North American Philosophical Publications

Truth, Paradox, and Nietzschean Perspectivism Author(s): Steven D. Hales and Robert C. Welshon Reviewed work(s): Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), pp. 101-119 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744612 . Accessed: 01/03/2012 15:54
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Illinois Press and North American Philosophical Publications are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to History of Philosophy Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

History
Volume

of Philosophy
11, Number

Quarterly
1994

1, January

NIETZSCHEAN PERSPECTIVISM
Steven D. Hales and Robert C. Welshon

TRUTH, PARADOX, AND

writings on truth are among themost elusive and difficult NIETZSCHE'S

reading and he 'truth', ones in his appears or subject are corpus. either One indication of their obscurity in his use is that on an initial 'true' To get blatantly inconsistent vacillations of the words of truth.

to inexplicable no

on the value

some idea of the depth of the problem, consider that inHATH

writes that "there italics).1 eternal passages facts, are nor are there any (Nietzsche's Other likewise saturated with

2 Nietzsche
truths" and venom

absolute

contempt about truth.Yet inAC 50 he writes that

Truth has had to be fought for every step of the way, almost everything else dear to our hearts, on which our love and our trust in life depend, has had to be sacrificed for it: the service of truth is the hardest to it. Greatness service. of soul is needed One can hardly imagine a more impassioned, to imply on truth What their demands indeed reverential, believes greatness and is an and acute, soliloquy that of soul. on there But

truth. Moreover, is a univocal then sense the question above texts and of the

this passage about seem that his

seems

that Nietzsche sacrifice

of truth which views

becomes is required

the easy is capable

choices

mentioned tion

inadequate. acknowledges Nietzsche's

instead and

interpreta of both truth. always but as show

complexities, and

respecting One signs that

explaining approach sense to

venom

devotion

towards neither same result way,

attractive the this same

is to recognize 'truth' nor always

that Nietzsche uses it in the but the

variability

is not mere

equivocation, his

of his

finding

distinct senses
distinguish Nietzsche these various has

of 'truth' in the philosophical

them when projects, he promotes both In this critical essay and one

tradition and so needing

alternatives constructive, projects of the only to that with tradition.2 respect

to
to

among senses one

different

of'truth.' of providing future. This

of those

is considered, sort of truth

the constructive

the correct

conception

he thinks genuinely available

philosophers spectivism. Unfortunately, isolating behavior this of the interpretative constructive truth of the

to humans,
sense

the kind of truth sought by the

is perspectival truth, or per

of 'truth'

problems

with

perspectivism as a to ethical,

do theory

not

end

by the or

project, (as

for perspectivism opposed, that say, received

about

predicate

ontological, treatment

epistemological

perspectivism)

is not a topic

extensive

101

102
from Nietzsche. lizing critiques the but

HISTORY
The

OF PHILOSOPHY
he makes are never about

QUARTERLY
truth perspectivism systematically, most of what he and to Power are as says these tanta are his

remarks and and

seldom

more

developed Moreover, in his

of Christianity in an abridged Still,

morality. is found

about were

perspectivism death. published

of truth

only

notebooks, The Will truth

published his his

form as

the controversial that Nietzsche

only after in claims

it is undeniable and

affirms

perspectivism published

writings

that many

of his most

infamous

would be ill-supported without it. So there is at least a prima facie case for digging a little into his views on truth perspectivism. The project of this paper
is to engage plausible tival The in such view we philosophical can from the archaeology, fragments to mold the most writings coherent and of Nietzsche's on perspec

truth. rough are and safely disjointed be ignored that nature by the it tries of Nietzsche's interpreter, the to capitalize essay, more what elaborate is defended writings in part on the on truth the here perspectiv interpretive is subject nature on perspec than behalf what to of

ism cannot risks

because offered

the greater criticism remarks

for it. Indeed, on truth.

interpretation Nietzsche's

a potential Nietzsche's tivism any he are

fragmentary comments of perspectivism on Nietzsche's does not

In this

embedded

in a richer, While wrote this

theory here he wrote criticism

explicitly what defended.

developed. Yet

entails is here approach remarks

Nietzsche

on the should single

topic, what not be a

entail the

of either

adopted by the

or the results, Nietzsche task a

for no

theory

left. The

interpretive together than whole colors. there exegesis

of perspectivism task at hand more the broken remains

is entailed closely

resembles

the archaeological artifact painting be fully to begin. coherence philosophical that respects to form to reveal recovered, Without with

of piecing

of an unknown of cleaning can whole the with original which a

coherent its original

the

restorative in neither

project case

Although must

in the former such a whole, The

is no well-individuated rely more while offered heavily here

on establishing general believe, one

the balance consistency. both of these

of Nietzsche's interpretation

thought,

maintaining is, we

desiderata.

The prima facie case for this approach

Nietzsche's proliferation given no truth tors l?gica! and on doubt commentators of interpretations obsession authorized one finds assimilated his theory have had for his views. of those with

is strengthened by the fascination

views This the matter on truth fascination interpretive by some views version logical and the consequent is the is to be expected proliferation of his such as commenta epistemo theory, views and about unified

philosophers' partially

truth

and

by the imputed

subject

itself. Unfortunately,

perspectivism is erroneously perspectivism, is not therefore Of course,

to Nietzsche Nietzschean or his to the

to other

of fictions, sensitive appeals

of the bundle structure in many of his contexts

sufficiently Nietzsche over with

truth.3

to perspectives moreover,

advocates truth works theory.

perspectivism together

main

domains; to

perspectivism to form a more kind

these

other

perspectivisms interpret every

However,

it is not

possible

of Nietzschean

NIETZSCHEAN
perspectivism no attempt in a single is made here article, to do and so. The

PERSPECTIVISM
itmust focus be here emphasized is solely at the outset on those passages and

103
that in

which Nietzsche
philosopher related areas

is concerned with the way

Other thought applications are I beyond

in which the truth of the new

of perspectivism the purview of this other paper.4

is perspectival. of Nietzsche's

We

propose

to analyze Nietzsche

Nietzsche's

proposals commentary. the

more This latest

rigorously does fad not mean in analytic terms.

than

is common think

in some

quarters

of Nietzsche

that we

philosophy is legitimate interpretation, but we do intend to be cautious with

the on logic of perspectivism such pleads and unambiguous for Nietzsche one who with our This whose his readers. in EH (pref. and he constraint views can interpretation is justified, scrutiny and is a philosopher it from interpreters his

interpreting

as anticipating

or continental

withstand Nietzsche wishes that cision Not virtue. contains diction sistent

demands

Indeed, 1) and claims pre

for understanding who more learn

among to read

for perfect readers more and "speaking . . . this all alone

him well

(D, pref.), greater pref. 2). is an and

precisely,

demanding (GM that

greater

is fitting

for a philosopher" agree while

of Nietzsche's claim that

interpreters no and interpretation ambiguity, are

precision not

interpretive unless that contra con it

Some

of Nietzsche others argue

is satisfactory only but also

contradiction is an readings evidence essential

component

of Nietzschean inconsistent with

dialectic, his project

that

of Nietzsche

of deconstructing there is little

logic. But textual even

the former

that he

is most and since methodology unappealing, ever wished to undermine argumentative of certain unrigorous ridicules on these aspects of logic, the second of Nietzsche strategy, an

consistency strategy often and it must in The that on truth to is cite

though

he as

is critical well.5 as Still,

unappealing Nietzsche be admitted Will insists to Power. on

interpreters interpretive rather

himself

justification

for their logic

that Nietzsche One might begging with

consistently, chastise Nietzsche's at least

especially interpretation views three

grounds There

rigor with dealing

the question unjustly.

against are

or otherwise

them

responses

this kind of criticism.

First, Nietzsche's more attacks on logic are rarely attacks on logical laws that or rules there are of inference; often he attacks the metaphysical denies available WP created" 516 is the

assumption claim as that

entities in the world to which the formulae of logic apply. To put the claim in
contemporary perspectival interpreted to fictitious has only been terms, what Nietzsche entities instance, have there are extra in or non-logical formulae. entities For that we to serve holds the values "logic claims . . . that of terms applies

that 558

only

and WP

"thingness

invented "we

by us owing and that the little

to the requirements as well will

for the day getting

when

logicians

17 hopes of logic." BGE . . . accustom to ourselves

along

without

'it'," arguably

a criticism

variable

(see also WP 488, 521 and P 150). HATH

11 declares that "logic . . .

of the very

notion

of

104
rests And on

HISTORY
assumptions OTL, that

OF PHILOSOPHY
do not correspond claims

QUARTERLY
to anything that in the real world."

consider

p. 81, where

Nietzsche

the axioms

and

theorems

of logic are "empty husks." All of these claims entail rejection only of the thesis that interpreted logical formulae refer to anything ontologically independent
of perspectives, substantive that any and in particular provocative of his the thesis perspective for Nietzsche about of logic. This is of and course a to advance, truth must it is a thesis But of

itself it offers no support whatsoever

studies rejection proof formal correct of extant survives inference. semantic At best,

interpretation

perspectivism what

for rejecting logic as the discipline that

is entailed for formal Nietzsche the value by Nietzsche's and natural himself, of good thesis languages; while not and a is

respect.

interpretations And who knows

theory

unscathed.

of course

logician,

is a philosopher others for arguing

argument on his

who engages in itwith full knowledge of the rules of inference. He repeatedly

inveighs against fallaciously and prides himself own

inferential prowess (cf.BGE

Second, hard rules any ifNietzsche anyone cannot agrees is going to see why of inference theory that

15).
so far as take him to reject seriously. and criticized and views proof A theory, theory we that find it very all to

should

rejects approach

is impervious even that his

to critique, be claims

the appropriate

in principle

course

Nietzsche

is deep And of suspicion. are subject to criticism;

18: "It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable; it is precisely thereby that it attracts subtler minds." At BGE 22 and 43 Nietzsche recall BGE
even welcomes But challengers who would to infer what he offer their own interpretations for good and backed readers and and perspectives. for diverse contradictory than of his tency appeals texts. and it is sophistry that much less from his desires desire

interpretations readings, to his more For honesty that not that are all fails

is multiply readings surface

internally of some that consis his value. without it is that own

contradictory claims and into account thinkers and

by little more

hyperbolic to take virtues

discrepancies insistence to respect of equal to survive 517).

his and

own

among

it fails are unable 493,

warnings Third, logic bootless

interpretations recognizes to continue

perspectives are

Nietzsche

himself for us an of him

that we our lives

it is necessary to defend

(cf. WP

Hence,

inconsistent get along thinks claim

interpretation without necessary that we logic, for need was

of Nietzsche for to do so would life. More logic will

by requiring entail be this said view

interpretations of something follows about

rejection in what implies. several

Nietzsche Nietzsche's perspectivism

and what

Nietzsche's

about

truth

meant

to accomplish

things, both rhetorical and philosophical. Strategically, perspectivism helped

Nietzsche cal tradition to cast he off the rigid inherited. absolutism, categories he and found ossified in his thinking predecessors detestable, is a thumbed central his nose of the philosophi a rampant dogmatic, component at the and and in Nietzsche which Truth Just

often militant need project

considered

of displacement.6 of displacement.

perspectivism as Nietzsche

of that canons of

German philology by publishing The Birth of Tragedy as his firstmajor work,

NIETZSCHEAN
so too truth perspectivism wrote that helped

PERSPECTIVISM
to punctuate his radical rejection enemies means

105
of nearly

every element of the received philosophical

54, than even 55) Nietzsche lies;" "convictions him perspectivism sacred provided convictions. perspectivism with out Nietzsche's in BGE plays with

tradition.7 InHATH
dangerous a principled

483 (cf. AC
of truth of attacking

are more

the most

Philosophically, spectivism whose case is well

truth

two major of objects 34, and and

roles.

First,

truth

per

is coherent laid

theory 14, 21,

as fictions, in numerous

a theory passages

inWP,
holds we

including 477, 480, 495, 515, 516, 549, 552, 568, and 636. Nietzsche
that subjects, to suit be said our objects, ends. about at all, constructed and If he things attributes is right, are there all fabricated distinctions that true is nothing Indeed, us over (WP 'metaphysically' there and 568, is no perspective over: cf. TI "[the world] IV). Hence, be to sets On that to a of this be

invent

that might independent is a mere even

in the world. reminds

world fiction, or

as Nietzsche of fictitious

entities" that the

if truth

consists

in correspondence, At best vary room truth elements to be no whose point there question, of fictions former

correspondence would

cannot

thing-in-itself, fictitious ontology, Nietzsche eternal course entities there

'real' world. whose

correspondence kind are of absolute constant

from perspective values

to perspective. truth across

seems statements this nor are

for any

insists

on privileged

perspectives. 2: "there italics). here, are It no is of

makes

clearly any but

in the already absolute one that truths" cannot

cited HATH (Nietzsche's be addressed

facts, an interesting or whether the following by him as

whether

the ontological ism, least

theory the

supplements and views with

and motivates motivated on the nature each other, by and

truth the

perspectiv But at and truth offered

is supported

latter.

is true: Nietzsche's to be consistent

of objects are

perspectivism together Equally Nietzsche's how

are meant a pair. is

often

important ethics. He

the

foundational the connection claims first:

role

that

perspectivism 6: "If one would really does all came this

plays explain about, (does

in

admits

at BGE

the abstrusest well (and

metaphysical wise) to ask endorses a morality forging his own

of a philosopher at what morality new law: envisions own moral

it he)

is always aim?" the

Nietzsche tyranny his

that their

philosophers "each (AC one

free from of us should

of Christianity own virtue,

devise

italics): By abolishing any kind of 'absolute' truth that even the new philoso
phers must acknowledge, diverse the absence life, a Nietzsche prepares fear truths new the ground of running allows for different afoul of 'the persons truth.' the living, to develop Moreover, experimental moralities of cosmic life without moral

categorical

imperative."

11, Nietzsche's

Nietzsche and

to advocate ways of

of sampling

perspectives

HATH without permanent allegiance to any particular one (cf. 301, BGE 205, WP 944, 962).
Granted essential is easier the importance clear about when of perspectivism truth contrasted to Nietzsche's as other to be as is possible. The

pref. 4, GS 290,
concerns, Perspectivism cardinal intui it is

perspectivism with

to understand

absolutism.

106
tion of truth

HISTORY
absolutism untrue is that from

OF PHILOSOPHY
is that statements, The are

QUARTERLY
if true, are true for everyone behind and, truth

if untrue, perspectivism but can ment that the are be

then

for everyone. statements, another, as

Nietzschean true from, the

intuition or in, some Truth claim that

if true, this yet

perspective, state

untrue

or in another, claim, untrue

perspective.8 viz., in another.

perspectivism every a statement occupied absolutism viz., as the by

characterized is true in some for one are

precisely is untrue with as that

perspective, distinct

Hence, Truth

is true two

person

for another respect to that

if the perspectives statement.

persons contrasted

is then claim and

negatively the case other are

the denial every

of truth

perspectivism, is true in some is logically they are

that untrue that

it is not in some there

statement This thesis that

perspective to the in all to true

perspective. statements in all

equivalent either

thesis

some

such

perspectives deny. who "There there Recall asked Z me

or untrue III 11.2:

perspectives.9 is my way; the way Even and where that the

It is this

that Nietzsche I answered and and also

seems

"This For

is yours?'thus not has exist." eyes

those 540,

'the way' kinds kinds

does sphinx

WP

are many are many

of eyes. of 'truths,' there

consequently truth." That is,

consequently truth. it may

there

is no

it seems,

consequently has yet are

is no absolute defined, and

'Perspective' precisely. following of view the point individuals)? fundamental the nature perspectives to these mistaken, Maudemarie One

to be

not

be

possible

to specify the point as welle.g. account to two, more

it the

can begin

to appreciate there only or are

the relevant supra-individual there an

problems

by considering e.g.

question: of science of view

prespectives perspectives Nietzschean answers does does

or of religion of individuals this

individual adequate entails First, how, if at another?

(pending complex

of

Answering and equally to be of a perspective are

question

difficult, to be?

questions. Second, from one can be made

what all,

Nietzsche Nietzsche

take think

individuated questions

A beginning one

to an answer tempting, but

fundamental answer. Clark's

by reviewing

claim

that

the interpretation ofNietzsche

that must be rejected. She holds that:

a perspective

is a set

of beliefs

exemplifies

us to grant that every belief that can be derived from a [Perspectivism] requires set of beliefs is true, or at least as true as any other belief. For each such consistent a way the world manifests in which set of beliefs may count as a perspective, itself.10 But this view is an infelicitous interpretation we have of Nietzsche and unsupportable so

philosophically.
nothing from is true more 'a statement

It is too easy to think of the perspective we inhabit as being

a set is held of beliefs true about true) the world; such he holds to do is to slip indeed can be (or believed nowhere with and in a perspective'to a view that 'a statement and there

than

in a perspective.' positions within beliefs

Nietzsche inconsistent a perspective, true

advocates all,

champions untrue

it. After

this would

not be possible true

if a perspec

tive were defined as a set of beliefs. Nietzsche

between being believed in a perspective

is explicit about the distinction

and being in a perspective

NIETZSCHEAN

PERSPECTIVISM

107

and is,moreover, quite justified in drawing this distinction. InAC 23 he writes

"truth and the belief Compare of life and WP has that something "a belief, is true: however truth" Other two completely diverse worlds of interest." tion 487: nothing nonetheless necessary and WP evidence it is for the preserva 483: "a belief can be a

of a species,

to do with be false."

condition

for this may

be found

inNietzsche's
AC 52, 54, 55).

HATH attacks on Christianity's reliance on faith (cf.

If a perspective beliefs. or AC But were nothing is not his repeated belief sets. more than a group as against even

483, D 89,
of beliefs, the most

Nietzsche's
cal ill effects cursory

critique of faith could be justified only by appeal to the psychologi

of such ofGM that only criticism, shows. His warnings martyrdom

reading

(BGE 25, GM III 8,AC 53,WP 457) as proving nothing about truth also inveigh
against identifying perspectives with

In order to be both philosophically

then, can a distinction be held true, claim It is only it is the needs to be made or believed, that the latter in some are that

defensible and accurate to Nietzsche,

the obvious and claim not that statements and not the in of perspectives true has in some anything that best in others and

between

interesting others.11 truth, views and

statements latter thesis not truth.

perspectives to do with represents

the nature Nietzsche's

thesis, about

the former,

on perspectivism is not

A perspective a a

then

a class

of beliefs.

What

is it? Any

plausible

answer

to this question must begin by recalling WP

that such locus locus, of will and to power Nietzsche change over one's a world generates thinks their that

567, in which Nietzsche

For change example, themselves is itself a perspective with (WP them:

claims
is in the a means is then "we can 517).

a perspective. if persons

a person

right way of becoming a way

they will master

perspective: (WP 643).

"interpretation Adopting to grips made"

something" experiences, that we

of mastering only

of coming have

comprehend

ourselves

495,

cf. WP

In itself,Nietzsche
categorize perspectives, ated whenever it and

thinks the world is chaos (WP 508, 515, 569); it is we who

turn it into claims, something then intelligible. a set of true a perspective.12 without could such one If truths statements There vary will will across be gener

as Nietzsche one adopts

or creates

be minimal they and could not

consistency not be

constraints And,

on perspectives; as noted,

constraints,

individuated.

adopt

a perspective

yet

believe
an

all of the true statements entailed by it. Still, even if there is a

relation to the between issue loci of power and perspectives, that can and it does have not provide of the kinds of entities a perspective. Consider that of the

dependency answer

Indeed, WP 259:

Nietzsche "all

individuates evaluation

perspectives from a

broadly definite a race,

narrowly.

is made

perspective: a state, and

preservation a culture." All

of the

individual, will be

a community, loci of power

a church, so all seems contains

a faith, will be

of these adopt one

for Nietzsche, In short, Nietzsche

entities

which

or create

perspectives. each has or generates

to offer a domain

a non-reductive of entities, each

hierarchy

of loci of power,

level

of which

of which

a perspective.

108

HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY II

QUARTERLY

Nietzsche's argument tent is offered tives not a

perspectivism that claims that

about

truth

is the target

of a frequently

encountered

or self-referentially by Danto: in which statements then untrue much both obtain can be

is either inconsis perspectivism self-referentially or both. Asimple version of the argument paradoxical, is a perspective, only then there are perspec is some in are untrue in a perspective; statement has and if perspectivism is true the form of a self-ref Paradox paradoxes, the statement of

if perspectivism

perspective, and paradox, that scrutiny 's version

perspectives erential

it is untrue that every is in others. The argument like the Liar Paradox are members there are no

the Russell of semantic in which value.

set-membership, paradoxes under Danto ous ism such this

of which because

of the class conditions a out truth

consistently would

assigned make in which

Unfortunately, A more perspicu perspectiv follows, clear, versions notational become

of the paradox of the paradox and the of the paradox

is not worked

in any detail.

statement as a thesis

the distinction it is true For reasons

between

conditions

explicit.

In what

a version version paradox of the that

is formulated. 'the real paradox the same

that will

will

be

called

of perspectivism.' general structure

Other are

of the variants Recall the

(e.g. Danto's) real paradox.

with

absolutism every following is either the thesis

is the denial statement is a true

of perspectivism. in some of absolutism:

Since

perspectivism and is at untrue least

is in one

claim

that the

is true

perspective there or untrue

another, statement Clearly, that some

rendering in all

which either

perspectives

in all

perspectives. in in

is, perspectivism perspectives and

or perspectivally, of perspectivism is true absolutely or it is true in all perspectives true or untrue is either untrue there thesis in others. Suppose that which perspectivism has the same if there then is true truth value is a statement of perspectivism value in all in all

all perspectives. in all perspectives which Thus statement is true. to put tives, shows help

If so, then viz., has the

itself. But, perspectives,

is some

the same

truth is true

absolutism is true, or,

if perspectivism in an

perspectives, conclusion The

absolutism is true is that which is sound, perspectivism since in all

the matter then that

equivalent is untrue.

form, This

if perspectivism

perspec claim it is of no is untrue there is a

perspectivism perspectivism

critics so

is self-refuting. Suppose

argument then that

to a defender perspective. that then Consider In such

of perspectivism. If so, absolutism is true that the in all

in any

is true

in all

perspectives,

statement Suppose others. untrue. Now,

perspectives is true the

viz.,

absolutism. perspectives in which that statement not and untrue in is

perspectivism latter case,

in some

perspective is some

perspectivism is true or untrue

a perspective, is true But hypothesi is true; only there

not-perspectivism if there is no such are statement: perspectives since statement

is, absolutism that the thesis

is true.

absolutism

in all perspectives. itself, since ex

of absolutism and

there

in which ex hypothesi

it is untrue there are

perspectivism tives in which

not perspectivism, nor any other it is untrue;

perspec in which

in the perspective

NIETZSCHEAN
absolutism statements tives; that is true, are since there are there

PERSPECTIVISM
distinct perspectives that in which is true in which is all

109
of those

untrue.

Hence, statement it

is no statement are But perspectives then shown,

in all perspec it is true true and in all is

is, for every in which and

there

perspectives perspectives, untrue. Another ism is way true

is untrue. have already

perspectivism entails that

this, we

perspectivism

of putting

the argument Now consider 'p' true? When if and at all then

is as the

follows. statement an

Suppose

that

perspectiv is true find the

absolutely. When

'perspectivism answer, at one must This all

absolutely' truth

is a statement of the statement. absolutely is true

To get is 'p'true

conditions

absolutely? then

is a bit more Of true. If

complex: course, any is

'p' is true if any

only

if 'p' is true

perspectives.

statement is absolutely if and

perspectives absolutism

it is absolutely Thus at all

statement true absolutely But

true, only

is true. is true

perspectivism perspectives. in which both and in all para

if perspectivism there true, since are

Transitivity and the supposition that perspectivism is true yield the truth of
absolutism. perspectivism contradictories perspectives, graphs back. then Perspectives problem perspectivism perspective absolutely, then there or that perspectivism in which for the defender is untrue, are only it is true is true perspectivism of perspectivism, that two is, in which possibilities: then true that in some is perspectives true so consider not-perspectivism either but untrue pose is true. in no in In is abso is true peculiar a state a this and is self-contradictory: absolutism both be are true. no conditions are they contradictories is true reached two

cannot

Hence, the same

if perspectivism conclusion

contradiction

results

Suppose others. obvious which this true

perspectivally

a perspective

not-perspectivism is true

perspectivally. Assume is that

If not-perspectivism not-perspectivism is a

lutely,

absolutism

is true.

perspectivally. statement; is true, question statement is only truth thesis ment true truth and is

'Not-perspectivism indeed, some we submit

perspectivally'

very

ment is true perspectivally ifand only if there is some perspective inwhich it

perspective the same truth in which This value there it is untrue. statement in all What claims if the that But statement there if this with is in some 'not-perspectivism'? then

it is self-contradictory.

Consider:

with

perspectives. be are

statement the same the state is same

perspectivally value in all

true, perspectives. truth insists perspectives, truth value

cannot all, there

a statement perspectives

After is untrue.

in which there is no

of'not-perspectivism' with the same

In such perspectives. is some forbids also

perspectives Thus statement the The

value that

in all there and

'not-perspectivism that has the of a statement of'not-perspec is

perspectivally' value in all the same is true

existence problem of

that has tivism

in all perspectives. is just its head. the problem

perspectivally' stood Nietzsche on

'perspectivism

true

non-perspectivally' Nowhere perspectivism. does

explicitly there are

address passages

the problems that suggest

raised that he was

here

about

However,

sensitive

110
to the general that Nietzsche makes does

HISTORY
charge

OF PHILOSOPHY
and threat that

QUARTERLY
he was views aware on to some truth. extent

of self-reference, constituted a a

self-reference seems the obvious appear

to his to this

Moreover, he nowhere true, he true

to provide error

response his

charge.

Although as

of claiming

perspectivism perspectivism

to be absolutely perspectivally

to believe

that maintaining will be

is a defensible position. Recall BGE

interpretation and you eager

22: "Supposing
enough to make

that this also

this objection?

is only
well, so

much the better." There is also BGE 43: "itmust offend [the] pride [of the new philosophers], also their taste, if their truth is supposed to be a truth for
everyman route pitfalls. . . . 'My judgment takes as has true. To does just claim is my seem been judgment': no one else is easily some entitled to

it that iswhat the philosopher of the futuremay perhaps say of himself." The
that Nietzsche However, promising, argued, the and thesis it avoids conspicuous cannot of perspectivism self-contradiction. for Nietzsche's unfortunately that that problem of thinking interpret succumb that to per

be perspectivally The ers and paradox has

otherwise has strange been

is to broach an irritant Most

of perspectivism resulted Nietzsche in some himself

defenses.

the mistake spectivism true. while spots Schrift is true Alan at

apparently

makes,

can be Schrift, the same

saved

from paradox

by affirming the a multiplicity to the charge Lawrence to Nietzsche the danger can

it is only perspectivally of "[denying] and truth

for example, time proclaiming victim that of "falling Nietzsche

recognizes

of truths,"

accurately However, cue is no truth

the danger agrees only

of self-reference."14 be avoided Hinman, the view

with

if perspectivism taking that his

perspectivally.15 correctly truth claims

Likewise, attributes game, within a

largely of any Moreover,

from OTL,

there the

ontologically

privileged Hinman

language claim

or perspective, language thought game that

from which may be

particular

assessed.16

that Nietzsche and that metaphors

truth this a

is fundamentally at least in

a property part by

of metaphors, losing their can

acquire within of metaphors

property particular is true,

metaphorical say that his

meaning theory in our

language according to

Hinman, by declaring the theory itself to be a dead metaphor that has become
canonical, Nietzsche man's allowed tivally fixed, "to defense and obligatory logical language.18 about is really true same This approach the claim permits But that Hin he is avoid difficulties against self-referentiality."19 only so long as thing. it is simply He calls must

game.17

Nietzsche

of Nietzsche

paradox thesis much insists the

to declare true. George

the perspectivism Stack says and

perspec it as a

Nietzsche's adopt

perspectivism provisional on this view

"paradoxical," hypothesis, is offered by Ken

that

"[Nietzsche]

a perspectival Gemes. i.e. what Gemes

interpretation Gemes we then notes have been

. . . "20 A "an

recent overly absolute

variation strident truth,

that

rejection "can lead

of the unconditional," quickly to paradox."21

calling solution:

offers

this

"Nietzsche's In other words,

rejection the falsity true.

of the unconditional of absolutism?or

is itself a conditional the truth

rejection."22 only

of perspectivism?is

perspectivally

NIETZSCHEAN
Two tivism, other offered recent answers to the Nehamas

PERSPECTIVISM
self-referential problems

111
posed with two class But by perspec more he first,

by Alexander

and Maudemarie

Clark,

are much paradox, things: as

turn first to Nehamas. When We confronted sophisticated.23 to accomplish offers up a modal that is supposed argument show Paradox is in the is not appears more how the and, same paradox second, class as of perspectivism show how the paradox as shown the Liar, is not in the same is to be resolved. earlier, if the is still and is

the Liar

the paradox resolution as with crux it a of

the proposed in fact

successful it argues substantive

anyway.

Nehamas's and

argument even

irreparable: is replaced The

for a tautology, conclusion, the

tautology

argument

a red herring.

the problem is that he mistakenly

perspectivism can salvage it from

believes
paradox.

that introducing modality

But, since perspectivism

into
a

is not

modal
while Clark paradox. a 'minimal that ture true ski's

thesis, pointing out that Nietzsche may allow that it ispossibly untrue
maintaining declares Her that that it is actually interpretation on a distinction theory true, is irrelevant.24 is immune between what from she the calls her rests of perspectivism introduced of truth'and The Davidson's former doctrine

defense

'metaphysical true

correspondence theory correspond constituted correspond the L thesis that is one

quasi-Tarskian is the whose abilities derives theory "'S' and thesis "na are

correspondence statements

of truth.'25 to Kantian

things-in-themselves of cognitive The latter adequate

is determinately because Convention language only they T,

independently" to those that an entities.26 extensionally all Clark then

from Tar of truth is true in

for some L if and

entails

sentences argues

of the form against in BGE, it.We

if S." With theory

Nietzsche, but

the metaphysical accepts EH, TI, that

correspondence Davidson's and portions

of truth,

claims

not only

that Nietzsche GM,AC,

minimal of WP,

correspondence but also that of truth with nor

theory he must is not entails

of truth accept the

argue and

elsewhere theory that

the Tarski-Davidson that it is neither be

theory consistent accepted

only

plausible

of truth; it neither

perspectivism;

is nor must

by Nietzsche.27

Ill
Given surprise Nietzsche's pends upon the difficulties in avoiding believe and the that avoiding paradox there are of perspectivism, at least The and defined in which two ways one absolutisms as the thesis and it may here be a to learn that we of defending de of differ that for

perspectivism

paradox. was

developed

distinguishing no In section ing strengths. statement, in which there is

between

perspectivisms

(I) perspectivism some perspective Call this

every

it is

true, strong

some

perspective tivism. There

it is untrue.

sort of perspectivism of weakening itwith restricted this

perspec abandon over call it

is a quite

straightforward and The result

way replace

thesis

quantification only weak that some

over all statements statements.

quantification so we

is a weaker

form of perspectivism, shall be taken there is some

perspectivism. there is at least

Henceforth one

weak

perspectivism such that

to be the thesis in which

statement

perspective

112
it is true, with weak and

HISTORY
some

OF PHILOSOPHY
in which some

QUARTERLY
Note the that same nearly that it is consistent truth all value in

perspective that is, one truth

it is untrue. have

perspectivism that truth have truth values their values

statements

all perspectives, have their statements have truth there offered are

can maintain

that very many and yet on hold

statements some

perspectivally, values all across or

nevertheless some

absolutely. in all

In other words, This

statements about

perspectives.

is the view

on Nietzsche's several

behalf. to this proposal. The The first is that against to him makes and it talks weak that so the paradox Nietzsche's the claims refutes only strong about itself. some is

There

advantages results

of perspectivism perspectivism version every Weak statement perspectivism

is resolved that

if it is adopted. in paradox it is because

argument attributing

requires strong

of perspectivism; that lacks not

perspectivism since

perspectivism this talking as and the be

is self-referential consequence; about itself. true

about

statements, consistent distinct

it need with

Indeed, the

perspectivism all else statements is bedrock

accepting are

absolutely laws true.

thesis

from perspectivism over

of logic Hence, is adopted,

(and whatever the paradox and so weak

for Nietzsche) stricted

perspectivally solution

is defused

if re

quantification and elegant

statements

perspectivism

is a simple One tivism tivism

to the paradox.

of weak of paradox is an advantage perspec deny that avoidance might on the grounds aim in discussing that Nietzsche's truth and its perspec over truth. But such to generate and puzzlement is precisely paradox confuses the potential purposes results uses can be of perspectivism served by with presenting and both that its content. Legiti and puzzles are activities is itself paradoxi

complaint mate showing which cal

philosophical the paradoxical Nietzsche

by in

of a long-held

view,

is not much ways to show theory

negative thinking seem positive best Weak

However, advancing delighted. a paradoxical for although of a discovery, as a the of e.g. way poverty illustrating itself count as an acceptable truth positive that Nietzsche and not merely is just such intended

a theory

help theory may or way of a strategy theory. Since his to be an acceptable example, entail he

in of

it cannot

texts

perspectivism trick that does

a provocative of perspectivism a version.31

or negative not

is

served

by an

interpretation

paradox.

perspectivism

Likewise,
that tivism the price

itmight be argued against this interpretation of perspectivism

of escaping is to provide the paws of paradox it had for rejecting and is to strip Nietzsche's to start with. absolutist other logical which Since perspec the point used of and to that itwas makes that what philosophical power

of whatever

perspectivism dogmatic warrant there such be some

grounds our defense appears

metaphysics devices requires

philosophical absolutism, absolute But to either of inference

appeals

to bivalence

of perspectivism, to relapse

truths, itmust

into the very militancy perspectivism and its admission only confirms

designed no commitment logical Thus rules

to avoid.

be emphasized that weak or non-bivalent bivalent logic, are shared across perspectives

Nietzsche himself claims about their place in human thought (recall WP 522).
Nietzsche may consistently endorse both perspectivism and proof theory.

NIETZSCHEAN
Moreover, critique to ground absolutist cians of all weak perspectivism insistence has

PERSPECTIVISM
systematic there are benefits for Nietzsche easily strong only and

113
his

of morality Nietzsche's

and metaphysics. that

It is, for instance, no moral

enough moral

facts,

interpretations of phenomena
proclamations stripes of science are not,

(BGE
what

108, TI VII
other is claimed with truth,

1,WP
on their

258) and that the

and metaphysi absolutely that is only values theses too declaration "physics their behalf,

by Christians, despite is also

religious

types,

true. Weak the claims

perspectivism lack

consistent

Nietzsche's and that

cross-perspectival on the class

an interpretation" (BGE 14, cf. WP 636). All that weak perspectivism imposes
are minimal perspectivally; Nietzsche Still, axioms just wants there are boundaries it does of statements the provocative that have and truth not preclude substantive

perspectivism some that statements are

to advance. the in all, perspectivism or across all, of inference for humans again at WP thesis itself and and absolutely logical that is for

for instance that

true and

perspectives, are true if it is true that

to say

perspectivism

the rules true

humans, perspectives. axioms

for a statement However, absolutely (although speculates section, laws of logic, thought off1

is absolutely it must true be for human

in all human logical other unchar As to he we

emphasized perspectives, that,

although about

are

nothing 616,

follows Nietzsche

perspectives acteristically argued accept claims, cannot Nietzsche's inability logic of On Nietzsche far that only Note are true fewer all not the

it should on the

be noted possibility thinks

of non-human that, as humans,

perspectives). we are forced where that at WP to a not

in the first

Nietzsche a position is

he makes

explicit according

522, scheme

"rational throw

interpretation italics). about we It an are

(Nietzsche's nothing follows

is

important unable are

to misinterpret world from our laws of of the

claims: to avoid holding and as than truths

extra

perspectival to conceive forced one there truths

or escape shows to think

logic. That except at all

nothing

that we take

to adopt

a certain points to only thought that

perspective Truth

in order Lie

(this we Sense).

to be

of the main are, for

in a Nonmoral here, The universal

Hence,

according humans, have claims

interpreted philosophers are absolute.

or absolute

have

traditionally view here

thought.

Many

attributed

to Nietzsche

a small that

few are.32 in characterizing of perspectives truths that are are absolute or true truths truths. human truths we do not say that they

outside there are

ex?ra-perspectivally. within The all human

Rather, perspectives, about

the claim that values is,

is that that

there

cross-perspectival or after to commit one deducted a

attempt

to talk

truth

(indeed, the attempt to talk of anything) outside of human perspectives

talk nonsense, over category mistake.33 "As (WP if a world 567). Indeed, would there remain pervasive distinction being nervous true the perspective!" interpretation being behalf true in all

is to
still is a the

problem between outside

in Nietzschean something of all on his

of failing perspectives

to recognize and are

something rightly of

perspectives.

Nietzsche's that some

commentators statements are

about

claiming

true outside

114
perspectives, thing insistence

HISTORY
but extension true, there

OF PHILOSOPHY
of this that fear prevents

QUARTERLY
them from saying that any as

is absolutely that

is, true outside

in all

perspectives.

Nehamas's that might

repeated serve

a bearer of truth is an instance of this fallacy if interpreted as implying

rejection Clark and to truth equate that of some too falls outside absolute victim truths. to the temptation Although knowledge "to consider in a set believe to conflate she writes with truth that in all perspectives reasonable

is nothing

of interpretations

perspectives.

"it seems of

nonperspectival she also states, what it must be grounded else

knowledge

things-in-them would beings there be must to

selves,"34 insist accept

knowledge nonperspectival . . beliefs of. all rational . . . [Nietzsche With calls]

no matter

they

nonperspectival claim is no is precisely stepping outside de incoherent

knowledge disagreement. what of the human mand. truth But in all

'an absurdity Indeed, rules

and knowledge out,

a nonsense.'"35 of Kantian since such

the first

things-in-themselves requires thinks is an

perspectivism in the human

knowledge

perspective, second

something passage but with she by

Nietzsche conflates

extra-perspectival non-perspectival truth. The view

truth with truth not with here that

perspectives truth, between

equating absolute the two: and

extra-perspectival forges Nietzsche outside group However, tives, their a strict considers of the human perspectives, Nietzsche statements perspective. objection truths

proposed truth truth

distinction

it is extra-perspectival a nonsense; or are to use of all a

to be an absurdity perspective, is to speak can that accept true are which

predicates and mistake. perspec is true in

is the conjunction to commit truths

individual

gibberish that for all there

category human else

in all

humans

no matter

what

Another absolute

to the kind

suggested to Nietzsche

interpretation is mistaken.

is that After

attributing all, he

any

of any

proclaims that untruth is a condition of life (GS 110, 121, BGE 4,WP 483, 487, 493, 507, 514), and declares that "everything is false! everything is permitted!"
(WP truths that 602, cf. GM III 24). Hence, so the objection to say 487 that cited goes, there earlier: has there are no but absolute nothing however to do with conflict is for humans; is true. Recall it may Grant that be it is more the passage accurate from WP is falsity,

frequently

"A belief, nothing the

necessary truth."

for the preservation objection that that elements has prima

of a species, facie bite.

this

only superficial and can be explained away with less difficulty than might be
expected. metaphysical available constants, endorsed untruth cannot and For the thesis untruth there are is a condition no non-fictional, of interpretation And this proposal, than untrue, are no the of life is a variation extra-logical we The of the entities thesis to serve as

However,

in a domain language. in all amounts Our is because

for the variables, believe, claim is that

predicates as

of our true

by Nietzsche is a condition escape our human

human

perspectives. are

of life thus

to no more beliefs

claim

that we are not

perspective. but that

for they

extra-perspectivally truths of any kind.

true,

there

extra-perspectival and non-truth that

It is precisely

extra-perspectival

truth

NIETZSCHEAN
Nietzsche ridicules and and rejects outright: true.

PERSPECTIVISM
no matter how even that essential a belief

115
is for true

the preservation it still is not

enhancement

of life no matter The belief

if it is absolutely is such

spectival truth and non-truth is a fiction, and it is this kind of truth that is an
illusion of which we have forgotten at worst. and that it is an illusion, of this a worn out metaphor with there truths, of

extra-perspectivally

there

extra-per

(OTL p. 84). Finally, it is the search for such truth an sich thatNietzsche finds
quixotic being, statements at best within and absurd But all is consistent the set of humbler that are true in all non-dogmatic Indeed, perspectival "untruth human

life" is itself an instance of the kind of statement that Nietzsche

human, While quate able all the too human, absolute truth. defended of Nietzsche's of the more here texts hyperbolic provides and of perspectivism majority some

perspectives.

is a condition

thinks is a
an ade

interpretation in its own

interpretation thesis

of the vast right,

is a respect claims about

BGE perspectivism from

appears pose What ways Nietzsche represent Nachlass, might save a to argue problem then are we for weak

4,WP 480, 481, 516, 535 and 540, inwhich Nietzsche

applicability which of perspectivism, precludes There that these are are seem to perspectivism, them. away problematic one own self-referentiality. at least three in these passages largely

for the self-referential

to say of these to

passages? might rhetoric these say and

of responding gets his which argue that carried

First, by his

passages do from Hence, in order not the one to

considered Nietzsche

view. never

Second, intended him

passages

to be published a view doomed A notes. third

anyway. to failure option

it is unfair passages

to assign found

a few hyperbolic have no

in his

is to claim

that Nietzsche
paradox are WP

is only insisting that the absolute truths required to avoid the

ontological as are status outside of the human perspective. We opt

minimally
jointly 481, to do

for the last, although it should be noted that the first two options
consistent, for example, We such a thing." are accept the "we are the the last that two. "facts any such truths, as is precisely fact this "in one are that what there is not, only to as declares

interpretations. want denying perspective truths presented claim claim are that and still that

cannot

establish

itself:"

perhaps

it is folly not human facts of any are

Passages in order

best

understood

there

absolute

statements

denizens that

must

to live, but

as denying According fact 'in itself" But

there

or

outside here, there make

structure cannot no

of perspectives. establish any that weak their

to the

interpretation to the keep that Or this there can

is equivalent allows

extra-perspectival point have which

truths.

Nietzsche

further

perspectivism values

some

statements

truth

absolutely.

consider

Nietzsche's
classical, acceptance generated 517). And

insistence atWP 480 that truth is a fiction. To be sure, truth in the

extra-perspectival of this by proposal "the will sense still is a fiction permits over a set by Nietzsche's of perspectival truths for humans. of truth lights. However, truths (WP human

to be master

the multiplicity

of sensations"

it permits even

the existence some

of absolute of the

Clearly,

if dispelling

fog of misinterpretations

116
perspectivism he promotes admitted

HISTORY
puts the that in the us

OF PHILOSOPHY
position there

QUARTERLY
Nietzsche pressing is only pertain other relations Nietzsche that much work.36 is after when issues To one raised by of

in a better

to see what are many

perspectival remain

life, untouched

perspectivism we Nietzsche's ogy, and, been truth begun done.

by our

investigations. facets These the

reiterate

what

introduction, Other interesting, essay, been other much

truth

perspectivism

component epistemol have barely them

perspectivism. perhaps, most in this

important ontology. less have While

to ethics, aspects between

touched

and has to be

perspectivism to address We hope

investigated. concerns, of these some

recent

scholarship remains

these to address

it is our belief issues

in future

Georgia State University and at Colorado University of Colorado

Springs Received January 5, 1993

NOTES
1. Abbreviations HATH for Nietzsche's All (Lincoln: texts are as follows: ed. and trans. Marion Press, Faber 1984; and of Nebraska Stephen edition:

Human, Lehmann 1878).

Too Human, University

original

D P

trans. R.J. Hollingdale University (Cambridge: Cambridge Daybreak, 1881). Press, 1982; original edition: on the Struggle Between Reflections Art and Knowl "The Philosopher: in Philosophy and Truth: Selections From Nietzsche's Note edge" ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale books of the Early (London: 1870's, Press Humanities 1979). International, in a Nonmoral in Philosophy Sense" and Truth: "On Truth and Lie From Nietzsche's ed. and Notebooks Selections 1870's, of the Early trans. Daniel Breazeale Humanities Press (London: International, 1979). The ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann Gay Science, 1882). Books, 1974; original edition: ed. and trans. Walter Thus Zarathustra, Spoke Nietzsche (New York: Viking Penguin, 1885). (New York: Vintage Kaufmann, 1954; original in The edition:

OTL

GS Z

Portable BGE GM AC TI EH WP

ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann and Evil, Good (New York: Beyond 1886). Books, 1966; original edition: Vintage ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann On the Genealogy (New of Morals, York: Vintage 1887). Books, 1967; original edition: ed. and trans. R.J. Hollingdale The Antichrist, (New York: Viking Pen 1895). guin, 1968; original edition: ed. and trans. R.J. Hollingdale The Twilight (New York: of the Idols, 1889). 1968; original edition: Viking Penguin, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann Ecce Homo, (New York: Vintage Books, 1908). 1967; original edition: ed. and trans. Walter The Will toPower, 1968). (New York: Vintage Books, Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale senses in chapter

Schacht's discussion of these different 2. See for example Richard and Kegan 2 of his book Nietzsche 1983). (London: Routledge Paul,

NIETZSCHEAN
3. We kinds we do not deny of perspectivism that there are relations or that Nietzsche

PERSPECTIVISM

117

focus here

on moral Virtues (1992), 4. We some

only on perspectivism see Robert and an application, perspectivism and the Health of the Soul," International thank Richard Schacht for pointing

between truth perspectivism and the other interesting things to say about them. Again, as a thesis about the nature of truth. For reflections has C. Welshon, Studies "Nietzsche's in Philosophy, last remarks. Peculiar vol. 24

pp. 77-89. out the need for these delicacy reflections. But of some just what Nietzsche there is one aspect rejects from logic. See below for of his critique of logic that might

5. It is a matter preliminary be pressed Nietzsche

of perspectivism does the interpretation being offered here. Consider: against the thesis that every statement has a truth-value, and this reject bivalence, 34 offer some prima is either true or false? WP truth-value 516, 535, and BGE facie not one bit for the interpretation of perspec evidence that he does. Still, this matters tivism N.B.: offered here. The status of bivalence is irrelevant to the thesis of perspectivism formulated rather in this paper. some of Nietzsche's results

assume that he rejects bivalence and infer interpreters or from this. Some argue that views which reject bivalence reject thereby an axiom of any logic and so entail rejection replace "binary oppositions" of all logic. Others the need for a novel logic argue that rejection of bivalence supports are paradigms in which and paradox of logicality. Still others argue that contradiction remarkable sanctions of bivalence inconsistency rejection ideas." Maudemarie "unconstrained play among Cambridge often use or what Clark, an is euphemistically called on Truth and in her Nietzsche

(Cambridge: Philosophy deconstructionists ment;

1990) p. 66 uses the first argu Press, University Deconstruction all three; cf. John Ellis, Against citations for textual of these claims. Princeton 1989) (Princeton: Press, University are uniformly fallacious. of bivalence entails these arguments Rejection Unfortunately, logics that remainintuitionist logic; there are plenty of alternative rejection of bivalent and van Kleene, by Lukasiewicz, logics of the sort proposed logics and many-valued Fraassen other are be defined logics despite by introducing than true or false.

the suggestion indulging neither does Nietzsche: and in the end Nietzsche is Nietzsche's though 6. Kant 7. Cf. Ken cal Research, 8. We This that that

For each such logic consistency may rejection of bivalence. additional rules of inference to govern formulae with values can scarcely of non-bivalent One imagine a proponent logic that consistency bivalence lapses simply because lapses. And goes beyond that only a nihilist nihilism. rejects logic altogether battle 353. (WP 24),

he holds standard the heavens

truth be known

Fichte's whipping boy, although fall" also comes to mind. Cf. D

cry "let the

Gemes,

"Nietzsche's

vol. 52 (1992),

take "true" and "false" no

of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenologi Critique of this rhetoric. pp. 47-65 for a good discussion "Untrue" is the negation of "true." "untrue" to be contradictories. to bivalence, instead Therefore contraries Those who reject bivalence hold of contradictories, but they do not claim we are not assuming and that "untrue" however.

does not commit "true" and there are

the account are

contradictories. for Nietzsche.

"false" mean

the same

a perspective," and is then defined as

"is a statement," "is let R be a one place predicate 9. Let P be a one place predicate "is true in." The thesis of perspectivism let T be a two place predicate (1) Vx3y3z(Px-?(Ry&Rz&Txy&~Txz)) is simply the denial of perspectivism, (2)~(Vx3y3z(Px-*(Ry&Rz&Txy&~Txz))) the following may be restructured (3) 3xVyVz~(Px-KRy&Rz&Txy&~Txz)) (4) 3xVyVz(Px&~(Ry&Rz&Txy&~Txz)) (5) 3xVyVz(Px&((Ry&Rz&Txy)->Txz))

Absolutism

viz.

Absolutism

way: from 2, quantifier from 3, equivalence from 4, equivalence negation

118
In English, perspective, 10. Clark, that and (5) then op.

HISTORY
states that

OF PHILOSOPHY
there in all. is some statement

QUARTERLY
such that, if it is true in any

it is true

cognitive capacities that different belief

cit., p. 139. It should be mentioned interests are and practical sets are to be commensurable

that Clark involved

our central points. of persons former thesis, but not the latter, has to do with intentional attitudes a perspective. of course has the within Nietzsche interesting things to say about and intentional attitudes what they are, their formation, their truth, their justification, this affects 11. The things the consequences here and 12. We take

does add the provisos in perspectives (p. 133), But none of (p. 141 et passim).

of state in the same way that possible worlds determine the truth values perspective are not possible worlds, but they seem in possible world semantics. ments Perspectives in an analogous is elaboration of this intuition to be intensional entities way. Further a logical apparatus for this technical not possible without inappropriately developing paper. 13. Arthur 14. Alan 1990) Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher and the Question (New York: Macmillan, of Interpretation 1965), p. 80. Schrift, Nietzsche p. 153. ibid., p. 153. Philosophy is from pp. and 197-8. Pheno (New York: Routledge,

ones but we do not have space to consider those of having particular the nature of truth anyway. they are of little interest in determining a within to determine the truth values of statements perspectives

15. Schrift, 16. Lawrence menological 17. Hinman, 18. Hinman, 19. Hinman,

and Truth," "Nietzsche, Hinman, Metaphor, 43 (1982): pp. 179-199. The quotation Research ibid., ibid., ibid., pp. 189-191. p. 194. p. 192.

and Perspectival 20. George "Nietzsche Stack, Interpretation," Today, Philosophy is from p. 221; the second from p. 238. The first quotation vol. 25 (1981), pp. 221-241. it should be noted that at the end of his article (cf. p. 240), Stack claims that However, In "the paradoxes satisfactorily." by his thinking cannot really be resolved generated section Nietzsche III we show that this last claim of Stack's is mistaken the paradoxes facing can be resolved. op cit. p. 55. ibid., p. 56. as Literature 1994 issue. (Cam

21. Gemes, 22. Gemes,

Nietzsche: 23. See Clark, op cit., and Alexander Nehamas, Life 1985). Press, University bridge: Harvard on Nietzsche's 24. See our "Nehamas Theory of Truth," March, 25. Clark, 26. Clark, 27. See Philosophy 28. See op. cit., pp. 30-31. p. 41; cf. also p. 45. Clark's Research, Nietzsche March option. of Maudemarie

ibid., and

our "Review

on Truth 1994 issue.

and

Philosophy,"

Phenomenological fn 31 for some discussion perspectivism: perspectivism: to see how

of the other

29. Strong Weak 30.

Vx3y3z(Px-KRy&Rz&Txy&~Txz)) 3x3y3z(Px&Ry&Rz&Txy&~Txz) strong and weak versions of absolutism can be generated,

It is easy weak strong

absolutism: absolutism:

3xVyVz(Px&((Ry&Rz&Txy)->Txz)) VxVyVz(Px&Ry&Txy->(Rz->Txz))

Weak

is the is the negation and strong absolutism of strong perspectivism, absolutism and weak perspectivism ofweak perspectivism. It is clear how weak absolutism negation are consistent behalf. and indeed we advocate them both on Nietzsche's

NIETZSCHEAN

PERSPECTIVISM

119

is a specific theory devised 31. Perspectivism own idiosyncratic for Nietzsche's philo to be a semi-apparent and is not supposed sophical purposes linguistic fact or intuition. to tailor perspectivism As such, it is legitimate to suit whatever claims philosophical and ends he wishes. Whether it works to solve other paradoxes with which the paradox

of perspectivism is most is a matter that neither can nor needs be closely associated here. Granted, restricted to solve other analyzed quantification might be extended well-known such as Russell's or the liar, but of set-membership paradoxes, paradox restricted quantification (as suggested by Russell's theory of types) to exclude problem atic cases is not the most popular to these paradoxes. solution There is a belief that

the possibility of unrestricted in a language, whether it be preserving quantification or some class, is worthwhile. about all sets, or this sentence, If so, it is ad hoc to rule that a syntactic string cannot 'say of itself that it has certain properties, particularly In general, a ban on self-reference the property of untruth. to avoid works although some of the paradoxes, it seems to be a case where the cure is worse than the disease. the alternatives to the distinction between theory of types, Alfred Tarski's comes to mind. Although we think that the obviously the paradox of perspectivism, it is more technological

Among

object-and meta-level languages Tarski treatment would dissolve than needed. But in brief: guage (say, a particular (much language

we

Based

"Mathematical Russell, sketchy.) For the theory of types, see Bertrand Logic as on The Theory of Types," Logic and Knowledge (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956). The locus classicus of the Tarski in of Truth is, of course, his "The Concept approach in Logic, Semantics, Formalized Hack Metamathematics Languages," (Indianapolis: ett Publishing in the Tarskian "Outline Co., 2nd ed. 1983). Also spirit is Saul Kripke, we of a Theory of Truth," Journal vol. 72 (1975), pp. 690-716. In general, of Philosophy, think that the problems are harder to solve than the one facing the other paradoxes so more complex and more controversial solutions are needed for facing perspectivism, them. of an overarching that we are all forced to advocacy perspective that we believe is partly for Danto's of responsible misreading as a pragmatist. Danto "In the interests of life and survival, we are writes, to affirm the body of beliefs which constrained sense and reject for common passes 32. It is Nietzsche's humans conflicts with this" (Danto, op. cit., p. 75). Danto may be right that this is of Nietzsche's The views, but he is wrong to think it simple pragmatism. representative are ones that are absolutely class of statements in mind that Danto has true for they are true in all human 33. On (London: the nature Hutchinson, op. of category mistakes, 1949), p. 16 et passim. perspectives. see Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind

be within the range of its own quantifier. Colloquially put, every time the perspectivism thesis within the language its level over which the thesis would level and up to a ranges, quantifier get booted out of that language the paradox could never get generated. (We realize that these remarks higher one. Hence tried to put are

the perspectivism thesis would be a sentence in the metalan or German), of English in the which says of sentences partition or German) of the rest of English that they all have their truth object can contain both its own truth values view no language On Tarski's perspectivally. to refer to its own expression. and the means Thus the perspectivism thesis predicate itself could never

as adopt Nietzsche whatever

Nietzsche;

34. Clark, 35. Clark,

cit., p. 132.

36. We Ernest Nussbaum, Sosa, Richard Schmitt, Jaegwon and an anonymous referee for for Kim, Victor Caston, History of Philosophy Quarterly of this paper and for helpful discussions. criticisms of ancestors

ibid., p. 130. to thank Martha wish