De Guzman v. Comelec G.R. No.

129118 (July 19, 2000) FACTS: The Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act. The Act prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city or municipality for more than four years. Petitioners claim that the act violated the equal protection clause because not all election officials were covered by the prohibition. HELD: The law does not violate the equal protection clause. It is intended to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be carried out without the complicity of election officers, who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality.

Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals

Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the president, he cannot invoke the Presidents immunity from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but merely those of a department secretary. Moreover, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Indefinite reassignment is definitely violative of the security of tenure. Facts: Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994. Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the implementation of his reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasianos right to security of tenure. The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit. Issues: 1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit. 2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his security of tenure.

Held: 1. Petitioners contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. 2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644): "Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138). While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)." Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced. (Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000)

Dario vs. Mison (1989) Facts:When President Cory Aquino came into power, she proceeded to reorganize the government, upon which Mison,the Commissioner of Customs sent notices of termination to 394 Customs officials. Some sought reinstatementfrom the CSC which the latter granted to 279 of them while the others went directly to the Supreme Court. Mison also filed a petition questioning the decision of the CSC. Also, RA 6656 was passed, providing that all officers andemployees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed. The validity of this law is also put into question. Held: All the parties agree on the validity of reorganization per se, leaving the question only on its nature and extent.Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are dictated by theneed to hasten the passage from the old to th e new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and securityof tenure .At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of office (not by virtueof the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals undertaken tocomply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the Government is not obliged to prove anything becausethe Constitution allows it. Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987Constitution is a grant of a license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have validly doneunder an "automatic"-vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service. And the separationcontemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,1986, (2) the reorganization from February 2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of career officers tendered in line withthe existing policy and which resignations have been accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is clearly and primarilyexclusionary, to exclude those career civil service employees separated "for cause." In other words, in order to beentitled to the benefits granted under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, onenegative and the other positive , must concur, to wit:1. The separation must not be for cause, and2. The separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on February 25, 1987,advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. 70 It can only mean, then, that whatever reorganization is takingplace is upon the authority of the present Charter, and necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions andsafeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately stated that we are merely continuing what the revolutionaryConstitution of the Revolutionary Government had started. We are through with reorganization under the FreedomConstitution - the first stage. We are on the second stage that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of ArticleXVIII of the permanent basic document. What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immenserevolution ary powers, the President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent from ExecutiveOrder No. 17, which established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless propensity that accompaniesreorganizations - notwithstanding the fact that removals arising therefrom were "not for

cause," and in spite of thefact that such removals would have been valid and unquestionable. Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in theExecutive Order that dismissals should be made on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness torender public service. Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals "not for cause" in a manner thatwould have been permissible in a revolutionary setting as Commissioner Mison so purports, it would seem that theCommissioner would have been powerless, in any event, to order dismissals at the Customs Bureau left and right.Lastly, reorganizations must be carried out in good faith. In this case, Mison failed to prove that the reorganizationwas indeed made in good faith because he hired more people to replace those that he fired and no legitimatestructural changes have been made. To sum up, the President could have validly removed officials before theeffectivity of the 1987 Constitution even without cause because it was a revolutionarygovernment. However, from the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the State did not lose its right to reorganizeresulting to removals but such reorganization must be made in good faith.

G.R. No. 87211, March 5, 1991 JOVENCIO L. MAYOR , petitioner, VS.HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, HON. RIZALINACAJUCOM, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.LOURDES A. SALES and RICARDO OLAIREZ, petitioners-intervenors. FACTS: Five special civic actions are jointly decided because they involve one common, fundamental issue, the constitutionality of RA No. 6715 in so far as it declares vacant all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the National labor Relations Commission, and operates to remove the incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. The old positions were declared vacant because of the need to professionalize their higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, salaries or emoluments. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6715 has worked such an abolition of the petitioners' offices, expressly or impliedly HELD: It is immediately apparent that there is NO express abolition in RA 6715 of the petitioners' positions. Implied abolition means that there is an irreconcilable inconsistency between the nature, duties and functions of the petitioners' offices under the old rules and those corresponding thereto under the new law. An examination of the relevant provisions of RA 6715, with a view of discovering the changes thereby effected on the nature, composition, powers, duties and functions of the Commission and the Commissioners, the Executive Director, the deputy Executive Director, and the Labor Arbiters under the prior legislation, fails to disclose such essential inconsistencies. REASONS: Republic Act No. 6715 did not abolish the NLRC, or change its essential character as a supervisory and adjudicatory body. Under said Act, as under the former law, the NLRC continue to act collegially, whether it performs administrative or rule-making functions or exercise appellate jurisdiction to review decisions and final orders of the Labor Arbiters. None of the provisions can be said to work so essential or radical a revision of the nature, powers and duties of the NLRC as to justify a conclusion that

the Actin truth did not merely declare vacant but actually abolished the offices of commissioners and others in their place. Similar considerations yield the same conclusion as far as the positions of Labor Arbiters are concerned, there being no essential inconsistency on that score between Republic Act No. 6715 and the old law. The position titles of Executive Clerk and Deputy Executive Clerk(s) provided for in RA 6715 are obviously not those of newly-created offices, but new appellations or designations given to the existing positions of Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director. There is no essential change from the prescribed and basically administrative duties of these positions and, at the same time, no menytion in the Act of the former titles, from which the logical conclusion is that what was intended was merely a change in nomenclature, not an express or implied abolition. Canonizado, et al. vs. Aguirre, 323 SCRA 312 (2000) FACTS: Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the National Police Commission whenRepublic Act No. 8851, otherwise known as the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998, took effect. Section 8 of R.A. No. 8851 provided that the terms of office of theincumbent petitioners were deemed expired and thus assailed by petitioners for being unconstitutional for it violates the petitioners security of tenure. In defense of the law, the Solicitor General argues that the law intended to impliedly abolish the NAPOLCOMby means of reorganization by changing the functions and composition of the same. ISSUE: WON there was a valid abolition of the NAPOLCOM. HELD: NONE. R.A. 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners positions. In order to determine whether there has been an implied abolition, it becomes necessary to examine the changes introduced by the new law in the nature, composition and functions of the NAPOLCOM. The powers and duties of the NAPOLCOM remain basically unchanged by the amendments. The NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative, supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions. Reorganization takes place when there is alteration of the existing structure of the government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. In involves a reduction in personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Naturally, it may result in the loss of ones position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith. No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress, RA 8851, insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent commissioners, petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in their removal from office, removes civil service employees from office without legal cause and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm. Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment that there are now new appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched principle that when a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position never becomes

vacant under the law and he is considered as not having left his office. The new appointments made in order to replace petitioners are not valid. Canonizado, et al. vs. Aguirre, 323 SCRA 312 (2001)