Fire detectlonand suppression systems in road tunnels Volume 1 -Summary Report

by G I Crabb (TRl Ltd), M J Bullock (ChHtern international Fira ltd) and R H Harse (Symonds Group ltd)

PRJIS/17A/01 3/340

TRL Ltd

PROJECT REPORT PRlIS/17 A/01

FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMSIN ROAD TUNNELS

by G I Crabb (TRL Ltd),

M J Bullock(Chiitern international Fire Ltd) and RH Harse(Symonds Group Lid)

Prepared for: Project Record: 3/340 Use Of Fire Sprinkler Type Systems In Road Tunnels Client: Quality Services, Civil Engineering, Highways Agency (Mr T Aloysius)

Copyright TRL LtdOctober 2002. Thls report preesred for me Highways Agency must not be referred to in any publication without the permlesion of !he Highways Agency. The views expreseed are those of the authors and not necessarily thoseof the Highways Agency.

Thls report bas been produced by TRL Ltd, under/as part of a Contract placed by the Highways Agency. Any views expressed are not necessarily those of the Agency.

TRl is committed tooptimising energy efficiency, reducing waste and promoting recycling and re-use. In support of theseenvironmental goals, this report has been printed on recycled paper, comprising 100% post-consumer waste, manufactured using a TCF (totaUy chlorine free) process.

CONTENTS
Page 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ABSTRAeT .............................................................................................................................. 5

1 Introduction 5 2 Defniition of fires 6 2.1 Frequency '" 6 2.2 Size; development and duration .................................................................................7 2.3 Spread 8 3 Types of tunnels ~ 8 3.1 Geometry 8 3.2 Design seenarios 9 4 Opraonal management .................................................................................................. 10 4.1 Detection of fires ................................................................;....................................11 4.2 Initial response to a fire ~ 11 4.3 ther actions '" 11 4.4 After an incident 12 4.5 Training, emergency exercises, safety management and review procedures 12 4.6 Operation of fire suppression equipment 12 4.7 Incident records '" 14 5 Objec~ves of fire suppression systems 14 6 Fire control systems ......................................................................................................... 16 6.1 Detection '" 16 6.2 Suppression................................................................................................................16 6.3 Sprinkler systems 17 6.4Pipework ...................................................................................................................17 6.5 J:>rainage. ; 18 6.6 Priorities for further research....................................................................................19 6.7 Pull-scale tests 20 7 Computer modellieg .......................................................................................................... 20 8 Risk management. , '" .................................................................22 9 Costsand benefits 23 9.1 Benohmark costs '" 24 9.2 Whole life costs 24 10 Conclusions 25 10.1 PrimaJ)'safety ~ ~ ~ ~~ 25 10.2 Escape facilities ~ 25 10.3 Tunneloperation 26 10.4 Priorities following the outbreak of a fire ................................................................. 26 10.5 Probabilities, costs and benefits 26 11 Recommendations 27 11.1 Case studies 27 11.2 Cemmunication and evacuetion 27 11.3 Deseetion and suppression 28 11.4 Full-scale tests 28 11.5 Computer modelling 28 12 References 29

13 Acknowledgements VOLUME 2 APPENDIX A

29

APPENDIXB APPENDIXC

APPENDIXD

Report by Chiltern International Fire AI-A79 Hydraulic Design Pro-forma Annex A1- Annex A6 Sketch schematic of sprinkler system ...................................... Annex B CFD modelling questionnaire ............................... ,.....Annex Cl - C45 Report by Symonds Group .................................................... BI - B29 Risk management. ........................................................................... 1 -14 Figure 4.1 ................................................................................... A l-C7 Figure 4.2 Cl - Cl5 Digital Equipment Corporatien v. Hampshire CC D1 - D5
lil plastic

[Appendices A,B, C and D are provided on a CD fitred into back ofthis volume ofthe report.] VOLUME 3 RECOMMENDATIONS FORFUTHERRESEARCH

waUetat the

CONTENTS
I 2 3 4 Al A 1.1 Al.2 A2 INTRODUCTION OPTION 1: ESTABLISHMENT OF FIRE TESTFACILITY INTHE UK QPTION 2: PAN-EUROPEAN PROGRAMME OF RESEARCH THEWAYFORWARD BACKGROUND Problems of defining research option Basis of'options OPTION 1: ESTABLISHMENT Of TEST FACILITY IN THE UK FOR FIRE RESEARCH A2.1 Genera! requirements A2.2 Test sectionsand equipment A2.3 Test equipment A2.4 Numerical Modelling A2.5Personnel A2.6 Reporting A2.7 Number ef trials A2.8 Timetable A2.9 eosts A3 OPTION2: PAN-EUROPEAN OF RESEARCH. A3.I . Genera! A3.2 Developing a research proposal A3.3 Testfacilities A3.4 Test programme A3.5 .Timtabl A3.6 Cost [Volume 3 is provided in separate covers]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PRIISI17A101: FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS IN ROAD TUNNELS: PHASE 1
by 0 1 Crabh (TRLLtd), M J Bulloek (Chiltern International Fire Limited) and RH
Harse (SYltlonds Group Limited) Project Reference: Project O(ficer: Project.Manager: 3/340 Use of fire sprinkler type systems in rood tunnels Mr T .Alpysius, Quality Services, Civil Engineering, Highways Agency Mr cr Crabb, TRLLtd

SCOPE OF TUE PROJECT

The objective of this first phase of the project is to provide theHighways Agency with adviee and recommendations on the use off1Xedfire suppression systems in. road tunnels. This phase was to investigate the capabilities ofcurrent fire detection and suppressin systems, their costs and benefits,experience of their use, andto. make recommendations for further research in the remaining two phases ofthe.proJect

SUMMARY OF REPORT
Method
Two sub...contractors assisted TRL in this investigation, Symonds Oroup . Ltd. was commisstoned to provide information on the classificationandfrequencyof.fires in road tunnels, together with aclassification of UK highway tunnels based on parameters that affect the installatien and use of firedetection andssppression systems within them, Chiltern International Fire Ltd was commissioned to provide informationon the operational management andcomputermodeUingof lires in road tunnels ... This included a review of the capabilities of current fire .detection. and suppression systems that might be used in road tunnels. The applicability of these systems was ranked through Value Engineering assessments. A wide-ranging lirerature review has been undertaken; of particularinterest were the results of fire tests in road tunnels. Case-history evidence was sought from tunnel operators, particularly these with experieaee ofthe useof'fixed suppression systems, A~s~ll1al1agen1entstudY\Vascompleted. Thisranked variousfn-escenariosfor road tunn~l~ in order.of risk:.this.was..derl~d.as.the.produet..of.au.assessed consequence prlorityanda probabilityofoccurrence.priority. However, becanse of the pancityof data for sueh extremely rare eveats, the findings aretentative. Results !he available dataindicate that, inthe UK, there are 4 fires per 108 vehicle kilomefres.For .the .'averageUK. tunnel', definedas850rn long. and .carrying46,OOO vehiclesper day,this equatesto a reported fire every 21 months.However, it should be noted that most fires are extmguished without any serieus risk to life or limbor to the continued operatien of the tunnel. The risk of a serious fire is tentatively estimated

to be 0.2 per 108 vehicle kilometres; this was based onthe fact that about 5% of fires are due.te vehiclecollisions. Thankfully, catastrophes, such as the Mont Blanc tunnel fire, aremuch rarer. Four classesof veniele fire loads are defined: car bus, lorry and hazardousload ..The last hasthe grestest potentiel fire loading: on average. the rate of hatrelease for this class is 150MW, the duration of the fire is an hour and the maximum temprature is 1200EC Thee classesoftunnel geometry relvantto the generationand snppression of'fireare defmed,and the implications of likely fire scenarios discussed' for each. For a variety of reaso,s, bi-directional tunnels pose a biggerproblem than uni-diretional ones, The order of priority for reeponding to a fire in a road tunnel was identified as; earlydetection ass~ssment (by trained personnel) aletting theemergency services cletand simple emergeaey'procedures cOl1ttol of ventilation effective traffic control provision of effective means of escape, and the use of fire suppression equipment

Available detectionand suppression techniques are described and ranked: the two mostprmising detectionsystems are;

1
2

linear heat dereetion by optical fihre,and digital image analysis of'clesedcireuit two mostpromising relevision (CCTV) images.

Similarly,the

suppression systems for further investigation were;

1
2

longitudinal jet fan ventilation with targeted manual' fire suppression (for unidirectional tunnels only), and water spray with fuel vapourabsorbenr additive.

A ValueEngineering analysis .identified iTIJNFIR.E'as tbe most . promising of the compu.ona.kt1uiddynamics<CFD)J11QdeUingacppli~tiQnscoIl$-id~e4.'I1s9uld he usedf following validationhy fun-seale trials, .to reduee ,the .wide variety of scenarios that would need te he investi~ted at full--scale. The fmdings ofthe study suggest that it would not he cost-effective, or indeed appropriate, to make it mandstory to equip all road tunnels in the UK with fixed fire supptessionsystems. Te reducethe. consequenees of afrre in aroadtutmel, effor! is hetterdirected at .improving incident detection, trafficconttolandcommunieaction withvehicle oeeupants,and, particularlyfor new tunnels; the provisionofemergency

egress,

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that an effeetive fire suppression system could have a pivotal role in substantially reducing the severity of a fire in a road tunnel. Such a system would have to be integrated with traffic control and oommunication systems, for example, into the overall management operatien for a tunnel. However, as it stands, a eonsiderable amount of research involving full-scale fire tests is required to investigate the cost-effeetiveness of fire suppression systems in road tunnels. The requirements of a research programme are discussed in Volume 3 of this project report.

IMPLEMENTATION
The next phase of this study should cover: A study of the road tunnels in the UK to determine the relative eostfbenefit ratios for various improvements 10 fire safety. An investigation, using a driving simulator, of the effectiveness of methods for commanieating with drivers, botb approaching a tunnel and in a tunnel where thereis a fire. This would cover signage, alarms, means of closing a tunnel, as well as in-tunnel communications. A review of the means and cost-benefits for collaborating with European partners to complete a programme of tests on dereetion and suppression systems. The use of Computational Huid Dynamies (CFD) for simulating tunnel fires and theirsuppression, and the validared of such calculations, as best can be, by the results of past, and perhaps new, full-scalefire tests.

FIRE DETECTION AND SYSTEMS IN ROAD TUNNELS

ABSTRACT

SUPPRESSION

Recent .serieus fires in tunnels on mainland Enrope have focussed attention on the safety ofroad. tunnels in the UK .. These fires demonstrated, quite graphically, the importance of early deteetion; incident planning and control; communicationbetween tunnel operators, emergency services and vehicle occupants; means of escape; and early andaccurate intervention to prevent a fire fromgrowing to theextent that oonditions. in the tunnel become dangerous, if not life-threatening, for its users and emergency services. This report provides the fmdingsofa study undertaken to assist the.Highways Agency plan further research into tunnel safety, particularly the applieability of fire suppression systems suehas sprinklers. AlLtbe important points Iisted above were considered. The study included anexamination of .. case records, the results from earlierresearch into tunnel fires,the stock of roadtunnels-in the UK, the frequency and sevent)' of tunnel fires, and tbe tecbniqaes available for detecting and suppressing fires and theconsequences of their use. The studyconfirmedtbat the probahilityofa serieus fire in a roadtunnel in the UK was extremely.low.lt was concluded that, with regard to tunnel safety, most benefit was likel)t toaccrue fromimprovements inoperational management, incident planning,fire detection, conununications systems andprovision of a means ofescape, At present, the installation of sprinklers does not seem to he warranted in most, if any, of theroadtunnels in theUK. As .envisaged from the outset,a detailed programme of research is required to investigate the cost-effeotiveaess offire .suppeession systerns in road tunnels. The requirements for such a programmeare considered in this project report.

INTRODUCTION

Recent serieus fires in road and rail tunnels in Europe have focuseed attention on the safety of road tunnels. Such events have confirrnedthe. importanee .ofeady detection and (appropriate) intervention, to prevent a fire from growing to the extent that conditioas in the tunnel become untenable for its users and emergencyserVices. Thisreport covers the first phase of a (proposed) three-phase project to provide the HighwaysAgency (HA)with adviceand recommendations. on theuseaf fire detectionand suppressionsystems, including spriaklers; in raad tunnels. first phase was to provide reeemmendations on the work programme theproject. lts brief was to. invcstigate thc capabilities, costs andbenefits. of firesuppression systemssuitable for road tunnels in the UK. It was alse.to cover the important and related.aspeetef'fire dereetion. Inessencc,the

for tbc following phasesof

Two sabeontractorsassisted

TRL in this study:

SymondsGroup was cornmissioned to define classifeations for (a) the size and frequency of fires in road tunnels, and (b) UK road tunnels based on parameters affecting the instaUationand use of fire detection and suppression systems within them. Chiltern International Fire Ltd was commissioned to investigate tae operational management and modelling of fires in road tunnel. Thisincluded a review of the capabilities of firedetection and suppression systetns that might beinstalled in road tunnels:each of these was ranked through a Value Engineering.assessment.

The subcontract reports form Volume 2 of this report. A literature review has been andertaken to collect and assess the resultsoffire tests in road tunnels. Evidence was also sought from tunnel operators, particularly these with experiellceoftheuse offixed frresuppI'ession systems. A risk management study wasundertaken .at TRL. This ranked variousfirescenarios forroaqtunnels in order .ofrisk basedon.the product of anassessedcoeseqaence priorityanda probability ofoccurrence .priority. However, becauseoftbepaucity of data forsuchextremelyrare eveats; thefindillgs are tentative, Costs were estimated for the preeurement and instaflation of fire dereetion and suppression systems in a lkn1longtwo~lane tunnel:this wasbasedon designs for the Stockholm. Ring Road .Tunnel. .This exercise wascompleted for-the two .: systems rankedhighest in.the Value Engineering assessment, ke.a foamlwater delugesystem andawatermistsystem (both combinedwithan opticalfibrefrre detection device). Conclusions are drawn on the installation of fire detection and suppression system in road tunnels. Recommendations are made for the werk programme for the following phasesofthe project. Most ofthis iscovered in Volume 3 of this report. Further work might modify, or even overtum, theconclusionsofthisinitialstudy. (The first two volumes of this project report were issued in June 2001. Following further study, which established the recommendationsfor taldngthe workfurther (see Volume 3), this now three-volume report was produced in October 2002.)

2
2.1

DEFINITIONOFFlRES
FREQlJENCY

Eires intoadtunnels are rare events: indeednocatastrophic firehasever takenplace in a roadtunnel in tbe.UK. Theprobability ufa frreina particwar tunnel is dependent on sitespecificfa.ctol'Ssuchas. twmelgeometry (in . particularits length)andthe characteristics of the traffic flowing through it. Each tunnel in the UK has unique feaMes.Nonetbeless,amean :rateoffireoccurrencecan be.estimated from historica! data,)frexample aS reported byBird .and Elsworth(1999) and !he Home Office (1995).However,becauseastandardreporting system forsuch events was not used, the accuracy of these data is open te question.Inparticwar,records weuld ner be kept of incidents that did not come to the attention of the tunnel operator or fire service: it could be assumed that most of these wouldbe relatively minorincidents.The data are

surnmarised in Table 1. For the purposes of this study, 'serieus' fires are defined as those that could resu1t in injuries or fatelities and/or damage to the tunnel infrastruetUre. Taking a (very) cautious view, these can be assumed to represem 5% of all fires:~is is based onthe fact thatthis percentage is generared by vehicle collisioas, ~d so their consequences are more likely to be severe, Given that there are about 20 or so road tunnels in the UK thisrate is equivalent to a 'serieus' fire every two years or so. However, "serieus' fires defined in this manner have not in practice led to anysubstantial or prolonged disruptionof the operation of any road tunnel in the UK. Note that the first rood tunnel in the UK (at Blackwall) wascommissioned in 1897 and no particular problems relating to vehicle fires have been reported to date. The proportion of fires that cause such disniption is probably less than 0.1 %. 4firesperl0S vehicle.k:m (equivalent to one fire every 21 months in every 'average UK road tunnel'*) .

ABrepor~p vehlcle fires

Serleus flres

0.2 per lOS vehiele km (i.e, 5% of flres are assumed to be serieus) (equivalent to a serieus fire every 35 years in every 'average UK road tunnel'

*'Average UK road tunnel' defined as an 850m long tunnel carrying 46,000 vehicles per day (see Appendix B) Table 1 Estlmated frequeney of fires in UK road tunnels

2.2

SIZE; DEVELOPMENT AND DURATION

Information On the .types of fire expected in road tunnels has 'been obtained from arialysis of the design data for modem tunnels, the results of experimentsand case studies of actual tunnel fires. Table 2 provides estimates suitable for assessing the requirements of fire detectionand suppression systems for various fire loads (see Appendix B). The data were derived from the sourees Iisted in Table 3.

Vehicle

Peek heat output

Maximum temperature

Fire duratlon

oe
Car Bus
La

Hazardons load

1000 1000 1200 1200 Table 2 Data for varleus classes of vehlcte flre

Souree BD78 MRB 2.2.9 UK FireResearch Station Eureka Firetun EU499 Stockhohn Rin Road Tunnel 0resundTunnei

Desi
Desi

Activi T ical values for desi Vehicle fire tests for the Channel Tunnel Safe Vehicle fire tests in a ventilated mine all

Unit

fire scenarios
fire senarios

Tabl 3 Sourees of data for Table 2

2.3

SPREAD

Fire sp~~d is dependent on the presence and location of flammable material adjacent to the me. A fire might weU spread, progressively,.through a queue of traffic backedup behind a buming vehiele, The rate and extent' offire spread dependon the following; charaoteristics offire (size, fuel souree etc.) position of other vehicles characteristics of the vehicles in the queue, particularly the loads carried by goods ve1cles ventiltion conditions speed of response of effective fire suppression system

Because of the scareity of test data, the likely fire spread in a road tunnel is difficult to estimatewell. It is conceivable that, in the worst case, vehicles could be stopped either side of a fire as happened in the Mont Blanc tunnel in 1999: in this case 36 vehic1eswere destroyed (see Sectien 1.2 of Appendix A). Iris prudent toassume that fire willspread; its. rate ofspread isdependent on the factors listed above. Further discussignon fire spread is given in Sectioris 1,3.4 and 1.3.5of Appendix A.

3
3.1

TYPES OF TUNNELS
GEOMETRY

Each UKroad tunnel iS\1nique in .someway or other with regard to its length, crossscti9l:bb)n9itl.ldin~lprofile,v~ntilation,IltUnber aIld"Widt~of .. traffic .l~es,~d the chaiateristicsof traft1c flow. However, forthepurposesofthis study, thetunnels can beputiri.fu oneofthreebroad groups; lcircu1ar 2 3 bored tunnels

non-eireular driven tunnels ethers, which include cut-end-cover, immersed tube and the like

The features of the different groups affect the requirement for fire detection and suppression systems, and the practicalities of their instellation. 8

Circular bored tunnels (Flgure 1 in Appendix B) circularbored tunnels in the UK are generally the older, longer, sub-aqueous tunnels(e.g. Blackwall, Dartford, Tyne and Mersey) in general, ventilation is semi-transverse a. circtdarcross-section provides headroom above the centre of the carriageway but thi~~pace is generaUy taken up by existing services thereislittle freespaee at the sides of these tunnel oftenJhere isa. void beneath theroad deck.along the invert of these tunnels,. but not alwa,ysalong their fulllength;. sueb. a.void can provide .a route for pipework a largeproportion of the reported tunnel fires. in the.UK. were from the Tyne and Dartfordtunnels - however, these are manned and so minor incidents are more likely tobe reported than for unmanned tunnels
driven tunnels (Figure2 in Appendix B)

Non-eircular

these are generally shorter than the.icireular: bored tunnels (e.g. Southwick, RoundbiU, andSaltash) theyhaye a greaterwidththan the circalar bored tunnels aH areloIlgitudinally vntilated thereisspaeeabove 'the.carriageway whichceuld aecommodate the additienel ser'\'ibesrequired for fire detection and sepprssion systems there i8.no void along the invert, andalthough servieetrenehes or ducts may exist beneatha walkway it is unlikely that these will have much, if any, free space

Other tunnels (Figure 3 in Appendixll)

3.2

thesevaryinJength (e.g, Hatfield at 1l50m, and Fore Street at 400m) fornewieoi1Struetion, the eross-sectional area and shape willbe less constrained bygeo19gical and economie factorsthanfor bored tunnels forexisting tunnels, thespace outside the traffic envelope might be limited longitu.Qinalventilation is the norm shallow depthofcover no. voidprovided along invert DESIGN SCENARIOS

Ina~diti()~t0tunI1el.geometry,asdiscussed. above,considerationmust begivento the differen:t ~ffic mvements within..uni..and . bi..directional . tunnels;.bothin..temlSof.the overaUriskand .seventy ofcollisions and of operational procedures in emergency situations. Sjmilarly,the difference between limited facility. tunnels (LFT)and. standard height tunnelsllas implieations ..for likely. fire .:scenariosand,therefore, for det~etionand suppression eptions. Despite proven utility .else",here, for. example in .Fraace (see Appendix T), there are no limited facility road tunnels in"the UK but, because they might beibuilt in future, they are con8ideredbnefly .herein,

3.2.1

Uni- and bl-directionaltunnels

Most, but not all, UK road tunnels carry uni-directieaal traffic, However, where the tunnel remains in service during maintenance, the traffic will be bi-directional. Bi-direetional flow increases the risk and severity of'collisions, and the eonsequences of a fire, Beeause there is likely to be stationary traffic on bath sides of acollision, with.bi-directional traffic smoke cannot be removed in .any one direction away from all thetunnel occupants.lt is. clear that the mitigation of the risk of a majorfire throughthe use of detection .and suppressionsystems is more urgent where traffic is bi-directional.It is cruciailo note thatthe latter was the case in boththeMont Blanc andTauetrn tunnels (seeSection 1.2 of Appendix.A). 3.2.2 Limited facilitytunnels

The hearoom in a LFT and the size and types of vehieles using suehtunnels affect the requrements for heat detection and fire suppression systems. For example, for a particularfire load thelemperature rise at ceiling level would.beexpecsed to be higher in a LFT thana standard-height tunnel. Dereetion systems migbt therefore be expected to be more effeetive. in a LFT in terms of their speed and .eccuraey of detection, When assessing the risk of fire in an LFT, it Sh9uld also beappreciated that large.gQodsvehicles, buses and m9st, .ifnotall, hazardons leads would be.excluded from them and also that the traffic flow wouldbe uni-direetional. Further diseussion on thist9pic is provided in.Sectio 2 of Appendix A.

OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

The eXJ?frience .gainedof fires in tunnels has shown the importanee of early dereetion and (appropriate) intervention to prevent a fire from growing to such a level that conditions in the tunnel becom dangerous, if not life-threaterring, for its users and emergency service persennel. Altheugh the available fire suppression ... system can provide 'a first response, at present they are incapable' of extinguishingaU types of tunnel fire. Intervention by the fire service is therefore necessary to deal with fires outsidethe capabilities of such systems. Henee the eerly and .accurate detection of a fire are cruelal requirements even where a permanent suppression system is installed. The benefits of automatic dereetion and suppression will only be realised as part of an i!1te~t~ . ~ppr~c~ to. fire. safety.... S\lc:banappraach.s~0tll~.Start . by. e?e$idering. the means ofreducing .the.riskofvehicle.collisions,..whichmight bethe soUfceof.fires; Safetysystems must be considered inthe round. The usefulness of anautomatic fire detection system is dependent onother systems being in plaee to respend to its alarnlS,Likewise,. suppression systems IDtlstbe.eonsidered as part.of a.fire proteetion system,.which in.cludesventilation control, traffic managementand the provision of escaper()utes. Tbc viabilityofsafetysystemsmight be dependent on whetherornot thetunll~l bas a permanently manned control room. Equipment and procedures must remain effectivethroughout theworking Iife of the tunnel, thus consideration must be given to maintenance of the equipment, training, and updating and reviewing operational procedures. 10

The policyrcgarding the passageof hazardous goods through a road tunnel(s) should also be considered. And, on an even wider scale, Central Government, perhaps in collaboration with the haulage industry, might examine the means of preventing fires arising from vehicle defects as part of a broad safety strategy. Operators must be prepared for dealing with emergencies: advice on such matters is given by Bird et al (2001) and by BD 78/99 (DMRB 2.2.9)t. The strategy for dealing with an emergency should be based, as faras pessible, on standerdprocedures,

4.1DETECTION

OF FIRES

In most cases, automatic detection equipment, utilising remote sensors er image analysis, Will provide the earliest notification of a fire to a tunnel operator. However other sources should not be overlooked,these inelude detection throughclose circuit television(CCTV) images, and by members of the public usingemergency er mobile telephcnesor by triggering the alarm on fire fighting equipment. Although an alarm willbetelvd ineither a tunnel er police control room, depending whetherthe tunnel is>rnanned or uamenned, telephone calls by the public ..may be received elsewheretThe procedures and training foroperators sbould, therefore,anticipatea variety of'possibly conflicting alarms, Consideration should be given in planning and tra:.ningJ? the Iikelihood of false alarms from each source, but in particular from automaticequipment Procedures should include confirmation of a fire through, for example,<2CTVimages ..Equipment that automatically draws attention to the correct CCTV view could save time in critical situations.

4.2

INITIAL RESPONSETO A FlRE

Following detection, usually the first steps would be to stop traffic entering the tunnel, in bothdirections,and to summonthe emergencyservices, Correct control of ventilationcanclramatically affect thespread of fire and access to the seat of a fire for emergency services. The operatien of ventilation equipment might automatically follow a pre . determined plan on the receipt ofanalarm, but proceduresshould allow for manual intervention. However manual intervention must onlybe undertaken by suitably trained persounel. Similarly, the operatien of fire suppression equipment may he activated according to a plan, butthe untimely or incorrect eperation of such equipment might be dangerous. The circumstances when fire suppression equipment should be operated, and discussien on its actiVtionare diseussed in Section 4.6 below,

4.3

OnmR

ACTIONS

Other elements of aplanned response should be initiatedas necessary, These inclu4e the activation of alarms, theimplementation of traffic control andevacuation procedures, and the mobilisation of emergency maintenance staff and equipment. Upon their arrival, the fire services would normally take charge ofoperations and furtheraction would be taken under their instruction or in consultatien withthem.

Hereafter referred to as BD78

11

This might stoppingifire ineident.sre training and

include altering ventilation settings (but see above) and starting or suppression equipment, It is imperative that the fire officersattending an conversant with the layont and eperation ofthe tunnel through on-site familiarisationexercises.

4.4AFTERAN

INCIDENT

The proeeduresfor retuming the tunnel te fulloperation include the restoration of fire detectioand suppression equipment, for example re-filling tanks, and the clearance of debrisineluding any remaining :fire suppressionproducts. It wouldalsobe useful in planningfor future potentlal events if detailed records were kept of the incident and response$(see Section4.7).

4.5

TJAjNING, EMERGENCYEXERCISES, ANDREVIEWPROCEDURES

SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Becauseof the .aeed for a .rapid and .appropriate response foUowing. the receipt of possiblyivariedand conf1ictingalarms,. operating staff should be able tocope with emergeticysituationsand they must be trained in .the operation of fire detection.aad suppressiPll.equipment. Experien.ce. of tunnel fires,partieulai'ly these .in ..the Mont Blanc a.nd Tauern.. (see Sectionj,2 of Appendix A),. shows that. gQodeommunication is a. pre ..requisite .for safety.insuehevents. To ensure an integrated and.effectiveresponse, tunnel.operators and emergency services should be fuUy aware of the procedures, equipment and capabilities of all parties likely te be involyed in taekling afire, Thus plans for the activatien. of fire suppression systems should beestablished through round-table discussions, .. andsimulation exereises are. necessaryto testthata .eo... ordinated approachcan be achieved in the event of a fire, Althougb theoperation of automatic detectionequipment can be simulated withease, consideration should be given to the feasibilityof operating suppressionequipmentduring suchexercises. Thereareinstances where failings in managementand operating procedures have impairedthe response to a tunnel fire. Therefore,proceduresshouldbe .in.place for overseeing, co-ordinating and regularly. reviewing. the operation and maintenanee of equipment and contingency plans for dealing with emergencies: it is imperative that proeedllteS,personnel andeqtiipment. are .appropriate to thewk in hand. General guidance on tunnel procedures is givenby Bird et al (2001).

4.6

OPERATION OFFIRESUPPRESSIONEQUIPi\fENT
equipment is, in itself,dangerous, particularly include reduced. visibility, .slippery road and where a firehas occurred,the activation offire location mighthamper those melding the fire and

The operation of :fire suppression followinga. false a1ann ...Hazards paveinentsurfaces,. andpanic.AIso, suppressionequipment at the wrong disrupttheevaeuation of the tunneL

Theprbabilities andconsequencesoffalse alarms shouldbeevaluated when considering the use of automatieallytriggeredfiresuppressionequipment. Beeauseef the serieus consequences resulting from the operatien of suppression systems (that are currently available) in response to a false alarm, it is improbable thet automatic

12

activatien will he acceptable: this situation is unlikely to change for some time. Thus it followsthat fire suppression equipment should only be installed where there are staff available 24-hours a day, who are trained and able te make the necessary rapid appraisal and accurate response (i.e. where there is a control room). Where no staff are on site, consideration may be given to the opertion of theequipment froma regionaltraffic control centre or, possibly, a fire service control room. However, unlessthecontrol room isconnected to CCTV eameras in thetunnel itis unlikely that the cOrrectresponse wouldalways be made. Purthermore; unlessa fire station is close te the mflnel some of theadvantages of immediate detection are lost. In Sweden, a 30 to 60 secend delay is allowed befere a suppression system is activated.This is to allow a check to be made for false alarms and to verify conditions inthe tunnel, butthis reqUiresa rapid interventioll and appraisal by the operator.This policy>assumesthat, .overall, tbe advantages .of .correct manul operation might outweiglttheadvantages of onlya slightly faster (automatic) response witbtbe attendantproblems of false alanns. Guidelinesshould bedrawn up te assist operators in making decisions aboutthe operationoffire suppression equipment. The decisien-making proeess isaffected by: trafflcfiow - whether moving or statienary loationof pedestrians (evacuees, tunnel operatives and "fire-fghters) whether any warning of a change in eperafion can be given acu.racy ofthe location ofthe fire - forexample, whether visibleon CCTV I1~tJ.lreand .extentof fire - whether growiag or threatening lifeand/or the ~elinfrastructure,and .whether otberfires might. develop: through, .for e~ple, multiple. collistons or fuel spiUs whetherfire service persennel are present

Clearly ,thesupply of water, or other agents, for fire suppression should be adequate, with su.fficient reserve, to deal witb tbe fires for wbich tbeequipment is designed, The supplysbould .. be independent of nd not affect ather .fire fighting supplies. The required stock is influenced by the likely speed of the response of th fire services and also by the type of their equipment. In Japan, a tunnel fire was controlled for 30 minutes or sobefore on-site supplies were exhausted; the fire re-ignited befere the fire services apived (see Seetien 1.2.4 of Appendix A).

W1l~J,"~ ~ fit~.supprys~i()I1.sY~YII1i~.~H,ll~ il:l.l,l;.t9IlI1yl, thy.4fl,l;in~gy.sY~~II1 ~()\lld.l>e

siZedand>adapted accordingly, . inparticular t~ prevent .the. releaseofhazardous materialsinto the environment. The procedures tobe foUowed intbeevent. of the operatics .of a suppression system shonld include the rnobilisation of facilities or equipment to disperse suppression agents or products. Fire detection and automatic suppression equipment ..should function .as intended throughout the eperating life of a tunnel.' (At tbe time ofthe recent {rre in tbe Mont Blanc tunnel, part of the suppression system was disabled. formaintenance but there was no back up in place.) Equipment should he reliable and robust: it must he able to cope with the aggressive environment within a road tunnel, Guidance on equipping

13

tunnels is given by Evans et al (2001). To facilitate maintenance, and retrofitting to an existing.tunnel, equipment should beeasy to install and access. There should he some means oftestingequipment to obtain an assurance of its condition,

4.7

INCIDENT RECORDS

Recorqsof fires andother incideatsareessential datafor determining the probability ofcertaineventsoccurring during .the service .Iife of a .tunnel,andhence for. making decisions on the installation of fire detection.and. othersafety equipment. Theycan providesalutatory lessens about the need for and the effeotiveness of eperating and emergency procedures. Incidelltreords from tunnel operatQrs,police, fire brig~desand other bodieshave beenass~ll1bledfor 14roadtunnels in EnglandandWales.The resultsare reported.by Birdap,d E1sw0rth (1999) and areutilised in AppendixB ofthis report. Using these dataanattempt was made to derive statistieally based stimates: oftheoccurrence of incidents. However, it was concluded that variabie standerds of reporting made it in1pQ$Sibletoestablish reliabie trends. ft. is recornrnened that, as part of tbe routine duties,itunnel operators log specified hazardous iaeidents.: incorporating, where apprQpnate, records from the emergency services ".Sueh logs shouid. provide a description of the incidente and review what, if any ,changes should he made to opera.til$procedures .. Thisshouldprovide. comprehensive .and .consistent records of tunnel. incidents for future evaluatioa,

run

Experience of usingthe STATS19 (DETR 1999) road traffic accident database suggested thatthe generation and storage of natioal records, to an ad:quate and consistent staedard; required the: creation ofanational. overseeing body made up of represeatatives from the providers, users and managers ofthe data:see Bird et al (2001). The tunnel operators' meetingsintheUKmightprovidean appropriate forum for developing a national system of record keeping for tunnels. BD53(DMRB3J.6) details the records thatshould.bekept by tunnel operatcrs.For utility,such records should be comprehensiveandkept up-tc-date, In a well-collated and readi1y aecssible format, such records would form au invaluab1easset for undert~g risk analyses.

OBJECTIVES OF FlRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

1'0.apP11s .the potentiid.of.ire .sppressil1.sfgtms it is .neessrY..to cnsiderthe

ob]ectivesoftlleir use. Eight leey .functional objectives have been identified and rankediIJ.ti1e following order of priority. 1 2 Safety of road users (includingpedestrians) Safetyofemergency service personnel

3 4

Sa.fetyoftunnel operatiVeslcontractors Proteetion of'the tunnel structure

14

5 6 7 8

Preteetion of the transport infrastructure Proteetion of services and vehicles within the tunnel Proteetion of the environment Proteetion from adverse publicity and/or legal action

The first three identify 'life safety' as the critical objective, and so this was usedas the rnainassessment criterion. Selection dictates the relationship between the suppression system and other rite safety measures such as fire detection, ventilation, communication, traffic control and means of escape. It also has a fundamental bearing

on;
type of suppression duration of operation initiation of eperation method of activation location of application identification of inappropriate applieation

Evidencefrom actual fires and fire tests demonstrate that early and accurate intervention is essenrial for dealing with fires in road tunnels. lntervention is defined as those activities needed to prevent a fire compromising the critical objective of life safety and the secondary objectives of protecting the tunnel, infrastructure and environment. lntervention must be both 'early' and 'accurate' to prevent a fire from spreading, i.e. it must, respectively, 1 be applied befere a critical temperatureand and rate of heat release are reached,

loate the fire precisely enough te limit suppression to the required zone and make best useof the supply of suppression agents.

A limitingcondition for early intervention was dfined by the 'Eureka' prject as a rate ofh~trelease of3 to 5MWand a tempersture inthe of 400 to 500C. Ifthis was generate<ibyabumngcar, therequired acuracy ofdetetion is Jto .. 5tn ..Details of the 'Eureka' project are given in Sectien 1.3.5 of Appendix A. The results. of fire experiments, such. asthe Memorial Tunnel.programme (see Luchiaa, 1995), have shownthat, provided the tmmeldownstreamofa fire isclear of occupants (and other fires) significant safety benefits can he achieved solely through longitudinal smoke. extrationby jet fans. The worse caseconditionis where traffic is stationlU)'both upstrearn aad downstream of a.fireas could easilyoccur with bidirectienel traffic.

Detection

and suppression systems were appraised against varieus technical assessment criteria (see Section 3 of Appendix A): an overview of the results is

15

presented in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. However, it is important to note at this point that none of the detection or suppression systems seem to have been tested on a full-scale vehicle fire in a raad tunnel.

FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS

Issues relating to fire suppression systems are discussed in Section 3.3 of Appendix A. (The genera! requirements for fitting such systems into tunnels are based on the technicalspecifications outIined in Section 3.3 .13 of that Appendix.)

6.1

DETECnON

Viabie methods for detecting fires in tunnels are ranked in Table 4.

3 4 5
6= 6=

8
Table 4 Value Engineering ranking ef.detectlen systems

6.2

SUPPRESSION

Viabie methods for sappressing fires in tunnels are ranked in Table 5.

Rankln 1 2

ression

3= 3=
5

Tabl 5 Value Engineering

ranking ofsuppression

systems

16

6.3

SPRINKLER SYSTEMS

All butene of the systems ranked in Table 5 is based on the use of water witb or withoutadditives er foams, AUwater-based systems require delivery to the loeation oftbe fite,.which conventionally would be via nozzles supplied by pipework and
valves,

Experiments have been undertaken to. test.theeffeetivenessof sprinkler system.s on hydrocarbon pool mes of a size that simulate a vehicle fire, However, information about theconfiguration used in these ex.periments is incomplete and there: is little ex.perimentalevidence to identify the optimum location and type of nozzles. Sprinkletsystemsare mostoften rnouatedat eeiling level. in .puildings; .this bas the advantagetbat water distribution.is assisted by gravity, However, as confinned by tests carried out by the Fire Research Station (FRS) forthe Channel TunnelSafety Unit,afweunderthe bonnet ofa ear, or in its interior or.ben.eathit (wIlere leak;,edfuel will ignite) is sheltered freman overhead sprinklers (SeeAppendix B Sectien 2). The ex.periments undertaken at the Memorial Tunnel included tests of foam-water (3%.AFFF) sprinklers:onhydrocarbonpool firesef up to .1OOMW.The effectiveness ofceiling-mounted sprinklers, at a height of4.3m, was unaffected byanairflow of 4.2rn/st1'm>ughthe tunnel. Nozzles mounted on the tunnel wall, at a height of 2.1m, were found tobe Iess effective, However, this finding mighthave more tedo with variations in the size of the fires and the rate of discharge of the suppressant than the position of the nozzles. The discharge of a low-expansion foam at a lew-level in a tunnel might be very effectivein sappressing the combustion of spilt fuel, but mightbe ineffective where the fire involved the payload of a goeds vehicle: the fire at the Mont Blanc tunnel involveda cargo of margarine and fleur (see Appendix A, Section 1.2.7 and Appendix. B, Section 2, page BW) . In. general, tbe. discharge.from a lew-level nozzle will cover a .smaller. area than a simil~rone .positioned onthe ceiling. Lew-tevel ..placement mightprovidesome reduetiQninthe length ofpipework and.ease of inspection and maintenance, but it. is, therefor~, likely torequirecloser nozzle spacing. The installationofupward-spraying nozzlesin tbc rood snee, inana~lllPt. toovercome .the .masking effect of b~d)')"grk,. is. at.. present.tb01Jg;ht.t() . be. iIIlpr~ctieal.. beca~se.. (a) . ~f.the.obstrtletion.to.the paveIn~nland (b) such nozzles wiU become blocked quiterapidlyandbedifficultto maintainor replace.

6.4

PIPEWORK

Consideration must be given te the protection of pipework in the aggressive tunnel environment, and to the possible advesse reaction ofthe pipework to itscontents.For example, because of the latter, the pipes for a foam distribution system cannot be galvatlised. Thus relativelYexpensive stainless steel pipes and fittings might have to be usedin a tunnel. For. frostprotection,. pipework .mi~ht need to. beprovided witb trace heating. Provision must be made for the dismantling and replaeement of lengtas

17

of pipe; where flanged pipesare used this might require the introduetion of bends or special joints. Based on the specificatien outlined in Sectien 9.1 below, and as detailed in Section 3.3.13 of Appendix A, there wiUalmost certainly be spaeeto install spray heads and pipeworkin a tunnel, buteo-ordiaatioe with Iightlng and wiring systems may be complex.To meet the. specificatioa; separate. water and foam .eoaeentrase distributor pipes running the whole length of the tunnel are required: 200mm and 65mm diameter pipes would be required respeetively. Motorised valves to mix the water and concentrte and te feedthemixinto risersare also required, Wherethevoid beneaththe road deck is used forventilation, it still rnight be best to run the .pipes along them .. There .should be sufficientspace for the pipes .and assooiatd valves, and any consequent rednetion in the performance of the ventilation systenlc~uld he.corrected. hyintroduc.ing jet fans to boost longitudinalairflow .:The instaUatiBnofjet fans wouldalsohnprovethe.control ofsmoke wheretraffic flow is uni~diretionaL However, the void rnightnotrun alongtheentire lengthofa tunnel, In this aS,and .also for mmersed tube and non. circular bored tuanets, the only free space fotthepipeworkand valves mightbe above a walkway, at say 3 10 4m above the invert. However: 1 E&ra circular er arched structure, this wouldprobably coineide withthe minimum distancebetween the trafficclearanceenvelope and the tunnel wall, Cmmonly, suchspaee is used for ether mechanicaland electrical equipment. ofa fire .and,

2 3

The main pipework and valves are vulnerable to theeffects therefore, require proteetion.

4 5

Similarly, pipework mounted on a tunnel waU might require protectionagainst vehicle impacts. The weight of the pipework, and its contents, impose a lead on the tunnel liaing.

Theremightbe room to run the mainpipework in. the crown of a tunnel, particularly incircular and .arched ..tunnels. However,. here, the pipework and. valves would be difficllittoaccess for inspection .and maintenance,and they might become detached when tile tUnnel Iining WaSdamaged byfire~. Where .. available, ir might be .possible to run thetp,ain pipework into a tunnel via ventilation shafts.
::"::<:,:><:,:-:":::"::::>::: .. ' ::: .. ' ,., :..:: : ',.,.,' ,.,.. ,., ,-:.::'. ::::,:,. ., ,.,""","'" , , , ..

In additiBIlt() thein-tuIlneleql1pment, ~\Vater timk and associatedpllmps are required outsidea tunnel. Finding space for the pumps should net he a problm,' but it might he difficultto find sufficient space adjacent to the tunnel for a large watertank. Some tunnel approaches are eenstrucred on reclaimed or made ground, and in these cases substanti~lJoundationsmight berequiredto support the weight of thefiUedtank.

6.5

DRAINAGE

The drainage systemof a tunnel must be capable ofhandling thevolume of water that could be discharged by the spray beads; a flowrate .of just over 4,000.litres/minute or 70 litres/sec could be assumed (see Appendix A). This is not far from the commonly

18

used design figure of 66 litres/sec, which is based on the output of two firehydrants eperating simultaneously (see BD78; Clause 7.32). However, where separate supply systemsa.reoperated,asmaybethecase when asuppression system is retrofitted into a tunnel,~ere is a riskofflooding when both are operated simultaneously for more than aboutlOminutes,even in atunnel provided .with a modem drainage system. The drainagesystems .in older tunnels might not beable to cope with suchhigh flows, and space mayrestrict the size.of pumps. that ean be installed inthem .{Howevermost drainagesystems areover~designed;).Increasing the sizeofsumps in a tuanel.eouldbe very costlyif, indeed, it was practical. In mostn9rmal.situations, . the flooding of a..tunnel in the event of a fire. would be unaccepta{)le. Attheveryleastaccess to the fire would he made.rnore.difficult and evacuatietrof vehicle occupants, particularly the young, elderlyanddisabled,. fromthe tunnel willbe hindered (perhaps fataHy so). At worst, flammabl substances could be spreadbey6ndthe area over which thesprinlders are operating .aad hazardousJiquids withinthesumps couldbe released. !he capacityofthe sumpsand the drain~ge pumps must be.assessed when considering the instaUation of a sprinkler. system .in a tunnel: indeed they might determine the viabilityofsuch a system. It shoutdbeappreciated that most drainage pumpiagsystems. will shut down when a hazardouelsabstance is detected in a sump: this would 1000 the pumping capability at that sump'The spillage of aliquidhydrocarbon followed by a fire would therefore be a very diffieult situation to address satisfactorily.

6.6PRIORITIES

FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Theranlcil1gofthe variousdetection and suppression systems,in Table 5,provides a basis forprioritising further research on the development of appropriate fixed suppression systems for tunnels with bi-directional and uni-directieaal traffic'lows. With firedetection systems, further research seems warranted on linear heatdetection based onoptical fibre technology. Optical flame and smoke technologies, .combined with CCTV digital imaging, appear to have. the necessary. performance attributes. Common to all these systems is the availability of intelligent signal processing. It is consid~redthat these arethe most. likely routes for developing. robust fire. detection systems foruni-directionalandbi-directional tunnels,and ones that will work in conceI'twithautomatic fire suppression. Systems based on water spray and water mist, or combinations with these, seem -to ll~Y~ tJ:1.~ !~t~t . p~tell~l . f()r. ~~t()trlatic.. ~re .. sHP~ression .. ~.~~t:rns'... VV~ter .r nist .. s}'st:rns are. inreasingly promoted foruse in transporttunnels,buttodatlittleex~rin1ental workJ.la.speen. carriedOtlt. to validate the .clain1sand theoriesput forwardfor them. ThissllQllldbe ad<iressed beforesuchsystems are installed inroad tunnels. Further -. investigation shouldbe undertakenen theuse of additives .to augment the effectiveaess of water-based systemsagainst the wide range of fires that can occur in a road tunnel. Similarly, further work seems warrantedonthe use of'Low-expansion AFFF' and 'ARC' suppressants: thesescored weU intheassessment.process, and the latter \Vasparticularly successful in the Memorial Tunnel research programme.

19

6.7

FULL-SCALE TESTS

STUV Aisthe German research organisation for underground traasportetien facilities, Theyhav recently stated that they intend to establisha fire test facility ineither an existingtunne10r ina purpose-bu1t tunnel up to 500 te 600m long. They propose to undertakefull-scale trials of all. types of automatic fire detection and .suppression equipment. The totaloost oftbeexperimentalprogrammeis estimatedat 2.2MEuro, onthebasis tbat suppliers would pro vide and insta.lLequipment free of charge. The locationef the test facility was to be seleeted in mid-200 1 se tbat the sitecan be preparedduring the secend half of the year. The first ful-seale tests were planned to takepla.ceduringthe flI'Sthalfof2002. The Swiss Roadand Railway Administrations are likelyto be support STUV A in tros work, but STUV A areseeking the support and collabo'flil,tionofother parties. The N(1)VegianFireResearch. Laberatory (NBL) is the Norwegian. ceatre for fire technology resrchaad developmenLln May 2001 it infonned TRL that .it was bidding>for an EU-supported project on .firesafety in tunnels. TRL. anderstand that NBL ha$the following felities for undertaking. full-scale-triels, 1 2 1l.100m long concretetnnnel; whichcan be used to train. fire fighters,and

tWo roadtunnls, 800 and 1600m long, wbich are. not used for. ordinarytraffic and are better suited for undertakingfull-scale trials. is censtnicting; area of 80 to

The Hagerbach Test Gallery Ltd, loctedin'Flums.Switzerlend 1

90Ill,

a~OOm long two-lane motorway tunnel, withacross-sctional

in.clinedtunnels at gradients of 5 and 10%, each with a cross-sectional area of 50m2,and atunnelhaving a cross-sectional area of 40m2

These. tunnels are to be used fortraining emergency service personnel. intackling tunnel fires, It would seem that such a facility would ..be ideal.forcarrying out fuUscale fire suppression tests. It is believed that this is one of the tunnels is being considere4for useby STUVA. The~~handSafetyExecutive(HSE)ihaveasubsJgfacegan(;)rya11ds\U'face>test galleryattheir .laboratory nearBuxton. Thesub-surface. gaUery .is200m Jong but it has across-s(;)Ction~Lar~ of4.2n12 l11aking it unsuitable for fuU-seale tests. of tunnel fires.Tbe surface gal1ery is 366m longand has a slightly largeI' cross-sectionalarea of 5.6m2,but againit isJar toe smal1 for fuU-scale fire tests, except possibly for LFT.

COMPUTER MODELhlNG

As part of this or ether projects, it is probable that future fire tests will he eerried out on suppression systems based on, for example, water mist teehnology, Because of the

20

high eests-of full-scale tests, it is attractive to supplement the physical data obtained from these with the results of calculations. However, there is little published information that could be used to validate the results obtained from computation fluid dynamic (CPD) modelling of tunnel fires. The validatien of sueh calculations, by data obtained from suppression experiments, win enable 'virtual tests' to be carried out relativelycheaply. Such tests could check the sensitivity of a design tovariation in tbe governing parameters. The application of CFD models to, for example, the Memorial Tunnel test programme baveshowa that they are capable of predieting, with a reasonabledegree of accuracy, the air flows generated by a fire and the influence of. featuressuch as powered ventilatioJl. To be of benefit to a designer, the CFD models need to be able to account for the action of a suppressant on a fire. The use of computer modelling for prediering the effects of fire suppressants was assessedbyconsidering the .abilityof .eight CFD models to provide informatica relatingWtbirteencriteria including the following five criticalones; I 2 3 4 5 atmospheric tempersture s11l(}ke density visibility (including effects of smoke de-stratification) relative humidity di~placement of fire gases by thegeneration of steam

Theresultsoftheassessment summarised in Table 6.

are presented in .Seetion 3.5 of Appendix A and are

CFDmodel

Past use in tunnel applications

Validation wlth respeetlo tunnel

flres 'TUNFIRE STAR

Analytical treatwent of interactioo.between su ressantand lire v

PHOENICS Sot.;vENT
v
X

FLOVEN'f
FLOW3D

GAMBITtr~ GRm

X X medels

X X

CFX

No res ..oase reeeived

TabJe6 AssessmeotofCFD

21

General. recommendations can be made regarding the instrumentation required to providedata against whieh the predictions derived from the models can be judged, Instrumentation is required to monitor: rate ofmass loss of fuel airlsmoke flow velocity atmosphere temperatere

visibility
humidity eoncemtrations of fuel gas and OXygen the deposition and/or density profile of the suppressant

RISK MANAGEMENT

Risk assessment is a structured approach that improves theconsistency of deelsion making and the cost-effectiveness in the allocation of resources. H is the corner stone of all harmonised health and safety legislation and standerds. A riskassessment indicates; systematically, how hazards can occur and provide a clearer understanding of their nature and eonsequenees (including economie ones), thereby improving the identification of the most effective way to prevent injury or damage to health. The flowchart in Appendix C outlines the broad framework for risk assessment, The process iavolves consideration of the technique most appropriate for the partienlar assessment, Techniques range from basic qualitative methods of hazard identification and anal)'sis to advanced quantitative methods in which numerical valnes of risk frequency or probability are derived. Because adequate quantitative. data on the probabilities of the individnal risks are not available, qualitative techniques have been used in this study. An assessment has been conducted on three different classes of tunnel, for seven types of fire. The resultsof the assessmentsuggest that the most likely fire will involve a single car. The fire/with the worst consequences is likely to be .generated by a multiple cellision withatJ~st ene of the vehicles carrying a hazardous load, They also snggest that a fire occurrlng in a circular bored road tunnel is likely to have the most severe conseq1}~ces;these tunnels are, in the main, the.older sub-aqueous tunnels withsemitransvegie ventilation and Hmitedescape facilities. Some also have bi. directional trafficf1pw.Notethatduringmaintenancework,thetraffic ... intunnels~tretnain operational wiIl be bi-directional. It is cOIlcludedthat the risks posed by a fire in a road tunnel would be mosteffectively reducedthrough a combination of safe systems of work, appropriate tunnel design. and engineering control. In this context, en~ineering. control includes deteetien, communication and traffic eentrolsystems; provisionofa means of escape. as weil as fixed fire suppression systems. (A fuller di~cussion is provided in Appendix C along with the generio model of the risk assessment process for tunnel fires.) A risk assessment should he completed before any control measures are implemented in a partienlar tunnel. Information on the control measures already in place, the speed 22

of response to emergencies, evacuation procedures, dimensionsof the tunnel and characteristics of the traffic should be collected and used into an assessment. The probabiUtyof occurrence should becalculated for each event on the tree pathand the final proba.bility established for all consequences. All risks should he quantified and a decision made as to whether their level is tolerable.

eOSTS ANDBENEFITS

Althoughinformation is .available on the costs of installing fire detection and suppressionsystems, the benefits of suehsystemsare muchmoredifficult to quantify. It should b. appreciated, however, thatover~riding political decisions take preeedenee over theresults ofsuch a paper exereise, As.hasbeendemonstrated.by the recellt mes in. tunnels at Mont .Blanc, Tauefn (see SectionJ.2ofAppendix A),andKaprun {Hamer; 20(0), the cost of a fire in terms of humanlifevdamagetoatunneLstructureand lossofservicecan be veryhigh. The probabilityofsuch anextreme event occurring ina road tunnel in theUK, where most tunnels,ar~shortand uni-directional, is unquantifiably smalt As stated.arlier, to date there has not been a catastrophic fire in a raad tunnel in the UK. Butdisasters and complaceney are no strasgers. The cost of doingnothing to improve. safety should be judged. against the consequences of. such, thankfully, .rare catastrophes. Inaddition to the .less oflife. and .vehicles, the Mont Blanc tunnel: is still out of service some two years after the fire: the alternative route represents a.diverslon of some 50 km, part of which is through urbanareas where the passage of goods vehieles isunwelcome. The fire in the Channel Tunnel (see.Appendix A.,.Section 1.2.6) disrupted services for about six months or so, and ..in addition to. thecost of repair there was a reduction in operating revenue for somewhat longer than the repair work, as user-confidence had to be regained. Finally, when all done and dusted, it is unlikely that the total cost of the rail crash at Hatfield, in which 4 lives were lost, will be lesSthan!l Billion. the tunnel in a particldar incident. If it is subsequently shown that the decision was in error, it is possiblthat the.owners, operators and emergency services might .be. sued for dama~s'In thecaseof.thefire.atthe . Digital Equipment Corporation's offices in :a~itl~~~~itl1990,thefire()tf1ceriAc~esllllt<i()~th~~rilllqeE~)'st~'''l/1lich had opemtedautomatically. As aresult thefiregt Qutof control and thebuilding was a totalloss. The final bill for drtlages. to. Hampshire .County .Council, havinglost the resulting/court case and subsequent appeal, .was !19.8M. (Anarticle from the Hampsbire Chronicle and extracts from the Appeal Court hearing are reproduced .in Appendix D.) . , There isalso the question of liability.Where sprinklers areinstalled,

operator/flre service must decide whether or net the system should beactivated

None~eless, for .road tunnels in the. UK, it seems probable that the rednetion in risk provid~d by improvements. toprimary safety measures,traffic and ventilationcontrol, operationalprocedures and provision ofeffective escape facilitiesarelikely to be more beneficial than the installation offixedfiresuppressionsystems.

23

9.1

BENCHMARK COSTS

Benchrnark costs have been determined for the installation of two fire suppression systems,both eontrelled by an optical Iinear heat detection device, withina singlebore two-lane 1km long road tunnel. The teehuical specificatien for the system is given in Section 3.3.13 of Appendix A. The hydraulic design of a system conforming to the specificatien was completed, and the prirnary components of the system were identified. The .design details were forwarded 10. a fire engineering company speeialising in the designand supply of fire suppres~ionsystents. Theyprovidedestimates . for (a) anoverhe.ad sprinkler. system, whichus~da 3% ARC foamadditive, and(b) .a high-pressure water mist system. Similarly;suppliersoffire detection equipmentprovideda budgetcost for thesupply, instaUationand commissioning of. an optical linear heat detection system. The estiInatsare provided in Table 7.Theestimates. are based o~ the use of galvanised pipe\y()rkfor. the watermainandd.istribution pipes,and blacksteel.pipework for the separat~to~mdeliverymain. Section 6.4suggeststbatstainless-steel.pipework. may b n~es~a.rr to combat.tbe ag~essivetunnel environment. The additionalcapitalcost is likelytobe benveen ~O.5to~l miUionperkilometerofbore.However, the low.. maintenance nature of correctly specified stainless steel should reduce maintenance and refiltbishment costs in future years, thereby redueing ..the whole life casts (see Section.~.2)Detectiofisstem: 'Fibrolaser IJ' er tieal linear heat deseetion ~31k ~760k

~950k
'rable7 Benclunarkcosts for lkm longtwin-bore two-lane tunnel

Note that the above cover the eest of installieg the meehaaical and electrical equipment, except wiring, in a new tunnel, The cost of providing a water tank and pumps outside one end of the tunnel is included, but net .: any civil engineering collsttUctioncosts.
All all0v.rancefortheadjustmentlrelocation ofexis.tillg installations andequipment must be included whenconside.ring . retrofittingasygte.m intoanexisting tunnel. Be9~H~\s~I1\yprk'1VQ~<l1l~y~t()lltd()~atr~trit~tit1le.s,forr)(alllple.llet\yrrIl midnigllland 5~ fortheMersey Tunnels,1twould. becostly .A Ilominalfigureof HOOkperktnbore mightbesufficientto covertbe.relocationof e.xistingservices, but thecosfsofrestricted workingandtraffic management .works might welldoubie the figuresgiveninTable7 above.

9.2

WHOLE LIFE COSTS

The instaUation of fire dete.ctionand suppression systems in a tunnel.wiU increase its operationandmaintenancecosts. But as a generalrule, the choice.ofsystem.should.be made firstly on thebasisofperformance and reliabiHty, and secondly on the basis of whole life costs.

24

Once a performance specificatien for asystem has been determined, a whole life cost studycanconsider .all possible options.and consequences, including the effects of a new system on the operatien and maintenance of existing meehaaical and electrical equipmeat, For new tunnels, such a study can be used to assess the equipment specifiaton, and the eperation and maintenance procedures for various options, Awholelife .cost model for tunnels is being developed at TRL for HA: it is due to be complet~d in thenext three menths or so. This win provide a spreadsheet-based assessraet, tool incorporatiag cost elemeats .for the construction, eperation and maintena.nce of road tunnels.

10

CONCLUSIONS
SAFETY

10.1PRIMARY

Thebrief'of this phase of the project was mainlyeoncemed with fire detectionand suppressQn systems, ie. with systems designed to deal with fires, Volume 30f this projetreport .discusses .the potential means of undertaking further investigation to determinetbe cost-effectiveness of sueh systems. However, benefitcould be gained in the foUowingphases by first attending to aspects of primary safety i.e. reducing the probability of fires occurring. This includes; prevention of collisions by suitable tunnel layout and traffic management (the fire inth~Tauem tunnel wasassociated with the instellation of temporary traffic lights in thetunnel) improved vehicle design, including fire suppression systems in vehioles the installation of an automatic fire suppression system in the engine compartment of goeds and public service vehicles - this would eliminate most vehiole fires

10.2

ESCAPE FACILITIES

Wherever possible, escape facilities shouldbe provided in tunnels.The most effective escape acility is a separate tunnel, sealed from the carriageway tunnels by fire and smok fesistaIlt doors end' maintained at a higher air preesure than therunning bores to exclUde smoke. This is indeed the arrangement used for the recently completed immersedroad funnelat Cork(Fordet al, 1997}.Als,the refurbisnmenfwtkatthe MontBlanctunnel includes tbe conversion .ofthe void in the invert, used 'asan air duet, toan escape passage. In some cases, the cost of providing a separate tunnel could be mitigated by its use as a pilot tunnel; for routingservicesandutility lines; by reducing thecross-section. and cost ofthe main tunnels; and by reducing the need for tunnelclosures for equipment maintenance; Goodfellow et al (1995) stated thata service tunnel could be justified for tunJjelsover lkmlong onthe grounds of reducedexcavation alene, The extra benefitofproviding aaeseape route and fue ether facilities listed above should reduce this threshold.

25

Escape .facilities canalso he provided by cross passages and doms conneering the two bores of a uni-directionaltunnel. Where the doors are in a narrow dividing wan hetweentwo bores it seems imperative that the doors should not be operared until traffic inthe ether, bore has been stopped, BD78 l"equires that thenominal spacing between such doms should be no more than 150m~2U'1d preferentially lOOm. Thelatter distancecould he maintained where cross passagesconnect te anescape/service tunnel, hutan even closerspacing ofsay. 40m t050m1'n.ight be desirable in many cases. And, for a shallow urban or rural tunnel, the possihility of providingescape routes to the surface at simdar intervals should be

considered.

10.3

TUNNEL OPERATION

The personnel responsible for the eperation of a tunnel, whether local operators, the emergencyservices or a regioaal control centre, shouldbetrained,andprepared, to respondcorrectly to a fire in the tunnel. Where co-erdination is required between operatorsand emergency services, theprotocols for this shold: be clearly defined, Emergencyproceduresshouldbe clearlystatedand regularly tested by means offuUscaleex:ercises during tunnelmaintenance closures, This wou1d melude-the mannel use ofcemmunioation and control systems,portable suppression equipmentaad fixed equipment such as sprinklers if fitted. This process .may include the use of smoke generatoJ:s,or even a. controlled fire,totesttheeffectiveness of ventilation control. Experietlce in such matters has shown that what should work according to theory does not always work as wen in practice.

10.4

PRIORITIESFOLLOWING TUE OUTBREAK OF A FlRE

The priorities for miniruising the severity of a fire are; earlydetection and accurate loeation of fire llotificationof emergeacy services prevention of vehicles entering the tunnel apprepriate setting of ventilation evacuation of fire zone opera.tion ofsuppression equipment infire zone of theearlier actions will in. most cases eliminare the need

Success1'tdinlplementation for lateractions .

.............
,

All theallthorities .consulted as part phase of the project agreed thatsprinklers shouldbe considered as a last resort: they were only to be used. following evacuation of the fire zone, and must not be triggered automatically.

10.S

PROBABILITIES, COSTS ANDBENEFITS

Tbe prol:>ability of a>catastrophic t1reoccurringin a UKroadtunnel is.extremely smaU, but the costof installinga firesuppression sygtems in a tunnel is high, Particul~lrly .for existing tunnels. Thus thehenefits of instaUing fixed suppression equipment in most tunnels are unlikely to be jusrifled on cost grounds alone.iThere

26

might, ho~ever, be a case for instelling such a system in the mostpetentially hazardons tunnels: these include the older sub-aqueous tunnels, where their bends and gradient increase the risk of vehicle collisions, and which have limited means of escape. Some also have two-waytraffic. There might alse be a case for fixed suppression equipment in very long tunnels, particularly if the response time of the emergelly services jsIikely to be more than.a few minutes. However,the unanimous view oftl1ose .consultedwas that sneh systems should not be installed unless there was a peI'1lUlllelldy-manned control room with well-trained staffabie to assessthe severity of anyincident that might lead toa me. On theoJh,erhand, the eest of installing improved detection systems would be relativelylow and relatively straightforwardeven in existing tunnels. Where tunnels are monitred sueh systems.eeuld faeilitate arapid response, aUowing the majority of fires to be eontrolled without the need for fixedsuppression equiprnent However, although the systems described in this report show promise, none have been adequately proven in a tunnel fire: proving trials are therefore required.

11

RECOMMENDATIONS

The folloWingrecommendatiens shouldbeconsidered in drawing up the specificatien for the relllaining phases of the project. Reference shouldalso be made to Volume 3 of thisprbject report when considering further.work.

11.1

CASESTUDIES

A smallnumber of tunnel categories were defined forgeneric risk assessment purposes,buttbere was considerable diversity within each of the categories. It might be heneficial to undertake amoredetailed study of a partienlar tunnel(s) judgedto be of a relatively high risk to determine the relative oost/benefit ratios of various improvements to fire safety.

11.2

COMMUNICATION AND EVACUATION

Effective communication with the occupants of vehicles in a tunnel isareeognised problem and it should be the target of further research. In a number of incidents, the response of the tunnel operator and vehicle occupants has been inappropriate, for example at Hstfield (Hertfordshire Constabulary, 1989): this has increased the severityof'an incident. Theevacuation of a tunnel requires aneffective means of stopping the traffic entering a tunnel but, currently, many tunnels have no such meaes. In many documented cases traffic bas continued to enter a tunnel following the start of an incident, thereby increasing the hazard and obstrueting access by the emergency services. Provision of gates simUartothoseused forrailway crossings or asused atthe Clyde Tunnelmight beappropriate. A driving simulator could be used as part of a preliminary investigation into means of coatrolling traffic in tunnels. Simnlation techniques could also be used to investigate effective means of communicating with the occupants of vehicles in a tunnel: these
27

mightiaehrde variabie message signs, audible alarms and messages and interfaces with in-ear information systems,

11.3

DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION

Ex.tensiy~experiments.have .been undertaken todetermine the heat release and rate of developq1ent of vehiclefires in tumlels,and. on.the effectsoftunnel ventilation on a fire. H9wever, there are Uttledataavailable from fuIl-scaie tests on thedetection or suppression of vehicle fires in tunnels. Such tests thathave been perforrnedhave,m the mam, been undertaken on hydrocarbon pool fires in tunnels, or on vehiele (or mocked-up vehile) . fires .in.t.est.chamhers .. that are umepresentative ..of .the envirOlll'l:lelltin al'oad tunneL Most automatic deteetionsystems .have not been'triedin atul1n.e1fire.'rhel'eisclearlya.needfor furtherpraeticalexperimentation to evaluate themostpromising systems describedherein. 11.4

FULL.. SCALETESTS

Prior to the selection of a fire dereetion or suppression system for a road tunnel, experimental work should he undertaken to detennine its effectivenesaSuch proving trials are best undertaken on a real vehicle in. a fuUscale .tunneL .Anumberof European organisationsare. proposing. to .perferm such.experiments: .collaboration is essentiahtosharetheextremelyhighcost of performing .sueh.research.By way of example, theEureka testprogram,\Vhichcovered a litnited.ran$e. ?f. variables, . eest 6.67MEuro, and STUVA estimatethatthecostof theirproposedproject would he about 2.5M Euro. However the latter. is based on the assulllption that industry wiIl cover thecosts of design, supply, instellation and dismantlingtherequired hardware. Inatestpl'agriunme, it would.benecessary to bum.arangeof' 'typical' vehieles whilst measurin~eoverage, . airflow,smokedensityand temperatureat . a . largenumber of pomtsaround the fire.This wouldneed to berepeated for suppression systems and, perhaps,far various. 'delay before applieation' times. However, ..a number of fire detectien systemscould be tested simultaneously. There are sa .many variables to consider that for practical .. and economie reasens only a limited. subset could be investigated, These include; fYpeofvehiele type of suppression d;eIaybeforesuppression rateaIapplicationofsuppressant

11.5

COMPUTER MODELLING

The results froD1 thsprogt'alncould be usedta calibrate,as best as can be,variaus CFD systems. Such systems might then be used to investigate the effeetsof a wider range ofvariables than could ever be eovered in the full-scale trials.

28

12

REFERENCES

Bird, S and Elsworth, N E (1999). Review of tunnel incident records. Unpublished Project Report PRJCE/197/99. TRL Ltd, Crowthorne. Bird S, Potter JE, Hiller DM and Bowers K H (200l). procedures. TRL Report 448. TRL Ltd, Crowthorne. DETR (1999). Road Accidents in Great Britain: Stationery Office, London Value management for tunnel

1999 the casualty report. The

Evans A, Bird S, Bowers K H, Crabb G 1 and Harse RH (2001). Value engineering for tunnel equipment. TRL Report 449. TRL Ltd, Crowthorne. Ford C,Fitzgerald W A, Shinkwin J D and Murphy J T (1997). The Lee tunnel, Cork, Ireland, planning, contract strategy and conceptual design. Proceedings of the international conference "Immersed Tunnel Techniques 2". Thomas Telford Ltd, London,pp108-121. GoodfeUow R J F, Astle P J and Hiller D M (1995). The application of a service tunnel in the design of road tunnels in the UK. Unpublished Project Report PRJCE/128/95. TRL Ltd, Crowthorne. Hamer, M (2000). What fed the inferno? New Scientist, Vol. 168 (2265) 18 November 2000, p4. Hertfordshire Constabulary (1989). Video cassette recording of the Al(M) Hatfield Tunnel Fire. Luchian S (1995) The Central Artery/Tunnel Project Memorial Tunnel Fire Test Program. Massachusetts Highway Department and Federal Highway Administration (USA). The Highways Agency. Design Manual for Roads and Bridges. BD 53 Inspeetion and records for road tunnels (DMRB 3.1.6). The Stationery Office, London. The Highways Agency. Design Manual for Roads and Bridges. BD 78 Design ofroad tunnels (DMRB 2.2.9). The Stationery Office, London. The Home Office (1995). Home Office Statistical Records - Summary Fire Staristics UK .1995- Firesandcasualties from fires in cars. Table 15.(STATS 19).

13

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The work described in this report was carried out in the Structures Department (Ground Engineering Group) of the Transport Research Laberatory. The project manager was Mr G I Crabb and the Quality Audit and Review Officer was Dr J Temporal. The project manager would like to thank Dr K C Brady, Dr K H Bowers, Mr S Bird, Mr G Clark, Mr M Greene and Mrs C Fowler of TRL, Mr C Stanbridge of

29

Symonds Group and Mr J Lavender of Chiltern International Fire, who all assisted with the work.

30