SAARC

Introduction
The world today is at a turning point. The changes that we are undergoing are global in scope, revolutionary, fundamental and structural 21st in content. As we have entered the century a sense of optimism prevails for attaining peace and prosperity through effective role-play of regional as well as global organizations. Many view Asia as having a variety of characteristics in common with Europe of the nineteenth century: underdeveloped international institutions, mixed domestic orders, rising nationalism, high but differential growth rates, and bitter, emotional rivalries between insecure neighbours. The success of states in todays world is not so much measured in terms of capacity for defending borders or creating uniquely national institutions, but in terms of ability to adapt to regional and global trends, promote exports, attract investments, and skilled labour, provide a beneficial environment for transnational companies, build attractive institutions of research and higher learning, wield political influence on the regional and global scene, and also brand the nation culturally in the international market-place.1 Consequently, regional associations are fast becoming an important and effective new scene for political and economic interaction in the world. In this new environment the importance of regional community and functional groupings has been heightened. Regional, political and religious blocs of nations now provide platforms for a number of countries to exercise influence in global affairs. Interest in greater regional economic integration, fuelled partly by the achievement of an economic union and a single currency in Europe, has grown in different parts of the world. This includes South Asia and the regional organization known as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which has announced the goal of attaining an economic union and expressed the desire for a common currency. SAARC is a fairly recent association, established in 1985 by the seven member states of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. These seven countries differ greatly in land area, GDP, and population, although they have similar levels of human and
1 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
economic development. They also share the unusual feature of having a common border with one another member country. The objective of this paper is to present some preliminary information relevant to the pattern and process of regional economic integration in the member states under SAARC in the region. Today world is divided into two major categories. The states whose influence goes beyond a particular region the world powers and those whose influence is confined to a particular region the regional powers.
Globalism
Globalism is defined as a borderless world programme that implies a tendency towards a global social system. Its historical origins reached a new stage in the post-Second World War era since the sense of geographical distance has dramatically changed; some even speak of the end of geography. The world is now considered as one global village. Globalization is a new phenomenon. There is an intricate relationship between regionalization and globalization. Compared to regionalism with an impressive theoretical tradition behind it, globalism is a more recent concept in social sciences. Whether its consequences are seen as catastrophic or as the ultimate unification of the world, the concept of globalisation is often used in a rather loose and ideological sense. However, there are also many definitions of regionalism. For the critics, the regionalist trend constitutes a threat to the multilateral system, on the other hand, for the enthusiasts the regionalism could form the basis for an improved multilateral system. The effectiveness of regional governance arrangements has been recognized since the end of the Second World War. Now regionalism has emerged as one of the dominant themes of World politics in the post-Cold War era. In this world of globalization, the nature of competition presses towards the formation of larger units, both for economic efficiency and to ensure the political power necessary to bargain effectively over the rules and institutions that govern the world economy. European Union, NAFTA, ASEAN are the examples of state-driven integration policies which are effectively responding to the challenges of international competition. Economic integration that encompasses broad areas of socio-political, economic and cultural links with nations joining together in a forum generally belongs to one or several regions.2 The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) are few examples of such integration. The degree of economic integration ranges from preferential trade arrangements (PTA) to free trade area (FTA), customs union (CU), common market (CM) and economic union (EU).3 The study of regionalism lies in the problem of how conflict can be avoided and how cooperation and stability can be maintained.
Regionalism
Regions in international politics are described as a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual independence and could be differentia ted according to the level and scope of exchange, formal organizations, and political interdependence. It involves formal and informal agreements marked by explicit and implicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Regionalization does not come about unless the states in a particular region want it. It may come about through political regime, economic policy or security but often triggers from political events that set the process in motion. The foreign policy and political events identify this change in a state as an actor in regional integration process. Region as a geographical unit is delimited by more or less through natural physical barriers and is marked by ecological characteristics that as social system imply trans-local relations between human groups. Region is organized for cooperation in the cultural, economic, and political and security fields. Region in civil society takes shape when the organizational framework facilitates and promotes social communication and convergence of values throughout the region. Region has a distinct identity, a legitimate structure of decision-making and actor capability. Crucial areas for regional integration lead to conflict resolution within the member states and help creation of welfare, social security and regional balance. This process is similar to state formation and nation building, and the ultimate outcome is a voluntary evolution of a group of sovereign national, political units into a supranational security community, where sovereignty is pooled for the best of all. For Deutsch, integration is a relationship among units, which makes them interdependent, and those units produce such properties within the system that they would lack in separate cases.6 Cohesion of an integrated system can be measured by its capacity to withstand stress and strain, support disequilibria, and resist disruptions. Thus, strain-survival capacity of an integrated system is directly proportional to its cohesion.
Regional integration was traditionally seen as a harmonization of trade policies leading to deeper economic integration, with political integration as a possible future result. The concept of regionalism refers to a transformation of a particular region from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity with regard to a number of dimensions, the most important being culture, security, economic policies and political regimes. The convergence along these four dimensions may be a natural process or a politically steered one or, most likely, a mixture of the two. A certain level of sameness is necessary but not a sufficient condition. Furthermore, all regions are hardly equal in their potential for institutional formation and success. Not only do they vary in their homogeneity by the above criteria, but they also vary immensely in the resources they can bring to bear on the problems of their member states. Changes in political regimes today typically mean democratization and changes in economic policies nowadays normally go in the direction of economic openness. The dynamics of regionalization thus constitute the interaction between these dimensions found at different levels in the world society. On the global level, the changing structure of the world system provides autonomy for the regional actors, as the process of regionalization in itself constitutes a structural change towards multi-polarity and globalization. On the level of interregional relations the behaviour of one region affects the behaviour of other regions. European regionalism is, for instance, the trigger of global regionalization, at least in two different ways: one positive, in promoting regionalism by providing a model, the other negative, in provoking regionalism by constituting a protectionist threat. Thus regions themselves constitute arenas for sometimes competing and sometimes converging national interests for emerging as an effective regional actor.
Origin and Evolution of SAARC

After the analysis of theories of globalism and regionalism, it becomes imperative to find out the rationale for regional cooperation in South Asia. Besides, it is desirable to look at the evolutionary process of regional cooperation in South Asia to assess the pace of regionalism in reaching at its present destination as SAARC. The evolution passed through four phases that include: Conception (1977-80) The Meeting of Foreign Secretaries (1981-83), The Meeting of Foreign Ministers (198385), and The Summits (1985-2004). The first concrete proposal for establishing a framework for regional cooperation in South Asia was made by the late president of Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman, on May 2, 1980. Prior to this, the idea of regional cooperation in South Asia was discussed in at least three conferences: the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in April 1947, the Baguio Conference in the Philippines in May 1950, and the Colombo Powers Conference in April 1954.8 Since 1977, the Bangladesh president seemed to have been working on the idea of an ASEAN-like organization in South Asia.9 During his visit to India in December 1977, Ziaur Rahman discussed the issue of regional cooperation with the new Indian Prime Minister, Morarji Desai. In the inaugural speech to the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee which met in Kathmandu in December 1977, King Birendra of Nepal gave a call for close regional cooperation among South Asian countries in sharing river waters. President Ziaur Rahman welcomed the Kings call during the formers visit to Bangladesh in January 1978. President Ziaur Rahman had also informally discussed the idea of regional cooperation with the leaders of South Asian countries during the Commonwealth Summit in Lusaka (1979) and the Non-Aligned Summit in Havana (1979). However, the Bangladesh president seems to have given a concrete shape to the proposal after his visit to Sri Lanka and discussion with the Sri Lankan president, J.R. Jayawardene, in November 1979. Several factors seem to have influenced President Ziaur Rahmans thinking about establishing a regional organization in South Asia during 1975-1979: a) Change in the political leadership in South Asian countries and demonstration of accommodative diplomacy by the new leaders;
b) Ziaur Rahmans need for Indian support to legitimize his coup dtat regime; c) An acute balance of payment crisis of almost all South Asian countries which was further aggravated by the second oil crisis in 1979; d) Failure of the North-South dialogues, and increasing protectionism by the developed countries; publication of an extremely useful background report by the Committee on Studies for Cooperation in Development in South Asia (CSCD), identifying many feasible areas of cooperation assurance of economic assistance for multilateral cooperative projects on sharing water resources of the Ganga and Brahmaputra by United States President Jimmy Carter and British Prime Minister James Callaghan during their visit to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in January 1978; and the Soviet military Intervention in Afghanistan in late December 1979 and the resulting rapid deterioration of South Asian security situation. During this critical period, President Ziaur Rahmans initiative for establishing a regional organization which would give the leaders of South Asian countries an opportunity to improve their understanding of one anothers problems and to deal with conflicts before they turned into crisis, became much more appealing. While the Bangladesh proposal was promptly endorsed by Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Bhutan, India and Pakistan were sceptical initially. Indias main concern was the proposals reference to the security matters in South Asia. Indian policy-makers also feared that Ziaur Rahmans proposal for a regional organization might provide an opportunity for new smaller neighbours to regionalize all bilateral issues and to join with each other to gang up against India. Pakistan assumed that it might be an Indian strategy to organize the other South Asian countries against Pakistan and ensure a regional market for Indian products, thereby consolidating and further strengthening Indias economic dominance in the region. However, after a series of quiet diplomatic consultations between South Asian foreign ministers at the UN headquarters in New York from August to September 1980, it was agreed that Bangladesh would prepare the draft of a working paper for discussion among the foreign secretaries of South Asian countries. The new Bangladesh draft paper, sensitive to Indias and Pakistans concerns, dropped all references to security matters and suggested only non-political and non-controversial areas for cooperation. Between 1980 and 1983, four meetings at the foreign secretary level (April 21-23, 1981,
Colombo; November 2-4, 1981, Kathmandu; August 7-8, 1982, Islamabad; March 28-30, 1983, Dhaka) took place to establish the principles of organization and identify areas for cooperation. After three years of preparatory discussions at the official level, the focus of discussion shifted to the political level in 1983. The first South Asian foreign ministers conference was held in New Delhi from August 1-3, 1983, where the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) on mutually agreed areas of cooperation (i.e., agriculture, rural development, telecommunications, meteorology, health and population control, transport, sports, arts and culture, postal services and scientific and technical cooperation) was launched. The foreign ministers at this conference also adopted a Declaration on Regional Cooperation, formally beginning an organization known as South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC). Following the New Delhi meeting, three more meetings of the foreign ministers were held at Male (July 10-11, 1984), Thimpu (May 13-14, 1985), and Dhaka (December 5, 1985) to finalize details and determine a date and place for the first meeting of South Asian heads of state. At the Dhaka foreign ministers meeting, a decision was taken to change the name of the organization from South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) to South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The change in the acronym was based on the thinking that while SARC refers to the process of South Asian Regional Cooperation, SAARC marks the establishment of an association (organization) to promote and develop such cooperation. Finally, the first summit meeting of the heads of state or government of South Asian countries was held at Dhaka from December 7-8, 1985.
Aims and Objectives of SAARC

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka is a dynamic institutionalized regional cooperation in South Asia, basically perceived as an economic grouping to work together for accelerating the pace of socio-economic and cultural development. The objectives of the association as defined in the SAARC Charter are: To promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia; To contribute to develop mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one anothers problem; To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields; To strengthen cooperation with other developing countries; To strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interest; and To cooperate with international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes. Cooperation in the SAARC is based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, noninterference in internal affairs of the member states and mutual benefit. Regional cooperation is seen as a complement to the bilateral and multilateral relations of SAARC members. Decisions are taken on the basis of unanimity. Bilateral and contentious issues are excluded from the deliberations of SAARC. Though economic cooperation among South Asian nations was not a new phenomenon yet the quest for economic integration remained inhibited by the colonial heritage of these countries. Since 1985, SAARC has evolved slowly but continuously both in terms of institutions and programmes. However, it is true that most of the programmes and achievements of SAARC exist on paper. The much talked about SAARC Food Security Reserve could not be utilized to meet the needs of Bangladesh during its worst natural disaster in 1991. It is also true that most
SAARC activities are confined to the holding of seminars, workshops, and short training programmes. These activities may be useful, but they do not address priority areas and lack visibility and regional focus so essential for evolving a South Asian identity. Most importantly, SAARC suffers from an acute resource crunch. Unless the organization is successful in mobilizing funds and technical know-how from outside sources, most of its projects cannot be implemented and, thus, its relevance will remain limited.
Salient Features of the Organization Secretariat

The SAARC Secretariat is based in Kathmandu. It coordinates and monitors implementation of activities, prepares for and services meetings, and serves as a channel of communication between the Association and its member states as well as other regional organizations. The Secretary General, who is appointed by the Council of Ministers from member countries in alphabetical order for a three-year term, heads the Secretariat. Mr. Q.A.M.A. Rahim from Bangladesh is the current Secretary General. The previous Secretaries Generals were from Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The next Secretary General is to be from Bhutan. Seven Directors on deputation from member states assist the Secretary General. The SAARC Secretariat and member states observe 8 December as the SAARC Charter Day.
SAARC Regional Centres

Regional Centres covering Agriculture, Tuberculosis, Documentation, Meteorological Research, and Human Resource Development have been established in different SAARC capitals: SAIC (Dhaka, 1998) STC (Katmandu, 1992) SDC (New Delhi, 1994) SMRC (Dhaka, 1995) SHRDC (Islamabad, 1999) SCC (Kandy, 2004) SCZMC (Mal, 2004) and SIC (Katmandu, 2004). In addition, three new regional centres covering Culture, Coastal Zones Management, and Information are being established.
Summits
Summits which are the highest authority in SAARC, are supposed to be held annually. The country hosting the Summit also holds the Chair of the Association. Bangladesh hosted the Thirteenth Summit in November 2005 at Dhaka as the Chairperson of the Association. India will host the Fourteenth SAARC Summit in 2007 as its Chairman. South Asias regional cooperation, international political and economic environment, poverty alleviation, advancing economic cooperation, funding mechanisms, security of small states, combating, terrorism, social, natural disasters and environmental challenges as an agenda for third decade of SAARC was also discussed in the Thirteenth Summit. Enhancing people-topeople contact and cultural cooperation, political cooperation and external linkages of SAARC was also discussed. SAARC member states welcomed the request by the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for membership and invited Afghanistan as a member, subject to the completion of formalities. SAARC member states also agreed in principle with the desire of the Peoples Republic of China and Japan to be associated as observers. The Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters Establishment of SAARC Arbitration Council, and the Limited Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters were signed during the thirteenth SAARC Summit . The Council of Ministers comprising Foreign Ministers, meets at least twice a year. Its functions include formulating policy, reviewing progress of regional cooperation, identifying new areas of cooperation and establishing additional mechanisms that may be necessary. The Standing Committee comprising Foreign Secretaries, monitors and coordinates SAARC programmes of cooperation, approves projects including their financing and mobilizes regional and external resources. It meets as often as necessary and reports to the Council of Ministers.
The Association also convenes meetings at Ministerial Level on specialized themes. The Committee on Economic Cooperation consisting of Secretaries of Commerce oversees regional cooperation in the economic field. During the Twelfth Summit in Islamabad, the SAARC Social Charter was signed in order to address social issues such as population stabilization, empowerment of women, youth mobilization, human resource development, promotion of health and nutrition, and protection of children, which are keys to the welfare and well-being of all South Asians. South Asian States have adopted Conventions on the Suppression of Terrorism (including Additional Protocol signed in January 2004 in Islamabad), Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Trafficking in Women and Children, and Child Welfare in South Asia. An Agreement on Food Security Reserve is also in place. During the 12th SAARC summit held in Islamabad the leaders of South Asia reiterated their commitment to form South Asian Economic Union (SAEU). If formed, it will pave the way for more ambitious but entirely achievable goals such as a Free Trade Area, an Economic Union, open borders, and a common currency for the region. As President Pervez Musharraf said, we must expand SAARC charter to discuss bilateral issues at the regional level. There can be no development in the absence of peace. There can be no peace, so long as political issues and disputes continue to fester. The Twelfth Summit renewed the urgency to deal with poverty in the region. For this purpose, the Summit directed the Independent South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation (ISACPA) to submit to the next Summit a comprehensive and realistic blueprint setting out SAARC Development Goals for the next five years in the areas of poverty alleviation, education, health and environment. The Governors of the Central Banks of member states under the auspices of SAARCFINANCE meet regularly to consider cooperation in financial matters. For strengthening cooperation in information and media related activities of the Association, the Heads of National Television and Radio Organizations of member countries meet annually. Similarly, the SAARC Audio-Visual Exchange (SAVE) Committee disseminates information both on SAARC and its Member States through regular Radio and TV Programmes. In the field of education, the Member States
cooperate through the forums of SACODiL (SAARC Consortium on Open and Distance Learning) and Heads of Universities Grants Commission/Equivalent Bodies. Memoranda of Understanding have been signed to promote collaboration with UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), UNICEF (United Nations Childrens Fund), UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), UNESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific), UNDCP (United Nations Drug Control Programme), ITU (International Telecommunications Union), APT (Asia Pacific
Telecommunity), WHO (World Health Organization), UNIFEM (Untied Nations Fund for Women), CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency), EC (European Commission), PTB (German Metrology Institute), WB (World Bank), ADB (Asian Development Bank), UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS) and SACEP (South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme). Regular dialogues with other Regional Organizations such as ASEAN (Association of SouthEast Asian Nations), ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization) and PIFS (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat) are held with a view to promoting cooperation among sub-regional organizations. The Association promotes interaction on multilateral issues of common concern to its members and has identified areas in which collective positions could be projected at international forums. These include trade, finance, environment, agriculture, women and children, information and telecommunications. Beyond official linkages, SAARC also encourages and facilitates cooperation in private sector through the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI), which is a SAARC Apex Body. Other such bodies are SAARCLAW and South Asian Federation of Accountants (SAFA). In addition, the status of SAARC Recognized Bodies has been accorded to professional groups in South Asia including Architects, Management Development Institutions, University Women, Town Planners, Cardiologists, Dermatologists, Teachers, Writers, Insurance Organizations, Diploma Engineers, Radiological and Surgical Care Societies. The Association of Speakers and Parliamentarians enjoy special recognition by the Heads of State or Government.
Achievements
Several factors such as political, economic, security and potentiality of mutual economic benefit through regionalism seem to have influenced President Ziaur Rahmans thinking about establishing a regional organization in South Asia. SAARCs existence, however, has enabled South Asian political leaders to meet regularly and carry on informal discussions to address their mutual problems. This is no mean achievement given South Asias past history and low level of interaction among South Asian countries since their independence. Informal talks among the leaders at regularly held SAARC meetings have led to inter-elite reconciliation on many sensitive issues, producing some noteworthy results in South Asia. The informal talks between the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers at the second SAARC Summit meeting at Bangalore in November 1986 led to the diffusion of tension between the two countries on the issue of Indias military exercise, Operation Brasstacks, on the Indo-Pakistan border, and the India-Sri Lanka talks at the 1987 SAARC foreign ministers meeting led to their accord on the Tamil problem. As a result of an informal meeting and discussion between Prime Minister of India and Pakistan, Narasimha Rao and Nawaz Sharif, at Davos (Switzerland), in 1992, the Pakistani government took action to prevent the move of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) to cross the ceasefire line in Kashmir later that year. The Davos meeting was possible because of an earlier informal agreement between the two leaders at the sixth SAARC Summit meeting at Colombo in December 1991. Given this utility of SAARC, can the organization grow or expand its role in the coming decades? The Heads of State or Government during the Ninth SAARC Summit agreed for the first time that a process of informal political consultations would prove useful in promoting peace, stability, amity and accelerated socio-economic cooperation in the region. The leaders reiterated this intent during their Tenth and Eleventh Summits in Colombo and Kathmandu respectively also. The Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was signed in 1993 and four rounds of trade negotiations have been concluded. With the objective of moving towards a South Asian Economic Union (SAEU), the Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) was signed during the Twelfth Summit in Islamabad in January 2004. SAFTA may
enter into force by the end of the year 2006. The Association has carried out Regional Studies on trade, manufactures and services, environment and poverty alleviation, SAFTA and Customs matters. Since its inception in 1984 there have also been serious differences among member countries over the aims and functioning of SAARC. Such differences have been pronounced in verbal bickerings in several SAARC meetings. This is in the face of the fact that closer social, economic and cultural ties (the espoused ideals of SAARC) are considered the one and only hope for building regional cooperation efforts in South Asia in the coming years. Indeed, increasing rationalization of world trade and the fluidity of the emerging global system has increased trade within each trade bloc and those countries that do not belong to any trade blocs are likely to be the losers. This also provides a strong rationale for sustaining the SAARC vis--vis future trade prospects of South Asia. The assumption that peace can be achieved through SAARC without addressing the political problems of the region has neither been able to cultivate peace nor to invigorate the SAARC process successfully. Though since its very inception it has been regularly able to hold Summit meetings yet there have been interruptions in between owing mainly to intrastate conflicts between the member countries.
India and SAARC

The Indian elephant cannot transform itself into a mouse. If South Asia is to get itself out of the crippling binds of conflicts and cleavages, the six will have to accept the bigness of the seventh. And the seventh, that is India, will have to prove to the six that big can indeed be beautiful.Bhabani Sen Gupta. The enabling and constraining capabilities of India with regard to promoting regional cooperation in South Asia had been discussed even before the conceptual journey of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) began in 1983. India occupies a unique position in the South Asian region. By the virtue of its size, location and economic potential, India assumes a natural leadership role in the region. But the over-bearing presence of a neighbour with aspirations for global leadership has also been a source of apprehensions for the other South Asian countries. Consequently, cooperative efforts of the South Asian countries are hijacked by the dilemma of comprehending. Indias perceived and actual role as a stepping stone or a stumbling bloc for the regional efforts. India claims a leadership position for herself, while her South Asian neighbours accuse her of exercising hegemony. For a rational understanding of Indias position and role in the region the concepts of leadership and hegemony will have to be unravelled and Indias policies and neighbours perceptions examined in the light of subsequent deductions. The present paper focuses on the regional interactions through and beyond the SAARC forum for ascertaining the degree of leadership or hegemony manifest in the policies of India and perceptions of other South Asian states. Power, Perceptions, Leadership and Hegemony: Conceptual Clarifications The analysis of Indias policies and her neighbours expectations often turn out to be biased depending on which country is making the analysis. Advice is viewed as interference; assistance is viewed as instigation; guidance is viewed as domination. The manner in which policies are projected and interpreted by the South Asian states clearly demonstrates a lack of understanding of the concepts of power, leadership, hegemony and formation of perceptions. Issues like
relativity of power, perceptual biases, responsibilities of leadership and challenges to hegemonism need to be examined for a better understanding of the South Asian affairs. This section seeks to examine the concepts of power, perceptions, hegemony and leadership.
Power In the words of Michel Foucault The question of power remains a total enigma. From theories of Thomas Hobbes tracing the origin of power in human nature to Hans Morgenthau's realism defining national interest in terms of power, the various dimensions of intra and inter state relations are de-coded and comprehended through different power relation approaches. Taking inspiration from the works of Foucault the present study seeks to examine how power is exercised, by what means, what are the effects of the exercise of power rather than what is power and where does it come from. The power that a state possesses in a community of nations is measured either by a quantification of the elements of national power or an assessment of the states relations with other units in the system. The resources of power in the first approach include tangible elements like national population, GDP, military expenditure, technological capabilities and intangible elements like national morale and quality of leadership. The policies that a state designs on the basis of these resources determine the relational aspect of power. Simply stated, the resources depict latent or potential power, which is converted into actual power through the policies of the state. Actual power is the degree of influence exercised by the state in accomplishing a desired objective. Robert Gilpin subscribes to the second approach in defining power as an actors ability to impose his or her will despite resistance. Bertrand Russell defined power as the production of intended effects, while Max Weber and C. Wright Mills connect power with the realization of the will of the powerful. The relational approach to power emphasizes that maximization of power resources is contingent upon state policies. The central argument of the paper is based on this relational aspect of power. States with weak resources of power have pursued aggressive policies, while states with impressive elements of power have adopted consensual policies. Hegemony and leadership emerge from the same sources of power elements, but essentially differ in the mode of power projection and reception creating different models of inter-state relations.
Perceptions Whereas power refers to the economic, military and related capabilities of a state, prestige refers primarily to the perceptions of other states with respect to a states capabilities and its ability and willingness to exercise power. A combined discourse on power and prestige needs to be reasserted for a holistic analysis of power. The relationship between perceptions and power find reference in several theories. Neoclassical realism incorporates unit level factors like personalities and perceptions of statesmen, state-society relationship and state interests in the analysis of power. Gideon Rose explains that foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being. According to Ole Holsti, Decision makers act upon their definition of the situation and their images of states-others as well as their own. These images are in turn dependent upon the decision-makers belief system and these may not be accurate representations of reality. Traditionally the role of perceptions in power is examined through the decision-making theory. Rather than making the present study simply a variant of the decision-making theory, an attempt is made to analyze the general process of policy implementation and perception formation and its subsequent impact on the exercise of power. Perceptions arise not only from interactions but involve interpretations given to these impressions by the states. Perception is psychologically rooted in what and how of the others behaviour in international interaction. It is conditioned to circumstances, duration of time and historical experience. An important component of perception is combining and arranging the separate events into a whole so that a meaningful picture can emerge. The process of combination and arrangement can be rational or biased depending on the orientation of the states, which in the process also impacts the analysis of power. Perception can be misperception due to numerous perceptual modifications. Perceptual variants can either be simple exaggerations or more stubborn prejudices. Not every overblown generalization is a prejudice. Some are simply misconceptions wherein wrong information is organized. It is important to distinguish between ordinary errors of prejudgment and prejudice. Pre-judgments become prejudices only if they are not reversible when exposed to new knowledge. A prejudice, unlike a simple misconception, is actively resistant to all evidence that would unseat it. Another common mode of perceiving the reality is complimentary projection. We might define
complimentary projection simply as the process of explaining and justifying our own state of mind by reference to the imagined intentions and behaviour of others. This process of complimentary projection is inspired by and in turn reinforces the mote-beam mechanism, which is a kind of perceptual accentuation-perceiving more than what really exists. In examining the power-perception interface the theory of the Gestalt School proves convincing. he main theme of the Gestalt School is that patterns are formed for the convenience of perception, and any new variable is interpreted to fit within the existing design. Gestalt psychology is a theory of the mind and brain that proposes that the operational principle of the brain is holistic, parallel and analogue, with self organizing tendencies; or that the whole is greater than the some of its parts. Characteristics of the Gestalt School which are important in explaining how perceptions of hegemony and leadership emerge in inter-state politics are listed in Table 1. Properties Emergence Gesault School Perception-Power Relationship
a perceptual phenomenon where the the hegemony/leadership of a state is whole is first identified and the parts first identified and then its preceding are inferred. and ensuing policies are explained in a way to derive support for the initial conclusion drawn. Reification is the constructive aspect of the receiver tends to give preference to perception, by which the experienced its experiences over the policies of the precept contains more explicit spatial power wielder in defining the nature of information than the sensory stimulus power used. on which it was based. Multistability is the tendency of ambiguous even though the exercise of power may perceptual experience to pop back and benefit the receiver, the instances of forth unstably between two or more power abuse by the wielder elsewhere alternative interpretations. results in skepticism. Invariance is the property of perception whereby power may be exercised through simple geometrical objects are explicit or implicit means; soft or hard recognized independent of rotation, resources, but is always perceived as translation, and scale; as well as other imposing and unjustified on the part of variations such as elastic the receiver. deformations, different lighting.
The principles of the Gestalt School demonstrate that receivers have a distinct process of decoding the applied power, which may or may not be consistent with the policy purposes of the power wielder. Strategies and goals of power filter through the perceptions of the receivers to be
categorized as hegemony or leadership. Hence perceiving leadership or hegemony is as important as exercising hegemony or leadership, especially in the South Asian context. Most conflicts in the region emerge from this contradiction in perception and exercise of power.
Perceiving Hegemony and Leadership The basic hiatus between what India claims and what her South Asian neighbours perceive can be explained through the distinction between the Greek concepts of hegemonia and arche. For the fifth and fourth century Greeks, hegemonia, was a form of legitimate authority associated with Tim (honor and office), which in this sense meant the office to which one was accordingly entitled. Hegemonia is a honourific status conferred by others in recognition of the benefits an actor has provided for the community as a whole. Material capabilities come into the picture in so far as they provide the raw materials that facilitate the attainment of excellence and honor. Arche is based upon kratos (material capabilities) and, of necessity, sustains itself through dunamis (displays of power) and is always hierarchical characterized by a downward flow of authority. Arche is similar to the classical imperial theory and would last as long as material capabilities can sustain the requisite level of rewards, threats and punishments. India expects to hold the position of hegemonia (conferred headship) in the region, while her neighbours view it as arche (asserted headship). In perceiving the exercise of power as hegemonia (hegemony) or arche (leadership) certain distinguishable traits are identifiable.
Leadership Leadership perception is defined in terms of the match between perceiver prototypes (Indias South Asian neighbours) and the characteristics of the potential leaders (India). According to this view leadership perception was a dyadic level of processes that involved both perceiver and leader effects. Leadership lies in defining a positive direction and moving other partners towards more ambitious goals through unilateral action whenever possible. Leadership role can be understood to provide a more coherent and systematic worldview, which would serve as a principle of organization for social and economic institutions in the region. Leadership does not
reflect only one countrys national interest; it reflects the common interest of a group of states in the global order. The core in such instances is interested in creating a regulated system in which an area of consent is fully expanded and political conflict is diminished. Power is perceived as leadership when its exercise is characterized by the following: i) Encourage maximum involvement and participation ii) Diffusion of responsibility iii) Reinforcing inter-personal contacts iv) Initiation of new ideas v) Defending and advancing common group interest
Hegemony When power is distributed unevenly, political leaders and theorists use terms such as empire and hegemony. A mere power differential does not imply hegemony; it is more a behavioural trait than just structural attributes. If the power implementation is associated with egoistic, self serving goals, which overlooks the interests of those over whom it is exercised it is considered as hegemony. Hegemony is used to refer to different behaviours and degrees of control. For example, Charles Doran cites aggressive military power, while Robert Keohane looks at preponderance in economic resources as a source of hegemony. Joshua Goldstein defines hegemony as being able to dictate, or at least dominate, the rules and arrangements by which international relations, political and economic, are conductedEconomic hegemony implies the ability to centre the world economy around itself. Political hegemony means being able to dominate the world militarily. The exercise of power is perceived as hegemonic behaviour when characterized by the following: i) Changing the rules rather than adapting to policies to the existing rules ii) Enjoying special rights for advancing hegemonic interests
iii) Voluntary responsibility for group development is assumed, with focus on individual development iv) Group goals and strategies are defined by the hegemon which may or may not promote group interests v) Code of conduct is framed for directing and regulating behaviour of individual states.
Leadership and hegemony is thus the interplay of power potential, policies and respective perceptions of the states involved. The next segment seeks to identify the traits of hegemony and leadership in Indias regional interactions based on her policies and neighbours perceptions. An attempt is made to examine the regional interactions, bilateral and multi-lateral, for locating the sources Indias perceived leadership and alleged hegemony in the region.
Attributes of Indias power in South Asia Following the discussion in segment I the attributes of Indias power in the region are examined in terms of the national power variables possessed by India, regional policies pursued and the perceptions of her South Asian neighbours. The structural approach to power concedes an advantaged position to India in South Asia. The India shares borders with all South Asian countries, making it the vital physical link in the region. 72 percent of the land surface in South Asia is occupied by India, 77 percent of the regions population resides in India. India accounts for 75 percent of the regional economic output. The economic potential and military capabilities of India have made the country a primary regional force in South Asia. L. Kadirgamar has used the analogy of a wheel to depict centrality of India in South Asian affairs. According to him at the hub of the wheel lies regionally preponderant India. Radiating as spokes are Indias neighbours with each of whom India shares land or maritime boundaries, but no two others are thus joined without at the same time touching India also. Binding those spokes to that hub are the physical barriers.
The structural attributes of Indias power have been impressive enough to endow the country with added responsibilities. The South Asian nations in particular and global powers in general regard India to assume additional responsibility for ensuing regional development and cohesion. Statements of Heads of State at the inaugural Summit of SAARC reflect the degree of power entrusted on the largest South Asian state India. India was expected to by deeds and words create the confidence among us so necessary to make a beginning. India was referred to as the key to the development and progress of SAARC. Indias responsibility in shaping and directing the cooperation drive was recognized by extra-regional powers. The size and position of India give it a special role of leadership in South Asian and world affairs. They confer on it at the same time the special responsibility for accommodation and restraint that strength entails. The overall changes in international politics after the end of the Cold War further reinforced the primacy of the India factor in the region. According to Mohammed Ayoob the changing nature of Superpower relations has opened up prospects for regionally preeminent powers to adopt more overt managerial roles in their respective regions. Many countries consider India as a factor for the stability and protection of democracies and human rights in the South Asian region. Power always depends on the context in which the relationship exists. The context of Indias power in the region is shaped by a mix of historical experiences, national priorities, regional compulsions and ingrained perceptions. Exploring the counters of this context would reveal the true nature of Indias leadership and hegemony in the region. Having assessed the struct ural attributes of Indias centrality to South Asian affairs it is imperative to evaluate the regional policies and perceptions to ascertain the kind and degree of power-projection resorted to by India. Rather than elaborating the historical details of the regional events, the impact of these events on the formation of regional perceptions will be emphasized in the present study. India as a regional hegemon: Policies and Perceptions A mere variation in the degree and kind of power variables does not lead to hegemony. Hegemony is the privileged exercise of power in complete disregard to the interests of other sates. Indias policies and regional perceptions are examined in this section to ascertain the validity of characterising India as a hegemon. Indian policies with regard to the liberation movement in Bangladesh in 1971, the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka in 1987 and the attempted
military coup in Maldives in 1988 are cited as illustrations of Indias hegemonic authority in region. Even diplomatic statements, like the Indian Governments comment on the deteriorating conditions in Balochistan and also the advice for Pakistan Government to exercise restraint has been interpreted as interference by India. India has defended its Bangladesh policy on the grounds that India intervened only after her requests to the U.N. to act against Pakistan failed to yield results. The Guardian had described the Pakistani troops atrocities as an arrogant crime against humanity and human aspirations. Given the compulsions of national security coupled with the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan, India sought to provide military assistance that led to the emergence of Bangladesh. The military involvement by India is further defended by referring to the request for the same by Seikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of Bangladesh. Despite all justifications, the role played by India in the emergence of Bangladesh is viewed even today as a vindication of the regional apprehensions. The most important result of the 1971 crisis on regional perceptions has been the demonstrated ability of India to alter the geo-political landscape of South Asia. Though 1971 can be claimed by India to be an exceptional case, it exists as a tangible evidence of Indias over-bearing presence in the region. India is accused of using the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 to assert its military potential in the region. The accord allowed Indias diplomatic involvement in resolving the confrontation between the Tamil and Singhalese in Sri Lanka and the option of military assistance was expected to be contingency clause, which few expected would be utilized. The deterioration of the security situation in Sri Lanka and the fickle policies of President Premadasa forced India to get militarily involved in the Island politics. The professions of caution and restraint provided by India have done little to address the regional fear psychosis generated in response to the episode. The fallout of Indias gaffe in Sri Lanka was so immense that even the ministerial level meetings for launching SAARC were adversely affected. In November 1988 the Indian military in response to a request by the de jure government of Maldives helped to crush an attempted coup on the island. The Maldives episode, as an individual case study would have perhaps not invited much attention, but the fact that it took place barely a year after Indias military involvement in Sri Lanka sought to reinforce the negative perceptions about India. The importance of the Maldivian episode lies in the kind of the
reinforcements it provided for the apprehensions about Indias politico-military clout in South Asia. Indias relations with her South Asian neighbours is characterised by numerous bilateral contentions. India favours a bilateral dialogue for addressing these concerns, while the neighbours demand a multilateral regional approach. India fears that the neighbours would gangup against her and demand unrealistic concessions in a multi-lateral milieu, while the neighbours suspect that India seeks to take undue advantage of the weak bargaining capacity of each state in a bilateral dialogue. Neighbours view Indian bilateralism as an instrument of coercive diplomacy, while India considers the demand of multilateralism as an unnecessary burden of the nascent and fragile process of SAARC. Inter-state interaction is a multi-dimensional process involving bilateral, regional and other forms of multilateral relations. In South Asia the disagreement over the most preferred strategy emerges from and further reinforces the perceptual divergence among regional states. The psychological predispositions have come to be so shaped that any reference of bilateralism translates into possibilities of Indian hegemony and any assertion of multilateralism is deciphered as a pressure generating tactic, irrespective of the actual merits of either approaches. The most obvious example cited as a justification of Indias hegemonic aspirations is the Indira Doctrine. The origins of the Doctrine are traced to the Sri Lankan crisis of 1988 and laid down that India would consider the presence or influence of an external power in the region as adverse to its interests. Indias justification for the policy was an attempt to insulate the region from the adverse effects of the Cold War, but the neighbours viewed it as a policy to abolish any challenge to Indias regional position. In the recent years India has not only allowed but in fact aligned with extra-regional powers to address regional issues, but the regional perceptions fail to take cognizance of these developments. The 1997 Pakistan National Elections were observed by the Commonwealth Secretary General, the EU Election Observation Mission participated in the 2002 General Elections in Pakistan. The 2001 General Elections in Bangladesh was attended by the UN Electoral Assistance Secretariat and the EU Election Observation Mission. There was outstanding cooperation between US and Indian ambassadors to try and get Nepal back to multiparty democracy.
The Gujral Doctrine, Indias policy of providing unilateral concession to South Asian neighbours without seeking reciprocity, proved to be too mild in the face of the impregnable perceptual framework of Indias neighbours. Altaf Gauhar, leading Pakistani columnist commented that, The Gujral Doctrine is not a doctrine of good neighborly relations but a Bharti Plan to seize the neighbour peacefully. Regional economic cooperation is viewed by regional states as a mechanism of ensuring the economic empowerment of India at the expense of her South Asian neighbours. The South Asian countries were not enthusiastic about South Asian Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) because they felt that the impact of their unfavourable trade balance with India would be accentuated if liberalization is encouraged in regional context. Countries in the region also fear that if market forces are allowed to guide the intraregional trade India would emerge as the dominating factor leading to the political dependence of these states on India. Sadar Assef Ali, Foreign Minister of Pakistan and Mr. Mustafizur Rahman, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh clearly stated that despite their obligations under the Marrakesh and WTO arrangement they would not be able to respond to India under those obligations till political issues like Kashmir and Farakka are resolved. Pakistan refuses to grant India MFN status. Political perceptions have come to cloud economic rationality in the region. The Bangladeshi Government has rejected the proposal of an American Company to supply gas from Sylhet to New Delhi through pipelines. Despite being aware of the obvious economic advantages of the proposal, Bangladesh has rejected this World Bank recommended project on grounds that it is not in the interest of Bangladesh. The fear rather than the existence of Indian hegemon makes the South Asian states apathetic to pursuing mutually beneficial economic policies. Contrary to regional expectations, expansion of economic relations with India has benefited the regional economies and India has granted numerous economic concessions. In the case of Nepal, for instance, the constraint of the value-added component imposed on Nepali products for dutyfree entry into the Indian market was reduced from 80 percent to 50 percent, and now even this has been completely removed. In relation to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, India agrees in principle to reduce their adverse trade balances but the modalities have still to be worked out. Following the Gujral Doctrine India announced at the 1997 Male Summit to unilaterally withdraw restraints to entry to India of all exports from within the South Asian region, including Pakistan. Indian
companies had invested US$83 million in 140 ventures till 1999 in four SMCs. In addition Indian companies have extended US$ 3.5 million worth of loans and credits and guarantees worth $16.5 million to their affiliates in the SAARC region. As a major positive development for regional cooperation Indias preferential imports as compared to 1996, became more diversified in 2000. India already has a free trading arrangement with Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka and negotiations are underway for a free trade agreement with Bangladesh. India has adopted a preferential policy towards investment in SAARC countries. A fast track channel for processing investment proposals has been created to expedite projects. The ceiling for processing investments under the fast track channel had been increased from an initial US $4 million to US $ 15 million and further to US $30 million in May 1999, in case of member countries of SAARC other than Nepal and Bhutan. The trade deficit of Nepal vis--vis India has declined sharply and has turned into surplus in 2002. Since the implementation of Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA) there has been a phenomenal increase in India-Sri Lanka trade. Since the ISFTA became operational in March 2000, bilateral trade between the two countries has increased by 195 percent. Under international conventions India is obliged to provide only one transit route to facilitate Nepals trade with third countries, but India has provided 15 transit points. Readymade Garments Sector (RMG) is included in Indias sensitive list, but India has granted Bangladesh the opportunity to export six million pieces of RMG products to India, provided the entire fabric for the purpose is imported from India. India is Bhutan's largest trade partner. During the year 2001-2002, inclusive of electricity, Bhutan's exports to India totaled Rs.4.91 billion and constituted 94.5 percent of its total exports. According to Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema the most important impediment on the road to collective self reliance is not the incumbent asymmetry and the overwhelming stature of India but how other members perceive Indias intentions with reservations and apprehensions. Indias regional policies can be criticised for being short-sighted and errant on certain counts, but the perceptions of regional states have interpreted these as policies of domination. This does not imply that India has never pursued dominating policies but these cannot be likened to the designs of imperial hegemony. Indias policies of demanding certain concessions can be classified as arrogant but not outright hegemonic. Indias polices in the region are subject to the above discussed motebeam mechanism-perceiving more than what really exists. At the same time Indias neighbours acting under the compulsions of the Gestalt phenomenon are unable to distinguish between the
guidance and domination traits of Indias policies. Realization of these diplomatic and perceptual limitations by the South Asian states could put an end to the blame-game being played out in the region. India as a regional leader: Policies and Perceptions It is axiomatic that Indias size and level of development enjoins on it the responsibility of being the natural fulcrum in the process of South Asian development. In dealing with regional concerns India claims to perform its leadership role by pursuing policies to further the common interest of regional states. But the hesitant and cautious policies pursued by India contradict the qualities of dynamic leadership. On the pretext of countering regional apprehensions, India has on many occasions abandoned the leadership mantle. Ironically such policies have fuelled allegations of lack of interest on Indias part for regional concerns. Hence Indias policies of avoiding leadership have led to perceptions of abandonment of regional responsibilities. Dynamism is the most basic quality of leadership, which has not been demonstrated by India. India has shown reluctance for updating the IndoNepal Treaty of 1950 and the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of 1972 despite repeated demands by the two states. The Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949 was updated only recently in 2007. Diplomatic dynamism implies making the right move when time is opportune; a characteristic missing in Indias regional manoeuvres. The insistence by India for signing a five year agreement with Bangladesh allowing it to transport goods to the North-East of India at the sidelines of the SAARC Summit in Sri Lanka in early August 2008 reflects the political naivet of India. Without getting an assurance from Bangladesh on the issue, a public statement by the Indias Ministry of External Affairs on the possibility of signing an agreement only contributed in straining bilateral relations. Moreover expecting the Caretaker Government of Bangladesh to decide on such a sensitive issue demonstrates how distanced is Indias approach from the regional realities. In dealing with national political crisis, the South Asian states expect India to play a determining role. Ibrahim Hussain Zaki, Vice President, Maldivian Democratic Party, expected India to play a more active role in ensuring that true democracy is ushered in Maldives, rather than strengthening the hands of the dictatorial regime through defence packages. Former Nepalese Minister for Industries and senior leader of Communist Party of Nepal, Keshab Badal told The Hindu, We urge the Indian Government not to lend support to the Nepal government that could
end up with the latter turning even more repressive towards the movement for democracy in Nepal. We seek the sympathy of the Indian Government in our endeavours to replace the monarchy in Nepal with a democratic republic. By officially disassociating herself from such regional pleas, India makes a phoney attempt to emerge as a neutral variable in the intra-national and intra-regional politics. The Sri Lankan crisis of the late 1980s has led India to adopt an overcautious policy with regard to the problems of the Island state. The Indian government has refused to respond to the requests for arms supplies, allowing the Sri Lankan government to procure similar supplies from Pakistan and China. India has not even formally responded to the report that US Marine Corps are assisting Bangladesh in surveying and managing the IndoBangladesh border ostensibly with the objective of avoiding a direct confrontation on the issue with Bangladesh or the US. India has ignored the repeated requests by Nepal for assisting in the repatriation of Bhutanese refugees. By adopting a policy of passive dissociation rather than diplomatic innovativeness with regard to the crisis in the regional states India has surrendered its leadership role in the region. The neighbours perceptions could be cited as reasons for abandoning leadership on political issues but the regional economic concerns are essentially a victim of Indias lack of insight and innovativeness. India remains uninterested in opening its market to the neighbours. Instead of leading the charge towards a rapid reintegration of the South Asian economic space, India remains hesitant in its approach. Security arguments are cited to prevent economic cooperation. India has not evolved a positive approach to deal with the issue of labour migration from Nepal and Bangladesh. The policy of erecting barbed wires to deal with labour migration negates the leadership potential of India in the region. India continues to ignore the regional realities by emphasizing on duty free trade, while the real constraints to intra-regional trade are to be found in tariff and para-tariff barriers. Bangladeshi products like ceramic, melamine products, garments, fruit juice, electrical wire, leather and footwear, edible oil, hilsha fish and traditional jute are in huge demand in India, but bilateral trade is hampered due to tariff barriers. India imposed additional duties on four major export items of Bangladesh-hilsha fish, sari, medicine and porcelain, while SAFTA was about to take effect. Mandatory testing requirements are applicable on Indias imports in areas such as food items, textiles and leather. The samples of Bangladeshi textile and leather products are sent to Lucknow and Chennai for testing which takes significant time. Obtaining licenses for meeting the Indian mandatory standards on a
number of export interest items such as cement, electrical appliances, drinking water appliances etc. also involves considerable amount of time. India has neither taken the initiative to liberalise the license issuing procedure nor attempted to set up testing laboratories closer to the border area. India has been using rhetoric to undo the harm caused by her policies in the region. Gujral Doctrine best illustrates this reality. It is important to note that the Gujral Doctrine is not an innovative Indian policy to allay fears of neighbours. It is a standard practice in international relations for the bigger states to grant concessions to the smaller countries. Voicing this concern J.N. Dixit has stated that such gestures of generosity (Gujral Doctrine) smacks of a certain incipient big brotherly hegemonistic attitude. India has not genuinely applied the Doctrine on ground. For example, trade concessions to Bangladesh for a long time were made contingent on their giving transit rights. The discrepancy between Indias rhetoric and action is evident from the example below. Indias External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha had stated that India is seeking to institutionalize positive asymmetry in favour of our neighbours. This magnanimous statement of India needs to be contrasted with its policy of banning the broadcast of four Pakistani television channels in India-administered Kashmir in April 2008. Through such policies Indias regional credentials are gaining negative weightage. The shortcomings in Indias regional policies do not imply a complete absence of the leadership spirit. Some examples of political and economic initiative are highlighted above in the discussion on Indias perceived hegemonism. There are other examples of Indias sporadic leadership efforts in the region as well. India responded promptly to the Tsunami that hit the Indian Ocean islands, particularly SAARC member state Sri Lanka in December 2006. The Indian Navy deployed thirty two naval ships, seven aircraft and twenty helicopters in support of five rescue, relief and reconstruction missions as part of 'Operation Madad' (Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu coast), 'Operation Sea Waves' (Andaman & Nicobar Islands), 'Operation Castor' (Maldives), 'Operation Rainbow' (Sri Lanka) and 'Operation Gambhir' (Indonesia).36 India rushed relief supplies to Pakistan after a powerful earthquake hit Jammu and Kashmir in October 2005. India has put forth proposals for the free movement of media persons and media products in South Asia and the establishment of cultural sub centres under the main SAARC Cultural Centre in Kandy. At the 14th SAARC Summit held in 2007, India offered unilateral concessions in the
form of allowing duty free access to goods from the least developed countries of South Asia. India also initiated discussions on establishing a South Asia University and working towards creating a common currency for the region. Indias regional role does not fully correspond to the traditional leadership qualities. India tends to support or endorse rather than initiate and facilitate new regional ventures; India rarely champions the group interest at the international forums; rather than promoting group behaviour and diluting group differences within SAARC, India tends to disassociate issues and manage them at the bilateral level; regional goal setting and formulation of collective strategies are not explicitly pursued by India. Leadership demands the ability to take initiative and criticism with diplomatic deftness; a policy which India has not been able to evolve in her interactions with South Asian countries. Indias regional policies do not exhibit the ability to make short-term concessions for securing long term goals. In the face of negative perceptions India is exercising the option of restrained leadership, which needs to be replaced by a more pro-active leadership role for countering the adverse perceptual mould in the region. An examination of Indias policies and regional perceptions demonstrate that Indias role in South Asia neither confirms to the indices of traditional leadership nor genuine hegemony. The mismanagement of the power variables and complexicity of perceptual constructs has resulted in a situation where India fears to exercise its leadership and neighbours strive to counter its hegemony. Consequently, India in South Asia is powerful enough to be feared but not powerful enough to be respected. In the definitions of hegemony as discussed above, the most vital feature of a hegemonic power is the ability to induce change in the policies of the target group so that the interest of the dominant nation is served. Neither have Indias power variables nor its policies have succeeded in inducing desirable changes in South Asia. Instances of territorial annexation and economic exploitation associated with hegemonic authority have not characterized Indias regional interactions. All statistics indicate an absolutely asymmetrical South Asia. But the asymmetry tends to mask some absolute indicators. For example Bangladesh and Pakistan are seventh and sixth largest nations in the world in terms of population. By the virtue of its size Pakistan would
be in its own right a regional power in any other part of the world. Nepal and Sri Lanka are by world standards, middle sized countries. At a conference on the security of small nations in South Asia in Dhaka in January 1987, Pakistani delegate, Lt. General A.I. Akram said, Every neighbor fears its possible hegemonyfears which Indias professions of peace will not eliminate. This sentiment clearly demonstrates the rigidity of perceptions with regard to Indias regional image. Experience has demonstrated that neighbours tend to exaggerate the threats from India for addressing certain domestic compulsions. While assessing Indias coercive capability (i.e. its ability to coerce other states, by the virtue of its resources and power) and coercive policies (i.e. policy instruments directed at altering behavior of other states for its advantage) the degree of authoritarianism enjoyed by India is modest. Though Indias role in South Asia cannot be likened to a hegemonic power, India has also fallen short of the traditional leadership role in the region. Indias policies reflect supervisory postures rather than a more favourable participatory leadership character. India has failed to provide political advice and economic guidance to neighbours without appearing domineering. Rather than pursuing a consistent policy aimed at addressing the perceptual fears of the regional states, India tends to abdicate its pro-active role. Indias policy in the region is not consistent in terms of what it avoids and what it pursues and hence it fails to qualify as pure hegemony or positive leadership. Notions of hegemony and leadership are shaped by policies and sustained by perceptions. In an atmosphere of antagonism and distrust misperceptions often take precedence over pragmatism and rationality. The kind of the perceptual default prevalent in South Asia is not one of confrontation, but that of divergence. Lessons from the regional events discussed above highlight that most of the disagreements emerge from vision variance rather than factual discord. In addressing this vision variance all regional states have to accept equal responsibility; India needs to pursue policies which would actively confront the negative perceptual notions of her neighbours and the neighbours will have to acknowledge Indias efforts and emerge from their historical shells. The most viable meeting point for Indias policies and regional perceptions will be the Gramscian definition of hegemony -a mix of coercion and consent in which consent is dominant element. Indias regional role will be clearly defined only when this essential feature of Gramscian hegemony is incorporated in the regional policies of all South Asian countries.
SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA)

n December 1991, the Sixth Summit held in Colombo approved the establishment of an InterGovernmental Group (IGG) to formulate an agreement to establish a SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) by 1997. Given the consensus within SAARC, the Agreement on SAPTA was signed on 11 April 1993 and entered into force on 7 December 1995 well in advance of the date stipulated by the Colombo Summit. The Agreement reflected the desire of the Member States to promote and sustain mutual trade and economic cooperation within the SAARC region through the exchange of concessions. The basic principles underlying SAPTA are: a) overall reciprocity and mutuality of advantages so as to benefit equitably all Contracting States, taking into account their respective level of economic and industrial development, the pattern of their external trade, and trade and tariff policies and systems; b) negotiation of tariff reform step by step, improved and extended in successive stages through periodic reviews; c) recognition of the special needs of the Least Developed Contracting States and agreement on concrete preferential measures in their favour; and d) inclusion of all products, manufactures and commodities in their raw, semi-processed and processed forms. Four rounds of trade negotiations have been concluded under SAPTA covering over 5000 commodities. Each Round contributed to an incremental trend in the product coverage and the deepening of tariff concessions over previous Rounds.
South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA)

SAPTA was envisaged primarily as the first step towards the transition to a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) leading subsequently towards a Customs Union, Common Market and Economic Union. In 1995, the Sixteenth session of the Council of Ministers (New Delhi, 18-19 December 1995) agreed on the need to strive for the realization of SAFTA and to this end an Inter-Governmental Expert Group (IGEG) was set up in 1996 to identify the necessary steps for progressing to a free trade area. The Tenth SAARC Summit (Colombo, 29-31 July 1998) decided to set up a Committee of Experts (COE) to draft a comprehensive treaty framework for creating a free trade area within the region, taking into consideration the asymmetries in development within the region and bearing in mind the need to fix realistic and achievable targets. The SAFTA Agreement was signed on 6 January 2004 during Twelfth SAARC Summit held in Islamabad, Pakistan. The Agreement entered into force on 1 January 2006, and the Trade Liberalization Programme commenced from 1stJuly 2006. Following the Agreement coming into force the SAFTA Ministerial Council (SMC) has been established comprising the Commerce Ministers of the Member States. To assist the SMC, a SAFTA Committee of Experts (SCOE) has been formed. SCOE is expected to submit its report to SMC every six months. The SAFTA Agreement states that the the SMC shall meet at least once every year or more oftenas and when considered necessary by the Contracting States. Each Contracting State shall chair the SMC for a period of one year on rotational basis in alphabetical order. As indicated on SAARC website, the figure of total exports under SAFTA has reached about US$ 1.3 billion but is still far below the potential. For smooth functioning of the SAFTA, customs notifications for implementing Trade Liberalisation Programme (TLP) are issued as per the agreed timeline by the Member States. While reduction in the size of Sensitive Lists is important to increase the quantum of regional trade, efforts are made to take out those products out of the Sensitive Lists that are of export interests to the SAARC Member States for trade within South Asia.
Conclusion
Though the formation of SAARC is a landmark step taken by the leaders of the region, the main rational behind its establishment is to develop a congenial environment through summit diplomacy where all nations may interact peacefully with each other, cultivate sustainable peace nd promote mutual economic well being by harnessing available resources in the region through the peaceful process of economic integration. Nevertheless, after 21 years of establishment, neither South Asian nations have been able to push the process of integration into full swing nor the organization itself has become viable enough to promote peace, harmony and economic integration or prevent conflicts in the region. The political tensions and conflicts surrounding the countries of a South Asia pose a question of uncertainty and challenge to the formation of South Asian Union at par with European Union that would allow free movement of people; common currency and common foreign and economic policies which ultimately will sow the seeds of peace. In order to achieve the objectives the SAARC would have to evolve into a full-fledged regional entity that can cultivate peace in the region. The realization of durable peace and the future of economic integration through SAARC depend upon the ability and interest of South Asian leaders to resolve domestic as well as long-standing differences through peaceful deliberations. India needs to play a major role in SAARC India being an important member of the group should initiate steps to ensurethat the nations go beyond the rhetoric and make the Summit meaningful inthe future. Creation of Export Promotion Zones and Special EconomicZones in each SAARC member country as pointed out by industry bodieswill enhance investments between them and will thus encourage intra-SAARC investmentsThe Indian government has to understand that the export-import communityneeds easier movement of goods, services, and people within the member nations.India should also maintain peace and take proper and appropriate steps toresolve disputes and solve issues amongst the SAARC members especiallywith Pakistan.According to Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Countries in theSAARC region have to make a bold transition from mistrust to trust, fromdiscord to concord and from tension to peace. ell as long-standing differences through peaceful deliberations.
REFERENCES
http://www.saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/detail.php?activity_id=5 http://www.adbi.org/workingpaper/2008/12/19/2781.regional.integration.trade.costs.south.asia/sapta.safta.and.the.story.so .far/ http://www.saarc-sec.org/ http://mea.gov.in/ http://www.scribd.com/doc/38575394/India-and-Saarc

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Introduction

1 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

2 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

3 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

4 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

5 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

Origin and Evolution of SAARC

8 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

Aims and Objectives of SAARC

10 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

Salient Features of the Organization Secretariat

11 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SAARC Regional Centres

12 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

13 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

15 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

17 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

India and SAARC

18 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

23 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

24 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

26 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

27 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA)

35 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA)

36 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

38 | South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

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