People v.

Rivera

Facts of the case: Rivera signed and swore to a complaint accusing Vito and Moreno the crime of theft. According to the information, the items stolen were a white American suit with one eyeglasses amounting to P30, one buntal hat which costs P3, and to two buttons which cost P3 each, with the total amount of P39. The justice of the peace dismissed the case. After which, Vito and Moreno filed complaints against Rivera, charging him with incriminating innocent people, which falls under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. Rivera objected and claimed that the facts alleged did not fall under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code, and that, Article 363 of the Codigo Penal does not appear in the Revised Penal Code. Hence, there is no offense embracing acusacion o denuncia falsa.

Issue: Whether or not Rivera can be charged guilty of incriminating innocent people under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code

Held: No. Not guilty and inapplicable.

Ratio: The crime Rivera was accused of is not explicitly stated in the Revised Penal Code, although the crime of indictment of the innocent is included in the Old Penal Code. Article 363 of the Old Penal Code talks about punishment for false prosecutions. In the Revised Penal Code, Article 363 pertains to punishment for any act which may tend directly to cause a false prosecution. This provision is limited to acts of planting evidence which do not constitute false prosecution but tend directly to cause false prosecutions.

StatCon Maxim: The title may indicate the legislative intent to extend or restrict the scope of the law and a statute couched in a language of doubtful import will be construed to conform to the legislative intent as disclosed in its title.

Commissioner of Customs v. Lt. Col. Relunia

Facts of the case: RPS Misamis Oriental, a unit of the Philippine Navy, was dispatched to Japan to transport contingents bound for Puson, Korea, and carry Christmas gifts for our soldiers there. It was used for transportation purposes and it made trips between Korea and Japan. While RPS Misamis Oriental was in Japan, it loaded 180 cases containing various articles which are subject to customs duties. Upon arrival in the Philippines, these articles were forfeited because of violations of Customs Law. Commissioner of Customs argued that RPS Misamis Oriental is subject to Administrative Code Sec. 1363 which says that unmanifested merchandise found in the vessel shall be forfeited.

Issue: Are Navy vessels, like RPS Misamis Oriental, required to have a manifest?

Held: Yes.

Ratio: Even if Sec. 1221 of the Administrative Code is entitled Entrance of Vessels in Foreign Trade, Sec. 1228 states that it is required that every vessel from a foreign port or place must have on b oard complete written or typewritten manifests of all her cargoes. Also, RPS Misamis Oriental claimed to have submitted one to a certain Mr. Ysla, but was denied by the latter.

StatCon Maxim: The title can be resorted to as an aid where there is doubt as to the meaning of the law or as to the intention of the legislature in enacting it, and not otherwise.

City of Baguio v. Marcos

Facts of the case: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral proceedings. In November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land involved was the Baguio Townsite which was declared public land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case on the following grounds: 1) he and his predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times; 2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes reopening on the following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931; 2) the petition to reopen the case was not published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they have standing on the issue.

Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED on June 20, 1953

Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral proceedings

Ratio: The title of RA 931 was An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title to Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years Next Preceding the Approval of this Act. Section 1 of the Act reads as ..in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding the approval of this act. If the title is to be followed, November 13, 1922 is the date which should be followed, hence, would allow the reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date of the institution of reopening of the case which was April 12, 1912, the petition would be invalid.

StatCon Maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may inadequately be omitted in the text may be supplied or remedied by its title.

Central Capiz v. Ramirez

Facts of the case: In July 1, 1919, Ana Ramirez contracted with the Central Capiz to supply to it for a term of 30 years all sugar cane produced upon her plantation. Knowing her obligation, Ramirez refused to do so upon the fact that more than 61% of the capital stock of the petitioner is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippines or of United States. The land involved is a private agricultural land.

Issue: Whether or not Act No. 2874, also known as Public Land Act is applicable t agricultural lads which are privately owned

Held: Public Land Act is inapplicable to the lands of the respondents

Ratio: The title of the act was An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relating to Lands of the Public Domain and Other Purposes. Section 1 of the act provides that the short title of the act shall be The Public Land Act. Section2 provides that the provisions of this act shall apply to lands of the public domain. The and for other purposes in the title is non-existent. Agricultural lands in private ownership constitute no part of the public domain.

StatCon Maxim: The title may indicate the legislative intent to extend or restrict the scope of the law and a statute couched in a language of doubtful import will be construed to conform to the legislative intent as disclosed in its title.

Ebarle v. Sucaldito

Facts of the case: Ebarle, the petitioner, was then provincial governor of Zamboanga and a candidate for reelection in 1971 local elections. The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines filed complaints with the city fiscal against the petitioner for violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) and Articles 171, 182,183, 213, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner filed petitions for prohibition and certiorari in CFI but they were dismissed. He petitioned to the Supreme Court and alleged that the City Fiscal and Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of EO 264, which outlined the procedure how complainants charging the government officials and employees with the commission of irregularities should be guided.

Issues: Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively applicable to administrative charges and not to criminal complaints

Held: Petition dismissed.

Ratio: The title of the EO 264 is of Commission of Irregularities. It speaks of commission of irregularities and not criminal offenses. Had the order intended to make it applicable thereto, it could have been referred to the more specific terms like accused, convicted, and the like.

People v. Echavez

Facts of the case: Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court against 16 persons charging them with squatting, as penalized in Presidential Decree 772. Respondent Echavez dismissed the case on the grounds that 1) the accused entered the land through stealth and strategy and not with the use of force, intimidation, or threat or taking advantage of the absence of the owner (as described in the Presidential Decree); and 2) under the rule of ejusdem genernis, the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree 771 penalizes squatting and similar acts also apply to agricultural lands

Held: No.

Ratio: The preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas. The complainant involves pasture lands in rural areas. The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind) does not apply to this case.

StatCon maxim: A preamble may restrict what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of a law.

Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu

Facts of the case: Ordinance No.207 was passed by Municipal Board of Cebu, which required ships whose vessels dock at the public wharves of piers located in the said city, but owned by the national government. The petitioner paid the wharfage charges under protest. Aboitiz questioned the validity of the ordinance contending that the said ordinance could not have been enacted because the right to collect wharfage belongs to the national government. As a result of this ordinance, they will be paying twice. The petitioner attacked Sec. 17(w) of the ordinance which states that charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places, questioning the application of the word public whether it refers to the ownership of the national government, provincial, or municipality, because the local legislators did not make distinction between those owned by the national government and those owned by the city of Cebu.

Issue: Whether or not the city of Cebu may provide an ordinance charging vessels dock at public wharves of piers located in the said city but owned by the national government

Held: No.

Ratio: Because Sec 17(w) of the Charter of Cebu would refer only to those public wharves or landing places owned by the City of Cebu and not those owned by the national government, under the exclusive supervision of Bureau of Customs, Sec. 1142 of Revised Administrative Code.

StatCon maxim: Legislative intent should accordingly be ascertained from a consideration if the whole context of the statute and not from an isolated part or particular provision.

People v. Chaves

Facts of the case: Esteban Chaves has been found guilty by the CFI and CA of a violation of RA 145. He collected a claim for Marcela Rambuyon for death benefits in the sum of $4,252 due for the demise of her son, a USAFFE veteran. The check was cashed by Chaves and gave only P3, 202.20 to the claimant and retained P5, 362.20 for himself. He was sentenced to indemnify the offended party the sum of P5, 362.20 and costs. However, the indemnity has not been paid yet. So the sheriff resorted into taking a residential lot and building of the accused. The accused claimed that it was a recorded family home extra-judicially.

Issue: Whether or not, the family home extrajudicially constituted is entitled to exemption from the execution levy issued at the instance of the offended party?

Held: No.

Ratio: Article 243, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code provides that debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in Registry of Property shall be exempted. However, the Supreme Court ruled that it is of no merit that the appellant considered his unpaid indemnity due as a debt, and that, the word debt: shall be treated in its generic sense.

StatCon maxim: The context may circumscribe the meaning of a statute; it may give a word or phrase a meaning different from its usual or ordinary signification. In such a case, the meaning dictated by the context prevails.

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds

Facts of the case: Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate Inc. in December 1941. The registration was interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought to accomplish the said registration but was denied by the Register of Deeds of Manila on the grounds that he is a foreigner and he cannot acquire a land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko brought the case to the CFI of Manila. The CFI ruled that he cannot own a land, being an alien. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.

Held: No.

Ratio: Sec. 1, Art 13 of the Constitution talks about the conservation and utilization of natural resources. The said provision embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain. Its purpose is to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the nation. Although it mentions agricultural, timber, and mineral lands, the court held that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. Hence, public agricultural land was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral. Therefore, it includes residential lands.

StatCon maxim: If the only issue is a constitutional question which is unavoidable, the court should confront the question and decide the case on the merits.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales Inc.

Facts of the case: TMX Sales Inc. filed its quarterly income tax for the 1st quarter of 1981. It declared P571,174.31 and paying an income tax of P247,019 on May 13, 1981. However, during the subsequent quarters, TMX suffered losses. On April 15, 1982, when TMX filed its Annual Income Tax Return for the year ended in December 31, 1981, it declared a net loss of P6,156,525. On July 9, 1982, TMX filed with the Appellate Division of BIR for refund in the amount of P247,010 representing overpaid income tax. His claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On May 14, 1984, TMX Sales filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals against CIR, praying that the CIR be ordered to refund to TMX the amount of P247,010. The CIR averred that TMX is already barred for claiming the refund since more than 2 years has elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981) and the filing of the claim in court (March 14, 1984). The Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition of TMX Sales and ordered CIR to refund the amount mentioned. Hence, this appeal of CIR.

Issue: Whether or not TMX Sales Inc. is entitled to a refund considering that two years gas already elapsed since the payment of the tax

Held: Yes. Petition denied.

Ratio: Sec. 292, par. 2 of the National Internal Revenue Code stated that in any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the expiration of two years from the date of the payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment. This should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code. The most reasonable and logical application of the law would be to compute the 2-year prescriptive period at the time of the filing of the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return, where it can finally be ascertained if the tax payer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax. Since TMX filed the suit on March 14, 1984, it is within the 2-year prescriptive period starting from April 15, 1982 when they filed their Annual Income Tax Return.

StatCon maxim: The intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is taken into view.

Agcaoili v. Suguitan

Facts of the case: Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte by Francis Harrison on March 25, 1916, with authority to have and hold the said office with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereinto of right appertaining into him, subject to the conditions prescribed by law. Agcaoili received a letter from Luis Torres, Undersecretary of Justice, saying that he should cease to be a justice because he is now over 65 years old. Justice Agcaoili filled a protest through a letter addressed to the undersecretary to which he asserted that he will not cease from the office because he was appointed as justice of peace before the enactment of Act 3107, and he has the right to hold office during good behaviour. Agcaoili filed protest at Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte. He waited for a reply but nothing came. So, he filed for a petition for writ of quo warranto in the CFI of the Province of Ilocos Norte.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 216 of Act 190 is applicable to the petitioner with regard to his petition for quo warranto

Held: No.

Ratio: Article 190 provides remedies for the usurpation of office and franchise. Section 216 provides Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within five years after the act complained of was done or committed; nor shall an action be brought against an officer to be ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose. The Supreme Court held that this provision is applicable only to private officials. Hence, it has no applicability to the petitioner, who is a justice of the peace. The second point the court made is with regard to the rules of Statutory Construction, given that the said provision is applicable to public officials, the sentence after the word committed; should not be treated as a separate thought from the preceding phrase. In the end, the court ruled that the petitioner remain in office.

StatCon maxim: A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon must have relation to the same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the expression of a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma.

Nera v. Garcia

Facts of the case: Nera served as clerk in the Maternity and Children's Hospital, a government institution under the supervision of the Bureau of Hospitals and the Department of Health. He also served as manager and cashier of the Maternity Employer's Cooperative Association, Inc. Having hold of the positions, the fund of the associatin is supposedly under his control. On May 11, 1956, he was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with malversation for allegedly misappropriating a certain amount of money which belongs to the association. After a few months, a certain Simplicio Balcos, filed an administrative complaint case against Nera. Nera was suspended as clerk of the said hospital, as approved by respondent Garcia, Secretary of Health. The petitioner asked PCAC to intervene on his behalf. PCAC recommended respondents to lift the suspension of the petitioner. Respondents did not grant the lifting of suspension. The petitioner asked for reconsideration but was still denied. The CFI ruled in favour of the petitioner. As a result, respondents filed an appeal to the decision of the CFI. Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus to restrain respondents from proceeding with the administrative case until the termination of the criminal case and annul the suspension and to compel respondents to lift the suspension.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was illegally suspended thus, he must be reinstated in office and pay back his salary

Held: Decision of CFI reversed.

Ratio: There are two relevant laws outlined by the Supreme Court in this case. First is the Sec. 694 of the Administrative Code, entitled Removal or Suspension which states that suspension is applicable if the charge against such subordinate or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty. According to the Supreme Court, because of the use of the comma, dishonesty and oppression need not be committed in performance of duty. On the other hand, the other law involved is the Sec. 34 of Civil Service Act which is entitled Preventive Suspension which states that it is applicable if the charge against such officer, or

employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or to believe that the performance of duty, or if there are strong reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service. According to the Supreme Court, with the use of comma, the charges of dishonesty and oppression or grave misconduct need not be committed in the performance of duty it is only applicable if neglect is committed in performance of duty. The Supreme Court held that the alleged misappropriation involved in the criminal case is not entirely disconnected with the office of the petitioner. Even though Maternity Employee's Cooperative Association, which owns the funds, said to have been misappropriated, is a private entity, it is still an association composed of the employees of the Maternity Children's Hospital where petitioner was serving as an employee. Moreover, if petitioner was designated to and occupied the position of manager and cashier of said association, it was because he was an employee of the Maternity and Children's Hospital. The contention though indirect, and, in the opinion of some, rather remote, exists and is there.

StatCon maxim: The qualifying effect of a word or phrase may be confined to its last antecedent if the latter is separated by a comma from the other antecedents.

Florentino v. PNB

Facts of the case: Florentino et al are indebted to the respondent bank in the amount of P6,800 plus interest, incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2, 1954. The said loan is secured by a mortgage of real properties. Petitioner Florentino is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953. On December 27, 1953, petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank with their backpay certificate but PNB refused to accept petitioner's offer to pay the said indebtedness with the latter's backpay certificate.

Issues: Whether or not, Philippine National Bank be compelled to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino issued to him by the Republic of the Philippines, to pay an indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank?

Held: Appellee is ordered to accept the backpay certificate.

Ratio: Section 2 of RA 304 reads as obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the Government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or control by the Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement. SC held that the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase from the preceding ones. Hence, who may be willing to accept the same for settlement applies only to the last antecedent.

StatCon maxim: An argument based upon punctuation alone is not persuasive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give the statute the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks and inserting others where necessary.

Cornejo v Naval

Facts of the case: Miguel R. Cornejo was the municipal president of Pasay, Rizal. Eligio Naval was the provincial governor, while Jose M. Perez and Celestino de Dios constitute the provincial board of Rizal. The CFI of Rizal found Cornejo guilty of the criminal act of falsification of a private document and sentenced him therefor to one year, eight months, and twenty-one days' imprisonment, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law. An appeal from this judgment was taken by the accused to the Supreme Court. Immediately after the conviction in the trial court, the provincial governor of Rizal filed with the provincial board of that province an administrative complaint against Cornejo for corruption and improper conduct unbecoming a public officer. Thereafter, the provincial governor suspended Cornejo as president of Pasay pending action by the provincial board on the administrative charges preferred against Cornejo. Aside from filing an answer and challenging the jurisdiction of the provincial board, Cornejo did not otherwise defend himself before the board. The provincial board eventually decided that it had jurisdiction to investigate the charges, conducted its investigation, and recommended to the Chief of the Executive Bureau the suspension from the office of Cornejo pending the final determination by the Supreme Court of his appeal. On the recommendation of the Chief of the Executive Bureau, the Secretary of the Interior on April 29, 1930, approved the suspension of Cornejo as municipal president of Pasay, Rizal, for a period of time to extend to the conclusion of his appeal to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not a provincial governor and a provincial board have the power to suspend a municipal president who has been convicted for a crime by a trial court Held: No. The provincial board acted in excess of jurisdiction. Ratio: Under Section 2188 of the Administrative Code, The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of maladministration in office. For minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected, the written charges against the officer shall be filed with the board within five days. The SC held that the terms office officer would limit action to misconduct relating to the office and not extending to personal misbehavior.

People v. Subido

Facts of the case: The CFI found Subido guilty of liber. Therefore, he was sentenced of 3 months of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, pay the fine of P500.00, indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, of P10,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. However, the Court of Appeals modified the judgment by removing the penalty of arresto mayor, reducing the indemnity amount from P10,000 to P5,000 and mentioned nothing of the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. As a result, Subido filed with the trial court to recognize the decision of the Court of Appeals and to cancel his appeal bond.

Issue: Whether or not, the accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and indemnity prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency?

Held: Yes

Ratio: The use of a comma (,) in the part of the sentence is to make "the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer not only to non-payment of the indemnity, but also to non-payment of the fine.

In re: Estate of Johnson

Facts of the case: On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with an estimated amount of P231,800. The will was written in the testator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved under section 618. On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that 1) Johnson was, at the time of his death, a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; 2) that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner alleged that the law is inapplicable to his fathers will.

Issue: Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the part of the petitioner.

Held: No.

Ratio: Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court through the three-week publication of the notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court also asserted that in view of the statute concerned which reads as A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands the state, being not capitalized, does not mean that United States is excluded from the phrase (because during this time, Philippines was still a territory of the US).

Kare v. Platon

Facts of the case: The petitioner filed a motion of protest in the Court of First Instance of Albay contesting the election of one of the respondents, Francisco Perfecto. The respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Albay entered an order on which required the petitioner to give two kinds of bond in order that proper proceedings might be taken on his motion of protest. These two kinds of bond were personal bond for P3,000 and a cash bond of P2,000 to be deposited with the provincial treasurer of Albay within the time specified in the order. These sums were later changed so that the cash bond was for P1,500 and the personal bond for P3,500.

Issue: Whether or not the court has the right to choose in which form the petitioner would give his payment, through bond or through cash deposit

Held: Court will require a personal bond. Cash deposit on discretion of the petitioner

Ratio: Section 482 of the Election Law states that Before the court shall entertain any such contest or counter-contest or admit an appeal, the party filing the contest, counter-contest, or appeal shall give bond in an amount fixed by the court with two sureties satisfactory to it, conditioned that he will pay all expenses and costs incident to such motion or appeal, or shall deposit cash in court in lieu of such bond. The Supreme Court held that while the respondent judge holds that the court may require either a bond or a cash deposit, the petitioner maintains that it is to him alone the choice is given to file a personal bond or to make a cash deposit in lieu thereof. The Supreme Court ruled that the court may only require a personal bond, and that the contestant may make a cash deposit in lieu thereof.

StatCon maxim: The rule accepted by most of the authorities is that if the chapter or section heading has been inserted merely for convenience or reference, and not as integral part of the statute, it should not be allowed to control interpretation.

People v. Yabut

Facts of the case: Defendant was convicted for homicide. While serving sentence, he killed another prisoner. He was consequently charged for murder. Yabut alleged that it was Villanueva and not him who has given the fatal blow. However, the court found him guilty. After conviction, he was punished with the maximum period for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in applying Art. 160.

Held: No

Ratio: Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code states that Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.

StatCon maxim: Where the text of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety to resort to the headings or epigraphs of a section for interpretation of the text, especially where such epigraphs or headings are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows.