On or Out in Three Pitches?

20 March 2013 Captain Seth Keshel

I. Introduction Kyle Bunn, pitching coach of East Tennessee State University, asked me to investigate a theory that has been buzzing around collegiate circles. The theory is simple: that two of the first three pitches of an at-bat should be strikes, and that the hitter should either be on or out in three pitches or less. I will use the balance of this paper to give my thoughts on the theory and provide insight on why this theory, while grounded in sound principle, isnt feasible for all pitchers. My statistics are based on Major League numbers due to their easy accessibility, but Ill translate my thoughts to the college game when necessary. II. Analysis Before I debunk this flawed theory, I will first acknowledge the benefits of successful execution of the three-pitch plan. First, it would maximize the staying power of a starting pitcher. Power pitchers who are effectively wild usually post K/9 (strikeouts per nine innings) over 7.0 (MLB average for starting pitcher), but they also traditionally rack up walks and hit batsmen at a higher rate than their crafty counterparts and often run their pitch counts over 100 in the first five or six innings of a start. The three-pitch approach, if carried out effectively, would eliminate walks. In a day and age in the college game where nearly seventy percent of batted balls will result in outs, that makes it difficult for offenses to put up runs. As a result of this more efficient approach to pitching, bullpens would remain well rested for use in high-leverage situations or matchup play at critical moments. What coach wouldnt want a rested bullpen and starters capable of pitching in eight or nine innings per start? How about a coach who understands that the successful implementation of the three-pitch plan is a utopian idea that falls apart like a house of cards when you dissect it? It works only if everything works just as planned. Read on. Flop: The Count is 0-0 As a student of history, I believe the Declaration of Independences statement all men are created equal to be true; however, I do not believe that all pitchers, nor all hitters, are created equal. Where am I going with this? Well, first pitches can be unpredictable. Some hitters dont like to swing at any first pitches, but prefer instead to get adjusted to a pitchers release point or get settled into the box. Some hitters are looking for something in particular and wont swing at just certain pitches, like a curveball. Still, some hitters are like Vladimir Guerrero and will jump all over anything near the plate. This brings me to my first assumption. Everything must work perfectly or the system will go under. The three-pitch system has to have success on the first two pitches to be successful, as does any pitching program known to the game. The assumption here is that a pitcher is capable of throwing all of his pitches for strikes with great regularity. To throw only fastballs would be foolish.

Recent MLB Batting Averages on 0-0 counts: .344 (2007), .337 (2008), .338 (2009)
Those averages above are not pitch-specific. If a pitcher allows a hitter to become too comfortable at the plate in knowing that hes going to have a hittable pitch, even on 00, these numbers are going to inflate even higher, particularly in the college game. Additionally, if a pitcher can only get one particular pitch over, this will narrow his chances of retiring his opponents even further. The bottom line is this: if youre going to telegraph strikes over the plate every time on 0-0, youd better be able to do it with the fastball, breaking ball, and changeup. The three-pitch system fails to account for pitchers who struggle to command multiple pitches. I certainly realize the necessity of consistently staying up 0-1 instead of behind 1-0, but there still has to be a degree of finesse and strategy thrown in to pitching in the early count. Turn: The Count is 0-1 vs. The Count is 1-0 The hitter looked at, whiffed at, or fouled away the initial offering. This is good, but if your pitcher would have missed, hes still in the game statistically.

Recent MLB Batting Averages on 0-1 counts: .324 (2007), .339 (2008), .317 (2009) Recent MLB Batting Averages on 1-0 counts: .341 (2007), .339 (2008), .340 (2009)
When we do the math, we can see that hitters averaged .327 when down in the count 0-1 and went up to .340 if they were up 1-0. Thats a difference of 13 hits over the course of 1,000 at-bats. The moral of the story is this: while getting ahead on the first pitch is an ideal situation, its not worth grooving fastballs to powerful hitters when you can pursue other options. The true danger with the 1-0 count is the simple fact that its only a pitch away from the extremely dangerous 2-0 count, which is described in detail later on. River: The Count is 0-2 This is undoubtedly the best count for a pitcher to have a hitter in. Hitters must expand the strike zone in all two-strike counts and are often forced to go after bad pitches or pitches they arent fond of hitting.

Recent MLB Batting Averages on 0-2 counts: .164 (2007), .160 (2008), .156 (2009)
Those are the lowest batting averages of all twelve possible counts; however, the three-pitch strategy isnt feasible in any 0-2 scenario outside of a strikeout. The count of 0-2 isnt a count for pitching to contact. Its an opportunity to hunt for a strikeout, especially if the game scenario mandates that a ball not be put in play. 0-2 base hits are momentum killers. While 0-2 pitches are often elevated or break so far out of the zone that they are taken for balls, they can be useful as setup pitches for the fourth pitch of an at-bat. River (Part 2): The Count is 1-1

Recent MLB Batting Averages on 1-1 counts: .327 (2007), .329 (2008), .332 (2009)
A hitter in this count still has some slack to hunt for a pitch to drive. On the other hand, a pitcher faces pressure to throw a strike because the difference between 1-2 (.173) and 2-1 (.339) is so significant.

River (Part 3): The Count is 2-0 Since the three-pitch strategy calls for two strikes in the first three pitches, this count doesnt work out. Outside of the very small sample size for 3-0 pitches, this is the most dangerous count for a pitcher to engage a hitter. Most hitters take a red light on the 3-0 pitch, but 2-0 is an opportunity to look dead-red for a fastball.

Recent MLB Batting Averages on 2-0 counts: .350 (2007), .355 (2008), .368 (2009)
III. Conclusion The three-pitch strategy is flawed. While it is certainly rooted in sound strategy, its not for everyone. For a crafty left-hander who throws in the 83-86 MPH range with good command of three pitches, it makes some sense. This is a pitcher who isnt likely to get many swings and misses, but success in changing speeds may have hitters overly aggressive to his advantage. I caution coaches who engage in this strategy to avoid it when facing extra-base threats. It makes sense to conserve pitches against 8- or 9-hole hitters or light-hitting leadoff men, but funneling fastballs over the plate on the 0-0, 0-1, or 1-0 counts will (both statistically and in theory) get you burned against the heart of the order of any sound program. Other shortcomings of this strategy include: Set-up pitches: The three-pitch strategy doesnt allow for pitchers ahead in the count to use pitches to set a hitter up for the terminal pitch. For instance, a left-handed hitter may expect to see sinkers low and away, but a pitch well inside would keep him from sitting on that pitch for the duration of an at-bat. The three-pitch strategy eliminates this option and allows hitters to sit on desired pitches. Strikeout situations: With runners in scoring position and less than two out (presumably in a tight game), it is imperative that pitchers are able to pursue the strikeout. The three-pitch strategy implies that a pitcher needs to get contact at first opportunity in the interest of pitch conservation, but he actually needs to be able to set up the hitter for a strikeout. Use of relievers: Relievers bring a different dynamic to the game, particularly in professional baseball. Pitchers typically stamp themselves as relievers when they show a propensity for commanding just one pitch or possessing a hard fastball. They are relegated to the relief role because they are not seen as ideal options for working through a lineup three or four times in a game; therefore, they are expected to be able to register strikeouts, particularly when entering the game in a high leverage situation (MLB relievers average 8.0 K/9, but some of the most dominant relievers post over 10.0 K/9). -------------------In closing, I dont believe that the three-pitch strategy is something that works for all types of pitchers. Strikeouts, while requiring more stamina from starters, are an integral part of the game and hold a place in a winning strategy. Pitchers that use the three-pitch strategy should be able to command a fastball, breaking ball, and changeup; furthermore, pitchers with dominant stuff should be allowed to break free of this strategy and use their repertoires to set up hitters for strikeouts and counts that are not ideal for solid contact. Finally, the most damning critique of the three-pitch strategy are

in the form of the opposing batting averages associated with hitting with two strikes (regardless of the ball count) versus hitting with any other count, especially those early in the count.