisrelativelyeasyamendingformulaisunderstandable
giventherolethattheconstitutionplaysinthedemocratictransition,andthefactthat
ithastobemodifiedperiodicallyasthetransitionproceeds[Harding2001].Allthe
same,entrustingthepossibilityofamendingtheconstitutiontotheabsolutemajority
meansnegatingitsverynature.Evenifitmayhappen,asithasinThailand,thatthe
modificationsarenot,concretely,veryfrequent,stillthefactitselfthatsucha
possibilityisalwaysavailabletothepoliticalmajorities,emptiestheconstitutionof
itssacredroleandstabilizingfunction,andopensthedoortosuspensionsor
rewriting.

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2. Techniques for constitutionalizing rights
Ashasbeenpointedoutbycommentators,the1997Constitutionfocused
utmost interest on rights and liberties,andnotonpoliticalstructure[Varunyou
2003]forthefirsttimeintheconstitutionalhistoryofThailand.Inthiswayitfollows
thetendencytowardstheuniversalizationoftherightsoftheperson,atendency
whichepitomizes,inanincessantandincreasingway,theconstitutionalismofthe
secondhalfofthe20thcentury[thishasbeencalledconstitutionalismintheageof
rights:Weinrib2005].
Thisisevidentasearlyasthepreamble(asitwasforthe1991Constitutionas
well).Thepreambleincludestheprotectionofrightsasoneofthemainends
[aims??]pursuedbytheconstituents,alongwiththeincreaseofparticipationand
improvementofthedemocraticstructureofthegovernment.
Thecollocationofthearticlesonrightsisanotherelementwhichindicatesthe
centralityoftheissue:sect.4,placedamongthe general previsions includedin
ChapterI,statesthatthehuman dignity, right and liberty of the people shall be
protected.Theexpression human rightscontinuesbeingabsent,forthe
subversive character which was, especially in the past, connected to it
[Muntarbhorn].Despitetheuseofthe pseudonym ofhumandignity,sect.4
representsanimportantnoveltycomparedtotheconstitutionof1991.
ThisdistinguishestheThaiConstitutionfromotherEastAsianconstitutions,
whi ch i n t he maj ori t y of t he cases make no reference t o ri ght s among t he
fundamentalprinciples(whichusuallycontaintheproclamationofwhatisduethe
sovereignandthedefinitionoftheformofState),orinthepreamble(withsome
exceptions,likeCambodiaandSouthKorea).
Asforthestructureoftheconstitutionaltext,thesubjectofrightscomesafter
thatofthemonarchy,truefoundingelementoftheThaiConstitution,butprecedes
thearticlesabouttheorganizationofthepowers.Thereisnoreferencetothe
inviolableorfundamentalnatureofrights(differentfromtheconstitutionsofJapan,
articles11and97;SouthKorea,sect.10).
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As for t he el i gi bi l i t y t o hol d ri ght s, t here i s t he t endency i n t heThai
Constitution,asinmanyAsianconstitutions,totransformhumanrightsinrightsof
citizens,followingatechniquewhichproceedsinanoppositesensefromthatof
universalization.Thisistruefortheprincipleofequalityaswell.Thereferenceterm
whenspeakingaboutrightsordignityis peopleorperson inachapterthatis,
however,dedicatedtothe Rights and Liberties of the Thai People.Theprinciple
ofequality,formulatedamongthegeneralprovisionsofChapterI,alsoreferstothe
Thai people [Muntarbhorn],eveniftheinterpretationhasbeentoextendmostof
theprovisionstoforeignersaswell.Differentfrommanyconstitutionsofcountriesin
thearea,thereisnomentionofthejuridicalpositionoftheforeigner,abouthowone
becomesacitizenorlosescitizenship,orabouttheprotectionofcitizensresiding
abroad.
Anotherlimittouniversalization,whichcanbefoundintheThaiConstitution
aswell,isthepositionofclosuretointernationallaw:thisdistinguishestheAsian
constitutions,eventhemostrecent,fromthoseofthecountriesofLatinAmericaor
CentralandEasternEurope.TheseAsianconstitutionsfirmlyreassertnational
sovereignty,tothepointofclaimingthattheNationState,ascreatedinWestphalia,is
nowmostfullymaterializedinEasternAsia[Agalappa2002].Examplestothe
contrarycanbefoundinsect.31oftheCambodianConstitution
322
andinsect.6of
theSouthKoreanConstitution
323
.Inparticular,internationallaw(customaryortreaty
law)isnotusedasaparametertochecktheconstitutionalityofthelaws,whileitcan
beusedbytheNationalHumanRightsCommission,accordingtosect.200,to
indicateviolationstothenationalassembly.
Onthecontrary,theThaiConstitution,alongwiththatofthePhilippines,offers
anexampleofothertendenciestowardsthespecificationandpositivedefinitionof
rights.Thistendency,typicalofmorerecentconstitutionalism,distancesitfromother
322
ThisArticle,whichopensChapterIII,dedicatedtotherightsanddutiesofcitizens,states:
TheKingdomofCambodiashallrecognizeandrespectHumanRightsasstipulatedin
theUnitedNationsCharter,theUniversalDeclarationofHumanrights,thecovenantsand
conventionsrelatedtohumanrights,womensandchildrensrights.
323
Basedontheprovision:TreatiesdulyconcludedandpromulgatedundertheConstitution
andthegenerallyrecognizedruleofinternationallawhavethesameeffectasthedomestic
lawsoftheRepublicofKorea.
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constitutionsofEasternAsiaandmovesitclosertothemodelmostcommoninthe
third wave.
Thus,thecatalogueofrightsisa longcatalogueinbothsensesoftheword:
bothforthenumberofjuridicalpositionsprotectedandforthedetailofthe
provisionsgiven.Inaddition,thereisanoriginalopeningclausewhichinreference
tofundamentalrightsdoesnotlimititselftoconsideronlythoseexpresslycodifiedin
theConstitutionbutassimilatesothersrecognizedimplicitlyorthroughdecisions
fromtheConstitutionalCourt
324
.

3. The contents of the Bill of Rights

TheThaiConstitution,likeothersinEasternAsia,expresslystatestheprinciple
ofhumandignity,asalreadyIsaid.
Besidesappearingasafundamentalprincipleintheaforementionedsect.4of
theThaiConstitution,itisalsomentionedintheConstitutionofSouthKorea
(sect.10),atthebeginningoftheBillofRights,anditoccursmanytimesinthe
IndonesianConstitution,asmodifiedafter1999(forexample,insect.28H,which
speaksaboutdignified human being),inthePhilippineConstitution,where
amongthepublicpolicies(sect.II,Section11)canbefoundtheaffirmationthatthe
StateThe State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rightsandintheCambodianConstitution(sect.38,par.2):
The law shall protect the life, honour and dignity of the citizens.
Withinthecategoryoffundamentalrightsandfreedomsthereareboththe
traditionalnegativefreedomsandpositivefreedoms(tousethewordsofIsaiah
Berlin).
Theselatter,whichtakeconcreteformineconomic,culturalandsocialrights,
appeardoublyinthetextoftheConstitution:firstlyasrights(ofminors,elderly,the
324
Section27:RightsandlibertiesrecognisedbythisConstitutionexpressly,byimplication
orbydecisionsoftheConstitutionalCourtshallbeprotectedanddirectlybindingonthe
NationalAssembly,theCouncilofMinisters,CourtsandotherStateorgansinenacting,
applyingandinterpretinglaws.
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indigent,women,etc.)andthenasprincipleswhichtheStateshouldfollowinits
own policies (with reference each time to this or that category), or better,
programmaticprovisionswhichhavenofurtherjuridicalvaluethanthatofdirecting
theactivityofthepublicpowers(assect.88expresslyspecifies).
325
Theprincipleofequality,codifiedamongthegeneralprovisionswithreference
tocitizens,ismentionedagaininsect.30withreferencetoall persons.The
possibilityofaffirmativeactionstoovercomeinequalitiesandreachsubstantial
equalityisalsoconfirmed
326
.Theequalityofmenandwomenisspecifically
disciplinedinthisarticle.
Thelistofcivilandpoliticalrightsinclude[includes?],inmoreorlessdetail,
therightstofreedomandpersonalsecurity,placeofdwelling,communication,
movement,expressionofthought,information,religion,meeting,association,active
andpassiveelectorate,petition,citizenship,freedomfromtortureandfrominhuman
ordegradingtreatment,therighttoafairtrial.Thefreedomofassociationincludes
anexaminationofthedemocraticnatureoftheactivityofpoliticalparties,andthe
possibilitythattheirresolutionsbesetasidebytheConstitutionalCourtonthisbasis
(sect.47).Thereareeventhird generation rights, like the right of a person to
325
Sect.88oftheThaiConstitutionstatesthatTheprovisionsofthisChapterareintendedto
serveasdirectiveprinciplesforlegislatinganddeterminingpoliciesfortheadministration
oftheStateaffairs.InstatingitspoliciestotheNationalAssemblyundersection211,
theCouncilofMinisterswhichwillassumetheadministrationoftheStateaffairsshall
clearlystatetotheNationalAssemblytheactivitiesintendedtobecarriedoutfor
theadministrationoftheStateaffairsinimplementationofthedirectiveprinciplesof
fundamentalStatepoliciesprovidedinthisChapterandshallprepareandsubmitto
theNationalAssemblyanannualreportontheresultoftheimplementation,including
problemsandobstaclesencountered.
326
Sect.30states:Allpersonsareequalbeforethelawandshallenjoyequalprotection
underthelaw.Menandwomenshallenjoyequalrights.Unjustdiscriminationagainsta
persononthegroundsofthedifferenceinorigin,race,language,sex,age,physicalor
healthcondition,personalstatus,economicorsocialstanding,religiousbelief,education
orconstitutionallypoliticalview,shallnotbepermitted.MeasuresdeterminedbytheState
inordertoeliminateobstacletoortopromotepersonsabilitytoexercisetheirrightsand
libertiesasotherpersonsshallnotbedeemedasunjustdiscriminationunderparagraph
three.
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give to the State and communities participation in the preservation and
exploitation of natural resources and biological diversity and in the protection,
promotion and preservation of the quality of the environment for usual and
consistent survival in the environment which is not hazardous to his or her
health and sanitary condition, welfare or quality of life (sect.56),or the right
of a person as a consumer (sect. 57),orthe right to get access to public
i nformati on i n possessi on of a State agency, State enterpri se or l ocal
government organisation(sect.58),orto receive information, explanation and
reason from a State agency, State enterprise or local government organisation
before permission is given for the operation of any project or activity which may
affect the quality of the environment, health and sanitary conditions, the quality
of life or any other material interest concerning him or her or a local community
and shall have the right to express his or her opinions on such matters in
accordance with the public hearing procedure, as provided by law(sect.59).
ThereisnoprevisionforaStatereligion(differentlyfromwhathappensin
othercountriesofthearea:BuddhisminCambodia,sect.43,IslaminIndonesia,sect.
29,Brunei,sect.3,Malaysia,sect.3).
Referencestocollectiverightsarequiteabitlesscommonintheconstitutions
ofEasternAsiathanthediscussionaboutAsian values wouldleadonetobelieve.
AndthisistrueforThailandaswell,ashasbeenpointedout: There is no attempt
to construct a notion of rights based on Asian values: none of the rights would
be out of place in a European Constitution, and no significant right generally
enshrined in European Constitutions seems missing[Harding2001].
Anyreferencetothevalueoftradition,formsofcustomaryorautochthonous
rights,ancestralorreligiousinstitutionsisabsent,unlikeintheConstitutionsofother
partsoftheworld,especiallyintheAfricanones.Alongsidetherightsofthefamily,
protectedinalltheConstitutions(see,inparticular,sect.XVofthePhilippine
Constitution),insomethereisaspecificprotectionoflinguisticrightsseenas
collectiverights,oroftherightsoftheautochthonouspeoples
327
.Article28Iofthe
327
TheIndonesianConstitutionprovides(Sect.32)fortherightoftheminoritygroupsto
speaktheirownlanguage,andintheformofdutiesthatthepublicpowersrespectand
preservethelocallanguages.Therightofpeopleofeverynationalitytouseanddevelop
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IndonesianConstitutionoffersaninterestingexampleofcompromisewhenitstates
(par.3):The cultural identities and rights of traditional communities shall be
respected in accordance with the development of times and civilisations.
Lastly,theThaiConstitutionevenprotectstherighttoresistany act
committed for the acquisition of the power to rule the country by a means which
is not in accordance with the modes provided in this Constitution(sect.65).
Aparticularlyimportantelementistheexpressprovisionoftheaccessto
justicefortherecognitionofrights,asoutlinedinsect.29.2:A person whose
rights and liberties recognised by this Constitution are violated can invoke the
provisions of this Constitution to bring a lawsuit or to defend himself or herself
in the court.
Thedutiesofcitizensalsoreceiveampletreatment[areextensivelyprovided].
ThisiscommonamongConstitutionsofEasternAsiancountries,wherethesubject
ofrightsisneverseparatedfromthatofduties.Thisconnectionnotonlyemergesin
thetitleofthechapterdedicatedtorights(wherethetwowordsareinvariably
itsownlanguage,spokenorwritten,togetherwiththerightofmaintainingorchanging
theirownusesandcustomsappearsamongthegeneralprovisionsinChapterIoftheChi-
neseConstitution(Sect.4).TheVietnameseConstitutionalsocontainstherightofevery
nationalitytouseitslanguageandsystemofwriting,besidespreservingitsidentityand
promotingitsownuses,customs,traditionsandculture(Sect.5).Thisrightisrecognized
intheLaotianConstitution(sect.8)aswell.ThePhilippineConstitutionsimplyprovides
forthepossibilityofcreatingaconsultingorganthatprovidesanopiniontothepresident
aboutthepoliciesthatinvolveindigenousculturalcommunities,composedofamajority
ofmembersofthatcommunity(Sect.XV,section12).TheMalaysianConstitution,inthe
articleabouttheprincipleofequality,providesthatthisprinciplewillnotinvalidatethe
rulesandregulationscreatedtoprotecttheaboriginalpeoples,includingthereservationof
land,orthereservationforthesecommunitiesofacertainnumberofpositionsinpublic
services(Sect.8).InThailand(Sect.46),thetraditionalcommunitieshavetherighttopro-
tectorrecuperatetheirowncustoms,traditions,beliefs,artisticandculturalgoods,andto
participateintheprotectionanduseofthenaturalandenvironmentalresources.InTaiwan,
thelegalprotectionofthestatusandoftherighttopoliticalparticipationforaboriginesis
statedinSect.9oftheadditionalprovisionsof1994.
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associated);insomecasesitisexplicatedinthetextoftheConstitution
328
.Theduties
mentionedarethetraditionalonesofobediencetothelawandtotheConstitution,
loyaltytothecountry,paymentoftaxes,defenceandmilitaryservice.
InChapterIVoftheThaiConstitutionthedutiesofconservinglocalartistic
andculturalpatrimony,protectingtheenvironmentandnaturalresources(sect.69),
promotingthecountry,religion,thekingandthedemocraticregime(sect.66)are
alsomentioned.TheThaiConstitution(sect.51)providesthattheprohibitionof
forcedlabourcanbesuspended,bylaw,incaseofimminentnaturaldisaster,when
thecountryisinastateofwar,orwhenastateofemergencyormartiallawhasbeen
declared.InsomecaseswhatwouldbeconsideredrightsinWesternconstitutionalism
areformulatedasduties,e.g.,therighttovote(Thailand,sect.68),therightto
instruction(formulatedasthedutytoreceiveinstruction,Thailandsect.69,Indonesia
sect.31.2,Chinasect.46)andtherighttowork(frequentlyconsideredasaright/
duty:Japansect.27,SouthKoreasect.32,Chinasect.42).
Rightsarelimited intheconstitutions ofEasternAsiausingdifferent
techniques,whichcanbetracedbacktoallthreecategoriesidentifiedintheliterature
[Kretzmer1999].
Fromacomparativepointofview,thechoicesexpressedintheConstitutions
concerningthenecessityofbalancingguaranteedrightsorinterestsagainstothers
canbeofthreetypes,eachofwhichhasanotableinfluenceontheroleofthejudges
andonthebalancingtechniquesusedbythem.
Inthefirstplaceitispossible,asintheUnitedStates,thattheConstitution
disregardsthematterandthatitonlyindicatestherightsguaranteed,withoutgiving
anyindicationabouttheirlimitation.Thecreationofbalancingprinciplesisthusleft
fullytothecourts,whoseroleofinterpretingtheconstitutionisoverloaded[molto
valorizzato,enfatizzato,esaltato:questovogliodire].
Asecondroute,followed,forexample,bytheItalianConstitutionandbythe
EuropeanConventiononHumanRights,insertsprovisionsthatcontainspecific
328
See,forexample,sect.51oftheConstitutionofVietnam:Thecitizensrightsare
inseparablefromhisduties.TheStateguaranteestherightsofthecitizen;thecitizenmust
fulfll his duties to the State and society.
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limitsregardingsinglerightsintotheconstitutionaltext.
Athirdpossibility,adopted,amongothers,bytheCanadianCharterofRights
andFreedom,theNewZealandBillofRights,thefundamentallawsofIsraelandby
theprojectoftheEuropeanConstitution,consistsoffurnishingageneralbalancing
testtoevaluatethelegitimacyofthelimitationofalloftherightsguaranteed
329
.
ApartformaveryfewconstitutionsthatfollowtheU.S.model(suchasJapan),
mostofEasternAsianConstitutionscanbeclassifiedintothesecondanthethird
category,accordingtothelimitationclause.
Insomecountriesdoexistspecificlimitationclausesforthevariousrightsand
freedoms,eachofwhichisthereforelimitedinitsownwayandforitsownreasons.
Inmostcasesthelawisusedtolimittherightwithoutestablishinganyadditional
indicationforittofollow(liketheConstitutionsofCambodiaandVietnam).When
someindicationcanbefound,itreferstopublicsafety,publicinterestandpublic
heal t h, dependi ng on t he ri ght bei ng consi dered (see, e. g. , t he Phi l i ppi ne
Constitution).Insomecasesthebreadthofthelimitationclauseissuchthatit
completelynegatestheguaranteedright.TheSingaporeConstitutionoffersan
exampleofthis:thefewguaranteedrights(freedomofexpression,ofassemblyand
ofassociation)aresubjecttopenetratinglimitsthattheparliamentcanestablishby
law.Regardingthefreedomofexpressionthereisreferencetotheinterestofnational
security,friendlyrelationshipswithothercountries,publicorder,decencyandofany
otherlimitationaimedatprotectingtheParliamentandtheCourtsfromoffence.The
freedomofassemblyislimitedbyallthoserestrictionsdeemednecessarytoensure
nationalsecurityandpublicorder,whilelimitstothefreedomofassociationcanbe
setbyanylawrelativetoworkoreducation(sect.14).Thesamecanbesaidabout
theMalaysianConstitution.Herenotonlythesamefreedoms(ofmovement,
expression,assembly,association:articles9and10)canbelimitedbyparliamentby
law,foraseriesofgivenreasons(nearlyidenticaltothosegivenintheSingapore
Constitution),butwhenajudicialreviewoflegislationisneeded,forreasonslinked
tothefederalnatureoftheState,itisexplicitlystatedthatnolawcanbedeclared
unconstitutionalbecauseitlimitssaidrightscontrarytothecausesoflimitation

329
ThisformulationinD.Kretzmer,BasicLawsasSurrogateofBillofRights:TheCaseof
Israel,inP.Alston,ed.,PromotingHumanRightsThroughBillsofRights,p.82.
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providedbytheConstitution(seesect.4).Tomodifyalawapprovedonthebasisof
thelimitationclause,itisalsonecessarytohavea2/3majorityineachofthetwo
Chambers(sect.159),thatisamajorityidenticaltothatnecessaryforconstitutional
revision.
Inothercountriesthereisagenerallimitationclause.Forexample,Indonesias
constitutionstates:In exercising his/her rights and freedoms, every person shall
have the duty to accept the restrictions established by law for the sole purposes
of guaranteeing the recognition and respect of the rights and freedoms of others
and of satisfying just demands based upon considerations of morality, religious
values, security and public order in a democratic society(sect.28J).Atthesame
timeitstatesthatsomerights(therighttolife,tofreedomfromtorture,thefreedom
ofthoughtandconscience,freedomofreligion,thefreedomfromenslavement,the
recognitionasapersonbeforethelawandtherightnottobetriedunderalawwith
retrospectiveeffect)cannotbelimitedinanycircumstance(Indonesia,sect.28I).
ThereisagenerallimitationclauseinSouthKoreaaswell,onthebasisofsect.37,
par.2
330
.TheTaiwanConstitutionalsohasanoptionforagenerallimitationclause,
accordingtowhichnorightcanbelimitedifnotbylawandinthemeasureinwhich
itmaybenecessaryto prevent infringement upon the freedoms of others, to
avert an imminent danger, to maintain social order, or to promote public
welfare(sect.23).
AsfarastheThaiConstitutionisconcerned,firstofallwefindananalogous
typeofclause,itmeansagenerallimitationclause,insect.29.Thisstatesthatthe
restriction of such rights and liberties as recognised by the Constitution shall
not be imposed on a person except by virtue of provisions of the law specifically
enacted for the purpose determined by this Constitution and only to the extent
of necessity and provided that it shall not affect the essential substances of such
ri ghts and l i berti es. The l aw under paragraph one shal l be of general
application and shall not be intended to apply to any particular case or person;
provided that the provision of the Constitution authorising its enactment shall
330
Thisarticlestates:Thefreedomsandrightsofcitizensmayberestrictedbylawonly
whennecessaryfornationalsecurity,themaintenanceoflawandorder,orforpublic
welfare.Evenwhensuchrestrictionisimposed,noessentialaspectofthefreedomorright
shallbeviolated.
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also be mentioned therein.Thisdoesnot,however,preventthepossibilityofother
limitsonthefreedomoftravelling(sect.36),communication(sect.37),expression
(sect.39),scholarshipandresearch(sect.42),meetings(sect.44),association(sect.
45)andoccupation(sect.50).
Sect.28,moreover,circumscribesthepossibilityofexercisingonesrightsand
freedoms,shouldthesebeincontrastwiththerightsofothersorwithgood
morals:A person can invoke human dignity or exercise his or her rights and
liberties in so far as it is not in violation of rights and liberties of other persons
or contrary to this Constitution or good morals.Sect.63,then,statesthatno
person shall exercise the rights and liberties prescribed in the Constitution to
overthrow the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the
State under this Constitution or to acquire the power to rule the country by any
means which is not in accordance with the modes provided in this Constitution.
In the case where a person or a political party has committed the act under
paragraph one, the person knowing of such act shall have the right to request
the Prosecutor General to investigate its facts and submit a motion to the
Constitutional Court for ordering cessation of such act without, however,
prejudice to the institution of a criminal action against such person.

4. The system of guarantees

TheweakprotectionofrightsintheconstitutionsofEasternAsiaisfurther
shownbytheguaranteeprovisions.Thisistrueeveninthoseconstitutionswhich
wouldseemmoreopenlymarkedbytheprotectionoffundamentalrights[Beer1992,
Hassal,Saunder2002].TheThaiConstitutionseemstobebyfarthemostattentive
totheguaranteeofrightsandprovidesforacomplexmechanismofcontroland
guaranteebodies.
Theregulatory(orinstitutional)guarantees,understoodasallofthose
techniqueswhichaimatprotectingrightswithoutundertakingjudicialprocedures,
canessentiallybeidentifiedinthetypicalaffirmationaboutthesupremacyofthe
Constitution(Thailandsect.6;Cambodiasect.131;Singaporesect.4;Malaysia
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sect.4;Vietnamsect.146)anditsbindingnatureforallpublicpowers
331
,aswellas,
withtheexceptionofthethreesocialiststatesinthearea
332
,intheproclamationof
theprincipleoftheruleoflaw(Indonesia,sect.1,section3)andoftheindependence
ofthejudiciary(Cambodia,sect.109,whereaMagistratesGoverningCouncilis
alsoprovidedfortothatend;Thailand,sect.249;SouthKorea,sect.103;Japan,sect.
76).Theprincipleoftheruleoflawisinanyeventaffirmedlessfrequentlythanin
otherpartsoftheworld:thereisnoreference,forexample,totheprincipleofthe
separationofpower[consideredforeigntotheAsiatictradition:DeVergottini1998,
2003].
Otherprocedureswhichcouldbeidentifiedasinstitutionalguaranteesandthat
areverycommonintheconstitutionsofthe third wave,arecompletelyabsent
fromEasternAsiaConstitutions:the overentrenchedproceduresforconstitutional
revisionwhenmodifyingthecatalogueofrights;themechanismstoresolvethe
problemoflegislativeomissions;thepresenceofclausesofopennesstointernational
law[Ceccherini2002].
Asforconstitutionalamendment,almostalltheStatesinthearea,Thailand
included,provideforonlyoneamendingformula.Inthemajorityofthecasesa
parliamentaryvoteissufficient,withaqualifiedmajority(whichvariesamongthe
331
TheThaiConstitution,sect.26,says:InexercisingpowersofallStateauthorities,regard
shallbehadtohumandignity,rightsandlibertiesinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthis
Constitution;andsect.27:RightsandlibertiesrecognisedbythisConstitutionexpressly,
byimplicationorbydecisionsoftheConstitutionalCourtshallbeprotectedanddirectly
bindingontheNationalAssembly,theCouncilofMinisters,CourtsandotherStateorgans
inenacting,applyingandinterpretinglaws,andtheJapaneseConstitution,sect.99:The
EmperorortheRegentaswellasMinistersofStates,membersoftheDiet,judges,andall
other public offcials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution. After the
constitutionalreformof2004,theChineseConstitution,insect.33.3provides,ashasbeen
said,thattheStaterespectsandguaranteeshumanrights.

332
Butseesect.126oftheChineseConstitution,whichdeclarestheindependenceofthe
judicialpower,evenifwithinthelimitsprovidedforbylaw.
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countriesfromtheabsolutemajoritytoamajority)ofthelegislativeassembly
333
.
InThailand,sect.313requiresthreereadings,thefirstandthelastbynotleasthalfof
thetotalnumberoftheexistingmembersofbothHouses,thesecondbyasimple
majorityofvotes.
OnlytheConstitutionofSingaporecanbedefinedashavinga variable
rigidity;nevertheless,themostreinforcedprocedure(whichbesidesrequiringa2/3
majorityinParliamentrequiresa2/3majorityinthereferendumaswell)isreserved
fortheregulationswhichdealwiththeorganizationoftheState,notthosethatdeal
withrights(sect.5).
InMalaysiathereisaflexibilizationclause.TheConstitution,whichis
expresslyindicated(sect.4)asthesupremelawofthefederation(withthe
consequencethatanylawincontrastwiththeconstitutionisnull),canonlybe
modifiedwithalawapprovedbya2/3majorityinbothoftheHouses(sect.159).
Nevertheless,forsomematterstherigidityiseliminated,andthemodificationcanbe
carriedoutwithordinarylaw:theseare(andthisisevenmorecontradictory)matters
closelyconnectedwiththefederalnatureoftheState,liketheadmissionofaState
tothefederation,thealterationoftheconfinesoftheState,changingthefederal
capital,orthecompositionofthesecondhouse.
Lastly,evenwheremateriallimitstoconstitutionalrevisionareprovidedfor,
theydonotdealwithfundamentalrights(theymentiontheunitaryformoftheState
inIndonesia,sect.37;theliberalandpluralisticsystemofdemocracyandtheformof
governmentoftheconstitutionalmonarchyinCambodia,sect.134.InThailand,a
motion for amendment which has the effect of changing the democratic regime
of government with the King as Head of the State or changing the form of the
State shall be prohibited (sect.313).

333
ItistheabsolutemajorityinThailand,sect.313andIndonesia,sect.37;see,however,the
morecomplexprocedure,withthepossibilityofconvokingaconstitutionalconventionand
ofareferendumprovidedbytheConstitutionofthePhilippines,sect.XVII;inSouthKorea
a2/3parliamentarymajorityisneededandtheapprovalinanobligatorypopularreferen-
dum,sect.130;inTaiwana3/4majorityandthepossibilityofthereferendumisprovided
for,sect.164;inCambodiathemajorityisof2/3,sect.132;asinVietnam,sect.147,Laos,
sect.80,Cina,sect.64.
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AmongtheguaranteesitshouldbepointedoutthattheThaiConstitution
providesforthecreationofaspecificbodyoriented[devoted?]atensuringthatthe
governingprinciplesofpublicpolicies(includingmanysocialrights,codifiedinthe
formofprogrammaticnorms)canbeimplemented
334
.AndtheTaiwanConstitution
explicitlyprovidescivilandpenalresponsibilityforpublicemployeeswhohave
damagedfundamentalrights
335
.
AnotheraspectwhichdistinguishestheconstitutionsoftheEasternAsian
countriesfromthemostrecenttendenciesofconstitutionalismhastodowiththe
provisionsforemergencysituations.
Inthefaceoftheemergency,infact,thetendencyofconstitutionsismoreand
morethatofcodification,throughregulationswhichallowmodificationstothe
organizationofpublicpowerandtotheprovisionsforrightsforlimitedtimesduring
internationalorinternalemergencies.Eventhoughthisrisksopeningthewayto
authoritarianism,thesepossibilitiesrepresentanattempttobringthesubjectofthe
emergencywithinthesphereoflaw,therebyremovingitfromthesphereofpure
event,inordertolimitthearbitrarinessofgovernmentsandallowjurisdictional
controloftheirdecisions.
Onthecontrary,theprovisionsforthesematterswhichcanbefoundinthe
constitutionofthecountriesofEasternAsiaarequitesuccinct.Theyaregenerally
limitedtoentrustingtheexecutivepowerwiththepossibilityofdeclaringthestateof
emergency,withoutprovidingtheconditionsandwithoutindicatinglimits
334
Sect.89:ForthepurposeoftheimplementationofthisChapter,theStateshallestablish
theNationalEconomicandSocialCounciltobechargedwiththedutytogiveadviceand
recommendationstotheCouncilofMinistersoneconomicandsocialproblemsAnational
economicandsocialdevelopmentplanandotherplansasprovidedbylawshallobtain
opinionsoftheNationalEconomicandSocialCouncilbeforetheycanbeadoptedand
published.Thecomposition,source,powersanddutiesandtheoperationoftheNational
EconomicandSocialCouncilshallbeinaccordancewiththeprovisionoflaw.
335
Sect.24oftheTaiwanConstitutionstates:Anypublicemployeewho,inviolationoflaw,
infringesuponthefreedomorrightofanypersonshall,inadditiontobeingsubjectto
disciplinarypunishmentinaccordancewithlaw,beliabletocriminalandcivilaction.
Thevictimmay,inaccordancewithlaw,claimdamagesfromtheStateforanyinjury
sustainedtherefrom.
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(Indonesia,sect.12,givesthispowertothePresident,asdoessect.43ofthe
ConstitutionofTaiwan;aboutmartiallaw,sect.222oftheThaiConstitutiongives
thispowertotheking;onthecontrary,inCambodiathedeclarationofthestateof
emergencyanditsmanagementareputintothehandsofthelegislativeassembly,
sect.86).TheConstitutionofSouthKoreaprovidesthepresident
336
withemergency
powers,alongwiththeproclamationofmartiallaw
337
.
Theconstitutionswhichprovideforemergencypowersseemtodosonotso
much in order to regulate and contain them as to consent almost unlimited
possibilitiesofinterventiontotheexecutivepower(Singapore,Malaysia,Brunei).
Asforjurisdictionalguarantees,thesearealsoexplicitlyrecognizedinfew
constitutions.TheyareparticularlylimitedintheconstitutionsofthethreeSocialist
Statesoftheregion,wheretheroleofmonitoringtheapplicationoftheconstitution
andofthelawsisentrustedtopoliticalbodies,likethePermanentCommitteeofthe
NationalAssembly(Vietnamsect.91;China,sect.67).Sect.109oftheCambodian
Constitutionexplicitlystatesthatthe judiciary guarantees and defends with
336
Sect.76:1)Intimeofinternalturmoil,externalmenace,naturalcalamity,oragrave
financialoreconomiccrisis,thePresidentmaytakeinrespecttothemtheminimum
necessaryfinancialandeconomicactionsorissueordershavingtheeffectoflaw,only
whenitisrequiredtotakeurgentmeasuresforthemaintenanceofnationalsecurityor
publicpeaceandorder,andthereisnotimetoawaittheconvocationoftheNational
Assembly.2)Incaseofmajorhostilitiesaffectingnationalsecurity,thePresidentmay
issueordershavingtheeffectoflaw,onlywhenitisrequiredtopreservetheintegrityof
thenation,anditisimpossibletoconvenetheNationalAssembly.3)Inthecaseofactions
takenorordersissuedunderparagraphs1)and2),thePresidentpromptlynotifiesthe
NationalAssemblyandobtainsitsapproval.
337
Thestateofwarcanbeproclaimedwhenitisrequiredtocopewithamilitarynecessity
ortomaintainthepublicsafetyandorderbymobilizationofthemilitaryforcesintimeof
war,armedconflictorsimilarnationalemergency(sect.77).Thelawprovidesforthe
conditions;thesamearticlealsostatesthatSpecialmeasuresmaybetakenwithrespectto
thenecessityforwarrants,freedomofspeech,thepress,assemblyandassociation,orthe
powersoftheExecutiveandtheJudiciaryundertheconditionsasprescribedbylaw.
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impartiality the rights and freedoms of the citizens
338
.
Inmostofthecountriesacentralizedsystemofconstitutionaljusticewas
instituted(JapanandthePhilippines,thathaveadecentralizedsystemofjudicial
reviewoflegislation,areexceptions);thisentruststhejudicialreviewoflegislation
toaspecializedcourt.Theseconstitutionalcourtsarealsocalledupontoresolve
conflictsamongpowersandtocarryoutotherfunctions,suchascontrolofthe
partiesoroftheelections[Ginsburg2003].
Forexample,the1947ConstitutionofTaiwanentrustedthetaskofinterpreting
theConstitutiontotheCounciloftheGrandJusticesoftheJudicialYuan(supreme
justicesoftheState;articles78and79):thispower,whichcanbeactivatedby
requestofindividuals,publicbodiesandpoliticalparties,wasrevitalizedbythe
constitutionalreformattheendofthe1990stothepointthattheGrandJusticesnow
functionlikeatrueconstitutionalcourt,inchargeofbothabstractandconcrete
reviewsanditreceivesagrowingnumberofpetitions.
Theconstitutional question
339
existsinSouthKoreaaswell,whereitis
placedalongsidethedirectindividualcomplaint,modelledontheGermansystem
(accordingtosect.68,par.1,oftheConstitutionalCourtAct),whichoccupiesthe
majorityoftheworkoftheCourt
340
.
338
Sect.28oftheThaiConstitutionshouldbementioned:Apersoncaninvokehumandig-
nityorexercisehisorherrightsandlibertiesinsofarasitisnotinviolationofrightsand
libertiesofotherpersonsorcontrarytothisConstitutionorgoodmorals.Apersonwhose
rightsandlibertiesrecognisedbythisConstitutionareviolatedcaninvoketheprovisions
ofthisConstitutiontobringalawsuitortodefendhimselforherselfintheCourt.
339
Constitutionalquestionsareraisedbyordinaryjudges.Whentheordinaryjudgehasto
decideacase,ifhebelievesthattheapplicablestatuteisunconstitutional,hecanreferthe
questiontotheconstitutionalcourt.TheCourtwillreviewtheconstitutionalityofthe
statute,butitwillnotdecidethecase:thedecisionisuptotheordinaryjudge,thathasto
wait(astheordinarytrialissuspended)thedecisionontheconstitutionalityofthestatute,
beforereassumingtheproceeding.
340
TheconstitutionalcomplaintallowsindividualstodirectlyinvokeCourtsjurisdictionif
theyconsiderthattheirfundamentalrightshavebeenviolated(thisprocedureisvery
popularinSpainandGermany,andinCentralandEasternEuropeancountriesaswell.
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InCambodia,theConstitutionalCouncilreviewstheconstitutionalityofthe
laws,butonly1/10ofthemembersofparliamentorthePresidentoftheParliament
canformulateaconstitutionalchallenge(sect.121).
InIndonesia,eventhoughthereisaConstitutionalCourtchargedwithjudicial
reviewoflegislation,accesstoitisnotdirectlyprovidedforintheConstitution(sect.
24C).Moreover,itspowerwaslimitedbythelegislationforitsimplementation,
whichremovedpowertoreviewanylawbefore19October1999dateofthefirst
revisionoftheConstitutionafterthedemocratictransitionfromthisConstitutional
Court
341
.
InThailand(sect.264)theincidentalquestioncanbebroughtbyordinary
judgesevenonrequestbyapartyfromthecase:whenthequestionisraisedbythis
avenue,thedecisionoftheConstitutionalCourtwillhave inter parteseffect.There
isalsotheprovision(sect.198)ofanappealtotheOmbudsman.Abstractanda
priori reviewisprovidedonlyfororganiclawsandproceedingrulesofparliament.
OnlyThailandintroducedtheOmbudsmanintheConstitution,afigure[sidice
cos?Sarebbeorgano]whichhashadgreatsuccessinthemostrecentconstitution
sofLatinAmerica,centralandeasternEuropeandAfrica.Sections196and197of
theConstitutionprovidefortheOmbudsman,seenessentiallyasthebodyappointed
toverifytheactivityofthepublicadministration.ThereisalsoaHumanRights
Commission(sections189and190),proposedbytheSenateandnominatedbythe
King,whichwatchesovertheprotectionofhumanrights,andpromotesawareness
andrespectofthem.ThepowersoftheCommissionincludethepossibilityof
sendingrecommendationsandcomments,aswellasanannualreport,toParliament.
Therearelimitations:duringitswork,theCommissionhastokeepinmindthe
interestsofthecountryandofthecommunity[Harding2006].ThePhilippines
Constitution(sect.XIII,sections17and18)alsoprovidesforaHumanRights
Commissionwhosecompositionistobedefinedbythelawchargedwith
investigatingviolationsofhumanrights,seeingtothemeasuresnecessarytoprotect
therightsofandthelegalassistanceforallthosewhoserightshavebeenviolated,
visitinggaolsandprisons,researching,educatingandinformingabouthumanrights,
341
Accordingtosect.50oflaw24/2003.
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monitoringtheactivityofthePhilippinegovernmentinfulfilmentofinternational
obligationsinthisarea,recommendingmeasurestoParliamentforthepromotionof
humanrightsandforthepaymentofdamagestovictimsofviolations
342
.

5. Perspectives
The coup dt at i n Sept ember 2006 seems t o have agai n set i n mot i o
nwhathasbeendefinedasthe cycle of Thai politics:a military coup suspends
the old constitution; a new constitution is enacted; elections are held; time
passed until a perceived crisis leads to another military coup [McDorman1995].
Inotherwords,theleastoptimisticprevisionsaboutthe1997Constitution
seemtohavebeenconfirmed.Thedifficultyofasuddenchangeinbehaviour
towardstheconstitution,whichfor70yearshadbeennothingmorethanadocument
approvedonlytothenbesuspendedbyanewcoupdtat,wasbroadlyemphasized
[e.g.,StreckfussandTempleton2001].Inparticularasregardshumanrights,itwas
said(withreferencetothe1991Constitution),thatthe Thai Constitution and its
reference to rights is not representative of a social contract between the state
and its people. It is not genuinely based upon the universality of human
rights.it has more to do with the functions of government[citare!!Perme].In
comparison,the1997Constitutionpresentedsomeimportantdevelopments:the
introduction ofthereference torights among thegeneral provisions of the
Constitution;thecodificationofnewrights,suchassocialrights,(inprecedence
formulatedonlyasDirectivePrinciplesofStatePolicies)andrightsofthird
generation;theintroductionofsomegeneralclausesaboutrights(articles26-29)
whichaimatpointingouttheobligatorynatureoftheregulationsaboutrights,even
forpublicauthority,andofagenerallimitationclause;theintroductionofthe
principleofjusticiabilityofrights.
342
Inothercountries,likeIndonesia,theHumanRightsCommissionisinstitutedbylaw
(law39/1999).ThereareevendedicatedHumanRightsCourtswithinthepowerofthe
judiciary,calledontojudgegrossviolationsofhumanrights(law26/2000):seeStockmann
2004,p.289.
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Buttherearemanycontinuouselements[commonfeatures?]betweenthetwo
texts.Despitethelimitationclauseofsect.29,eachrightcontinuestofinditslimits
inthelaw,whichcaninterveneonthebasisofgenericformulas,suchastherecurrent
necessityofprotectingpublicorderorgoodmorals.Thereisampleattentiongivento
thedutiesoftheperson.Theaffirmationoftheuniversalityofrightscontinuestobe
absent,rightscontinuetobelinkedtotheideaofcitizenshipandthereisnoopenness
tointernationallawonhumanrights.
Onthesubjectoftheguaranteeofrights,perplexityremainsovertheexcessive
weaknessoftheamendingformulaandovertheabsenceoflimitsonconstitutional
amendmentthatmakeexplicitreferencetorightsandtheirinviolablenature.
Oneareawhereagreatdealofimprovementhasbeenmadeinthe1997
ConstitutionhastodowiththeConstitutionalCourtandotherwatchdogs.TheCourt
wasapurepretenceinthe1991Constitution;in1997itis,instead,enabledtocarry
outaneffectiveroleofguaranteeing,accordingtotheanti-majoritymodelwhich
characterizesconstitutionaljusticeintheworld,eventoughthedirectcomplaintto
protectfundamentalrights,ascanbefoundinSpainorGermany,wouldhave
providedafurtheremphasisonthecentralityofrights,andguaranteedimmediate
justicetothepeoplewhomrightshadbeenviolated.

The Interim Constitution of

1 October 2006 takes an ambivalent position.
Ononehand,itseemstoreconfirmrightsandfreedoms,beginning[yet?]inits
preamble.Sect.38seemstolenditselftobeinterpretedasaimedatmaintaininto
forcethe1997Constitutionprovisionsaboutrights,whenitaffirmsthatFor cases
not covered by constitutional provisions, the ruling should follow precedents of
the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State.
Ontheotherhand,however,theInterimConstitutionsignalstheendofthe
existenceoftheConstitutionalCourtbyestablishingaConstitutionalTribunal
composedofjusticesfromtheSupremeCourtandbydeclaringthatallthecases
whichweretobedecidedbytheConstitutionalCourtatthemomentofthecoupare
transferredtothenewTribunal.
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TheweaknessofconstitutionalisminThailand,asistestifiedbymanyaspects
ofthecodificationofhumanrights,contributestomakingtheConstitutionamere
pieceofpaper.Aslongasacultureofhumanrightsandanawarenessoftheclose
relationshipbetweentheconstitutionandtheprotectionofrightshavenotbeen
developed,aslongastheconstitutionisnotfelttobeafoundingactofthelegal
system,itwillbedifficultforittofulfilthatfundamentalroleofstabilizationwhich
itsowellhasfulfilledinmanypartsoftheworldduringdemocratizationprocesses.
Unfortunately,theInterimConstitutionseemstogointheoppositedirection,
providingforaconstituentprocesswhich,despitetheaffirmationsofthepreamble
(whichclaimstowishtodraft and enact a new Constitution with broad public
participation in every step),placesthewritingofthenewConstitutioninthe
handsofbodiesformednotondemocraticbasesbutessentiallyselectedbythe
membersofthemilitarynowinpower:Thepeoplewillonlybecalledupontoratify
theproductinareferendum.Theeffortof1997seemstohavebeencancelled:the
constitutionseemsdestinedtoremain,asisbynowtraditioninThaihistory,apiece
of paper,afarcry[veryfar??]fromthatcompactfoundinganeworderwhich,
instead,theThaisocietyhadhopedfor.

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Uwanno B., Burns W.D., The Thai Constitution of 1997: Sources and Process, in
University of British Columbia Law Review, 1998, 227
Varunyou 2003
Weinrib 2005
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Constitutional provisions
and the Media:
Lessons from Thailand for Italy?
Sara Pennicino
343

T hepaperisacomparativeanalysisofThaiandItalianbroadcastinglegislation.
Thetwocountriesmakeaninterestingcomparisonbecausetheyhavebothhadmedia
tycoonsasPrimeMinisters.
Commentatorsusuallyavoidcomparisonbetweenthetwolegalsystems
because,regardlessofthismutualexperience,thetwocountriesareconsideredvery
different.MostItalianmediaexpertsdismisstheideaofdrawingaparallelbetween
ItalyanditscenturiesofpoliticalandmediacultureandThailand,adeveloping
nationinSoutheastAsia.Inthesameway,Thaicommentatorsdonotliketocompare
theirPrimeMinistertoaEuropeanpoliticianwhohasbeenindictedforalleged
bribery.
Onthecontrarythispaperapproachesthecomparisonfromalegaland
constitutionalstandpoint.
343
PhDCandidateinComparativeConstitutionalLaw,UniversityofSienaandTeaching
AssistantofPublicLawattheBocconiUniversity,MilanandComparativePublicLawat
theUniversityofBologna.
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Indoingthis,twomainpointsareaddressed:first,thelimitstomediaproperty,
second,therulesonthepropertyownedbypeopleholdingpoliticalpositions.The
latterisreferredtointheItalianlegalsystemasthelegislationontheconflictof
interest.
Thefirstpartofthepaperdealswiththemediapropertyclausesprovidedforin
the1997ThaiConstitutionandthesystemofwatchdogsconsequentlyintroduced.
MoreoveritfocusesonPartI,ChapterXofthe1997Constitution,whichprovided
forcontrolsonassetsofpersonsholdingpoliticalpositions.
ThesecondpartisdevotedtothedevelopmentofItalianmedialegislationand
itsimplementation.TheItalianConstitutiondoesnotcontainaspecificarticle
devot ed t o medi a propert y rul es, nor t o t he al l ocat i on ofTV frequenci es.
Furthermore,nomediawatchdogbodyhasbeenconstitutionallyentrenched.Italian
mediaisregulatedexclusivelybystatutelaw,howeveritisgreatlyinfluencedbythe
interpretativeandappellativejudgmentsoftheItalianConstitutionalCourt.Thispart
ofthepaperalsodescribesthestatutelawthatprovidesforlimitstopropertyowned
bypeopleholdingpoliticalofficeinordertopreventtheabove-mentionedconflictof
interest.
Inconclusion,notwithstandingthehistorical,culturalandlegaldifferences
betweenItalyandThailandthepaperaddressestheissueofwhetheramedia
clause andlimitstothepropertyofpeopleholdingpoliticalpositionsshouldbe
included in the Italian Constitution along the same lines as the 1997Thai
Constitution.
Group 5
Decentralization and Empowerment of Civil Society
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Democratic and civil society movement
344
Professor Dr. Amara Pongsapij

Abstract
I wouldliketolookatthedemocraticmovementinthepatternofcivilsociety
movementduringthe3periodoftime(thewordCivil Society Movement
presentedherereferstotheactivitiesthatarenotconductedbythegovernmentand
businesssectors).Thedemocraticmovementstatedmoreorlessduringtheyear1932
intheformoffemaleandBuddhistorganizations,whichwerelatersuppressedinthe
eraofmilitarydictatorship.Thesecondphaseofdemocraticmovementstartedinthe
formofstudentorganization,whichledtothefaithfuleventofOctober14
th
,1973,
andwassuppressedbytherevolutionofOctober6th,1976.Afterwards,the
democraticorganizationhadtohideorescapeintothejungleuntilthe66/23amnesty
policywasissued.Thenthedemocraticmovementwasdevelopedintheformofcivil
societymovement.Duringthethirdphase,civilsocietyorganizationsincreasedin

344
AdaptedfromAmaraPongsapitcFuture of Thai politics: Democratic movement for social
justice AnnualspeechonOctober14th,2006,organizedbytheOctober14
th
Foundationat
theOctober14thConferenceRoom,onOctober14th,2006.
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numberandadjusttheirrolestosocialdevelopmentwiththeintentiontoestablish
democracy.Theoperationsweremadeintheformofnetworktodothecampaigns
forvariouskindsofdevelopment.AndintheeventofMay1992,thenetworksof
civilsocietyorganizationswereabletojoininthemovementagainstGen.Sujinda
Kraprayoonssteptopower,whichmightleadtomilitarydictatorship.Duringthis
thirdphase,democraticmovementwasdevelopedtotheformofassemblingasa
networkofalliances.Thatis,itbecamethenetworkoforganizationalnetwork,and
wasthendevelopedintothedemocraticmovementthatcouldbepowerfully
assembledintheyear2006.Finally,Iwouldliketoproposethatthedemocratic
movementin2006isthemovementmadewithapurposetocreatedemocratic
societyandgoodgovernance.The3majorfeaturesofthiskindofsocietyare:
(1)Theleadermustbeethical;(2)Theaimofthesocietyistohavedemocracywith
socialjustice,and;(3)Thecivilsocietysectormustbeabletoplayitsroleinclose
inspectionoftheoperationalmechanismofthegovernmentandbusinesssector.
Today,therevolutiongroupofSeptember19
th
,2006,mustbeassuredthatthis
politicalreformhasthesamepurposeasthatofcivilsocietymovement.Otherwise,
theinsurgencymayoccuronceagain.Atpresent,democracymusthavethepattern
andcontextthataredifferentfromthepast.Thatis,ithastotakeintoconsideration
thedevelopmentofthepastdemocraticpatterns,whileemphasismustalsomade
fromthefeatureorcontextrequiredbypeopleinThaisociety.Nowadays,Thai
societycallsforqualitydemocracythathasethicalandmoralissuesasmajor
components,notjustanykindofdemocracy.

1. Democratic movement during the revolution in 1932

InconsideringthedevelopmentofdemocracysincethefirstrevolutionofJune
24
th
,1932,wecanseethatthepatternofdemocracyhasbeenchangedfromtimeto
time.Thefirstchangewasthechangefromabsolutemonarchytodemocracyunder
theKingasheadofthestate.AccordingtoThongchaiWinijjakulsopiniononthis
change,People or civil society groups did not have any power or participate in
any decision concerning major policies or political issues Since the power of
people was not strong enough, it could not be the base for the 1932 revolution.
This is why they were not separated from centralization, either by absolute
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monarchy state, or the state after 1932(Thongchai2005:23).Thisfactresultedin
thesettlementoftherulesoftheKingindemocracytobyaboveorunderthe
Constitution.
Inaddition,ThongchaialsoperceivedthattheconflictsbetweenthePeoples
Partyandtheroyalfamilywereevidentafter1932.Thatis,sincetheConstitution
writtenbythePeoplesPartydidnotallowtheKingandtheroyalfamilytoplay
politicalroles,andprescribedthattheKingandroyalfamilymustbebeyondthe
politics.However,afterwards,thepro-royalgroupattemptedtomaketheKingreturn
topoliticalroles.AccordingtotheConstitutionB.E.2492(1949),Thailandisa
democraticregimewithKingasHeadoftheState,andnobodyshallinstituteany
chargeagainsttheKing.ThisConstitutionalsoprovidedmorepowertotheKing,
suchasinselectionandappointmentofSenates,indeclaringemergencystage,andin
approvalofthechangeingovernmentspolicies,etc(Thongchai2005:23).
Theconceptualcombatingivingdefinitiontodemocracywasinitiatedbefore
1932,asseenthroughthealternativepoliticalleadershipbetweenciviliansand
military officials. However, most of the timeThailand was under military
dictatorship,rangingfromFieldMarshallPorPibulsongkram,FieldMarshalSarit
Thanarat,andFieldMarshalThanomKittikajorn.Duringthosetimes,therewere
severalreformsandrebellions.AccordingtoThongchaisperception,afterthelossof
thepro-royalgroup,therecoveryoftheKingspowerdidnotaimforshort-term
effectorthroughtheparliamentprocess.Onthecontrary,thetheoryofThaiking
wasslowlybutfirmlyestablishedthroughaccumulationofreverenceandthenew
definitionabovepolitics.Andfinallythegreatsuccessbeganaftertheeventof
October14th,1973(Thongchai2005:35)

The movement of fmales and Buddhist monks
AlthoughThongchaiperceivesthatthepowerofpeoplewasnotstrong,wecan
stillacknowledgetherolesofthinkersandjournalistssuchasTianwanandNarin
Pasitinpresentingtheirideasaboutdemocracyandsocialjustice(Chai-anan
Samutawanich1974andSakdinaChatrakulNaAyudhaya2001).Besides,duringthe
transitionalperiodin1932,thereweremovementsfromfemalegroupsrequiring
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theirrights.SuchmovementwasinfactinitiatedwhenAmdang(Miss)Muanand
AmdangJunappealedtoKingRamaIVaskingfortheirowndecisionmakingright
nottomarrythepersonsselectedforthembytheirparents.InthecaseofAmdang
Muan,herparentstorturedandforcedhertomarryMr.Phuwithoutherconsent.
Therefore,AmdangMuan,whowasinlovewithMr.Rid,appealedfortherightto
chooseherhusbandbyinthecaseofAmdangJun,shewassoldtoothersbyher
husband,Mr.Iam,accordingtothebeliefthatwiveswerehouseholdslaves.Asa
result,KingRamaIVdeclaredtheannulmentofforcedmarriagetraditioninthe
DeclarationofAbductionActB.E.2406(1863),followedbytheenactmentofB.E.
2411(1868)Actforbiddingmenfromsellingtheirwivesandparentsfromselling
theirchildren(KrittayaandKanokwan2002:40).
Thenextevidentphenomenonoffemalemovementoccurredbeforethe
revolutionof1932,wheneducatedwomenpublishedabookandmagazinecalled
Satree-NiphonandSatree-Sup(WomanWritingandWomanWord)topresentthe
ideasaboutwomenandgender.Themovementofwomenduringthattimefocused
oneducationalequalityandmonogamymarriage.Afterwards,thedemocratic
atmosphereduringtherevolutionencouragedwomentoexpressmoreideas.Asa
resultoftherequestforeducationalequality,womenhadanopportunitytostudyat
ChulalongkornUniversitythathadbeenestablishedin1916.However,theequality
intermsoflegitimatemarriageandmonogamyfamilysystembecamematerialized
aftertheenactmentoftheCivilandCommercialCodeSection5regardingthefamily
matterin1935.
Furthermore,in1932,theThaiWomenofSiamAssociationwasestablishedby
theEditorofYingThai(ThaiWomen)newspaperwhograduatedfromlawschool.
Themovementofwomenduringthistimewasconsideredliberalismforitsemphasis
onimpartialityandequalityofwomen,especiallyamonglaborers.Thisresultedinan
enactmentoflawstoincreasetherightsofwomen.However,whenthegovernment
aftertherevolutionof1932invitedwomentobeelectioncandidates,theeditorof
YingThainewspaperprotestedsincesuchinvitationprovidedanopportunityfor
onlyafewmiddleclasswomen.Itdidnotmeanthattheother7millionwomen
wouldhavethesameopportunity.Thisgroupofwomenbelievedthatliberalismto
provideequalitytowomenshouldoccuratthesametimewithotheraspectsof
politicalchanges.Lateron,YingThaiNewspaperwasorderedtoclosebythe
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governmentwhenthearticlesinthenewspaperbecamemoreradical(Siriporn
1993:28-35).
Meanwhile,therewasamovementfortherecoveryoffemaleBuddhistnovices
andmonksinThailand.SuchmovementwasledbyNarinPasit,aradicalthinker
whoseriouslystudiedBuddhismandbecameafaithfulfollower.Heestablishedthe
Buddhist AssociationandpublishedthebookscalledSara Dharma and
World and Dharmatobeusedasamajorformforexchangeofreligious
opinions.HealsorequiredtherestorationoffemaleordinationasBuddhistnovice
andmonkashavingbeenestablishedintheBuddhasera.Narinproposedthatmales
andfemalesdidnothavethesameopportunitytolearnandunderstandtheBuddhas
teaching.Besides,thelackoffemaleBuddhistnoviceandmonkswasanobstacle
againstwomensspiritualrightstobeordained.Narinstartedhiscampaignby
providingsupporttohisdaughters,MissSaraandMissJongdee,andotherwomen
whowereinterestedinenteringordination.Healsoprovidedthebuildingbehind
The Buddhist PlacetobeusedforreligiousactivitiesoffemaleBuddhistnovice
inSeptember1928,andcalleditWat Nareewong.However,hiscampaignwas
notsuccessful.OnthedateofSeptember7th,1929,thesefemalenoviceswere
caught by t he pol i ce and were sent enced t o i mpri sonment by t he Court of
NonthabureeProvince.NarinthenfiledpetitiontoKingRamaVII,buttheKings
decisionwasthatNarinshouldcalloffhisintentiontorestorefemaleordination.
Therefore,Narinhadtoaborthismovement(Sakdina2001:13-17).
Activitiesofwomenmovementwerestoppedaftertherevolutionof1932,
especiallywhentheNationalCultureActB.E.2485(1942)stipulatedthatthe
establishmentoforganizationsmustbeforthepurposeofculturalpromotiononly,
andanyactivitiesinvolvedwithpoliticswereprohibited.Therefore,themovements
weremissedduringsuchperiod,untiltheoccurrenceofOctober14
th
,1973.Thatis,
womenorganizationsestablishedduringtheyear1942-1973wereonlyforcharity
purpose,andnoseriousmovementwasmade(Amara2005).
Duringtherevolutionof1932,therewasamovementfromagroupofBuddhist
monkscalled Religious Reform Group(Khanungnit1985).Themovementaimed
atcombiningthetwoBuddhistsub-orders,namelyDharmayuktikaNikayaandMaha
Nikayatobe The New Monkor the Monk of Siam.Themovementwas
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initiatedinthelate1934,whenapproximately300monksfromBangkokand
ThonburicalledforameetingatPataraWikromHouse.Thedisputeswerecausedby
internalproblemofinjusticeinthemonkadministrationbasedontheBuddhistOrder
orSanghaActofRatanakorsinEra121.Theproblemwasalsoescalatedbythe
externalfactorsfrompoliticalsituationaftertherevolutionof1932.Accordingto
Khanungnit:
Themovementwasmadethroughvariouskindsofstrategies,suchasfiling
petitiontothemonkadministrative,theuseofassemblingpowerofmonksfrom
BangkokandupcountrytofilepetitiontotheSupremeSanghaCouncilandthe
government,andmostimportantly,theuseofpowerfrompoliticiansandmasse
media,especiallynewspaper.Themovementforreformconfrontedconsiderable
obstacles.Butwiththefirmideologyandwiththesupportfromthegovernmentand
certaingroupsofpeoplewhowereawareoftheproblemsamongBuddhistmonk,the
reformgroupwasabletosubmitthepetitiontotheParliament,resultinginthe
changeoftheBuddhistOrderorSanghaAct(Khanungnit1989:29).
However, the movement of the reform group was successful with the
enactmentofthe1941SanghaAct.Butthesuccesslastedforonlyashortperiod,
becausethe1941SanghaActwasannulledin1962bytheRevolutionTeamunder
FieldMarshalSaritThanarat,PrimeMinister.

The 1942 National Culture Act 1942

and the overview of civil society movement
Asaresultofthepromulgationofthe1942NationalCultureAct,civilsociety
organizationsoperatedindividuallyandwerenotabletoassembleformovementdue
tothestrictcontrolofthegovernment.Mostofthecivilsocietyorganizations
operationconcernedtheprovisionofsocialserviceandcharityassistance.Besides,
theseorganizationswereusuallyofsmallsizeandwererunbymembersofelite
groups.Someofthemwerereligiousorganizations,emphasizingonmeritoperation
andprovidingsupporttothegovernmentsincethegovernmentwasunabletoprovide
sufficientwelfaretothepeople.Althoughtheseorganizationshelpedimprovethe
governmentsimage,theirrolestowardthesocietywereinsignificantbecauseof
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limitednumberoforganizationsandtemporarynatureofoperation.Forexample,
theseorganizationsusuallyhelpedintheemergencyornaturaldisastercases,orin
theformofscholarshipanddonationstohospitals,vulnerable,orpoorpeoplefrom
timetotime.Therolesofcivilsocietyduringthistimecanbeanalyzedbythe
WelfareStateTheory.Basedonthistheory,theseorganizationscanonlyhelpprovide
socialserviceinthestatesthatareunabletoprovidesufficientwelfaretothepeople.
Additionally,duringthisperiod,therewerealsoassociationsofoversea
Chinesepeopledividedbylineageordialects.Theseassociationsplayedrolesin
providingassistancetopeopleofthesamegroups,suchasthosewhowerefromthe
samelineage,speakingthesamedialect,orhavingthesamereligious.Therolesof
theseorganizationscanbeexplainedbytheHeterogeneityTheory.Accordingtothis
theory,inthesocietywithvarietiesofculture,itisimpossibleforthegovernmentto
respondtotheneedsofallgroupsofpeopleandsocietiessincethoseneedsdiffer.
Meanwhile,whenacountryisstillpoor,themarketmechanismisunabletorespond
tothesocialneeds.Insuchcase,civilsocietyorganizationswillplayrolesin
respondingtotheneedsoftheirowngroup.
Inconclusion,duringtheestablishmentofthenationstateaftertheWorldWar
II,thegovernmentspoliciesemphasizedontheestablishmentofthecountrys
stabilityandtheimplementationofcapitalismdevelopmentideology.Therefore,the
governmenthadtocontrolcivilsocietyorganizationsandallowedthemtoplayroles
insupportingthegovernmentonly.Forexample,religiousandChineseassociations
wereabletoplayrolesinsocialserviceonly.Thisistopreventtheseorganizations
fromperformingpoliticaldutiesbyprovidingassistancetothegovernments
opponent,orCommunismthatwaswidelydisseminatedduringthattime.

Democracy under military dictatorship

Inconsideringthedemocracyatitsinitialstage,Iwouldliketoencourageyou
toconsideraboutthetypesofmovementfordemocracyduringtheyear1932.Apart
fromthePeoplesParty,whichhadevidentrolesinthemovementforconcrete
changeofpolitics,therewerealsothemovementsofwomenandmonks,reflecting
theatmosphereoftherequestsfordemocracyfromseveralparities.Meanwhile,
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expansionofcommunismwasanotherkindofmovementthatwasrelatedtopolitical
development.Additionally,theemergenceoftheSoutheastAsiaLeagueinevitably
affectedthestabilityofThaigovernmentandthegovernmentofothercountriesin
Indochina.Atthesametime,whileCommunistPartieswereestablishedinvarious
countriesinSoutheastAsia,therewerealsoothermovementsfromvariousgroupsin
theborderprovinces.
Theexpansionofcivilsocietyorganizationsandpoliticalmovement,eitherin
theformsofpoliticalpartiesorpoliticalideologies,resultedinthetightercontrolof
FieldMarshalPorPhiboonsongkramsgovernmentoverthemovementofthose
organizations.The1942NationalCultureActwaspromulgated,stipulatingthatthe
organizationswiththeobjectivetopromoteartsandculture,orothercharity
organizations,mustregisterintheformsofassociationorfoundation.Lateron,the
1966CommerceandChamberofCommerceActwaspromulgatedforadditional
controlovertradingandbusinessactivities.
Thatis,democracyundermilitarydictatorshipwascausedbytheattemptto
definitelyseparatesocialactivitiesfrompoliticalactivities.Inregistrationof
associationsandfoundations,itwasnecessarytospecifyclearlythattheactivitiesof
theassociationsandfoundationswouldnothaveinvolvedwithpolitics.Atthesame
time,politicalactivitiesweremainlyconductedintheformofpoliticalparty
establishmentandadministrationofelection.Therefore,democracyundermilitary
dictatorshiponlyreferredtohavingtherighttovote.Thefreedominexpressing
opinionsthroughspeakingandwritingwasstilllimited.Duringthetimeof
revolution,theannouncementoftheRevolutionGroupplayeditsroleinlimitingthe
freedomofpeople,resultinginlimitedmeaningofdemocracy.Atthattime,the
peoplespowerwastooweaktoresistortodemanddemocracyinotherforms.
Therefore,representativedemocracywastheonlyformofdemocracybeingknown
toThaisocietyduringthisperiod.

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2. Democracy movement before
and after October 14
th
:
The growth of participatory democracy
and direct democracy
Thedemandfordemocracythroughthestudentmovementthatoccurredinthe
eventofOctober14
th
,1973,wasdevelopedfromtheuniversitystudentscamp
activities,theestablishmentofRuralRenovationOrganizations(lateronitwascalled
The Foundation of Rural Renovation)in1967,andthevolunteergraduate
projectinitiatedinThammasartUniversity.Atthesametime,therewasalsothe
developmentofotherorganizationsasrecordedindetailsinotherstudies(Amara
Pongsapitchetal.:2003).However,thisarticlewillmentiononlythedevelopment
ofthepatternsfororganizationalmovementsandthepatternsofdemocracybriefly.
TheperiodbetweenOctober14th,1973,andOctober6th,1976,wascalled
The Age of Blooming Democracy.The bloomingofdemocracymainly
appearedintheformoffreedominexpressingopinions.Therewerenewnon-
governmentorganizationsthatemphasizedonotherkindsofdevelopmentinaddition
tothecharityorganizationshavingregisteredwiththeOfficeofNationalCulture.
Therewerealsoreligiousorganizationsthatworkedonadditionaldevelopmentin
additiontotheirreligiousactivities.Besides,therewerethefederationsoffarmers,
laborunions,inadditiontotheemergenceoffarmerleaders,laborleaders,and
variouskindofLeftistactivities.Theemergenceoftheseorganizationswastothe
extentthatthegovernmentfounditnecessarytocontroltheactivitiesofcivilsociety.
Suchattemptwasreflectedinthe1984CremationAssociationAct,whichcontrolled
theestablishmentoforganizationsatvillageleveltobeunderthesupervisionofthe
DepartmentofPublicWelfare.Anotherexamplewasthe1975LaborRelationAct,
whichcontrolledactivitiesoffactoryemployeesandtheestablishmentoflaborunion
undersupervisionoftheMinistryofLabor,whileinthepastlaborcontrolwasunder
therevolutionarylaws(Amaraetal.2546).
Socialmovementsintheformofthedemandforfreedomwereincreasedin
numbertotheextentthattherewastheperceptionofExcessive Blooming
Democracy. Therefore,rightistsocialmovementwasestablishedforcounter
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balance,resultinginsevereconfrontation.AftertheeventofOctober6th,1976,
democraticmovementswereoppresseduntiltheyhadtooperatesecretly.Andafter
thedeclarationof66/2523policy,non-governmentorganizationswererecoveredto
workforgrassrootdevelopment.Thiswastheperiodoflearningandfindinganswers
about devel opment .At one t i me, i t was percei ved t hat t he answers were
communities,villages,andactivitiesthatfocusedonruralandurbandevelopment,as
wellasthecareforvariousmarginalgroups.Therefore,theconceptofproviding
assistancetothepooratindividuallevelortospecificgroupswasexpandedto
communityandsociety.Thedevelopmentofindividualswaschangedtothe
developmentofcommunityandsociety.
Thedevelopmentreferstophysicalandeconomicdevelopment,suchasin
livelihoodandoccupations,aswellasconceptualdevelopment.Someprogressive
organizationsaskedforthemeaningofdevelopment,andreachedtheconclusionthat
onlyeconomicandphysicaldevelopmentswereinsufficient.Itwasalsonecessaryto
createdemocraticconscience,whichinvolvedtheissueofegality,equality,freedom
andliberty.However,eachorganizationwasratherweakandlackedpower.
Therefore,severalorganizationswithsimilarobjectivesstartedtoassembleasa
networktostrengthenoneanother.Theiroperationswereexpanded,andnew
organizationswereestablished.Theseorganizationsworkedintheformofnetwork.
Thereweremoreworkinggroupsandnetworkorganizationsresponsiblefor
coordinationandpromotingvariouskindsofpolicies.Forexample,thenetworkof
environmentalorganizationsbeganitsoperationinconservationofenvironment,and
thenexpandedtoresistingthedevelopmentprojectsthatdestroyedtheenvironment.
Similarly,thenetworkofchildrenorganizationsstartedtheiractivitiesbyproviding
scholarship,healthandnutritioncare,beforeexpandingtheiroperationtochildrights
andcareforchildrenindifficultsituations,childrenwhoweretortured,childlabor,
aswellaseducationforcommunitiesandsocieties.Expansionwasalsomadefor
childactivitiesbyincreasingchild-relatedissues.Moreover,thedefinitionofchild
groupswasbroadened,fromschoolchildrentothechildrenincommunities,whether
ornottheywereatschools.Besides,educationalcareforchildrenwasaugmentedto
educationalmanagementforallpeopleinthecommunity.
TheseactivitiescanbeanalyzedbytheCivilSocietyTheory.Accordingtothis
theory,inthedemocraticorhalf-democraticsociety,socialorganizationswill
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conducttheirdutyasthemechanismtoinspecttheworkofvariousagencies.These
organizationsemphasizeonethicsorsocialrighteousness,aswellassocial
responsibility.Sometimesindividualsneedtosacrificetheirpersonalhappinessfor
benefitsofthepublic.Relationshipbetweenindividualsandpublicmustbein
agreement.Individualsareabletoparticipateinpublicactivities.Theymustalso
havepublicconscience,anddotheirdutiesininspectingtheworkofthegovernment
andbusinesssectorstopreventthemfromtakingadvantageofothers,toeradicate
corruption,andtocreatepeacefulsociety.
Duringthisperiod,anothermajorphenomenonwastheadjustmentof
operationalconcept,fromindividualoperationtoorganizationaloperation.Emphasis
wasmadeonthedevelopmentoforganizations,includingbothnon-government
organizationsandcharityorganizations.Theseorganizationsunitedasnetworksto
encouragejointmovement.Thus,theybecamemorepowerful,andthiswasthe
beginningofanotherrevivalofsocialmovement.
Developmentofdirectdemocracyemergedatthesametimeandinparallel
withthegrowthofnewsocialmovement.Asmentionedearlier,inthepast,social
movementandpoliticalmovementhadalwaysbeenseparated.Politicalmovement
hadbeenprescribedtoinvolvemainlywithpolitics.Asforothermovementsthat
wereirrelevanttotheelection,suchasthemovementofreligiousgroups,women
groups,andlaborgroupshadbeenconsideredsocialmovement.Butwhensocial
movementordemocraticmovementbegantheiroperationindemandingtheir
politicalrights,suchasthefarmergroupsaimingtodestroythestatepower,the
differencebetweensocialmovement and politicalmovement was no more
distinctive.Themodernmovementwithpoliticalpurposesandtheneedstoadjust
publicpolicieswasthereforedifferentfromthepastsocialmovement,whichaimed
forindividualpurposes.
Whengeneralorganizationsdidnothavesufficientpowertonegotiatewiththe
statepowerandthusassembledintheformofnetworktostrengthenoneanother,it
doesnotmeanthatthenetworkwouldbepowerfulenoughtonegotiatewiththestate
power.Thegovernmentalwayshaspoweroverthepeople.Rulesandregulations
issuedbythegovernmentalwaysputthegovernmentinmorefavorableposition.If
theleaderisunfairandtakesadvantageofpeople,inequalityofpowerwillbe
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multiplied.Ingeneral,amerecitizenisnotabletofightagainstthestatepower.The
fightagainststatepowerinthepastwasusuallyconductedintheformoffarmers
rebellions.AccordingtoJamesC.Scott(1978),thisistheonlywaythatweaker
individualsareabletofightwithpowerfulpeople(Weaponsoftheweak).Thisisthe
disobedience,orrefusaltodoasorderedbypowerfulpersons,althoughsuch
powerfulpersonscontrolrulesandregulations.Theanalysisoffarmersrebellionsin
severalcountriesindicatesthatthefightoftheweakistheassemblingmadetoresist
powerfulpeople,anditisawayofdirectexpression,ortheuseofdirectdemocracy.
Inthepast,farmersrebellionsmadeseveralcountriesturntoCommunism,showing
thepoweroftheweakinfightingforjustice.Nowadays,disobedienceoftheweak
againstthestatepowerismoreaccepted,andsuchpeacefuldisobedienceis
perceivedasCivil disobedience.

The use of Direct Democracy

to fulfill Representative Democracy
ThecoupdetatmadebytheNationalPeaceKeepingCouncilin1991clearly
indicatesthateconomicdevelopmentunderthegovernmentofGeneralChartchai
Chunhawancreatedseveresocialdisparitysothatthemilitarysawitnecessaryto
conductacoupdetat.However,thecoupdetatofthemilitarywasperceivedas
degradationfordemocracy.AlthoughtheappointmentofMr.AnanPanyarachunas
PrimeMinisterhelpedimprovetheimageofdemocracytoacertainlevel,the
appointmentofGeneralSujindaKraprayoonasPrimeMinisteraftertheelectionof
1992exacerbatedthesituation.Civilsocietycouldnottolerateitanymore.There
weredemonstrationsthatfinallyresultedinviolentsuppressionintheeventofthe
Black May.
Duringtheyear1973-1992,ortheperioddescribedashalf-democratic era,
thediscourseofdemocracywasstilllimitedtotheformofrepresentativedemocracy.
ThetermHalf-democracy impliedtheissueofbeingrepresentativesthroughthe
election,whilePrimeMinisterandtheministerialcouncildidnothavetocome
throughtheelection.Actually,theachievementof Full Democracy afterMay
1992wastheresultofDirect Democracy,althoughthistermwasnotused
widely.Theeventof Black May wasthephenomenonthatclearlyreflectedthe
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patternofdirectdemocracy.Thatis,civilsocietynetworksassembledtodenythe
appointmentofGeneralSujindaKraprayoonasPrimeMinister.Finally,the
conclusionthatThaisocietyneedsPrimeMinisterwhocomesfromelectiononlyis
theresultofthedemandmadebycivilsocietymovementonRachadamnernRoad.
ThisactionindicatesthedefinitionofDemocracy,bothforrepresentative
democracy,andparticipatoryordirectdemocracyatthesametime.
Thealleviationof Black May eventwasthedirecteffectoftherolesofHis
MajestytheKing.AndhencetheissueoftheKingsrolesindemocraticdevelopment
ofThailandreceivedconsiderablyattention.Thedevelopmentofdemocracyduring
thisperiodwasthereforebasedonthemovementofcivilsociety,government,as
wellasthemonarch.

3. After May 1992 : Democracy for Social Justice

Whenthedisputeofhalf-democracyandfull-democracy,whichconcernedthe
obtainmentofPrimeMinisteraccordingtothemechanismofrepresentative
democracy,wasover,themovementofsocialsocietywaschangedfromtheissueof
patterntotheconceptsocialjustice.Inthisregard,thisarticlewillconsiderthe
following3issues:1)Paradigmshiftregardingtherelationshipbetweenthestate
andpeopleasaresultofglobalization;2)Theparadigmofsocialsocietyinthe
constitution,and;Democracyandethicsinthepresentsociety.
Gl obal i zati on : Soci o-pol i ti cal rul e that changes the
relationship between states and people
Thedisputesinpoliticalsciencewithregardstotherelationshipbetweenstates
andtheirpeoplehavelongbeenestablished.AccordingtothebookcalledWestern
PoliticalSciencefromHobbesPublishing(15881679),thestatehadpowerand
dutiestotakecare,alleviatesuffering,andpromotehappinessforthepeople.The
statehadtobestrongenoughtotakecareofthepeople,andtherefore,ithadtohave
considerablepower.ButintheopinionsoftheschoolofLocke(16321734),the
governmentshouldnothavemuchpower,becausepeoplesectororcivilsocietywas
abletotakecareofitself.However,ineitherschoolofthought,thestatehadits
mechanismintermsoflawsandregulationstocontrolitspeople.Accordingly,
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politicalscientistsusuallyperceivetherelationshipofmembersofsocietyas
prescribedbythegovernment.Theyalsoperceivethatmembersofasocietyare
dividedto2parts,thosewhogovernandthosewhoaregoverned,whichrefertothe
governmentanditspeople.
Asforthearcheologicaldimension,emphasisismadeonhumanbeingswho
livedtogetherinthesociety.Relationshipofmembersofasocietyandsocial
structurewasconsideredbasedontherelationshipofpeopleinvariouspatterns,such
asrelativesorsocialclasses.Regulationsoragreementscompriseculturaland
traditionalrules,standards,andvalues.Thecontrolovermembersofsocietytobein
thesameframeworkdependedoncultureandtradition,asexplainedintheterms
Social controland Social sanction.Butasthesocietyhaschangedandbecame
morecomplicated,thecontrolwasthenmadeintheformsoflawsandregulations
(CommonLawandCivilLaw).Humansocietywasthereforeinorder,withthe
availabilityofrulesandregulationsintheformsoftraditionalrulesorlaws.
Relationshipbetweenpoliticsandsociety,orbetweenthegovernmentandsociety
hasalwaysexisted.However,politicalsocietydoesnotconcernonlythestateandits
people,butthereareseveralotherissuestobeconsidered.
Duringthedecadeof1960,administratorsinseveralcountriesperceivedthat
stateandsocietywerethesamething.Theroleofstatewassosignificantthatit
dominatedallsocialcomponents,bothinthewesternandthecommunistcountries.
Butsuchperceptionwasoveraftertheendofthecoldwarandtherevokeof
separationlinebetweenthe2typesofgovernance.Fromthenon,theexpansionof
transnationalbusinesshasallowedbusinessmechanismtoplayrolesinthestate
administration.Therefore,therelationshipbetweenthestateandpeoplehastobe
adjustedbyemphasizingmoreonthebusinesssector.
Theexpansionoftransnationalbusinessresultsinmoreeconomiccompetition.
Economicmechanismatacountrylevelisahorizontalmechanism.Thatis,business
enterprisescancompeteorcooperateamongthemselveswithouthavingtodependon
thestate.Butduetotheoperationoftransnationalbusiness,thestatemustpay
attentiontotheverticalmechanism.Thatis,thegovernmenthasadutyinconnecting
foreignmechanismwithdomesticbusiness.Moreover,businessenterpriseshaveto
dependonthegovernmentinpublicmanagement,suchastheissuanceofregulations
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tobeappliedatthenationalorinternationallevel.Thegovernmenthastochangeits
rolefromgoverningthepeopletocoordinatingforthepurposeofinternational
economiccompetition.
Therapidchangeinglobalsocietyduringthepastdecade,togetherwith
globalizationprocess,resultsintheparadigmshiftregardingtheperceptionofthe
governmentsroles,relationshipbetweenthegovernmentandpeople,aswellasthe
relationshipamongmembersofsociety,bothdomesticallyandinternationally.The
majorparadigmshiftistheshiftfromGovernmentconcepttoGovernanceconcept.
Thisimpliesthereductionofstatepowerandtheincreaseofpeoplesectorinthe
formofdecentralizationandacceptanceofthedifferencesamongvarietiesof
minorities.Duetosomeotherchanges,certaincommercialandinvestment
mechanismsbecomeundercontrolofsomeorganizationsthatarebeyondthestate
power,suchastheWorldTradeOrganization,theWorldBank/RegionalBanks.
Consequently,itisnecessarythatgoodgovernancemustemergeatthelevelbeyond
nations,ortransnational,aswellasnationalandlocallevels.
AccordingtoPierreandPeters(2000),thereare3modelsforthetransferof
power.Theyare:
(1)Thetransferofpowertotheorganizationsbeyondthestatesfortheissuesof
inspectionandcontroloftradeandinvestment,globalenvironment,
security,andhumanrights;
(2)Thetransferofpowerfromthenationalleveltolocallevelthrough
reductionofbureaucracyandregulationstoenhanceflexibilityandabilityto
respondtovarietiesanddifferencesinlocaldemand,and;
(3)Thetransferofcertainenterprisestopeoplesectorandcivilsociety,which
areexpandedtremendouslyafterthefallofcommunismandwiththe
supportofinternationalorganizationsandsuperpowercountries.
AsforThailand,whenMr.AnanPanyarachumwasPrimeMinister,hispolicies
supportedthegrowthofcivilsocietyorganizations.Theprogressofsocialmovement
becamemoredistinctive.Asaresult,themovementnetworks,bothatthenational
andtransnationallevels,begantodemandforaconstitution.Theconstitutional
draftingprocesswasoneofthemostconcreteexamplesofsuchprogressatthe
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nationallevel.Atthetransnationallevel,thereweremovementsagainsttransnational
capitalismthatwasaresultoftheexpansionoftransnationalcapitalism,oreconomic
globalizationwithhighsocialimpact.Disparitybetweentherichandthepoorinthe
samecountrywasincrease,aswellasthedifferencesbetweenthedevelopedand
under-developedcountries.
Itisevidentthatthemovementofcivilsocietyorganizationsinvarious
countriesisthemovementatthegloballevelintheformofsocialglobalization.
Suchchangereceivesfinancialsupportfromtransnationalorganizationsatthe
bilateralandmultilaterallevelsaswellastheUnitedNationsandothertransnational
religiousandpublicutilityorganizations.Anetworkcanbeestablishedwithina
country,andisthenexpandedtocoordinatewithinternationalorganizations.Onthe
otherhand,anetworkmayaswellstartinaforeigncountry,andthenestablishesits
branchinanothercountry.Theestablishmentofnetworksresultsintheemergence
ofsocialmovementorganizationsthatoperateinvariousdimensions,suchas
environment,humanrights,health,andbecomepartsoftransnationalsocial
movement.
Atthismoment,distinctiveactivitiesofdemocraticmovementarethe
movementsagainsteconomicglobalizationsandpowerbeyondthestate,especially
frominternationalfinancialinstitutionssuchastheWorldBank,international
financialorganizations,andAsianDevelopmentBank.Thecurrentactivitieswere
initiatedfromthecombatagainststatepowerinthepast,andbecamethemovements
againstcapitalismintheformsoftransnationalcompaniesandextraterritorialpower.
Theoperationalapproachesofsuchmovementincludepromotionandincreaseof
negotiationpowerforpeoplesorganizationsandstrengtheninglocalorganizations.
EvidentexamplesinThailandincludeAssemblyofthePoorandthenetworkoflocal
organizations,whichjoinhandinhandtoprotestagainstgiganticinfrastructure
constructionprojects.
Intheageoftransnationalsocialmovement,thegovernmentmustbeaware
thatitneedstoreduceitsrolesandtoaccepttheincreasingrolesofpeoplesector.
Theemergentmovementofcivilsocietyistheresistanceagainstthepowerbeyond
thestateandglobalizationprocessratherthantheresistanceagainststatepower.
Therefore,thegovernmenthastoclearlyunderstandthepurposeoftheprocessand
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movement,aswellasbeabletoanalyzethesituationprofoundly.Itisnecessarythat
thegovernmentchangesitsmethodsofoperation,andinsteadtrytofindouthowthe
governmentandpeoplecanoperate.Thepurposeofsocialmovementofthisperiod
istoseeksocialjustice.

Paradigm of social justice in the 1997 Constitution

Thedraftingprocessofthe1997Constitutioncomprisedtheprocessof
selectingtheConstitutionDraftingAssembly,aswellasbrainstormingaboutthe
contextoftheconstitution,andorganizingparticipatoryworkshopseminarsto
considerthedraftconstitution.Suchprocessreflectstherepresentativeand
participatorydemocraticprocessesatthesametime.Similarly,thecontextofseveral
sectionsinthe1997Constitutionalsosupportsparticipatoryanddirectdemocracy.
Thedistinctivepointofthe1997Constitutionisthestipulationofindependent
organizationstoinspectandbalancethestatepower.However,duringthepast4-5
years,therewereproblemsfromtheinterventionofstatepowerinmanyindependent
organizations,especiallytheorganizationsthatwereabletorewardandpunish
holdersof politicalpositions. Forexample, the operations of the House of
Representatives,theHoseofSenates,theNationalCounterCorruptionCommission,
OfficeofAuditor-GeneralofThailand,orevensomecourts,reflecteddisparityin
favorofthegovernment.Thosewhousedtobelieveinthemechanismsstipulatedin
theConstitutionbegantolosefaith.TheydidnotseehowThaisocietywouldbeable
tocontinuewithjustice,righteous,andfairness.ItseemedthatThaipeoplewerenot
abletodependonlawsanymore.Powerofthegovernmentwastremendous,andthe
onlywaytofightagainstsuchpowerwasdisobedienceasusual.
Civilsocietyusedtheconceptofgoodgovernancetofightagainstthestate
poweringlobalizationera,whichcomprisedthemixtureofpoliticalpowerand
economicpower.Therefore,civilsocietyneededtomakethegovernmentacceptthe
politicalprocessinwhichvariousgroupsofpeopleareabletoassuretheirrightsand
interestsdirectlywithoutdependinguponrepresentativesystem.SeksarnPrasertkul
said:

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National assets have always been unfairly allocated. Moreover,
nowadays, considerable proportions of those assets are also dominated
by foreign countries. Thus, the use of discourse on nation to silence those
who protest is not able to create concurrence. In contrast, it may lead to
the use of violence from the state mechanism that has the duty of
suppression.
In this case, the perception that must be changed is that power
holders must stop using the victory in election as a base to justify all
kinds of decision. These power holders must be keen in establishing
consensus continuously. In this regard, people sector politics is the
process to create new kind of consensus, and it is also the process that
define national interests for varieties of people groups as well
(Seksarn 2005 : 136-137)
SincetheConstitutionallowspeoplesectortooperate,thegrowthofpeople
sectorpoliticstoestablishdemocracyforsocialjusticeisthereforeanimportant
mechanismindemandingsocialjusticeinvariouspublicissues.Seksandividedsuch
movementinto4cases,theyare:
(1)Themovementforpetitioningordemandingthegovernmenttosolve
problemsthathavebeenignored;
(2) Themovementthataimsatinspectingtheexerciseofstatepower;
(3)Theprotestagainststatepowerandthedemandtotransfertheexistingstate
powertothepeople;
(4)Cooperationwiththegovernmentinanalyticalaspect,orcreativebond,to
sharethespaceoftheprocessinexercisingstatepowerwiththecivilsociety
(Seksarn2005:174).
Inaddition,Seksarnalsoperceivesthatthefeaturesofpeoplespolitical
movementwillcompensatethedisadvantageofThailandamongstglobalization.This
isbecause:
(1)Peoplesectorspoliticsistheprocessofdirectdemocracyorparticipatory
democracy.Itwillhelpsolveproblemsthatarecausedbyrepresentative
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democracy,ortheproblemsthatrepresentativedemocracycannotdealwith;
(2)Thepeoplesectorpolitics,bynature,isamultilateralprocess,comprising
groupsofpeoplethathavevarietiesofidentities,lifestyles,andinterests.
Thesegroupscannotacceptbaselessjustifications,especiallyonbehalfof
thenation,whichisratherintangible.Therefore,peoplesectorpoliticsis
beneficialfordefiningnational interestforvarietiesofgroupsonce
again,andfinally;
(3)Peoplesectorpoliticsisthealternativedevelopmentprocessthatdoesnot
dependuponfreemarketmechanismofthenewliberalismideologywithout
condition,anditdoesnotfollowtheconsumerismapproachofglobalized
capitalismwithoutlimit.Therefore,peoplesectorpoliticsplaysrolesin
balancingtheinfluenceoftransnationalfunds,conservingnaturalresources
andenvironment,aswellassolvingstructuralproblemsofpoverty(Seksarn
2005:204-205)
ThedemandforsocialjusticeunderthegovernmentofPrimeMinisterThaksin
Shinawatrawasdelayedsincethegovernmentdidnotpayattention.Besides,those
whowereresponsibleforgoverningthecountry,togetherwithpoliticalelitegroup,
andsomepublicgroupsdidnotagreewithsuchdemand.Consequently,theparadigm
shiftdidnotmaterialize,andthepopularistpolicieswereusedtoobtainthepublicin
theelectioncampaign.Withthissituation,thepowerofpeoplesectorpoliticsbecame
weakersothatithadtoadjustthestrategiesbyassemblingasalliancetoestablish
networksofthenetworksandtomobilizeallkindsofpowertoprotestagainst
Thaksingovernmentunderthejointtargetofpublic policy.

Social injustice in the case of Southern insurgencies

TheviolenceofproblemsintheSouthwasmultiple,rangingfromthearm
robberyatthemilitarycampinNarathiwatProvinceonJanuary4
th
,2004,followed
byotherviolentincidents.Othermajorincidentswithclearevidenceofalarge
numberofcasualtieswerecausedbythesuppressionofthe insurgents atKrue-
saeMosqueandSaba-yoiDistrictonApril28th,2004,aswellasfromthetransferof
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the group of insurgentsfrominfrontofTak-baiDistrictPoliceStationto
InkhayuthMilitaryCamponOctober25
th
,2004.Inaddition,therewasalsodaily
violenceoccurringinthe3southernprovinces.Suchphenomenonresultedin
difficultsituationsineconomical,social,andpoliticalaspects,orasitwascalled
the southern war.
Democracydidnotexistinthesocietyof3southernprovinces.Peopledidnot
havefreedominexpressingopinionsbecausetheywereafraidofbeingthreatenedby
theinsurgentsorbythegovernment.Thesocietywasdisunited,anditwasdifficult
totellwhoisonwhichside.Theinsurgentswantedtocommunicatetopower
holdersinthegovernmentthattheyarenottreatedfairly,whilethepowerholdersdid
notknowwhere,orwhat,theinjusticewas.Therefore,theywereunabletosolvethe
problem.ThegovernmentestablishedtheNationalReconciliationCommission
(NRC.)tostudytheproblemsolvingapproaches.However,thegovernmentdidnot
payattentiontothereportoftheNRCPresentedonJune5
th
,2006.Insincerityof
Thaksingovernmentinproblemsolvingaggravatedtheproblemstotheextentthat
thePrimeMinisteralsofeltinsecuretogotothe3southernprovinces.
TheNRCsreportanalyzedthecausesandtendencyoffutureviolence,and
proposedthemeasuresforimmediateandsustainablereconciliation.However,the
reportofNRCwasignoredbecausethethengovernmentdidnotpayattentionto
solvingproblemsfromsocialinjustice.Friendsfromwesterncountriesaskedwhy
civilsocietyinthe3southernprovincedidnothaveanymovement.Actually,the
movementofcivilsocietyinthe3southernprovincesappearedinvariousforms.
Thefirstonewasthecivilsocietyofthepeacemaker group,whodemanded
socialjusticeandtriedtocommunicatewiththegovernment,buttheirattemptswere
notrespondedto.Thesecondonwasthegroupofpeoplewhowerehelpingthosein
needsandwhotriedtoprovidementalassistanceandtocreatereconciliationinthe
society.Thethirdformofcivilsocietywasthegroupofpeoplewhosemovement
wasnotclearbecausetheywerenotabletogathertogethertounderstandthe
problemsandpreparefurtherstrategies.Therefore,themovementofthethirdgroup
wascritical.Ifthegovernmentspolicywaswrong,thisthirdgroupwouldbeready
tojointhefirstgroup.Consequently,thenumberofinsurgentscouldincrease.
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Inordertosolvetheproblemsof3southernprovince,thegovernmentmust,
firstofall,besinceretosolvetheproblems.Thegovernmentmustselectandappoint
fairandkindgovernmentofficialswhoarereadytodedicatetheirphysicaland
mentalabilitytosolveproblemstoworkinthearea.Inaddition,thegovernment
maycooperatewithcivilsocietyorganizationsintheareatoconductactivitiesthat
helpalleviatethedisputes.Inordertoreduceanger,hatred,anddisunity,problem
solvingapproachesmustbeinapeacefulway,andnoviolenceshouldbeapplied.
AccordingtoNRCsanalysis,violenceinthe3provincesiscausedbythe3
conditions.First,structuralcondition,whichistheinjusticecausedbyexisting
judicialprocessandgovernmentsystem.Second,economicandeducationalsystems,
togetherwithdemographicandgeographicconditions.Andthird,culturalcondition,
whichincludesspecificcharacteristicsofthereligionandethnicityinthearea.
Ifthegovernmentcannoteliminateorreducetheseconditions,violencetends
toincrease.The22bombsinthebanksofYalaprovinceand5-6bombsinHaad-
yaisbusinessareasinSeptember2006indicatethatexpansionofviolenceto
businesssector.Problemsolvingthroughreconciliationapproachescanbedone
througheliminatingunfairandunjustifiedexerciseofpower,dealingdecisivelywith
thosewhoabusetheirpowerinpositions,negotiatingwiththeinsurgents,and
establishingspecialunarmedpeacekeepingforcetopreventescalatingviolence.The
NationalReconciliationCommissionrecommendedtheestablishmentofSouthern
BorderProvincePeaceStrategyAdministrationCenter,localcouncilforsouthern
borderprovinces,andfundsforhealingandreconciliation,togetherwiththeother12
measuresforsustainablereconciliation.
ThefactthatformerPrimeMinisterThaksindidnotassignthesouthern
problemsolvinganationalagendathatrequiredspecialandurgentoperationresulted
infailureofoperationandreflectedthegovernmentsinsincerityinsolvingthis
problem.StabilityofThaksingovernmentwasconsiderablydependentonits
sincerityinsolvingsouthernproblem.Similarly,itisnecessaryforthenew
governmenttosolvetheproblemurgently.Thegovernmentisabletoimmediately
anddirectlyreduceproblemsfromindividualconditions,suchasbytransferring
officialswithunsuitableattributesfromthesouthernareaandamendingthe
regulationstocreatejustice.Inaddition,thegovernmentisabletocooperatewith
civilsocietysector,comprisingacademicsfromeducationalinstitutions,non-
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governmentorganizations,charityorganizations,andlocalorganizationsthatare
willingtoworkinreconciliationways.Furthermore,activitiesshouldbeheldto
reduceconflictsandtomaterializesocialjustice.

Democratic society and ethics

of the leaders for social justice
Civilsocietymovementisaninternationalprocessthatoccursalloverthe
worldandisapartofsocialglobalization.Meanwhile,inthesamemovement,there
isalsothesupportfortheconceptofgoodgovernance,whichreferstoadministration
throughreductionofthestateroles.Theconceptofdecentralizationthatispromoted
atthesametimealsocomplieswiththeconceptofreducingtherolesofcentralstate
andallocatingdecisionmakingpowertolocalgovernment.
However,civilsocietyundertheconceptofgoodgovernancewasunableto
negotiatewiththepowerofThaksingovernment,becausethegovernmentalways
referredtoitlegitimacyobtainedabundantvotes.AftercoalitionwithNew
Aspiration,ChartPatana,andSeriDharmaParties,ThaiRakThaiPartywonover
50%oftheseatsintheHouseofParliamentinthefirstelectionof2001.Forthe
secondelectionin2005,thePartygotasmuchas16-19millionsvotes.Theconflicts
ofthoughtsandparadigmsbetweenthegovernmentandcivilsocietybecamemore
apparentwhenthecivilsocietydecidedtodemonstrateitsprotestagainstthe
governmentthroughassemblinginthepublicunderthenameofthePeoples
AllianceforDemocracy.Confrontationbetweenthetwogroupsreflectedthe
confrontationof2typesofdemocraticparadigms.Thatis,PrimeMinisterThaksin
chosetheparadigmofrepresentativedemocracy,whiletheAlliancedecidedtouse
theparadigmofdirectdemocracy.Thegovernmentsaidthatrepresentative
democracywassufficienttojustifytheadministrationofThaksingovernment,
despitetheaccusationsandallegationsconcerningcorruption,conflictsofinterests,
prejudice,abuseofpower,interventionofindependentagencies,andlackof
transparencyingoverningthecountry.Moreover,thegovernmentaccusedthecivil
societyforthelackofjustificationbecauseitmadeillegalmovementagainstthestate
power.
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PrimeMinisterThaksinannouncedhissalesofstocksinShinCorp.on
Monday,January23
rd
,2006,aftertheamendmentofCommunicationLawshadbeen
effectiveonFriday,January20
th
,2006.Thisindicatedacomplicatedtransferof
73,000MillionBahtsstockstoavoidTaxLawandtheLawonstockholdingof
aliens.ThispersonalbusinesstransactionofPrimeMinisterwasconductedbyhis
taxlegaladvisor.Thedealwasmadepublicthroughvariousmedia,without
consideringthatthiswasthebusinesstransactionofPrimeMinister,which
contradictedtotheConstitutionprohibitingpoliticiansfromgettinginvolvedin
business.Thisphenomenoncouldnotavoidtheaccusationofconflictsofinterests.
ButwhenthecivilsocietycondemnedthatthePrimeMinisterwasnotjustifiedto
governthecountryduetohislackofethics,thefollowingquestionwasthatWhat
is ethics?
Actually,theissueofcapitalismversusethicsandmoralityhasbeenanissue
forconsiderationoftheindustrialdevelopmentprocessandexpansionofcapitalism
sincethe18
th
Century,orevenpriortothatperiod.Thisfactappearedinabook
calledThe Protestant Ethic and Spirit of CapitalismofMaxWeber,a
mainstreamsocialistwhowaswellacceptedamongacademiccircle.Duringthis
period,therewasaquestionofwhetherornotthedevelopmenttocapitalismwould
resultinthelossofethicalandmoralvalues.Definitionswerealsomadeonthe
termsvirtue, ethics andmoralsatthelevelsofgeneralbehaviorsanddaily
livelihood.However,theexpansionofcapitalismduringthefirststage,whichwas
actuallythebeginningofglobalization,wasprotestedagainstintheformofpeasants
rebellionsallovertheworld.Thoseprotestorsbelievedthattheexpansionof
capitalismwouldcreatemoresocialdisparity.Forexample,JamesC.Scottstudied
themovementofpeasantsinSoutheastAsiaandwroteabooknamedThe Moral
Economy of the Peasants (1986).Hepointedoutthatthesocietyofpeasantswas
basedontheethicaleconomicsystemorsufficienteconomy.Besides,peasantshad
ethicsfornottakingadvantageofoneanother(Peasantethic).Therefore,countries
thatrefusedcapitalismusuallyturnedtosocialistandcommunistideologies.
Itisapparentthatcapitalismhasalwaysbeenquestionedfortheissuesofethics
andmorals.Thisisbecausecapitalismemphasizesoncompetition.Thatis,
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competition willincreasewiththeexpansion of capitalism.Therefore, the
governmenthastointervenetopreventexcessiveexploitationofothers.However,
thegovernmentsattemptwasabletoobstructexploitationandreducesocialinjustice
onlyinsomeparts.Forexample,thedevelopmentinexpansionofliberalcapitalism
tomonopolizedcapitalismresultsinthegovernmentsenactmentoflawstoprohibit
monopoly.Andwhendomesticmonopolyisnotpossible,theenterprisesowners
have expand t hei r busi ness abroad, and become t ransnat i onal capi t al i sm.
Consequently,theystarttomakeexcessiveprofits,ortotakeadvantageofpeoplein
othercountries.Economicglobalizationresultsintheneedtoprescribethe
regulationsconcerningtradingandinvestmentthroughthemechanismsoftheWorld
TradeOrganizationinordertocontrolexploitationatdifferentlevelssystematically.
Corporategoodgovernanceisanotherconceptappliedtocontrolpeopleinthe
globalsociety.Accordingtothisconcept,allbusinessenterprisesofalllevelsmust
conductbusinesstransactionwithtransparency,fairness,andaccountability.The
PrimeMinistersbusinessisnottransparentandnotfair,because,asaPrime
Minister,heisnotabletodobusiness.ButinthecaseofThailand,PrimeMinisterlet
otherpeoplesdobusinessonbehalfofhim.Theissueofethicsandjustificationof
thePrimeMinisterwasthereforequestionedbycivilsociety,whilethePrime
Ministeralwaysrespondedthatallstepsbeingtakenwereinaccordancewiththe
laws.
Thosewhoareinbusinesssectoralwayssaythatthiskindofbusiness
transactionhasnormallybeenpracticed,thus,whyonehastomakespecialdemand
tothePrimeMinister.Inmyopinion,thetopicofdemocracyandethicsofthe
leadersconcernsthe3issuesasfollows:
1. Ethical standard of the leaders
Beingleadersmeansthatsuch persons mustbe different from others.
Compliancetolawsinonlytheminimumstandardforgeneralpeople.Asforthe
livelihoodoftheleaders,especiallyPrimeMinister,itisnecessarytodedicate
oneselfandtohavehigherethicalstandardthanwhatprescribedinthelaws.Leaders
pl ay rol es i n assuri ng t hat soci al j ust i ce exi st .They must t ake care of t he
disadvantagedandallowthemtohaveaccesstopublicresourcesasprescribedinthe
governmentsstandard.Ifthosedisadvantageddonothaveaccessaccordingtothe
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centralstandard,theymustbeprovidedwithadditionalopportunitytoenablethemto
reachthecentralstandard.Atthesametime,theleadersmustreducetheirownrights,
oratleast,theymustnotusetheirprivilegerightsorpowertotakeadvantageof
others.Lawenforcementmustbeparticularlystrictfortheleaders,especiallyPrime
Minister.
2. Meaning and features of democracy for social justice
Theword ethical democracy or good governance democracywasthe
processorconductthatwillleadtothepurposeofsocialjustice.Ethicaldemocratic
processisthereforethecultureofworkingbyadheringtoethics,morals,kindness,
peace,patience,andfairness.Althoughthetargetofhavingsocialjusticeis
farfetched,butitisworthlookingfor.
3. Roles of civil society in searching for democratic society
with ethical leaders
Democraticprocessistheprocessthatrequiresparticipationfromthepeople.
Thesearchfordemocraticsocietyisthereforethedutyforallofus.Civilsociety
politicswasinitiatedandhasbeenthroughseveralprocessesforover70yearswith
considerablelessonslearnt.Onlythepowerofpeopleincivilsocietyisableto
balancethestatepower,aswellastoinspecttheworkofthegovernmentandto
bringsocialjusticetoThaisociety.

Conclusion
DemocracyofThaisocietyhasbeenthroughseveralprocessessincebefore
1932,whendemocraticmovementwasinitiated.Atthattime,civilsociety
encouragedthemovementforchangesinvariousprocesses.In1932,therolesof
civilsocietybecamemoreapparentintheformofvariousmovements.Althoughthe
PeoplesPartywasthegroupofpeoplewhooperatedforthechange,othercivil
societyorganizations,suchastheprogressivewomengroupandthemonkgroup,
alsomovedtodemanddemocracyaswell.However,democraticmovementshadto
stoptheiractivitiesduringthemilitarydictatorship.

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Therolesofstudentmovementindemandingdemocracyduringtheeventof
October14
th
,1973,indicatethatdemocracycanemergeevenunderthemilitary
dictatorship.Duringthatperiod,civilsocietymovementwasexpandedand
strengthenedthroughitsoperationintheformofnetwork,althoughitsroleswere
reducedafterOctober6th,1976.Afterthegovernmentdeclaredits66/23Amnesty
PolicyinMay1992,civilsocietyisabletoshowpowertopreventThailandfrom
returningtomilitarydictatorship.Furthermore,inthesetwocases,theroleof
monarchyinalleviatingtheunrestofOctober14th,1973,andMay1992wasalso
recordedwidely.
Aft er t he economi c cri si s i n 1997 and t he promul gat i on of t he 1997
Constitution,themovementofdemocraticorganizationsagainstmilitarydictatorship
hasbeenchangedtobethemovementagainstinterventionofbusinessmen.Aftera
businessmanbecametheleaderofthecountry,theissueofdemocracyhasbeen
changedfromrepresentativedemocracyemphasizingonelectiontotheissueof
socialjustice.Thatis,theleadersmusthaveethicsandmorals.Theymustgovernthe
countrywithkindness,peace,patience,andjusticeinordertoachievesocialjustice
anddemocracy.
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Krittaya Archawanichkul and Kanokwan Tharawan (2002) Social movement on

political dimension
The issue of gender and woman body, in Pasuk Pongpaijit et al. Ways of life, ways of
fight : Movement Contemporary people Bangkok : Office of Funds for
Research Support
The National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) Win violence with the power of
reconciliation Bangkok: NRC.
Khanungnit Jantabutre (1985) The initial movement of young monks during 1934-
1941 Bangkok:
Thammasart University Printing and the project for sociology and humanities
textbooks.
Khanungnit Jantabutre (1989) Status and roles of Buddhism in Thailand Bangkok:
Religious for society coordination group.
Chai-anan Samutavanich (1974) Tianwan s literature Bangkok: Ramkhamhaeng
University Student Organization.
Thongchai Winijakul (2005) To Surpass the post-October 14th Democracy Annual
Speech on October 14
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, 2005. Bangkok: October 14
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Foundation.
Narin Pasit (2001) Announcement on Samaneree-wat-nareeowong in 1928 Chalong
Suntharawanich (Editor). The 4
th
book of uncommon book series. Bangkok
: Thai-Japan Friendship Association.
The Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997): Winyuchon Publishin.
Sakdina Chatkul Na Ayudhay (2001) Introduction in Chalong Suntharawanich
(Editor) Announcement on Samaneree-wat-nareeowong in 1928 The 4
th
book
of uncommon book series. Bangkok : Thai-Japan Friendship Association.
Constitution Reform: Comparative Perspectives
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Siriporn Skrobanek (1983) Woman movement in Thailand (1855-1932 ) Satree-Taj
1
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Year,Vol.3(August-September)Page2835.
Seksarn Prasertkul (2003) Thailand on the route of democracy : Surveys of the
problems and resolutions Annual Speech on October 14th 2003. Bangkok :
October 14th Foundation.
Seksarn Prasertkul (2005) People Sector Politics in Democracy. Bangkok : Amarin
Printing.
Amara Pongsapitch et al. (2003) Public utility organizations in Thailand
Bangkok: Social Research Institute, Chulalongkorn University.
Amara Pongsapitch ( 2005) Womanism and woman organizations : Movement of the
networks Transnational civil society and new concept of social movement.
Bangkok: Office of Social and Health Research, Ministry of Public Health.
Pierre, Jon and B.Guy Peters (2000) Governance, Politics,and the State. London :
Macmillan Press, Ltd.
Scott J.C. (1986) The Moral Economy of the Peasants. New York : Yale University
Press.
Weber, Max (1930) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism T.C .Parsons
(Trans.) London : Allen& Unwin
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509
Federalism, Regionalism and Devolution
in a comparative context
A path to be followed
by Thailands constitutional framers?
Justin Orlando Frosini
345

T henewStatuteofAutonomyofCatalunia,theGovernmentofWalesAct2006,
theConstitutionalReferenduminItaly,theamendmentstotherulesonthefederal
systemintheGermanBasicLaw,thesecessionofMontenegrofromtheUnionwith
Serbia,devolutionforCorsicathelistcouldgoonforpagestestimonyofthefact
thatfederalism,regionalismanddevolution(sometimesevensecession)have
becomeacentralissueincontemporarycomparativeconstitutionallaw.
TheunderlyingaimofthispaperistoverifywhethertheConstitutional
DraftingCouncilinstitutedbytheInterimConstitution2006mightconsider
adoptingafederal,regionalordevolvedsystemofgovernmentwhenitframesthe
newConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailand.Thepaperattemptstoreachthis
objectivebymeansofacomparativestudybasedonadiachronicaswellas
synchronicmethodofanalysisanditthereforecontainsseveralreferencestothe

345
Lecturer of Public LawattheBocconiUniversity,Milan,AdjunctProfessorof
ComparativePublicLawattheUniversityofBolognaanddirectorofthe Center for
Constitutional Studies and Democratic Development, Bologna.
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1997ThaiConstitution,especiallywithregardtolocalgovernment.
Morespecifically,thefirstpartofthepaperaddressesthesemanticproblems
relatedtothestudyingofmodelsofdecentralisationinacomparativecontext.The
paperunderlinesthatconfusionisoftenduetoincorrectdefinitionsorself-
definitions.Afterbrieflyexamininghowdecentralisedstatescomeintobeing,the
paperthengoesontoanalysetheUnitedStatesastheprototypeofafederalstate.
Afterillustratingthesalientdifferencesbetweenfederalandregionalstates,the
paperthenexaminesthewaythefederalmodelhasbeenexportedtocountriesin
SouthAmerica,Europe,Africaand(obviously)Asia.
Thethirdpartofthepaperdealswiththegrowingnumberofcountriesthat
haveadoptedformsofasymmetricalregionalismordevolutionsuchastheUnited
KingdomandSpainandposesthequestionofwhetherthismightbeaninstitutional
solutionfortheissueofself-governmentoftheSouthofThailandwherethemajority
ofthepopulationisofIslamicreligion.
Thefinalpartofthepaperaddressestheissueofhowsubnationalentities
shouldbeinvolvedinconstitutionaldraftingandamendment,especiallygiventhat
manyconstitutionalistsconsiderthistobeanessentialfeatureofafederalsystem.
Group 6
Unjust Discrimination against People
King Prajadhipoks Institute
513
Migrant workers and access
to membership goods
Dr. Sriprapa Petchmeesri

T hemigrationofindividualsandtheentirepopulationisaglobalphenomenon.
Migrationhasalwaysbeenwithourcountryfordecadesorevencenturies.Never,the
problemhasbeensoseriousastoday.Accordingtodifferentunofficialsourcesthere
areover2millionsirregularmigrantworkersinThailandmajorityofwhomarefrom
Burma.ThosepeoplecometoThailandfordifferentreasons.Theyallare,however,
sharemoreorlessthesamedifficultiesandvulnerability.
ThepaperattemptstoexaminewhatGOODSirregularmigrantsasamajor
groupofforeignnationalsareentitledtooncetheyareinThailand.GOODSinthis
contextrefersnot only to more concrete entitlements such as employment and
socio-economic resources, but also to the rights to stay and be a full member of
the society.Theinterestofthispaperistoidentify,inreality,whatGOODSare
deni ed t o t hi s group of peopl e. From ri ght s-based approach t he deni al of
membership goodsisconsideredasdiscrimination.Thepaperthusaddressesthe
rootcausesofwhatiscalled unjust discriminationagainstmigrantworkers.
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ThestudyfocusesonworkersfromBurmaandtheir legal status asoneof
themostimportant membership goods.Politicalbordersandpoliticsoflegal
statusareassessedandanalyzed.Usingtheideaof imagined communityandthe
self-constructed nation-state asaframeworkforanalysisthepapercomestothe
conclusionthataslongastheconceptsofnationalism,nationalityaswellasnational
sovereigntyprevailthepossibilityformigrants,irregularonesinparticular,toaccess
to membership goodsseemstobeminimal.

King Prajadhipoks Institute

515
Unjust Discrimination
Sirimitre Boonmoon

D iscriminationreferstotheconceptofhumanrightsbroughtuprecentlystarted
inthe20thcentury.Itpermeatedthroughhumanrightslaw.Humantriedtoseekfor
theanswerthateveryoneshouldhaveindividualrightsthatisunabletobetransferred
toanyoneandbedestroyedbyanykindsofpower.Atthesametime,therewere
alwaysstrugglestoacquirethiskindofrightsbetweenpeoplewhodeservedrights
andrulerswhohadtherealpowerandauthoritytoproviderights.
Theresultwasphilosophyhadgraduallydevelopedintotheprinciplesoflaw
thatwereenactedinseveralcountriestoassurerightofindividual.Althoughthere
wereenactmentoflawstoassurethecitizenrightsinseveralcountry,leveland
degreeoflawsweredifferent.Consequently,problemsofthehumanrightsviolation
alwayshappened.Therefore,theprotectionofcitizensrightswithinthecountry
needsassistancefrominternationalorganizationstomakerightsprotectionmore
effectivepractically.Philosophicalideasonhumanrightsbroughtaboutdeclaration
oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsin1948toassureinternational
standardofhumanrights.Afterthat,severalcountriesrealizedthesignificanceof
humanrightsanditbecamethecountrysresponsibilitytoworktogethertoprotect
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humanrights.Severalmeetingsandseminarswereheldtoinfindingbetter
approachesinprotectinghumanrights.
Thailand,astheUNmembers,istiedupwithcommitmentsintheUnited
NationsCharterdemandingtorespecthumanrightsandtopromotetheprotectionof
humanrightsaccordingtointentionsstatedintheUNCharter.Moreover,Thailand
alreadyapprovedtheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsin1948whichisthe
significantaffirmationmessageonhumanrightsdeclaringintentionofallUN
memberstatesinsettinguniversalstandardforhumanrightsprotection.
Humanrightsconceptordiscriminationconceptarebasedonequality
principle.Eitherfairdiscriminationorprohibitionofdiscriminationisallaimedat
creatingequality.Principleofequalitymeansitisimportanttoconductoneselfwith
regardtodifferentcontentsofthingsormattersaccordingtoitsnature.Constitution
oftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540categorizesequalityinto2maintypes
namely;
1.Generalequalityisstatedinsection30paragraph1asAll persons are
equal before the law and shall enjoy equal protection under the law.
2.Specificequalitywhichisequalrightsofmenandwomenstatedinsection
30paragraph2;equalrighttoreceivefundamentaleducationstatedin
section43;equalrighttoreceivestandardpublichealthservicestatedin
section52;righttobeprotectedbytheStateagainstviolenceandunfair
treatmentstatedinsection53paragraph1;righttoreceive
careandeducationfromtheState,asprovidedbylawstatedinsection53
paragraph2;righttoreceiveaidsfromtheState,asprovidedbylawforapersonwho
isoversixtyyearsofageandhasinsufficientincomestatedinsection54;rightto
receivepublicconveniencesandotheraidsfromtheState,asprovidedbylawforthe
disabledorhandicappedstatedinsection55;andpoliticalequalrightstatedin
section104,111and129.AlthoughtheConstitutionclearlyprescribesequality
principles,inpractical,itisunabletoactaccordingtotheintentionsofthe
Constitutionduetoseveralfactorssuchasgovernmentofficialsdonotcomplywith
thelawsorthereisnosubordinatelegislationstosupporttheimplementationbecause
theConstitutionbroadlystateswhattodobutinordertobringitintoforceand
effective,thesubordinatelegislationsareneeded.
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Fromequalityprincipletohumandignitywhichisanimportantfoundationof
humanrights.Meaningof DignitywasdefinedduringRomanperiodaspersonal
honorappearedinpublic.Itisnotforeveryonebutonlyapersonwhoareesteemed
orrespectedbythepublic.Later,in18thcentury,Dignitymeanthumanfreedom
butthefundamentalfreedomofpeoplewasnotmainlyaimedatthehumanhimself.
Theobjectivewastoallowpeopletoachievetheultimatevalueanditwasbelieved
thathumandignityisinnate.ButwhenwelookforthewordDignityintheThai
DictionarypublishedbytheRoyalInstituteofThailandB.E.2542(1999),itmeans
Kiattisakwhichcanbedescribedasacknowledgementoradmirationofhuman
statusinsociety.
Therefore,itcanbeconcludedthatDignityisinnate.Everyhumanbeinghas
dignitywhichisnotgivenbyanyone,anditmustappearorbecalledhonoror
prestigewhenbeinginpublic.
Thedefinitionof Human beingisdiversifiednamely;
Humanbeingandcustomandtradition:humancreatedcustomandtradition
bytheirintellect.Customandtraditionwouldmoulddifferentpeopletobe
inunityandlivetogetherpeacefully
Humanbeingandknowledgeanddevelopment:itisconsideredthathuman
livewithknow-how.Allsocialandnaturalproblemsderivedfromhuman
being.Thedevelopmentischangeprocessofideas.Therefore,human
existencemustcomefromimpartialandsustainabledevelopmentthrough
theuseofknowledge.
Human bei ng and pol i t i cal soci et y: i t i s vi ewed t hat human bei ng
incorporaterulesofcause-and-effectandideaofRelativismperfectly
together.
Humanbeingandanimal:HumanissplitfromthewordAnimal
completelybecausehumanregardhimselfdifferentfromanimal.
Insum,allthesepointofviewsignifiesdifferencebetweenhumanandanimal
inthisworldsuchaspointofviewintermsofcustomandtradition,knowledgeand
developmentandpoliticalsociety.Alltheseexistinhumanbeingnototheranimal.
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Therefore,thetermhuman beingmaybeusetodifferentiatehumanfromother
kindsofcreaturesorlivingthings.
Therefore,whenputtingthewords Dignityand Human Beingtogether,it
becomesHuman Dignity.Eventhoughthereisnodirectexplanationsuchaword
inThaiDictionarypublishedbyTheRoyalInstituteofThailand,itcanbetranslated
wordbyword,mixedmeaninganddefinedasesteemandrespectofbeinghuman.It
canbeseenthathumandignityisthematterofvalueratherthanrightswhichis
inbornvalue.
Humandignityisstatedinsection4,26,and28oftheConstitutionofthe
KingdomofThailandB.E.2540asfollows:
Thehumandignityinsection4oftheGeneralProvisionsisregardedassetting
outofgeneralprinciplestoexpressstatesintentionsandinterpretedasfundamental
rights.
Thehumandignityinsection26isregardedasthesamestatusasrightsand
libertieswhicharenottherightsandlibertiesinaccordancewiththeConstitution,
butshallenjoyequalprotectionunderthelaw.
Thehumandignityinsection28isregardedasthesamestatusasrightsand
liberties.Itisresultedintheclaimofhumandignityundertheconditionthatitdoes
notviolateotherpersonsrightsandliberties.
Inconclusion,humandignityexpressesinnatehumanvaluethatisunabletobe
givenortransferred.Forthisreasonpeoplefeelthattheymustrespecthumandignity
ofotherpersons.Ifanyonedoesnotrespecthis/herhumandignity,itdoesnotmean
thathe/shedoesnothavehumandignity.Onthecontrary,anyonewhodoesnot
respecthumandignityofotherpersons,itcanberegardedashe/shedevalueshis/her
ownhumandignity.Asmentionedbeforethathumandignityistheoriginof
fundamentalrightsandliberties.Itisthelandofrightsthatthestatecannotuseits
powertoviolatethatboundary.Consideringlawondiscrimination,itcanbeseen
thatconceptofhumandignityisthemainissuedemandingforpreventiveregulations
againstdiscriminationbetweenrulersandcitizens.
Afterconsiderationofequalityandhumandignityprinciples,thenextthingto
beconsideredisthehumanrightsprincipleduetothefactthathumanrightsconcept
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is based on the respect of human dignity. At the beginning, we called human rights
as natural rights because it is originated from natural law which is the law
claimed by people that its content is set by nature, has validity everywhere at anytime
and the state is under this law. Therefore, the natural law can be divided into 3 main
features as follows:
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First, this law can be used without time limitation and is not out-of-date.
Second, this law can be used everywhere and not limited to be used in any
specified state.
Third, this law is above any laws enacted by the state. The state cannot enact
any laws that contradict the natural law otherwise that states law would
be unable to execute.
There are well-known Greek philosophers concerning natural law, for example;
Heraclitus defined natural law as the law that is unwritten but it is spread and
controlled by nature. If this law did not exist this world would be in chaos.
Therefore, according to his idea, natural law derived from the principle that
everything happened as it should be.
Plato had developed the idea of natural law to logic. He affirmed the
difference between impartial laws and other laws enacted by the state.
Aristotle, another Greek philosopher and one of Platos students, expressed his
idea about something that is impartial by nature which is an absolute fairness
and something that is impartial by law which is incomplete fairness. He
considers that fairness by nature is complete because it is effective everywhere.
It can be concluded that Plato and Aristotle are the first group of philosophers
who think about natural law as disciplines for human. Human should comply with
and behave accordingly in order to realize personal value and general goodness.
After that, Stoic philosophers, a group of famous philosophers about 4 B.C.,
got ideas from Plato and Aristotle. They believed that natural law is used to control
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Kulpol Polawat, World Human Rights, (Bangkok: Nititham Publishing) page 6
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godandhuman.Thelawrecommended what should be done andprohibit what
should not be done. Theythoughtthatrulesandstabilityarenatureforcesthatcan
advisehumantoliveandbehaveaccordingtonature.Iftherewerenosuchaforce,
societywouldlackofpeaceandorderliness.Thiskindofsecurityisnaturallaw.
Theideaofnaturallawbroughtaboutanideaaboutnaturalrights.Thisideais
thatpeople are born equal and all of them acquire rights from the God. These
rights cannot be transferred and violated namely rights in life, freedom, and
rights to gain happiness. All states must do everything in order to assure that
human would considerably get these rights. This makes human become
rational; accept that it is a good principle, and believe that it will make human
being be able to live peacefully and happily in society.Whenthenaturalrights
startedtogainmoreacceptanceandhumanclearlyunderstoodtheirownrightsand
otherpersonsrights,naturalrightsthenbecame human rightsatpresent.
Principleondiscriminationisoneoftheapproachesthatleadtoequality.
Al t hough i t i s not t he onl y approach, i t i s unavoi dabl e. Not al l ki nds of
discriminationwouldevokeinequalitybecausethediscriminationwillbeunjust
whenitisdoneonthebasisofunfaircause.Itcanbeseenthatdiscriminationleads
to2consequences.First,thediscriminationbecauseofunfaircausewouldsurely
leadtoinequality.Second,discriminationcancreateequalityifitisimplementedto
eradicateinequalityinsociety.Thus,thesetwokindsofdiscriminationcanbecalled
thediscriminationtosolveinequality.Toverifywhetherthediscriminationis
justifiedornot,itisimportanttoconsiderwhetheritbringsaboutequalityornot.If
not,thatkindofdiscriminationcanberegardedasunjust.
Discriminationisthefundamentalprincipleofhumanrightsandhumanrights
principleispartofinternationallaw.Severalinternationalconventionsalways
outlinefundamentalprincipleonhumanrightsevenintheUnitedNationsUniversal
DeclarationofHumanRightswhichistheoriginoftheprinciplesofhumanrights
lawinseveralaspects.Althoughthereisnolaweffectiveasinternationaltreaties,
severalstatesdonotrefusetheregulationsinthisDeclarationorInternational
CovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights1966.
Thedefinitionofdiscriminationisgatewaytobetterunderstandingofthescope
ofdiscriminationanditscomponents.Primarily,itisthemeaningofdiscrimination
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consideringformwordsanddefinitionswrittenininternationallawsorfrom
academics.Asdiscriminationcomprises2maincomponentsnamelydiscrimination
andthecauseofdiscrimination,itisneededtostudyeachcomponentbyconsidered
generalmeaningfromthedefinitionofinternationallawsoracademics.Thesecan
deducethediscrimination,obstruction,detention,bias,differentiation,limitation,and
classificationbecauseofsex,skincolor,races,languages,religion,lineage,ancestry,
statusorpoliticalperspectivesaimsatoraffectsorwastesordamagesones
acceptance,consumptionofrightsortheuseofrightsonthebasisofequalityof
rightsandlibertiesaswellassuppressionandobstructionofequaluseofpersonal
rights.
DefinitionfromthedraftoftheInternationalConventiontoPromoteand
ProtecttheRightsandDignityofPersonswithDisabilitiesmeansanydifference,
discriminationorlimitationthatintendstooraffectindecreasingvalueorspoilthe
acceptancetoworktogetheroftheDisabledbasedonequalityofallkindsofhuman
rightsandfundamentalfreedoms.
Itcanbeconcludedthatdiscriminationmeansdifferentactionbasedon
somethingasdefinedsuchasrace,religion,sex,origin,orphysicalconditionand
leadstoinequality.
Justified discrimination came form principle of equality focusing on
consequenceshappenedbetweenpersonswhohavespecificcharacteristicssuchas
sex,races,religion,originorphysicalconditioncomparetonormalpeopleinorderto
haveequalityproportionally.Thereshouldbesomekindsofspecialmeasuresto
assistpeoplewithspecificcharacteristicssuchastosetquotaorworkingpositionfor
them.
Justifieddiscriminationcanbetheselectionofpeoplefortherecruitment,
supporttoparticipateinthetrainingprogram,positiontransferbecausethatperson
hasspecificcharacteristics,suchasdisability,sex,orreligion,regardlesshis/her
workingability.Itisconsideredbasedontheprinciplesofbalanceandchangeability
accordingtoappropriateness.
Balancemeansconsiderationfortheappropriateproportionbetween
bestowmentofspecialrightstopersonandconsiderationofrealcapability
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withrespecttoeachobjectiveforexample,theprescriptionofworking
quotaforthedisabled
Changeabilityaccordingtoappropriatenessmeanstochangesomeregul
ationstosubserveorbestowrightstopersonwithspecialtraitssuchas
specialrecruitmentfordisabledemployeeinsomepositionsregardless
requirementssetforthatposition.
Theaffirmationofrightsofthedisabledaccordingtochapter7(4)thedraftof
theInternationalConventiontoPromoteandProtecttheRightsandDignityof
PersonswithDisabilitiesisasfollows:
To ensure the rights to equality for the persons with disabilities, member
states shall implement according to suitable process including the enactment of
laws to provide appropriate facilities which is imperative and appropriate
sol ut i ons as wel l as t o adj ust and modi f y t he assurance of t he ri ght s
consumption or the use of right on the basis of equality of human rights and
fundamental freedoms except that measures impose a disproportionate or
undue burden
Inaddition,chapter7(5)ofthedraftoftheInternationalConventionto
PromoteandProtecttheRightsandDignityofPersonswithDisabilitiesstatedthat:
Specific measures which are necessary to accelerate or achieve de facto
equality of persons with disabilities shall not be considered discrimination
under the terms of the present Convention. But, the measures must not bring
about consequence that maintains standard of inequality or standard of
separation. These measures must be terminated for the purpose of equality of
opportunity and successful action
Itcanbeseenthatthisdraftofinternationalconventionexpressesconceptof
j ust i fi ed di scri mi nat i on for persons wi t h di sabi l i t i es.The concept i s t he
implementationofspecialmeasuretocreateequalitytothepersonswithdisabilities.
Itdoesnotregardasunjustdiscrimination;likewiseanyotherregulationsunderthe
lawsarenotdiscrimination.Moreover,thestatemustprovidefacilitytocreate
equalityforthedisabledandthisistheconceptthatisbuiltupinthesameissueas
justifieddiscrimination.
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PrincipleofjustifieddiscriminationaccordingtotheConstitutionofthe
KingdomofThailandB.E.2540,section30paragraph4andsection55are
provisionsoflawthatexpressedconceptofjustifieddiscrimination.Section30
paragraph4statedthatmeasuresdeterminedbytheStateinordertoeliminate
obstacletoortopromotepersonsabilitytoexercisetheirrightsandlibertiesasother
personsshallnotbedeemedasunjustdiscriminationunderparagraphthree.
Section55statedthatthedisabledorhandicappedshallhavetherighttoreceive
publicconveniencesandotheraidsfromtheState,asprovidedbylaw.
Althoughconceptsinthesetwosectionsarediscrimination,buttheyarethe
discriminationtopromoteequalityandaregovernmentmeasurestofacilitatepersons
withdisabilities.AccordingtotheInternationalConvention,itisnotconsidered
unjustdiscrimination.Unjustdiscriminationmustbebasedonequalitywhichmeans
todothesamethingtopeopleatthesamestatusandtododifferentthingtopeopleat
differentstatus.Thedifferenceisjustifieddiscriminationcanbeimplemented,but
unjustdiscriminationcannotbeimplemented.However,itisquitedifficultto
considerthatwhichoneisjustified discrimination andwhichoneisunjust
discrimination.Oneoftheprinciplesthatshouldtakeintoconsiderationisequality
principle.Ifitbringsaboutequality,itcanberegardedasjustifieddiscrimination.
AccordingtotheprovisionoflawintheConstitutionoftheKingdomof
ThailandB.E.2540,protectionforthedisabledfrombeingdiscriminatedisstatedin
section30paragraph3,whichistheonlyonesectionintheConstitution,that:
Unjust discrimination against a person on the grounds of the difference
in origin, race, language, sex, age, physicalor health condition, personal status,
economic or social standing, religious belief, education or constitutionally
political view, shall not be permitted.
Consideringsection3,paragraph3oftheconstitutionalprovision,theword
disabledcannotbeseen.Itseemsthatdiscriminationcanbeusedwiththe
disabled.Whensearchingforthewordphysical conditionintheThaiDictionary
publishedbyTheRoyalInstituteofThailandB.E.2542(1999),thereisnomeaning.
Buttherearetwowordof conditionandphysical.Conditionmeansastate
ofbeingnormalorthestateofsomethingorsomeoneandthewordphysical
meansbody.Whencombinethesetwowordsandmeanings,theconcludedmeaning
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isbodywithnormalappearance.Inthiscase,ifanyonehasdifferentappearance
fromothernormalpeople,theywillbeprotectedfromunjustdiscriminationas
providedbytheconstitution.
Inadditiontotheprotectionfromunjustdiscriminationofpersonswith
disabilitiesaccordingtosection30paragraph3oftheconstitution,theprotectionof
thedisabledthatenhanceequalityisstatedinsection55asfollows:
The disabled or handicapped shall have the right to receive public
conveniences and other aids from the State, as provided by law.
Besides,thereissection80paragraph2thatisenactedtoprotecttherightsof
thedisabled.
The State shall provide aids to the elderly, the indigent, the disabled or
handicapped and the underprivileged for their good quality of life and ability to
depend on themselves.
ThisprovisionoflawintheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandis
enactedtosupporttherightsofthedisabledthatagreewithtopic63inpartIIofthe
affirmationofViennaDeclarationandtheProgramofActionthatall human rights
and fundamental freedoms are universal and thus unreservedly include persons
with disabilities. Every person is born equal and has the same rights to life and
welfare, education and work, living independently and active participation in all
aspects of society. Any direct discrimination or other negative discriminatory
treatment of a disabled person is therefore a violation of his or her rights. The
World Conference on Human Rights calls on Governments, where necessary, to
adopt or adjust legislation to assure access to these and other rights for disabled
persons.
Topic64statedthatThe place of disabled persons is everywhere. Persons
with disabilities should be guaranteed equal opportunity through the
elimination of all socially determined barriers, be the physical, financial, social
or psychological, which exclude or restrict full participation in society.
Topic65statedthatRecalling the World Programme of Action concerning
Disabled Persons, adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session,
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the World Conference on Human Rights calls upon the General Assembly and
the Economic and Social Council to adopt the draft standard rules on the
equalization of opportunities for persons with disabilities, at their meetings in
1993.
ItcanbeseenfromtheaffirmationofViennaDeclarationandtheProgramof
Actionthatitisthepromotionandprotectionofhumanrightsofthepersonswith
disabilitieswhichisoneofthetopprioritiesoftheworldcommunity.Thisworld
conferenceprovidedspecialopportunitytowidelyanalyzeinternationalsystemof
humanrightsandmechanismsfortheprotectionofhumanrights.Itwastoincrease
and,therefore,fullypromotetheimplementationaccordingtotheserightswith
patternandbalancebyrecognizingvalue.Itisconfirmedthatallkindsofhuman
rightsoriginatedfromdignityandinbornvalueofhumanandthatoneselfisthe
centerofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms.Forthisreason,peopleshouldbe
themainbeneficiaryandshouldactivelyparticipateinseriouslycarryingforwardto
achievetheserightsandfreedoms.
Then,consideringunlawfuldiscriminationwhichmeansthereisaninteraction
betweentwopersons.Oneofthetwopersonsbecomesimproperlydisadvantageous
becauseofthedifferencethatisnotacceptedbylawswhiletheotherpersoninthe
samesituationseemstohavemoreadvantage.
Unlawfuldiscriminationcanbecategorizedinto2maincriteriaasfollows:
1)Thereisunjustdiscriminationwhichhas3rulesforconsiderationnamely;
1.1.Considerdifferentaction:whethertherearedifferentactionsornotand
itiscertainthattheremustbecomparisonsbetweentwoparties.
1.2.Considersituation:itisnottoconsideronlythedifferentaction,but
situationstobeconsideredmustbethesame.
1.3.Considertheinvestigationofobjectandappropriateness:Inshort,
differentactionmustnotstemfrombiasorprejudiceorarbitrarily
measures.
2) Unjustdiscriminationonthebasisofdifferenceprohibitedbylaw.For
example,accordingtosection30paragraph3theConstitutionofthe
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KingdomofThailandB.E.2540,theconstitutionprescribesthirteenground
ofthedifferencenamelyorigin,race,language,sex,age,physicalorhealth
condition,personalstatus,economicorsocialstanding,religiousbelief,
educationorconstitutionallypoliticalview.Therefore,ifthereis
discriminationbutthegroundsofdiscriminationarenotprescribedbylaw
suchasnationality.Ifthereisdiscriminationbecauseofthedifferencein
nationality,itisnotconsideredunlawfuldiscriminationbecausenationality
isnotthegroundofdifferencespecifiedbytheConstitutionoftheKingdom
ofThailand.
Di sabi l i t y i s one of t he grounds accept ed by i nt ernat i onal l aws t hat
discriminationagainstapersoncannotbedoneonthegroundsofthedisability.
Althoughthereisnodefiniteprescriptionofthegroundsofdisabilityininternational
conventionsorcovenants,thecommitteesoftheinternationalconventionsor
covenantsalwaysincludethegroundofdisabilityintheprocessofinterpretation.
Especially,thereisalreadyadraftoftheInternationalConventiontoPromoteand
ProtecttheRightsandDignityofPersonswithDisabilitiesthatshowedawarenessof
discriminationagainstthedisabled.TheUnitedNationsdeclarationoftheYearof
InternationalDisabledin1981andtheDecadeoftheDisabledduring1983-1992led
totheinterpretationtoexpandthelevelofprotectioninseveralconventionson
humanbeingtoprotectthedisabledbyexploitingthedefinitionofother status
andincludingthedisabilityinthisstatus.Inordertosetscopeofdisability,
internationallawswouldbroadlysetthescopeandgiveanopportunitytoeachstate
tosettheirownscopeofdisability.Animportantthingistopayattentiontoconcept
ofsocialmodelinsettingdefinitionorscopeofthedisabledthatcanreceivethe
protection.
ConsideringthediscriminationaccordingtotheConstitutionoftheKingdom
ofThailandB.E.2540regardingtheactionofgovernmentagenciestakento
individual,itcanbeseenthattherearestillsomeunjustdiscriminations,especially
theunjustdiscriminationongroundsofdifferenceinphysicalconditionforthe
recruitmentofgovernmentagencies.Thisarticleisaboutthecaseoftheapplication
forJudicialOfficialandProsecutionOfficial.Thesetwogovernmentagencies
refusedtogiverightstothedisabledtoapplyforbeinggovernmentofficials.Itisthe
studyofthecaseofMr.SirimitreBoonmoonandMissBoonchutiKlubprasit.Both
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ofthemhavecompletequalificationstoapplyfortheentranceexaminationtowork
asajudicialofficialinthepositionofAssistantJudge,the43rdintheyear1999,of
theCourtofJustice.However,thecommitteeofJudiciaryCommissiondisqualified
themfromthementranceexaminationbecausetheirphysicalconditionisunsuitable
forbeingjudicialofficials.
Thetwoapplicantsfeltthatthedisqualificationofapplicantsistheunjust
discriminationongroundsofdifferenceinphysicalconditionwhichcausedtheloss
totheapplicants.TheyviewedthattheprovisionsoftheActonCodeofConductfor
JudicialOfficialB.E.2521(1978)article27(11)(12)andtheActonCodeof
ConductforJudicialOfficialB.E.2543(2000)article26(10)(11)againstor
contradicttheprovisionsofsection30paragraph3oftheConstitution.Thus,both
applicantsrequestedforjusticefromtheParliamentaryOmbudsmanbythevirtueof
sect i on 198 of t he Const i t ut i on t o submi t t he case al ong wi t h opi ni ons t o
Constitutional Court to adjudicate the case of legitimacy according to the
Constitution.
Theombudsmanviewedthatarticle26(10)oftheActonCodeofConductfor
JudicialOfficialB.E.2543(2000)andtheactionsoftheJudiciaryCommissionand
theSubcommitteefortheVerificationofApplicantsQualificationsaresubjecttothe
problemoflegitimacyaccordingtosection30oftheConstitution.Thus,the
ConstitutionalCourtissuedthedecisionno.16/2545.
Subject:TheombudsmanrequestsfortheadjucationoftheConstitutional
Courtaccordingtosection198oftheConstitutiononthecaseofthearticle26(10)of
theActonCodeofConductforJudicialOfficialB.E.2543(2000)aboutits
legitimacyaccordingtotheConstitution
The ombudsman fi l ed t he mot i on refer t o t he l et t er of Offi ce of t he
Ombudsman dat ed 11t h Jul y 2001 request i ng for t he adj udi cat i on of t he
ConstitutionalCourtinthefollowingissues:
1. Article26(10)oftheActonCodeofConductforJudicialOfficialB.E.
2543(2000)reallyhasproblemoflegitimacyaccordingtosection30ofthe
Constitutionornot.
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2. TheactionsoftheJudiciaryCommissionandtheSubcommitteeforthe
VerificationofApplicantsQualificationsfortheEntranceExaminationofa
JudicialOfficialinthePositionofAssistantJudge,the43rdoftheyear
1999,reallyhaveproblemoflegitimacyaccordingtosection30ofthe
Constitutionornot.
Thefactsaccordingtothepetition,additionalpetitions,otherrelated
documentsandtheelucidationletteroftheOfficeoftheCourtofJusticecanbe
summarizedasfollows:
Mr.SirimitrBoonmoon,a32yearsoldlawyerandMissBoonchutiKlubprasit,
30yearsoldlawyerappliedforanentranceexaminationtoworkasajudicialofficial
inthepositionofAssistantJudge,the43
rd
intheyear1999.Theyhadamentaland
physicalhealthtestandcheck-upatChulalongkornHospitalwiththemedical
committeeassignedbythejudicialcommittee.Themedicalcommitteereportedthe
physicalandmentalhealthtestresultsthatMr.SirimitrBoonmoonhaspolioand
MissBoonchutiKlubprasitsbackbonehasbeencrippledbypoliowhenshewas3
yearsoldsothatshecanwalkonlyforashortdistance.
SubcommitteefortheVerificationofApplicantsQualificationsforthe
EntranceExaminationofaJudicialOfficialinthePositionofAssistantJudge
consideredthatthesetwoapplicantsdonothavesuitablephysicalcondition
accordingtoarticle27(11)oftheActonCodeofConductforJudicialOfficialB.E.
2521(1978),thereforethesubcommitteedecidednottoreceivetheapplication(Now
itisarticle26(10)).
Later,duringthe13thmeetingoftheyear2000(13/2543)on14thand16th
Mar ch 2543, t he Judi ci ar y Commi ssi on agr eed wi t h t he opi ni on of t he
SubcommitteefortheVerificationofApplicantsQualificationsfortheEntrance
ExaminationofaJudicialOfficialinthePositionofAssistantJudge.Therefore,the
JudiciaryCommissiondecidednottoreceivetheapplicationbecauseofunsuitable
physicalconditionaccordingtoarticle27(11)oftheActonCodeofConductfor
JudicialOfficialB.E.2521(1978)
ConstitutionalCourtconsideredarticle30oftheConstitutionstatedasa
principlethatallpersonsareequalbeforethelawandshallenjoyequalprotection
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underthelaw.Menandwomenshallenjoyequalrights.Unjustdiscrimination
againstapersononthegroundsofthedifferenceinorigin,race,language,sex,age,
physicalorhealthcondition,personalstatus,economicorsocialstanding,religious
belief,educationorconstitutionallypoliticalviewthatisnotcontradictthe
provisionsoflawintheConstitution,shallnotbepermitted.However,inorderto
recruitnewofficialtoworkinanygovernmentagencies,itisconcededthatthe
agenciesmustconsidertheapplicantsknowledgeandeducationalbackground,
capability,andsuitabilityforeachposition.Inthiscase,Mr.SirimitrBoonmoonand
MissBoonchutiKlubprasit,botharelawyers,appliedfortheentranceexaminationto
workasjudicialofficialandtobeappointedtoworkinthepositionofAssistant
Judge.Iftheypassedtheexamination,latertherewouldbetherequestfortheroyal
commandtograciouslyappointtobeaJudge.Theapplicationfortheentrance
examinationwillconsidernotonlyknowledgeandeducationalbackgroundand
capability,butalsothefullnessofphysicalandmentalhealthaswellasgood
personalitytobeaJudgewhichisthehonoredpositionandworkinthenameofHis
MajestytheKing.Toworkasajudgeisnotonlytoconsiderandgiveverdictof
lawsuitsinthecourtroom,butsometimesthejudgehastogoworkingoutsidethe
court,forexample,totakeevidenceoutofcourttoinvestigatewitnesswhocannot
cometothecourt.Therefore,theconsiderationfortherecruitmentofapplicantsto
beajudicialofficialinthepositionofAssistantJudgehasmoredifferentandstrict
measuresthanotherpositions.Insection29paragraph1oftheConstitutionstatedas
anexceptionthattherestrictionofpersonsrightsandlibertiesasrecognizedbythe
Constitutionshallnotbeimposedonapersonexceptbyvirtueofprovisionsofthe
lawspecificallyenactedforthepurposedeterminedbythisConstitutionandonlyto
theextentofnecessityandprovidedthatitshallnotaffecttheessentialsubstancesof
suchrightsandliberties.Inparagraph2statedthatthelawunderparagraphone
shallbeofgeneralapplicationandshallnotbeintendedtoapplytoanyparticular
caseorperson;providedthattheprovisionoflawintheConstitutionauthorizingits
enactmentshallalsobementionedtherein.Theprovisionsofparagraphoneand
paragraphtwoshallapplymutatismutandistorulesorregulationsissuedbyvirtueof
theprovisionsofthelaw.
Whileconsiderarticle26(10)oftheActonCodeofConductforJudicial
OfficialB.E.2543(2000),thephasehave body.unsuitable for being judicial
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officialwillbeusedtogetherwitharticle26(11)whichstatedthatis the one who
passed physical and mental health test by the committee of at least 3 doctors
assigned by the Judiciary Commission and the Judiciary Commission
considered the test report and allow the submission of the application.The
provisionofarticle26(10)oftheActonCodeofConductforJudicialOfficialB.E.
wasenactedaccordingtothenecessityandappropriatenessofthejudiciary.
Therefore,article26(10)intheActontheCodeofConductforJudicialOfficialB.E.
2543(2000)isthecharacteristicaccordingtotheexceptioninsection29ofthe
ConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540whichdoesnotaffectthe
essentialsubstancesofrightsandliberties.Itisgenerallyeffectiveanddoesnottend
tobeexecutedinspecificcasesorwithspecificpersons.Itisnottheunjust
discriminationasstatedinsection30oftheConstitution.
IntermsofthelegitimacyoftheactionoftheJudiciaryCommissionandthe
SubcommitteefortheVerificationofApplicantsQualificationsfortheEntrance
ExaminationofaJudicialOfficialinthePositionofAssistantJudge,the43
rd
ofthe
year1999,itisconsideredthatitisarequestforadjudicationoftheactions
committedbytheJudiciaryCommissionandtheSubcommitteewhichistheuseof
discretion.Therefore,itisnottheauthorityoftheConstitutionalCourttomakea
decision.
Then,Mr.SirimitrBoonmoonbroughtthecaseofthedisqualification
committedbytheJudiciaryCommissiontotheCourtofJustice(CivilCourt).The
CivilCourtdismissedthecasebygivingthereasonthatthecaseisnotdisputeof
rightsaccordingtoarticle55oftheCivilProcedureCode.Mr.Sirimitrthenlodged
anappeal,onlyonproblemofthemattersoflaw,directlytotheSupremeCourt.The
SupremeCourtissuedthedecisionno.7696/2548basedonthedecisionoftheCivil
Courtconsideringthefactthattheplaintiffstillhadnodisputeabouthisrightsand
dutiesaccordingtoarticle55oftheCivilProcedureCode.Then,Mr.Sirimitr
BoonmoonbroughtthisissuetohumblypresentthepetitionforjusticetoHis
MajestytheKingwhichisnow(October2006)waitingfortheroyaldecision.
ThedecisionoftheConstitutionalCourtno.44/2545regardingtheCentral
AdministrativeCourtsentthedisputeofthelitigants(betweenMr.Sirimitr
BoonmoonandthePublicProsecutorServiceCommission)inthecaseblacknumber
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(pendingcase)no.4119/2544requestingtheConstitutionalCourttoconsiderand
decideaccordingtosection264oftheConstitutionwhethertheActonCodeof
ConductforProsecutionOfficialB.E.252133(11)isagainstorcontradictthe
Constitutionornot.
CentralAdministrativeCourtfiledamotiondated7
th
February2002requesting
theConstitutionalCourttomakeadecisionwhetherarticle33(11)oftheActonthe
CodeofConductforProsecutionOfficialB.E.2521(1978)isagainstorcontradict
theConstitutionornot.
Thefactsaccordingtothepetition,otherrelateddocumentsandtheelucidation
letteroftheOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneralcanbeconcludedthatMr.Sirimitr
Boonmoon,a33yearsoldlawyer,asalitigant,appliedfortheentranceexamination
fortheprosecutionofficialinthepositionofAssistantProsecutoroftheyear2001on
28thFebruary2001.Hereceivedapplicationno.1279/2544.WhenthePublic
ProsecutorServiceCommissionannouncedthenameoftheeligibleapplicants,the
nameofthelitigantwasnotonthelist.Thelitigantthensenttheletterdated9th
August2001tothePublicProsecutorServiceCommissionrequestingforthereason
ofnotbeingeligibleapplicant.ThePublicProsecutorServiceCommission
explainedthattheSubcommitteefortheVerificationofApplicantsQualifications
receivedreportfromMedicalCommitteethatMr.Sirimitrhasphysicaldisability;
walklamely;musclesinthearmsandlegsarelooseandfloppy;bentbackboneafter
theoperationtoputmetalsplintinthebackbonetomakebothshouldersequal.
Therefore,theCommissionagreednottoreceivehisapplicationbecausehehas
unsuitablepersonalityandphysicalconditionforbeingtheProsecutorOfficial
accordingtoarticle33(11)oftheCodeofConductforProsecutionOfficialB.E.
2521(1978).
ThelitigantviewedthatthereasongivenbythePublicProsecutorService
Commissionisunjustdiscriminationbasedonthegroundofdifferenceinphysical
conditionandthatarticle33(11)oftheActonCodeofConductforProsecution
OfficialB.E.2521(1978)isagainstorcontradictsection30oftheConstitution.The
litigantthenfiledchargesagainstthePublicProsecutorServiceCommissiontothe
CentralConstitutionalCourtasacaseblacknumber(pendingcase)no.4119/2544
andrequestedtobringinaverdictasfollows:
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1. Article33(11)oftheActonCodeofConductforProsecutionOfficial
B. E. 2521 (1978) and t he order of t he Publ i c Prosecut or Servi ce
Commissionthatdisqualifiedthelitigantfromhavingentranceexamination
toworkasaprosecutionofficialinthepositionofAssistantProsecutorin
theyear2001isagainstsection30oftheConstitution.
2. OrderthePublicProsecutorServiceCommissiontoresolvetohostspecial
examinationforthelitigantinordertocompensatethedisqualificationfrom
thepreviousexamination.
TheConstitutionalCourtconsideredthatsection30oftheConstitutionlays
downtheprinciplethatallpersonsareequalbeforethelawandshallenjoyequal
protectionunderthelawandstatedthatmenandwomenshallenjoyequalrights.
Unjustdiscriminationagainstapersononthegroundsofthedifferenceinorigin,
race,language,sex,age,physicalorhealthcondition,personalstatus,economicor
socialstanding,religiousbelief,educationorconstitutionallypoliticalview,shall
notbepermitted.However,inordertorecruitnewofficialtoworkinanypositions
ofthegovernmentagencies,itisconcededthattheagenciesmustconsiderthe
applicantsknowledgeandeducationalbackground,capability,andsuitabilityfor
eachposition.Accordingtothepetition,Mr.SirimitrBoonmoon,alawyer,applied
fortheentranceexaminationtoworkasjudicialofficialandtobeappointedtothe
positionofAssistantJudge.Iftheypassedtheexamination,latertherewouldbethe
requestfortheroyalcommandtograciouslyappointtobeajudicialofficial.The
applicationfortheentranceexaminationandselectionwillconsidernotonly
knowledgeandeducationalbackgroundandcapability.Butalsothefullnessof
physicalandmentalhealthisalsoconsideredinordertoworkinthepositionand
goodpersonalitytobeaprosecutorofficial.Toworkasajudgeisnotonlyto
considerandgiveverdictoflawsuitsinthecourtroomoroffice,butsometimesthe
judgehastogoworkingoutsidethecourt.Forexample,totakeevidenceoutof
courttoinvestigatewitnesswhocannotcometothecourt;toworkwiththe
interrogationofficialsinthepost-mortemexamination;andtodisseminatelegal
knowledgetopeopleinruralareas.Therefore,theconsiderationfortherecruitment
ofapplicantstobeajudicialofficialandappointedtoworkinthepositionof
AssistantJudgehasmoredifferentandstrictmeasuresthanotherpositions.In
section29paragraph1oftheConstitutionstatedasanexceptionthattherestriction
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533
ofpersonsrightsandlibertiesasrecognizedbytheConstitutionshallnotbe
imposedonapersonexceptbyvirtueofprovisionsofthelawspecificallyenacted
forthepurposedeterminedbythisConstitutionandonlytotheextentofnecessity
andprovidedthatitshallnotaffecttheessentialsubstancesofsuchrightsand
liberties.Inparagraph2statedthatthelawunderparagraphoneshallbeofgeneral
applicationandshallnotbeintendedtoapplytoanyparticularcaseorperson;
providedthattheprovisionoftheConstitutionauthorizingitsenactmentshallalsobe
mentionedtherein.Theprovisionsofparagraphoneandparagraphtwoshallapply
mutatismutandistorulesorregulationsissuedbyvirtueoftheprovisionsofthelaw.
Whileconsiderarticle33(11)oftheActonCodeofConductforProsecution
Official B. E. 2521 (1978), the phase have body. unsuitable for being
prosecution official willbeusedtogetherwitharticle33(12)whichstatedthatis
the one who passed physical and mental health test by the committee of at least
3 doctors assigned by the Public Prosecutor Service Commission and the Public
Prosecutor Service Commission considered the test report and allow the
submission of the application.Article33(11)oftheActonCodeofConductfor
ProsecutorOfficialB.E.2521(1978)wasenactedaccordingtothenecessityand
appropriatenessoftheprosecutor.Therefore,article33(11)oftheActontheCode
ofConductforProsecutionOfficialB.E.2521(1978)isthecharacteristicsaccording
totheexceptioninsection29oftheConstitutionwhichdoesnotaffecttheessential
partofrightsandliberties.Itisgenerallyeffectiveanddoesnottendtobeexecuted
inspecificcasesorwithspecificpersons.Itisnottheunjustdiscriminationasstated
insection30oftheConstitution.
AsofthesetwodecisionsoftheConstitutionalCourt,thereareissuesworth
consideringregardingthediscriminationbasedontheConstitutionoftheKingdom
ofThailandB.E.2540asfollows:
First,apartofthedecisionoftheConstitutionalCourtno.16/2545statedthat
article 26 (10) of the Act on Code of Conduct for Judicial Official B.E. 2543
(2000)andthedecisionno.44/2545statedthatarticle 33 (11) of the Act on Code
of Conduct for Prosecutor Official B.E. 2521 (1978) arethecharacteristic
accordingtotheexceptioninsection29oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomof
ThailandB.E.2540anddoesnotaffecttheessentialsubstancesofsuchrightsand
liberties.
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Consideringarticle29oftheConstitutionthattherestrictionofsuchrightsand
libertiesasrecognizedbytheConstitutionshallnotbeimposedonapersonexcept
byvirtueofprovisionsofthelawspecificallyenactedforthepurposedeterminedby
theConstitutionandonlytotheextentofnecessityandprovidedthatitshallnot
affecttheessentialsubstancesofsuchrightsandliberties.Itcanbeseenthatthe
enactmentoflaws,orders,andregulationstolimittherightsandfreedomsofperson
mustbedoneonthebasisofjustifieddiscrimination.Theadjudicationofthe
ConstitutionalCourt,thatitistheexceptionofthespecificprovisionsofbothActs
accordingtosection29oftheConstitution,isaverybroadinterpretationandis
beyondthescope.Itmakestherestrictionofrightsandfreedomsofpersonbecome
easierjustrefertotheexceptioninsection29oftheConstitution.Therightsand
freedomsofpersonsupportedbytheConstitutioncannotbeconcretelyputintoforce.
Second,apartofthedecisionoftheConstitutionalCourtno.16/2545stated
thatarticle 26(10) of the Act on Code of Conduct for Judicial Official B.E. 2543
(2000)andthedecisionno.44/2545thatarticle 33 (11) of the Act on Code of
Conduct for Prosecution Official B.E. 2521 (1978)areinlinewiththenecessity
andsuitabilityofbothActs.
WhataretheprinciplesandstandardsfortheadjudicationoftheConstitutional
Courtintermsofnecessityandsuitability?Ifconsideredthenecessityforthe
selectionofpersonnelwithgoodknowledgeandability,theexaminationmustbe
conductedtoselectrequiredperson.But,ifconsideredthesuitabilitythatbothActs
usethephasehave body unsuitable for being judicial official orhave
body unsuitable for being prosecution official.Thewordhave body that is
unsuitable to be judicial official or prosecution officialhasabroadmeaningthat
willeasilyleadtounjustdiscrimination.Therefore,theenactmentoflawsby
governmentagenciesmustbedonewithrespecttothehumanrightsprincipleand,
importantly,basedonequalityprinciple.Whenlawenactmentisdonetodestroy
rightsandfreedomsofperson,itistheunjustdiscriminationonthegroundof
differenceinphysicalconditionthatcontradictstheConstitutionornot.
ThedecisionoftheCentralAdministrativeCourt,thecaserednumber(end
case)no.816/2546
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ThisisthecasethatMr.SirimitrBoonmoonarguedthedecisionofthePublic
ProsecutorServiceCommissionnottoreceivehisapplicantandrequestthecourtto
judgeasfollows:
A. Article33(11)oftheActonCodeofConductforProsecutionOfficialB.E.
2521(1978)andtheorderofthePublicProsecutorServiceCommissionthat
deprivedMr.Sirimitrsrightstohaveentranceexaminationtoworkasa
prosecutionofficialinthepositionofAssistantProsecutorintheyear2001
isagainstsection30oftheConstitution.
B. OrderthePublicProsecutorServiceCommissiontoresolvetohostspecial
examinationforthelitigantinordertocompensatethedisqualificationfrom
thepreviousexamination.
TheCentralAdministrativeCourtgaveaverdictthatthephysicalcondition
ofthelitigantthatisdisabledaccordingtothereportofmedicalsubcommitteeisthe
differencethatgreatlyobstructtoperformanceofresponsibilityasaprosecution
official compared to other normal person.The Public Prosecutor Service
Commissionsagreementwiththeopinionofthesubcommitteefortheverificationof
applicantsqualificationsthatthelitigantsphysicalconditionisunsuitabletobea
prosecutionofficialasstatedinarticle33(11)and(12)ofActontheCodeof
ConductforProsecutionOfficialB.E.2521(1978)andagreednottoreceivethe
applicationofthelitigantistheconsiderationaccordingtoauthorityprescribedby
lawandisthefairandreasonableconsideration.Therefore,thedisqualificationof
thelitigantfromhavingtheentranceexaminationforthepositionofAssistance
Prosecutorintheyear2001islawfulaction.Asaresult,thereisnoreasonthatthe
CourtshouldorderthePublicProsecutorServiceCommissiontohostspecial
examinationforthelitigantinordertocompensatethedisqualificationfromthe
previousexamination.Thecourtdismissedthecase.

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The decision of the Supreme Administrative Court,
the case red number no. 142/2547
Mr.SirimitrBoonmoonappealedthedecisionoftheCentralAdministrative
Courtno.816/2546.TheSupremeAdministrativeCourtconsideredthatthe
subcommitteefortheverificationofapplicantsqualificationsconsideredthatthe
litigantlackedofqualificationsasstatedinarticle33(11)and(12)oftheActonthe
CodeofConductforProsecutionOfficialB.E.2521(1978).Theopinionsofthe
MedicalCommitteeandtheSubcommitteefortheVerificationofApplicants
QualificationsarejusttheinitialopinionsubmittedtothePublicProsecutorService
Commi ssi on for t he perusal .The case t hat t he Publ i c Prosecut or Servi ce
Commissionrefusedtheapplicationofthelitigantwithoutconsideringthereal
workingabilityhasnofirmreasonthatphysicalconditionofthelitigantwould
obstructtheworkingperformanceas a prosecutionofficial.Thereforethe
adjudicationofthePublicProsecutorServiceCommissiontorefusethelitigants
applicationfortheentranceexaminationtoworkasaprosecutionofficialintheyear
2001isunlawfuladjudicationaccordingtoarticle33(11)oftheActontheCodeof
ConductforProsecutionOfficialB.E.2521(1978)anditisunjustdiscrimination
againstthelitigantaccordingtosection30oftheConstitution.TheAdministrative
CourtconsideredreversethejudgmenttorevoketheresolutionofthePublic
ProsecutorServiceCommissionofthemeetingno.6/2544on18
th
June2001
regardingthedecisiontorefusetheapplicationofthelitiganttotheentrance
examinationtoworkasaprosecutionofficialinthepositionofAssistantProsecutor
intheyear2001.IntermsofthelitigantsrequestsubmittedtotheAdministrative
CourttoorderthePublicProsecutorServiceCommissiontohosttheexaminationfor
thelitiganttocompensatehimfornotbeinglistedonthenamelistoftheeligible
examinee,theSupremeAdministrativeCourtisunabletospecifytheorderregarding
thismatter.
TheadjudicationoftheSupremeAdministrativeCourtcanbesummarizedthat
althoughthesuitorisdisabled,thiskindofdifferenceisnotagreatobstaclein
performingtheduty.Therefore,thecasethatthePublicProsecutorService
CommissionrefusedtoreceivetheapplicationofMr.Sirimitrtohavetheentrance
examinationtoworkasaprosecutionofficialwithoutconsiderationforthereal
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capabi l i t y t o work has not enough reasons for t he heari ng.The Supreme
AdministrativeCourtconsideredthatthedifferenceinphysicalconditionisnotan
obstacletoperformduty,anddecisionshouldbemadeaftertheconsiderationofthe
realability.TheCourtconsideredthattheessentialsubstanceistheabilitytowork
thatagreeswiththeprincipleofequality.
Fromthatprinciple,itcanbeconcludedthatthediscriminationonthebasisof
equalityandhumandignityaccordingtothehumanrightsprinciplestatedinsection
30oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540
Theabove-mentionedprinciplecanbesummarizedthatthediscriminationis
basedonequalityandhumandignityaccordingtohumanrightsprinciple.Section
30oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540(1997)prescribesthe
prohibitionofunjustdiscriminationtobeinconformitywithinternationallaws.
However,onceaprinciplethatsupportfundamentalrightsofapersonisenactedasa
law,thenextthingthattherulershouldthinkaboutistheenforcementoflawand
how the ideas agree with the general principles of law.After studying the
adjudicationoftheConstitutionalCourtandtheAdministrativeCourtofThailand,
onethingthatcanbeclearlyseenisthedifferenceofdecisionanditsresults.Both
courtsdecidedthefactstogetherwiththelawsbyusingdifferentprinciples.Itmay
bebecausetheoneswhousethelawhavedifferentpointofviewsandvisions.
Therefore,thedecisionofthesamefactsbecomesdifferent.IftheConstitutional
CourtandtheAdministrativeCourtcouldlaydownsuitablestandardformaking
decisionontheprincipleofdiscrimination,itwouldbeastandardtosupportrights
andfreedomsofThaipeople.Onthecontrary,theConstitutionalCourtviewedthat
theActonCodeofConductforJudicialOfficialandtheActonCodeofConductfor
ProsecutorOfficialthatstipulateunjustdiscriminationagainstthedisabledare
suitableanddoesnotaffecttheessentialsubstancesofsuchrightsandliberties.
Thisdecisionisagainsttheequalityprincipleanddoesnotcomplywiththeprinciple
ofinternationaldiscrimination.
However,thereisanadjudicationoftheSupremeAdministrativeCourtviewed
thedisabilityasadifferencebutitisnotsubstantial,whichagreedwiththeprinciple
ofequality.

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Therefore,tomakediscriminationcomplywiththeprincipleofhumanrights
andtheConstitution,thestateshouldputregulationmeasuresintoforceinorderto
solvetheproblemofunjustdiscrimination.Itcanbedonebyamendingand
abrogatinglaws,rules,andregulationsthatdoesnotcomplywithhumanrights
principleandshouldenactthelawtoprotectunjustdiscriminationagainstaperson.
King Prajadhipoks Institute
539
Constitutions and Women
Isabell Loyd

C onstitutionbuildingisaninternalprocessinwhichaGovernmentobservesand
establishesavaluesystemfacilitatinggrowthanddiversity,developmentorreform
ofthelegislativeframeworkandconformitywithinternationallaw.
RuleofLawandDemocratic principles need to be integrated into the
constitutionwhichshouldalsoincludearticlesandreferencestosubstantiveequality
forcitizens.ThailandhasratifiedanumberofInternationalConventionsandTreaties
suchastheConventionontheEliminationofallformsofDiscriminationAgainst
Women(CEDAW),theChildRightsConvention(CRC),andtheConventionon
CivilandPoliticalRights(CCPR),allofwhichcanguideconstitutiondrafters.
Eachtimeaconstitutioniswrittendraftershavetheopportunitytoreflect
forwardthinkingtrends,amongwhichshouldbetrendsrelatedtohowgender
equalityisguaranteedincompliancewithinternationaltreaties,especiallywhere
vulnerablegroupssuchaspoorwomen,ethnicminoritiesandthedisabled,are
concerned.

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540
The1997ThaiConstitutionprovidesthatAll Thai citizens, regardless of
birth, gender or religion, are entitled to equal protection under this Constitution.
(General Provisions, article 4).Chapter3article30,RightsandLibertiesofThai
people,bansdiscriminationonthebasisofgenderandintroducestheconceptof
affirmativeactionandarticlesthroughouttheconstitutionprovideforsubstantive
equalityinsocial,economicandpoliticallife.Theconstitutionalsocallsfor
protectionofrightsandfreedomsofthepeopleandaccesstojustice,andpromotes
theindependenceofwatchdoginstitutionssuchastheNationalHumanRights
Commission,theOfficeoftheOmbudsmanandthecourts.
UsingCanadianandThaiexamples,thispresentationwilldiscussthe
advantagesofincludingequalityprovisionsintheconstitutionandtheneedfor
nationalmechanismstoensurethatsuchprovisionsaresubsequentlyreflectedinlaw
andregulationsandinthebehaviourofStateinstitutions.
King Prajadhipoks Institute
541
The legal recognition of
same-sex partnerships:
a comparative constitutional analysis
Nicholas Bamforth
Oxford University

[WhatfollowsismerelyasummaryofwhatIwilldiscussattheConference]
I nanyjurisdiction,atleastfoursetsofimportantlegalquestionstendtobe
relevantindebatesaboutwhethersame-sexpartnershipsshouldbegrantedsome
leveloflegalprotection.Giventhatsuchquestionshaveariseninjurisdictionswhich
havedebatedtheissuetodate,itseemslogicaltosupposethatthey(orverysimilar
questions)arelikelytoariseinanydebateaboutpartnershiprightsintheThai
context.(Therearealso,ofcourse,manyimportantpolicyand/orphilosophical
questions,buttheseliebeyondthescopeofthepresentpaper).
Thelegalquestionsareasfollows:
1. What type of legal recognition/protection is being asked for
and/or granted?
Thereseemtobethreemainmodels:
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(i)Fullinclusionwithintheinstitutionofmarriagee.g.CivilMarriageAct
2005(Canada)
(ii)Creationofadistinctinstitutionofregisteredpartnershipopenonlytosame-
sexcouples,withmostoralloftherightsandresponsibilitiesofmarriage
e.g.CivilPartnershipAct2004(UnitedKingdom).
(iii)Creationofadistinctinstitutionofregisteredpartnershipopentoallcouples
andfallingshortoftherightsandresponsibilitiesofmarriage(whetheror
notmarriageremainsanopposite-sexinstitutioninthejurisdiction
concerned)e.g.thePACSlegislation(France).
2. Is it inevitable that the decriminalisation of lesbian and gay
sexual activity, or the protection of sexual minority groups against
discrimination, will inevitably lead to the recognition of same-sex
partnership rights?
Perhaps curiously, some supporters and some opponents of same-sex
partnershiprightsseemtoagreethattheanswertothisquestionisyes:theone
inevitablyleadstotheother.However,thisviewisonanalysissimplistic.First,
whileitwouldclearlybewhollyillogicaltorecognisetherightforsame-sexcouples
tomarry,orformaregisteredpartnership,inajurisdictioninwhichsexualacts
betweenpersonsofthesame-sexwereprohibited,thereisoftenaverywidedistance
bothconstitutionallyandpoliticallybetweenrecognisingthatcriminalpenalties
shouldnotattachtoprivate,consentingsexualactivity,andgrantingpublic
recognitiontosame-sexpartnerships(intheUK,forexample,therewasintervalof
37years(inEnglandandWales)betweentheoneandtheother;seealsoWilkinsonv.
Ki t zi nger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam. ) (UK Hi gh Court ) on possi bl e l egal /
constitutionaldifferences).Secondly,differentjurisdictionshaveapproachedmatters
indifferentways.Thus,intheU.K.andCanada,therehasbeenaprogression(albeit
notaconstantone)overthreedecadesfromdecriminalizationtotherecognitionof
same-sexpartnershiprights.IntheU.S.A.,bycontrast,thedebateaboutpartnership
rightsassumedafederaldimensionverysoonaftertheSupremeCourtsrecognition
i n Lawr ence v. Texas ( 2003) 123 S Ct 2472 ( US Supr eme Cour t ; ht t p: / /
www.supremecourtus.gov/)thatitwasunconstitutionaltocriminalizeconsenting
sexualactivitybetweenpersonsofthesamesexonlybecauseU.S.lawlaggedsofar
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behindthatofanalogousjurisdictions.Inshort,theavailableexamplessuggestthatit
isverydifficulttotraceanyneatmodelsinwhichonelegalmoveinevitablyleads
toanother.
3. On which constitutional provisions have claims for same-sex
partnership rights be based?
Obviouslythisdependsuponthedraftingoftheconstitutionsconcerned,butit
isinterestingtonotetherangeofheadingsunderwhichsuchclaimshavebeen
brought(successfullyorotherwise)
Dignity: Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie(2006)1SA524(SouthAfrican
ConstitutionalCourt;http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/home.htm)
Equality:Goodridge v. Department of Public Health(2003)798NE2d941
(MassachusettsSupremeJudicialCourt;http://massreports.com/);MinisterofHome
Affairsv.Fourie,above.
Non-discrimination in relation to marriage: Wilkinson v. Kitzinger,above(U.K.).
Non-discrimination in relation to sex: D. v. Council[2001]ECR-I4319(European
CourtofJustice;http://curia.europa.eu/)
Privacy/family life: Karner v. Austria, applicationno.40016/98,ECHR2003-IX,
Estevezv.Spain10thMay2001(European CourtofHumanRights;http://
www.echr.coe.int/echr);Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza[2004]UKHL30,Secretary of
State for Work and Pensions v. M.[2006]UKHL11(UKHouseofLords;http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldjudgmt.htm).Note:canthesevarious
decisionsbereconciled?
4. What are the appropriate roles of legislatures and courts in
this area?
Again,thiswillvaryaccordingtothespheresofactionofeachinstitution
undertheconstitutionalprovisionsofthejurisdictionconcerned,anditisnoteworthy
howfartheissueofsame-sexpartnershiprightsseemstohavebecomeacontentious
issueinmanyjurisdictionsnotleastwherethecourtshavetakenthelead.

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The legislature takes the lead: UKCivilPartnershipAct2004(foragood
counter-example,wherethelegislaturetakestheleadinseekingtoblockthelegal
recognitionofsame-sexpartnerships,seetheUnitedStatesDefenseofMarriageAct
1996).
The courts take the lead: Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, above
(Massachusetts);Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie,above(SouthAfrica).Note,
however,thedeferenceinvolvedintheSouthAfricandecision(thelegislatureis
givenayeartorectifythelegislationbeforethecourtdecisioncomesintoeffect).
NotealsothepopulistreactionstojudicialdecisionsintheUSA,intheformof
DefenseofMarriagestatestatutesorconstitutionalamendments.
The legislature passes the issue to the court: Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage
[2004]3SCR698(SupremeCourtofCanada;http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/).Notethat
theCivilMarriageAct2005waspassedbytheCanadianParliamentfollowingthe
SupremeCourtsdecision,althoughtheissuemaybeunderreviewbyCanadasnew
Conservativegovernment.
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We have never planned
to give any teeth to Suhakam:
Aspiration, Actualisation and
National Human Rights
Protection in Malaysia
Prof. Thio Li-ann

I nMarch2006,agovernmentministerreportedlystatedthatSuhakam was
never meant to have any teeth. Sinceitsconceptionandestablishmentbystatute
in1999,withoutpopularconsultation,theMalaysianNationalHumanRights
Commissionmaybesaidtohaveexceededandfallenshortofexpectations.Itsbirth
withgreetedbyskepticismthatitreflectedacosmeticratherthanasubstantial
changetothemechanismsforpromotingindividualsandgroupsagainstrights
violations.
Initsconception,itwaspresentedasanappropriatemethodofpromoting
humanrightsinthesemi-authoritarianstateofMalaysia,whosepoliticalleadershave
atvarioustimescriticizedtheuniversalistpretensionsofhumanrights,byappealing
toculturalparticularitiesundertherubricoftheAsianvaluesschooloflawand
development..Thisisreflectedintheviewexpressedinthe1993FinalDeclaration
oftheRegionalMeetingforAsiaoftheWorldConferenceonHumanRights(The
Bangkok Declaration)whichwelcomedtheimportant role played by national
institutions in the genuine and constructive promotion of human rights, and
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believe that the conceptualization and eventual establishment of such
institutions are best left for the States to decide.Thisstatementreflectedthe
articulatedconcernofAsianstateswithrespecttotheapplicationofdoublestandards
inthepoliticisedimplementationofhumanrightsthroughconditionalitiesattachedto
development-related aid, noting that promoting human rights should be
encouraged by cooperation and consensus ratherthanthrough confrontation
and the imposition of incompatible values. NationalHumanRightInstitutions
(NHRI)occupyauniquepositionwithintheconstitutionalandlegalorderasan
institution dedicated to the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamentalliberties.Humanrightsconstitutealimitonstatepower.NHRIsarenot
partofcivilsocietyandwhilepartoftheapparatusofgovernment,theirinstitutional
designistocheckabusesofpublicpowerwheretheseentailhumanrightsviolations.
Unsurprisingly,oneofthecentralprincipleslaiddownbytheParisPrinciples
relatingtothestatusandfunctioningofnationalinstitutionsforprotectionand
promotionofhumanrights(endorsedbyGeneralAssemblyResolutionA/RES/48/
134,20Dec1993)istheneedtoestablishinstitutionalandfinancialautonomyfor
theeffectivefunctioningofNHRIs.
Fromtheoutset,detractorsthoughtSuhakamwasdoomedtofailure,givenits
limited,non-bindingpowersandthenarrowtermsofitsmandate,whichqualifiedthe
typeofhumanrightsitcouldreview.ThiswasrestrictedtoPartIIoftheFederal
ConstitutionofMalaysiawhichrelatestocivil-politicalrights.However,inpractice
Suhakamhasassumedabroadermandate,examiningsocio-economicrights,for
instanceandborrowingfrominternationalhumanrightsnormsindefiningthe
parametersofitsmandate.Thispaperexaminesthemannerandextenttowhich
Suhakamhasbeenabletopracticallycontributetotheexerciseandenjoymentof
humanrightsinMalaysia,bearinginmindthatMalaysiahasonlysigned3human
rightstreatiesandsubjecteditselftotheminimalistobligationofstatereporting,
withoutmakingavailabletoitscitizensanycomplaintsproceduretoaninternational
supervisorybody.
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Group 1
Summary and Discussions
Political Parties, Elections
and the Exercise of Legislative Power

Politicalparties,elections,andtheexerciseoflegislativepowerconstitute
bothinstitutionandpoliticalprocessesindemocraticsystem.
Theunderlyingissueishowtoarrangesuchinstitutionandprocessesto
conformwithdemocraticprinciples.

Assoc. Prof. Preecha Hongkrailert

- ThaiparliamentwasderivedfromBritishparliament,knownasgovernment
oftheparliamentorgovernmentofpoliticalparties.
- Theheartofapoliticalpartyliesinideologyandconvictionofacollective
groupofpeople.
- Boss-subordinate thinkinginpoliticalpartysystemisderivedfromhigh
level.
- Mutualinterest,conflict,coupdetat
- Electionprovideslegitimacyforthebosstoexercisestatepower.
- BipartisansysteminThailand
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- 1997Constitution facilitated establishment ofapolitical party but
constitutionallawsrenderedestablishmentdifficultandmadedissolution
easy.
-Proposepoliticaldevelopmentplan.

Prof. Robert B. Albritton

- Presentedissuesregardingthestructureofelectoralsystemandpolitical
impactonpoliticalpartiesandelection.
- Thailanddeployswinner-take-allelectoralsystemtoreducenumberof
politicalpartiesandinstallcoalitiongovernmentwithafewpartiesand
politicalstability.
- Inreality,itis pluralityratherthan majoritysystem.
- Proportionalorpartylistelectoralsystemkeenlysupportsdevelopmentof
politicalparties,especiallythoseoriginatinginregions.But,doesthis
approachcontradictwithdevelopmentofpoliticalpartiesatnationallevel?
- Forinstance,incaseoftheelectionofsenatorsrepresentingPattaniwhere
majorityofvotersareMuslim,electedsenatorscompriseoneMuslimand
oneBuddhist.
- Prohibitionofcanvassingbysenatorresultsinelectionofonlycandidates
namesrecognizedbyvoters.
- Discernedthatelectoralsystem is problematicin terms of genuine
representationofthemajorityofpeople.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Guoguang Wu

- SharedconstitutionalreformexperiencesinChina.
- Discernedthatso-calledconstitutionalreformismerelytransformationof
thestateitself.
- Presentedcasestudiesregardingviolationofbasiccivilrightswhich
broughtaboutimprovementinlegislativearea.
- Itmaybesaidthatconstitutionalreformstemsfromattempttomonopolize
thestatespoliticalpowerwhileundertakingeconomicreform.
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Group 2
Summary and Discussions
Balance of Power and Relationships
between the Legislative and Executive Branches

1. Does 1997 Constitution generally pose any problems?

-Noproblemsregardingbasicprinciplesof1997Constitution.However,
therearepracticalissuesconcerningwithpoliticiansexerciseofthe
constitutionandpoliticiansbehaviors.
-Shouldretainkeyprinciples of1997Constitution pertaining tothe
executivespowerandenhancinggreaterandcleareraccountability.
-Itwouldbeamistakeif1997Constitutionperseisrejected.

2. Lesson learned from 1997 Constitution

Nofocusorlittleemphasisonpublicparticipation.
Emphasizeonparticipationofelitegroup.
InducecircumstancesthatfosterviciouscycleinThaipoliticalsystem.
Deviationfromthewillandkeyprinciplesoftheconstitutioninrespectof
parliamentaryquestioningprocessforoversightofthegovernmentand
removalofofficeholders.
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Theexecutivesoverwhelminginfluenceuponlegislativebranchinavariety
ofways.
Prescriptionofparliamentarydissolutionspowervestedsolelyuponthe
primeminister.
Issuesconcerninggapsbetweentheory,principle,andimplementation.
Issuesconcerningthelegislativebranchsmechanism,especiallyredundant
functions,partiality,andexcessivepowerofvariouscommittees.

3. Basic assumptions of Thailands political system and

constitution
PowerstructureinThaisocietyshouldreckonrealisticpoliticalandsocial
predicament,especiallypowerofmilitaryinstitutionandthemonarchy.
Paradoxofconstitutionaldraftingbetweendraftingforpracticalbasistoday
andinthefuture.

4. Basic principles and design of constitution

Emphasizeonsharedpowerofvariousfactions.
Detereitherfactionfrommonopolizingpower.
Deterabuseofpower.
Basicprinciplesimposedtoallowthegovernmenttofunctionandserve
publicinterestsoastoovercomeinstabilityandinsecurity.
Legitimacyandendorsementbypublicmajorityisconsideredlegalrules
andgenuinefeedbackfromthepeople.
Onceconstitutionisdrafted,itmustbepracticalinrealworld.
Curtailingtherolesofbureaucraticsystemandbureaucratswhowilltakeup
leadershipinpoliticalinstitution.
Strengtheningtherolesofindependentbodiesasawatchdogbodyandto
performpoliticaloversight;emphasizingperformanceofindependent
bodies.
Multitudeofbalance-of-powerschemes.

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5. Perception and attitudes towards constitution governing
a country
Constitutiondraftertendstoreckonconstitutionalpowerratherthantruthin
thesociety.
Influenceandparticipationofexpertsandtechnocratsinconstitution
draftingprocessismoreimportantthanparticipationofthepeoplewho
exerciseandareaffectedbytheconstitution.

6. Balance-of-power concept
Shouldviewpoliticsasbargainingprocessatsocietylevelratherthan
emphasizingonlyrelationshipbetweenlegislativeandexecutivebranch.
Shouldimposebalance-of-powerinwidercontextatcivilsocietylevel,
especiallybalance-of-poweroverthelongtermlinkedwithinducementof
citizenship.

7. Constitutional drafting process

Cherishrationalizationbetweentheprocessandtheoutcome.
Fosterlegitimacyandacceptanceofconstitutionaloutcomepertainingto
representation,expertsparticipation,andreferendum.
Basedonexperiencesinvariouscountries,itwasobservedthatreferendum
outcomemaybecontroversial.
Parallelprocessofconsultationandimpositionofpoliticaleducationin
constitutionaldraftingprocess.
Participationofpoliticalpartiesinconstitutionaldraftingprocesswhich
fosterstransformationofpoliticalpartiesandimprovementofpartypolitics.

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Group 3
Summary and Discussions
Oversight of the Exercise of State Power by
Independent Organizations
According to the Constitution

Part 1: Issues Concerning Oversight of the State Power by

Constitutionally Appointed Independent Bodies
Constitutionallyappointedindependentbodiesmustconfronthighly
powerfulexecutivebodies.Executivepowercanoverwhelmotherpowers.
Nominationprocessofconstitutionallyappointedindependentbodiesis
manipulatedbypoliticseitherthroughnominationcommitteeortheSenate.
ThegovernmentcancontroltheEC.Asaresult,allpowersaresubmissive
tothegovernmentbecausetheECintimidatesotherpoliticalpowers.
TheSenate,whichisdestinedtobeimpartialinpoliticsandplayvitalroles
innominationprocessofconstitutionallyappointedbodies,cannotmaintain
itsneutrality;anditispoliticallymotivated.Thus,thisadverselyaffects
nominationprocessofindependentbodies.
TheexpulsionprocessofofficeholdersinThailandisproblematicand
impractical.
Appointees in constitutionally appointed bodies tend to be retired
bureaucrats.Thus,theylackvisiontocarryouttheirduties.
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Constitutionallyappointedbodiesarenotsubjectedtooversightbyother
bodies.

Part 2: Recommendati on f or Nomi nati on Process of

Constitutionally Appointed Independent Bodies
2.1 Organization authorized to oversee state power
Shouldallowautonomousandpoliticallyneutralbodiestoperform
oversightfunctions.
Ifoversightquorumdoesnotmanifestdefinitivequorumsimilarto
characteristicsofthecriminalcasesectionofpoliticalofficeholdersin
theSupremeCourt,anadvantageislackofintervention.
Expulsionprocessshouldnotcovertoobroadascope,forexample,the
caseofhigh-levelbureaucrat.Insomecase,allegationshouldbe
explicitlydetermined.
2.2 Nomination process of constitutionally appointed bodies
Shouldnotallowpoliticalinterventioninnominationprocessof
constitutionallyappointedbodies.
Nominationprocessshouldentailqualifiednomineelistsystemsothat
independentbodiesareempoweredtoselectappointeesfromthelistof
qualifiednominees.
Ifnominationcommitteeisrequired,civilsectorshouldbeallowedto
partakeinsuchcommittee.
Shouldallowcivilsocietytoexaminenominees.
2.3 Stipulation of qualification of appointee in constitutionally
appointed bodies
Should allow civil sector to nominate competent nominee with
pertinentlydistinguishedachievementtorepresentinconstitutionally
appointedbodies.
Shoul d not al l ow onl y r epr es ent at i on of t he s t at e s ect or i n
constitutionallyappointedbodies.
Shouldclearlyprescribedetailedqualificationsothatnominationbody
canperformitsrolesaccordingtotheobjectives.

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Group 4
Summary and Discussions
Oversight of the Exercise State Power by the People

Past Situation
1. Corruption
1.1 Corruptionisavalueinthesocietyandorganization.
1.2 Mutuallydependentrelationshipineconomic,social,andpoliticalspheres
1.3 Inpolitics,itisabuseofpowerforpersonalgainsandinterestofclose
associates.
1.4 Monopolizingofpowerandquestforpowerisobserved.
1.5 Itisdifficulttoexaminehugecorruptionbylegalmeans.
Oversight
1.Peoplelearnaboutexerciseofstatepower.
2.Majoroversightprocessconductedbythepeoplewascreated.
3.Weakenedoversightpowerofinstitutedofficialbodiesentailsgreaterpublic
roles.
4.Oversightmeasuresundertakenbythepeople,bothindividualandgroup,
andmedia(newspaperismoreactivethanothers).
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5.Peopledonthaveaccesstoefficientoversightmechanism.
6.Prosecutiontakesalongtime.
7.IssuesconcerningprescriptionofcorruptioncaseslodgedatCCCanduseof
evidencewhichisdifficulttogather.
8.Oversighthasgainedlittlesuccess.Oversightofpoliticalpartiesisdifficult
andcomplicated.
Legislation
1.TheConstitutionoftheKingdomofThailandB.E.2540recognizesthe
importanceofoversightbutprovidesafewmechanisms.
2.Lawsdontfacilitateinformationdisclosureandhaveloopholeswhich
renderdeterrenceofcorruptiondifficult.
3.Issuesconcerning1997Constitution
- Considerablelimitations;enforcementisnotpossible;noconstitutional
laws.
- Amendmentprocessofsomeissuesintheconstitutionistooeasye.g.
rights.
- Notopenedforinternationalhumanrightlaws(butstipulatedinthe
interimconstitution).
Definition
Thoseexercisingpowerthosehavingpower,includinggovernment,cabinet,
politician,bureaucrat,andindependentbody
Corruption
1. Concernwithstateadministration,failuretoenforcelaws,exercising
monopolypowerforpersonalgains.
2. Offerprivilegestocronies.
3. Conflictbetweenself-interestandpublicinterest.
Media
1. Entitieshavingoversightpower.
2. Proposeprocessesandalternativesforthepeople.
3. Createvaluessothatthesocietycanreckonandperceive.
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Factors Influencing Corruption
1. Socialvaluethatacceptscorruptionasanorm.
2. Economic,social,andpoliticalrelationship
3. Monopoly

2. Factors Hampering Oversight by the People

1. Highoversightcost.Insomecase,thatmeanslossoflife.
2. Vaguelaws;lawsareunaccommodating,unenforceable,orinefficient.
3. Peopledonthaveeasyaccesstoinformation.
4. Thestateisnotresponsivetowhatisproposedbythepeople.
5. Peoplearenotvigilant.

3. Oversight Schemes of State Power Conducted by the

People
Various schemes
1. Pressinterview
2. Discussionandseminar
3. Lodgingdemandandsubmittingletterinunsealedenvelope
4. Enlistingsupporternamesaccordingtotheconstitution
5. Prosecution
6. Stagingdemonstration
7. Pursuingdifferentavenuestoupliftpublicawareness
8. SubmittingpetitiontoHisMajestyanddisseminationofinformation
Recommendation
1. Legislation
Theconstitutionmustclearlyprescribeoversightofcorruption.
Constitutionaldraftingmustbelegitimate.
Facilitateaccessibilityandparticipationofthepeople.
Developlawspertainingtoassetseizure,prescription,andnewlegal
principlesdealingwithcorruptioncase.
Equateprescriptionofcorruptioncasewiththatofcriminalcase.
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Incorruptioncase,mitigationofpunishmentorreprieveshouldnotbe
allowed.
Peoplemaybeinjuredpartyinstatecorruptioncase.
Peopleshouldattainprivilegeinoversightofexerciseofstatepoweror
corruption.
2. Other measures
2.1Socialmeasures
-Instillvirtueandethicsandcreatehealthydemocraticculture.
- Applypeoplesauditconceptandprocessmultilaterallytoinstill
virtue.
2.2Marketingmeasures
-Suitableeconomicintervention.Toomuchortoolittleintervention
maygiverisetocorruption.
2.3Politicalmeasures
-Carryoutpoliticalreformandinstitutepoliticalstructurewhich
empowerspeople,doesntmonopolize,establishesparticipatory
processofthepeople,andachievesequitableincomedistribution.
2.4Massmedia
- Neutralandtransparent
- Havefreedomindisseminationofnewsandinformation.
3. Implementation
Facilitatepublicoversightandprotectpeoplewhodemandtheirrights.
Offeroversightincentive.
Apportionabudgetforpublicoversight.
Inducegenuinepublicparticipationinpolicyprocess.
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Group 5
Summary and Discussions
Decentralization and Empowerment of Civil Society

Prof. Dr. Amara Pongsapitch

1. Development of civil society in three eras
-Civilsocietysectorcarriedoutactivitiessincethebeginning.
-Civilsocietysectorwasbarredfrompoliticalinvolvement(southernregion,
militarydictatorship).
-14Oct73,6Oct76,andPolicy66/23inducedexpansionofcivilsociety
sector,focusingon network operations.
-Atpresent,movementofcivilsocietysectorbecomesmoreprevalent.
2. Distinctive roles of civil society sector
-Thailandhasdemocracyviarepresentationsystem.
-Rolesofnon-governmentalbodiesabovethegovernmentsuchasUNor
internationalorganizationsfocusonstrengtheningfunctionsandrolesof
civilsocietysector.
3. Recommendation
-Shouldprovidespace/forumforcivilsocietysector
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Prof. Dr. Justin O. Frosini
1. State formation concept
-Singlestate
-Federalstate
2. Consideration on decentralization
-Clarifyingregionalroles
-Decentralizationmustbescrutinizedfrommanagement-legislative-judiciary
perspectives.
-Decentralizationcanbeimplementedwithapproacheslike
oTop-down
oBottom-up
Dependingonlocalcontext.
3. Recommendation
-Tosolveproblemsinthreesouthernmostprovinces,localityshouldbe
empoweredtoresolvesomeissues

Assoc.Prof. Dr. Nakarin Mektrairat

1. Civilsocietyconceptisstillambiguous.
2. Keyelementofcivilsocietysectorissenseofownership.
3. Localadministrationofcivilsocietyisself-government.
4. Localadministrationorganizationcancollaborateinprovisionofpublic
servicesundervariousschemes.
- Cooperative
- Executingagreement
- Arrangementofspecialzone
- Etc.
5. Recommendation
- Tosolveproblemsinthreesouthernmostprovinces,localitymustbe
empoweredtoresolvesomeissues.
- Localadministrationorganizationshouldinitiatecollaborativeundertaking.
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Collective Summary
1. Decentralization
- Civilsocietysectoriscrucialandmustappearintheconstitution.
2. Meaning of decentralization
2.1Original=publicservices
2.2 New=Decentralizationoflegislativepower(someaspects)
3. Decentralization upon three levels of organization
- Region
- Localadministrationorganization
- Civilsocietysector,civilorganization,communitygroup
* Condition:Clearlystipulatewhichlevelisaccountableforwhich
activity/function.
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Group 6
Summary and Discussions
Unjust Discrimination against People

Key Findings
Panelistssharedexperiencesconcerningunfairdiscriminationineachcountry.
Minoritygroups,whicharetreatedunfairly,include
- Women
- Children
- Domesticandoversealaborers
- Transsexualgroupwithsame-sexpartnership
Each country prescribes human right provisions in
- Constitution
- Legalprovisions
- Internationaltreaties
- UNChartersalsomentionabouthumanrights,equality,anddignity
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However, in practice, legal provisions stipulated in aforesaid sources
are rarely observed because of the followings:
- Weakhumanrightinstitutemayresultfromthefactthatitissetupbythe
government.Thus,itbecomesatoolofthegovernment.Forexample,
SuhakaminMalaysiaissupervisedbythegovernment.Privateinstituteis
alsoweakenedbecauseoflackofbudget,personnel,andlawenforcement
authority.
- Cultureineachcountryisanotherfactorthatrenderslegalprovisions
unenforceable.Forexample,patrioticmindsetresultsininadequate
protectionforalienworkers.Dispositiontowardsnationalsecurityalso
rendershumanitylessimportantthanpeopleorcitizensofthatcountry.
- Nationstateconceptisanotherfactorthathampersequalaccesstovaluable
sourcesandnationalresourcesbythepeoplelivinginthatcountry.
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Summary of discussion
from participants

Participant comments
- Bipartisanpoliticalsystem
- ThaiconstitutionshouldconformwithThaisocietyorThailifestyles.
- Renderpoliticalpartyapublicly-ownedparty.
Mechanism of Success
1. Havingclearlegalframework.
2. Reviewdecentralizationofpublicfinance
3. Thestatemustclearlylimititsroles
3.1Reducerolesempowerlocaladministrationorganizationandcivil
society
3.2Transformitsrolestowardsbecomingasupporterofcivilsocietysector.
4. Enhancecapacity-buildingofthecivilsector.
Essence that Should Be Incorporated in the Constitution
1. Proposecurtailingrolesofcentralgovernment.
2. Prescribepersistentdecentralization.
3. Revi ew st ruct ure and management syst em of l ocal administrat i on
organizationanddecentralizationofpublicfinance.
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4. Reformingbureaucraticsystem(attitude/power).
5. Determinationofmechanismandchannelforexerciseofadministrative
powerbycivilsocietysector.
In conclusion, human right issues in each nation arise from
a group of people
- whobelongstoacountrybutisconsideredaminoritye.g.women,children,
laborersetc.
- whoresidesinacountrye.g.alienworkers,refugeesetc.
- Inthemeeting,casesofalienworkeranddiscriminationbygovernment
agencieswillbecited.
- Thailandadoptswinner-take-allelectoralsystemtoreducethenumberof
politicalpartiesandinstallcoalitiongovernmentwithafewpartiesand
politicalstability.
- Inreality,itis pluralitysystemratherthan majority system.
- Proportional or party list electoral system is aimed at fostering
developmentofpoliticalparties.
Challenging Questions
1.Clarifyingthestatuswhetherlocaladministrationorganizationisconsidereda
civilsocietysector.
Localadministrationorganizationisquasi-bureaucraticagency
detachedfromstatureofcivilsociety.
Localadministrationorganizationposesasarepresentativeofthe
peopleMustbecivilsociety.
2. Precisemeaningofparticipation
3. Localadministrationorganization/civilsociety=self-government
Oversee people
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Special Keynote Address
By Former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai
Constitution: sustainability of democratic system in Thailand
Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
On Sunday, November 5, 2006.
United Nations Conference Center, Bangkok
Ratchadoemnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand


Chairman, Secretary-General of King Prajadhipoks Institute
and Distinguished participants,
L ast few moment s ago, our present er fai l ed for 2 peri ods, and I was a
representative for 13 periods. Therefore, I will not be qualified if the next issue of
the constitution prohibiting for 2 periods. I must be reborn again so that all of the
participants can be in conference for 3 days. At this minute, I think everyone is very
tired but please bear with me for another half hour. If you return home by car, please
tell the driver to pick you up here. But if its an airplane, please dont tell them to
pick you up here. Anyway, it was such a great advantage to hear everyones speech
at the last few minutes ago, especially listening to political colleagues talked about
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giving their enthusiasm. For those who dont have money and I would like to
encourage you to find money. If you dont even have money for the application fees,
please dont apply for it. But please dont use the money to buy votes because if you
think that you want to buy votes then stop thinking about enter the political arena.
Because of todays crisis, it causes us to talk about the next issue of the constitution
reform for today. The main causes started from this event, which was the event on
buying vote. And, it was the worst thing in the period of 74 years for changing the
democratic form of government in Thailand. In few moments, we will get to review
on this, but I would like to admire King Prajadhipoks Institute for creating this
subject in advance. I am not sure if there is any conspiracy behind todays talk,
which will occur at the same time of power seizing. It is not an exam but obviously
it is about copying the exam answers. The subject is very interesting because at the
end, we come back to the first step. The first step is to start thinking again about the
constitution, how it looks like? We have discussed and compared the comments of
several experts from foreign countries. Yesterday, I had an opportunity to listen to
Prof. Dr. Borwornsak about copying the West Minister Model.
Today I will not talk about the form of Amitharam Temple and its comparison
but I would like to inform that the universal standard of democratic process is in the
form of West Minister or the form of Amitharam Temple. It must be the same thing
but the process on some of the structure must agree with the cultural belief and
values of Thai people. I would like to emphasize that the chairman had already
commented at the opening remark to give more consideration on our own culture.
There were several examples that I had discussed with Secretary General on the 17
issues of the constitution. There were several observations on some of the issues that
we had an opportunity to review at the time. But for the benefits of colleagues and
friend from foreign country who came to this conference, which I think that these
participants had high level of experiences from their own countries. But I would like
the participants to learn about the background, in which we can trace back to look at
our own history in writing for more than 800 years. And for almost 1,000 years, our
country had been ruled by King as the chief of state or called as Por Kunram
since the Sukhothai, Ayutthaya, Thonburi or Rathanakosin periods.
Our foreign friends can completely understand this quality from the past, which
had also influenced the ideas on the government system. In the past, the changes
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had been occurred 74 years ago and we had been governed under constitutional law
under the parliament system and ruled by King. However, we can fairly say that the
ideas on the changes for the government in the past 74 years had been expressed
through royal thoughts at the time of the revolution by the peoples party. I believe,
you had seen from the history that King Rama 5
th
wanted Watchilawut students to
give the parliament and the constitution to the citizen after sitting on the throne. At
that time, there was no word called Constitution and the king had borrowed these
words constitution and parliament from a foreign language since King Monkul 6
th

had sat on the throne for 10 years. There was only a project to experiment with
politic such as Dusit Thani, and the required education through Royal decree on
required education. This was an intention to provide more education to the people,
and it served the main purposes of King Prajadhipok 7
th
.
I believe that King Prajadhipok institute has gathered the most complete
information and you can observe that the kings high intention to change the country.
But the kings royal thought had been turned down from the 2 powerful prime
ministers because Thai people in Siam did not have adequate education. I believe, the
king was very regretful that his royal thought had been turned down from the prime
ministers and his advisors. Even though, the drafting of the constitution had already
been started and the appearance of this issue of constitution is more or less that the
constitution of the Maji period, but we need to admire his royal thought.
The changing on June 14
th
, 1932 was the time of power seizing, and the first
temporary issue of constitution has been started on June 27
th
, 1932 to draft the
permanent issue of constitution. At that time or 74 years ago, there were no sky
train, or subway, but it seem that the drafting process was faster than today. At last,
the temporary issue of the constitution for the year 1932 had been completed on
December 10
th
, 1932 and it was called as the first permanent issue of constitution.
Our foreign friends should know that today is holiday and at this moment its
beginning of the time to have constitution for the democratic system of Thailand.
Therefore, the official holiday on December 10
th
has been marked until today. I have
checked all 17 issues of constitutions and arranged them in order to find the subject
on the sustainability of the democratic system of Thailand. By looking at the
comparison time of used for the constitution, you can observe that the first
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permanent issue of constitution from the year 1932 had been used for the longest
period of time. It had been used for about 14 years but there were some changes on
this one. The second longest issue was the issue of the year 1978 and the third
temporary issue of the year 1959 had been used for 9 years and the permanent issue
had been used for 2 years. We may not apply the lasting number of time of the issue
for the constitution to measure anything because the 9 years or third longest issue
was the issue of dictatorship system and also a temporary issue for the revolution
party to stay and to overthrow the government. They stayed since the period of
General Sarit to General Thanom and one of the Prime Minister passed away and
then another one changed the constitution to the 1968 issue. I have a chance to study
the constitution at the university and studying all the indoctrination at the time of
revolution by the dictatorship system. I had studied all the concepts and did not
know where to perform, so I performed a play through Chinese opera at Thammasart
University. That was the origin of the Thammasart Universitys Chinese opera but I
also had participated with the actual constitution and that was the 8 issue of
constitution of the year 1968. Actually, My age was qualified to apply as the
representative.
Therefore, I am a practitioner for todays talk and I am not a theorist or a
draftsman for the constitution. I have never draft any constitution but I have play in
the politic arena since I was qualified to apply for it. When someone criticize the
evil side of the politician, I am in pain because I am very determined to work for
politic since the beginning and not because I have no place to go or I have nothing to
do. I have work to do and I have a career as judge waiting for me. But I choose to be
a politician and when the people choose me to work for them and I feel very proud
which is the best thing in my life. I would like to tell my friend that for the moment
ago you don have money and you really wanted to be a representative or if you
really wanted to be a representative then money is not a matter. If you have money
to buy one jeep for about 10000 bath but you have no money to buy gas then you
need to use motorcycle to find vote. But we have high intention, and Thai politic
need people with good intention who willing to do the work with forcing to work.
You have to apply to work for the politic with love and if you have spirit in you soul
then I can guarantee that you will work for the politic of the country and the public.
The public will get to use the constitution of the year 1968 which spend about 9 year
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to draft and use it for 2 years and 9 months after that the parliament fell. In all of the
17 issues, especially for the permanent issues, I can say that the issue of the year
1932 was used for the longest period of time about 14 years with some changes.
Therefore, it can be honestly asserted that this particular issue of the
constitution had good standard and built stability on the democratic system. Because
that issue had lived longer through the period of World War 2 which helped extend
the life of the representative for another 4 years without new election. Thus, the
representatives were very satisfied and they didnt want to change the constitution.
The name of the country had been changed from Siam to Thailand on that issue and
we started to have good issue of constitution later. I narrate on this event to confirm
with you that the democratic process under the first issue of the constitution has been
developed in a good order. Even when the freedom of the citizen was still limited
through their inadequate education and the time had been extended for choosing only
the representative from the election under the agreement of 20 years period.
However, in the year 1946, we had second permanent issue of constitution through
the agreement that it was an appropriate time to improve the constitution to agree
with the changes of the better democratic system. At last, this legislative
constitution was revolutionized and the bird flu started to spread in the year 1947.
No one had though that the virus will stay this long and to compare with situation
today, and its similar with the silent on the spreading of the bird flu virus. No one
can be sure that the virus will be gone when General Pin seized the power on the year
1957. That was the beginning on the use of a coup d etat to destroy the constitution
and this kind of behavior has emerged in stages. When it continued in several short
periods such as 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, 5 years until the year of 1957, the year of
dirty election.
I came to Bangkok for the first time and in the end, General Sarit had destroyed
the power of General Por. or the prime minister with the longest serving period of
time. At this point, we had 9 years on temporary issue of constitution to use for
drafting the 2 years permanent issue. And I started to use this issue of constitution
till today and until it had been changed to the 17 issue. Therefore, I am here to talk
to you as a practitioner, not a witness and I think that its very reasonable to tell you
directly that each issue has its own weakness and strength point. As you can see,
since the issue from the year 1968, I started to be a representative on the year 1969
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and this issue had no democratic system at all. This issue had prohibited the member
of the parliament to become a prime minister and only the permanent government
officers were qualified to be a prime minister and member of the parliament. This
legislative issue had allowed the coup party to stay in the power and they actually
stayed until we got tired of them. Finally, the constitution of the year 1968 had been
issued until the event on October 14, 1973 and it revolutionized itself. Actually
before the October 14, 1973, there was an event on November 17, 1971 by General
Thanom or prime minister and he revolutionized himself through time limitation.
But I had told him that I had written this story in the book of Royal institute on the
power seizing of the year 1971 through the perspective of the representative of the
people.
We can concluded that it was a blame on the member of the representative of
the people, but actually the as I was at the real event, the government under General
Thanom or the Sahapracha Thai party had given money to the member of the
parliament about 350,00 bath per each person and we said that it was not right.
The government had no concern on the member of the parliament. The
government party received 350,000 Bath on the first year and they needed one
million Bath for the second year. The commission needed one million Bath but the
government did not give it to the commission. They bargained to make another
consideration on the slow budget and the General Thanom was annoyed by this
situation, so he started the revolution and seized the power. Actually, they seized the
power of General Thanom, this may sound confusing to the foreigners but they had
different last name. Then, another temporary constitution had been issued and used
for managing the country until the incident on October 14, 1973.
Finally, the country had entered the battle period of the citizen and the period
without the power seizing of General Thanom. It fell from the changes through the
flight of the citizen and students. Thus the government had emerged from confer of
the king and professor Sanya Thammasak and then the best constitution had been
created in the history of democratic system of Thailand. It was the constitution of the
year 1974 and this issue started the election of the year 1975 and before the incident
of the October 6, 1976. I would like to tell you that constitution of the year 1974 was
one of the best issue because it was a democratic constitution. Also, this constitution
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started the election to agree with the culture of the Thai people. Before this, we had
an election with the combination of boundary system in the year 1969 and I applied
on the election of the province. And I had 2 representatives and one came from
Prachat hi pat Part y, and one from General Thanoms part y. There were 6
representatives from Chiang Rai and Pracharthipat won all on that period of the year
1974. Obviously, we can observe that if the boundary for the election is too large
and it will be difficult for the citizen to receive care from the representatives even if
the representative party was the legislative party. According to the required process
of the election on the first limited boundary of the election, each boundary had 3
person. And this concept has influenced to the next constitution of the year 1978.
I would like to say that the second longest constitution is the Constitution.
You can imagine that the constitution during the period of General Kriengsak
Chamanun called half democratic constitution issue, and why it stayed for a long
period of time? Actually this constitution had no democratic system at all. If you
look at the provisional article on the 4 years periods, the intention of this provisional
article was to let General Kriengsak Chamanun to stay as the prime minister. And
actually, he became prime minister, but in the end, General Kriengsak Chamanun
resigned because there was not enough support Thus, General Prem Thilasulanon
came to replace him and this was one of the reason to have the second longest
constitution of Thailand. All of the politicians had agreed with the government of
General Prem Thilasulanon and the control on the stability of the country was under
the permanent government officer, which was the soldier. They were both
government party and political party, so this constitution stayed very long until the
year 1991. Several government parties had been changed such as General Prem,
General Kriengsak and General Prem, and General Chardchai Chuanhawon, and
finally on February 23, 1991, General Soonthorn Kongsompong had seized the
power. And this may help answer on the lengthy period of the constitution when the
provisional article had been canceled. We have to say that this issue of constitution
must admit on the appropriation of the constitution of the year 1974. Al last, this
constitution must be amended and changed on the election, which in the past, the
region of the province was the division for the election and each region should have
only 3 person. If each boundary had more that 3 people, then it should be divided
into 2 regions with 2 people.
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Therefore, the changes on the concept in the year 1974 on the election system
had great impact on the results, which I think we can come to the conclusion now.
You may think about the year 1997, at last, we used the regional system with 1
person for one region. The villages used to call it as one man one vote which is a
western system, isnt it? How Thai culture will respond to this situation? Because
the idea came from the learned person but they may not feel the reality, therefore the
idea has been presented now to observe the constitution of the year 1974 and the year
1977. You may look at the improvement on the additional details, between one
person for each region on the constitution of 1997, each region with no more than 3
people in the year 1974, 1978 and to the year 1991. Which of these years are more
suitable to have great effect on the results? Between those who buy votes and those
good people who dont buy vote? And, one person for each boundary!
It must be very difficult to win those people who buy vote. Since I have play
in the political arena for more than 37 years, I have to say that I am the only one on
the parliament who still flight to win and the longest one to stay too. Again, I think
the election process has been developed very well and more of several educated
people also had entered the election. In contrast, it disagreed with the worst
development on buying votes because there were more numbers of people who buy
votes. We will not have the best government if they cheated on the election. Those
people who buy votes will not care about the people and their living. Therefore, the
developments over the 74 years had several good things even there were several
revolutions. But we still learn from these experiences to find the deficient points and
to solve the problems. Finally, it became the origin of the constitution of the year
1997 and the year 1991. Have you heard? Each time of the revolution, the coup
seized the power to improve the constitution because the constitution was not in the
form of a democratic system. Actually, we can go back in the past 74 years that the
development on the constitution was to accept more power from the citizen except
some of the incidents such as the case on the constitution of the year 1968, 1949 and
1946. These developments went into a reverse on privilege and the power of the
citizen. But I think the developments had been improved in good order. And if it is
truth so why there was the incident on September 19.
I woul d l i ke everyone t o go back t o revi ew t he announcement of t he
governmental reform party under the king as the chief of the state. On that night,
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there were 4 reasons for them to seize the power. I dont have time to give the
complete details and there were more important aspects to refer to on the incident.
We may say that it was the part of weakness of the government, and, there were not
much of it. There were some unclear, unstable ideas on the constitution and some
violation on the 17 issues of the constitution. I can honestly say that there were little
changes on the structure of the sovereignty power on the 3 institutions. Only the
issue of the year 1997, new organizations had been established to support the
democratic system. No one realized that these organizations became as a
counterweight. We can say that the legislation and the management power still had
great relations even there were few changes on some particular periods. The
technical expert groups suggested to improve the member of the parliament without
the responsible of the political party. Some experts said that they didnt want to see
the political party control the member of the parliament. Personally, speaking from
my own experience, I dont agree that the member of the parliament responded by
the political party need to sell themselves. Even though, it was just a personal
behavior, but it was truth. We will only need to assign the agreement on the time to
be under the responsibility of the political party. Obviously, we can talk about these
problems on the relation between the legislation and management and these will be
the problems that we can criticize forever due to our system as usual.
Our system was the legislation and the management. Do we want the
legislation as the government party to overthrow the its own government? Is it
possible? It is not possible. However, the relation and the counterweight have more
reasons than before at this moment. When we talk about the legislation and
constitution of 1997, we had senators, the senate from the election, then we had 2
supporting columns or one big column divided into 2 sides, one side was the
representatives of the people with majority votes. This is not the form of the
President of a Republic, therefore, we can not expect to see the legislative party to be
part of the government and to evaluate as the opposition which is not possible. We
need to understand them that the legislative party is part of senate, and it will be a
failure through the evaluation by the government. And it can get worst when they
appointed in some period because they sold themselves and receive monthly salary.
Some people said they paid an installment to work on a daily labor. But this was the
truth happening in the past.
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Well, please allow me to admire the member of the senate who were being very
independence. As you can see, if the management came from the legislative party,
then it reflected the legislative side. I can confirm that we will have the government
as we have the legislative party. If you buy votes then we will have the government
that buy vote. Actually, the changes on the system of the government in the past 74
years, one of the strong party is the judicial service. I have to say that it is the
judicial service. Also the stability of the judicial service came from the government
officer and not from the election. The judiciary makes their ways up from the
assistant of the judge and then become the judge. Thus, people accepted more on the
judicial service. I think that I can end the three power of sovereignty on the
condition of reality.
Now we can t al k on t he beam of t he power, whi ch i s t he heart of t he
democratic system. If the beam of the power is stable then the democratic system
can be sustainable. However, the content of the constitution is as important as the
people who use the constitution. I have to talk about the 4 points of the reform party
on the democratic system under the power of the king as the chief of the state on
September 19. This is one part on the use of power by the executive in the past 5
years. Our foreign friends have no chance to know such as England, and America.
Actually, England had sent diplomatic agent to meet me. And I call the diplomat as a
democratic person choosing from the election. For us, we will never support the
revolution through power seizing, but we have to admit that we never see the worst
case on the development of the country as this one. Beside the information
mentioned by the reform party, I have to tell you that we are seriously missing the
balance, which means that there was interference on every organization. The main
organization was your member of the senate, and at least 60 people sold themselves.
And these 60 people had affected the changes on the results of the voting.
When the member of the senate had sold themselves, then they had resolved to
select the committee for the independent organization. This was the reason that we
did not get the right person when this organization did not have the right people at
the beginning. These organizations were not able to perform according to the
intention on the establishment of the institution and the evaluation could not be
made. To be fairly speaking, before the last government party through the
revolution, these organizations had been already established, and also at the same
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time when I was a prime minister and had done the best on the work. I was able to
check the members in my party and my government, or punish them because they
came from the honest election without interference. The government did not try to
compete, and distribute a list of the senate member for the selection of their own
people. But after that the selection of these people had been changed, even the
article on the legislation had been assigned about sending one representative. But
with the alibi on the use of the constitution, the constitution did not say that there
must be a party with a majority vote. Then they choose the party with vote from one
person, two persons as the representative. Apparently, the party with the second
majority vote did not get selected at all. The mechanism of the selection process is
partially paralyzed because the selection has been assigned and ready to be
transferred from the Office of National Police to work as an advisor of the Prime
Minister at the Government House.
We can simply say that the government tried to build a wall to defend itself.
The government didnt build the immune system and good values for protection.
Instead, the government built the wall to protect harm from other by not letting
anyone to inspect on the work. The inspection process could not be made, and this
problem scattered to every organizations such as Justices of Constitutional Court,
Office of National Counter Corruption Commission and Office of Election
Commission of Thailand. As you can see, Office of National Counter Corruption
Commission is obviously the worst one. These organizations were not able to
inspect the work for the management team. Obviously, the election of the year 2005
was one of the dirtiest one in the election history of Thailand. Did they select any red
ticket?
Yes, they did. They selected one ticket, which was Mr. Thanin Jai Samut. And
he made a speech against prime ministry on the story of Tak Bai. This is the truth.
They did not catch anything else at all because office of Election Commission of a
Thailand was perished.
I have to mention this because the permanent officers talked about these evil
things. For election of the year 2005, the permanent office had participated in this
election too such as police, soldier and the bad management team. Actually, they had
been assigned to help Thai Ruk Thai Party, If you didnt help them then they will
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accuse you as a mafia. Some units of the soldier became a weapon, a place to meet
and talk about the cheating for the election. Also, the police was the worst to talk
about because the management had to bargain with them too. Last Friday, new
governors had been appointed and one of these governors came to see me. And the
governor said to me that he has been a governor for a long time and he wasnt sure
that this time he will be appointed again. I ask him about the truth and he said they
bargain with him to stay in the south. But under one condition, he must let the Thai
Ruk Thai Party win the election. Did he accept it? He said, he was scared to accept
it. So when you are afraid, you dont get select. So he asked, what he supposed to
do this time. The deputy is from Chulalongkorn, the director general of a
government is from Chulalongkorn, and the minister is also from Chulalongkorn too.
And he is Red Singha from Thammasart and that scared him already. So I told him
all the story on the last election that most of the governor had been offered to help
cheated on the election for Thai Ruk Thai Party. I cant help it if you complain this
time because if you had been appointed for the position, then you are the governor
without any condition to help any political party. These are just some bad example
that happened to the election. Have you ever seen any soldier complain at any
period? And please let me use the quote by the General Montri, he criticized about
me on that he needed a soldier to be a minister of defense. Mr. Chuan Leepai as a
civilian is also good because he created many good works and he didnt know much
about army. So, the General ordered the soldier to be in the operation. Actually, I
dont know the details and thats truth, but I have worked on the policy. I have to say
that there were many blames and criticisms about politicians. However, about
General Surayuth or our current prime minister, if there were no politicians from the
civilian to work as minister of defense, so I am not sure that he will get the
opportunity to be a commander for the army or not. Because the General had been
transferred twice to be the honorable expert and cut loose from the 5 tigers. But
I dont see any rules that the commander of the army must come from the 5 tigers or
5 elephants or 5 rhinoceros. I was the one you brought him through good negotiation
with the former commander of the army or the General Jatha Thanajaroa and spend
about 2 to 3 weeks to understand it. The General presented good person but I knew
the best person that would be appropriated with the crisis on the corruptions, fraud on
the budget of the army, trade on weapon, fraud on the brokers payment. They
bought those things that could not be used on the first day because no one came to
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shoot them yet. There are no war and no shooting. This is how we work here.
Therefore, if you want to blame the politician, then you need to know how to analyze
on different sides.
You should understand that the political party is the one who want to seize the
power. The political party tried to compete to become politician to help on the
management. If you wanted to seize the power in 1996, I lose on 2 votes when the
light went out in Prathumthanee. I must struggle to be the government and the vote
of allies is waiting for me. But we had already said that if we didnt win the first
place then we wanted the first person to establish the government. Our words are
more important that becoming prime minister. We dont want to fight and seize the
power. Therefore, the real politicians will work for the country and the public.
Actually, the political arena is very similar with other arenas. There are good people
and bad people all together. But the important thing is that Can we really inspect
those people with bad behavior in the organization under the constitution? This is
the most important problem. And, if the organization was strong enough, then the
crisis on power seizing would not occurred on the 19
th
. What institutions would not
be responsible for this event? I had already mentioned on the judiciary service, the
management , t he cabi net , permanent government offi cers, i ndependence
organizations, mass media, and citizen.
However, citizen is the most important one. Who would you like to choose?
You want to choose the politician or political business people? You gave your votes
to them because you think they were good people or they paid the money for your
vote.
Obviously, the citizen is the very first group to get the inspection and the next
one is the judiciary service and the opposition party. Do they really do the work?
I am very proud to called you the 5 years. But, I was highly criticized because
I did many tasks and told the south was wrong since 5 years ago. They had no right
to kill people and it was wrong. We were the one who told that their solution for
solving the drugs problem is wrong, and it violated the legal justice of the country.
We were the one who said there was a seriously interference on the mass media, and
we complained to the ombudsman. Apparently, the mass media didnt feel anything
about it yet, but they had just come to the conclusion that it was the most important
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interference on the mass media. The opposition party is the first party to talk about
the interference on the independent organizations, and they could not work at all.
Today, I can honestly say that if I dont do this kind of thing, then all of you
will ask me again. You may say that Why dont you do it when you were the
opposition?
I was proud that I had done it at that time. Actually, I have to admit that I made
mistake on the cancellation of Southern Border Province Administrative Center.
Yesterday, I was just said that it was new information. I remembered that the
person who disagreed with the method of former Prime Minister Taksin is the
Deputy Commander of the 4 regions. And the Prime Minister Surayuth said that he
was also the one who opposed that ideas, and he had good new on the new
information. But unfortunately, there were no strong organization such as Office of
the National Security Council. It was good that he also helped oppose against
Taksin. Obviously, Taksin walked into the wrong path, and others tried to save their
own skin. They feared that they would be like the Deputy Commander of the 4
regions because Deputy Commander of the 4 regions disagreed with the ideas, and
he had been transferred to stay there. They feared to talk about it, and the country
had been destroyed from it. Can you see? All of the organizations are very
important as well as the mass media. Government was afraid of the media more than
the opposition party. They were afraid of the media, so they must control all of the
medias such as radio, television. And, they controlled about 100 % of the medias,
except the newspaper, and they only controlled about 80 % of it. When we made
complain about buying votes, then they criticized us as a bad gramophone record.
Anyway, We have to admit that people who use the constitution are as
important as the contents of the constitution, and it will sustain our democratic
system.
Finally, we come to the conclusion on the personal subject, and some of our
friend at this meeting talked about it too.
I have to say that political party must be the important organization for the
sustainability of our democratic system. Our member should observe on the political
parties because we had learned our lesson. But the political parties should be
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King Prajadhipoks Institute
583
established from the ideas of good political parties that work for the citizen.
They should not be hired to be in the election. Actually, they provide
opportunities in the real political parties. I dont dare to give example but I would
like to say that I am just like all of you. I am just a son of the common people. My
background is not a wealthy family, but this is my political party and my opportunity.
I have to prove it and I had spent about 22 years. Some people had resigned before
me and there is not a short cut for the son of the common people, but they gave me
the opportunity. The day we became the head of the political party, and we needed
the support from the government, the society and all of the organizations or the real
political parties. As a person who stay in the same political party all my life, the
work on the politic is not for the amateur and it was not easy to be in the politic.
They had to prepare the people on the management of the country and train about the
manner.
At last, I would like to end with the royal speech of King Bhumipol from 37
years ago. In our country, there are both good people and bad people. No one can
make all the people to become a good person. To keep the peace of the country is
not about producing good people but it is about supporting good people to govern the
country and control those bad people not to have the power, or cause trouble. This
royal speech was graciously bestowed on December 11, 1969. It is the truth and
eternal speech, which agree with every situation of every period, including now and
the future.
King Prajadhipoks Institute
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Closing Remarks
By Associate Professor Noranit Setabutr
KPI Congress VIII
Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
On Sunday, November 5, 2006. Time: 4:00 p.m.
United Nations Conference Center, Bangkok
Ratchadoemnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand


Former Pri me Mi ni st er Chuan Leepai , f el l ow exper t s f rom
neighboring countries and from far away countries, distinguished
participants,

A t last, the 8th Annual Meetings of King Prajadhipoks Institute has come to the
final part of the conference. And it is my duty as Secretaty General to give this
closing remarks. To all honorable guests, you had heard the introductory speech of
Prof. Loyd Axworthy on the last 2 days. He had given the ideas on the drafting
process of the constitution with many interesting observations. Also, you had listened
to many comments from the experts of several foreign countries and including
experts from Thailand. All the experts had pointed out many different perspectives
on the drafting process of the constitution. These are also very valuable experiences
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of those people who had practically worked on the political issues. On our todays
presentation, it was very enjoyable to see most people asking questions and offering
comments.
Many people were asking to speak on the limited time of the meeting.
Actually, this year is very special for me, and I have also received many gifts. And,
the closing remarks of the former Prime Minister Chuan Leepai is very impressive,
and please allow me say thank you for the wonderful remarks.
And please dont say that I am Prachathipat. Most of the time, I was accused
about this issue because yesterday I have invited the former chairman of the
parliament Dr. Bhokin Polkul who is not Prachathipat, but he is Thai Ruk Thai.
Today, I want to give special opportunities to the former prime minister of Chart Thai
Party to ask question. I thought, 3 parties had already asked questions, and other
parties also may ask questions too. As you can see, the beginning of the presentation
by Prof. Llyod Axworthy, the speaker was a former politician and used to be a
minister of foreign affairs of Canada. Few minutes ago, we also brought the
politician to give a closing speech. The experts closing remarks are also very
similar to my remarks. We have also invited the former prime minister and former
chairman of the parliament of Thailand, or Chuan Leepai to speak today. Therefore,
all the ideas had been presented from the experts and politicians. Actually, I want
like to say that, if you get to draft the constitution, then you really need to be patience
on its process. And you also need to hold on to the teaching of the Buddhist priest on
pat i ence or Kunti Thi rasa Lungal o. Pati ence i s the ornament of the
philosopher. Please be patience!
Whenever you had accepted to draft the constitution, they will complain and
curse later. You will be suffered if you are impatience about it. People were very
surprised, when we started the opening with the title on the Constitutional Reform:
Comparative Perspectives. And I thought that the Secretary General of the Institute
has changed the title of the meeting for the excitement of this situation. I have to say
that the Secretary General is not that proficient. The answers on test have not been
copied because we dont know who make the test.
Until the September 20
th
, we will know who make the test. I mean September
20
th
, and that is really the truth! For this kind of meeting, we may not change the title
of the meeting as in the regular kind of debate. We have been thinking about it for
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more than 2 weeks. Also, title of the meeting had been announced in last November
and the public knew about it in advance. Professor Andrew Harding had confirmed
that he prepared to debate on the second. Actually, more people were very interested
to participate, when the title of the meeting is very updated, and there are many good
and famous experts in this meeting. Also, more people would like to come and listen
to the debate even on the last day of the meeting. Eventually, the debate has received
good feedback more than we have expected. Honestly, I can say that there are more
people at this meeting in the history record. But for next year, we may not have
many people because the power seizing may not happen again. I believe that all the
comments on the presentation will be useful to all the people who would like to help
draft the constitution. May be we should collect the money on the expenses from the
body of people who will draft the constitution in the future? But we dont know
where we need to send the bill to collect the money. At this moment, please allow
me t o say t hat we have a chai rman and st rong group of commi t t ee for t he
management of the meeting, and the chairman is Dr. Chingchai Harnjanelak.
Besides, we also receive the participation from friends outside the country and
inside the country such as Professor Harding from the Victoria University and
experts from several countries from Europe and Asia. They are now sitting in here
on your left and right hand side. I have noticed that there are many experts at this
meeting, since the time I was working as Secretary General. Actually, it is very
unusual that Prof. Robert B. Albritton is here, because he said that he has class to
teach at the university.
If it is not because of the title, then he will not be here. He is very determined
to come to speak and listen to the debate. I didnt say that myself. But he was
speaking on this stage this morning, and all his speech may not be the same with my
speech. Actually the intended speech had the same contents for other supporters,
which their names had been written on the curtain such as from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
However, we didnt know because the government didnt organize us, but
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was partially a sponsor. You may read the report and you
can see that there are no lists on the name of Ministers from the office of the Prime
Minister. Actually, he gave it to me yesterday because Minister Theerapat is very
close to King Prajadhipoks Institute. Though, he became a minister, but still he
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came to the meeting. Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has given support
and Minister from Office of Prime Minister also come here to give a speech.
Anyway, please dont get me wrong, because the government didnt organize us and
I have no idea about it.
For the Government Lottery Office, you consumed and then you shared which
mean that you bought the lottery to help the event too. Also the UNDP has been
given us a lots of supports on financial issues, the cost for printing and the books for
all the reviews of the presentation. I believe that Dr. Thawilwadee must quickly
speed up to finish the work this year. Actually, I cant speed up anyone, but I try to
speed up myself to be out of position in the next 10 days. Do you believe it? PPT
Public Company Limited, Federick Ebert Foundations, French Embassy and
Columbo Plants also have given supports on this event. And I would like to thank
every sponsor for supporting us. Especially, I also would like to thank the individual
and juristic person. We dont hire 3 press secretaries but we have one press
secretary. For those people studying at and owing the debt to King Prajadhipoks
Institute, they also come to help organize this event. The organization for the 8th
Annual Meetings of King has been done very successfully at this time. For the
perfection of this event is for all of the participators to judge. But this event will fail
if you dont have all the participator from the foreign countries, provincial areas, and
Bangkok areas. I have to speak to the speakers, if you are not here today. Think
about it? How large is this room? I must be very lonely?
At this moment, it is about time and I believe that everyone has received good
food for thought on democratic process. I would like to ask permission to end the
meeting. Best wishes to everyone. Please dont forget next year on November. We
have the same meeting because we will have the next 8th annual meetings. Whoever
you are, any Secretary General from any institutes, you may not see them this year,
but they will project the scene in advance on the theme of the debate. They are afraid
that it will be accurate just as this year. They need to wait for about 2 months and
then they can come to a settlement. Thank you and Goodbye.
Collection of the image activities
APPENDIX
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Collection of the image activities
KPI Congress VIII
Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
November 3 5, 2006
United Nations Conference Center, Bangkok
Ratchadoemnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand
Hosted by King Prajadhipoks Institute
in conjunction with the Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives,
University of Victoria, Canada
Proceeding of KPI Congress 8 (2006) / 491
Constitutional Reform : Comparative Perspectives
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Collection of the image activities
KPI Congress VIII
Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
November 3 5, 2006
United Nations Conference Center, Bangkok
Ratchadoemnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand
Hosted by King Prajadhipoks Institute
in conjunction with the Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives,University of Victoria, Canada
Proceeding of KPI Congress 8 (2006) / 491
Constitutional Reform : Comparative Perspectives
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Collection of the image activities
KPI Congress VIII
Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
November 3 5, 2006
United Nations Conference Center, Bangkok
Ratchadoemnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand
Hosted by King Prajadhipoks Institute
in conjunction with the Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives,University of Victoria, Canada
Proceeding of KPI Congress 8 (2006) / 491
Constitutional Reform : Comparative Perspectives
(.:.:.r..:. : :::a.z.:.::.::)
Collection of the image activities
KPI Congress VIII
Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
November 3 5, 2006
United Nations Conference Center, Bangkok
Ratchadoemnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand
Hosted by King Prajadhipoks Institute
in conjunction with the Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives,University of Victoria, Canada
Proceeding of KPI Congress 8 (2006) / 491
Constitutional Reform : Comparative Perspectives
(.:.:.r..:. : :::a.z.:.::.::)
Collection of the image activities
KPI Congress VIII
Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
November 3 5, 2006
United Nations Conference Center, Bangkok
Ratchadoemnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand
Hosted by King Prajadhipoks Institute
in conjunction with the Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives,University of Victoria, Canada
Proceeding of KPI Congress 8 (2006) / 491
Constitutional Reform : Comparative Perspectives
(.:.:.r..:. : :::a.z.:.::.::)
Collection of the image activities
KPI Congress VIII
Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
November 3 5, 2006
United Nations Conference Center, Bangkok
Ratchadoemnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand
Hosted by King Prajadhipoks Institute
in conjunction with the Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives,University of Victoria, Canada
Proceeding of KPI Congress 8 (2006) / 491
Constitutional Reform : Comparative Perspectives
(.:.:.r..:. : :::a.z.:.::.::)
Collection of the image activities
KPI Congress VIII
Constitutional Reform: Comparative Perspectives
November 3 5, 2006
United Nations Conference Center, Bangkok
Ratchadoemnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand
Hosted by King Prajadhipoks Institute
in conjunction with the Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives,University of Victoria, Canada
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King Prajadhipoks Institute
47/101 Seminar Center Building, Civil Service Training Institute,
Tiwanon Road, Nonthaburi 11000
Tel. 0-2527-7830-9
Fax. 0-2527-7824
http://www.kpi.ac.th
Constitution Reform:
Comparative Perspectives
November 3-5, 2006
United Nations Conference Center
Rajdamnern Avenue, Bangkok, Thailand

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Constitution Reform:
ISBN : 978-974-449-395-8
1,299 B.-