WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/18/2008

BOX: 00003 FOLDER: 0008 TAB: 1 DOC ID: 31205897

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 13

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Hurley's [FBI^File

DOCUMENT DATE: 05/21/2001 DOCUMENT TYPE: Letter

FROM: Rowley

TO: Mueller

SUBJECT: Letter from Rowley to Mueller re. Minneapolis Moussaoui Investigation

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
 Possible Lines of Inquiry for Team #6

FBI Counterterrorism Strategy [to the extent not covered by the Joint
Inquiry]
*How the FBI's Counterterrorism strategies are developed and implemented,
both at the Field and HQ level.

Possible interviews: Former Director Freeh, Director Mueller, former Executive

Assistant Director Dale Watson, former International Terrorism Section Chief
Michael Rolince, Executive Assistant Director Patrick D' Amuro, former Deputy
Executive Assistant Director Tim Caruso, selected Special Agents in Charge of
FBI Field Offices.

Possible document requests: FBI Counterterrorism strategy documents, 1998-

Present; Annual Field Office reports from selected FBI Field Offices, 1998-
Present.

*The role of the Justice Department, the White House, and the Director of
Central Intelligence in the FBI's Counterterrorism strategy, policy, and
budget.

Possible interviews: DOJ, White House, and FBI officials (listed in greater
detail on investigative plan).

Possible document requests: Policy statements, directive or guidance from DOJ

or the White House to FBI.

*The relative prioritization of Counterterrorism at the FBI.

Possible interviews and document requests: Similar list to #1

Headquarters vs. Field [to the extent not covered by the Joint Inquiry]

The ability of FBI HQ to set, guide, and enforce its Counterterrorism priorities;
the extent of field offices' autonomy in setting their own investigative priorities.

Field Offices' ability to reprogram and reassign personnel to and from

Counterterrorism.

Whether the FBI's management career track and promotion policies are affecting
HQ's ability to run an effective national Counterterrorism program.

The experience level of the FBI HQ program managers and Counterterrorism

executives.
 Possible interviews: Personnel who have served on the FBI's Special Agent
career boards, Selected FBI executives, Training Division personnel.

Possible document requests: Manual of Investigative and Operational

Guidelines, Manual of Administrative and Operational Procedures, statistical
reviews of counterterrorism-related experience of program managers and
executives, training documents.

Collection

^Initiation and operation of counterterrorism investigations.

How decisions to open an investigation are made, and the extent to which
investigative decisions are driven by either the Field or HQ counterterrorism
strategy.

The bases for determining whether to initiate as a criminal or intelligence

investigation.

The factors involved in decisions to convert an investigation from a "Preliminary

Inquiry" to a "Full Field Investigation," and HQ's role in this process.

The factors involved in the decisions to close investigations, and HQ's role in this
process.

Possible interviews: Selected counterterrorism HQ program managers,

Intelligence Operations Specialists, field agents, and field supervisory personnel.

Possible documents: MIOG and MAOP, case studies of how hijackers

associates' investigations were handled.

*Informants:

The extent to which informant development is emphasized, both by HQ and Field

Office management.

The training FBI agents receive in recruiting informants, both in New Agent
training and in in-services.

The factors involved in the decision as to whether to open/run the informant as an

informational or operational asset, and the importance of the distinctions.

Overall strategy, both at HQ and field level, in targeting recruitment efforts.

How tasking for informants is developed.

 The effectiveness of the FBI's efforts to recruit and retain FBI agents with
expertise in Arab language, culture, and history.

Obstacles to informant development, including internal FBI and DOJ guidelines,

and any external legal impediments.

Possible interviews: Training Division personnel, counterterrorism HQ and

Field managers and executives, counterterrorism field agents.

Possible documents: Documents outlining either HQ or Field recruitment

strategy, training curricula from new agent training and relevant in-services,
statistics on number of Arabic speaking agent personnel, statistics on numbers of
recruitments at selected field offices.

*Electronic Surveillance: FISA/Title III

How decision to employ FISAs of Title Ills in particular investigations are made,
both at Field and HQ level.

How FISA and Title III targets are selected and prioritized.

Overall effectiveness of FBI use of electronic surveillance.

Legal obstacles affecting the FBI's ability to effectively utilize these collection
techniques.

Possible interviews: DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review managers

and line attorneys, DOJ Office of Enforcement Operations managers and line
attorneys, attorneys from FBI's National Security Law Unit and from
Investigative Law Unit, counterterrorism managers.

Possible documents: Documents outlining FISA strategy or prioritization.

*Physical Surveillance

How decisions to employ physical surveillance are made in particular

investigations.

Availability of surveillance resources for counterterrorism investigations.

Possible interviews: Special Surveillance Group specialists and managers,

Counterterrorism field agents and program managers.

Possible documents: Policy documents relating to use of Special Surveillance

Group teams, statistics and other documents indicating how surveillance resources
were used.
*Other collection techniques, including National Security Letters and Subpoenas.

How these collection techniques are utilized, and any legal obstacles to
effective collection.

*Open source information, including private sector/data mining

How the FBI goes about collecting open source information, and how this
information is used in the course of its counterterrorism investigations.

The extent to which legal barriers are affecting the FBI's ability to collect and
utilize open source information.

Possible interviews: Officials from Choicepoint and Axiom, and from civil
liberties organizations, headquarters and field office analysts.

Possible documents: FBI policies on the collection and use of open source
information, documents on agreements reached between the FBI and these data
mining companies.

information from other federal agencies, state and local authorities, and foreign
governments.

What type of counterterrorism information the FBI receives from other entities.

How the FBI determines what information it needs from other entities, and the
way that this process works.

Obstacles which affect the FBI's ability to receive necessary information from
these other entities.

Possible interviews: Personnel from state/local law enforcement and other

federal agencies assigned to JTTFs, detailees from FBI to other federal agencies,
and from other federal agencies to the FBI.

Possible documents: Memoranda of Understanding between the FBI and these

other entities, Any JTTF strategy documents.

Processing

The FBI and DOJ policies for processing raw FISA and Title III information, who
is responsible for this processing, and how it actually occurs.
 The FBI and DOJ policies for processing other raw collection data, such as
foreign language documents, and surveillance logs, who is responsible for this
processing, and how it actually occurs.

The FBI's ability to process foreign language information in a timely fashion.

The FBI and DOJ policies for processing/documenting information derived from
interviews, and how this actually occurs.

The FBI and DOJ policies for processing/documenting information from

informants, and how this actually occurs.

How the FBI processes information provided by the private sector, and data
mining companies.

The FBI and DOJ policies for processing information derived from other
collection techniques, such as Pen Register/trap and trace.

Possible interviews: Field Office Language Specialists and their supervisors,

Field Agents and supervisors, field and Headquarters analysts.

Possible documents: Review documents from selected FISAs, Title Ills,

surveillance logs, and other raw collection data to track when it was collected and
when and how it was actually processed, review FBI policy documents relating to
processing.

Dissemination:
The FBI and DOJ policies for dissemination information derived from informants,
who is responsible for this dissemination, and how it actually occurs.

The FBI and DOJ policies for disseminating information derived from electronic
and physical surveillance, who is responsible for this dissemination, and how it
actually occurs.

The FBI and DOJ policies for disseminating other raw collection data, such as
foreign language documents, who is responsible for this dissemination, and how it
actually occurs.

The FBI and DOJ policies for dissemination of information provided by

state/local law enforcement, foreign governments, and other federal agencies.

The extent to which technological limitations are affecting the FBI's

dissemination capability.
 Whether the newly established Reports Officer program is improving the FBI
information dissemination capabilities.

The qualifications of and training for the Reports Officers.

The FBI's dissemination of intelligence information to national policymakers.

The quality and quantity of information dissemination by the FBI to other

agencies (from the other agencies' perspective).

Possible interviews: Field agents and their supervisors, headquarters

supervisors, analytic personnel, Reports Officers, personnel from other agencies
receiving FBI information, national policymakers, SCOPE and Trilogy user
group.

Possible documents: Review case files from hijackers' associates to determine

how information collected in the course of these investigations was actually
disseminated, review FBI and DOJ policy documents on these subjects,
documents from FBI to national policymakers and to other federal agencies.

Analysis:

The qualifications of and training for field and HQ analytic personnel.

The FBI's ability to recruit and retain top analytic personnel.

The role of the FBI HQ analysts; the role of the Field analysts.

The degree to which analysis is driving investigations and collection priorities.

The independence of the analytic entities from the operational elements, and their
ability to produce independent analytic judgments.

How strategic and tactical analytic priorities and established and implemented.

The analysts' role in validating information provided by its informants.

The FBI's ability to "mine" the data in its possession, and the use and
effectiveness of analytic software.

The FBI's ability to produce meaningful strategic analytic products to inform its
executives, foreign governments, the Intelligence Community, local/state law
enforcement, and the national policymakers.

The FBI's ability to produce tactical analytic products on specific investigations.

 The effectiveness of the recent analytic reforms.

Possible interviews: FBI field and HQ analysts and analytic managers, Office of
of Intelligence personnel, operational managers, field agents and supervisors,
"customers" from other agencies receiving FBI analytic products.

Possible documents: Documents establishing the Office of Intelligence, analytic

strategy documents, actual analytic products.

Collaboration/coordination with foreign governments

FBI and DOJ procedures and policies for responding to requests for information
from foreign governments, and how this process actually occurs.

The focus of the FBI Legal Attaches on counterterrorism matters, and their role in
the counterterrorism arena.

The FBI Legal Attaches' relationship with both their foreign law enforcement and
intelligence counterparts.

The FBI Legal Attaches' relationship with the CIA Stations and the Ambassadors.

The selection process for and qualifications of the Legal Attaches.

The Legats' ability to adequately cover the countries for which they are
responsible.

The adequacy of the resources devoted to the Legat program.

The ability of the Legats to use diplomatic pressure to advance investigative

interests.

The FBI's effectiveness in coordinating overseas investigations with their foreign

counterparts.

Possible interviews: Selected Legal Attaches, CIA Station personnel, State

Department personnel, Training Division, Legal Attache Career Board

Possible documents: MLATs, MOUs with CIA and State Department, FBI
Inspection documents.

Collaboration/Coordination with state/local law enforcement

Official agreements on coordination and collaboration between FBI and

state/local, both in and out of JTTF structure.
 The availability of security clearances for Police Chiefs and other police officials.

The effectiveness of the FBI's efforts to disseminate warnings and other relevant
information about possible terrorist activity to state/local law enforcement.

The role of state/local law enforcement on the JTTFs.

The extent to which the FBI and state/local have access to each others'
information databases.

The training provided for state/local officials on counterterrorism matters.

The FBI's ability to effectively task state/local law enforcement for relevant
information.

Possible interviews: Police chiefs and other officials, state/local law

enforcement serving on JTTFs, FBI field agents on JTTFs.

Possible documents: MOUs

Collaboration/coordination with other federal law enforcement and

intelligence agencies

The role of other federal agency personnel on the JTTFs.

The process through which the FBI tasks other federal agencies for terrorist-
related information.

The process through which the FBI responds to requests for information from
other federal agencies.

The role/coverage of detailees from the FBI to other federal agencies (and vice-
versa) and their ability to provide adequate coverage.

Obstacles to information sharing with other intelligence community agencies.

Possible interviews: personnel from other agencies assigned to JTTFs, personnel

from other agencies detailed to the FBI, FBI detailees to other federal agencies,
FBI executives, executives from other federal law enforcement and intelligence
agencies.

Possible documents: MOUs.

Domestic Intelligence Policy Issues

Other countries' structures for handling domestic intelligence responsibilities.

 The pros and cons of having separate intelligence and law enforcement entities.

What legal authorities a newly created domestic intelligence agency would need
to adequately investigate international terrorist activity.

The relationship between a newly created domestic intelligence agency and

federal and state law enforcement entities.

The relationship between a newly created domestic intelligence agency and the
Intelligence Community.
How the newly created domestic intelligence agency would go about collecting,
processing, analyzing and dissemination intelligence collected about possible
terrorist activity, and whether this would remedy systemic problems with the
current system.

Possible interviews: domestic intelligence policy experts, personnel from other

countries' intelligence agencies, U.S. Intelligence Community personnel.

Possible documents: documents relating to other countries' domestic

intelligence structures, authorities, and responsibilities.

Legal Issues and Authorities

Defer to Lance.
FBI FIELD OFFICE SITE VISITS

Possible interviews: case agents for hijackers' associates; international terrorism

squad/JTTF supervisor(s); Assistant Special Agent in Charge of International
Terrorism squad(s); Special Agent in Charge; Arabic Language Specialists;
Supervisor(s) of Language Specialist Squad(s); Special Surveillance Group
personnel; Special Surveillance Group squad supervisor; Special Operations
Group personnel; International Terrorism squad(s) rotor/file clerk; personnel from
other federal agencies assigned to JTTF; state/local law enforcement assigned to
JTTF; analytic personnel; analytic squad supervisor; personnel responsible for
Field Office's information technology systems.

Possible documents: case files from hijackers' associates investigations,

including relevant sub-files (surveillance logs, raw FISA/Title III information,
etc), Field Office policy/strategy documents, MOUs related to the JTTF, MIOG
and MAOP.

10
Mail:: INBOX: Doc Requests Page 1 of 1

51.02MB / 476.84MB (10.70%)

Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2003 16:09:50 -0400
From: "" <sallan@9-11commission.gov>^P
To: "" <mhurley@9-11commission.gov>4P
Subject: Doc Requests
Mike:

As requested here's the status of doc requests in case your are asked where
w e ' r e at.

DOJ #9:

Faith Burton said (last Thursday) they sent 1,000 pages responsive to our
request (no. 9-item 1). She has a small batch related to item 5 which she'll
be sending over this week.

FBI #9:

Spoke with Pat O'Brien this a.m. and I told him we recieved the doc. regarding
Mueller's briefings. He is still waiting for doc's to arrive from their
archives. Once recieved, they will review for responsiveness/classification
and then send our way. However, this may not be for a few weeks (at the very
least 2 weeks before we start seeing things). He was told by our F/0 to focus
on doc's related to the T6's ongoing field interviews and then concentrate on
T4's request. Looks like we are number 3 in line.

DoS #3:

Spoke with Jean McCray this a.m. as well. The doc's mentioned at last week's
meeting will be coming to us by week's end. It's mostly 7th Floor related--
and a lot of it (roughly 90,000 pages).

--S

http://kinesis.swishmail.com./webmail/imp/message.php?Horde=6e3f79a9fD2ffce501efa47a9... 8/13/03
 WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/18/2008

BOX: 00003 FOLDER: 0008 TAB: 2 DOC ID: 31205898

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 2

RESTRICTEDJ
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Hurley's [FBI] File

DOCUMENT DATE: 07/16/2003 DOCUMENT TYPE: Note/Notes

FROM:

TO:

SUBJECT: DOJ/FBI Role in CTP

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE