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GOITIA VS. CAMPOS-RUEDA GANDIOCO VS.

PENERANDA
Facts: Teresita Gandioco, legal wife of petitioner, Froilan Gandioco, filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner for legal separation on the ground of concubinage with a petition for support and payment of damages. Teresita also filed a complaint for concubinage against petitioner with the MTC of General Santos City. And again, for the application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite. The respondent judge Peneranda, ordered the payment of support pendent lite. Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents thereto should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage. ISSUE: W o N the civil action for legal separation shall be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage. HELD: Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminal action for concubinage for the action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability arising from the offense. Civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Support pendente lite, as a remedy can be availed of in an action for legal separation and granted at the discretion of the judge.

KALAW VS. FERNANDEZ


Doctrine: In the case, there are grounds for legal separation but not for psychological incapacity under FC36 Facts: Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met 1973 Married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976 Tyrone had extramarital affair with Jocelyn who gave birth to his son in March 1983

May 1985: Malyn left conjugal home and her four children to Tyrone. Tyrone started living with Jocelyn who bore him more children (3) 1990: Tyrone went to US together with Jocelyn and their children He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver. Nine years since de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36. Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Gates and a catholic canon law expert, Fr. Healy to testify Dr. Gates: Malyn may suffer from psychological incapacity due to evidence (madjong, frequent nights out), reflect a narcissistic personality disorder, based her diagnosis on facts revealed in interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (sisterin-law) and their son Fr. Healy: her psych inc. is totes grave and incurable: based his opinion on interview with Tyrone, trial transcripts as well as reports from Dr. Dayan, Malyns expert witness; clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyns habits, because he believed it was the duty of the court to do so

ISSUE: W o N Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malyn suffers from psych inc? HELD: No. Burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. He must prove that it existed at the time of marriage and must be grave and incurable. Pet. Failed to prove that res suffers from psych inc. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD. But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner. What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be

grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage. Grounds for legal sep which may be present in the case: 1) sexual infidelity, 2)physical abuse

REPUBLIC VS. QUINTOS


Facts: Eduardo and Catalina married on March 16, 1977 April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalinas psychological incapacity Catalina did not object, but prayed to be given a share of conjugal house

Issue: Did the TC sufficiently prove Catalinas alleged personality disorder and is this a sufficient ground for declaring the marriage null and void due to psychological incapacity? HELD: No. Her traits did not meet the guidelines. Rather, the only fact established here was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live with another man. Abandonment is a ground for legal separation. Petition dismissed. ALMELOR VS. RTC

CAMPOS VS. CAMPOS

LAPUZ VS. EUFEMIO


FACTS: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present rebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights. HELD: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

MATUBIS VS. PRAXEDES


FACTS: Matubis and Praxedes were married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. On May 30, 1944, for failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, they agreed to live separately from each other. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement on their legal separation. Starting January 1955, Praxedes began cohabiting with Asuncion Rebulado, deported themselves as husband and wife in the community; and on September 1, 1955, Asuncion gave birth to Praxedes child. On April 24, 1956, alleging abandonment and concubinage,

Matubis, filed with the CFI of Camarines Sur a complaint for Legal Separation and change of surname against Praxedes, who denied the allegations and contended that it was Matubis who left the conjugal home. CFI dismissed the complaint on ground that the action has prescribed, but acknowledged that Praxedes acts constituted concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation. ISSUE: Whether or not the action for filing the petition had already prescribed. RULING: Yes, under Art. 102 of the Civil Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when the cause occurred. Matubis became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her husband with Asuncion Rebulado in January, 1955, but the complaint was filed only on April 24, 1956. The present action was, therefore, filed out of time and for that reason action is barred. Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the lower courts ruling.

PEOPLE VS. ZAPATA


Doctrine: 2 separate instances of sexual intercourse can constitute 2 separate counts of adultery. Thus, the accused may be charged twice without double jeopardy. Reasons: (1) every sexual intercourse constitutes the crime of adultery; (2) if paramours knowledge of marriage cannot be proven in the first commission, it will be in the second Facts: A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse. The complaint was filed twice: 1. For the period 1946 to 14 March 1947 2. For the period 15 March 1947 to 17 September 1948 In both cases, Dalmacio knew that Guadalupe was married. Respondents allege that this will constitute double jeopardy. Issue: W/N Double Jeopardy.

Held: NO Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency. True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are against the same person the offended husband, the same status the union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and the same community represented by the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended party, status society does not argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal consummated, for as long as the status remain unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime. In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need not to another or other adulterous acts to consummate it. After the last acts of adultery had been committed as charged in the first complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and for which the second complaint was filed. Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if the second places complaint the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, the adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his codefendant was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this defendant was a married woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts

ARANETA VS. CONCEPCION


PlaintiffLuisMa.AranetafiledcomplaintforlegalseparationagainstDefendant EmmaBenitezAranetaonthegroundofadultery.Aftertheissueswerejoined, defendantthereinfiledanomnibuspetitiontosecurecustodyoftheirthree minorchildren,amonthlysupportofP5,000,andreturnofherpassport;to

enjoinplaintifffromorderinghishirelingsfromharassingandmolestingher;and forattorneysfees.Plaintiffdeniedsaidallegationsandprayedthatpartiesbe requiredtosubmitrespectiveevidenceinthedeterminationofcustodyand support. RespondentJudgeHon.HermogenesConcepcionresolvedtheomnibuspetition, grantingthecustodyofthechildrentothedefendantincludingsupport(P2,300 monthlyallowance,P300forahouse,andP2,000forattorneysfees).Indenying plaintiffsmotionforsubmissionofevidence,RespondentJudgeinvokesArticle 103oftheCivilCode,whichreads: Actionforlegalseparationshallin nocasebetriedbeforesixmonthsshall haveelapsedsincethefilingofthepetition. PlaintiffinstitutedthispetitionforcertiorariagainstsaidorderoftheJudgeand formandamustocompelhimtorequirethepartiestosubmitevidencebefore decidingtheomnibuspetition. ISSUE: W/NtherespondentJudgeshouldhaverequired thepartiestosubmit evidencebeforedecidingtheomnibuspetition YES .Article103isamandatoryprovision.Theintroductionofanyevidenceis prohibitedinkeepingwiththeintentionofthelawtopreservethefamilyand homefromutterruin.Admittingevidenceexposessuchfamiliestothedangerof makingreconciliationdifficult,ifnotimpossible. Theperiodofsixmonthsfixedinthesaidarticleisintendedasacoolingoff periodtomakepossiblereconciliation betweenthespouses, andtogivethem opportunityfordispassionatereflection. But, thispracticalexpedientdoesnothavetheeffectofoverridingother provisionssuchasthedeterminationofthechildrenandalimonyandsupport pendentelite. Evidenceofallthedisputedclaims(allegationsofadulteryletter ofauthenticityasevidenceabandonmentofconjugalabode)shouldbeallowed thediscretionofthecourtastothecustodyandalimonypendentelitemaybe lawfullyexercised. Theruleisthatalltheprovisionsofthelawevenifapparentlycontradictory shouldbeallowedtostandandgiveneffectbyreconcilingthemifnecessary.

Thus,thedeterminationofthecustodyandalimonyshouldbegiveneffectand force,provideditdoesnotgototheextentofviolatingthepolicyofthecooling offperiod.Thatis,evidencenotaffectingthecauseoftheseparation,likethe actualcustodyofthechildren,themeansconducivetotheirwelfareand convenienceduringthependencyofthecase,theseshouldbeallowedthat the courtmaydeterminewhichisbestfortheircustody. FALLO: Thewritprayedforisherebyissuedandthe Respondent judgeor whosoevertakeshisplaceisorderedtoproceedonthequestionofcustodyand supportpendenteliteinaccordancewiththisopinion.Thecourtsorderfixing thealimony andrequiringpaymentisreversed.Withoutcosts.

DE OCAMPO VS. FLORENCIANO


Doctrine: No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. This case is about an action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife Serafina, on ground of adultery. The court of Nueva Ecija dismissed the petition. CA affirmed holding that there was confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription. This present petition for certiorari was granted to consider the application of articles 100 and 101 of the NCC. NCC 100: Legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided that there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. NCC 101: No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. Facts: 1938- marriage of Serafina and Jose March 1951- adultery of Serafina to Jose Arcalas

June 1955- adultery with Nelson Orzame Defendant made no answer to the allegations against her, court defaulted her, and pursuant to Art. 101 above, directed the provincial fiscal to investigate presence of collusion between parties, fiscal said there was no collusion; plaintiff presented his evidence thru testimony of Vicente Medina, Ernesto Ocampo, Cesar Enriquez, Mateo Damo, Jose de Ocampo, and Capt. Serafin Gubat. CA: o Evidence presented by plaintiff showed that they did marry (Plaintiff and Defendant) on 1938, on 1951, plaintiff found out on several occasions of his wifes infidelity o June 1951: sent her to Manila to study o 1952: lived separately o 1955: plaintiff surprised and caught his wife in the act of having illicit relations with husband, p signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which d manifested her agreeance provided she need not be charged criminally o CA said that husbands right to legal sep has prescribed, action was not filed a year after March 1951, when p first discovered her infidelity (NCC 102) o As to 2nd infidelity (with Nelson Orzame), 1955: husband upon finding out illicit connection, expressed his wish to file for legal sep and defendant readily agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by the fiscal upon orders of the court, she admitted to having sexual relations with Nelson Orzame, this was interpreted as a judicial confession

ISSUE: W o N her confession constitutes a confession of judgment disallowed by the law. HELD: Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by NCC 102. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on confession but upon evidence presented by plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendants confession. Petition should be granted because action for second adultery has not prescribed.

SOMOSA-RAMOS vs VAMENTA
GR No. L-34132

July 29, 1972 Fernando, J. FACTS: June 18, 1971: Lucy Somosa-Ramos filed for legal separation due to concubinage and an alleged attempt by Clemente Ramos against her life. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property. July 3, 1971: Opposition to the hearing based on Article 103 of CC July 16, 1971: A pleading by him stated that if the motion asking for pr eliminary mandatory injunction would be heard, reconciliation would be more dim. August 4, 1971: Order of Judge Vamenta granting Ramos petition for suspension of the hearing for the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction this is the order assailed in this petition for certiorari ISSUE: WON Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit HELD: It is the holding of this Court that Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period. 1. Delay is normally not permitted in deciding cases but it is different for legal separation. It involves a relationship on which the law for the best reasons would attach the quality of permanence. Despite constant bickering and the loss of affection for one another, it will not serve public interest, much less the welfare of the husband or the wife, to allow them to go their respective ways. Where there are offspring, the reason for maintaining the conjugal union is even more imperative. Even then, the hope that the parties may settle their differences is not all together abandoned. The healing balm of time may aid in the process. Hopefully, the guilty parties may mend his or her ways, and the offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity. Hence, the interposition of a sixmonth period before an action for legal separation is to be tried.

2. That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself are discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court." There would appear to be then recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstance 3. At any rate, from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six months certainly had elapsed. Thus there can be no more impediments for the lower court acting onthe motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.GRANTED (Respondent Judge Vamenta is directed to proceed without delay to hear the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction.)

PACETE VS. CARIAGA


Apr 1938 Enrico Pacete married Alanis Pacete (Cotabato) Mar 1943 had a child (Consuelo) 1948 Enrico contracted 2nd marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion (Kidapawan) Aug 1979 Alanis learned of Enricos 2nd marriage Oct 1979 Alanis filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage o During her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles o He fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" o He ignored overtures for an amicable settlement o Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. Nov 15, 1979 Defendant was served summon filed a motion for extension granted

Dec 18, 1979 Defendant filed second motion for extension granted Jan 18, 1980 Defendant filed another motion for extension denied

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer on the decree of legal separation, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita HELD: Ordinarily, the petition would have been outrightly dismissed. However, Civil Code Art 101 (Now FC 60) states: No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, thecourt shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. State attorneys are called to intervene in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted. Petition for Certiorari GRANTED

DE LA VINA VS. VILLAREAL


FACTS: On September 17, 1917, Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo against Diego de la Via for divorce, partition of conjugal

property, and alimony pendente lite in the sum of P400/month. Geopano and De la Via got married in 1888, but since 1913 and up to the date of the complaint, defendant had been committing acts of adultery with one Ana Calog, sustaining illicit relations with her and having her as his concubine, with public scandal and in disgrace of the plaintiff. Because of said illicit relations, the defendant ejected Geopano from the conjugal home, for which reason she was obliged to live in the city of Iloilo, where she had since established as her habitual residence. Scorned by her husband, Geopano had no means of support and was living only at the expense of one of her daughters. Subsequent to the filing of the said complaint, Geopano presented a motion alleging that since the filing of her complaint she had personal knowledge that the defendant was trying to alienate or encumber the property which belonged to the conjugal partnership between her and De la Via and prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued to restrain and prohibit De la Via in the premises. CFI granted preliminary injunction, but De la Via appealed, claiming that CFI Iloilo has no jurisdiction since his wife should follow his domicile, and that the judge has exceeded his power and authority in granting the preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of an action for divorce instituted by the wife. RULING: Yes. Under Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 164, Act No. 190, an action for divorce brought by the wife against the husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is an issue, the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband, prohibiting the husband from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action. Although the husband is the sole administrator of the conjugal property, the plaintiff's rights sought to be protected by is not the right to administer the conjugal property, but the right to share in the conjugal property upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

SABALONES VS. CA
Facts:

Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at#17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties. After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage on October5, 1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his retirement in 1985 at a separate residence. The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife. After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated April 7, 1992, granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife. Issue: W/N the preliminary injunction is valid? Held: Yes. Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge. Injunction was used to prohibit petitioner from administering the land. The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation.

Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.

YANGCO VS. RHODE

LERMA VS. CA
FACTS: Teodoro E. Lerma and Concepcion Diaz were married on May 19, 1951. On August 22, 1969 the petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez and on September 26, 1972 the court of First Instance of Rizal decided the adultery case of the respondent and found her and her co-accused, Teodoro Ramirez, guilty of the charge, sentencing them to a term of imprisonment. During the pendency of the adultery case against the respondent, wife On November 18, 1969 the respondent filed with the lower court, a complaint against the petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their youngest son, Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody. The respondent's complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life. The application for support pendente lite was granted in an order dated December 24, 1969, which was amended in an order dated February 15, 1970. The petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent's application for support pendente lite, setting up as defense the adultery charge he had filed against the respondent On March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorariand prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the aforementioned orders on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion. The next day the respondent court gave due course to the petition and issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said orders. The respondent court, in its decision of October 8, 1970, set aside the assailed orders and granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the lower court in support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite. The respondent moved to reconsider the decision on the ground that the petitioner had not asked that he be allowed to present evidence in the lower court. The respondent court, in its resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside the decision of October 8 and rendered another, dismissing the petition. This is now the subject of the instant proceeding for review.

ISSUE: W/N the lower court acted with grave abused of discretion in granting the respondents application for support pendente lite without giving the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense against the said application. HELD: Court of Appeals January 20, 1971 resolution and the orders of respondent Juvenile andDomestic Relations Court herein complained of, dated December 24, 1969 and February 15, 1970, all are set aside and their enforcement enjoined, without prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the pending action for legal separation between the parties. The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendent lite.

PEOPLE VS. SANSANO


Doctrine: In adultery, a party cannot institute a criminal proceeding if he has given his consent, either expressly or impliedly, to its commission. Facts: April 29, 1919- Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married. Shortly after the marriage, Ventura left her for three year. She cohabited with Mariano Ramos. 1924- Mariano Ventura came back, filed an adultery charged against Sensano and Ramos. The two were found guilty and was sentenced to serve the punishment of arresto mayor. She tried to make amends with Ventura, but the latter refused to forgive the former and told her (you) could go where you wished, (I) have nothing more to do with (you), and (you) could do as (you) pleased. He left again for Hawaii. 1931 (after 7 years)- Ventura again came back, instituted another adultery proceeding against the two for him to be able to obtain divorce.

Issue: Whether or not Sensano and Ramos can still be prosecuted for adultery?

Held: No.Art. 344 of the RPC states that the offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution for adultery if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.The statement Ventura made, and his conduct warrant the inference that he had consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused. That being the case, he cannot institute another criminal proceeding against his wife and its paramour.

PEOPLE VS. SCHNECKENBERGER


March 16, 1926- Rodolfo Schneckenberger married Elena Cartagena. They agreed to live separately after 7 years and executed a document stating the same on May 25, 1935. June 15, 1935- Rodolfo secured divorce decree from Mexico, he married Julia Medel on May 11, 1936. As the divorce decree is not valid, people filed a case against him for bigamy and concubinage. Rodolfo was found guilty of bigamy. In the concubinage case, he contended that it was double jeopardy, the Court however did not give credence to his statement and found him guilty of the said offense as charged.

Issue: Whether or not the case of concubinage must be dismissed by reason of the prior consent given by Elena to Rodolfo in the document they executed prior to the commission of the crime? Held:Double jeopardy is not present in the case at bar as Rodolfo was not tried for the same offense. Material to the case, the case of concubinage must be dismissed because of the prior consent given by Elena Cartagena in the document they executed on May 1935. Priorconsent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense.

GINEZ VS. BUGAYONG


Facts: July 1951- Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman to the US Navy and Leonila Ginez were married. He soon left for the US. He was informed by his sisters, where his wife was residing of the sames adulterous acts. August 1952- Benjamin Bugayong went home to Pangasinan and looked for Ginez. He found her and brought her to the house of Pedro Bugayon. They stayed there and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. He confronted Ginez about her supposed adulterous acts, she did not answer and just packed her things and left. He filed for legal separation on Nov. 18, 1952.

Ginez denied the allegations and contented that Benjamin cannot sue as he had already condoned her deeds, assuming that it were true, by virtue of their sexual intercourse in the house of Pedro Bugayong. Issue: Whether or not sexual intercourse and living together as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day amount to condonation? Held: Yes. Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. It deprives the offended spouse the action to file for legal separation. Any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation. A single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery ofthe offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation. The same necessary implies forgiveness on the part of the offended spouse.

BROWN VS. YAMBAO


Doctrine: Decree of legal separation may not be given to plaintiff whose acts also constitute for the grounds on which the complaint was based. Facts: July 14, 1955- William H. Brown filed a legal separation suit against Juanita Yambao on the ground that the latter had contracted extra-marital affairs while the former was interred at the UST during WW2. Juanita Yambao did not respond to the court despite dure service of summons. The Court later on order the State fiscal to determine whether there is collusion between the parties. Through cross examination, it has been established that Brown is not an innocent party (he had lived martially with another woman after his liberation) and that there has been connivance and that his actions to sue had already prescribed asstated under Article 102 of the NCC since it was shown that he knew of his wifes actions in 1945 but only filed the proceeding in 1955. Thus the petition was denied. Issue: Whether or not legal separation may be given to a plaintiff spouse whereby the same spouse also does the ground where the complaint was based?

Held: No. Recrimination is where an accused party in a case makes a similar accusation against the plaintiff. (Simply put, it as a situation where the accused can say you too or eh ikaw din naman eh) In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Juanita Yambao had committed adulterous acts. Nevertheless, it must be noted that Brown committed also the same acts. Therefore, Brown cannot use the ground of committing adulterous acts against Juanita Yambao because that would constitute recrimination.

ONG VS. ONG


Facts: July 13, 1975- Lucita and William Ong were married. March 21, 1996- Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation based on petitioners abusive conduct. RTO ruled for the legal separation, the CA affirmed in toto the same decision. Both courts found that there is indeed abuse on the part of William Ong that warrants the grant of the decree of legal separation. William Ong filed a petition at the SC, the petitioner raised for the first time that the legal separation decree should not have been issued because it is the respondent herself who has given ground for legal separation by abandoning the family simply because of a quarrel. Issue: Whether or not petition for legal separation shall be denied on the ground that it is the respondent who left the conjugal dwelling and is thus who has given ground for legal separation? Held: No. Role of the Supreme Court is only to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court. It is not a trier of facts. The argument that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56 par. 4 of the FC, which states that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation, is without merit. The abandonment referred to by the FC is abandonment without justifiable cause formore than one year. As shown by the evidence on record, Lucita left William becauseof the latters abusive conduct.

REPUBLIC VS. CA
Facts: Eduardo De Quintos and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalinas hysterectomy following her second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply with her essential mar ital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Issue: 1. Whether or not there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity of Catalinas marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. 2. Whether or not there was collusion between the parties. Held: Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married personis not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, we then laid down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina, The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the

totality of evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity. Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability of Catalinas psychological incapacity. There was, to s tart with, no evidence showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. Her immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. To rule that such immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity. Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The assertion was based on his admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of P50, 000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in order to convince her not to oppose his petition or to bring any action on her part. The payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and Eduardo. To recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless made it clear enough that she was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo willingly gave her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that whether or not he did so also to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing the petition for nullity of the marriage should by no means be of any consequence m determining the issue of collusion between the spouses. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 30,2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit.

MATUTE VS. MACADAEG


FACTS Armando Medel brought an action forlegal separation against his wife,Rosario Matute, upon the ground ofadultery committed with his brother,Ernesto Medel

Nov 6, 1952 CFI Manila granteddecree of legal separation andawarded to Armando the custody oftheir four minor children, then 12, 10,8, and 4 years of age. Armando then went to the US, and leftthe children in Davao with his sister,Pilar Medel Rosario eventually lived there as well to be with her children Late 1954 Armando returned to the Philippines March 1955 children joined their father in Cebu April 1955 With Armandos permission, Rosario brought the children to Manila to attend thefuneral of her father, on the conditionthat she would return the childrenwithin two weeks HOWEVER, Rosario did not return the children, and INSTEAD June 10, 1955 Rosario filed civil case for custody of the children and support of Armando in school fees and allowances. It was alleged that the 3 oldest children do not want to go back to their father because he is living with a woman other than their mother Armando opposed the motion, and countered with a petition to declare and punish Rosario for contempt of court; refusal to restore custody of the children June 29, 1955 Judge Macadaeg issued an order absolving Rosario from the charge of contempt of court because she secured the consent of Armando before bringing the children to Manila, but denying her motion for custody, and ordering her to deliverthe children to Armando Rosario filed for certiorari and prohibition ISSUE Whether or not Rosario should be granted custody of her children HELD NO. 1. Writ of certiorari and prohibition do not lie, because Judge Macadaeg did notact without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. If he made mistakes, these are simply errors of judgment. These are not errors of jurisdiction, but errors in the exercise of jurisdiction that the lower court admittedly had. - Proper remedy is review by appeal

- Order of June 29, 1955 enforced award in Nov 6, 1952 Order - Decisions re custody of minorchildren is never final still subject to review at any time that the Court may deem it for the best interest of said minors; until reviewed and modified, said award must stand - Since no modification has been made, respondent Judge has the duty to execute and implement award. - Rosario obtained permission of Armando to bring children to Manila; she holds it in the name, on behalf, and by authority of Armando, she is the agent; he may demand their return, and she cannot question such authority 2. Children over 10 years of age whose parents are living separately may choose which parent to live with, unless parent is unfit due to moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,incapacity, or poverty (ROC 100, sec.6) - Rosario is without means of livelihood, and she lives on the charity of her brothers; no home of her own, and would shelter children under the roof of her brothers. - Rosario is unfit to take care of the children or made it unwise to place them under her care DISPOSITION Petition DENIED, without prejudice to appropriate action Rosario may file to secure review of Order

QUIAO VS. QUIAO


FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the

petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned. RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation. ISSUES: 1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. Art 129 will govern. 2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights overof the properties in the conjugal partnership NO. 3. Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute community? NO. RATIO: 1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife. Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife. While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial courts ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process. 3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolutecommunity, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couples properties. And when the couples marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned. In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. And since the legal separationshare decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing. On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and

divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty partys favor.

LAPERAL VS. REPUBLIC


Facts: Elisea Laperal filed in the CIF of Baguio a petition which reads: 1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three years prior to the date of the filing of this petition; 2. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final; 3. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now; 4. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL. Petitioner prayed she be allowed to resume using her maiden name.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal. Ruling: The fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at bar is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner. It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner owns extensive business interests, the continued used of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding is however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the petition was based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced.

MACADANGDANG VS. CA
FACTS: Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on the legal separation.

HELD: The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated. The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects

of such final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse. Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.

REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA

ARROYO VS. VASQUEZ-ARROYO


Topic: Rights and Obligations of Spouses; Obligation to live with the other spouse; General rule and exceptions Facts: Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo have been married for 10 years when Dolores decided to leave their domicile with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. Mariano thus initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of the husband and thus she filed a cross complaint that asks for a decree of separation, a liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence, concluded that the continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. Thus, the judge gave judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed Issues and Ruling: (1) Whether or not the abandonment by the wife of the marital home was with sufficient justification No. It has been held that the tales of cruelty on the part of the husband were not proven; (2) Whether or not cross complaint conclusively proves that the plaintiff has forfeited his right to the marital society of his wife.

The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143, CC. Accordingly, where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance; and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorneys fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spousesa state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband. Facts of the case show that the plaintiff has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and she is under a moral and legal obligation to return to the common home and cohabit with him. (3) Whether or not the husband is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction to compel the wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as his dutiful wife Although the husband is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return, the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. Thus, that the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint. Held: judgment appealed from in respect both to the original complaint and the crossbill, it is declared that Dolores has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. Plaintiff absolved from cross-complaint.

CUADERNO VS. CUADERNO


Topic: Obligation to live with the other spouse (general rule and exceptions) FACTS: Petitioner Lourdes Ramirez-Cuaderno filed a complaint for support against her husband, respondent Angel Cuaderno on August 14, 1957 on the basis of maltreatment and abandonment by Angel

o The couple have been living separately since November 1956, as a result of injuries inflicted by Angel upon Lourdes during a quarrel; Angel took Lourdes to her mothers house where she stayed until the filing of the complaint Angel opposed, contending that it was Lourdes who left the conjugal dwelling; hence she is not entitled to support o However, during the hearing, he declared that, "all the trouble she (the wife) has given me is enough for me to turn my back to her," The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court decided in favor of Lourdes, ordering Angel to give her monthly support of P150 from the date of the filing of the complaint, attorneys fees, and to pay the costs The CA reversed the decision of the JDRC "so that (in the langua ge of the court) appellant and appellee may again resume cohabitation which they are hereby admonished to do as their duty as husband and wife." o CA decided upon the belief that conditions were such that cohabitation between the spouses is not yet impossible Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether Lourdes is may claim support without being compelled to live with Angel HELD: YES. The decision of the JDRC is revived. The Court ordered the sum of P150.00 for the Lourdes's monthly support. As the separation has been brought about by the husband and under the circumstances established during the trial, the same shall subsist until a different situation between the parties shall take place. It would be taking an unrealistic view to compel or urge them to live tog ether when they, specially the husband are speaking of impossibility of cohabitation. While marriage entitles both parties to cohabitation or consortium, the sanction therefor is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order. This is due to the inherent characteristic and nature of marriage in this jurisdiction. In this case, the infliction of the physical injuries upon the wife by the husband gave rise to their separation. It was also the husband who took his wife to her parents home where he left her. The fact that the wife allegedly accepted money from her husband and desisted from accepting any later because she was allegedly demanding for more, only indicates that

even before the filing of the present case, the defendant-husband was already providing something for the separate maintenance. Continued support would not be unreasonable, considering that the wife has no income while the husband was employed.

ILUSORIO VS. BILDNER SSS VS. DE LOS SANTOS SSS VS. FAVILA CALDERON VS. ROXAS YASIN VS. SHARIAH COURT SHARICA MARI GO TAN VS. SPOUSES TAN
Doctrine: The principle of conspiracy in the RPC may be applied suppletorily to RA 9262. -Tan and Steven Tan were married and they begot 2 children

a TPO (Temp Protective Order) against Steven and her parents-in-law, R Spouses Tan o She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with Rs, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses in violation of RA 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004

-in-law, they werent covered by RA 9262 -in-law not

included under RA 9262 (under the rule of law expressio unius est exclusion alterius = the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another and so, to include Rs would be a strained interpretation of the provision of the law ISSUE: WoN R-spouses may be included in petition for TPO in accordance with RA 9262 Contentions: P: RA 9262 explicitly provides for application of RPC RPC Art. 8 on conspiracy can be applied Rs: They arent covered as said RA explicitly provides the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage or a sexual relationship SC Ruling: Yes, they may be included.

connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual/dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC (Sec. 47, RA 9262: For purposes of this Act, the RPC and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.

instant case, it is the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.

and set aside.

SAN DIEGO VS. RTC

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