MARIT. POL. MGMT.

2000,

VOL.

27,

NO.

1, 79 88

Culture in maritime safety

VOLD JON IVAR HA Department of Electro-Technology and General Studies, Alesund lesund, Norway and rden, N-6021 A College, PO Box 5104, Larga Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), N-7491 Trondheim, Norway
Many accidents, resulting in a larger number of fatalities during the last few years, have focused attention on issues of maritime safety. Accident registration reveals that a large proportion have human related causes, and indicates that, by looking at cultural aspects, ones understanding of the underlying mechanisms leading to accidents might increase. Several constructs of culture and climate have appeared on national, organizational and safety levels. Those constructs are discussed together with problems that occur when interpreting accidental data, and recording accidental causes. The papers reviewed indicate the existence of a `chain of evidence from accidents/safety to attitudes, communications, con ict-solving, etc. and further to safety culture. To be able to reduce the risk for accidents, there seems to be a need for coordination and the cultural perspective seems to be one that integrates and takes the many disciplines and multi-level nature of accidents and safety into account.
1. Introduction

A large number of accidents over the last few years, with 100s of fatalities, like Piper Alfa, Herald of Free Enterprise, Estonia and Scandinavian Star, have drawn attention to human factors, the role of training, the role of the incident commander, and decisions under stress and culture/climate in maritime safety. This paper focuses primarily on papers and books on organizational culture/climate and safety in a maritime context. However, since most of the research in culture and climate has been done in the area of industry and air safety, the author has taken a broader scope and included material from those areas, together with papers discussing culture and climate from a more general viewpoint. In addition, papers looking at the reliability and validity of accident registration have been reviewed.
2. S afety and culture/climate

2.1. Are organizational culture and organizational climate the same? There are many de nitions of the two central constructs; organizational culture and organizational climate. In some papers, authors have used the terms alternately and in other papers, as two distinct constructs. The term `organizational culture seems to have entered academic literature in an article by Pettigrew published in Administrative Science Quarterly in 1979 [1], and is, therefore, a relatively recent construct. A similar term `corporate culture appeared earlier in articles, by Blake and Mouton [2] and Silverveig and Allen [3], but their use of the term `corporate culture was more equivalent to de nitions of `organizational
Maritime Policy & Management ISSN 0308 8839 print/ISSN 1464 5254 online # 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd http://www.tandf.co. uk/journals/tf/03088839.html

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climate. Schein [4] is probably the most central writer when it comes to understanding and de ning organizational culture. As a consultant in di erent countries he observed how organizations operating in a multinational context sometimes did things in the same way, even in widely di ering national cultures. The observation that there could be cultures in the company that overrode, or at least modi ed, national cultures made him curious. Schein [4] looked upon his major work on culture as a journey of integration. He used research from many disciplines and many writers, e.g. on artifacts and what artifacts mean [5 8], values and espoused values [9 12], basic underlying assumptions [13 15]. In addition, Schein [4] illuminated the construct organizational culture with examples and observed cases which explained his theory. His de nition of organizational culture is the one that is widely accepted and most referred in the academic literature:
Organizational culture is a pattern of basic assumptions invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems [4, p.9].

Another central scientist on national and organizational culture is Geert Hofstede. Hofstede et al. [16] also focus on the integrative aspect of the organizational culture construct and argue that most authors probably will agree on the following characteristics of the organizational culture construct: It is (1) holistic, (2) historically determined, (3) related to anthropolgical concepts, (4) socially constructed, (5) soft, and (6) di cult to change. All of these characteristics of organizations have been separately recognized in the literature in the previous decades; what was new about organizational culture was their integration into one construct. Organizational climate entered the academic literature much earlier than the term organizational culture. Already, in 1974 a review article by James and Jones [17] referred to Porter and Lawler s use of the construct in 1965 [18], and Fleishman s use of coherent sets of organizational perceptions in 1953 [19]. From the literature reviewed, there is no indication that any de nition of organizational climate is as widely used as Schein s de nition of organizational culture. Campell et al. [20] had elements in their de nition of organizational climate which brings it very close to the construct of organizational culture:
Organizational climate are a set of attributes speci c for an organization which can be observed by the way the organization is dealing with its members and its environment. For each member of the organization the climate will appear as a set of attitudes and expectations that describe the organization both in static characteristics (like the degree of autonomy) and links between actions and result, and one result related to another. (p. 390)

Bang [21] discusses several de nitions of both organizational climate and organizational culture. He concludes that, even if a large degree of resemblance exists between organizational climate and organizational culture, they have to be looked upon as two separate constructs. Schein [4] says too that climate is one of several common meanings that re ect the organizational culture, but the term culture should be reserved for the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by the members of the organization, that operate unconsciously, and de ne, in a basic `taken for granted fashion, an organizations view of itself and its environment. Another condition that previously showed a distinct di erence between the constructs organizational culture and organizational climate was research designs.

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Traditionally, research on culture has been conducted using qualitative methods, while research on climate has used quantitative methods. Quoting Schein [4] on how to do cultural research:
Can one use questionnaires or other more formalized tests? Given the approach I take to culture, the answer must clearly be `no . At best what one would get with such an instrument is some of the espoused values of group members. If these then were treated as an artifact to be deciphered along with other artifacts, one is probably on safe ground; but if one took the data to be measure of the culture in the sense of underlying taken for granted assumptions, one would be skating on very thin ice indeed, and, worst of all, would not know how thin the ice actually was. (pp. 135 136)

Even if Schein was very clear how cultural studies should be done, lately the di erences between research design has disappeared and the most common design in cultural studies is triangulation where both quantitative and qualitative methods are in use [16, 21, 22]. 2.2. Organizational culture/climate e ect on safety (safety culture/climate ) There are as many de nitions on the `subconstruct safety culture and safety climate as on organizational culture and organizational climate. Dyrhaug and Holden [23] have de ned safety culture as follows:
Safety culture is a series of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles and social and technical practices which are established to minimize the exposure of employees, managers, customers and third parties to hazard. (p. 7)

Similarly, Weick [24] de nes safety culture as:

A clear understanding of the system and its safety features, positive attitudes towards safety measures, and an incentive system that encourages safety in operations. (p. 113)

Zohar [25] de nes safety climate as the coherent set of perceptions and expectations that employees have regarding safety in their organization. As for organizational climate and organizational culture, even if there exists a large degree of resemblance between safety climate and safety culture, they have to be looked upon as two separate constructs, because the de nition of safety culture seems to have a much broader scope and is able to include safety climate as a `subconstruct . The rst attempt to measure safety climate was published by Zohar [25], who studied the e ects of safety climate in industrial organizations in Israel. He used factor analysis to identify components of safety climate which permitted the distinction between high-accident and low-accident companies. The eight factors he found were:
. . . . . . . .

perceived management attitudes on safety, e ect of safe work practice on promotion, social status of individuals, status of safety o cer, status of safety committee, importance/e ectiveness of safety training, risks at the workplace, and enforcement versus guidance.

A factor which is not in Zohar s ndings but which might di erentiate between organizations with a positive safety culture/climate and organizations with a less

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positive safety culture/climate is the thoroughness and degree of sophistication with which accidents and other safety related events are investigated and analysed [26 29]. Zohar s [25] ndings have been assessed by Glennon [30], Brown and Holmes [31] and Lutness [32]. Glennon [30], who used Zohar s method on an Australian workforce, questioned the generality of Zohar s results, which were based on an Israeli sample, and he argued that safety climate factors seemed not to be stable across organizations. Coyle et al. [33] report safety climate factors found in clerical and service organizations in Australia. Their paper concludes that Zohar s original theory lacks validity on the Australian studied population, but some methodological issues have to be scrutinized before nal conclusions concerning the validity of Zohar s theories can be reached. Diaz and Cabrera [34] have explored the relationship between safety climate and accident rate in three di erent types of enterprises at Tenerif e-South Airport: the airport authority, the handling division and the fuelling company. Their results were consistent with Zohar s study, in which safety climate seemed to be related to the general safety level in the organizations studied. They also found signi cant di erences in safety attitudes and climate in relation to the type of enterprise; the enterprises with higher safety levels also scored higher on safety climate and had a more positive attitude towards safety. In the construct safety culture, there are two main elements that appear in both in Zohar s [25] safety climate and Weicks [24] safety culture:

(1) Management commitment. (2) `Employee involvement .

Other papers support the ndings that management commitment and worker involvement appear to be the two most important dimensions in safety climate and culture [31, 35, 36]. It seems to be generally accepted that attitudes and perception a ect ones propensity to have accidents [37 39]. Other papers indicate and claim that many safety problems have their origins in poor management attitudes towards safety [40] and that unsafe attitudes almost always precede accidents. Booth and Lee [41] and DeJoy [42] agree, and claim that a key determinant of successful management of safety is the promotion of a positive safety culture, which includes the right attitudes and beliefs, together with commitment of directors and employees at all levels. Good safety performance is, therefore a matter of much more than the preparation of well structured company safety procedures. Margolis [43] found that engineering solutions to accidents were in themselves insu cient in preventing accidents. Individual attitudes of employees towards safety were directly related to managerial attitudes towards safety. Beck and Feldman [44] reached a similar conclusion, arguing that safe work practices are dependent on the expectation of the employees. `Many of the events that lead to the Piper Alpha accident were rooted in the culture, the structure, and the procedures of Occidental Petroleum, some of which are common to large segments of the oil and gas industry and other industries as well [45]. A signi cant nding of several injury reports was that senior managers shared the mistaken belief that they were working in organizations with total commitment to safety and e ective safety systems [41]. n [9] call espoused These ndings might indicate that what Argyris and Scho values are present in many organizations. (Espoused values: The company may

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say that they value safety, people, milieu, etc. but its record in that regard may contradict that. ) However, as mentioned earlier in this paper, there is relatively strong agreement amongst scientists about the impact that climate and culture might have on processes such as communications, decision-making, problem solving, con ict solving, attitudes, motivation, leadership etc. and, therefore, resulting variables such as performance [34]. Merritt and Helmreich [46] also indicate that organizational culture and, therefore, safety culture is formed by management:
`Organizational culture directly in uences behaviour in the cockpit. Pilots are more likely to model their own behaviour after the behavior they observe in the organization, because they believe it to be the behavior sanctioned by management. The cockpit is a microcosm of the organization it re ects the organizations norms. (p. 5)

2.3. National cultures e ect on safety One can ask if national cultures have any e ect on safety. The most central research on national culture di erences is published in a book by Hofstede [47]. The study was done by using a large existing databank of IBM employees. The databank covered populations from 64 countries and included 116 000 survey questionnaires. The data used for studying di erences in national cultures was an unintended byproduct, but this is what made the study famous. Because of an insu cient number of people in some countries, Hofstede used data from 53 countries. The study showed national and regional patterns and revealed four largely independent dimensions of di erences among national value systems. These dimensions were labelled `power distance (large vs. small), `uncertainty avoidance (strong vs. weak), `individualism vs. `collectivism and `masculinity vs. `femininity . All 53 countries were scored in all four dimensions. Later, in a follow up study used on student populations from 23 countries, the four dimensions were con rmed, but a fth meaningful dimension, independent of the four others, was found [48, 49]. This fth dimension was labelled `Confucian dynamism and contrasted a long term to a short term orientation in life and work. To nd out the extent to which Hofstede s dimensions have relevance in regards to safety, research has been done at the University of Texas, by Merritt [50] and Merritt and Helmreich [46]. They used many of Hofstedes questions and replicated his study with regard to safety on 9000 male commercial airline pilots in 18 countries, and concluded that national culture can and should be added to the list of in uences upon a pilots work style and preferences. Merritt and Helmreich [46] also found a link between national culture, organizational culture and safety. In situations where national and organizational culture are in harmony there are no stress factors that can in uence the safety, but in situations where the values in the national culture and the organizational culture are in con ict, this might lead to stress.
3. The link between safety culture/climate and the human factor in safety

There is relative agreement among scientists that climate and culture have an e ect on factors such as communications, decision making, con ict solving, attitudes, motivation, leadership etc. In three companies on Tenerife, Diaz and Cabrera [34] compared the safety level, accidents and incidents with their safety climate and found a statistically signi cant

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relationship. The scores obtained for each enterprise showed that those enterprises with a higher safety level also had higher scores on safety climate and a more positive safety attitude. Perrow [51] indicated that many accidents are rooted in production pressure. Even if the espoused values in the company say `safety rst, the true situation might be that the individual decision maker makes short cuts. nzler [52] agree with Perrow, and describe a sociotechnical model of Grote and Ku safety culture and name it `Total Safety Management . Results from research they carried out in ve di erent companies provided some support for the view that con icts between safety and production can more likely be solved in favour of safety in organizations where safety is understood as an integral part of the primary task of the work system (`Positive safety culture ). Helmreich and Merritt [53] claim that the aim of a safety culture is to reduce human error by the trokia:
. reducing the likelihood of error, . trapping errors before they have an operational e ect, and . mitigating the consequences of error.

4.

Registration of human factors in maritime accidents

One means of preventing accidents is thorough investigation of the causes of marine casualties, the analysis of which might illuminate necessary safety improvements. The Norwegian Maritime Directorate, Norwegian National Coastal Administration and the Norwegian Veritas are registering data from maritime accidents. Statistics from The Norwegian Maritime Directorates database reveal that more than 50% of the accidents have human-related causes. Other causes and causes unknown are in addition reported in 15 20% of the casualties. (Skipsfartsstatistikk Sj ulykker/ Shipping Statistics Accidents at Sea 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 [60]. ) On a television programme on NRK1, spring 1997 (Schr dingers katt spesial . Reference: www.nrk.no/katta/arkiv/spes97/spes97.htm, 17 mars 1997), it was claimed that more than 90% of all accidents at sea and in the air could be traced back to the human factor. In his book Normal Accidents, which has become a central book on marine accidents, as well as other accidents, Perrow [51] writes:
`Though 80% of marine accidents are attributed to human error, generally excessive speed in poor weather and errors in navigation, ships are certainly not free of equipment and design failures . (p. 224)

Other sources claim that 60 90% of all accidents at sea and air can be classi ed under the heading `human factors [25, 54, 55]. Whether the human factor is responsible for 60 or 90% of the accidents, the proportion related to human factors is high and, by understanding the underlying mechanisms, it should be easier to prevent accidents. A question that arises is why does the percentage of accidents related to human factors di er so much from one paper/registration to another? One of the main reasons might be found in the de nition of the term accident; it seems that the de nition di ers from country to country, and from database to database. Another reason for the di erence might be found in research evaluating validity and reliability of the data registered in accident databases. Hill et al. [56] and Rothblum and Carvalhais [57] indicate that four factors had impact on analysing human related causal factors from causalities:

Culture in maritime safety investigators,

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. the reliability and completeness of the data can be a ected depending on the . the collection of human factors data can be overlooked and oversimpli ed, . the taxonomy/classi cation scheme a ects data collected as well as data . the computer interface used for data entry can a ect the reliability, validity, and

reported, and

completeness of human factors data.

Other research papers [41, 51, 57] support the ndings on the multi-causal nature of accidents and, therefore, the problems with and signi cance of a good registration. Accidents happen as a result of chance concentration of many distinct causative factors, each one necessary but not su cient to cause a break down.
`The Piper Alpha accident was one of the cases that can hardly be attributed to ``an act of God : it was mostly self-in icted. Although the catastrophe was not in itself controllable, the failure resulted essentially from accumulation of management errors [45, p. 215].

The importance of the investigator is also pointed out by research of DeJoy [42]:
First line supervisors typically play important roles in reporting and investigating accidents and in seeing that recommended corrective actions are implemented and maintained. Supervisory training programs should highlight sources of attributable bias in supervisor subordinate interactions as well as the importance of making accurate diagnoses of safety problems. (p. 15)
5. Future research

Accidents and safety as research areas are, by Rasmussen [38], claimed to be crossdisciplinary and nested on several levels:
. On authorities, regulators, international associations level the research disci. On shipping company level the research discipline might be decision theory,

pline might be political science, law, economics, or culture and sociology.

organizational sociology/theory, management, organizational culture, or safety culture. . On ship, captain, group-leader level the research disciplines might be organizational sociology/theory, management, work psychology, organizational culture, safety culture, or decisions under stress and emergency command. . On sta and work level the research disciplines might be work psychology, human factors, man-machine communications, decisions under stress organizational culture and safety culture. Tore J Larson [59], editor of Safety Science Monitor, is also focusing on the multidisciplinary aspect of accidents and safety:
However, I believe that the particular case of industrial safety and occupational injury prevention demands the combined approach of several disciplines: Epidemiology commands the necessary tools to access the prevalence of negative outcomes given certain hazardous exposures; psychology will explain the cognitive aspects of human behaviour, perceptions, attitudes and emotions; sociology and human resource management can interpret the pertinent results of group behaviour and tell us how organizations change and why; ergonomists can nd solutions to exposure problems in perceptual, manual and cognitive tasks; structural engineers can pinpoint the relevant safety aspects in design; and statisticians can evaluate the measurement of incidence and validate potential outcomes of interventions.

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Because of the multidisciplinary and multilevel aspects to safety there seems to be need for a coordination of the di erent levels to reduce the risk. The integrating element which can take all levels into account seems to be culture. As mentioned earlier, research indicates that safety culture and safety climate have an e ect on intermediary variables like communications, decision making, con ict solving, attitudes, motivation, leadership etc. The research reviewed in this paper indicates also a clear link between the intermediary variables and accidents. Because there has been very little research done on organizational culture and organizational climate in maritime safety, further studies are indicated in the following areas:
. Transfer of ndings in industry and air safety to maritime safety. . Determining the most important cultural factors a ecting maritime safety. . Investigating the e ects of culture on risk aversion and risk taking, and how

culture can e ect safety in times of increasing production pressures and in critical situations. . Develop indicators for maritime safety, which can be used by classi cation and insurance companies. A paper written by Helmreich and Wilhelm [22] also points at areas for further studies:
The relationships between safety culture and national culture and professional culture and safety behaviors have not been demonstrated empirically because a quantitative index of safety culture has not been developed. The relationships between organizational climate, safety culture and safe behaviors, if any, have also to be determined. (p. 3)

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