Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN Petitioner,

G.R. No. 168852 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: September 30, 2008

- versus -

SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*

x----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution1[1] dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution2[2] dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual background of the case:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married.3[3] Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle4[4] and Kristen Denise.5[5] On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) 6[6] against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents,
1 2 3 4 5 6

were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7[7] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8[8] otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice 9[9] granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.

On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,10[10] contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.

On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition 11[11] to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence.

7 8 9 10 11

On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12[12] dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law expressio unius est exclusio alterius.13[13]

On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration14[14] contending that the doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process.

On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration15[15] arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.

On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16[16] denying petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.
12 13 14 15 16

Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004.17[17]

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.

On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether
17

illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.

Thus, in People v. Moreno,18[18] the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noting that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19[19] the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.

18 19

In People v. Chowdury,20[20] the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words principal, accomplices and accessories under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, because said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.

In Yu v. People,21[21] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, noting the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.

Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22[22] the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

20 21 22

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.23[23]

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: xxx (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: (1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places; (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child; (3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will; (4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and (5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

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In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include individuals other than the offending husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs: (a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; (b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law24[24] and that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.

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Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an ancillary rule of statutory construction. It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.25[25]

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts.26[26] It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.

25 26

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against respondents is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents. DECISION ABAD, J.:

This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it. The Indictment The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads: That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.1 The Facts and the Case The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him. Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone. In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irishs face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A).2 The senders cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3 After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!" Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert in information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and the body belonged to just one person. Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan. For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him. Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police station. Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the senders number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5 Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustans wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.

After trial, the RTC found Irishs testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter rendered a decision dated January 31, 2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustans motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari. The Issues Presented The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. The subordinate issues are: 1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262; 2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262; 3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his constitutional rights; and 4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case. The Courts Rulings Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus: SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

xxxx Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus: SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: xxxx h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: xxxx 5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are: 1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her. One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus: (e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.) Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Websters Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her."

But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couples relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9 R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved. Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a continuing basis." But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love. An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustans messages, he would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous.10 Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones. Rustan alleges that todays women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them. But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 27). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them. Michelle, Rustans wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There

would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.1avvphi1 Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustans low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of todays youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irishs head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare. Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference. Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irishs testimony that she received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the senders cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages. Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.13 His defense was that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender. Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.14

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.15 In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008. SO ORDERED. ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Oct 26

Digest 4: RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010, Abad, J.
Admissibility of Electronic Documents and Signatures RUSTAN ANG y PASCUAvs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010, Abad, J. Facts: Petitioner-accused Rustan Ang was charged of a violation against RA 9262 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act, by sending through SMS using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture. Issue: Whether or not the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document Ruling: Petition DENIED. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. Digest 4: RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010 RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents. Facts: The herein petitioner, Rustan Ang and the private respondent, Irish Sagud were lovers during their college days in Wesleyan University in Maria Aurora Province of Aurora. Eventually, Irish heard that Rustan has a live-in-partner whom

Rustan got pregnant. Because of this, Irish decided to broke up with Rustan. The latter asked Irish to elope with him, since he does not love the other girl, to which Irish refused. To pressure Irish to get back with him he send multimedia messages to Irish, bearing a picture of a naked woman, who spread her legs with a face of Irish superimposed on it. Rustan even added in the text message that it is easy for him to spread those pictures in the internet. Because of this scenario, Irish, asked help from the Vic-Mayor of the municipality, to which coordination with the local police was made. Entrapment operation was conducted and arrested Rustan. Issue: Whether or not Rustans contention that the multimedia messages should not be made admissible for the basic reason that such was not properly authenticated as provided by the Rules on Electronic Documents? Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following: Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. Indeed the assertion of Rustan will not be given merit for the basic reason that such contention was only raised before this court to which the latter had a presumption that Rustan has waived his right to question the authenticity of the pictures. Moreover, the court avers that such assertion of Rustan cannot be made possible in criminal case; such can only be made before, civil and administrative actions. The high court denied the petition.

Family court judge dismissed SC Dismisses Makati Family Court Judge May 4, 2010 The Supreme Court has dismissed a Makati City Family Court Judge for gross misconduct. In a 75-page consolidated per curiam decision, the Court En Banc also ordered the forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification from public office of Family Court Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, also Presiding Judge of the Makati City Regional Trial Court, Branch 144. The cases against Judge Arcaya-Chua have also been referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for her possible disbarment. Her dismissal was spawned by judicial audit investigation on her sala conducted by the SC. The Court found substantial evidence showing that Judge Arcaya-Chua did not report in her Monthly Reports the actual number of marriages she had solemnized and that the solemnization fees that were paid did not correspond to the number of marriages that were solemnized by her. From November 2005 to March 2007, her Monthly Reports indicated that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 1,068 marriage certificates issued by her during the said period are in the Courts custody. Victoria C. Jamora, Court Stenographer of the Makati City RTC, Branch 144, was found guilty of grave misconduct and dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits. The Court said that Jamora was a willing participant since she knew that the figures stated in the Monthly Reports were incorrect but she had condoned the wrongdoing by affixing her signature on them. Immediately upon service on Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua and Victoria C. Jamora of this decision, they are deemed to have vacated their respective office, and their authority to act as Judge and Court Stenographer, respectively, are considered automatically terminated, the Court said. The Court also found Judge Arcaya-Chua guilty of gross ignorance of the law and suspended for six months without pay for issuing a temporary protection order (TPO) in favor of a male litigant in violation of RA 9292 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004), which provides that a TPO cannot be issued a in favor of a man against his wife. Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge ArcayaChua is expected to know the correct implementation of RA 9292, the Court said.

Likewise, the Court denied for lack of merit Judge Arcaya-Chuas motion for reconsideration of the July 14, 2005 resolution of the Court, which had imposed a six-month suspension for receiving money in exchange for a favorable decision. (AM OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, Ocampo v. Judge Arcaya-Chua; AM No. RTJ07-2049, OCA v. Judge Arcaya-Chua; AM No. RTJ-08-2141, OCA v. Judge Arcaya-Chua; AM No. RTJ-07-2093, Santos v. Judge Arcaya-Chua, April 23, 2010)

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 182367 December 15, 2010

CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner, vs. GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent. DECISION ABAD, J.: This case is about a mothers claim for temporary support of an unacknowledged child, which she sought in an action for the issuance of a temporary protection order that she brought against the supposed father. The Facts and the Case In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-071 for alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.2 In filling out the blanks in the pro-forma complaint, Dolina added a handwritten prayer for financial support3 from Vallecera for their supposed child. She based her prayer on the latters Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as the childs father. The petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines, Valleceras employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate. Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolinas petition was essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses; that he was not the childs father; that the signature appearing on the childs Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the petition is a harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his and give it financial support; and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.

On March 13, 20084 the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment exists establishing the filiation of Dolinas son and granting him the right to support as basis for an order to compel the giving of such support. Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its April 4, 2008 Order,5 with an admonition that she first file a petition for compulsory recognition of her child as a prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the present petition for review directly with this Court. The Issue Presented The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child. The Courts Ruling Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence.6 Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child.1avvphil But it became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action was to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the father. He of course vigorously denied this. To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him.7 The childs remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition.8 If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation.9 In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.10 Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.11 It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the entire case based solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolinas child since the main issue remains to be the alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and whether they are entitled to protection. But of course, this matter is already water under the bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review. This omission lends

credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the petition is to obtain support from Vallecera. While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative fathers legitimate family.12 Vallecera disowns Dolinas child and denies having a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case. ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban Citys Order dated March 13, 2008 that dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolinas action in P.O. 2008-02-07, and Order dated April 4, 2008, denying her motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2008. SO ORDERED. ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

DOLINA V. VALLECERA GR No. 182367- [December 15, 2010] DOCTRINE: To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. FACTS: In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against Glenn Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and child abuse under RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint cherryl added a prayer for support for their supposed child. She based such prayer on the latters certificate of live birth which listed Vallecera s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate. Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolinas petition was essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses, that he was not the childs father and that the signature in the birth certificate was not here. He also added that the petition is a harassment suit intended to for him to acknowledge the child as his and therefore give financial support. RTC dismissed petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child? HELD: Yes. RATIO: Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. In this case neither her or her child lived with Vallecera.

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The childs remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved. Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.