Yang Yang Ethical Theory Professor Wright 21 April 2013 I.

In a recent report by Unicef, About 29,000 children under the age of five 21 each minute die every day, mainly from preventable causes. More than 70 per cent of almost 11 million child deaths every year are attributable to six causes: diarrhea, malaria, neonatal infection, pneumonia, preterm delivery, or lack of oxygen at birth (Unicef). What is striking about this report is not the number of deaths, but that they are of children and that they are preventable. If we extend past these deaths into the poverty stricken, war grieved, and the disease inflicted children, we have millions of underprivileged kids in need of serious help. I list these examples for becuase I take it to be granted and accepted by most people that children under five are not at fault for their deaths, poverty, and dire situations. If this is the case, do we, as citizens of affluent nations, have an obligation to help? And what of impoverished adults that grew up in such situations? Should we alleviate their sufferings as well? In the famous article Famine, Affluence, and Morality, Peter Singer gives us the scenario that I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing (Singer, 837). Peter Singer believes that it is rather obvious for ethical actions that we should not take into account proximity and distance or I am the only one capable of doing the good action or that I am just one among millions in the same position (Singer, 836). The resulting ethical theme in its qualified form is such: if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it (Singer, 836). The implication of this theory involves a radical change to our lives, but an aim for the correct ethical truth does not need to consider its departure from the norms. In fact, if we

act according to this principle, we would have to donate until we are left with only basic necessities. Here, I will address why I do not believe we need to accept Singers conclusion even if we agree with his premises. The purpose of this paper is to provide a different justification for obligation to help the drowning child as well as a different outlook on fighting global poverty and child fatality. II. The reason that I do not accept Singers conclusion is not due to practical concerns. That is to say the arguments I shall make does not involve the practicality or result of giving to charities. On the Supposed Obligation to Relieve Famine is an article by John Kekes that criticizes Singer with such concerns. Collectively, the concerns are an attempt to undermine our supposed obligation to help. The arguments are as follows: 1. It depends on who we are helping. Arguably, we do not want to help unjust aggressors or justly convicted murderers. 2. The consequences of helping like giving to charity may be worse than not helping at all 3. The people that are suffering may be responsible for their own demise. 4. The people threatened by the very bad thing are proud, independent, and refuse help. 5. Do our contributions actually matter? Is there a good chance of success in preventing the bad things from happening? With these considerations in mind, Kekes thinks that Singer, in offering his simple-minded argument, fails to consider these complexities (Kekes, 507). However, such considerations ultimately fail. Keith Horton points out that Kekes claim that we lack the kind of evidence on which to base a reasonable verdict, [but such is] apparently based on simple ignorance about the range of data that is available (Horton, 324). For charities, there are many studies of official aid (aid given by governments)

that have been produced. And then of even more relevance for potential donors, there are the various independent evaluations of projects conducted by NGOs (non-governmental organizations) (Horton, 323). If we want to know who we are helping, how we are helping, and the results of our charity, there are vast amounts of data out there that can address our concerns. As Singer has addressed in his original article, communication has changed into a global village with expert observers and supervisors, sent out by famine relief organizations or permanently stationed in the famine-prone areas, can direct our aid to a refugee in Bengal almost as effectively as we could get it to someone in our own block (Singer, 837). III. if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it (Singer, 836). In contrast to this principle, John Arthur raises up that we actually have a different set of codes, one of rights and deserts. Suppose that we can help others by giving away body parts, then Singers principle or, as Arthur calls it, the greater moral evil rule demands that sacrifice from us: our lives may be shortened by the loss of a kidney or [become] less enjoyable if lived with only one eye, [but] those costs are probably not comparable to the loss experienced by a person who will die without any kidney or who is totally blind. Similarly, if the absence of a sexual partner would cause psychological harm or even rape (Arthur, 847-849), are we obligated to provide services for those sexually deprived? If anything is clear , he says, itclear, it is that our code does not require such heroism (Arthur, 849). Rights and deserts, a different outlook on life, is each separated into two categories, of the positive and negative. Negative right are rights of noninterference such as right to life, right to privacy, and right to exercise religious freedom. Positive rights are rights of recipience, such as when I agree to share in a business venture, my promise creates a right of recipience, so that when I back out

of the deal, Ive violated your right (Arthur, 849). When we do not rescue the child in the pond, we are not violating anyones rights. Deserts are another kind of entitlement. Positive entitlements are earned: in the case that I work hard while my neighbor wastes his time by being lazy, I have earned it through *my+ hard work and am not forced to pay for my neighbor from the fruit of my efforts. Negative deserts are of punishment. A Nazi war criminal did what he did means he deserves punishment, even if he is old and harmless (Arthur, 850). However, Arthur does not think such entitlements are our only moral code, but that we agree with Singers principle as well. Entitlements are only the flipone side of the moral coin. In an objective point of view all comparable suffering, our morality and concern for equality demands equal consideration of equal consideration of interests as well as respect for certain rights (Arthur, 848). By considering both entitlements and equality, we are encouraged to help others in need, especially when its a friend or someone we are close to geographically, and when the cost is not significant. But it also gives weight to right and desert, so that we are not usually obligated to give to strangers (Arthur, 851). We perhaps should still rescue the girl in the pond, financially help our lazy and impoverished neighbor, or forgive and release the old Nazi soldier. Its just not clear as to when we are obligated to help. Why should this dual moral perspective be accepted? Arthur expresses that a moral code must be rational for us to support as well as be practical and must be able to gain the support of almost everyone. It is wrong to ignore the possibilities of altruism, but also wrong for a code to assume people are more unselfish than they are so that they would work only for angels. A reasonable code would require people to help when there is no substantial cost to themselves, that is, when what they are sacrificing would not mean significant reduction in their own or families level of happiness (Arthur, 851-852).

Certainly, Singers principle is too impractical to be of actual use. At an interview with Bailey Ronald in 2000, Singer stated he gives away 20 percent of his income to famine relief organizations. For Singers salary, the average salary of a full professor at Princeton runs around $100,000 per year in 2000 and Singer also draws income from a trust fund that his father [has] set up and from the sales of his books. Singer forthrightly admitted that he was not living up to his own standards, but that he was doing far more than most and hinted that he would increase his giving when everybody else started contributing similar amounts of their incomes. Perhaps Singer should reconsider his conclusions if he himself finds it impossible to follow his rules, but Singer would no doubt respond that his personal failings hardly invalidate his ideas (Reason). Returning to Arthur s argument, certainly, the ideal may be too farfetched for practical reasons, but Singer has also presented a weaker form of his argument: if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally to do it (Singer, 839). Sacrificing an organ, forcing oneself to give sexual services, or reducing oneself to poverty will be considered as something morally significant and of which we are not obligated to do. Singers weakened principle would account for our rights, but still obligate us to give considerable amount to charity. Moreover, Arthur fails to give us an account as to when we should be charitable. Why is it that we should help a friend or someone in close proximity, but not a distant stranger in severe need? Sure, we may be entitled to our fruits of labor due to just deserts, but that is not a justification as to why we are allowed to discriminate against strangers or those far off if our moral code also considers equality of interests. If anything, there is a clear contradiction in saying that we are entitled to our gains, but that we are also required to help when there is no substantial cost (Arthur, 852) to ourselves. How does our morality demand that we be charitable due to equal consideration of interests while at the same time deserving of what we sow?

IV. John Arthur may have realized this apparent paradox and thus decided to consider his moral schema as two sides of a coin. But the fact is that we dont have this moral contradiction nor do we want to live our lives as a paradox between two contrasting ideals. The question is: does objectivity require us to have equal consideration of interests (Arthur, 848)? Objectivity would only require us to have equal consider of interests if the said people are of equal desert. It is clearly wrong, for Singer and most, to save the life of torturous and mean spirit Nazi over the life of an innocent child. For Singer, the ones he is urging us to save are the lives of innocents, the victims of disasters, famine and poverty, those who are not ultimately responsible for their own demise. In the modern day, we do not feel sympathy if it is the Al Qaeda being killed, but feel regret for the innocent civilians that are killed by drone strikes. My point is this: objectivity does not lead to the equal consideration of interests of everyone independent of who they are, but also consider their past actions, and thus is aligned with the idea of desert. Thus, objectivity is not the opposite side of entitlements, but rather the same. A form of identification, of objectivity, is our basic moral outlook on life. Singers argument draws upon this: if it is morally necessary that we help the child drowning in the pond, we should be also obliged to help those far away since distance does not matter in todays age. There are however some significant differences that are of importance:. 1. T Firstly, the child that is closer is more deserving of help. The child is in the same society as I am and my society demands that I help the child so. Indeed, it may be part of my social contract contract. Second,2. Tthere is much greater impact if I refuse to save the drowning child than someone in a third world country. If everyone else in my society do not save the child, our society becomes of much lower ethical status and there would arise a great sense of distrust upon its inhabitants. Finally,3. iIt is of much greater satisfaction to save the drowning child through

personal actively involved efforts than spending money on someone far away. In addition, the guilt that would consume me if I do not save the child outweighs the amount of effort it would take me to do the actual saving. My third last objection is illustrated in Peter Ungers example of The Envelope and The Vintage Sedan. An envelope explains that unless I send a check of $100 to UNICEF, several children will die from treatable diseases. Most people would not condemn my action if I were to just ignore and throw away the letter. In the case of The Vintage Sedan, if through my driving I come across a birdwatcher whose leg is severely contaminated after being cut by a barbed wire and that the only way his leg will be preserved is if I drive him to the hospital at the expense of my backseats condition (ruined by blood from his leg), most people would think I ought morally do it. These examples illustrate the indifference people have toward those far away. Whether or not these possible reasons are fully justified is of another concern, the reason I present these objections is to show that Singers conclusion of(having to save those faraway) does not necessarily follow from his premise of(having to save the drowning child). I am sympathetic to Singers claim that we should help, but for different reasons. People are entitled to what they have earned due to desert. If this is what they believe, is it actually the case? According to globalrichlist.com, a salary of $50,000 per year makes you in the top .28% of the world. A salary of $10,000 means you are in the top 14.36 percent. Do we deserve what we earned? Due to no opportunities and low living standards, people are trapped in what we consider to be poverty. There are many of those who work just as hard if not much harder than we but earn less than ten times of our own salary. An appeal to our current conception of desert by the presentation of facts might persuade and result in acts of charity. By realizing the fortune of our situation, we can come to appreciate our circumstance but also come to realize we are not fully deserving of what we earn and thus be compelled to contribute to others in order alleviate our sense of equality and justice.

Secondly, we should be made aware of what we are in actuality doing when we purchase luxury goods. When we purchase and spend our money, we are also giving up part of our chance to give to charity. If I buy a new car, I should be aware of the fact that I am purchasing at the expense of potentially saving ten lives or more. These two reasons present a force as to why we should give to charity, but not obligated to. Yet, if a decent population of affluent nations is made aware, we can end global poverty as well as increase opportunities, equality, and liberty. Possible Objections: 1. Vanity of vanities, All is vanity. Humans believe they deserve what they receive. Thus, it is false to think people would donate because they wont realize they dont deserve their income etc. Reply: If people believe they fully deserve what they earn, we cannot convince them that they are obligated to charity anyway. This only goes further to show as to why we are against Singers egalitarian principle because of the fundamental idea of desert. Honesty with self is important and a lot of people will seek such honesty. With knowledge about the lack of opportunities that the world suffers, we would come to know that we are perhaps not as deserving as we originally thought and thus prompted to be charitable. As of now, we are not forthright presented with the details of the worlds disparaging income distribution and inequality in todays education;. Nnor is it easy to find out the full relevant details. In addition, through research, we come to see that we as consumers promote this inequality when we purchase goods through outsourced jobs. 2. There is something intrinsically wrong with saying that buying a new car means that we value a new car for ourselves/family more than we value the lives of 10 other people Reply: It is a harsh fact and one we have to live with. We are not moral and upright/caring as we believe we are. When we realize that we are not, but that we want to be, we become prompted to act morally and donate to charity. If I consciously buy a new car over saving lives, is it not true that I

have given in to value of a car for myself more than the lives of others? If i consciously decide not to save a drowning child over the hassle it brings, have I given more value to my comfort than the life of another? Works Cited: http://www.unicef.org/mdg/childmortality.html Bailey, Ronald. The Pursuit of Happiness, Peter Singer interviewed by Ronald Bailey. Reason, December 2000. Web. 06 May 2013. http://reason.com/archives/2000/12/01/the-pursuit-of-happiness-peter/. Kekes, John (2002). On the supposed obligation to relieve famine. Philosophy 77 (4):503-517. Peter Singer (1972). Famine, affluence, and morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243. John Arthur (2009). World Hunger and moral obligation: The case against Singer. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press. Keith Horton (2004). Famine and fanaticism: A response to Kekes. Philosophy 79 (2):319-327. Peter K. Unger (1996). Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence. Oxford University Press.