Avicenna Daneshnameh Part 1: LOGIC

DNESHNMEH
Part I:

LOGIC

BrAe

=- ,--=-

D~ ~~ ~neshn~ ~~ ~meh part I: Logic

a

CONTENTS

[Preface:] Exposition of the purpose and utility in the science of logic

The Beginning of the Science of Logic

1. Elucidation of that which is called Single among Expressions and Concepts
2. Elucidation of Universal and Particular Expressions
3. Exposition of Essential and Accidental Universals
4. Exposition of Genus, Species, Difference, Property and Common Accident
5. Explication of the character of Definition and Description
6. Elucidation of the meaning of Noun, Verb and Particle
7. Explication of what a Proposition is
8. Explication of the types of Propositions
9. Explication of the Predicative Proposition: Affirmation, Negation, Universality,
Particularity and whatever pertains to it
10. Explication of the character of Connective and Disjunctive Conditional Propositions,
in the same manner as was done for Predicative Propositions
11. Explication of the character of Contradiction
12. Exposition of the character of Conversion
13. On Recognizing the Syllogism
14. Explication of the Connective Syllogism
15. Exposition of the Moods of the Syllogisms of the First Figure
_=.= :_,.==. sbI - BrAe

i
B Omj

| ---- | -- --,' =-- '= -- = ,--'-

_=-- ;-- '-'

'+,-- '+=- ---,= -- -' -,- (1)
= _' =- -,- (2)
_-= _- _' ,--'- (3)
'= = -'= .- ,- -= ,--'- (4)
- -= '= -, (5)
= - '- _-- -,- (6)
,- -, ,- (7)
,- --- -, (8)
-, ,- ,' -'- '=, _'-= ,= - - (9)
,- , ,=-- -'
,- '= -, -- _=- ' .---- .- (10)
--' - _'-= ' -
,-- '= -, (11)
= '= ,--'- (12)
', -='-- (13)
_-- ', -, (14)
.- '+-', '= ,--'- (15)
D~ ~~ ~neshn~ ~~ ~meh part I: Logic

b
16. Syllogisms of the Second Figure
17. Syllogisms of the Third Figure
18. Exceptive Syllogisms [derived] from Connective [Conditionals]
19. Exceptive Syllogisms [derived] from Disjunctive [Conditionals]
20. Composite Syllogisms
21. Syllogism by reductio ad absurdum
22. Disclosure of the character of Induction
23. Disclosure of the character of Analogy
24. The Way of the Dialecticians in Proving the Absent from the Present
25. Explication of the Form and Matter of the Syllogism
26. Exposition of the types of Primitive Premises in Syllogisms
27. Explication of the Status of these Premises
28. Further Comment on the Account of Demonstration
29. The Types of Problems in the Demonstrative Sciences
30. Explanation of the term Essential as used in the Premises of Demonstrative
[Sciences]
31. The [various] types of Principles of Demonstration and that which is Predicate in
them
32. Exposition of the character of Demonstrative Syllogisms
33. Explication of the types of Scientific Questions
34. Directives giving Protection against Fallacies
_=.= :_,.==. sbI - BrAe

ii
.- '+-', (16)
,- .- '+-', , (17)
`--- _-'-`-- '+-', (18)
`---- _-'-`-- '+-', (19)
- '+-', - (20)
-'= ', (21)
--- '= ,- (22)
'`- '= ,- (23)
-'- -'- - ., - ',-= - (24)
'- ', , -, ', (25)
'+-', - ,-, '---- '+--- ,-'- (26)
''''= -, '---- (27)
'- --= - - --,- (28)
_'- '+-'= .-'-- '- (29)
=- ,-- _ --,' _'- '---- - (30)
,- ,-=- '- - ' '- '-- '- (31)
_'- '+-', '= ,-'- (32)
'+--- -, _-'= -'=- (33)
-- _-- '='- '+-, (34)
D~ ~~ ~nishn~ ~~ ~meh
1
Praise and glory upon the Lord, the Creator, the Bestower of reason
Blessings upon His elected messenger, Muhammad, the chosen,
and upon his household and companions

[Preface]
The great command of our lord the just prince, the assisted [by God] and triumphant,
the pillar of religion Al al-Dawla honor of the nation, crown of the people Ab
Jafar Muhammad, son of Doshmanzir, [2] my master, the Commander of the Faithful
long be his life, prosperous his fortune, and may his kingdom increase came to me, the
bondsman and servant of his court, who have attained in his service all my wishes
security, grandeur, eminence, fulfillment, engagement in science and [residence in his]
proximity that I, the servant of this grand court, must compose a book in the Persian
language in which I gather together, with utmost brevity, the principles and [main] points
of five sciences from the sciences of wisdom of the ancients:
(i) The science of Logic, which is the science of the balance.
[3] (ii) The science of Physics, which is the science of those things that can be seen
with the senses and which are in motion and change.
(iii) The science of Astronomy and the structure of the universe: the character
[and] form of the motion of the heavens and the stars, so that it becomes revealed
how the truth of this could be known.
(iv) The science of Music: explication of the cause of the consonance and
dissonance of sounds and the composition of melodies.
(v) The science of that which is outside of nature.
BrAe
1
Ai eja fBrbI iBfjE fAfa j sBNm pBm
. AiB OI A jI ,v fZ fl jJB jI eie

[f]

fA fAfz ,iv ,f eB ,B fAfa ilI Bj
AjA /iBlqe IfZ jU IA A XBM Ajb [2]
fI I fE ,lA jI sBqeB ,kj ObI ,eBI kAie sBfk
A kA :sa BB Ofa ifA ANB , Bie eBa
fBI ;NqAe el I NaAej OB q ilI
BuA ifA ie miBI vM IBN iAilI oV E eBa
.iBvNaA OBI ,iE ej Br OY B kA W BN

/.OmkAjM
,fe fBrI oZI OmBl E PBJ e [3]
.fAtej sJU ifA
BiBNm BBmE sJU Piu BY B eB PD m
.NnAe E OY OnBrI fAekBI B
.BZ eB BkAE kBmB kBm KJm ekBI m iB
.OmA OJ kA jI E V

D~ ~~ ~nishn~ ~~ ~meh
2
It was so resolved that upon completion of the science of logic, one contrive [4] to make
a beginning from the superior science, and [from there] proceed gradually to the inferior
sciences, contrary to the established custom and habit. If, therefore, at some point there
should be no alternative other than to refer to one of the inferior sciences, reference will
be made.

So although I servant that I am did not consider myself [to be] of the level of this
science, but regarded it as surpassing my capacity, [still] I deemed that if I should comply
with and obey the command of my benefactor, compliance would issue in a favorable
outcome. [Thus] I trusted in my Creator and applied myself to obeying the command.

BrAe
2
fE ej /Y , kA fE NaAej eBNA iBNaA B [4]
E bI ,fE fq jk BI WifNI ,eq ej jI kA kBE
B kA I OAY kA eJ iB BU jA o .OmA PeB mi
.fE ej OAY ,jk

Ai A ,NnAf A BB Ai Nra f j ,eBa o
O Bj OB ejI B ,fe sa if kA lA
iBfjE jI ej M ;eiE iBI M OB NnVa jI ,jI sa
/.fq r iAejI BjI sa
D~ ~~ ~nishn~ ~~ ~meh part I: Logic
3
Exposition of the Purpose and Utility in the Science of Logic
[5] Knowledge is of two kinds: one is conception (in Arabic called taawwur), e.g. if
someone says man or fairy or angel (or whatever is similar to this), you
understand, conceive and grasp [what he means by this]. The second [kind] is assent, e.g.
when you assent that fairy exists, or that man is under command or whatever is
similar to this; and this in Arabic is called tadq.

Now, each of these two is of two kinds. [6] One [kind] is that which can be grasped by
thought; and there is no alternative [here], for it can [only] be elicited through inquiry by
way of reasoning; for example, conceiving and apprehending the whatness of soul, or for
example, assenting to and affirming the immortality of soul.
The other [kind] is that we conceive [something] and assent to it, neither by means of
thought nor by the inquiry of reason, but rather: (a) we know it by primary reason: e.g.
we know that any [number of] things [that are] equal to one thing (in that each one of
them is equal to it) are also equal to one another; [7] (b) or [we know it] by the senses:
e.g. we know that the sun is bright; (c) or we have received [our conceptions and
affirmations] from the great and the wise, such as from the author of religious laws and
the imms; (d) or [our conceptions and affirmations] are a thing on which the agreement
of men rests and upon which our upbringing has been based: e.g. we say, lying is
disgraceful, or one ought not to do injustice; (e) or in another respect that will be
mentioned later.
Everything whose conception or affirmation must be elicited by thought, requires that
prior to it we know something else, so that by means of this we may know the unknown.
[8] An example of this in the case of conception is: if we do not know what man is, and
someone explains to us, saying, man is an animal that speaks, we would first need to
have known, and conceived of, the meaning of animal and the meaning of speaks.
We would then know what we did not know [in regard to] the meaning of man.
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
3
ifA fB ifA ~j e kBI [5]
jA B ,fAa ivM kBNI fmi ifA :OmA e NnAe
ivM M (fB fI j ) Nqj B j B ej :f n
jI B ,fj e [.fAa fI ] IB ifA
kBNI Ai A ;fB fI j ,#OnBj jk ej$ #On j$
.f fvM

iB ,NBifA fBq rfBI OnE /.fA e e j A [6]
l I fmi ifA B ,eiE BVI fBq eja Ai kA KI Ai A ,eJ
.I ej fvM ,Ai ejBI fj B ; ej ivM ,Ai

KI rfA OU kA ,jI I ,IBifA Ai A OnE je
) l BI fqBI jIAjI j Ae B ,Ae eja BI :I ,eja
Ae B ,oZI B /.fI jIAjI l je BI (fI f j [7]
KYBu kA B BBAe BilI kA qBI Njh B .OmA qi LBNE
jI B tij ,eI jI ej BMA fqBI l B .BBA BNjq
jI B .#ej fBJ Nm$ #OmA Oqk ie$ : B ,fqBI eI
.fE ej eB jNnm Bi kA je

fBI kA s ,eiE fBI BVI rfBI I fvM B ivM j
/.AfI I Ai NnAeB BM qBI NnAe je l
eI ej fqBJ NnAe Ai B jA :E - ivM LBI ie A BR [8]
Onb B fBI ,#B eI iBU ej$ f ,fB kBI Ai B n
o ;BrBI qBI fmi ifA B ,iBU qBI NnAe
.AfI ej kA qBI NnAf E BE
4
An example of this in the case of affirmation and assent is: if we do not know that the
world is created, and someone explains to us, saying, the world is [endowed] with form,
and whatever is [endowed] with form is created, we would need to have affirmed and
known [beforehand] that the world is [endowed] with form, as well as affirmed and
known [9] that whatever is [endowed] with form is created. We would then know what
we did not know [before] about the createdness of the world.

Hence anything that we do not know but wish to know, we will know by the things that
we have first known; [i.e.] whatever is unknown [to us] comes to be known by the
known. However, not every known leads the way to every unknown, since for every
unknown there exists an appropriate known, through which [that unknown] may be
known. [Moreover,] there exists a path by which it is possible to proceed from the
known to the unknown, so that [the unknown] comes to be known.

Now, the science of logic is the science in which it becomes evident what the modes are
of the coming-to-be-known of the unknown through the known, viz., which are the true
[modes]; which are the ones close to the truth; which are false; and of how many [10]
kinds each are.
The science of logic is the science of the balance, while the other sciences are the
sciences of profit and loss. The salvation of man is through the purity of soul, and the
purity of soul consists in the conception of the beings within it and in keeping distant
from the defilement of nature. The way to both of these is through science. But any
science that is not weighed in the balance [of logic] is not certain, hence is not truly a
science. Consequently, there is no alternative but to learn the science of logic.
Now, these sciences of the ancients have the character that the one who studies them does
not at first know what utility there is in that which he is studying; then, at the end, he
realizes all at once and grasps its utility and purpose. Therefore, the reader of this book
must not lose heart on hearing things that do not disclose their utility quickly.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
4
fqBJ NnAe Ai B jA :E - fvM fj LBI ie A BR
,Omiv B$ f fB kBI Ai B n ,OmA TfZ B
NnAe qBI fj B fBI .#eI TfZ eI iv j
TfZ eI iv j /NnAe qBI fj l .Omiv B [9]
.AfI B QfZ BY kA qBI NnAf E BE o .eI

NnAe Ai BrA A Ae BlI ,AfI Aa Af j o
ejI Ai NnAe j .eq NnAe NnAfI ,eI NnAeB j .qBI
AiA fBq kA , iaifA On NnAe Ai NnAeB j ;NnAeB jI
.eq NnAe BM NnAeBI NnAe kA fq fBq Ai AfI OnAi NnAe

NnAeB fq NnAe BY eq ff ifA OmA E
,eI OZI el eI Af ,eI OZI eI Af ,NnAfI
.eI /f j ,eI eI Af [10]

iBNmi .OmA Bk em je B ,OmkAjM
ifI , ifA OmBNn NnI PivI BU B ,OmA BU BI ej
kAjNI rAe j ,OmA sAfI e j fI Ai ,OJ sE kA eI
NaE kA On iB o .eJ sAe OZI o ,eJ ,eJ Nbm
.

fAf iB BI fkE OnE OuBa AjBr B A
E fBI ,fAfI iBJI jaFI o ,ekE E ifA On fB
er M e Ai LBN A fAa fBI o . ~jI fmi ifA
.fB Ai fB ek Bl frI
5
THE BEGINNING OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC
1. Elucidation of that which is called Single among Expressions and Concepts
[11] [Knowing single and composite expressions:] It must be known that expressions are
of two kinds: One is called single [i.e. when none of the parts of the expression signify
any part of the meaning], such as when you say Zaid or Muhammad, or as when you
say man or wise. The other is called composite or compound [i.e. when some of the
parts of the expression signify some part of the meaning], such as when you say man is
wise, or the wise man. As long as the character of single expressions is not known,
the character of composite expressions will not be known.

2. Elucidation of Universal and Particular Expressions
Every single expression is either universal or particular. [12] A universal [expression] is
one that can apply with the same meaning to many things equally: e.g. man, for man
applies with the same meaning to Zaid, Amr and Bakr. If it happens that [a universal
expression] has been applied to one thing, you can imagine applying it to many things,
for from that meaning you can, by the imagination, think of many things; for instance,
you can think of many suns and many moons. A particular [expression] is one that
cannot apply with the same meaning to other than a single thing, and you cannot apply
that same meaning of it to anything else: e.g. [13] Zaid, for the meaning of Zaid
belongs to none other than Zaid. Hence if you call another thing Zaid, you do so with
another meaning and not with the same meaning.

Now, the devotees of science are not concerned with the character of particular
expressions or particular concepts; their concern is rather with universal concepts,
[though] there is no doubt that every universal has [a number of] particulars [subsumed]
under it.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
5
kBE [11]
B B kA fAa ej E ej ff (1)
.eI e fE NnAe fBI .Kj ej NnAe
AlUA kA zI jI AlUA kA zI OnE E]fAa ej Ai
.#BAe$ #ej$ B #fZ$ #fk$ B [f Oe
kA zI jI AlUA kA zI OnE E] fAa Kj Ai
.#BAe ej$ B #OmBAe ej$ : B [f Oe AlUA
.fB NnAe Kj B BY ,fB NnAe ej B BY BM

lU ej ff (2)
Bl jI I eI E /.lU B ,eI B ej j [12]
fk jI I ej ,#ej$ B ,jIAjI fNA fBq iBnI
M M ,eI eBNA l jI eI B jA .jI jI jjI ,fNA
E kA AM I ,A iBnI Bl jI Ai A ej AM
,iBnI BIBNE frfA AM B .frfA iBnI Bl
,eI Ai l lU fBr I eI E lU .iBnI BIBNB
,#fk$ : B fA je ljI Ai B AN
je I ,Aa fk Ai je l jA o .eJ Ai fk lU fk
. BI ,Aa

I ,lU B lU BA BZI On r Ai A
BlU Ai j On q .OmA BI BrA q
.eI jk ifA
6
3. Exposition of Essential and Accidental Universals
The universal, in relation to its particulars, is either essential or accidental. The essential
[universal] is that which, when you know its meaning and the meaning of its particular,
you of necessity know [the following] three factors: (i)You know that [the given]
particular has the meaning [conveyed by the universal]. For instance, when you know
what animal is, what man is, what number is, and what four is, you cannot fail to know
that man is animal, and likewise you cannot fail to know that four [14] is number.
However, if instead of animal and number you put existent or white, it is possible for you
not to know whether man exists, or four exists, or whether man is white or not. (ii) You
know that first the essential concept (meaning) must exist, in order that it [can then apply
to] a particular thing. For instance, a thing must first be animal, in order that it [can] then
be man; and it must first be number, in order that it [can] then be four; and it must first be
man, in order that it [can] then be Zaid. [15] (iii) You know that nothing has given that
concept (meaning) to the particular, rather, it has it through itself. For instance, you
rightly know that nothing has made man animal, or made four number; otherwise, if that
thing did not exist, there could be a man that is non-animal, and similarly there could be a
four that is non-number, and this is impossible.

The meaning of our saying, something made something [else] such-and-such, is that
the thing was not in itself that way, but that something from the outside rendered it thus.
Now, if a thing cannot be other than the way [it is], then another thing has not made it
such. Indeed, that thing which made man, made [therewith] animal; but it did not make
man [16] animal, for man is himself animal, four is itself number, and blackness is itself
color. And this is not in the way whiteness is for man, for there is something that makes
man white [both] within his nature and outside of his nature. Nor is it in the way
existence is for man, for there must be something which gives man existence.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
6
yj MAg e kBI (3)
eI E MAg .yj B eI MAg B Ai sa BlU j
:Ej AfI BY m ,AfI lU ,AfI
AfI B ,On E Ai lU E AfI E
AN ,eI iB ,eI iBq ,eI ej ,eI AY
.OmiBq /iB Af AN B ,OnAY ej Af [14]
ej AM , fm B , eU iBq AY fI jA
.On B Omfm ej B ,On iB B ,On ej Af
E BM eI fBI OmA MAg E Onb AfI E je
ej A BE BM eI AY l Onb fBI B .eI Ai lU l E
BM eI ej fBI ,eI iB A BE BM eI iBq Onb fBI ,eI
eAf E Ai lU E l AfI E m / .eI fk A BE [15]
Ai ej l AfI OmifI B .eI ea kA E Ai A I ,eI
AYB eI ej ,eJ l E jA A ,ej iBq Ai iB ,ej AY
.eI BZ A ,iBqB eI iB B

ebI l E eI E ,#ej Ai l l$ B iBN
l fBr jA ,ej l Ai A jI kA ,eJ ea
Ai ej l E iE .eI ej Ai A l o ,eI lU ea
ea ej ,ej AY / Ai ej ;ejI Ai AY ,ejI [16]
B A .OmA ea Bm OmiBq ea iB OnAY
J ifA f fm Ai ej eI l ,Ai ej fm OmA
fBI l ,Ai ej j Nn OnB ; J kA jI
.fe Nn Ai ej
7
Hence every concept that embraces these three conditions is an essential concept, and
anything that lacks any one of these conditions is accidental. [Yet] there is an accidental
[characteristic] which can never be separated from the thing, not even by the imagination:
for instance, evenness [cannot be separated] from thousand; or from triangle [one cannot
separate] its three angles being equal to [17] two right angles (the explanation of which
will be made known later). Or for instance, [one cannot separate] from man [the ability
to] laugh by nature. However, these are characteristics which are subsequent to the
reality of the thing; and of this, too, we must speak in more detail.

Man possesses two characteristics that are analogous: one essential, the other accidental.
As for the essential [characteristic], it is [having the faculty of] speech/reason, and its
explanation is that man has a soul [capable of] speech that soul from which comes
speaking, discernment and the characteristics belonging to man. The other, the accidental
[characteristic], is [his being capable of] laughter, and its explanation is that mans
nature is such that when he sees or hears something perplexing [and] strange, he becomes
perplexed, [18] and if there be no hindrance from either [his] nature or disposition, he
may laugh. [However,] prior to these two characteristics, it is necessary that the soul first
exist, in order that man exist. So when this soul becomes coupled with body, and man
becomes man, then do laughing and wonderment come about. Thus the later
characteristic [only] comes about when man has become man; accordingly, you can say
that man must first possess a human soul in order to become human, and in order that he
may be [capable of] laughing by nature. But you cannot say that he must first be [capable
of] laughing by nature, in order that he [then] have a human soul and become human.
Consequently, the former characteristic is in reality essential, and the second
characteristic, even though it is never separated from man, is not essential but is
accidental.

But as for your saying Zaid is sitting, or is sleeping, or is old, or is young there
is no doubt that these are accidental, although one changes more quickly and another
remains longer. [19]
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
7
BY kA j .eI MAg ,eI Ai Y m A j o
elajI lj fBr eI yj .eI yj ,eJ Ai Y
m eI ,SR kA B NU ,iAl kA B ,I l ,l kA
kA B ,eq NnAe A jnM jNnm B e / f A Ak [17]
.fI l OY om fA BNu BrA ,JI Bfa ,ej
.I jNYjrI l Ai A fBI

.yj e MAg :el jfI ,OmA Ou e Ai ej j
,eI B bm BU Ai eI E jnM ,#B$ B ,MAg BA
,yj je .fE A kA ej BuBa lM N bm BU E
l OnB J ifA OnE jnM ,#YBy$ B
J kA eJ fiAekBI jA /.fE Oq Ai ,eq B fI Kj Oq [18]
eJI BU fBI Ou e A kA jNr ;efbI fBq ,a kA B
,eq ej ej ,eq OU M BI BU A o .eJI ej BM ,Onb
ej fE BE u nm o .fE iAe Oq Bfa BE
ej BU Ai ej fBI Onb N AM Ai J A kA ,eq ej
fBI Onb N AN .JI fqBI Afa BM ,eq ej BM eI
r u o .eq ej fqBI ej BU Ai A BM JI fqBI Afa
MAg elbjI ej kA lj f j e u OZI OmA MAg
.OmA yj ,On

B ,#Omj$ B ,#OmA Na$ B ,#OmA Nnr fk$ E BA
eejjI jMek f j ,OmA yj On q ,#OnAU$
.fBI jMje

8
4. Exposition of Genus, Species, Difference, Property and Common Accident
There are altogether five [kinds of] universal terms: three essential, two accidental. The
essential is of two kinds:
(a) The first is that when you ask in regard to [some] things, what are they?,
seeking [to learn] by that question the reality of their meaning, answer is given to that by
an essential term. For instance, if you ask what are man, ox and horse?, it will be
answered, they are animals; and if you ask what are blackness, whiteness and
redness?, it will be answered, they are colors; and if you ask what are ten, five and
three?, it will be answered, they are numbers. Similarly, if it is asked what are Zaid,
Amr and Kh~led?, it will be answered, they are men. [20] Hence animal, color,
number, and man fall within the answer [to the question] of the whatness of these
things; in Arabic this is called the answer to m~ huwa? [What is?]
(b) The other [kind of essential universal term] is that given as answer when you
ask about the which-ness of each [thing] in itself; e.g. [if] you ask which animal is
man?, it will be replied, the rational [animal]. Thus rational is the answer to [the
question] which is? regarding man; in Arabic it is said in answer to [the question] ayyu
shayin? [Which thing is it?]. Or for instance, [if] it is asked, four is which number?,
it will be replied that [number] which on being halved twice arrives at one.

[21] Everything which is an essential universal, and is the response to [the question]
Which thing is it?, is called difference (fal). As for that essential universal which is in
response to [the question] What is? (m~ huwa?), it is more general and more particular
[than the former]. For instance, body is more general than animal, but more particular
than substance; animal is more general than man, but more particular than body;
similarly, number is more particular than quantity, but more general than even (for
example); even is more particular than number, but more general than four; and four is
more particular than even, but more general than this four or that four. Hence everything
that is a more general universal is the genus of a more particular [universal], and
everything that is a more particular universal is the species of a more general [universal].

There may be a thing that is both genus and species; [22] and there may be a thing that is
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
8
B ~j uBa v oU ekBI (4) [19]
:fqBI e MAg .yj e MAg m :fA W BA
smj AfI #?fA $ Bl kA mjI eI E ,Onb
mjI B ,fe MAg AfI LAU ,Aa BrA OY
.#fA AY$ fe LAU #?fA KmA B ej$
.#fA $ fe LAU #?fA ajm fm Bm$ mjI
.#fiBq$ fe LAU #?fI m W e$ mjI
fe LAU #?fI fBa j fk$ fmjI
LAU ifA #ej$ #iBq$ #$ #AY$ o / .#fA ej$ [20]
.fAa #? B$ LAU Ai A kBNI .fNA Bl A l
;eI E LAU ,sea ifA mjI j Af kA eI E
#B$ o .#B$ f #?OmA AY Af ej$ mjI B
B .f #?q A$ LAU kBNI eI ej Af LAU
/.fmi I ej iBIfI E f #?OmiBq Af iB$ fmjI

E BA .fAa v AjE ,eI #?q A$ LAU eI MAg j [21]
:B ,jNuBa eI jNB kA ,eI #? B$ LAU ifA MAg
OmA jNB AY ;j kA OmA jNuBa ,AY kA OmjNB nU
f kA OmA jNuBa iBq ,nU kA OmA jNuBa ej kA
.iB kA OmA jNB iBq kA OmA jNuBa OU ;R OU kA OmA jNB
j o .iB E iB kA OmA jNB OU kA OmA jNuBa iB
.eI jNB ,eI jNuBa j ,eI jNuBa oU ,eI jNB

;oI eI oU eI l /. eI oU eI l [22]
eI l .f j :BBR A ifA B ,eJ l jk
9
genus only, and is not a species below any [other] thing: e.g., in the [above] examples,
substance and quantity. Or there may be a thing that is species only, and that is not the
genus of any species because there is no essential universal below it in answer to [the
question] what is? (m~ huwa?); rather, below it are only particulars, such as man, four,
blackness for blackness does not differ from blackness by nature, as does color from
color: for color differs from color as does blackness from whiteness and is opposed to it
with an essential difference. Blackness, however, does not differ from blackness
substantially or [by essential] difference, but [23] by extrinsic factors: e.g. one is the
blackness of the raven, another the blackness of ink: raven and ink are things extrinsic to
the nature of blackness. The existence of blackness in the raven is not an essential state
for blackness, even though it cannot now be separated from the raven; however, in
imagination it could be that this same exact blackness did not exist in the raven but in
some other thing.

In sum, particulars subsumed under [the same] species differ from one another by
something accidental; e.g. Zaid differs from Amr in that Zaid is, for example, taller,
whiter, older, the son of someone else, [24] and from another town and these are all
accidental characteristics.

It has thus become clear what the character is of the species that does not become genus;
and this is called the Species of species, i.e. the species of all the species that are below it.
Hence it is evident that the essential universal is either genus, or species or difference.

As for the accidental universal, either it belongs to a single universal alone (just as
laughter belongs to man), and this is called property; or it belongs to more than one
universal (just as movement belongs both to man and to another thing, or blackness
belongs both to the raven and to another thing); [25] and this is called common accident.

Consequently, every universal term is either genus (e.g. animal), or species (e.g. man in
relation to animal), or difference (e.g. rational), or property (e.g. laughing), or common
accident (e.g. mover, white, black).
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
9
LAU ifA MAg jk Ajk ,eJ oU ;oI eI
B ej B ,oI fI PBlU jk I ,eJ #? B$
JI eiAf AfU E je Bm kA Bm ,Bm B iB
,fm kA Bm eiAe AfU E kA Ajk , kA
,v jI eiAf AfU Bm kA Bm BA .eiAe OBb MAg vI
.eAf Bm eI Ak Bm B ,jI BBZI / [23]
OnBY Ak ifA Bm eI ,Bm J kA jI fA Bl eAf Ak
I . Ak kA fq fAN AfU A f j ,MAg ,Ai Bm j
.eI je l ifA ,eJ Ak ifA I Bm NnBq

,fiAe yj lI AfU je kA ,fI jk BlU VI
jMj ,R eI jMfm jMkAie fk eiAe AfI AfU j kA fk B
.fA yj Bu A .je jq kA /eI je n jn [24]

,fAa AA Ai A er oU eI fq Af o
eI oU B MAg fE ff o .fA jk B
.v B eI B

Ai A ,Ai ej Bfa B ,eI Ai j BM B ,yj BA
l Ai ej fJU B eI Ai kA sI B B ,fAa uBa
.fAa B ~j Ai A /Ai je l Ai Ak Bm ,Ai je [25]

;AY kA ej ,eI B ;AY ,eI oU B j o
,eI B ~j B ;YBy ,eI uBa B ;B ,eI v B
.Bm fm fJU B
10
5. Explication of the Character of Definition and Description
In definition, the purpose is to discern the reality of a things essence; [here] the
distinction [of the thing from other things] follows of itself. In description, [on the other
hand,] the purpose is to denote a thing, even though its essence is not really discerned; the
very denoting [of the thing] is to distinguish [it from other things].

Definition, [26] then, [involves] the essential characteristics of a thing. Defining a thing
consists in your taking the genus that is closest to it (e.g., animal in the case of man), and
then supplying its essential difference (e.g., rational). Thus, you say: man is a rational
animal; this, then, is the definition of man. Likewise, when you say: four is a number
which upon being halved twice arrives at one.

As for description, it is, for instance, such as when you say: man is a laughing, crying,
wide-nailed animal; or four is a number which, when multiplied by itself, sixteen
results; or four is a number which results from the multiplication of two by itself.

Now, it is necessary that in definition and description four kinds of error not be
committed. All four [of these errors] fall under a single notion, namely: every unknown
thing that you wish to make known, you must [make known] by means of a thing which
is more known than it; otherwise [27] there would be no utility [in your making it
known].

As regards those four errors that split off from this notion:
(a) One is that of making something known by itself; e.g., in the definition of
time it is said, Time is the duration of motion. But time and duration are the same
thing, and whoever [finds] the definition of time difficult, will also [find] the definition of
duration difficult: his asking What is time? is [tantamount to] his asking what is
duration?

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
10
mi fY BY ej Af (5)
.fE JNI ea AfU ,OmA l PAg OY NaBq ,fY ifA ~j
OZI PAg f j ,lI OmA eAe Br ,mi ifA ~j
.eI Ai ej AfU ,eAe Br ea .fB NaBq

jM el eI E ej fY .eI l MAg Bu kA fY /o [26]
,iBI MAg v BE ,Ai ej AY B ,jI l oU
.eI ej fY A o ;#OmA B AY ej$ o ,B B
.#fmi I ej iBIfI OmA iBq iB$ B

,#aB ,Bj ,Afa OnAY ej$ eI B mi BA
B ,#fE elBq Nra ifA Ljy kA OmA iBq iB$ B
.#fE On Nra ifA e Ljy kA OmA iBq$

ifA iB j ,fN Ba iB mi fY ifA fBI
Aa eI NaBqB l j fBI : OnE E BA .fNA
.eJ fB / A ,eI jM NaBq kA lI , NaBq [27]

:fBq A kA Ba iB E BA
f Bk fY ifA B ,fBmBq ebI Ai l OnE
Ai oE .eI l Bk Pf #OmA sJU Pf Bk$
fmj ,eI r Pf fY Ai A ,eI r Bk fY
#?On Pf$ eI fmj #?On Bk$

11
(b) Another, is that of making one thing known by means of something [else]
which is similar to it in obscurity and clarity; e.g., it is said, blackness is that color
which is the opposite of whiteness; but this is no better than [28] when it is said,
whiteness is that color which is the opposite of blackness, for blackness and whiteness
are of the same order in terms of obscurity and clarity.
(c) Third, is that of making one thing known by means of another thing that is
more obscure; e.g., in the definition of fire it is said: [fire] is that body which resembles
the soul. Yet soul is much more obscure than fire.
(d) Fourth, is that of making a thing known by means of that by which it becomes
recognized; e.g., in the definition of the sun it is said: the sun is the star which emerges
in the day. Thus, the sun is made known by means of day; yet it is not possible for
anyone [29] to recognize day except by means of the sun, for in reality day is the time in
which the sun has emerged. Hence if sun is difficult [to define], so too would day be, or
rather, more so.
These four conditions are extremely important in definitions and descriptions in order
that error does not occur.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
11
eI l E ,fBmBq lI Ai l OnE je
fm fy OmA E Bm$ f B ,Af fqI
fy OmA E fm$ f E /kA On jNA A .#OmA [28]
.Af fq ifA fABBU I fm Bm ,#OmA Bm

B ,fBmBq jM fq kA lI Ai l OnE m
iBnI o ,#fB oI OmA nU E $ : sME fY ifA f
.sME kA OmA jM fq

,eq NaBq I l FI fBmBrI Ai l OnE iB
.#fEjI kjI OmA iBNm E LBNE$ : LBNE fY ifA f B
,LBNFI A fmBrI Ai ki /n fBr ,fBmBq kjI Ai LBNE o [29]
o .eI fE jI ifA LBNE eI Bk E ki OZI Ajk
.eI jM r I ,eI r ki ,eI r LBNE

.fN BM ej mi fY ifA OmA Obm jq iB A

12
6. Elucidation of the meaning of Noun, Verb and Particle
Every single expression is either a noun, verb, or particle (in Arabic noun is called ism,
while as for verb, the grammarians call it fil and the logicians kalima). Noun (ism) and
verb (kalima) both have complete meaning. For example, if someone asks, who did you
see?, and you reply, Zaid, the answer is complete; or if someone asks, what did Zaid
do?, and you reply, he left, the answer is complete. But particle does not have a
complete meaning: for example, if it is asked, where is Zaid?, [30] and you reply to
or on or in, it would be no answer as long as you do not say to the house or in the
mosque or on the roof.
However, the difference between noun (ism) and verb (kalima) is that noun conveys
meaning, but does not convey the temporal aspect of that meaning; e.g., man or
honesty. The verb (kalima), on the other hand, conveys [both] meaning and the
temporal aspect of that meaning; e.g., he hit, which signifies [the act of] hitting and
that it was in past time. And likewise when you say he may hit. Also, [the verb]
always signifies the person with whom the meaning is [associated], like the hitter or
the crawler. However, that person or that thing is not specified so that you know which
it is.
[31] If someone asks, Are yesterday (d ), last year (p~r), of last year (p~rnh)
nouns or verbs?, the answer is that they are nouns. If he then says that each of these
three signifies time and must [therefore] be a verb, we would reply: not everything that
signifies time is a verb; for [a verb] must first signify a meaning, and then signify the
time of that meaning. For example, [when] you say he hit, you signify [first, the act of]
hitting, and then the time of that hitting. Now, our saying yesterday (d ), has the core
of its meaning in time, [but] it is not such that it signifies a meaning and then the time of
that meaning.
This much that has been said about single expressions is sufficient. We must now speak
of composite expressions. [32]

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
12
jY s B ej ff (6)
,fAa mA Ai B kBNI ;jY B ,s B ,eI B B ,ej j
Ai e j mA .fAa B fAa BZ Ai sj
,#Ai fk$ : #?fe Aj$ :fmj n jA B ,eI BM
LAU ,#OjI$ : #?ej fk$ : fmj n jA eI BM LAU
/#?OmBV fk$ :f jA B ,eJ BM Ai jY BA .eI BM
BM eJ LAU #ifA$ B #jI$ B #L$ : [30]
.#BI jI$ B ,#fVn ifA$ B ,#BbI$

jI eJ e , jI eI e mA : OnE mA B j
jI eI e BA .#Nmie$ #ej$ B , E
E jI ek jI eI e ,#elI$ : B , E
jI eI e r .#flI$ B .eI Nqh Bk ifA
l E B oE .fla B fk : eI Ai A E n
/ .OnAf Ae ,eJ

eI E LAU #? B OnB iB iB e$ : fmj n jA [31]
,eI fBI Bk jI OmA e m j A f jA o .OnB
jI eI e fBI Onb ,eI Bk jI eI e j
jI e ,#elI$ B , E Bk jI eI e BE
,OnBk s o #e$ B iBN ,ek E Bk jI BE ek
.sBk jI eI e BE jI eI e OnB

B ifA A .eI fnI ej B ifA fE N iAf A
/ .N fBI bm Kj
13
7. Explication of what a Proposition is
From these single expressions, diverse compositions arise. Among the latter, there is one
kind that we must now [consider], namely, the kind that is [variously] called proposition
(qadya), [declaratory] statement or assertoric speech. This is that which, on hearing it,
you may say it is true, or it is false. For example: if someone says, for man, there is
reward and punishment, you can say that it is so; and if he says, man is a flyer, you
can say that it is not so. [33] If someone says, whenever the sun rises, it is day, you can
say that it is so; and if he says, whenever the sun rises the stars are visible, you can say
that it is not so. If he says, number is either odd or even, you can say that it is so; and if
he says, number is either black or white, you can say that it is not so. But if someone
says, teach me something or some problem, the answer to him in no way consists in
your saying it is so, or it is not so. [34] [Similarly,] if he says, come with me to the
mosque, the answer to him is not that it is so, and you spoke the truth, or it is not
so, and you lied.

8. Explication of the Types of Propositions
Propositions are of three types:
(a) One is called Predicative, e.g., man is an animal, or man is not an animal.
(b) One is called Connective Conditional, e.g., since it is like this, it is like this;
and if it is like that, it is like that; and it is not [the case] that since it is like this or like
that, it is like this or like that.
(c) One is called Disjunctive Conditional, e.g., either it is like this [35] or it is
like that; or it is not [the case] that it is either like this or like that.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
13
eI z ej Af (7) [32]
A Ai B BrA kA .fE KjM B ,ej B A kA
kBU bm fAa jJa fAa z AjE OmA E A ,fBI
fBq #OmA OmAi$ fBq rI eI E A .fAa
AM ,#OnIB LAQ Ai ej$f n jA :E BR .#Onie$
N AM ,#OmA fj ej$ f jA ,OmA N
N AM ,#eI ki ,fEjI LBNE B j$ f n jA /.OmA [33]
,#fI Af BiBNm ,fEjI LBNE B j$ :f jA .OmA
,#OU B OmA B B ,iBq$ :f jA .OmA N AM
,#fm B eI Bm B ,iBq$ :f jA .OmA N AM
An B l Aj$:f n jA BA .OmA N AM
$ B #OmA $ E eJ I LAU ,#kBI
#OmA $ eJ E LAU ,#E fVnI BI$ :f jA /.#OmA [34]
.#N ie$ #OmA $ B ,#N OmAi$

z On ej Af (8)
:fA n m B z
.#iBU On ej$ B #OmiBU ej$ B ,fAa Y Ai
;eI ,eI $ : B ,fAa vN jq Ai
.#eI B B ,eI B B eI $ ;#eI B ,eI B jA
B ;#eI B B /eI B$ : B ,fAa v jq Ai [35]
.#eI B B eI B On$ :

14
9. Explication of the Predicative Proposition:
Affirmation, Negation, Universality, Particularity
and whatever pertains to it

The characteristic of the predicative proposition is that through it we make a judgment
that something is something, or that something is not something: e.g., we say, man is an
animal, or man is not an animal. That [proposition in] which we say is, is called
affirmative, and that [proposition in] which we say is not, is called negative. That part
[of the proposition] about which the judgment is made (such as, in this example, man)
is called the subject; [36] and that part [of the proposition] by which the judgment is
[conveyed] viz., that it is or is not is called the predicate (such as, in this example,
animal).

Each of these two [sc. subject and predicate] is sometimes a simple expression: e.g.,
man is an animal; and sometimes a composite expression: e.g., whoever does not
digest his food must have a sickness in his stomach; for, [in the latter case,] the whole of
our saying [whoever] does not digest his food is the subject, and the whole of our
saying must have a sickness in his stomach is the predicate. However, it is possible
that you replace each of these two phrases with a simple expression: thus you may
designate the person who has not digested his food, A, [37] and the person whose
stomach has a sickness, B; therefore, [if] you then say A is B, it will have the same
meaning. Or it may be that of these two parts one is a single [expression], the other a
composite.

If someone asks, Our saying: Zaid is non-sighted or is not-at-home is it affirmative
or negative?, we would reply that it is affirmative, for non-sighted is as a whole a
single predicate: if you affirm it, the proposition would be affirmative; and if you negate
it, the proposition would be negative. Hence, since we said he is non-sighted, we
affirmed it by the term is. Consequently, the proposition became affirmative; [38] this
is called the Deviant Affirmative. But if we want [the proposition] to be negative, we
would say, Zaid is not sighted.
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
14
O Km LBVA Y z ej Af (9)
eI A iaifA E OlU
,OmA l l qBI ej Y ifA eI E Y z OuBa
AY ej$ B #OnAY ej$ : B ,On l l B
, #On$ AjE ,fAa KU , #On$ AjE .#On
,eI #ej$ BR ifA B ,OmjI Y kA iB E .fAa KBm
B (On B On )eI fI Y kA iB E /,fAa y [36]
.fAa Z ,eI #AY$ BR ifA

,#OnAY ej$ B ,fqBI ej B e kA j
NE Aj f ,eiA B Aj j$ B ,fqBI Kj B
,OmA y #eiA sB$ B iBN U BVE ,#fqBI fmi
fBq .OmA Z #fqBI fmi NE Ai f$ B iBN U
sB Ai oE fBq , U e kA j fI ej
B (L) fqBI fmi NE Ai tAf Ai oE /, B (A) eiA [37]
e kA fqBI .eiAe #OmA (L) (A)$ BE o .
.Kj eI ej iB

B OmA KU ,OmA BbI B ,OmBIB fk B iBN$ :f n jA
PBJQA jA ,OmA Z VI #BIB$ ,OmA KU : #?KBm
N o .eI KBm z s jA ,eI KU z s
Ai A fq / KU z o .ej PBJQA #OmA$ I ,#OmBIB$ [38]
.#BI On fk$ : ,eI KBm Aa jA .fAa f JU

15
Now, the difference between these two [propositions] is that if Zaid did not exist in the
world, you could say Zaid is not sighted, because that Zaid which does not exist, is not
sighted. But you could not say Zaid is non-sighted except when Zaid in fact exists. If
it is asked, Our saying: Zaid is not non-sighted is it affirmative or negative?, we
would reply that it is negative, because non-sighted is the predicate, and the term is
not has negated it. This is called Deviant Negative.

This having become known, one must [next] know that the subject [of a proposition] is
either a universal expression or a particular expression. [39] An example of a particular
subject is your saying, Zaid is a writer, or is not a writer. This is called a Singular or
Individual [proposition]; the first [example] is affirmative, the second negative.

But as for when the subject is universal, there are two alternatives.
(a) Either it is not made clear to how many the judgment [applies]: whether [it
applies] to all or to some e.g., when you say, Man is a mover, and do not say whether
all men or some men. This is called Indefinite Affirmative. And again, when you say,
Man is not a mover, and this is called Indefinite Negative.

(b) Or it is made clear [what] the quantity of the judgment is; this is called
Definite [proposition], [40] and the term indicating the quantity is called Sr. Definite
[propositions] are of four kinds:
(i) One is when the judgment applies affirmatively to all: e.g.,
Everything that is a man is an animal, or, every man is an animal. This is called the
Universal Affirmative [proposition] and its quantity-indicator (sr) are the terms
everything and every.
(ii) Another is when the judgment is applied to all negatively and by
denial: e.g., None [among] men is immortal. This is called the Universal Negative
[proposition] and its quantity-indicator (sr) is the term none.
(iii) Third is when the judgment is applied to some positively and by
affirmation: e.g., Some man is a writer. This is called the Particular Affirmative
[proposition], [41] and its quantity-indicator (sr) is the term some.
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
15
: fBq ,eJ BU ifA fk jA , OnE e j A B j
: fBr .eJ BI ,On fk E Ajk ,#BI On fk$
B iBN$ fmj jA .eI BVI fk BE A #OmBIB fk$
#BIB$ Ajk ,OmA KBm : #?KBm B OmA KU ,BIB On fk
.fAa f JBm Ai A ,Omej Ai A #On$ OmA Z

B eI B y fE NnAe fBI ,fE NnAe A
A ,#On jIe B OmjIe fk$ : E lU y BR /.lU [39]
.OmA KBm e OmA KU Nnb ;fAa vbq fAa uvb Ai

.eJ jI e kA eI y BA
: B ,ajI jI B ,OmA jI :Omf jI Y eI ej Af B
JU Ai A ;ej ajI B ej ,#OmA fJU ej$
.fAa JBm Ai A #fJU On ej$ : B .fAa

f jAf /,fAa ivZ Ai A ,Y f eI ej Af B [40]
:OmA iB ivZ .fAa im Ai
,eI ej j$ : B ,PBJQBI eI ej jI Y OnE
fAa KU Ai A ,#OnAY ej j$ : B ,#eI AY
.eI #j$ # j$ im
ej $ : B , KnI fqBI ej jI Y OnE je
.eI #$ im fAa KBm Ai A ,#On AfBU
ajI$ : B ,Nn PBJQBI fqBI ej ajI jI Y OnE m
.eI #ajI$ im /fAa KU lU Ai A ,#OmjIe ej [41]

16
(iv) Fourth is when the judgment is applied to some by denial and
negation: e.g., Some men are not writers. This is called the Particular Negative, and its
quantity-indicator (sr) is the expression someare not; it also has another quantity-
indicator, namely, not all, not everything, and not every. For when you say, Not
all men are writers, or not everything that is a man is a writer, or not every man is a
writer, you make a judgment of non-being, therefore it is negative; and you do not make
your judgment about all, because when you say not all, [42] it is possible that some
exist. Hence these statements that we [have just] noted are particular negative.

The judgment [borne by] an indefinite [proposition] is a particular judgment. For when
you say Man is such-and-such, your saying man may apply to all men, or it may
apply to [some] men, in that all men are men, and some men also are men. Hence, [the
statement applies] with certainty to some men, and with doubt to all men. Thus if
someone says, some men are such-and-such, it does not necessarily follow that some
others are contrary to that, because when all are, some are also. Consequently, the
judgment applying to some is not prevented from likewise applying to the others;
however, it applies with certainty to some, but with doubt to all.

[43] Thus, it has become evident that the judgment of an indefinite [proposition]
corresponds to the judgment of a particular [proposition]; and it has become evident that
predicative propositions are eight [in number]:
[FOUR INDEFINITE]:
1. Affirmative Singular;
2. Negative Singular;
3. Affirmative Indefinite;
4. Negative Indefinite;

FOUR DEFINITE:
5. Universal Affirmative;
6. Universal Negative;
7. Particular Affirmative;
8. Particular Negative.
Of these eight, the Singular [proposition] is not used in the sciences, while the indefinite
[conveys] a particular judgment. Thus the propositions that are of use in the sciences are
the remaining four definite propositions. As for the indefinite, wherever it is used in
place of the Universal it leads to error and confusion, as we shall make clear in another
place; consequently, it must be avoided.
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
16
: B ,Nn I fqBI ej ajI jI Y OnE iB
On$ im fAa KBm lU Ai A ,#jIe ej ajI On$
# j $ OmA # $ Omje im Ai ,eI #ajI
j $ : B ,#OmA jIe ej $ : Ajk .#j $
ej Nn Y ,#OmA jIe ej j $ : B ,#OmA jIe OmA ej
/,# $ Ajk ,qBI ej jI Y eI KBm o ,qBI
.OmA KBm lU N B iBN A o .eI ajI fBq [42]

M iBN ,#OmA ej$ : Ajk ,OmA lU Y Y
ej ,fqBI Ai ej fBq ,fqBI Ai ej fBq #ej$
.rI ej OmA I ej ajI o .OmA ej l ej ,fA ej
ajI On KUA BVE kA #OmA ej ajI$:f n jA B
kBI ajI jI Y o .eI l ajI ,eI Ajk ,eI E bI je
/ .rI jI ,eI I ajI jI ,eI B djI je jI eiAf

B z fE ff ,eI lU Y Y fE ff o [43]
,JBm ,JU ,JBm uvb ,JU uvb :fA Or Y
.KBm lU KU lU KBm KU :ivZ iB

o ,OnlU ZI fB iBI BifA uvb ,Or A kA
BV j , BA .ivZ iB B ifA fE iBI B z fBI
; Af je BVI B ,srM fA , BVI fE ejI iBI
.ej fBI lj kA o

17
One must know that the judgment of every proposition is either (a) inescapable and
binding: e.g., man is a body and this is called Necessary; [44] or (b) [one that] may or
may not be [the case]: e.g., man is a writer and this is called Possible; or (c) [one
that] cannot be [the case]: e.g., man is an angel and this is called Impossible.

Now, the term possible applies to two notions: (i) it applies to [what simply] can be and
nothing more, or, in sum, to whatever is not impossible. (The necessary falls under this
[sense of the] possible, for the necessary does not exist as long as it is not possible for it
to exist.) (ii) It applies to [what] may or may not be: this is the true possible, and the
necessary does not fall under this. [For] everything that is possible to exist in this
[second] sense [of the possible], it is possible that it not exist. But [for] everything that is
possible to exist in the former sense, it is not possible [45] not to exist. This much is
enough regarding the clarification of the character of predicative propositions.

10. Explication of the character of
Connective and Disjunctive Conditional Propositions,
in the same manner as was done for Predicative Propositions

Just as predicative [propositions] consist of two parts (a subject and a predicate),
conditional [propositions] also have two parts.

As for the connective conditional, it consists of two parts and nothing more: an
antecedent and a consequent. The antecedent is that [part] with which the condition is
associated, while the consequent is that [part] which is the reply. An example of this is
when we say, if the sun rises, it is day: [46] our saying if the sun rises is the
antecedent, and it is day is the consequent.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
17
B ,KUA fqBI E j B z j Y fE NnAe fBI
,eIB eI fBq B /;fAa ijy Ai A ,#OmA nU ej$ : [44]
,eI fBr B ;fAa Ai A ,#OmA jIe ej$ : B
.fAa N Ai A ,#OmA Nqj ej$ : B

E jI VI ,oI eI fBq jI :fNA e jI #$
.eJ ,eI fBr BM KUA Ajk ,fNA A jk ifA KUA .eJ N
fN jk ie KUA OmA Y A ,eIB eI fBq jI je
j ;eJ eI ,eJI fI eI j
ifA OmA OB if A .eJ /eI ,eJI r I eI [45]
.Y B z BY e

v vN jq B z BY ej Af (10)
fE ej Y ie i E jI
l Ai jq ,Z y ,eI iB e Ai Y B
.eI iB e

jq eI E f .BM f :oI eI iB e Ai vN BA
: OnE A BR .eI LAU eI E BM ,eI j I
iBN OmA f #fEjI LBNE jA$ B iBN /,#eI ki ,fEjI LBNE jA$ [46]
.OmA BM #eI ki$ B

18
But as for the disjunctive conditional, it may be that a single antecedent has a [only] a
single consequent, or it may be that it has many consequents. An example of the first
[case] is when you say, either this number is even, or it is odd: the first [part] is the
antecedent, the second [part] the consequent and here there is no more than a single
[consequent]. An example of the [second case] is when you say, that number is either
equal to that [other] number, or it is less, or more: here a single antecedent has two
consequents. Or it may be that there are more than two [consequents], or an unlimited
number: e.g., every number is either two or three or four; and this has no limit.

[47] Thus the difference between the antecedent and the consequent [on the one hand],
and the subject and the predicate [on the other], is that a simple expression [can] stand in
place of the subject and the predicate, but it [cannot] stand in place of the antecedent and
the consequent, because each one of these [latter] is in itself a proposition. E.g., If the
sun rises, it is day: your saying the sun rises is a proposition, and your saying it is
day is [also] a proposition. However, the conditional [particle] bars the antecedent from
being a proposition, for when you say if the sun rises, with the introduction of the term
if this speech is excluded from being a proposition, so that it is neither true nor false.
[Likewise,] the [particle] of the reply bars the consequent from being a proposition, for
when you say then it is day, it too is neither true nor false.

[48] Similarly, with the disjunctive [conditional]: for when you say, this number is
either odd: if the word either were not there, this antecedent would be a
proposition; [likewise with] or it is even: if the word or were not there, this
consequent would be a proposition. This, then, is one difference between the antecedent
and the consequent [on the one hand], and the subject and the predicate [on the other].

Another difference is that [in the case of] subject and predicate, you say that the subject is
(or is not) the predicate, e.g., Zaid is (or is not) alive. But [in the case of] antecedent
and consequent, you do not say that the antecedent is (or is not) the consequent.
However, there are two differences between the antecedent and consequent of the
connective, and the antecedent and consequent of the disjunctive.
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
18
iBnI BBM fqBI ,eI BM Ai f fqBI v ifA BA
.#eI B iBq A B eI OU iBq A B$: OnE A BR .eI
je BR .eJ lU BVA ,OmA BM e ,OmA f Nnb
BVA ,#sI B B ,eI iBq E f B ,iBq E$ : OnE
,fqBI Aj I fqBI ,eI e kA sI fqBI .OmA BM e Ai f
/ .On Aj Ai A #iB B m B eI e B iBq j$: B

y OnE ,Z y B ,BM f B j o [47]
Ajk ,fNnA BM f BVI ,fNnBI ej BrA BVI Z
LBNE jA$ : B .fA Nz sa oI j BM f
#eI ki$ M iBN OmA z #fEjI LBNE$ M iBN ,#eI ki ,fEjI
: Ajk ejJI Nz kA Ai f ,jq .OmA z
BM ,frI Nz kA bm A #jA$ fE ifA BI ,#fEjI LBNE jA$
Ajk ,ejJI NzkA Ai BM j LAU .ie OmA OmAi
/ .ie eI OmAi ,#eI ki BE$

jA ,#OmA B B ,iBq A$ : ,v ifA [48]
eJ #B$ jA ,#OmA OU B$ ;eI z f A eJ #B$
y B ,BM f B Onj A o .eI z BM A
.Z

Z y ,eI Z y BVE , OnE j je
BVE .#On B ,OmA fk fk$: B ,On B ,OmA
,vN BM f B .On B OmA BM f ,eI BM f
/ .OmA j e v BM f
19
[49] (a) One [difference] is that the antecedent of the connective [conditional] cannot
become the consequent, nor can the consequent become the antecedent, without altering
the meaning [of the proposition]. For example, when you say, if the sun rises, it is day,
the judgment [here] cannot remain the same judgment if the antecedent becomes the
consequent, and the consequent becomes the antecedent. However, in the disjunctive
[conditional] you [can] make whichever [consequent] you wish into the antecedent and
the meaning remains the same. For example, if you wish, you [can] say, number is
either even or odd, or if you wish, you [can] say, number is either odd or even.

(b) The other difference is that the consequent of the connective [conditional] is
in accord with the antecedent and is its counterpart, e.g., being day [in relation to] the
rising of the sun. But the consequent of the disjunctive [conditional], on the other hand,
is opposed to, and incompatible with the antecedent, e.g., being even [in relation to]
being odd. It is for this reason that the [50] validation and affirmativeness of the
connective [conditional] consists in your maintaining the existence of this consonance
(e.g., if the sun rises, it is day). [On the other hand,] the denial and negativeness of the
connective [conditional] consists in your maintaining the non-existence of this
consonance (e.g., it is not the case that when the sun rises, it is night). But it may be
that the antecedent and the consequent are negative, yet the proposition is in itself
affirmative due to your having asserted this consonance: e.g., if the sun does not rise, it
is not day; this is affirmative on the ground that a judgment has been made regarding the
actuality and correlation of the non-existence of day with the non-rising of the sun.

[51] The indefiniteness and definiteness of the connective [conditional] consists in this.
Whenever you say, if (or when) the sun rises, it is day, and you do not add always,
every time or sometimes, this would be an indefinite conditional. But if you say
every time, it would be a universal affirmative [proposition]. Or if you say,
sometimes, when the sun rises it is cloudy: this is a particular affirmative [proposition].
Or if you say, it is never the case that when the sun rises it is night: this is a universal
negative [proposition]. Or if you say, not every time the sun rises is it cloudy: this is a
particular negative [proposition]. It may be that the connective proposition is universal,
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
19
,eI f BM ,eI BM fBr ,vN f OnE [49]
Y fBr ,#eI ki fEjI LBNE jA$ : B .eI BVI
Af j ,v ifA BA .f BM ,eq BM f ,eI Y
OU B iBq$ : ,Aa jA B .eI BVI f Aa
.#OU B eI B B iBq$ : Aa jA ,#B B eI

B ,fqBI iAe e f BI eI A ,vN BM OnE je j
,f BI iBkBmB eI Bb ,v BM BA .fE jI LBNE BI eI ki
eI KU PBJQA / OmAi J kA .eI B BI eI OU B [50]
fEjI LBNE jA$ : B ,iBkBm A NnI Y OnE vN
,iBkBm A eIBI Y OnE vN eI KBm .#eI ki
BM f fqBI .#eI Kq ,fEjI LBNE eJ$ : B
ej PBJQA Ai iBkBm A eI KU sa oI z ,fI KBm
KU J E kA A ,#eJ ki ,fBjI LBNE jA$ : B ,qBI
/.Ai fEB jI LBNE j OmfE ej eIB ki iAe e NnI Y OmA

LBNE ( B) jA$ : B j OnE vN ivZ [51]
jq A ,#B$ B #iBI j$ #r$ ,#eI ki fE jI
B$ : B .eI KU ,#iBI j$ jA BA .eI
LBNE eJ lj$: B .eI KU lU A ,#eI jIA fEjI LBNE
jIA fEjI LBNE B j $ : B .eI KBm A ,#eI Kq ,fEjI
iB e j ,eI vN z fqBI .eI KBm lU A ,#eI
jIe iBU ajI ,fI jIe ej ajI B j$ : / B ,eI lU [52]
.#B j$ A N eI Ai J E kA A ,#fI

20
while both its parts are particular: e.g., [52] whenever some men are writers, some
animals are writers. This is universal on account of your saying whenever.

As regards affirmation in the disjunctive [conditional], it consists in your asserting the
dissonance [between the antecedent and the consequent]: e.g., either it is like this, or it is
like that. The negation [of the disjunctive conditional] consists in your denying this
dissonance: e.g., it is not the case that number is either even or white; rather, it is either
even or odd. The universal [disjunctive conditional] consists in this dissonance being
permanent: e.g., always, it is either like this or like that. The particular [disjunctive
conditional] consists in this dissonance being [present] some of the time: e.g.,
sometimes it happens that men are either in a ship or drowned; [53] this sometimes
[refers to] that time when [men are] at sea. The true disjunctive [conditional] is one
wherein this dissonance exists, but where the judgment does not reside outside its
components: e.g., this number is either equal to that number, or it is less, or more.

11. Explication of the character of Contradiction
The contradiction of a proposition is a proposition that is opposed to it by affirmation or
negation. If one is affirmative, the other is negative; and if one is negative, the other is
affirmative. [On the basis] of the form of their opposition, one of [the propositions] must
necessarily be true, and the other, false: they will then be contradictory to one another.

The conditions [governing] the form of this opposition are [the following].
(a) The meaning of the subject and predicate, as well as of the antecedent and the
consequent, must be the same; otherwise, the two [propositions] would not be
contradictory to each other. E.g., someone says, the lamb has a father, while another
says, the lamb does not have a father. [54] In one case, by lamb is meant sheep,
while in the other a celestial sign (of the Zodiac) is meant. Their statements [here] are
not contradictory to each other; this opposition is with respect to the subject. Or it is said,
sugar is shrn, [sweet] and, sugar is not shrn (i.e. not made of milk (shr)). Both of
these are true and are not contradictory to one another; this opposition is with respect to
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
20
: B , PBJQA Ai iBkBmB A eI E v ifA LBVA BA
, Ai iBkBmB A eI E Km .#eI B B ,eI B$
.#eI B B OU B I ,fm B OU B iBq eJ$ : B
B B eI B Af$: B ,eI Ae iBkBmB A eI E
eI B$ : B ,eI B iBkBmB A eI E lU .#eI
ifA OmA BE #B$ A / ,#eI j B ,eI Nr ifA B ej [53]
E kA jI Y eI iBkBmB A eI E OZI v .eI Bie
.#sI B B eI jIAjI B iBq E BI iBq A$: B ,eJ tBNn

| BY ej Af (11)
,eI KU jA .JBm JUI Bb eI Nz ,z |
BrA a Piu kA .eI KU A ,eI KBm jA ;eI KBm A
.fI | Ai jej BE ,eI ie eI OmAi fBI Ej

: OnE a A Piu Bjq
jfj e j A ,eI BM f Z y fBI
Ai jI$ f je #eI if Ai jI$ f n B .fJ | Ai
B .fAa BmE XjI I fAa fm #jI$ I /.#eJ if [54]
f B .OmA y KBU kA a A fJ jf | BrA
A .On ej jq kA ,#On jq jq$ #OmA jq jq$
.OmA Z KBU kA a A ;fJ jf | fI OmAi e j
eI fq B ifA BBU iBnJI ,BVA OmA iBqE BY A
.fA

21
the predicate. Now, in this case the [situation] is obvious, but in many places in the
sciences it is concealed and leads to error.

(b) Another condition is that there must not be opposition between whole and
part: e.g., one says, the eye of so-and-so is black, and again, the eye of so-and-so is
white, not black. [In the first case,] by blackness is meant the blackness of the pupil,
[while in the second case,] by the denial of blackness is meant the white [55] area [of the
eye].

(c) Another condition is that both judgments be either in potentiality or in
actuality, not such as when someone says, this fire is burning (i.e. potentially), and
another says, it is not burning (i.e. actually, when it is not burning anything). Both of
these utterances are true and are not contradictory to one another.

(d) Another [condition] is that what supplements [the meaning of either
proposition] be the same for both: not such as when someone says, ten is more (i.e.
than nine), and another says, ten is not more (i.e. than eleven). These are both true and
are not contradictory.

(e) Another [condition] is that the time be the same and not two [different] times;
and [likewise] that the place be the same and not two [different] places.

In sum, the judgment of both [propositions] must be [made] in the same respect and must
have the same predicate [56] and the same subject. Hence if the subject is universal, one
of the propositions must be universal, the other particular; for it may be that both
universal [propositions] are false (e.g., every man is a writer, and no man is a writer);
and it may be that both particular [propositions] are true (e.g., some men are writers,
and some men are not writers). Hence the contradictory of every is not every, and
the contradictory of none is some. Once these conditions have been met, one [of the
propositions] would necessarily be true, and the other false. Know the character of
conditionals on the basis of [the same] reasoning.
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
21
:f B ,eJ a iB ifA fBI OnE jq je
,BnI ,#Bm ,OmA fm r$ ,#OnBm r$
.fAa Ai fm / BBUj ,Bm I fAa fe Bm [55]

:f n B ,I B eI PI B Y e j OnE jq je
,#fkm On$:f je ,PI ,#OmA fkm sME A$
fJ | ,eI OmAi bm e j A .ekn Ai l BE ,I
.Aijfj

:f n B ,eI e j BrA OByA eI E je
,#On jNrI e$ :f je , kA ,#OmA jNrI e$
.fJ | OnNmAi e j A .ekB kA

.BBU e eI BBU ,O e eI ,O E je

.y B fBI / Z B ,fBI OV kA e j Y VI [56]
;lU ,eI z fBI ,fqBI y jA o
$ #OmjIe ej j$ : B) fI ie e j fBq
ajI$ : B) fI OmAi lU e j fBq ;(#On jIe ej
#j $ ,#j$ | o .(#On jIe ej ajI$ #OmjIe ej
Ej ,eI eiE BVI Bjq A .eI #ajI$ ,#$ | eI
.AfI Bjq BY pB jI .eI ie eI OmAi

22
12. Exposition of the character of Conversion
Conversion involves your turning the subject [of a proposition] into a predicate, and the
predicate into a subject [57] or making the antecedent a consequent, and the consequent
an antecedent while retaining the affirmative or negative [quality of the proposition],
and while retaining its truth.

As for the universal negative, it admits of conversion and results in the universal negative
again: for whenever it is true that no A is B, it is true that no B is A; otherwise its
contradictory would be true, viz. some B is A. That some is necessarily something,
say C. So C is that B which is A, and the same thing is both A and B. So there is an A
which is B; yet we had said that no A is B is true; and this is impossible. Thus, it has
become evident that when no A is B, no [58] B is A.

As for the universal affirmative, it is not necessary that its conversion be in every case a
universal affirmative; for one can say, every man is animal, but one cannot say, every
animal is man. However, it is necessary that its conversion be a particular affirmative,
because whenever all As are B, some Bs must be A, otherwise no B would be A [in that
case] it becomes necessary, as has [just] been shown, that no A is B, yet we had said that
every A is B.

The conversion of the particular affirmative yields a particular affirmative; thus when
you say, some As are B, it is necessary that some Bs be A, [59] on the basis of the
same argument that we have stated.

As for the particular negative, it is not necessary that it have a conversion, for you can
say, not every animal is man, but you cannot say, not every man is animal.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
22
o BY e kBI (12)
f B ; / y ,Z Z ,y eI E o BY [57]
.eI BVI NmAi iAe BVI JBm JU , f BM BM

eI OmAi B j ,fE kBI KBm I ejh o ,KBm BA
| A ,On iBNmBI eI OmAi ,On iBNmBI
.AeBI BI ,eI l Ej djI E ,OmA iBNmBI kA ajI eI OmAi
;iBNmBI eI I ,OmA eI iBNmBI E BI o
OmA Y eI N ,eI iBNmBI On o
,eJ iBNmBI fE ff o .OmA BZ A ,On iBNmBI
.eJ iBNmBI / [58]

N AM ,eI KU o Ej fB KUA ,KU BA
.#OmA ej AY j$ N AN ,#OnAY ej j$
,fI iBNmBI B B j Ajk ,KU lU o AiA fE KUA
B fE KUA ,eJ iBNmBI A ,fI AiBNmBI ajI fBI
.OmA iBNmBI j A N ,eJ iBNmBI fq ej Af

iBNmBI B ajI$ : B ,eI KU lU E o ,KU lU
.N OVY BI / ,fI AiBNmBI ajI fBI ,#fI [59]

$ N AM Ajk ,eI o Ai A fB KUA ,KBm lU BA
.#OnAY ej j $ N AN ,#Onej AY j

23
13. On Recognizing the Syllogism
To every unknown there is a path by which it becomes known. As regards conceiving or
conception, that path consists of definition and description, both of which we have
[already] mentioned. As regards affirming or assent, the path consists of reasoning.
Reasoning is of three kinds: syllogism, induction, and analogy. (But to argue from what
is present [manifest] to what is absent is also a part of analogy.) The most reliable of
these three is the syllogism, and of all syllogisms, the demonstrative syllogism. But as
long as we do not know what the syllogism as a whole is, we cannot know what the
demonstrative syllogism is.

[60] The syllogism, as a whole, is a discourse in which a number of statements are made,
such that if these statements are admitted, there follows of necessity another statement.
For example, if someone says, every body is [endowed] with form, and everything
that is [endowed] with form is created, this speech is a syllogism; because whenever
both of these propositions are admitted and conceded, there follows of necessity another
speech, viz., every body is created. [61] Likewise, if someone says, if the world is
[endowed] with form, then the world is created; but the world is [endowed] with form;
this, too, is a syllogism. For this is a speech composed of two propositions which,
whenever both are admitted, a third speech follows of necessity -- [a speech] other than
these two, although it is a part of one of them -- and that speech is: the world is created.

Now, syllogism is of two kinds: one is called connective, the other exceptive.

14. Explication of the Connective Syllogism
[62] Connective syllogism involves the bringing together of two propositions, each of
which has one part in common and is different in the other part. From these [two
propositions] there then results, of necessity, another proposition [made up] of those two
parts that were not shared in common. An example of this is what we said [before], viz.,
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
23
pB NaBq ie (13)
,Ai ej ivM Ai fmi ifA BA .eq NnAe I OnAi NnAeB jI
,Ai ej fvM Ai fj BA .ej eB Ai e j A ,mi OmfY Ai
ejI e BA) .BR AjNmA pB :OmA m OVY .OmA OVY Ai
kA ,OmA pB m j kA fN (.OmA BR U kA KBI fBq kA
NnAe AN ,eI VI pB Af BM .BjI pB BmB U
/ .eI BjI pB

fE Njh eq N Bbm ifA eI bm VI pB [60]
BR .Ej fE k je iBN BVE kA ,eI fE N ifA Bbm
A ,#OmA TfZ iv j ,OmA iv nU j$:f n jA A
ej nM ,fE Njh z e j A B j Ajk ,eI pB bm
B / .#OmA TfZ nU j$ : fE k je bm BVA kA ,eq [61]
B ,OmA TfZ B o ,OmA iv B jA$ :f n jA
z e kA OmA bm A Ajk ,eI pB l A ;#OmA iv
iB f j ,e j A lUfE k m bm ,fE Njh e j B j
.#OmA TfZ B$ : OnE bm A OmA BrA kA

/ .BRNmA Ai ,fAa AjNA Ai :OmA e pB

24
whenever it is conceded that every body is [endowed] with form, and everything that
is [endowed] with form is created, there follows of necessity [the proposition], every
body is created. There are, therefore, two propositions here:
(i): every body is [endowed] with form;
[63] (ii): everything that is [endowed] with form is created.
The first premise has body as one part, and [endowed] with form as the other part;
while the second premise has [endowed] with form as one part, and created as the
other part. Consequently, [endowed] with form is a part of both [premises]. However,
one [premise] has body alone, and the other has created [alone]. This [third]
proposition that has resulted of necessity, has body as one part, and created as
another part. Now, matters revolve around these three parts: body, [endowed] with
form, and created, which are called terms. Thus, [endowed] with form and
everything that is similar to it is called the middle term; body, which becomes the
subject in the resulting [proposition] is called the minor term; and created, which
becomes the [64] predicate in the resulting [proposition] is called the major term. Both
of those two propositions that are in the syllogism are called premises, and that
proposition which results of necessity is called the conclusion. That [proposition] in
which is [contained] the subject of the conclusion is called the minor premise, and that in
which is [contained] the predicate of the conclusion is called the major premise. The
coming together of these two premises is called connection, and the form of [this] coming
together is called figure.

Now, this form is of three kinds: (a) either the middle term is the predicate in one premise
and the subject in the other -- and this is called the first figure; [65] or (b) the [middle
term] is the predicate in both [premises] -- and this is called the second figure; or (c) the
[middle term] is the subject in both [premises]; -- and this is called the third figure. The
case of the antecedent and consequent [in] a connective [conditional proposition] is the
same as that of the subject and predicate of a predicative [proposition]. No syllogism
results from two negative [propositions], nor from two particular [propositions].
[Likewise,] whenever the minor is negative and its major is particular, no syllogism
results. Thus each figure has its own characteristics.
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
24
AjNA pB ej Af (14) [62]
kBJA iB ifA Ai e j ,fiE ej Ai z e eI E AjNA pB
e E kA ,je Az fE KUA BrA kA o .AfU iB jfI ,eI
ej nM B j N E A BR .eJ kBJA BrA ifA eI iB
fE k BVA kA ,#OmA TfZ iv j Omiv nU j$ : fE
nU j$ E :OmA z e BVA o .#OmA TfZ nU j$
Ai r f .#OmA TfZ iv j$ E je /;#Omiv [63]
#iv$ lU Ai e f ;#iv$ lU je ,OmA #nU$ lU
Ai .OmA e j lU #iv$ o .#TfZ$ lU je ,OmA
tlU ,fE k z A .#TfZ$ Ai ,OmBM #nU$
nU jI :OmA iB m jI iB tej .#TfZ$ lU OmA #nU$
fB I j Ai #iv$ o .fAa fY Ai BrA ;TfZ iv
fY fE k E ifA eq y Ai #nU$ ;fAa B fY
.fAa fY fE k E ifA eq Z / Ai #TfZ$ ;fAa [64]
k Ai z E ,fAa f OmA pB ifA Ai z e j E
,fAa f eI ifA VN y AjE ,fAa VN fE
e A fE ej .fAa f eI ifA VN Z AjE
.fAa q Ai fE ej Piu ,fAa AjNA Ai f

y ,f ifA eI Z B fY B :eI m Piu A
Ai A eI Z e j ifA B /.fAa Nnb q Ai A ,je ifA
Y .fAa m q Ai A eI y e j ifA B .fAa e q [65]
kA .OmA Y Z y Y OmA vN kA BM f
eI KBm ju Bj .fB pB lU e kA ,fB pB KBm e
.OmBNuva Ai q j o .fB pB eI lU sjJ
25
15. Exposition of the Moods of the Syllogisms of the First Figure
The first figure has two merits: one is that its syllogisms do not require any proof in order
to establish that they are syllogisms (which is not the case for the other two figures); [66]
the other is that all four definite [propositions] (namely, the universal affirmative,
universal negative, particular affirmative, and particular negative) can be made into the
conclusion of this figure, whereas in the second figure no conclusion is affirmative, and
in the third figure no conclusion is universal, as will become evident [below].

In order for the conjuncts of the first figure to become a syllogism, two conditions [must
be fulfilled]: (i) their minor must be affirmative;
(ii) their major must be universal.
If this is not the case, it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false;
[67] but everything whose conclusion is not in every case true, when its premises are
true, is not a syllogism. Consequently, as these are the two [requisite] conditions, the
syllogisms of this figure are four [in number].

(a) First Syllogism: [consisting of] two universal affirmatives.
Example: If someone says, every A is B, and every B is C; from here the conclusion
follows that every A is C. Thus when you say, every body is [endowed] with form,
and everything [endowed] with form [68] is created, from here the conclusion follows
that every body is created; and this is a universal affirmative conclusion.

(b) Second Syllogism: [consisting of] two universals, but with the major negative.
For example, when someone says, every A is B, and no B is C, the conclusion
follows that no A is C. E.g.: every body is [endowed] with form, and nothing [that
has been endowed] with form is pre-eternal; whence it necessarily follows that no body
is pre-eternal; and this conclusion is a universal negative.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
25
A q BmB BY ekBI (15)
Omie fBJ NVY AiA BmB E :OmA Oz e Ai A q
j E je / ;(je q e BY OmA ) fApB f [66]
lU KU lU KBm OmA KU ) Ai ivZ iB
,eJ KU VN e q ifA ,ej fBq VN ifA (KBm
.eq Af ea B ,eJ VN m q ifA

:OmA jq e Ai Nnb q BAjNA fq pBj
.eI KU fBI BqAju OnE
.eI fBI BqAjJ OnE je
j ,eI / ie VN fI OmAi Bf fBq ,eJ jA [67]
.eJ pB E ,fI OmAi sMBf ,BY eJ OmAi VN
.fI iB q A BmB ,OmA jq e A ,jq o

.KU e kA :Nnb pB
kA ,#OmA BI iBNmBI j OmA iBNmBI j$f n jA : BR
Omiv nU j$ : B .#OmA BI j$ fE VN BVA
,#OmA TfZ nU j$ fE VN BVA kA ,#OmA TfZ / iv j [68]
.OmA KU VN A

.KBm jJ e kA :e pB
,#eJ BI iBNmBI ,OmA iBNmBI j$ :f n B
Omiv nU j$ : B .#eJ BI $ fE VN
A #eJ f nU $ fE k BVA kA ,#eJ f iv
.OmA KBm VN
26
(c) Third Syllogism: [consisting of] particular affirmative minor and universal
affirmative major. [69] E.g., someone says, some substances are soul, and every soul
receives the form of knowledge; hence, some substances receive the form of
knowledge; and this is a particular affirmative conclusion.

(d) Fourth Syllogism: [consisting of] particular affirmative minor and universal
negative major. E.g., someone says, some substances are soul, and no soul is body;
hence, some substances are not body.

The syllogisms of the connective [conditionals] are also in this way.

16. Syllogisms of the Second Figure
The [requirements] of the syllogism of the second figure are:
(i) that one premise be affirmative, the other negative;
(ii) that the major premise be in every case universal.
Consequently, the syllogisms [70] of [the second figure] are four.

(a) First [Syllogism]: [consisting of] two universals and a negative major.
E.g., every A is B, and no C is B; whence the conclusion: no A is C. The proof of
it is that since our saying, no C is B, is true, therefore its conversion (viz., no B is C)
is [also] true (as has been stated in the section on conversion). Hence when we say,
every A is B, and no B is C, this conclusion, viz., no A is C, is true.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
26
/ . KU jJ lU KU ju kA :m pB
,#ejh Piu n j OmA o Bj ajI$ :f n B [69]
.OmA KU lU VN A ;#ejh Piu Bj ajI$ o

. KBm jJ lU KU ju kA :iB pB
o ,#On nU o OmA o Bj zI$:f n B
.#On nU Bj ajI$

.eI Bm jI PvN BmB

e q BmB (16)
;KBm ,eI KU f OnE e q pB Nmie jq
.eI iB / BmB o .eI BY jI jJ f [70]

.KBm jJ e kA :Nnb
BVA kA ,#On iBNmBI BI OmA iBNmBI j$: B
BI $ B iBN E BjI .#On BI $ fE VN
Y (#On BI iBNmBI $ ) o o ,OmA Y #On iBNmBI
iBNmBI j$ o .o LBI ifA OmfE N B ,eI
BI $ : eI Omie VN A ,#On BIiBNmBI OmA
.#On

27
(b) Second [Syllogism]: [consisting of] two universals and a negative minor.
E.g., no A is B, and every C is B; conclusion: no A is C. For [71] if you convert
the minor, and invert the two premises, it becomes thus: every C is B, and no B is A;
conclusion: no C is A. This conclusion admits of conversion and becomes the former
conclusion, viz., no A is C.

(c) Third [Syllogism]: [consisting of] a particular affirmative minor and a
universal negative major. E.g., some As are B, and no C is B; conclusion: some As
are not C. For the major admits of conversion and then becomes the fourth [syllogism]
[72] of the first figure and yields the same conclusion.

(d) Fourth [Syllogism]: [consisting of] a particular negative minor, and a
universal affirmative major. E.g., some A is not B, and every C is B; conclusion:
some A is not C. But this conclusion cannot be established by way of conversion
because the minor is a particular negative and does not admit of conversion, while the
major is a universal affirmative whose conversion is a particular: [73] when you bring the
convert [of the major] together with the minor, [there will be] two particulars, and from
two particulars no syllogism follows. Hence in order to show that [this syllogism] yields
a conclusion there are two strategies: (i) one is called demonstration by supposition, (ii)
the other [is called] demonstration by reductio ad absurdum.

(i) As for the way of supposition, it consists in this. When you have said, some
A is not B, that some is necessarily something say, D. Then we say, no D is B,
and every C is B. The conclusion follows that no D is C. Once this has become
established, we say, some A is D, and no D is C. Hence from this statement it has
been established that some A is not C.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
27
.KBm ju e kA :e
fE VN ,#OmiBNmBI BI j On iBNmBI $ : B
Ai Nf o Ai ju / Ajk ;#On BI $ [71]
,#On iBNmBI OmA iBNmBI BI j$ eq , fJM
r VN ejh o VN A #On BI $ fE VN
.#On BI $ : eq

.jJ KBm ,ju KU lU kA :m
fE VN ,#On iBNmBI BI fiBNmBI B ajI$ : B
iBI BE ejh o jJ Ajk ,#fA BI B ajI$
.eiE VN eq A q / [pB] [72]

.jJ KU ,ju KBm lU kA :iB
fE VN ,#OmiBNmBI BI j On iBNmBI ajI$ : B
,ej Omie fBr o AjI Ai fE VN A .#On BI ajI$
OmA KU jJ ,ejh o OmA KBm lU ju Ajk
,fI lU e iE ej ju BI Ai o / ;eI lU o [73]
:OmA jIfM e Ai eiE VN ej ff j o .fB pB lU e kA
.a Ai f ~AjNA Ai
E ,#On iBNmBI ajI$ N : OnE ~AjNA Ai BA
iBNmBI E $ o .AeBI #E$ l E ,eI l BZ #ajI$
.#On BI E $ : fE VN ,#OmiBNmBI BI j On
kA o .#On BI E OmA E ajI$ : ,fq Omie A
/ .#eI BI j $ fq Omie

28
[74] (ii) As for the way of reductio ad absurdum, it consists in this. If our
[conclusion] some A is not C, is false, then all A must be C. We have said that every
C is B, hence all A must be B. But we had said that not every A is B this is
impossible, so the conclusion is true.

17. Syllogisms of the Third Figure
The [requisite] conditions for the syllogisms of this figure are:
(i) that the minor always be affirmative;
(ii) that one [75] premise (whichever it may be) be universal.
Consequently, the syllogisms of this figure are six [in number].

(a) First [Syllogism]: [consisting] of two universal affirmatives.
E.g., every B is A, and every B is C; conclusion: some A is C. For when you
convert the minor, [the syllogism] becomes: some As are B, and every B is C, and it
returns to the third syllogism of the first figure, yielding the conclusion [some A is C].

(b) Second [Syllogism]: [consisting] of two universals, [with] the major negative.
[76] E.g., every B is A, and no B is C; conclusion: some A is not C. For when
you convert the minor, it becomes the fourth [syllogism] of the first figure.

(c) Third [Syllogism]: [consisting] of two affirmatives, [with] the minor
particular. E.g., some Bs are A, and every B is C; conclusion: some As are C. For
when you convert the minor, it becomes the third [syllogism] of the first figure.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
28
#On BI ajI$ B iBN jA : OnE a Ai BA [74]
,#OmiBNmBI BI j$ N .eI BI fBI o ,OmA ie
.#OmA iBNmBI j $ eI N .eI iBNmBI fBI o
.OmA Omie VN o ,OmA BZ A

m q BmB (17)
f / ,Ej eI KU ju OnE q A BmB jq [75]
.fI sq q A BmB o .eI (eI Af j)

.KU e kA :Nnb
fE VN ,#OmA BI iBNmBI j OmA iBNmBI j$ : B
eq , o Ai ju Ajk .#eI BI kA ajI$
q kA m pBI ,#eI BI iBNmBI j fI iBNmBI B ajI$
.fE VN A eejkBI A

/ .KBm jJ , e kA :e
fE VN ,#On BI iBNmBI On iBNmBI j$ : B [76]
[pB] iBI o Ai ju Ajk .#OmA BI j $
.eq Nnb q

.lU ju ,KU e kA m
fE VN ,#OmA BI iBNmBI j fA AiBNmBI ajI$ : B
[pB] m , o Ai ju Ajk .#fA BI B ajI$
.eq Nnb q
29
(d) Fourth [Syllogism]: [consisting] of two affirmatives, [with] the major
particular. E.g., every B is A, [77] and some Bs are C; conclusion: some As are C.
For when you convert the major and say: some Cs are B, and every B is A, the
conclusion follows that some Cs are A; and then its conversion would be true, viz.,
some As are C.

(e) Fifth [Syllogism]: its minor is universal affirmative; its major particular
negative. E.g., every B is A, and some B is not C; [78] the conclusion follows that
some A is not C. This cannot be demonstrated by conversion, just as we stated in that
other case [sc. the fourth syllogism of the second figure]; however, it can be
demonstrated by [the method of] supposition and reductio ad absurdum.

As for [the method of] supposition, it is thus: let that B which is not C, be D, so
that no D is C. So we shall say, every B is A, and some B is D; the conclusion
follows that some A is D. We shall then say, no D is C; the conclusion follows that
some A is not C.

As for the method of reductio ad absurdum, it is this: if our [conclusion] some A
is not C is false, then every A is C. If we say, every B is A, and every A is C, the
conclusion follows that every B is C. [79] But we had said that not every B is C.
This is impossible, hence the conclusion that resulted is true.

(f) Sixth [Syllogism]: [consisting] of particular affirmative minor, and universal
negative major. E.g., some Bs are A, and no B is C; conclusion: some A is not C.
For when you convert the minor, it becomes the fourth [80] [syllogism] of the former [sc.
first] figure.

Likewise, for connective [conditionals] there are also two other figures where you replace
the subject and predicate with the antecedent and consequent.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
29
.lU jJ ,KU e kA :iB
fE VN ,#fBI AiBNmBI ajI /,On iBNmBI j$ : B [77]
ajI$ o Ai jJ Ajk .#fA BI B ajI$
BBI ajI$ fE VN ,#OmA iBNmBI j ,fAiBNmBI BBI
.#fBI B ajI$ eI Omie o BE ,#f

.KBm lU sjJ ,eI KU sju :V
/ ,#OmA BI iBNmBI j ,OmA iBNmBI j$ : B
ej Af fBr oI Ai A .#OmA BI j $ fE VN [78]
.bI ej fBq ~AjNBI ,N Ai je E B
BM ,AeBI E ,On BI iBNmBI E : eI B ~AjNA BA
;#OnE iBNmBI ajI On iBNmBI j$ : o .eJ BI E
,#On BI E $ : BE .#OmA E ajI$ fE VN
.#On BI ajI$ fE VN
#OmA BI j $ B iBN jA : OnE a j BA
j On iBNmBI j$ .OmA BI j o ,Onie
eI N /.#OmA BI iBNmBI j$ fE VN ,#OnBI [79]
.OmA Omie fE VN E o ,OmA BZ A .#OnBI iBNmBI j $

. KBm jJ ,lU KU ju kA :rq
VN ,#On BI iBNmBI ,OmA AiBNmBI ajI$: B
/ iBI , o Ai ju Ajk .#On BI j$ fE
.eq r q [pB] [80]
f ,Z y fI Ai PvN j eI je q e l
. BM
30
18. Exceptive Syllogisms [derived] from Connective [Conditionals]
Exceptive syllogisms [derived] from connective [conditionals] consist of a connective
[premise] and an exceptive [premise]. For example, you say, if so-and-so has a fever,
his pulse is fast; this is a connective [premise]. And you add, but so-and-so has a
fever; this is the exceptive. From here the conclusion results that so-and-so has a fast
pulse.

These syllogisms are of two kinds. [81]
(a) One is that the exceptive be identical to the antecedent and yield a conclusion
identical to the consequent, as we have [just] said.
(b) The other is that the exceptive be the contradictory of the consequent, e.g., in
[the above] example you say: but his pulse is not fast. [This] yields a conclusion
contradictory to the antecedent, viz., therefore so-and-so does not have a fever.

If you make the contradictory of the antecedent the exceptive, saying, so-and-so does
not have a fever, the conclusion does not result that the pulse of so-and-so is fast (or is
not fast). Similarly, if you make the exceptive identical to the consequent, as when you
say, but his pulse is fast, the conclusion does not result that he has (or does not have) a
fever.

19. Exceptive Syllogisms [derived] from Disjunctive [conditionals]
If the disjunctive consists of two parts, and you make the exceptive identical to either one
of them, [82] it yields [as] conclusion the contradictory of the other. For example, you
say, this number is either even or odd, but it is even; therefore you will say, it is not
odd. [Or else] but it is odd; therefore you will say, it is not even. But if you make
the contradictory of either part the exceptive, it would yield a conclusion identical to the
other [part]. For example, you say, but it is not odd; therefore it is even; [or] it is
not even; therefore it is odd. This is the case in true disjunctives, whereas in those
that are not true [disjunctives] it may be the case that it is not thus.
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
30
PvN kA BRNmA BmB (18)
j jA$: B ,BRNmA fE vN kA PvN kA BRNmA BmB
KM $ : kBI .OmA vN A ,#eI lM i ,eiAe KM Ai
.#eI lM i Ai $ fE VN BVA kA ;OmBRNmA A ,#Ai eiAe

/ :eI e BmB A
;N B ,Ai BM eiE VN eI f BRNmA eI E [81]
i $ :BR BI B ,eI BM | BRNmA eI E je
.#On KM Ai o$ Ai f | eiE VN .#On lM

fB VN ,#eiAf KM Ai $ : Ai f | BRNmA jA
: B BM BRNmA jA B .#On B OmlM i$
.#teiAf B teiAe KM$ fB VN ,#OmA lM i $

Pv kA BRNmA BmB (19)
eiE VN / fqBI Af j kA BRNmA eI lU e kA v jA [82]
,#OmA OU ;B B eI OU B iBq A$ : B ,Ai e |
BA ,#On OU$ : o ,#OmA B $ ;#On B$ : o
: B ,je eiE VN ,fqBI Af j , | BRNmA jA
,#OmA B$ o #On OU $ ;#OmA OU$ o ,#On B $
.eI fqBI Y YB ifA ,eI Y Pv ifA Y A

31
But if the disjunctive has more than two parts, whichever part you make the exceptive
from that whole [set] will negate the remainder. E.g., this number is either greater [than
that number], or it is less, or it is equal; but this number is greater; conclusion:
therefore it is not equal or less. And [if] you make the contradictory of any of the parts
the exceptive, the conclusion would be the remainder [of the proposition] in the way that
it is, [83] until one [part] remains. E.g., but it is not greater; conclusion: either it is
equal or it is less.

20. Composite Syllogisms
It is not the case that all conclusions come from a single syllogism or that two premises
are [always] sufficient; rather, it may be that a single problem is resolved by many
syllogisms. For example, a conclusion is drawn from two premises, and that conclusion
then becomes once more the premise for another syllogism and so on in this way until it
is the final [84] conclusion of the problem. Not all syllogisms are expressed in this well-
arranged order, but there are many instances when some premises are omitted, either for
[the sake of] brevity or for [some] expedient; and there are many instances when the
premises are inverted out of order. However, in reality, it comes back in the end to these
syllogisms of which we have spoken.

We will provide this discourse with an example [drawn] from the science of geometry,
and this example is the first figure from the book of Euclid.

We have a line AB, and we want to draw on this line, [85] by demonstration, a three-
sided figure (called a triangle) each side of which is equal to the other sides. We assert:
whenever we make point A the center of the compass, open [the compass] to point B and
[draw] a circle around A; then come back once again and make point B the center, and
draw a circle [with the radius extended] as far as point A around B [the two circles thus
formed] will necessarily intersect one another. Let us mark the point of intersection C,
and let us draw a straight line from that point to A, and [another] straight line to B.
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
31
E kA BRNmA Af j ,eI e kA sI BlU Ai v jA BA
;jIAjI B B OnlA B iBq A$ : B ,ejjI Ai BI ,U
| ;#On jIAjI o$ fE VN ,#OnlA iBq A
.fB BE BM /,eI B eI BI VN BRNmA Af j [83]
.# B OmjIAjI B$ fE VN ,#On lA $ : B

Kj BmB (20)
eI I ;fqBI oI f e B fBI pB kA B VN
E kBI ,fiE VN f e kA B ,eq Omie iBnI BmBI n
VN / jaE BM eq B Ai je mB eq f VN [84]
eI iBnI ,f NmAiE KMjM jI Ai BmB .eI n
eI iBnI .Ai OYj B Ai iBvNaAj ,fI Ai B f zI
B fE BmB fI jaE OZI ,f jaDM fM Ai B f
.N

kA AeBI Nnb q BR A mf kA iE BR Ai bm A
.pfA LBN

q BjJI / a jI Aa ,AeBI #LA$ Br Ona Ai B [85]
.eI jf f kA j (fAa SR Ai A ) m m
#L$ BM iBj lj Ai #A$ B j e
ifI lj Ai #L$ BI kBI ,#A$ ej jAe BrI
BfjI jI .fjI BZ Ai jej ,#L$ ej jAe #A$
.#L$ I OmAi a iE #A$ I OmAi a O E kA O #X$
32

C

B A

We say, then, that this figure which is enclosed by the points ABC is [86] a triangle with
all three sides equal. The proof of this is that the two lines AB and AC are equal, for they
have been traced from the center to the circumference. Likewise, the two lines BA and
BC are equal, because each one of them is equal to line AB. Hence on line AB we have
constructed a triangle whose three sides are equal.

So in speech syllogism is employed in this way; in reality it is such as I am going to say.
There are four [87] syllogisms here, all from the first figure.

(a) The first [syllogism] is this: The two lines AB and AC are two straight lines
that extend from the center to the circumference; every straight line that extends from the
center to the circumference is equal; conclusion: the two lines AB and AC are equal.

(b) Another [syllogism]: The same is the case for the two lines BA and BC.

(c) Third [syllogism]: The two lines AC and BC are two lines that are equal to
the single line AB; any two lines that are equal to a single line are equal to one another.
[88] Conclusion: the two lines AB and AC are both equal.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
32
X

L A

OmA RR / OmA #X ,L ,A$ B B ifA q A o
kA Ajk ,fjIAjI #X A$ #L A$ a e OnE A BjI .jIAjI m j [86]
a e ,fjIAjI #X L$ #A L$ a e .fA fE ZI lj
a jI o .fA #L A$ a jIAjI j Ajk ,fjIAjI #X L$ #X A$
.fjIAjI A m j ej RR #L A$

:N Aa eI OZI .fjI iBI pB bm ifA o
.A q kA OmA pB / iB BVA [87]

ZI lj kA fA OmAi a e #X A$ #L A$ a e :OnA Nnb
e fE VN ;fI jIAjI fE ZI lj kA OmAi a e j ,ffE
.fjIAjI #X A$ #L A$ a

.Ai #X L$ #A L$ a e j :je

j ,fA #L A$ a jIAjI fA a e #X L$ #X A$ a e :m
#L A$ a e fE VN / .fI jIAjI e j ,fI a jIAjI a e [88]
.fjIAjI e j #X A$

33
(d) Fourth [syllogism]: The figure ABC that has been constructed on line AB, is
bounded by three equal lines; everything that is bounded by three lines that are equal is a
triangle whose three sides are equal. Conclusion: the figure ABC, constructed on line
AB, is a triangle with all its three sides equal.

It is necessary that other problems be resolved according to this reasoning.

21. Syllogism by reductio ad absurdum
Among composite syllogisms there is one called syllogism by reductio ad absurdum.
[89] The difference between this syllogism and the preceding one (called direct or
straight syllogism) is that the syllogism by reductio ad absurdum establishes its
conclusion by [proving] the invalidity of its contrary; and it proves the invalidity of its
contrary by showing that it necessarily results in an impossibility. Everything from
which an impossibility results of necessity, is [itself] impossible; for, since the impossible
does not exist, that which cannot but be from the impossible never exists.

This syllogism by reductio ad absurdum is composed of two syllogisms: One is a
syllogism which I discovered among the unknown conjunctive syllogisms; and one is the
exceptive syllogism. Example of this: someone wants to establish [90] that every A is B;
he says, if not every A is B, while we know that every C is B (this is, for example,
without doubt), it necessarily follows from this that not every A is C. However, this is
impossible, for the opponent admits, for example, that this is impossible. Hence our
saying that every A is B is true.

In tackling this discourse by direct syllogisms, people have undertaken a lengthy labor,
and have themselves abandoned it. Now Aristotle has alluded to what I am going to say;
however, he went as far as saying that the reductio ad absurdum comes from the
conditional [syllogism]. Hence the demonstration of [the fact] that reductio ad absurdum
comes from the conditional is what I am going to speak of.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
33
,OmA jIAjI a m ejI On #L A$ a jI #X L A$ q :iB
VN .jIAjI t m j eI RR ,fI jIAjI a m ejI j
.jIAjI t m j OmA RR ,On #L A$ a jI #X L A$ q fE

.fE ej pB jI Bn je fBI

a pB (21)
B j / .fAa a pB Ai A OmA mB Kj BmB U kA [89]
pB OnE (fAa Nn pB OmAi pB Ai A ) r a
BI AfI Ai A a ,f BI Ai A a AfI f Omie Ai e a
, Ajk ,eI BZ fE k BZ kA j ,eiE k BZ kA f
.eJ On tiB BZ kA E lj ,eJ BZ

BmB U kA OmA mB :pB e kA OmA Kj a pB A
E A BR .BRNmA pB ;A eiE jI Kj AjNA
j jA$ :f ,OmA iBNmBI j / ej fAa Omie n [90]
kA (OmA q I R A ) OmiBNmBI BI j A NnAe ,OmiBNmBI
j va OmA BZ A .#OnBI j fE KUA BVA
.eI Y #OmA iBNmBI j$ B iBN o .OmA BZ A R eI

ea fANj s kAie iB Omie BmBI bm A ejIkBI ifA Bej
A ,N Aa OmA ej fI PiBqA oBBmiA .fA eB
jq kA a E ej ff o .OmA jq kA a : OnN iAf A
.N Aa OmA A ,OmA
34
The first syllogism [by reductio ad absurdum] consists of a conjunctive connective and a
predicative. For example, [91] if our saying that every A is B is false, then not every
A is B is true; now, [let us say] every C is B (by agreement); the conclusion that
follows is the condition that if every A is B is false, then not every A is C. However,
[let us say] every A is C (by agreement), and this is the exceptive. The conclusion
follows that every A is B is not false; therefore it is true.

If someone takes the contradictory of a conclusion in whose truth there is agreement, and
[if] he combines it with a premise which is true by agreement, the conclusion follows
directly without [recourse to] reductio ad absurdum. E.g., he says, every A is C; and
every C is B; therefore every A is B. [92] However, in speech there are many situations
where [syllogism by] reductio ad absurdum is more appropriate and the speech becomes
briefer.

22. Disclosure of the Character of Induction
Induction involves making a universal judgment about a subject, based on the particulars
found in that subject. For example, it is said, every animal moves its lower jaw when it
chews. If every single particular relating to this judgment could be found, so that none
[93] is excluded, the judgment regarding the universal would [in that case] be certain.
However, people who [use] induction, on finding many or the majority [of the
particulars] in a given way, make a judgment regarding all [of them]. But this is not
necessary, for it is possible that what has not been seen is contrary to what has been seen,
and that a hundred thousand [cases] are in agreement and [only] a single one opposed;
e.g., the crocodile, which moves its upper jaw and not the lower. Dialecticians and the
mutakallimn for one trust to this [sc. manner of reasoning].

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
34
: B iBN jA / .Y OmA vN AjNA kA pB Nnb [91]
,OmA OmAi #OmiBNmBI j $ o ,Onie ,#OmiBNmBI j$
OmiBNmBI jA$ jq fE VN ;#OmiBNmBI BMBI BI j$
:f f f Ai VN A kBI ,#OnBI j o ,Onie
j$ ,#OnBI j o ,Onie OmiBNmBI jA$
#OmiBNmBI j$ fE VN ;OmBRNmA A ,BMBI ,#OnBI
.OmA Y o ,On ie

f FI Ai A ,OnBMA NmifI ejI Ai VN | ea n jA
f B ,OmAi fE VN a I ea ,f KjM ,OmA BMA Y
/ #.OmiBNmBI j o ,OmiBNmBI BI j ,OnBI j$
jM BM bm eI jMiaifA a eI BBU iBnI bm B ifA [92]
.eq

AjNmA BY e (22)
PBlU ifA Y E J EkA y jI f Y eI E AjNmA
.#fBJU jk jk fBa OI AY j$ :f B ,fIB y E
jI Y ,fV / BM Y jI NB PBlU kA Ai j fANI jA [93]
Ai jNrI B Ai iBnI ,f AjNmA Bej .eI
a feB eI fBq Ajk ,eI ijy A ; jI f Y ,fIB
jIk jk `BnM B ,eI Bb fI NiAl fu ,eI fe
.OmA jI eBNA Ai BN BfU .fBJV jk ,fBJVI Ai

35
23. Disclosure of the Character of Analogy
Analogy is weaker than induction. [94] It involves making a judgment about something
on the basis of what has been observed in [another thing that] resembles it. It is said, for
example, the soul of man is a power that must not endure after the [death of the] body,
just as vision [does not endure after the destruction of] his eye.

Analogy is mostly employed in matters of governance and in fiqh (jurisprudence). It is
not a necessary [reasoning], for it may be that the judgment [based on] one similar thing
is contrary to the judgment [based on] another similar thing. For there are many things
that are similar in one sense, but contrary in a thousand other senses: on the basis of one
of them the judgment would (or could) be true, while on the basis of another it would not
and could not be true. So analogy is suitable for consolation and the spreading of [95]
belief, but it is not suitable for certainty. However, if the claim is particular, viz., some
A is B, analogy is itself a direct argument of the third figure. E.g., that is the example
of A, and that is the example of B; conclusion: some A is B.

24. The Way of the Dialecticians in Proving the Absent from the Present
At first, the dialecticians possessed this [reasoning by] analogy that we have mentioned;
[96] later on, however, they came to realize that this is not a necessary judgment, but they
did not know of any other way. [So] they thought up a ploy and declared, we seek the
cause. An example of this is that they came and found some character for a thing, such
as, for example, [in the case of] a house, its having been made. They called the house
the principle, and its having been made the judgment. They then went away and
beheld the sky and found it similar to the house. Since they viewed the sky too [as] a
body with shape and form, they declared the sky to have been made; but they did not say
that the sky is made because it is similar to a house for they realized that not everything
that is similar to something [else] [97] is of [the same] character but they said, Let us
establish the cause that a house [is a thing that] has been made is that it is a body with
shape and form; therefore everything that has this characteristic of being with shape and
form is [a thing that has been] made. And they sought to establish this in two ways.
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
35
BR BY e (23)
AfI l jI f Y eI E BR /.OmA AjNmA kA jM Onm BR [94]
M om fBI OmA M ej o$ : R f .fI A fB ifA
.# r BI B ,fB

Ajk Onijy A .fjI iBI ifA jIfM BiB ifA jNrI A
fA Bl iBnI ,eI je fB Y a fB Y fBq
,eI Omie Y BrA kA jI :Bb iAlI fI fB I
fBq Ai qa e BR o .fBr eJ Omie je jI ,eI fBq B
zI$ ,eI lU e jA BA .fBr Ai ,Ai B / fA [95]
E$ : B .m q kA eI Omie OVY ea BR ,#OmiBNmBI
.#OmiBNmBI ajI$ fE VN ,#OmiBNmBI BR E On BR

fBq kA KBI ejI e ifA BfU Ai (24)
fNnAfI om /E kA OmeI ej eB BR A BfU Ome ifA Onb [96]
fN ffrfA NY .fNnAf Ai je ,On KUA Y A
Y Ai l ffBI BrA OnE A BR .# O K B$
.Y Ai QfZ ffAa uA Ai Ba :QfZ Ai Ba R B ,fNB
Ai BmE AfI .fNB Ba fB Ai A ffj BmE ifA ffrI BE
fN ffAa TfZ Ai BmE ,Piu q BI ffe nU l
j fNnAe Ajk ,OmA Ba fB Ajk OmA TfZ BmE
Ba E O Omie$ :fN ,eI ZI /eI l fB [97]
Ou A Ai j o ,Piu q BI OmA nU OnE OmA TfZ
:fNnU fI Nmie A .#eI TfZ l ,eI Piu q BI eI
36
(a) One, by the earlier method, which is called conversion and rejection. For
example, everything that we have seen [possessing] shape and form, we have seen [as]
having been made; and everything that we have seen [that is] without shape and form has
not been made. But this method is weak, for there may exist a thing that is [98] contrary
to this and [which] they have not seen; or it may be that all [things] are that way except
the sky for there are many things that have the same character, and among which there
is one contrary to all. Hence, from finding everything with a single exception with
the same character, it does not necessarily follow that that single exception also is of the
same character.
(b) Then some who were a bit more astute came to realize that this argument is
not very solid. Putting forward an alternative way, they deemed it to be thoroughly
correct and now adopt this stance: [99] They come up with this thing which they call
principle and enumerate all its properties insofar as they can. They say, for example, the
house has existence; stands by itself; possesses this or that character; is a body [endowed]
with form; and has been made. Its having been made is not due to existence (otherwise
every existent thing would have been made), nor is it due to its subsisting by itself
(otherwise everything that subsists by itself would have been made), nor is it due to this
or that [character]. Therefore its having been made is due to its being a body [endowed]
with form. Therefore [100] every body that is [endowed] with form has been made;
therefore the sky has been made.
Now this is a more seemly method, good in dialectic; however, it is not true or certain.
To elucidate the uncertainty of this [method] there exist ways that are more difficult, but
we shall show by means of a few simpler ways that this is uncertain.
(a) First, it may be that the judgment relating to that thing which they call
principle is not due to any cause, but rather due to, for example, houseness and in [the
character] of houseness there is nothing in common with the house.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
36
B ,fAa ej o Ai E ,eI jNr jI
q I j ,fe TfZ fe Piu q BI j$ : R
eI fBq Ajk ,OmA Onm j A .#eJ TfZ fe Piu
lVI eI B eI fBq ,fA ff BrA A bI / On l [98]
b eI BrA B ifA ,Y I fI Bl iBnI ,BmE
Ej fB KUA ,Y jI OmA E lU j NB kA o .
.eI Y E jI l E

Ai .On bm A fNnAe feI jNjk Nb Bn o
/ .fAeBNnA Ai jI A OmA Omie Obm fNqAf feiE je
fjrI Bu fiE s fAa uA Ai l A fBI [99]
OmA oI B ,OmA On Ba$ :R f .fAM B
Nn J kA sQfZ .OmA TfZ Omiv nU ,OmA iBNmBI
B j A) OmA nI B J kA ,(eI TfZ Nn j A) OmA
sQfZ o .OmA iBNmBI kA OmA kA ,(eI TfZ nI
o .eI TfZ iv nU j / o .Omiv nU OnE J kA [100]
.#OmA TfZ BmE

.On Y ,OmA ta fU ifA OmA jM fB j A
jNBmE Ai fI ,OmA jMiAqe OmBAi ,A B ej ff ifA
.OmA B A Af

J kA ,f uA Ai l E j Y fqBI : OnE Nnb
.eJ kBJA Ai Ba j Ba ifA ,eI Ba J kA R I eI JJm

37
(b) Another is that it is no easy task to enumerate all of the properties [of a thing]:
[101] an argument is needed [to show] that all of the properties have been enumerated
and none left out. But [the dialecticians] never concern themselves with this; rather, they
say, If a property has been left out, [then] it is up to you who are the opponent to say
[what it is]; yet my ignorance [of what property may have been left out] I who am, for
example, the opponent is no reason that it does not exist. Or they say, If [this property
which you claim has been omitted] existed, it would not have been hidden from you and
I; just as if an elephant were standing here, you and I would see it. This, too, does not
amount to anything, for there exist in things many characters that I seek, and that he also
seeks, which are not seen at once. But it never happens that when an elephant stands
right before someone, it goes unseen or that one is cast into doubt [about it]. These two
defects exist in this way.
[102] (c) Third is this: Let it be such that he has found all the characteristics for
example, the house has three characteristics, A, B, C. [However,] the division of the
causes is not merely into three, but many more. For example, the house has been made
either on account of A, or on account of B, or on account of C; or on account of
houseness and A, or houseness and B, or houseness and C; or on account of A and B, or
B and C, or A and C; or on account of houseness and A and B, or a similar combination
of one with the other. For it may be that on account of a single character there is no
judgment, but when they become two or three the judgment ensues. [103] For instance,
blackness comes from alum and gallnut; ten comes from four and six, and any one of
these alone does not [yield] that judgment. Hence all these divisions must be ruled out so
that [only] one remains.
(d) The fourth defect is this. Let us also grant [the following]: let us be
accommodating and suppose that the division [of the characteristics] are A, B, and C
one by one, and no other. And let us concede that it is neither from A nor from B: [104]
[in that case] it does not of necessity follow that [the judgment] comes from C, in the
sense that wherever there is a C, [there too] the judgment is. For it may be that C has two
parts: one part that is the cause of that judgment, and another part that is not; and just
because A and B do not yield this judgment it does not of necessity follow that it comes
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
37
Bu fBI NVY /:OmA BmE iB Bu ejq E je [101]
I ,fqBJ r fI lj BrA .OmfB u Omejq
R NnAeB ,#va M I fBI OmfB u jA$ :f
fq M jI jI ,eI jA$ :f B .On On E e va
l l A .#ffI M ,eI eBNnA BVA jA B ,eJ
ifA ,f K l A K Bl ifA eI iBnI ,On
Ai A tfJ eI eBNnA n r s eJ lj .fJ O
/ .Ai ifA On K e A .fNA q

:eI u m Ai Ba R - OB u AeBI :E m [102]
R ;eI jNrI iBnI ,oI eI m BN On .BI iBNmBI
J kA B ;BI J kA B ,iBNmBI J kA B ,eI J kA B TfZ Ba
kA B ;BI Ba J kA B ,iBNmBI Ba J kA B , Ba
B ;BI J kA B ,BI iBNmBI J kA B ,iBNmBI J
J kA fBq ;je BI KjM iBNmBI Ba J kA
B / .fq m B ,fE Y fq e ,eJ Y Ai [103]
.eJ Y E BM Ai j sq iB kA fE e kB Ak kA fE Bm
.fB BM f BI Ai BnA A fBI o

BnA iAf j BmE n l A : OnE K iB
nM .On je ,B B ,OmA BI iBNmBI OmA
BI kA fB KUA / :OmAi iBNmBI kA OmA kA [104]
BI fBq Ajk .eI Y E eI BI BV j FI ,eI
Y A AfI .eJ n eI Y E O n :eI n e
Ajk .eI BI n e j kA fB KUA ,On Ai iBNmBI Ai
38
from both parts of C . For once it has become evident that the cause is outside of A and
B, it does not of necessity follow that everything that is outside of A and B is a cause.
Indeed, the cause does reside in that characteristic which is outside of A and B, and it
does not depart from there. However, it may be that the one remaining characteristic is of
two kinds, [105] and one of its kinds is not a cause, while the other is a cause. For
instance, if at first these four divisions were made: A, B, C
1
, and C
2
, and it was again
established that the cause was not A or B, it would not of necessity follow that each of
the remaining Cs is a cause; it would, however, be one of these two Cs. Similarly, now
that three parts are made and C is taken as a whole, it does not of necessity follow that
because it was not divided every C is a cause. Indeed, the cause does reside within the
totality of things that are C, but not every C [is a cause].
It thus becomes manifest for this reason that this way is not certain, but that [106] it is
good in dialectic, for the superficial and the mass of people do not know the defect of this
and accept it.

25. Explication of the Form and Matter of the Syllogism
The form of the syllogism is this conjunction and composition that occurs among the
premises, as has been said. As for the matter of the syllogism, [these] are the premises:
the more solid they are, the more solid the syllogism is. [107] Syllogisms are, in form,
all of one kind; however, not all consist of true premises, for there are many syllogisms
whose premises are [based] on opinion and not on truth.
In sum, the premises of any syllogism are one of two [kinds].
(a) Either they are premises that have first been established by a syllogism or an
argument (in truth or in opinion), and when they have been established, they are then
made the premise of the syllogism, for they have not been accepted in themselves and it
is possible for someone to doubt them.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
38
j fB KUA ,OmA iBNmBI kA jI fE ff O
jI eI u AifA O ,iE .eI O eI iBNmBI jI
e eI fB u E fBq .fV BVE kA ,eI iBNmBI
A kA jA B .eI O eJ O kA ,eI / [105]
BI iBNmBI :fej iB On A
fB KUA ,On iBNmBI O fq Omie kBI ,B BI
.eI BI e kA ;eI O eI fB BI Af j
AfI fB KUA ,Oj VI Ai BI ,ej On m A
OmBl U A ifA O ,iE .eI O BI j ej On
.BI j ,fA BI

,Om fU ifA / ,OmA Ai A eq KJm fI o [106]
.fjhI fAf A K ej B jB

pB PeB pB Piu ej Af (25)
N B ,fNA PBf B ifA eI DM AjNA A pB Piu
.eI jM Omie pB eI jM Omie fj ,fI PBf pB PeB BA .fE
,fI OmAi MBf kA ,fI PivI BmB / [107]
.fI OZI fI BI BrA PBf fI BmB iBnI

:eJ jI e kA mB j PBf VI
OZI) fI ej Omie NVY mBI Onb AjBrA fI MBf B
,f pB f Ai BrA BE fI ej Omie Ai BrA ,(BI B
.n f q BrA ifA fBq ,fA Njh sa oI AjBrA Ajk
39
[108] (b) Or they are premises that have been accepted as such, on the ground that they
are in themselves true.
Whenever the premises of the syllogism are such as the former type we stated [i.e. (a)],
they will have necessarily been established by means of other premises. But there is a
limit to this [procedure] and it reaches premises that are not established by other
premises; these are in truth principles. If they are good, true and right, the syllogisms
built on them will be right and true. But if they are false, that which has been built on
them would be false. Therefore, once we know the types of these primitive premises, we
would know the types of the principles of syllogisms and the matters of the syllogisms so
that [we would know] which are demonstrative, which dialectical, which sophistical,
[109] which rhetorical, and which poetic.

26. Exposition of the types of Primitive Premises in Syllogisms
The premises that are adopted and employed in syllogisms, without being established by
any argument, are of thirteen kinds: (i) the primary; (ii) the perceptible; [110] (iii) the
experiential; (iv) the transmitted; (v) those premises whose syllogism is always present to
the mind; (vi) [premises apprehended by] the estimative [faculty]; (vii) the widely-known
(in truth); (viii) [premises] accepted [on trust]; (ix) the indisputable; (x) the specious; (xi)
the widely-known (in appearance); (xii) the [premises based on] suspicion; (xiii) the
imaginary.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
39
ea BrA Y E jI ,fqBI Nj AjBrA fI MBf B [108]
.fA Omie

AjBrA Ej ,N r n ifA fqBI B pB PBf Bj
BrA fmi MBfI ,eI jaE Ai A .fqBI ej Omie je MBfI
Y fI jA .fI uA OZI BrA f Omie PBf jfI Ai
,fI BI jA .fI Y Omie fqBI ej BI BrA jI BmB ,Omie
r PBf A BnA o .fqBI BI fqBI ej BI BrA jI E
OnAf BjI BM ,AfI BmB BMeB BmB BuA BnA ,AfI
.OnAf jq OnAf IBa OnAf / B OnAf fU [109]

BmB ifA r PBf BNn e kBI (26)
Omie NVZI AjE E I ,fjI iBI fjI BmB ifA B f kA
:fA elm ,f
<4> ,PBIjVM <3> / ,PBmnZ <2> ,PBA <1> [110]
,r eI jyBY ifA BrAjI pB PBf E <5> ,PAjMAN
,PJ <8> ,OZI PAir <7> ,PB <6>
,jBI PAir <11> ,PBJr <10> ,PBn <9>
.PbN <13> ,PB <12>

40
(i) The Primary
As for the primary premises, they are those which reason first renders necessary in man;
[111] he cannot doubt them and does not know of ever having doubted them. If he
imagines that he came into this world all at once, with his reason the same as it is, neither
hearing nor learning anything other than someones teaching him the meaning of both
parts of that premise until he conceives it; and [if] he then wanted not to assent and to
doubt he could not doubt. Thus, for example, if he knew at that time, by conception,
what whole is and what part is; and [if he knew] what bigger is, and what smaller is, he
would not be able [112] to withhold assent to the fact that the whole is greater than the
part; similarly, he could not doubt that things that are equal to the same thing, are
themselves also equal to one another [and this] not on account of the estimative
declaring it thus, as we shall remark later.

(ii) The Perceptible
As for perceptible premises, they are those premises whose truth we know through
sensation. [113] For example, we say, the sun rises and sets; the moon waxes and
wanes.

(iii) The Experiential
The experiential are those premises which can be known neither by reason alone, nor by
sensation alone, but which can be known by means of both [together]. For instance, each
time when sensation perceives an action from a thing (or one of its states), and perceives
it in that way on every occasion, reason knows that it is not because of chance, or else it
would not always be the case, and would not be [for the most part]. An example of it is
the burning [action] of fire, [114] or the secretion of bile [induced by] scammony, and
whatever is similar to this.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
40
PBA <1>
fAN / ;f KUA AiA ej ifA A eja eI E PBA PBf BA [111]
q E ifA eI N lj fAf ,f q ifA ej
l ,ejbI B ,fE B A ifA Oe I eiAf jA .OqAe
fkBI f E lU e j Ai A n A ,OaB l fr
.ej fAN q - f q f fvM OmAa kBI ,ej ivM BM
lU ,eI O E ifA ivM ZI NnAfI jA ,R B
f fvM / ej NnAN ,eI jMeja ,eI jNilI ,eI [112]
Bl j ej q NnAN ,OmlU kA jN AfI
AjE J kA - fI jf jIAjI l BrA ,fI l jIAjI
. eB jNnm B ,fBj

PBmnZ <2>
.qBI NnAe oZI BrA NmAi fI PBf E PBmnZ PBf BA
.#fBI fAlI B$ ,#eq j fEjI LBNE$ : B / [113]

PBIjV <3>
;oY BNI NnAe fBrI eja BNI fI PBf E PBIjV
,fI iBI j l kA oY B .NnAe fBq e jI
OnBMA KJm kA eja fAe ,fI B BiBI fI BY Ai A B
/ sME Nam B BR .eJ BY jNrI eJ r A
.fB fI j ,Ai Aju Bm ej BmA [114]

41
(iv) The Transmitted
As for the transmitted, they are those premises that have been established for reason on
[the basis of] the testimony of many people. For instance, we know that in the world
there is Cairo and Baghdad, although we have not seen them. The condition for the
transmission [of a tradition] is that no doubt enter into it; everything concerning which
doubt can occur to someone, is not yet a transmitted [tradition] for that person. [115]
Hence it is not becoming for someone to say, You must assent to such-and-such a thing,
for the judgment of this is the same as the judgment of another thing which you have
affirmed; for if it were the case that the judgment of [this thing] were the same as the
judgment of that [other thing], we would not be able to doubt, just as we were not able to
in [the one case]. Transmitted [tradition] produces certainty in its own truth, so that the
hearer does not need to ponder about the speakers. [116]

(v) Premises that have syllogisms with themselves in nature
Some premises that have need of a syllogism are such that their syllogism can be
obtained through seeking [for it]. The seeking for a syllogism is the seeking for the
middle term, because the minor and the major terms are themselves [already] present in
the problem.

Some [syllogisms] are such that whenever the premise is recalled, the middle term is
recalled; for instance, you know at once that odd is one less than even. Not [117]
everyone in whose nature a syllogism is found knows what it is, or is able to express it in
words; however, by his own reason he knows correctly what its conclusion is.

(vi) [Premises apprehended by] the estimative [faculty]
Estimative [premises] are those false but extremely powerful premises in the soul,
regarding which the soul cannot at first fall into doubt. Their cause is the estimative
faculty, not the intellect; and they are of such an order that two states result.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
41
PAjMAN <4>
,Ai ejaj eI fq Omie o iBnI AI eI MBf E PAjMAN BA
jq .A ff f j ,eAfI Omjv BU ifA A NnAe B
o eBNA fAM q BI l j ,fN q ifA OnE jMAM
fI fBI$ : f fmj Ai n o /.eJ jMAM k Ai oE ,Ai [115]
,#fj I E kA ,OmA l je Y Y ,jI l
B ,ej q NnAN ,eI E Y Y eI B jA
OUBY Ai fq B ,fA ea OZI jMAM .NnAN E ifA
/.f DM Bf ifA fB

J ifA fiAe Nra BI pB MBf <5> [116]
Ai BrA pB fA B OmA OUBY pBI Ai BrA PBf kA zI
fY Ajk ,OmA B fY K ,pB K .eiE fBq OmfI KI
.fI jyBY n ifA ea fY

ie B ,fE eB mA fY ,fE eB f B j eI E zI
J ifA o j / ,eI I OU kA B AfI OBm [117]
sa ejbI ,N fANI BIlI B ,eI fAe eq Af mB
.eI VN AjE fAfI OmifI

PB <6>
ifA o B ,o ifA Obm ,BI fI MBf E PB
eI BBU AfI , eI E KJm .ej fAN q iB BI
.eI eBNA BYe AiA

42
(a) One is that reason does not have any judgment regarding them so that it [can]
then know by means of an argument; thus reason is silent about them.
[118] (b) The other is that the estimative [faculty] wishes to know that thing on the
basis of sensible [things], whereas that thing is not sensible, for it is prior to the sensible
and is not perceived by the estimative because only the sensible enters the estimative.
And what wonder is it that something does not enter the estimative, for the estimative
itself does not enter the estimative.

The estimative does not bring a contrary against anything that is primary in the intellect;
thus, it does not introduce any doubt about [the fact] that the whole is greater than the
part. Hence when the existence of things that are contrary to the sensible is established
by way of the primary [things], the estimative grants the premises but does not grant the
conclusion, because it is contrary to its capacity. [119] For example, the estimative says,
Anything to which one cannot point, viz., where it is, and which cannot be [either]
outside of the world or inside it, that thing does not exist. And it says, there is no
alternative but that outside the world there be either void or plenum. And, it is not
possible that a thing become greater than it is other than by an increase coming to it from
the outside or by there arising within it spaces. But the argument of reason itself
establishes that these are all false.

[120] (vii) The widely-known
As for the widely-known (which have [nothing] other than being widely-known), they are
premises which the mass of men and those like them consider to be primary in the nature
of reason, while it is not thus. However, from his childhood on man hears them, and all
[121] or most cities are in agreement regarding them.
[These premises are] either (a) something which the intellect does not [declare]
necessary by its first nature, but [which] mans habitude [does declare necessary]; such as
the concepts of shame and mercy and everything similar.
Or (b) the cause of [these premises] is induction.
Or (c) their cause is that there exists an intricate condition whereby the condition
of the state and the judgment alter. However, that condition being intricate, the mass of
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
42
ifA eja o ,fAfI OVZI BE BM eJ Y A ifA Ai eja
/.eI tBa
l E ,fAe PBmnZ Y jI Ai l E fAa eI E je [118]
lU Ajk ,fB ifA ifA eI pnZ kA s ,eJ pnZ
,fB ifA l eI KV .fB ifA pnZ
.fB ifA ea

ifA eiB q B ,eiB a Ai A ,OnA ifA l j
Bl Nn eq Omie PBA Ai kA o .lU kA eI jN E
,f nM Ai VN f nM Ai PBf ,fmnZ bI BrA
PiBqA I j$ : f B / .OmA sAM a Ajk [119]
l E ,eI B ifA B eI B jI fBr ,OmBV ej AN
fBr$ ,#eI B eI a B jI On iB$: f .#eJ
ifA B fmi I jI kA MeBk FI A ,eq jN On E kA l
/.OmA BI A f Omie ea eja OVY .#fNA BUj B

PAir <7> [120]
B fB B fA MBf ,fiAf ir lU PAir BA
e kA ;eI B ,OmiB BI eja J ifA ,fiAf
.fqBI ej BMA E jI ,Bjq jNrI B / ,Bjq eq E ej [121]
jq kA ,ej a ,J BI f KUA eI l B
.fB fI j OYi
.eI AjNmA KJm B
eejjI Y BY jq AfI eI iBI jq BVE eI E KJm B
BR .ejI jq I B o ,fAf ej B eI iBI jq E
43
men do not know it, hence they accept it thus unconditionally. An example of the
widely-known [premises] is when it is said, justice is necessary, or it is not fitting to
tell lies; or for instance when it is said, one ought not to expose ones nakedness in
front of [other] people, [122] or an innocent person ought not to be harmed. Or when
it is said, God is capable of everything and knows everything. Among these [widely-
known opinions], some are true, such as the former examples; but their truth becomes
established by argument. If man imagines that he has come into this world all at once,
endowed with reason, and strives to doubt [the truth of these premises], he could doubt
[them]. And some are false, except conditionally. For example, it cannot be said, [123]
God has power over the impossible; He is a knower and cognizant of [the fact] that he
has a companion.

There are many widely-known [things] that are pure falsehood, while [some] widely-
known [things] are superior to others. Some widely-known [things] are the same for all
people, as when it is said, lying is disgraceful; and some are widely-known among a
[particular] group, just as among doctors they are one thing, among astronomers another,
among craftsmen another, and others for other trades. The contradictory of the true is the
false, while the contradictory of the widely-known is the base. In sum, the widely-known
is that which the mass of men accept; however, those which [124] are widely-known and
no more are these premises and what resembles these premises. Hence if you take the
true widely-known absolutely, the primary [things], some of the sensible [things], the
experiential [things] and the transmitted [things] would be widely-known [things].
However, there is [another class of] widely-known besides these, as has been said.

(viii) Premises accepted [on trust]
The premises accepted [on trust] are those that are received from a virtuous and wise
person, possess firmness, and are neither primary nor perceptible.

(ix) The Indisputable
The indisputable are those premises which, once the opponent concedes them, you then
use them against him, [125] whether they be true or widely-known or accepted or not.
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
43
B #N fBr ie$ ,#OnJUA eAe$:f eI B PAir
,#eikE fBJ B I Ai o$ ,#eBr fBJ/Pi ,Bej s$:f [122]
zI U kA .#fAe Ai l j OmieB l j jI Afa$:f B
jA .eq Omie OVZI sNmAi ,r BBR B ,OmA OmAi
fU ,eI eja BI ,fq uBY Oe I BU ifA eiBA B ej
fBr B ,jrI A OmA ie zI .ej q fAM ,f q f
.#OmiB Ai FI BAe OmA B ,BZ jI OmA ieB Afa$ : /N [123]

.eI jM ir kA ir ,eI ju ie eI ir iBnI
.OmA Oqk ie f B ,eI Bn Ai ej j PAir kA zI
eI je Bql B ie B ,eI j B ie PAir kA zI
BI Y | .je Ai je r je Ajeie je BV BifA
fjhI ej B eI E ir VI .q ir | eI
o .PBf A fB fI PBf A ,oI eI sir /E [124]
PAjMAN PBIjV PBmnZ iB PBA ,j BI Ai Y ir
.fE N A ,eI BrA kA jI eI ir fI ir

PJ <8>
iANmA ,Y yB n kA fq Njh fI MBf PJ BA
.pnZ fI A ,fqBI NqAe

PBn <9>
/ ,iAe iBI jI o ,f nM va fI B f E PBn
M ir PBn .tBJ Aa tBI J B ir B Y Aa [125]
.ej OBU n PAir ,OmA va fA
44
The indisputable [premises] are the widely-known of one person, who is the opponent,
while the widely-known are [those premises] granted by the totality of men.

(x) The Specious
The specious are premises which by deceit present themselves as true, or widely-known,
or accepted, or indisputable, or resembling these, without in reality being them.

(xi) The Widely-known in appearance
The widely-known in appearance are those premises that upon first hearing them [126] it
is imagined that they are widely-known; but when you look at the truth, they are not
widely-known. For example, it is said, you must aid your friend in truth and in
falsehood. On a first hearing, it [is acceptable], but when it has been well thought
through with oneself, it is realized that it is not widely-known, for the widely-known is
contrary to it, viz., that one must not aid anyone, whether friend or enemy, in falsehood.

(xii) The Premises based on Suspicion
The premises based on suspicion are premises that become accepted through the
domination of doubt, [127] while reason knows that it may be that they are not true. For
example, someone says, so-and-so is lurking around the neighborhood at night, so he
has some mischief in mind; or so-and-so has sent a message to our enemy, so he is
engaged in enmity with us.

(xiii) The Imaginary
The imaginary are those premises that move the soul so that it covets something or is
repelled from something. It may be that the soul knows that they are false, as when
someone says to someone else, this thing that you are eating is bile that has been
thrown-up, while [in fact] the thing [in question] is honey. Although one knows that it
is false, [128] [ones] nature is repelled and does not want [the honey]. Hence the true
and the widely-known are also imagined; however, the purely imagined are such as these.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
44
PBJr <10>
ir B fA Y BrA fB ZI fI MBf PBJr BA
.fI BrA OZI fB BrBI E B n B J B fA

jBI PAir <11>
fNA / fq BI fI PBf E ,jBI PAir BA [126]
fBI$ :f B .fI ir jI OZI ,fir BrA
o ,fNA iBI fq BI ,# iB BI ZI Ai sa Ome
a ir ,On ir fE NnAe ,ea BI fE frfA
.ej iB BI jI eI qe B eI Ome Ai o fBJ ,OmA

PB <12>
fBq fAe eja /,fE Njh B JI fI MBf PB BA [127]
bM o ,eej OZ ej KrI $ :f n B ,eJ Omie
B BqfI o ,OmeBNmj B B qfI $ ,eiAe jm ifA
.#Onr

Pb <13>
l kA B eiE xjY l jI BM fBJVI Ai o fA MBf E Pb BA
: Ai n f n B ,fA ie fAe o fqBI .ej Pj
f j ,eI JA l E #OmeiEjI Aju ia M l A$
,eI b l ir Y o .fAb ej Pj J / Onie fAe [128]
.eI A ju b

45
27. Explication of the Status of these Premises
Primary [premises], perceptible [premises], experiential [premises], transmitted
[premises] and those [premises] whose syllogism is in [ones] nature are [all] premises of
the demonstrative syllogism. The use of demonstration is [the attainment of] certainty
and the discovery of truth. Widely-known and indisputable [premises] are premises of
the dialectical syllogism. There is no doubt that primary [premises] and everything that
was enumerated along with them, if [employed] in dialectic, it would be better. [129]
However, they do not occur in dialectic insofar as they are true but insofar as they are
widely-known and indisputable.

Now, dialectic has several uses.
(a) One is that [in the case of] those meddlesome prattlers who lay claim to
science, who have incorrect doctrines, and who proceed on an arduous path, you [can], by
knowing the truth via demonstration, demolish them by dialectic.
(b) Another is that if there are people whom you wish to persuade of some truth
or some expediency, and whom you cannot [persuade] by means of demonstration, you
[would be able to] induce belief in them by means of dialectic and the widely-known.
[130] (c) Third is that the students of the particular sciences (such as geometry,
medicine, physics and everything similar) have principles to conform to [which] are
established by other sciences (and ultimately the principles of all sciences are established
by metaphysics). Consequently, the student is then not satisfied; [but] when you prove
those principles to him by means of dialectical syllogisms, he becomes satisfied.
(d) Fourth is that with the power of dialectical syllogisms one can prove both
what is the case [131] and what is not the case. Hence, when in a problem dialectical
syllogisms are brought in [to prove] what is the case, and other syllogisms are brought in
[to prove] what is not the case, and those syllogisms are considered well, it may finally
turn out that the truth comes to be disclosed among them.

But as for how the principles of dialectic can be known and its art acquired, it is of no
concern to us in this book where our aim is the truth.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
45
PBf A BBBU ej Af (27)
pB f ,eI J ifA pB E jMAN IjVM pnZ A
PBn PAir .Y ej Af OmA BjI fB .eI BjI
ifA jA ,fE ejq BI j A On q ,fA fU pB f
,fA Y fU ifA fNA AjE OU kA ;eI /jNI ,fI fU [129]
.fA n fir AjE OU kA

:OmB fB Ai fUj
Ai fiAe OmAiB BJh ,f sAe e Bz OnE
.rI Ai BrA ,fVI o ,BjI Ai kA Y NnAfI ,fjI iAqe

B ,f teBNA BrA Aa Y fI Bn jA E je
/.A eBNA Ai BrA PAir fU AjI ,AN BjI AjI ,NZv

j PBJ K mf ) lU B BfkE OnE m [130]
BuA )eq Omie je BI fNI eI BuA Ai BrA ,(fB fI
ta BE e Ai fkE o .(eq Omie JA fI B I jaE B
.eq ta e , PBJQA jI Ai BuA E fU pBI ,eJ

On ,ej / PBJQA AM Ai On fU pB PI OnE iB [131]
,On jI BmB ,On jI fE eiE fU BmB n ifA o .Ai
.fE Af B E ifA Y fqBI jaE ,fE ej DM BmB E

Ai B ,ej Kn OBu NnAe fU uA AM E BA
.On iBI OmA Y ifA B eAj LBN ifA
46
As for the premises of the estimative [faculty] and the specious, they are the premises of
sophistical and fallacious syllogisms. In sophistical and fallacious syllogisms there is no
use [132] other than injury. Or if there is a use, it is that you [can] test someone who is
making a claim as to whether he knows or does not know; in that case it is called
probative syllogism. Or else [its use] is to rebuke the artless pretender, so that people do
not learn from him and recognize his rank; in that case it is called polemical syllogism.

As for the [premises that are] widely-known in appearance, the [premises] accepted [on
trust], and the premises based on suspicion, these are premises [belonging to] the
rhetorical syllogism. The use of rhetoric lies in the political governance of men, in the
branches of the religious law, [133] in giving counsel, enmity, censure, in praise and
blame, in magnifying or abbreviating speech, and everything resembling this. There is a
separate science and book [devoted] to rhetoric which is of no concern to us here. We
have recognized that if within the aims of rhetoric primary and widely-known [premises]
are used, it is well and good; however, it is not a condition that it must in every case be
such.

As for the imaginary, they are the premises of poetical syllogisms, and there is a
particular book [devoted] to it which is of no concern to us at present. If true premises
occur in poetry, [134] or widely-known [premises], it is not on account of truth that they
are employed, but on account of [their] imaginative [character].

Of all these syllogisms we are concerned with two sorts: the demonstrative in order that
we may use [them]; and the fallacious in order that we may avoid [them].

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
46
fI B Bnm pB PBf ,PBJr PB PBf BA
,eI fB jA .Bk A / On fB B Bnm pB ie [132]
pB Ai A BE ,fAf B fAe BM f e Ai n BkBI eI E
fkB kA Bej BM ,Ai j I e BkBI B .fAa BZNA
.fAa eB pB Ai BE ,fAfI OJMj

.fI IBa pB PBf ,PB PJ jBI PAir BA
Pir ifA / Ojq BaBq ifA ,eI ej OmBm ifA IBa fB [133]
ej eja bm ej ilI ifA s sBNm ifA LBN Ova
iBI BVA Ai B ,IBN OmA BAfU Ai IBa .fB fI j
,fE ejI iBI ir A ,IBa Byj ifA jA A NnAe .fB
.fBI B Ej On jq ,eI

A Ai B OnIBN uBa AjE ,fA jq pB PBf Pb BA
jI kA ,ir B /,fNA jq ifA OmAi PBf jA .On iBI [134]
.Ai bN jI kA ,fqBI fE iBI Ai NmAi

;iAe iBI BM - BjI :fE iBI LBI e BmB A U kA Ai B
. lj kA BM - B

47
28. Further Comment on the Account of Demonstration
Every demonstrative science is comprised of three things: one is called subject, one the
essential traits, and one the principles.

[135] The subject is the thing whose character is to be examined in that science; e.g. the
human body [is examined] in medicine, length in geometry, number in arithmetic, and
sound in the science of music. It is not necessary for the master of any one of such
sciences to establish that its subject exists. If the existence of the subject of the science is
evident, tant mieux; but if it is not, he establishes it in another science. However, there is
no alternative for him but to know the subject of his own science by definition.

Essential traits are those characteristics that fall [entirely] within the subject of that
science [and] which do not fall outside it; e.g., the triangular or the square with regard
to some quantities; [136] and straightness or crookedness with regard to some others
these traits are essential with regard to the subject of geometry. Or for example,
evenness and oddness (and everything similar) with regard to number; or harmony
and discordance with regard to sound; or health and illness with regard to the human
body. In every science it is necessary that first the definition of these things be known; as
for their existence, this is known at the end by reasoning, for these characters are the ones
which that science establishes.

As for the principles, these are the premises that are fundamental to that science; for the
student [137] must first affirm these principles in order that he may then know that
science.

Put otherwise, we say that every science has a subject, problems, and principles; [and] we
have [already] said what the principles and the subject are.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
47
Ai BjI SfY j `jq jNrI (28)
MAg iBQE Ai fAa y Ai :eI l m Ai BjI j j
/ .eBJ Ai

ql ej M B ,f BY ifA j E ifA eI lE y [135]
B ,Ai LBnY j iBq B ,Ai mf j kAfA B ,Ai
eJ k B kA j fAfa jI .Ai m j kAE
, B}J eI Af y Nn jA .On y f Omie
y E kA teJ iB ;f Omie ea je ifA ,eJ jA
.fmBrI fZI sa

,fN jI fNA E y ifA eI BNuBa E MAg iBQE BA
zI j NmAi B ,Ai / B kAfA zI j Ij SR B [136]
j B NU B ,Ai mf y j eI MAg BjQA A .Ai
B ,Ai kAE j iAkBmB iAkBm B ,Ai iBq j fB fI
Bl A fY BI fBI j ifA .Ai ej M j iBI Nmie
fI BBY E BBY A ,fAfI OVZI jaE ,BrA Nn BA ,fAfI
.f Omie Ai BrA E

eBJ FI Ai / fkE fqBI E uA fI MBf eBJ BA [137]
.fAfI Ai E BE BM fj fBJI Onb

eBJ OmA Bn OmA y Ai j je jI
.eI N y eBJ ;OmA

48
29. The Types of Problems in the Demonstrative Sciences
The subjects of the problems of the demonstrative sciences are either (a) part of the
subject of that science, or (b) they are part of the essential traits that we spoke of.

(a) If they are part of the subject of the science:
(i) Either they are the subject itself: e.g., in geometry it is said, every quantity is
[either] congruent with another [138] quantity of the same genus, or is incongruous, and
this is what is sought to be established; or e.g., it is said in arithmetic, every number is
the half of its two [neighbors], for both of them are of the same distance from it; just as 4
is the half of 5 and 3, 6 and 2, 7 and 1; and just as 5 is the half of 6 and 4, 3 and 7, 2 and
8, and 1 and 9.
(ii) Or they are the subject of the science [together] with a trait. For example, it
is said, every quantity that is incongruous with another quantity, is incongruous [139]
with all its congruents. For in this problem quantity has been taken [together] with
incongruent. Or e.g., it is said in the science of arithmetic, every number that you
divide in two, the [square] of its half is one quarter of the [square] of the whole of it; for
[here] number has been taken [together] with dividing in two in the subject.
(iii) Or they are a species of the subject of the science; e.g., it is said, Six is a
perfect number, for six is a species of number.
(iv) Or they are a species [together] with a trait; [140] e.g., it is said in geometry,
every straight line perpendicular to another straight line forms two right angles.

(b) Or they are an [essential] trait; e.g., it is said in geometry, [for] every triangle, its
three angles are equal to two right angles.

As for the predicate in the problems of the demonstrative sciences, it is an essential trait
specific to the essence of the subject of that science.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
48
BjI B Bn BnA (29)
kA B ,eI E y U kA BrA PBy B BjI B Bn
.N MAg iBQE U
:eI y U kA jA
/je iBr iAf j$: f mf ifA B ,eI y o B
B ,f Omie fAa A ,#BJ B ,eI ea oBV iAf [138]
ie Ai e j ,eI sa Aj e iBq j$: LBnY ifA f
,eI O ,e sq ,m W iB B ;eI kA
Or e OmA O m OmA iB sq W B
.#OmA OmA
,eI iAf BJ iAf j$:f B ,jQA BI eI y B
#BJ$ BI Ai #iAf$ n A ie ,#eI BiBr / BJ [139]
I Ljy , fI iBq j$:LBnY ifA f B .fNj
ifA fNj #ej e$ BI Ai #iBq$ ,#eI Ljy iB
.y
sq ,#OmA BM iBq sq$ :f B ,eI y kA B
.iBq kA OmA
jI Nn a j$ : mf ifA f B /,jQA BI eI B [140]
.#B e f Ak e fNnA Nn a

B e f Ak m RR j$ :mf ifA f B ,eI jQA B
.#fI

y PAgj xBa MAg eI jQA ,BjI Bn ifA Z BA
.Ai E
49
30. Explanation of the term Essential
as used in the Premises of Demonstrative [Sciences]
By essential here is not simply meant what we said earlier only; rather, that [141] is
meant and [more] besides. In sum, by essential is meant here something that belongs to
the essence. Either it is something that permeates the definition of its subject, and you
know that this [thing] belongs to the essence by itself. Or it is something in whose
definition the subject enters, in that the essence has the subject of the art in itself and not
on account of something that is more general (e.g., motion [belongs] to man not on
account of humanity but on account of corporeity, and corporeity is more general than
humanity), nor on account of a subject that is more particular than it (e.g., writing with
respect to body, which is on account of humanity, for as long as human does not exist,
body does not become writer). [142] However, it is like flat-nosedness [in relation] to the
nose, or straightness [in relation] to the line: for the nose is incorporated in the definition
of flat-nosed, as is the line in the definition of straightness.

In the problems of the demonstrative sciences the predicate is essential, and certainly no
extrinsic state is discussed or is made predicate: a geometer never looks to see whether
the straight line or the curved line is better, and he never looks to see whether the straight
is opposed or not to the curved, because goodness and opposition are not among the
essential [characters] of the line, and the subject of the science of geometry [143] is not
grasped in their definition; nor are they grasped in the definition of the subjects of the
problems of the science of geometry. Rather, in this case either the master of dialectics
speaks, or the scientific master, for essential goodness and opposition are his subject.

Consequently, the predicates of the problems of the demonstrative sciences are essential,
but not any essential; rather, this second essential, for the former essential is itself evident
in that it itself makes the subject evident. So why should the evident be sought for by
argument and demonstration?

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
49
f BjI PBf ifA MAg ej jnM (30)
fAa / E ,oI N jNr B fAa E BM MAhI BVA [141]
B .eI ea kA Ai PAg fAa l MAhI BVA VI .fAa E lU
ebI Ai PAgj A A NnAe fE ea y fY ifA eI l
OBu y PAg fE fY ifA y eI l B .eI ea
Ai ej sJU B) OmA jNB kA eI l jI kA eI ea kA Ai
,(ej kA OmA jNB nU ,OmA nU jI kA ,OmA ej jI kA
jI kA ,Ai nU jIe B) OmA jNuBa kA Ony jI kA
nA eI B / .(er jIe nU ,eJ BnA BM OnBnA [142]
.fE NmAi fY ifA a fE nA fY ifA I ,Ai a NmAi ,Ai I

f SZI Kj BY kA NJA ,eI MAg Z BjI Bn ifA
lj ,ej a B jM OmAi a ej pf lj .f Z AiA
BMAg kA fy Ajk ,eJ B eI fy Ai ej j OmAi ej
ifA BrA ,er Nj BrA fY ifA / mf y ,OmA a [143]
fU fAfa B BY ifA I ;fq Nj mf Bn PBy fY
.eI y MAg fy , fAfaB f bm

MAg A ,MAg j fI MAg BjI B Bn PZ o
.f Ai y ea eI ea r MAg Ajk ,e
?BjI OVZI ej K Ai fBq o

50
31. The [various] Types of Principles of Demonstration
and that which is Predicate in them
There are four principles and primary foundations in demonstrative science:

[144] (a) The definitions which at the outset are established as principles; e.g. the
definition of point, line, and figure in Euclids book.

(b) Primary premises and those [premises] other than primary, namely, those in
which there is no doubt; these are called axioms; e.g., in [Euclids] book it has been set
down as a principle that all things that are equal, their halves are equal; and if you
subtract from equals an equal [amount], those which remain would be equal.

(c) The posited principle which is the principle of the science and in which there
is doubt; [145] however, its truth [depends] on another science, and in this science it must
be taken by conformity; then it would be the posited principle which the student accepts
and [regarding which] there would not be for him a contrary belief.

(d) The postulate, and this is like the posited principle; however, the student has a
belief contrary to that principle, yet for the time being he forbears. The example of both
of these [sc. the postulate and the posited principle] are the principles one reads of in
Euclids book under the name of that which there is no choice but to agree upon; for
example, he says that you must accept that around every point [taken as] center [146] it
is possible to draw a circle. Here many people say that the circle does not exist in
reality, of course, nor is it possible that the circle exist in the way the geometers say, viz.,
that there is a center from which all straight lines [leading] to the periphery are equal.

These, then, are the [various] types of the principles of demonstrative science. It is
necessary that the predicates of the premises of the earlier principles be first. The first
[predicate] is [of a sort] that there is not a more general intermediary between it and the
subject. For example, animality and laughter in relation to man: he has each of them
without [147] a more general intermediary; and not like voluntary motion which man
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
50
eI Z BrA ifA E BjI eBJ BnA (31)
/ .fA iB BjI ifA A uA eBJ
a fY pfA LBN ifA B ,f uA AfNIBI BfY [144]
.q

Ai A ;On q BrA ifA VE kA ,A lU A PBf je
eB uA LBN E ifA B .fAa BU fAa iBN
jIAjI kA ,fI jIAjI BrA B fI jIAjI Bl j : OmfE
.fI jIAjI fBI BI ,jIAjI Bv

Nmie /,eI q ifA eI uA y uA m [145]
eI y uA BE Nj fBI fNI ifA ,eI je I
.eJ E Bb eBNA el ejhI AjE fkE

fkE eI E ,eI y uA ,OmA ieBv iB
A BR .O ifA f OZBn uA E a eiAe eBNA
On iB E BI fAa Ai pfA LBN ifA OmBuA E e j
lj j jI$ : jhI fBI f B ,jI ej BMA kA
,NJA On OZI jAe f ej iBnI BVA .#ej fBq / jAe [146]
fqBI slj ,f Bmf B eI eU jAe eI fBr
.fI jIAjI iBI kA OmAi Ba

r BuA PBf PZ .fA BjI BuA BnA A o
,jNB eJ mA y B B eI E A .fBI A
,jNB fA mA /I Ai j ,Ai ej Bfa iBU B [147]
51
possesses on account of animality, while animality is more general than humanity.

As for predicates of the premises that are not primary principles (those that have once
been the conclusion [of a syllogism] but have now become premises), it is possible that
they not be primary [predicates], but they must be essential and necessary if the problem
is to be necessary. For whenever the premises are not necessary, it is possible that their
judgment change; and if their judgment changes, then it is not incumbent upon reason to
assent to their conclusion; [148] hence their conclusion is not necessary.

The essential in the premises of demonstration are of both kinds, whereas in the problems
it is one kind, for it is possible that the middle term be the essential in the former [sense]
for the minor term. However, it is then not possible that the major term be essential in
the same [sense] for the middle term; otherwise, it would be essential also in this [sense]
for the minor, for the essential of the essential in this [sense] is essential. Hence it would
be essential in the conclusion and in the problem; and you [already] know that it is not
possible.

It is possible that the middle term be essential [in the] second [sense] for the minor, and
the major the essential [in the] former [sense] for the middle. And it is possible that both
be essential [149] in the second sense.

32. Exposition of the character of Demonstrative Syllogisms
What had to be said regarding the foundations, principles and problems has been said.
Now syllogisms must be spoken about. The demonstrative syllogism is of two kinds.

One is the true demonstrative, and it is called demonstration [of the reason] why (in
Arabic called demonstration of lima). The other is also a demonstration, but it is not a
demonstration [of the reason] why; rather, it is demonstration [150] of existence (in
Arabic called demonstration of anna).
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
51
ej kA iBU ;OmA iBU J kA Ai ej ,OmAbI sJU
.OmA jNB

fqBI eI VN iBJ ) eJ Nnb uA MBf PZ BA
ijy fI MAg fBI ,eI A fBq ,(fq f A
fBq fJ ijy PBf Bj ,eI fAa ijy n jA
VN I eja jI eJ KUA BE eejI BrA Y ,eejI BrA Y
.eJ ijy BrA VN o / ,ejI BrA [148]

fY fBq , Bn ifA ,eI ej BjI PBf ifA MAg
I fY fBr BE .Ai fYj eI r MAg mA
MAg MAg ,Ai j i jI eI MAg A ,Ai mA j eI MAg i
.fBr ANnAe eI MAg n VN ifA o .eI MAg ,i jI

mA j r MAg ,Ai j eI nm MAg mA fY fBq
.nm I fI / MAg e j fBq ,Ai [149]

BjI BmB BY ekBI (32)
BmB ifA A .fE N ,Bn eBJ uA ifA N OnBI E
.OmA e BjI pB .fE N bm fBI

.fAa BjI kBNI fAa Aj BjI AiA ,OmA Y BjI
OmA Nn/BjI ,On Aj BjI ,OmA BjI je [150]
.fAa C BjI kBNI
52
In sum, all demonstrations are demonstrations [of the reason] why, if by why is meant
the why of a belief or the why of a claim, for the middle term in every syllogism is
the cause of the belief in the conclusion. However, here we do not mean this [sense of]
why, rather, we mean the why of the state of the thing in its existence viz., why is it in
itself in this way? not why did you say such-and-such? For there are many times
when, by establishing [the answer to] why did you say [that]?, we know that what you
said exists; however, we do not know what the cause is that it is in that way.

For example, if someone says, at such-and-such a place there is a fire, and you ask him,
[151] Why did you say that?, and he answers you, saying, because there is smoke
there he has answered [the question] why did you say that? and has established that
there is a fire there. However, he has not established and not shown why fire has been
produced there and what the cause was. Thus the existence of smoke is the middle term;
however, it is the cause of existence in that you know that [the fire] exists, but it is not
the cause of the why of existence, so that you know why this fire that is there exists. Thus
if someone claims: such-and-such a thing will burn there, and you say, [152] Why did you say
that?, he says, Because there is a fire there and wherever there is fire things burn here he has
supplied both the why of speech and the why of existence. Hence this is called the demonstration
[of the reason] why (lima), and the former the demonstration of existence (anna).

The condition of the demonstration [of the reason] why (lima) is not that which is known
among the logicians, for they suppose that the middle term must in all circumstances be
the cause of the major term, just as fire (in the example we mentioned) is the cause of
burning. Rather, the middle term must be the cause of the existence of the major term in
the minor term, although it is not the cause of the major term, but is, for example, its
effect. However, it is because of [the middle term] that this major has been produced in
the minor, so that it is the cause of the why. [153] For example, you say, man is
animal; every animal is body, although body is the cause of animality, and animality is
not the cause of body. But animality is the cause that man is body, for corporeity belongs
first to animality and because of animality does it belong to man. For if animality existed
without corporeity, humanity would have been that way too.
:Nnb sbI - BrAe
52
Aj fAa eBNA Aj AjI jA ,fI Aj BjI BBjI VI
Aj A BVA ,eI VN eBNA O mBjI mA fY ,e
OmA Aj - Aa sNn ifA l BY Aj ,Aa
fEej Omie eI iBI iBnI ,#?N Aj$ - sa ebI
OmA KJm Af ,On N E AfI BM #?N Aj$
.OmA B

: / Ai A ,#OmA sME BBU I$ : f n jA R [151]
LAU ,#Omee BVE Ajk$ :f fe LAU AjM ;#?N Aj$
Af ej Omie ,OmA sME BVE ej Omie eAe #?N Aj$
mA fY ee eI o .OmeI KJm Omfq uBY BVE sME Aj ej
,On Nn Aj O ,On NnAe OmA Nn O ,OmA
l f e n jA o .OmAj OmBVE sME A AfI
sME BVE Ajk$ :f ,#?N Aj$/: M ,Nam fAbI BVE [152]
OmA N iBN Aj BVA ,#eknI Ai l eI sME BV j OmA
. C BjI Ai r ,fAa BjI Ai A o .Nn Aj

fBI B fY fiAf ,fAe B B OnE BjI jq
Nam O ej eB BR ifA sME B ,Ej eI fY O
f j , fY ifA eI fY eI O fBI mA fY I .OmA
AeI fq uBY KJnI eI R I eJ fY O
AYj OnAY ej$: B /.eI Aj KJm BM , ifA [153]
.On nU O AY OmA AY O nU fj ,#OmA nU
KJnI OmAi AYj nU Onb ,OmA nU ej OnE O AY
.eI B ej ,OnU I eI eU AY jA ,OmAi ej j AY
53
33. Explication of the types of Scientific Questions
Scientific questions are in all of four kinds: [154] (a) hal (is it?), asking about existence
and non-existence; (b) m (what?), asking about whatness; (c) ayyu (which?), asking
about whichness; (d) lima (why?), asking about the cause. As for how many?,
how?, when?, and where?, these do not fall within [the scope] of scientific
questions.

(a) The question hal (is it?) is of two kinds: One is when you ask, does such-
and-such a thing exist?; the other is when you ask, is such-and-such a thing this way?

(b) The question m is of two kinds: [155] One is when you say, what is the
meaning of the word you [used]?. For example, if someone says triangle, you will
say, what is the meaning of triangle? What do you mean by triangle?. The other is
when you say, what is the triangle in itself?

The first question of m (what?) is prior to hal (is it?), for first it is necessary that
you know what he is saying so that you can then concern yourself with whether it exists
or not. The other question of m (what?) is after hal (is it?), for as long as you do not
know if it exists, you do not say what is it?. The answer to the question m (what?)
is the explanation of the name or definition of the essence.

[156] (c) As for the question ayyu (which?), it asks either about [specific] difference
or property.

(d) As for the question lima (why?), it is of two kinds: One is, Why did you
say that?; the other is, Why is that?.

The question hal (is it?) and lima (why?) involve affirmation; the question m
(what?) and ayyu (which?) involve conception.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
53
KB BNn ej Af (33)
.fmj Nn Nn kA E ,#$ /.OmA iB BJ [154]
.fmj Af kA E ,#A$ K m .fmj l kA E ,#B$ je
#BV$ #$ #$ #f$ BA .fmj KJm kA E ,#$ K iB
.fN B BJ ifA

E je ;On l mjI :OmA e #$ K
.On l mjI

,#?M eI $ : OnE /:OmA e #B$ K [155]
Ab ?SR eI $: M ,#SR$f n R
#?sa oI ea SR eI $ : OnE je .#?SRI

AfI fBI Onb ,OmA #$ kA jNr #B$ kA r K
kA je #B$ K .On B On AfI q r BE BM f
.OmA l On qBI NnAf BM ,OmA #$ om
.PAg fY B ,eI B jnM #B$ K LAU

.uBa kA B ,fmj v kA B ,#A$ K BA [156]

Aj$ je ,#?N Aj$ : :OmA e #$ K BA
#?On

kA #A$ #B$ K ,fA fvM J kA #$ K #$ K
.fivM J
54
34. Directives giving Protection against Fallacies
Just as when we were teaching how definition and description must be done we gave
directives on how you [can] avoid [making] error [in] definition, so likewise since [157]
we have explicated how syllogism and demonstration are, we give directives by a few
principles so that there is protection from error in syllogism. There is no need to lengthen
out the speech and to mention all the causes of fallacy.

(a) The first thing is that you must become habituated to analyzing truly
complicated syllogisms so that you know quickly whether [a given] speech is a syllogism
and which syllogism it is, or whether it is not a syllogism.

(b) Another is that you divide the syllogism, analyze it to the limit, and consider
it so that the middle term is in the same respect and the same state in both premises; for if
[158] there is a little excess or defect the syllogism would not be a syllogism and there
would be error. For example, in conversion, if someone says, No house is in man, and
then again, No man is in the house, this speech would be false, [whereas] the
conversion of the universal negative must be true. The cause of this is that in the former
premise house was subject, and in man was predicate. And conversion consists in
your making the predicate, exactly as it is, the subject, and the subject, predicate. In the
original [proposition] man alone was not predicate, while house alone was the
subject. But in the conversion man alone became the subject, while house together
with in [became] the predicate. Consequently, a correct [conversion] did not result, for
one had to say, nothing that is in man is a house.

[159] (c) Third is that, when you have divided the syllogism, you consider it so that
there is no opposition between the major term and the minor, and between the two parts
of the conclusion. You must keep in mind the conditions of contradiction in such a
situation so that you know whether there is agreement or not.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
54
fe A PBB kA BNu (34)
Ba kA ej Ou ,ej fBI mi fY fkBI B
,eI BjI pB ej Af / l , lj fY [157]
fB OUBY .fNA A pB ifA kA BM f uBI Ou
.B LBJmA ej eBI bm fr kAifI

BM NmAjI NqE BmB ejI kBJI ej fBI PeB AjM OnE l A
.OmA pB B ,OmA pB Af OmA pB bm A AfI ek

jI mA fY BM ,jI jIkBI fY jnI vM Ai pB E je
,eI Bv PeBk BiAa/jA ,eI f e j ifA BY jI i [158]
: f n jA ,o ifA B .fNA eI pB pB
A ,#On Ba ifA ej $ : f kBI ,#On ej ifA Ba $
ifA OnE A KJm .eI OmAi fBI KBm o ,eI ie bm
eI E o .eI Z #ej ifA$ ,eI y #Ba$ r f
#ej$ BM uA ifA .Z Ai y , y I Ai Z
y #ej$ BM o ifA ,eI y #Ba$ BM ,eJ Z
N NnBI fE LAu jU ,Z #ifA$ BI #Ba$ ,fq
/.#On Ba eI ej ifA l $

fY B BM jI ,qBI ej vM Ai pB E m [159]
BBU ifA | Bjq fBI .eJ a VN iB e B
.On B On BMA AfI BM ,iAe eB

55
(d) Fourth is that [the meaning] of the terms be questioned. For there are many
times when there is a single term [160] with a double meaning, but it is supposed that it
has a single meaning and this is a great calamity. Therefore the meaning must be
adhered to, not the [given] term. This also is part of the conditions of contradiction, but
we have stated the use separately.

(e) Fifth is that it is necessary that no confusion occur at the place where a
pronoun is. For example, it is said, He did, where it may be that he refers to one
case, but it is thought to refer to another case. Likewise, it is said, He saw it, for it is
a pronoun referring to different cases. [161] For example, it is said, whoever has known
a thing, vey [he/she/it] is like what he knew. This term vey refers to the known and
the knower, and each of the two has a different meaning.

(f) Sixth is that you avoid the indefinite and not take it in place of the universal,
for there are many things which, if said as indefinite, reason becomes deceived and
accepts, while if said as universal, reason becomes awake and does not accept. For
example, it is said, someone who is a friend of your enemy is not your friend; it may be
that this [162] speech is accepted; but if this is made definite and it is said, everyone
who is a friend of the enemy, is an enemy, or no friend of the enemy is a friend,
reason does not accept [this] and says that it is not necessary that all be such.

(g) Seventh is that you consider the premises of the syllogism so that the cause of
your adherence to them is not that you, having thought to find their contradictory,
concede them because of your failure to discover [their contradictory] for it may be that
there is a contradictory for them but you have not found it. You then adhere [to the
premises] when you know that it is not possible that [163] they have a contradictory,
[and] not when you have not found it.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
55
,e eI / B eI iBnI ,fEfmj B kA E iB [160]
I fBI o .OmA ilI NE A OmA fE NqAf
Ai fB ,OmA | Bjq U ifA A .BI ,fE fjI
.NI AfU

,#ej $f B .fN Nb eI jy BU fBI E V
:f ;fiAf je BU eejkBI je BU #$ fqBI
B / .eejkBI Nb BBVI eI jy #q$ A ,#tffI$ [161]
#$ A ,#OnAe eI B ,OnAe Ai l j$ :f
.eI Nb Ai e j ,eejkBI fAfI NnAfI

eI l iBnI ,j BVI Ai lj kA E rq
eq iAfI eja f ,ejhI eq j eja fE N
fqBI ,#eJ M Ome ,eI Ome M qe BI n$ :f B ,ejh
n j$ : f f ivZ Ai A jA ,fE Njh bm /A [162]
ejh eja ,#eJ Ome ,qe Ome $ B #eI qe ,eI qe Ome
.fI On KUA f

eJ E BrBI fj KJm BM j ifA pB B f ifA E N
ej nM qBI NB ,IB | Ai BrA qBI frfA Nra
AfI j BE .qBI NB M eI | AjBrA eI - qBI
.NB M ,eI | Ai BrA / eI fBr [163]

56
(h) Eighth is that you see to it that you have not made of the problem (or of
something whose meaning is the meaning of the problem) its own premise by having
changed the term. For example, it is said, the reason that every moving [thing] must
have a mover is that nothing moves itself. This premise and problem have the same
meaning.

(i) Ninth is that you see to it that you do not establish one thing by another thing
which [164] itself is established by [the first thing]. For example, someone says, the
reason that the soul does not die is that it acts eternally. If again it is asked, Why does
it act eternally?, it is answered, because it does not die.

(j) Tenth is that you guard against taking the widely-known or the [apprehensions
of the estimative faculty] in place of the truth; and that you keep the indications that have
been said, so that if the premise is primary or true it becomes evident, and if it is other it
becomes evident. Hence you will be busy with true [premises], whether a true [premise]
whose truth does not need an argument [165] or whether a true [premise] that has been
established by argument and syllogism. You will make that the premise of the syllogism,
for whenever you know the syllogism, know and employ demonstration, and keep these
directives, you cannot make an error or know that you do not know.

Peace be upon the one who follows the right path

This is the end of the book of logic that was spoken of.
Next we shall speak regarding the higher science, i.e., the divine science.

:Nnb sbI - BrAe
56
fAej AfI qBI ej Nra f Ai n BM jI E Nr
E jI e$ : f B .OmA n Y Y l B qBI
n f A ,#fJV ea l OnE ,fBI fBJU Ai fJU j
.fA Y I

fAa Omie I / l E Omie lI Ai l BM jI E [164]
f iB Ae OnE ej o E jI e$ :f n B .fq
Ajk$ :f ,#?OmA f iB Ae Aj$ : fmjI kBI .#OmA
.#ej

E ;qBI Nj Y BVI Ai B Ai ir iAfB E e
ff eI Y B eI A f jA BM ,iAe B OmA fE N BN
sY Y Aa ,q r ZI o .fE ff eI je jA ,fE
f Ai E .Omfq Omie pB OVZI Y Aa / fBJ OVY Ai [165]
,iAeiBI NnAfI BjI ,qBI NnAe pB Bj , pB
.Af AfI B Ba ej AN ,iAe B BNu A

fA JMA nA

.fE N LBN jaE OnA
.A ,jI ifA bm om k

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