Office of the Ombudsman v CA Facts: Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria Constancia Corominas-Lim filed with the

Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) a criminal complaint for violation of Article 281 (Other Forms of Trespass) of the Revised Penal Code against herein Edmondo Arregadas et al, all employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office No. VII, Banilad, Mandaue City. The case was docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM99-1227. The same criminal complaint was also treated by the Office of the Ombudsman as an administrative complaint for abuse of authority and misconduct. By way of refutation, they alleged that they entered the Corominas landholding pursuant to the Order dated September 14, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 9 thereof, in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-17639 (entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Larrazabal, et al.), involving a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title. In the Resolution7 dated August 31, 2001, Charina Navarro-Quijano, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) I of the Office of the Ombudsman, dismissed the criminal complaint. However, in the administrative case (OMB-VISADM-99-1044), the Office of the Ombudsman rendered the Decision8 dated October 24, 2001, finding that, except for Arregadas, the other named DENR employees are guilty of simple misconduct and imposed on them the penalty of suspension for one month. Appellate court granted the petition of Armilla, et al. It affirmed the finding of the Office of the Ombudsman that Armilla, et al. were guilty of simple misconduct. However, it ruled that the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in imposing on them the penalty of suspension for one month. Citing the case of Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,12 the appellate court declared that the Office of the Ombudsmans power is limited only to the recommen dation of the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. Accordingly, it has no power to impose the penalty of suspension on Armilla, et al. Petitioner: Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6770 vesting in the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary powers. Citing the pertinent provisions15 in Republic Act No. 6770, petitioner posits that it possesses the following powers: "(1) [it] can, on its own, investigate any apparent illegality, irregularity, impropriety, or inefficiency committed by any public officer or employee not excepted from its disciplinary authority; (2) it can and must act on administrative complaints against them; (3) it can conduct administrative adjudication proceedings; (4) it can determine their guilt; (5) at its discretion, it can fix the penalty in case of guilt; (6) it can order the head of the office or agency to which the guilty public officer belongs to implement the penalty imposed; and (7) it can ensure compliance with the implementation of the penalty it fixed."16 Issue: WON Ombudsman can impose the penalty of suspension Held: Yes Ratio: In declaring that the Office of the Ombudsman only has the power to recommend, but not to impose, the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, the appellate court mainly relied on the following statement made by the Court in Tapiador, thus: Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph 3, of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned In fact, in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,25 the Court categorically pronounced that the statement in Tapiador on the Ombudsmans power "is, at best, merely an obiter dictum" and, as such, "cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of the Supreme Court. Likewise in Ledesma, the Court rejected the argument that the power of the

Office of the Ombudsman is only advisory or recommendatory in nature. It cautioned against the literal interpretation of Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution which directs the Office of the Ombudsman to "recommend" to the officer concerned the removal, suspension demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of any public official or employee at fault. Notwithstanding the term "recommend," according to the Court, the said provision, construed together with the pertinent provisions in Republic Act No. 6770, is not only advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. The Court further explained in Ledesma that the mandatory character of the Ombudsmans order imposing a sanction should not be interpreted as usurpation of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. This is because the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in Republic Act No. 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer. The mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman is expressed in Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution. Section 13 thereof vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the following powers, functions, and duties. In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman,27 the Court recognized that the foregoing enumeration is not exclusive and that the framers of the Constitution had given Congress the leeway to prescribe, by subsequent legislation, additional powers to the Ombudsman. The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond cavil. It is mandated by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution.29 In conjunction therewith, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative complaints: Sec. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which: (1) Are contrary to law or regulation; (2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; (3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions, though in accordance with law; (4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; (5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or (6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification. All these provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty. Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model whose function is merely to receive and process the peoples complaints against corrupt and abusive government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and employees. The legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions. De Rama v CA Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Petitioner de Rama justified his recall request on the allegation that the

appointments of the said employees were midnight appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. On April 30, 1996, the CSC denied petitioners request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC also cited Rule V, Sections 9 and 10 of the Omnibus Rules, and declared that the appointments of the said employees were issued in accordance with pertinent laws. Thus, the same were effective immediately, and cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority until disapproved by the CSC. The CSC also dismissed petitioners allegation that these were midnight appointments, pointing out that the Constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioners failure to present evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments. CA affirmed Issue: WON recall is valid Held: No Ratio: CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who made the appointments. Neither did he allege that the said appointments were tainted by irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and regulations governing appointments. His solitary reason for recalling these appointments was that they were, to his personal belief, midnight appointments which the outgoing mayor had no authority to make. Even in petitioners consolidated appeal and motion for reconsideration, he did not make any assertion that these appointments were violative of civil service rules and procedures. Indeed, he harped on the CSCs alleged lack of jurisdiction to refuse to recall the subject appointments. After first invoking the authority of the CSC to approve or affirm his act, he then contradicted himself by arguing that the CSC had no jurisdiction to do so, but only after the CSC had ruled that the recall was without legal basis. The grounds for the recall of the appointments that petitioner raised in his supplemental pleading to the consolidated appeal and motion for reconsideration are that: (1) the rules on screening of applicants based on adopted criteria were not followed; (2) there was no proper posting of notice of vacancy; and (3) the merit and fitness requirements set by the civil service rules were not observed. These are grounds that he could have stated in his order of recall, but which he did not. Neither did he raise said grounds in his original appeal, but only by way of a supplemental pleading. Failure of the petitioner to raise said grounds and to present supporting documents constitute a waiver thereof, and the same arguments and evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal before the CSC, nor in the Court of Appeals, and much less in a petition for review before the Supreme Court.[13] Petitioner asks this Court to appreciate and consider these factual issues. It must be recalled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact.[15] That is, of course, unless the factual findings assailed by petitioner are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.[16] A thorough perusal of the records reveal that the CSCs ruling is supported by the evidence and the law. The fourteen (14) employees were duly appointed following two meetings of the Personnel Selection Board held on May 31 and June 26, 1995. There is no showing that any of the private respondents were not qualified for the positions they were appointed to. Moreover, their appointments were duly attested to by the Head of the CSC field office at Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had already assumed their appointive positions even

before petitioner himself assumed his elected position as town mayor. Consequently, their appointments took effect immediately and cannot be unilaterally revoked or recalled by petitioner. well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing. [18] Petitioner admits that his very first official act upon assuming the position of town mayor was to issue Office Order No. 95-01 which recalled the appointments of the private respondents. There was no previous notice, much less a hearing accorded to the latter Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect un til disapproved by the Commission. Thus, it is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on any of the following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agencys Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agencys Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations. Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the above-cited grounds. And yet, the only reason advanced by the petitioner to justify the recall was that these were midnight appointments. The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohi bition on so-called midnight appointments, specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. Dissenting: Melo It is clear, however, that the Civil Service Commission did not find anything wrong or irregular in the appointments of respondents because it failed to appreciate the fact that "midnight appointments" - whether made by the President or by a mayor - are bad, because they are made hurriedly, without due deliberation and careful consideration of the needs of the office and the qualifications of the appointees, and by an appointing authority on the eve of his departure from office. "Midnight appointments" are bad because, as the Aytona decision puts it, they offend principles of "fairness, justice and righteousness." 5 They cannot be less bad because they are made at the local level, by mayors and other local executives Of course an outgoing executive retains the power of appointment up to the last day he is in his office. As the above excerpt from Aytona says, however, the exercise of such power is circumscribed by the requirement that the appointments made must be "few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications." 7 The hurried appointments of respondents detract from that degree of good faith, morality, and propriety required for appointments made by a faithful and prudent caretaker in order to be considered valid. Remolona v CSC Facts: Records show that petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the Postmaster at the Postal Office Service in Infanta, Quezon, while his wife Nery Remolona is a teacher at the Kiborosa Elementary School. In a letter[3] dated January 3, 1991, Francisco R. America, District Supervisor of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports at Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as to the status of the civil service

eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who purportedly got a rating of 81.25% as per Report of Rating issued by the National Board for Teachers.[4] After verification from the Register of Eligibles in the Office for Central Personnel Records revealed "that Remolona's name is not in the list of passing and failing examinees, and that the list of examinees for December 10, 1989 does not include the name of Remolona. During the preliminary investigation conducted by Jaime G. Pasion, Director II, Civil Service Field Office, Lucena City, Quezon, only petitioner Remolona appeared. He signed a written statement of facts[6] regarding the issuance of the questioned Report of Rating of Mrs. Remolona, which is summarized in the Memorandum Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no knowledge thereof, and that he did it because he wanted them to be together. Based on the foregoing, Director Pasion recommended the filing of the appropriate administrative action against Remolona but absolved Mrs. Nery Remolona from any liability since it has not been shown that she willfully participated in the commission of the offense CSC which issued Resolution No. 95-2908 on April 20, 1995, finding the spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona guilty of dishonesty and imposing the penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties. Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision dismissing the petition for review filed by herein petitioner Remolona. Issue: WON petitioner ought to be dismissed Held: Yes Ratio: 1. The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. The contention of Remolona that he never executed an extra-judicial admission and that he merely signed a blank form cannot be given credence. Remolona occupies a high position in government as Postmaster at Infanta, Quezon and, as such, he is expected to be circumspect in his actions specially where he is being administratively charged with a grave offense which carries the penalty of dismissal from service. 2. Although the offense of dishonesty is punishable under the Civil Service law, Remolona opines that such act must have been committed in the performance of his function and duty as Postmaster. Considering that the charge of dishonesty involves the falsification of the certificate of rating of his wife Nery Remolona, the same has no bearing on his office and hence, he is deemed not to have been dismissed for cause. This proposition is untenable. It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.[14]

Laurel v CSC Facts: Petitioner, the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangas, appointed his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor, a non-career service position which belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official. Upon the vacancy of the position of Provincial Administrator of Batangas, petitioner designated his brother as Acting Provincial Administrator. Then, he issued Benjamin Laurel a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer which is a position which the Civil Service Commission classifies as "primarily confidential" pursuant to P.D. No. 868. Laurel: . . . what is prohibited under Section 49 of P.D. 807 is the appointment of a relative to a career Civil Service position, like that of a provincial administrator. Governor Laurel did not appoint his brother, Benjamin, as Provincial Administrator. He merely designated him "Acting Provincial Administrator." And "appointment" and "designation" are two entirely different things. Appointment implies original establishment of official relation. Designation is the imposition of new or additional duties upon an officer to be performed by him in a special manner. It presupposes a previous appointment of the officer in whom the new or additional duties are imposed. On 12 July 1983, the Civil Service Commission handed down the aforesaid Resolution No. 83358 7 which, inter alia, revokes the designation of Benjamin as Acting Provincial Administrator on the ground that it is "nepotic", or in violation of Section 49, P.D. No. 807 on nepotism. Petitioner's motion to reconsider said Resolution, 8 based on the claim that the questioned position is primarily confidential in nature, having been denied in Resolution No. 85-271 of 3 July 1985 9 wherein the respondent Civil Service Commission maintains that said position is not primarily-confidential in nature since it neither belongs to the personal staff of the Governor nor are the duties thereof confidential in nature considering that its principal functions involve general planning, directive and control of administrative and personnel service in the Provincial Office ISSUE: Does nepotism apply to designation? RULING: Yes. Ratio: As correctly maintained by the public respondent and the Solicitor General, the position of Provincial Administrator is embraced within the Career Service under Section 5 of P.D. No. 807 as evidenced by the qualifications prescribed for it in the Manual of Position Descriptions render indisputable the above conclusion that the subject position is in the career service which, per Section 5 of P.D. No. 807, is characterized by (a) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications, (b) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions, and (c) security of tenure. More specifically, it is an open career position, for appointment to it requires prior qualification in an appropriate examination In Piero, et al. vs. Hechanova, et al., 18 this Court had the occasion to rule that: It is plain that, at least since the enactment of the 1959 Civil Service Act (R.A. 2260), it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy determining or highly technical. Executive pronouncements can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. And it must be so or else it would then lie within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by executive fiat, the protection of Section 4, Article XII 19 of the Constitution. The court ruled that petitioner could not legally and validly appoint his brother Benjamin Laurel to said position because of the prohibition on nepotism under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807. They are related within the third degree of consanguinity and the case does not fall within any of the exemptions provided therein. The exemption in the said section covering confidential positions cannot be considered since the said position is not primarily confidential for it belongs to the career service.

Petitioners contention that the designation of his brother is not covered by the prohibition cannot be accepted for by legal contemplation, the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation. It seems clear to Us that Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 does not suggest that designation should be differentiated from appointment. Reading this section with Section 25 of said decree, career service positions may be filled up only by appointment, either permanent or temporary; hence a designation of a person to fill it up because it is vacant, is necessarily included in the term appointment, for it precisely accomplishes the same purpose. Moreover, if a designation is not to be deemed included in the term appointment under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807, then the prohibition on nepotism would be meaningless and toothless. Any appointing authority may circumvent it by merely designating, and not appointing, a relative within the prohibited degree to a vacant position in the career service. Indeed, as correctly stated by public respondent, "what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly." Sangguniang Bayan v Martinez Facts: Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay is the legislative body of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, a local government unit created, organized and existing as such under pertinent laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Martinez is the incumbent Punong Barangay of the said local government unit. On 5 November 2004, Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner through the filing of a verified complaint before theSangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials among others, Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of their solid waste management project since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer derived from composting. On 28 July 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office. 2005, Municial Mayor Bagasao issued a Memorandum, wherein he stated that the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to order Martinezs removal from service. However, the Decision remains valid until reversed and must be executed by him. For the meantime, he ordered the indefinite suspension of Martinez since the period of appeal had not yet lapsed 2005, the trial court issued an Order declaring the Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It maintained that the proper courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective local official from office, in accordance with Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Note: case become moot but capable of repetition yet evading review Issue: whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office Held: no Ratio: Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials from office: Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions.An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds: An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,[17] the Court en banc categorically ruled that the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code. It further invalidated Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 The Court nullified the aforequoted rule since the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its authority when it granted to the disciplining

authority the power to remove elective officials, a power which the law itself granted only to the proper courts. Thus, it is clear that under the law, theSangguniang Bayan is not vested with the power to remove Martinez. Petitioner contends that administrative cases involving elective barangay officials may be filed with, heard and decided by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or SangguniangBayan concerned, which can, thereafter, impose a penalty of removal from office. The aforementioned position put forward by the petitioner would run counter to the rationale for making the removal of elective officials an exclusive judicial prerogative The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining authority. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether or not a local chief executive may be removed from office, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Moreover, such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to nothing more than an implementing arm of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan. This would be an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers, thus placing the courts under the orders of the legislative bodies of local governments. Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only after a trial before the appropriate court, where court rules of procedure and evidence can ensure impartiality and fairness and protect against political maneuverings. As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However,the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang B ayan cannot order the removal of an erring electivebarangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with the regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court. As a general rule, no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. However, this rule is not applicable where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved are essentially judicial. In this case, it is apparent that the Sangguniang Bayan acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated 28 July 2005 removing Martinez from office. Such act was patently illegal and, therefore, Martinez was no longer required to avail himself of an administrative appeal in order to annul the said Order of the Sangguniang Bayan.[24] Thus, his direct recourse to regular courts of justice was justified. Hagad v Gozo-Dadole Facts: Criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Alfredo Ouano,ViceMayor Paterno Caete a nd Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol, allpublic officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson andGaudiosa O. Bercede by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O.Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. The respondents were charged with having violated R.A No. 3019, as amended; Articles 170 and 171RPC; and R.A. No. 6713. Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondentofficials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7Mwithout authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City.

Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 LGC, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. Dionson and Bercede argued that the LGC could not have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power toinvestigate cases against all public officials and that, in any case, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss andrecommended the preventive suspens ion of respondent officials, except City BudgetOfficer Pedro M. Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the Ombudsman. A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction andtemporary restraining order, w as filed by respondent officials with the RTC. Actingfavorably on the pleas of petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued a restraining order directed at petitioner, enjoining him from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order of preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015. Issue: WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the present case Held: Yes. Ratio: The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section13(1,) Article X1, of the 1987 Constitution, while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770. Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it .Respondent officials, upon the other hand, argue that the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over local officials must be deemed to have been removed by the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which vests the authority to investigate administrative charges, listed under Section 60 thereof, on various offices In the case specifically of complaints against elective officials of provinces and highly urbanized cities. Thus, respondents insist, conformably with Section 63 of the Local GovernmentCode, preventive suspension can only be imposed by: ". . . the President if therespondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city; . . ." There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on thespecific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus esf optimusinterpretendi, i e, every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that underlies the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom." Quite interestingly, Sections 61 and63 of the present Local

Government Code run almost parallel with the provisions then existing under the old code. The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A No. 7160), in fine, did noteffect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President. Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-daypreventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even now maintain its application. The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) that charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong,(c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. Respondent officials, nevertheless, claim that petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion when he caused the issuance of the preventive suspension order without any hearing. The contention is without merit. The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of preventive suspension after the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the motion for preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum incompliance with the directive of petitioner Be that, as it may, we have heretofore held that, not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard. Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt or innocence. Moreover, respondent officials were, in point of fact, put on preventive suspension only after petitioner had found, in consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda vs. Flavier, that the evidence of guilt was strong. Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the Solicitor General that respondent officials' petition for prohibition, being an application for remedy against the findings of petitioner contained in his 21 September 1992 order, should not have been entertained by the trial court. CSC v Dacoycoy Facts: In 1995, George P. Suan, Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Quezon City, a complaint for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism against respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy. After a formal investigation, the CSC promulgated its resolution on January 28, 1997 finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the CSC found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CSCs resolution was reversed ruling that the respondent did not appoint his two sons; hence, respondent was not guilty of nepotism. The Court further held that it is the person who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act. Issues:

1. Whether or not Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism. 2. Who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an administrative civil service disciplinary case Held: Yes. The law defines nepotism as all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited. The word relative and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity. The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission. Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office, and d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. It is true that Dacoycoy did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended to DECS Region VIII the appointment of Rito Dacoycoy as driver and appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker. However, it was the respondent who recommended Mr. Daclags authority to appoint first level positions. It was also the respondent who certified that funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito and even rated his performance as very satisfactory. Further, Ped, listed him in his job description as his next higher supervisor. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent's two sons and placed them under respondent's immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career positions. Clearly he is guilty of nepotism. Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In Debulgado, we stressed that The basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one. The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive. If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the outstanding civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law. 2. There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held

respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that "the phrase 'party adversely affected by the decision' refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which, may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office
14

Dissenting: Melo Although I completely agree with the result and likewise with the wisdom in which the issues relating to nepotism are threshed out in the majority opinion, I do not agree with the majority opinion stating that the Civil Service Commission may appeal a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case involving nepotism. And Mr. Justice Puno would go further by allowing even a private complainant and by implication, a complainant office, to appeal a decision exonerating or absolving a civil service employee of charges against, or even imposing a penalty upon him. This totally contravenes our well-settled ruling in Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission that, the Philippine Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers and employees from administrative charges. The Mendez ruling was a reiteration of Paredes wherein we said: Based on the above provision of law, appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. It is true that as early as Paredes, this Court was already aware of the fact that in an administrative case, an offense, not only that involving nepotism as intimated in the majority opinion, is committed against the government. As rightly pointed out in Mr. Justice Puno's Separate Opinion, the charges in Paredes and the other subsequent cases were as serious, if not more serious than the present charge of nepotism. Surely, charges of abuse of authority or of graft and corruption are more serious than an accusation of nepotism, for the acts therein involved cannot but cause injury to government. If the complainant is allowed to appeal in cases involving nepotism, then with more reason should appeals be allowed in the dismissal of, or in the imposition of lighter penalties in, the charges mentioned. How about sexual harassment? Malversation? Where will this end up in except allowing appeal in all cases. The Court shall then be legislating or, at least, abandoning settled doctrines for no compelling reasons. It should also be noted that Presidential Decree No. 807 has not undergone any pertinent amendment since the Court applied the law in Paredes. From the time of its passage on October 6, 1975 until the present, appeals by the government in cases of exoneration in art administrative case had been disallowed. Moreover, it is recognized in our jurisdiction that an administrative case which could result in the revocation of license, or similar sanctions like dismissal from office, constitutes a proceeding which partakes of a criminal nature (cf. Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 345 [1995]). Being such, provisions of law pertaining thereto must perforce be construed strictly against the State, just as a penal laws are strictly construed strictly against the State (People vs. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684 [1962]). Any ambiguity, should there be any, must be resolved in favor of the respondent in the administrative case. The term "party adversely affected" should not construed as to include the State in administrative charges involving nepotism. To allow appeals from decisions, be they exonerative or otherwise, against civil service employees would, to my mind, be stocking the stakes too much against our civil servants. It should be noted in this regard that the greater bulk of our government workers are ordinary people, working under supervision and, more often than not, exposed to political pressure and the influence of peddlers of power.

A judgment of exoneration by the Court of Appeals, as in the case of a judgment of exoneration by the Civil Service Commission or the now defunct Merit System Protection Board, may indeed prove to be truly adverse to the government agency concerned and eventually to the State as a whole. This is especially so when there had been lapses in the interpretation and/or application of the law as in the present case. This notwithstanding, the right to appeal, which is merely statutory may not be invoked, much less exercised, when the law does not provide any. Fortunately for petitioner but not so for respondent, the latter failed to invoke the foregoing general rule. In a similar case, we held that the party favored by such law who fails to interpose any objection to an appeal may be deemed to have waived this right. Concurring: Puno ? I submit that a taxpayer has the standing to bring suit to void nepotic acts for he has an interest that "appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness . . . ." 5 A taxpayer has a right to good government and good government cannot result from appointments determined by bloodlines. The Civil Service Law itself recognizes that there are offenses which can be the subject of a complaint by any private citizen. Thus, Section 37 of the law allows any private citizen to file a complaint against a government official or employee directly with the Commission. Section 38 also recognizes that "administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the head of department or office of equivalent rank, or head of local government or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors or upon sworn written complaint of any other persons." The general rule is that one who has a right to be heard has standing to seek review of any ruling adverse to him. Hence, if a private citizen has the right to file an administrative complaint, he must also have the right to appeal a dismissal of his complaint, unless the law clearly precludes his right of appeal for indubitable policy reasons. A contrary rule will diminish the value of the right to complain. The cases of Parades, Mendez and Magpale do not give any policy reason why the dismissal of a charge of nepotism cannot be appealed. They merely resort to doubtful inferences in justifying the bar to appeals. Such an approach goes against the rule that "preclusion of judicial review of administrative action . . . is not lightly to be inferred." Geronga v Mayor Varela Facts: Petitioner works as Engineer IV at the General Services Department of the local government of Cadiz City. In 1996, he was involved in two administrative cases: 1) Administrative Case No. 96-045 for Unjust Vexation, Contempt, Insubordination, Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer, and Alarm and Scandal; and 2) Administrative Case No. 96-056 for Grave Misconduct and Engaging in Partisan Political Activity The two administrative cases were referred by Cadiz City Mayor Eduardo Varela (respondent) to City Legal Officer Marcelo R. del Pilar (Del Pilar) for investigation. After investigation, Del Pilar issued in Administrative Case No. 96-04 a Resolution/Recommendation dated December 1, 1997 for the dismissal of petitioner for grave misconduct.7In Administrative Case No. 96-05, Del Pilar issued a separate Resolution/Recommendation dated December 4, 1997, recommending the dismissal of petitioner, Nuyad and Ambos for grave misconduct and partisan politics.8Respondent approved both recommendations.9 Respondent issued to petitioner Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05, addressed to petitioner: We find the recommendation as contained therein to be just and proper under the premises . CSC granted petitioners appeal which became final and executor. CSC partly granted respondents MR: His prayer for the reversal of CSC Resolution No. 990717 dated March 25, 1999 is hereby denied. However, his request for the nonreinstatement of [petitioner] in view of the finality of the decision in Administrative Case No. 96-04, finding [petitioner] guilty of Grave Misconduct for which he was meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service is granted. Issue: whether the CSC may entertain respondent's motion for reconsideration of its decision exonerating petitioner. Held: yes Ratio:

Court has earlier held that, in an administrative case, only a decision involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension of more than 30 days, fine exceeding 30-day salary, demotion, transfer, removal or dismissal is appealable to the CSC; hence, a decision exonerating an employee cannot be appealed.28 Moreover, given the nature of the appealable decision, only said employee would qualify as the "party adversely affected" who is allowed to appeal; other persons, such as the appointing or disciplining authorities, cannot appeal.29 Consonant with the foregoing interpretation, the CSC adopted Section 2(l), Rule I and Section 38, Rule III of the URACCS30 in implementation of the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 807 and E.O. No. 292,31 to wit: Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered. The present view is different. In a long line of cases,32 beginning with Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,33 this Court has maintained that a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case is appealable, and that the CSC,34as the agency mandated by the Constitution to preserve and safeguard the integrity of our civil service system, and/or the appointing authority, such as a mayor 35 who exercises the power to discipline or remove an erring employee, qualifies as parties adversely affected by the judgment who can file an appeal. The rationale for this is explained in the concurring opinion of Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy: In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what the law declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary x x x. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses can not be appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.36 Thus, through Resolution No. 021600,37 the CSC amended the URACCS, by allowing the disciplining authority to appeal from a decision exonerating an erring employee, thus: Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee. The CSC is under the impression that in Administrative Case No. 96-04, respondent issued a "Decision dated December 1, 1997," and that it is said decision which petitioner should have appealed. The CA shared the notion. Both are wrong. What is dated December 1, 1997 is merely the Resolution/Recommendation issued by Del Pilar in Administrative Case No. 96-04. The formal decision of respondent is Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 dated January 8, 1998. There is a material difference between a mere recommendation to dismiss an employee and an administrative decision/resolution sentencing him with dismissal. Under Section 35,40 Rule III of the URACCS, a recommendation to dismiss is that contained in a formal investigation report issued by a hearing or investigating officer and submitted to the disciplining authority for approval. Thus, Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 being the decision of respondent in both Administrative Case No. 96-04 and Administrative Case No. 96-05, it is crucial to emphasize that in the Notice of Appeal which petitioner filed, he distinctly stated that what he is appealing to the CSC is his dismissal as "contained in [respondent's] Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 dated January 08, 1998."46 So too must the Court allow petitioner redress from the decision of respondent in Administrative Case No. 9604. While petitioner, unaided by legal counsel, may have omitted to raise specific grounds against the decision insofar as Administrative Case No. 96-04 is concerned, it cannot be denied that he intended to appeal from it. The least he deserves then is a scrutiny of the legal and factual bases of his dismissal. As it turns out, upon review, said decision, insofar as it relates to Administrative Case No. 96-04, is patently void. Two fundamental requirements54 of due process in administrative cases are that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him; and that he cannot be convicted of an offense or crime with which he was not charged.55 A deviation from these requirements renders the proceeding invalid and the judgment issued therein a lawless thing that can be struck down anytime. 56 In the present case, the records of

Administrative Case No. 96-04 reveal that petitioner was dismissed for an act which was not alleged in the administrative charge filed against him. Administrative Case No. 96-04 sprung from a Sworn Complaint57 dated March 15, 1996 filed by Rodrigo Mateo (Mateo) against petitioner for unjust vexation, gross misconduct, insubordination, conduct unbecoming a public officer and alarm and scandal,58 allegedly committed through the following acts: a) his refusal to comply with several orders issued by respondent and Mateo for the filing of daily time records;59 and b) his having challenged Mateo to a fistfight.60 Surprisingly, the conclusion which Del Pilar arrived at in his December 1, 1997 Resolution/Recommendation, and which became the basis of the dismissal of petitioner, has no bearing whatsoever on the offenses with which the latter was charged under the Sworn Complaint nor to the incidents/acts described therein. Rather, the conclusion pertains solely to the alleged defamatory statements which petitioner made in his April 1, 1996 Letter-Answer to the Sworn Complaint Nowhere in the records of Administrative Case No. 96-04 does it appear that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct, or that he was held to answer for his alleged defamatory statements in his April 1, 1996 letter. CSC v Sojor Facts: 1991, respondent Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as president of the Central Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC) in Dumaguete City. In June 1997, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8292, or the "Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997," was enacted. This law mandated that a Board of Trustees (BOT) be formed to act as the governing body in state colleges. The BOT of CVPC appointed respondent as president, with a four-year term beginning September 1998 up to September 2002. 3 Upon the expiration of his first term of office in 2002, he was appointed president of the institution for a second four-year term, expiring on September 24, 2006.4 On June 25, 2004, CVPC was converted into the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU).5 A Board of Regents (BOR) succeeded the BOT as its governing body. 3) separate administrative cases against respondent were filed by CVPC faculty members before the CSC Regional Office. He claimed that the CSC had no jurisdiction over him as a presidential appointee. Being part of the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government, he was exclusively under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the President (OP). He argued that CSC had no authority to entertain, investigate and resolve charges against him; that the Civil Service Law contained no provisions on the investigation, discipline, and removal of presidential appointees CSC-RO denied his motion to dismiss in its Resolution dated September 4, 2002. 10 His motion for reconsideration11 was likewise denied. Thus, respondent was formally charged with three administrative cases, namely: (1) Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Document; (2) Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; and (3) Nepotism. 12 CSC: Since the President of a state college is appointed by the Board of Regents/Trustees of the college concerned, it is crystal clear that he is not a presidential appointee. Therefore, it is without doubt that Sojor, being the President of a state college (Central Visayas Polytechnic College), is within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Commission. CA: Reversed. CA ruled that the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or to discipline. It declared that the enactment of R.A. No. 929923 in 2004, which converted CVPC into NORSU, did not divest the BOT of the power to discipline and remove its faculty members, administrative officials, and employees. Respondent was appointed as president of CVPC by the BOT by virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8292.24 The power of the BOT to remove and discipline erring employees, faculty members, and administrative officials as expressly provided for under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 is also granted to the BOR of NORSU under Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 Issue: WON CSC has jurisdiction

Held: Yes Ratio: 1. The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. 28 As defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government. On the other hand, noncareer service positions are characterized by: (1) entrance not by the usual tests of merit and fitness; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, coterminous with the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made It is evident that CSC has been granted by the Constitution and the Administrative Code jurisdiction over all civil service positions in the government service, whether career or non-career. We find that the specific jurisdiction, as spelled out in the CSC rules, did not depart from the general jurisdiction granted to it by law. The jurisdiction of the Regional Office of the CSC and the Commission central office (Commission Proper) is specified in the CSC rules as: Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees. Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of the CSC. 2. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, or the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997, under which law respondent was appointed during the time material to the present case, provides that the schools governing board shall have the general powers of administration granted to a corporation. In addition, Section 4 of the law grants to the board the power to remove school faculty members, administrative officials, and employees for cause. The above section was subsequently reproduced as Section 7(i) of the succeeding law that converted CVPC into NORSU, R.A. No. 9299. Notably, and in contrast with the earlier law, R.A. No. 9299 now provides that the administration of the university and exercise of corporate powers of the board of the school shall be exclusive But does this exclusive administrative power extend to the power to remove its erring employees and officials? In light of the other provisions of R.A. No. 9299, respondents argument that the BOR has exclusive power to remove its university officials must fail. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty members, employees, and officials of the university is granted to the BOR "in addition to its general powers of administration." This provision is essentially a reproduction of Section 4 of its predecessor, R.A. No. 8292, demonstrating that the intent of the lawmakers did not change even with the enactment of the new law. Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But this power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees and officials. Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and officials, there is no showing that such power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.37 Camacho v. Gloria: Of course under EO 292, a complaint against a state university official may be filed either with the universitys Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service Commission, although the CSC may delegate the investigation of a complaint and for that purpose, may deputize any department, agency, official or group of officials to conduct such investigation. 3. Certainly, academic institutions and personnel are granted wide latitude of action under the principle of academic freedom. Academic freedom encompasses the freedom to determine who may teach, who may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. 42 Following that doctrine, this Court has

recognized that institutions of higher learning has the freedom to decide for itself the best methods to achieve their aims and objectives, free from outside coercion, except when the welfare of the general public so requires.43 They have the independence to determine who to accept to study in their school and they cannot be compelled by mandamus to enroll a student.44 That principle, however, finds no application to the facts of the present case. Contrary to the matters traditionally held to be justified to be within the bounds of academic freedom, the administrative complaints filed against Sojor involve violations of civil service rules. He is facing charges of nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. These are classified as grave offenses under civil service rules, punishable with suspension or even dismissal.45 This Court has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution the unbridled authority to perform acts without any statutory basis.46 For that reason, a school official, who is a member of the civil service, may not be permitted to commit violations of civil service rules under the justification that he was free to do so under the principle of academic freedom. 4. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of the people. 49Under the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university president.