Digests - Special Civil Actions

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS|1
INTERPLEADER OCAMPO v. TIRONA FACTS: Ocampo alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land which he bought from Rosauro Breton o TCT is not yet in Ocampos name Tirona is a lessee occupying a portion of the said land o In recognition of the right of ownership of Ocampo, Tirano paid some monthly rentals due o However, the subject land was declared under area of priority development and hence, Tirona exercised her right of first refusal pursuant to a presidential decree and in connection thereto, will temporarily stop paying her monthly rentals Despite demand, Tirona refused to pay the rentals Hence, a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Ocampo o In her Answer, Tirona asserted that Lourdes Rodriguez Yaneza actually owns the subject land o In her amended answer, she further alleged that the certificate of title was not ever registered under Ocampos name MTC ruled in favor of Ocampo o Ocampo filed a motion for execution pending appeal Upon appeal to RTC, Maria Lourdes Breton Mendiola filed a motion with leave to file intervention o RTC denied her motion for intervention o In her memorandum, Tirona, for the first time, disclosed that Alipio Breton is the registered owner of the subject land o And upon his death, his children Rosauro and Maria Lourdes Breton inherited the land; o Rosauro Breton executed a deed of conveyance and waiver in favor Maria Lourdes o She alleged also that Ocampo could not acquire title over the land in view of the said waiver o Maria Lourder is her lessor and not Ocampo RTC affirmed the MTC decision CA set aside the RTC decision against her before filing a bill of interpleader. 37 An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property. 38 The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint. Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All the elements required for an unlawful detainer case to prosper are present. Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the subject land from Tironas lessor. Tironas continued occupation of the subject land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampos terms. However, Tirona eventually refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease. We GRANT the petition DECLARATORY RELIEF
Alfredo Tano, et al . (100), & Airline Shippers Association Of Palawan , petitioners, vs. Gov. Salvador P. Socrates, Members of Sanggunian Panlalawigan of Palawan, City Mayor Edward Hagedorn, Members of Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa, All Members of Bantay Dagat, Members of Philippine National Police of Palawan, Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, and All Judges of Palawan, Regional, Municipal And Metropolitan, respondents. (G.R. No. 110249 | August 21, 1997) FACTS: DAVIDE, JR., J.: Petitioners caption their petition as one for Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and pray that this Court: (1) DECLARE AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92 (1992) of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23 (1993) issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 , (1993) of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; (2) ENJOIN THE ENFORCEMENT thereof; and (3) RESTRAIN RESPONDENTS Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office Order. THE PETITION SHALL BE TREATED AS A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION. 1. The Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF, the full text of which reads as follows: Section 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. - To effectively free our City Sea Waters from Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance, and shall cover all persons and/or entities operating within and outside the City of Puerto Princesa who are directly or indirectly in the business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City. Section 3. Definition of terms . - For purpose of this Ordinance the following are hereby defined:
ISSUE: WON THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE MUST PROPSER AGAINST TIRONA HELD: Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. The elements to be proved and resolved in unlawful detainer cases are the fact of lease and expiration or violation of its terms The following facts support the conclusion that there was a violation of the lease agreement: (1) Tirona, through Callejo Law Office, sent a letter dated 5 July 1995 which stated that Tirona will temporarily stop paying her monthly obligation until the National Housing Authority has processed the pertinent papers regarding the amount due to Ocampo in view of PD 1517; 29 (2) As of August 1995, Tirona has not paid her rent to Ocampo corresponding to April to August 1995;30 and (3) In a letter dated 7 August 1995, Ocampo demanded from Tirona unpaid rent payments.31 In view of these facts, we hold that Tirona is estopped from denying her possession under a lease 32 and that there was a violation of the lease agreement. Thus, the MTC and RTC correctly ruled against Tirona. The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo

D. ALL LIVE FISH - All alive, breathing not necessarily moving of all specie[s] use for food and for aquarium purposes. E. LIVE LOBSTER - Several relatively, large marine crustaceans of the genus Homarus that are alive and breathing not necessarily moving. Section 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any business enterprise or company to ship out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any live fish and lobster EXCEPT sea bass, catfish, mudfish, and milkfish fries. Section 5. Penalty Clause. - Any person/s and/or business entity violating this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than P5,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) months, cancellation of their permit to do business in the City OR all of the herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the court. Section 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment found violating the provisions of this ordinance is a corporation or a partnership, the penalty prescribed in Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon its president and/or General Manager or Managing Partner and/or Manager, as the case maybe [sic]. Section 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of any ordinance inconsistent with this ordinance is deemed repealed. 2. To implement, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23-1993 which reads as follows: WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of R.A. 7160 empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties upon acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, among others. Resolution No. 33, Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and to enact Ordinance No. 2 for the purpose, to wit: Section II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS (RA 7160) Section III. DECLARATION OF POLICY. - to protect and conserve the marine resources of Palawan not only for the greatest good of the majority of the present generation but with [the] proper perspective and consideration of [sic] their prosperity, and to attain this end, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan henceforth declares that it shall be unlawful for any person or any business entity to engage in catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms in and coming out of Palawan Waters for a period of 5 years; Section IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. - Any person and/or business entity violating this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than P5K, Philippine Currency, and/or imprisonment of 6 months to 12 months and confiscation and forfeiture of paraphernalia and equipment in favor of the government at the discretion of the Court; 4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, thereby DEPRIVING ALL THE FISHERMEN of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from PERFORMING THEIR LAWFUL OCCUPATION AND TRADE; Petitioners Alfredo Tanoet al., were even CHARGED CRIMINALLY in the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cuyo-AgutayaMagsaysay; So were Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim were charged by the respondent PNP Puerto Princesa City;
In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74, otherwise known as AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS PERMIT and City Ordinance No. 15-92 , you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations either via aircraft or seacraft. Purpose: to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayors Permit and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the BFAR and as to compliance with all other existing rules and regulations on the matter. Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents as stated herein must be held for proper disposition. In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate with the PAL Manager, the PPA Manager, the local PNP Station and other offices concerned for the needed support and cooperation. 3. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan enacted Resolution No. 33 (February 19, 1993) entitled: a resolution PROHIBITING the CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, to wit: family: scaridae (MAMENG), epine phelus fasciatus (SUNO). cromileptes altivelis (PANTHER OR SENORITA), lobster below 200 grams and spawning, tradacna gigas (TAKLOBO), pinctada margaritefera (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), penaeus monodon (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), epinephelus suillus (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) and family: balistidae (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) for a PERIOD 5 YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS,
5.
WITHOUT SEEKING REDRESS from the concerned LGUs, prosecutors office and courts, PETITIONERS DIRECTLY INVOKED SCs original jurisdiction by filing this petition (1993), contending : First, the Ordinances DEPRIVED them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade. Second, Office Order No. 23 contained NO REGULATION NOR CONDITION the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit. Third, as Ordinance No. 2 TOOK AWAY the right of petitionersfishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were UNDULY PREVENTED from pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion. Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 is NULL AND VOID, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed. In their comment (13 August 1993), public respondents defended the validity of Ordinance No.2, Series of 1993, as a VALID EXERCISE OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS POWER UNDER THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE, and its specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC. The Ordinance covered ONLY LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS which were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides THE PROHIBITION was for only 5 years to PROTECT AND PRESERVE the pristine coral and allow THOSE DAMAGED TO REGENERATE. Respondents likewise maintained that THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (Public hearings were conducted, had a lawful purpose, and employed reasonable means;) and EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES of the Constitution (substantial distinction existed between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live : the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not.
WHEREAS studies disclose that only 5% of the corals of our province remain to be in excellent condition as a habitat of marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms; WHEREAS the destruction and devastation were principally due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious substances and other related activities; WHEREAS urgent need to protect and preserve the existence of the remaining corals and allow to reinvigorate and regenerate themselves into vitality within the span of 5 years;

Petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate Issuance of a TRO ( 25 October 1993) claiming that despite the pendency of this case, RTC of Palawan was proceeding with CRIMINAL CASE against petitioners Danilo Tano et al. for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said plea, SC issued a TRO directing Judge Angel Miclat of said court to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and pre-trial. There are actually TWO SETS OF PETITIONERS in this case. The FIRST is composed of Alfredo Tano, et al., who were criminally charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, The SECOND set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners numbering seventy-seven (77), all of whom, except the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan -- an alleged private association of several marine merchants -- are natural persons who claim to be fishermen. The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to prevent the prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that they being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely affected by the ordinances. ISSUE: Were the Provincial Ordinances unconstitutional? NO. Should SC grant the certiorari and prohibition prayed for by the petitioners? NO. IMPORTANT REASONS THEREFOR, CLEARLY AND SPECIFICALLY SET OUT IN THE PETITION . This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket . III SC opts to resolve this case on its merits considering that the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is about to end. THESE ORDINANCES WERE UNDOUBTEDLY ENACTED IN THE EXERCISE OF POWERS UNDER THE NEW LGC RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND ARE THUS NOVEL AND OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. No further delay then may be allowed in the resolution of the issues raised. It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption. IN SHORT, THE CONFLICT WITH THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE SHOWN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT . Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. TO DOUBT IS TO SUSTAIN. SC finds petitioners contentions baseless and so hold that THE FORMER DO NOT SUFFER FROM ANY INFIRMITY, BOTH UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS.
The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads: The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide: SEC. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources. There is absolutely NO SHOWING THAT ANY OF THE PETITIONERS QUALIFIES AS A SUBSISTENCE OR MARGINAL FISHERMAN. A MARGINAL FISHERMAN is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish, while a SUBSISTENCE FISHERMAN is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood . The LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a MARGINAL FARMER OR FISHERMAN as an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family. NOTHING IN THE RECORD SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT ANY PETITIONER FALLS WITHIN THESE DEFINITIONS. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth. The provision recognizes that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Section 149 of the LGC of 1991:
HELD: AS TO THE FIRST SET OF PETITIONERS: This special civil for CERTIORARI MUST FAIL on the ground of prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action. There is no showing that the said petitioners have filed motions to quash the information therein and that the same were denied. Even if the petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The GENERAL RULE is that where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy is for the party aggrieved to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits of adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law . And, even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial may be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari, an MR must have to be filed to allow the court concerned an opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion may be dispensed with because of existing exceptional circumstances. Finally, even if an MR has been filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 is still UNAVAILABLE absent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof. FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, THE PETITION AT BAR DOES NOT, AND COULD NOT HAVE , ALLEGED ANY OF SUCH GROUNDS. AS TO THE SECOND SET OF PETITIONERS The instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a declaration that the Ordinances in question are a nullity ... for being unconstitutional. Their PETITION MUST LIKEWISE FAIL, as this Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved, it being settled that the SC merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions. II While SC have concurrent jurisdiction with RTC and with the CA to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, so we held in People v. Cuaresma: There is after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. A DIRECT INVOCATION OF THE SUPREME COURTS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THESE WRITS SHOULD BE ALLOWED ONLY WHEN THERE ARE SPECIAL AND

SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. -- x x x (b) The sangguniang bayan may: (1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it: Provided, however, That duly registered organizations and cooperatives of marginal fishermen shall have preferential right to such fishery privileges .... In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3(April 1996), the Secretary of DA and the DILG prescribed the guidelines on the preferential treatment of small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right mentioned in Section 149 . THIS CASE, HOWEVER, DOES NOT INVOLVE SUCH FISHERY RIGHT. RE SECTION 7 OF ARTICLE XIII: it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources , BUT OF THEIR PROTECTION, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSERVATION. The ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment by the people may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to come. The PREFERENTIAL RIGHT of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is NOT AT ALL ABSOLUTE . In accordance with the REGALIAN DOCTRINE, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under the full control and supervision of the State . Moreover, their mandated protection, development, and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS ON WHATEVER RIGHT OF ENJOYMENT THERE MAY BE IN FAVOR OF ANYONE. MR. RODRIGO: So, once one is licensed as a marginal fisherman, he can go anywhere in the Philippines and fish in any fishing grounds. MR. BENGZON: Subject to whatever rules and regulations and local laws that may be passed, may be existing or will be passed.. Davide wont miss the chance to cite his ponencia in Oposa v. Factoran, this Court declared: While the right to balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles the State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation - aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners - the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions . As a matter of fact, THESE BASIC RIGHTS NEED NOT EVEN BE WRITTEN IN THE CONSTITUTION FOR THEY ARE ASSUMED TO EXIST FROM THE INCEPTION OF HUMANKIND . If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded FEAR OF ITS FRAMERS THAT UNLESS THE RIGHTS TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY AND TO HEALTH ARE MANDATED AS STATE POLICIES BY THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF, THEREBY HIGHLIGHTING THEIR CONTINUING IMPORTANCE AND IMPOSING UPON THE STATE A SOLEMN OBLIGATION TO PRESERVE THE FIRST AND PROTECT AND ADVANCE THE SECOND , THE DAY WOULD NOT BE TOO FAR WHEN ALL ELSE WOULD BE LOST NOT ONLY FOR THE PRESENT GENERATION , but also for those to come - generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. THE RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY CARRIES WITH IT A CORRELATIVE DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM IMPAIRING THE ENVIRONMENT ... Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as expressly mandated by the Constitution. Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on DEVOLUTION IS THE ENFORCEMENT OF FISHERY LAWS IN MUNICIPAL WATERS INCLUDING THE CONSERVATION OF MANGROVES. This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. The term MUNICIPAL WATERS, in turn, include not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and not comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and fifteen kilometers from it. Under P.D. No. 704, the marine waters included in municipal waters is limited to three nautical miles from the general coastline using the above perpendicular lines and a third parallel line. These fishery laws include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D. No. 1015 which authorizes the establishment of a closed season if necessary for conservation or ecological purposes; (3) P.D. No. 1219 which provides for the exploration, exploitation, utilization, and conservation of coral resources; (4) R.A. No. 5474, as amended by B.P. Blg. 58, which makes it unlawful for any person, association, or corporation to catch or cause to be caught, sell, offer to sell, purchase, or have in possession any of the fish specie called gobiidae or ipon during closed season; and (5) R.A. No. 6451 which prohibits and punishes electrofishing, as well as various issuances of the BFAR. To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and regulation of fishing in municipal waters and the protection of its marine environment are concerned, must be added the following: 1. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages within municipal waters; 2. Issuance of permits to gather aquarium fishes within municipal waters; 3. Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells within municipal waters; 4. Issuance of permits to gather/culture shelled mollusks w/n muni waters; 5. Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed farms within municipal waters; 6. Issuance of licenses to establish culture pearls within municipal waters; 7. Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport fish and fishery products; and 8. Establishment of closed season in municipal waters. These functions are covered in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government. Parenthetically, SC wishes to add that these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act (19 July 1992). This statute adopts a COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF PALAWAN COMPATIBLE WITH PROTECTING AND ENHANCING THE NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENDANGERED ENVIRONMENT OF THE PROVINCE. It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years, and (2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. The accomplishment of the FIRST OBJECTIVE IS WELL WITHIN THE DEVOLVED POWER TO ENFORCE FISHERY LAWS in municipal waters which allows the establishment of closed seasons. The devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the MOA between the DA and the DILG. The realization of the SECOND OBJECTIVE FALLS WITHIN BOTH THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE OF THE LGC AND THE EXPRESS MANDATE THEREUNDER TO CITIES AND PROVINCES TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND IMPOSE APPROPRIATE PENALTIES for acts which endanger the environment. <DISCUSSION ON HOW CYANIDE FISHING DESTROYS THE REEF ECOSYSTEM> THE PUBLIC PURPOSE AND REASONABLENESS ORDINANCES MAY NOT THEN BE CONTROVERTED. OF THE

The DISSENTING OPINION of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority on the part of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the theory that the subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the BFAR, that, in any event, the Ordinance is unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the DENR. FALSE. The jurisdiction and responsibility of the BFAR under P. D. no. 704, over the management, conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of all fishery and aquatic resources of the country is not allencompassing. That all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries and any disposition thereunder shall be submitted to the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources for appropriate action and shall have full force and effect only upon his approval. Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer under the DENR. Therefore, IT IS INCORRECT TO SAY THAT THE CHALLENGED ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF PUERTO PRINCESA IS INVALID OR UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE DENR . If at all, the approval that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the DA (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has been dispensed with in view of the following reasons: (1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or amends Section 16 and 29 of P.D. No. 704 insofar that they are inconsistent with the provisions of the LGC. As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing laws. Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance. filed before the RTC of Caloocan City against the NHMFC and HDMF and Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo. Petitioners alleged that they obtained housing loans from respondents who directly released the proceeds to the subdivision developer, Shelter Philippines, Inc. (Shelter). o However, Shelter failed to complete the subdivision according to the subdivision plan. Petitioners spent their own resources to improve the subdivision roads and alleys, and to install individual water facilities. o Respondents failed to ensure Shelters completion of the subdivision. o Respondents ignored their right to suspend amortization payments for Shelters failure to complete the subdivision, charged interests and penalties on their outstanding loans, threatened to foreclose their mortgages and initiated foreclosure proceedings against petitioner Rafael Martelino. o Hence, they prayed that respondents be restrained from foreclosing their mortgages. The RTC set the PI hearing, but said order, including the summons and petition, were served only on the NHMFC and Sheriff Castillo. Subsequently, the RTC ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the respondents from foreclosing the mortgages on petitioners houses. RTCs RULING: In dismissing the case, the RTC ruled that the issue of non-completion of the subdivision should have been brought before the HLURB. It also ruled that no judicial declaration can be made because the petition was vague. The RTC assumed that the subject of the petition was Republic Act No. 8501 (Housing Loan Condonation Act of 1998) which was cited by petitioners. But the RTC pointed out that petitioners failed to state which section of the law affected their rights and needed judicial declaration. Moreover, the RTC noted that respondents still foreclosed their mortgages, a breach of said law which rendered the petition for declaratory relief improper. The proper remedy was an ordinary civil action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Order.
(2)
ISSUES: Whether or not (1) The preliminary injunction order against the HDMF is valid NO (2) The petition for declaratory relief and prohibition was properly dismissed NO RULING: Preliminary Injunction We affirm the RTC and Court of Appeals ruling that the preliminary injunction order is not valid against the HDMF. 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court expressly states that No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. In the case at bar, petitioners even admit that the HDMF was not notified of the PI hearing. Petitioners do not contest the lower courts ruling that the July 9, 1998 Order cannot apply to the HDMF. They merely contend and insist that HDMF voluntarily submitted to the RTCs jurisdiction. However, such contention is immaterial because the issue involved is the validity of the PI order absent a notice of hearing for its issuance to the HDMF. Declaratory Relief and Prohibition The ruling that the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Prohibition is improper is correct, because the Petition must be filed before the occurrence of breach or any violation. Under 1, Rule 63, a person must file a petition for declaratory relief before breach or violation of a deed, will, contract, other written instrument, statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation. However, petitioners had already suspended payment of amortizations. Clearly giving the HDMF a right to foreclose the mortgage for failure to pay the debt secured by the mortgage. Petitioners actual suspension of payments defeated the purpose of the action to secure an authoritative declaration of their supposed right to suspend payment, for their guidance. o Thus, the RTC could no longer assume jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief because there was an occurrence of breach before filing the action. PURPOSE OF THE ACTION: Secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach.
In closing, SC COMMENDS THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF THE CITY OF PUERTO PRINCESA AND SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF THE PROVINCE OF PALAWAN FOR EXERCISING THE REQUISITE POLITICAL WILL TO ENACT URGENTLY NEEDED LEGISLATION TO PROTECT AND ENHANCE THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT, THEREBY SHARING IN THE HERCULEAN TASK OF ARRESTING THE TIDE OF ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION . We hope that other local government units shall now be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued on is LIFTED.
G.R. No. 160208 June 30, 2008 RAFAEL R. MARTELINO, BARCHELECHU S. MORALES, ROSELYN S. CACHAPERO, REYNALDO R. EVANGELISTA, CESAR B. YAPE, LEONORA R. PARAS, SEGUNDINA I. IBARRA, RAQUEL G. HALNIN, ZAMORA I. DIAZ, and ARTHUR L. VEGA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION and HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, respondents FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction

WHEN TO FILE THE ACTION : It may be entertained only BEFORE the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract to which it refers. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. The Dismissal of the Petition was Improper If the petition for declaratory relief and prohibition was vague, dismissal is not proper because the respondents may ask for more particulars. Notably, the NHMFC never assailed the supposed vagueness of the petition in its motion to dismiss nor did it ask for more particulars before filing its answer. When the RTC also set the pre-trial conference and ordered the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs, it even noted that the issues had already been joined. Petitioners fairly stated also the necessary ultimate facts, except that their action for declaratory relief was improper. The RTC made an assumption that RA No. 8501 was the subject matter of the case. But while the petition mentioned the law, the declaration that petitioners sought was not anchored on any of its provisions. The petition only stated that despite the effectivity of said law, respondents still acted in bad faith and with undue haste in threatening petitioners with foreclosures, instead of encouraging them to avail of its benefits. COMMENTO: The Condonation Act took effect, but instead of applying for condonation and for the restructuring of their loans, Petitioners filed an erroneous petition before the RTC (siguro akala nila automatic unyay, wala na silang utang!). On the other hand, the RTC was incorrect on the point that the case should have been filed before HLURB. The jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved and the parties. In this case, the petition for declaratory relief and prohibition did not involve an unsound real estate business practice, or a refund filed by subdivision buyers against the developer, or a specific performance case filed by buyers against the developer. and EDUARDO QUINTOS SR., Chief of Police of the City of Manila, respondents-appellees. FACTS: Petitioners filed a suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila contending that it amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance provides that: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the same person." As noted in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. Hence, petitioners appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the same person." As noted in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. ISSUE: WoN the suit has merit. HELD: NO. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers." This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which "delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to recall, is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence." As it was then, so it has continued to be. There is no showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance. WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed. No costs. CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS [G.R. No. 148288. August 12, 2005.] ROSEMARIE BALBA, petitioner, vs. PEAK DEVELOPMENT INC. and MA. ISABEL VASQUEZ, respondents. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NECESSITY TO DELVE INTO FACTUAL ISSUES TO RESOLVE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in reversing the factual findings in the case instead of ruling only on "errors of jurisdiction," as befits a judgment in a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. The flaw in petitioner's reasoning lies in the failure to appreciate that it is sometimes necessary to delve into factual issues in order to resolve allegations of grave abuse of discretion as a ground for the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition. Furthermore, the conflicting views of the LA and the NLRC on the factual issues or the insufficiency of the evidence supporting the respective allegations of the parties, warranted the review
Conversion of the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Prohibition to Ordinary Action GENERAL RULE: 6, Rule 63 allows the course of action. However, petitioners failed to specify the ordinary action they desired. The Court cannot assume that they seek annulment of the mortgages and further, the issue was not raised before the RTC. Therefore, the CA properly refused to entertain the issue as it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Conversion of Petition for Declaratory Relief to an Action for Prohibition GENERAL RULE: In De La Llana, etc., et al. v. Alba, etc., et al. , the Court considered a petition erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition as an action for prohibition. The case involved the constitutionality of BP Blg. 129, it was held that: that if the petition has far-reaching implications and it raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for prohibition. Under the circumstances, action for prohibition is still improper. PROHIBITION is a remedy against proceedings that are without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. But here, the petition did not even impute lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents and Sheriff Castillo regarding the foreclosure proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the appellate court are AFFIRMED. [G.R. No. L-24153. February 14, 1983.] TOMAS VELASCO, LOURDES RAMIREZ, SY PIN, EDMUNDO UNSON, APOLONIA RAMIREZ and LOURDES LOMIBAO, as component members of the STA. CRUZ BARBERSHOP ASSOCIATION, in their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of Manila, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, City Mayor of Manila, HON. HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, ViceMayor and Presiding Officer of the Municipal Board in relation to Republic Act 4065, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA

thereof by the CA, at the very least to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this Court agrees with petitioner that the CA erred in concluding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. NATURE OF THE ACTION The case in the Court of Appeals (CA) was a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the nullification of the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated July 20, 1999 in NLRC NCR CA No. 018421-99 (NLRC Case No. 05-03253-96), entitled "Rosemarie G. Balba v. Peak Development, Inc., et al." and its Resolution dated November 29, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration. FACTS: On April 17, 1996, a memorandum was issued by the respondent placing complainant, Rosemarie Balba (hired as Systems Administration Personnel) under preventive suspension, and at the same time, requiring the complainant to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for insubordination, negligence and incompetence, for the following cited acts or omissions, to wit: 1. Failure to promptly implement and/or comment on the recommendation of the internal auditor despite clear instruction . . . ; 2. Failure to promptly produce appropriate studies required by management (E-VAT study); 3. Implementation of clearly insufficient basic office procedure; 4. Failure to follow general office policies and procedures. Subsequently, another memorandum was issued requiring complainant to explain why despite being a managerial employee, she collected overtime pay for alleged overtime services rendered on April 3, 4 and 9, 1996. To both memoranda, complainant submitted her written explanations. Finding the complainant's explanations as unsatisfactory, the respondent terminated the complainant's services on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. BALBA charges the respondents of illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, nonpayment of service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, cash conversion of her vacation leave, and damages. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit, and [on the] money claims, the respondent company is hereby ordered to pay complainant the sum of P7,500.00 as proportionate 13th month pay for 1996. All other money claims are denied for want of merit. The NLRC partially GRANTED the appeal, to the effect that complainant-appellant was illegally discharged; and that respondentappellee Company is DIRECTED to pay her separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, one (1) year backwages and attorney's fee equivalent to ten percent (10%) of her total award of labor standards benefits pursuant to Article III of the Labor Code, computed as follows: Her appeal to CA was denied. On a motion for reconsideration, the CA proceeded to review the FACTUAL FINDINGS of the NLRC, in view of its conflict with those of the Labor Arbiter (LA). Accordingly, the CA set aside its first Decision and entered a new one reversing the NLRC decision and reinstating and affirming in toto the LA's decision. Petitioner first argues that the CA erred in reversing the factual findings in the case instead of ruling only on "errors of jurisdiction," as befits a judgment in a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. HELD: NO. See Syllabus NEW FRONTIER SUGAR CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 39, ILOILO CITY and EQUITABLE PCI BANK, Respondents. FACTS: New Frontier Sugar Corporation (petitioner) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of raw sugar milling. Foreseeing that it cannot meet its obligations with its creditors as they fell due, petitioner filed a Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (2000) some time in August 2002. Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued a Stay Order dated August 20, 2002, appointing Manuel B. Clemente as rehabilitation receiver, ordering the latter to put up a bond, and setting the initial hearing on the petition. One of petitioners creditors, the Equitable PCI Bank (respondent bank), filed a Comment/Opposition with Motion to Exclude Property, alleging that petitioner is not qualified for corporate rehabilitation, as it can no longer operate because it has no assets left. The RTC issued an Omnibus Order terminating the proceedings and dismissing the case. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion but this was denied by the RTC Petitioner then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari, which was denied and affirmed the orders assailed by the petitioner. In dismissing the petition, the CA sustained the findings of the RTC that since petitioner no longer has sufficient assets and properties to continue with its operations and answer its corresponding liabilities; it is no longer eligible for rehabilitation. The CA also ruled that even if the RTC erred in dismissing the petition, the same could not be corrected anymore because what petitioner filed before the CA was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal.
ISSUE W/N THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BEFORE IT AS "IMPROPER," APPEAL? HELD: The CA correctly ruled that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution, and a motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. The Omnibus Order dated January 13, 2003 issued by the RTC is a final order since it terminated the proceedings and dismissed the case before
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in reviewing the factual findings of the NLRC in pet for certiorari (RULE 65)

the trial court; it leaves nothing more to be done. As such, petitioners recourse is to file an appeal from the Omnibus Order. In this regard, A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC promulgated by the Court on September 4, 2001 provides that a petition for rehabilitation is considered a special proceeding given that it seeks to establish the status of a party or a particular fact. Accordingly, the period of appeal provided in paragraph 19 (b) of the Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 for special proceedings shall apply. Under said paragraph 19 (b), the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required. However, it should be noted that the Court issued A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC on September 14, 2004, clarifying the proper mode of appeal in cases involving corporate rehabilitation and intra-corporate controversies. It is provided therein that all decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealed to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision or final order of the RTC. In any event, as previously stated, since what petitioner filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules, the CA rightly dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed Orders. Bugarin v. Palisoc FACTS: A complaint for ejectment was filed by private respondents Cecilia Palisoc and Marina Mata o The court (MeTC) ruled in favor of private respondents o The court asked the petitioners to vacate the premises Petitioner appealed to RTC o Private respondents moved for execution pending appeal o RTC affirmed with modification the decision of the lower court o Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with opposition to the issuance of writ of execution. o RTC denied the motion o The writ of execution pending appeal was issued o Petitioner moved to defer the implementation of writ of execution o Private respondents filed a motion to the issuance of a special order of demolition o Thereafter, a supplemental motion was filed by the petitioners contending that Section 28 of RA 7279 was not complied with. o RTC declared the decision denying petitioners appeal final and executory and remanded the records to MeTC Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction before the CA MeTC set the Motion for the Issuance of Special Order of Demolition for hearing o The court granted said motion and asked the petitioners to vacate the premises o Petitioner filed a motion to quash and recall the order of demolition o MeTC denied the motion Hence, this petition supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. Once the Regional Trial Court decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately executory under Section 21,13 Rule 70, without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review, before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.14 However, petitioners failed to file a petition for review. Records show that petitioners received on March 12, 2003 the RTC decision denying their motion for reconsideration. They had until March 27, 2003 to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on April 10, 2003. In said petition, which is still pending, petitioners contended that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the MeTC decision and insisted that the latter court had no jurisdiction over the complaint. The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits in the instant case is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is that "there should be no appeal."15 Clearly, petitioners petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence.16 Thus, the filing of the petition for certiorari did not prevent the RTC decision from becoming final and executory.17 The RTC acted correctly when it remanded the case to the court of origin in the order dated April 11, 2003. Camutin vs. Potente Facts: Petitioners were the owners of a parcel of land situated in Cavite as evidenced by TCT s under their name. Upon Petitioners return to the PH, they discovered that Respondents erected a house and warehouse on their land. The parties agreed that respondents will pay rent but they failed to do so. Respondents do not want to vacate the lot despite demand. In the meantime, Petitioners sold the lot to a third party. Respondents filed before the RTC a complaint for partition against petitioners alleging that they have a right over half of the property by virtue of an acknowledgement of rights executed by petitioners deceased mother. Petitioners filed a complaint with the barangay to have the respondents warehouse removed. During the conference the parties agreed to wait for the outcome of the complaint for partition in the RTC. Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents before the MTC. The MTC, noting the pendency of the partition case before the RTC and treating the parties agreement in the barangay as an amicable settlement, issued an order indefinitely suspending the unlawful detainer case. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC but it was denied for being a prohibited pleading. In the meantime, the MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer case for lack of barangay conciliation proceedings. Issue: WON the RTC should have ruled on the petition for certiorari instead of dismissing it for being a prohibited pleading? Held: Yes, however in the case at bar the petition was dismissed for being moot and academic.
ISSUE: WON certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. HELD: Under Section 19,10 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor, and the courts duty to order the execution is practically ministerial.11 The defendant may stay it only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a

Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While a petition for certiorari is not allowed against any interlocutory order issued by the court in the unlawful detainer or ejectment case, in the case at bar, the filing of a petition for certiorari challenging the MTCs Orders dated 5 June 2007 and 16 August 2007 cannot be deemed a dilatory remedy resorted to by petitioners. On the contrary, sustaining the MTCs orders would unnecessarily and unfairly delay the unlawful detainer case, a result contrary to the rules objective of speedy disposition of cases. Petitioners could also not appeal from the orders of the MTC because these only ordered the indefinite suspension and archiving of the case. The case was not resolved on the merits so there is actually no decision from which petitioners can appeal. Thus, the RTC could have validly ruled on the petition for certiorari instead of dismissing it on the ground that it is a prohibited pleading. However, the MTCs revival of the unlawful detainer case and its subsequent dismissal thereof on the grounds aforestated have rendered the resolution of the present petition for review superfluous and unnecessary. In their petition for review, petitioners seek the nullification of the RTCs orders and the subsequent recall of the MTCs orders suspending the proceedings in the unlawful detainer case and archiving it. The suspension of the unlawful detainer case has apparently been lifted and the case has been decided. There is thus no more need for the Court to decide the present petition on the merits. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for being moot and academic. SO ORDERED. EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DOCTRINE: Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions. FACTS: On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican, Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543, the information reads: o "That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount aforestated. At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut." The lower court, guided by the principles that penal laws should be construed strictly against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an Order quashing the information. It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product while Sec. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product. Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" without compliance with grading rules established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated that: The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order , pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece of wood for it may consist of squared and manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had made lumber out of timber as not criminally liable is an absurd interpretation o f the law. Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's definition of "timber" is erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber" in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized under that section. Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was subsequently assigned to Branch 52. On June 10, 1992, the lower court issued Order setting aside the quashal Order of the previous judge . It declared that from the law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the possession, without the required legal documents, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It stated that even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the definition of forest products. Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that the lower court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order and in denying his motion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber or other forest products."
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ISSUE: W/N there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. RULING: The petition is devoid of merit. Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued on July 25, 1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino, provides for it. o Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after being prepared for the market.' Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus." To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the information. The petition simply has no legal basis. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power. Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction , as well as the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is enjoined to proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner. FACTS: Equitable PCI Bank as creditor-mortgage filed a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage contract executed by the Ramon and Natividad Nisce over two parcels of land. These mortgage contracts were executed by the spouses to secure their obligation under Promissory Note including a Suretyship Agreement executed by Natividad. The Ex- Officio Sheriff set the sale at public auction. The Nisce spouses filed before the RTC for Nullity of Suretyship Agreement, damages and legal compensation with prayer for injunctive relief against the Bank and the Ex-Officio Sheriff. The spouses alleged the following: o They had requested the bank to set off the peso equivalent of their obligation against their US Dollar Account with PCI Capital Asia Limited, a subsidiary of the Bank; o The Bank accepted their offer and requested for an estimate of the balance of their account; o They complied with the Banks request; and that they were surprised when they received a letter from the Bank demanding payment of their account, and later a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure. o They insist that the suretyship agreement is null and void on the ground that: it was executed without the knowledge and consent of Ramon Nisce, who is by law the administrator of the conjugal partnership; the surety agreement did not rebound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership and therefore did not bind the same; and assuming that the suretyship contract was valid and binding, any obligation arising therefrom is not covered by plaintiffs real estate mortgage which were constituted to secure the payment of certain specific obligations only. o Since they and the Bank are creditors and debtors with respect to each other, their obligations should have been offset by legal compensation to the extent of their account with the Bank. The Bank filed an Amended Petition with the office of the Executive Judge for extrajudicial foreclosure. In its answers, the Bank alleged that the spouses had no cause of action for legal compensation sine PCI Capital was a different corporation with a separate and distinct personality. In 1994, the Equitable Banking Corporation and the PCIB were merged under the corporate name Equitable PCI Bank. The RTC granted the spouses Nisces plea for a writ of preliminary injunction, declaring that that justice would be best served if a writ of preliminary injunction would be issued to preserve the status quo. BANKS CONTENTION: The Bank opted not to file a motion for reconsideration of the order and instead assailed the trial courts order before the CA via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Bank alleged that the spouses Nisce had failed to prove the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and thus, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the preliminary injunction. SPOUSES CONTENTION: pointed out that the Bank failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts order, a condition sine qua non to the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the error committed by the trial court is a mere error of judgment not correctible by certiorari; hence, the petition should have been dismissed outright by the CA. RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: CA granted the petitioned and nullified the RTC order. The appellate court declared that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be filed despite the failure to file a MR, particularly in instances where the issue raised is one of law; where the error is patent; the assailed order is void, or the questions raised are the same as those already ruled upon by the lower court. According to the appellate court, the issue raised before it was purely one of law: whether the loan account of the spouses was extinguished by legal compensation. Thus, a motion for the reconsideration of the assailed order was not a prerequisite to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. ISSUES: 5.1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE BANKS FAILURE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH THE TRIAL COURT.
G.R. No. 167434
February 19, 2007
SPOUSES RAMON M. NISCE and A. NATIVIDAD PARAS- NISCE, Petitioners vs. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC., Respondent CALLEJO, SR., J.:
5.2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT PREMATURELY RULED ON THE MERITS OF THE MAIN CASE. 5.3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN FAVOR OF THE SPOUSES NISCE. RULING: The Petition in the Court of Appeals is not Premature The general rule is that before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner is mandated to comply with a condition precedent: the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order, and the subsequent denial of the court a quo. A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and should be filed only as a last resort. The filing of a MR is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual issues. However, the rule is subject to the exceptions: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved. The Order of the trial court granting petitioners plea for a writ of preliminary injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction and thus a nullity. If the trial court issues a writ of preliminary injunction despite the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, the writ is a nullity. Petitioners Are Not Entitled to a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction 3, Rule 58 provides the requisites that must be established in order for a preliminary injunction to be granted. Injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of the parties substantive rights and interests. The sole aim of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo within the last actual status that preceded the pending controversy until the merits of the case can be heard fully. A petition for a preliminary injunction is an equitable remedy, and one who comes to claim for equity must do so with clean hands. The plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction must further establish that he or she has a present and unmistakable right to be protected; that the facts against which injunction is directed violate such right; and there is a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified. Thus, where the plaintiffs right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction. However, to establish the essential requisites for a preliminary injunction, the evidence to be submitted by the plaintiff need not be conclusive and complete. Such evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of the principal action which has yet to be decided. [COMMENTO: I think the case is more of an Oblicon/Corp case. The discussion regarding Certiorari is very limited, so I included the issue regarding Injunction. To simplify, the Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari to assail the Order granting the Injunction. The Court upheld CAs nullification of the RTC order because it was issued with GAD (WHY oh WHY with GAD ). The Bank clearly has the right under the contract to foreclose and sell because of the Spouses failure to pay the loan. The Spouses were not able to prove or overcome the burden that PCI Capital and Equitable are one and the same. The Spouses have dollar accounts with PCI Capital, a subsidiary of the Bank and they maintain that their dollar deposit should be setoff against their account with the Bank against their loan account. Mainly, they think they are entitled to the Writ kasi parang isang entity lang daw si PCI Capital and Equitableso setoff na lang! Un ung gusto nila mangyari. But NO, CANNOT be ] PCI Capital is a subsidiary of respondent Bank. Even then, PCI Capital [PCI Express Padala (HK) Ltd.] has an independent and separate juridical personality from that of the respondent Bank, its parent company; hence, any claim against the subsidiary is not a claim against the parent company and vice versa. The evidence on record shows that PCIB, which had been merged with Equitable Bank, owns almost all of the stocks of PCI Capital. However, the fact that a corporation owns all of the stocks of another corporation, taken alone, is not sufficient to justify their being treated as one entity. Petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence to justify the piercing of the veil of corporate entity and render respondent Bank liable for the US$20,000.00 deposit of petitioner Natividad Nisce as debtor. Petitioners could have spared themselves the expenses and tribulation of a litigation had they just withdrawn their deposit from the PCI Capital and remitted the same to respondent. However, petitioner insisted on their contention of setoff.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
DAVID, et.al vs.RIVERA G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159 January 16, 2004 FACTS: Respondent Agustin Rivera claiming to be the owner of a portion of land situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed on May 10, 1994 a Complaint for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession before the Provincial Adjudication Board (agrarian) of San Fernando, Pampanga against petitioners heirs of Spouses Cristino and Consolacion David. Respondent Rivera averred that the petitioners had been harassing him to vacate the subject land although it had already been given to him sometime in 1957 by the parents of the petitioners as "disturbance compensation", in consideration of his renunciation of his tenurial rights over the original 18-hectare farmholding. For their part, the petitioners filed a Complaint for ejectment before the MCTC of Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. They alleged that the respondent was occupying the subject land without paying rentals therefor and refused to vacate it despite repeated demands. In his Answer to the ejectment complaint, the respondent Rivera asserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the tenancy relationship between him and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners. He likewise informed the court of the complaint he had earlier filed before the regional agrarian board (PARAB). During the pendency of the ejectment case, the PARAB rendered its Decision declaring the respondent as tenant of the land and ordering that his peaceful possession be maintained. Meanwhile, on September 28, 1995, the MCTC rendered its Decision ordering the respondent to vacate the subject land, stressing that the
subject land has not been proven as devoted to agricultural production, and that the petitioners as the registered owners have a better right to possession of the subject land. Without appealing the MCTC Decision but within the period to appeal, the respondent filed before the RTC of Angeles City a Petition for prohibition with PI & TRO seeking the nullification of the MCTC decision: Maintaining that the MCTC had no jurisdiction as the issue before it was agrarian in nature. On January 30, 1996, the petitioners filed their Answer to the Petition for prohibition in which they asserted that the MCTC could not be divested of its jurisdiction by simply interposing the defense of tenancy. The case went to trial. After the respondent had rested his case, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss raising as grounds (1) that the extraordinary remedy of prohibition could not be made a substitute for the available and speedy recourse of appeal; (2) the jurisdiction of the MCTC of Mabalacat, Pampanga was legally vested, hence, the decision of the ejectment court was a legitimate and valid exercise of its jurisdiction. On February 25, 1998, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss. The court ruled that the motion, which was filed after the presentation of the plaintiffs evidence, partakes of a demurrer to evidence which, may be granted only upon a showing that the plaintiff has shown no right to the relief prayed for . Since the respondent has established an issue, the RTC ruled that the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, but the CA dismissed the same finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The CA ratiocinated that the order of denial is merely interlocutory and hence cannot be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In addition, it held that issues raised in the petition for prohibition were genuine and substantial, necessitating the presentation of evidence by both parties. The petitioners now come before the SC, seeking the nullification of the decision of the Court of Appeals. ISSUES: 1) (Side Issue) Whether the denial of the motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence was afflicted with grave abuse of discretion 2) (Main Issue) Whether or not the petition for prohibition filed before the RTC was properly resorted to by the respondent, upon the decision rendered by the lower court (MCTC), considering that another decision has been rendered in another tribunal involving the same parties over the same subject matter HELD: 1) No 2) Yes Petition denied. At the outset, it may be well to point out that certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss, even if it is in the form of a demurrer to evidence filed after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case. Being interlocutory, an order denying a demurrer to evidence is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. After such denial, the petitioners should present their evidence and if the decision of the trial judge would be adverse to them, they could raise on appeal the same issues raised in the demurrer. However, it is also settled that the rule admits of an exception, i.e., when the denial of a demurrer is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, the petitioners submit that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer. They insist that appeal, not prohibition, is the proper remedy to question the judgment of the MCTC and that the question of jurisdiction is one of law Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code FACTS: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province). Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because: which may be ruled upon without the evidence of the parties. We are not convinced and we uphold the Court of Appeals. It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for prohibition to correct what he perceived was an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the MCTC. On the main point: The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, where two tribunals exercised jurisdiction over two cases involving the same subject matter, issue, and parties, and ultimately rendered conflicting decisions, clearly makes out a case for prohibition . The MCTC manifestly took cognizance of the case for ejectment On the other hand, the ratiocination of the DARAB, is that the case falls squarely within its jurisdiction as it arose out of, or was connected with, agrarian relations . It is safe to conclude that the existence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship, if true, will divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction the previous juridical tie compels the characterization of the controversy as an agrarian dispute. With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of jurisdiction, it follows that the respondent has availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy which is the special civil action of prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court , or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained ." The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. While appeal is the recognized remedy to question the judgment of an inferior court, this does not detract from the authority of a higher court to issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the inferior court , among other instances, from proceeding further on the ground that it heard and decided the case without jurisdiction. Since the right to prohibition is defeated not by the existence, but by the adequacy, of a remedy by appeal, it may accordingly be granted where the remedy by appeal is not plain, speedy or adequate. The Court of Appeals is therefore correct in upholding the lower courts denial of the petitioners motion to dismiss. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. TAN vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite. The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC. ISSUE: WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected? NO. HELD: Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained . The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province). Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit: when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners. SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. [G.R. No. 123899. August 30, 1996] ROSALINDA MAYUGA, Spouses ARNEL BUGAYONG and NENA BUGAYONG, LITA CHUA, Spouses BENJAMIN SANTOS and PURITA SANTOS, Spouses SANTIAGO and GLORIA REYES, SOLEDAD LABRADOR, EMILIA CERVANTES, Spouses ERNESTO LABRADOR and LEONORA LABRADOR and RESTITUTO VALBUENA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROSMARI D. CARANDANG, and RPN REALTY, INC., respondents. FACTS: The petition originated from an action for recovery of possession filed in January 1993 by private respondent RPN Realty, Inc. against petitioners before the RTC, Manila. Private respondent alleged it purchased that parcel of land in Granate Street, Sta. Ana, Manila for which TCT were issued in its name in 1992 but the petitioners refused to vacate the property despite its demands. In their Answer, petitioner denied private respondent's ownership of the land. They claimed that they and their predecessors-in-interest, who were bona-fide tenants of the former owner , have been in possession of the land for sixty (60) years and have been paying monthly rent since then and that the land has been declared by the National Housing Authority (NHA) as within the Urban Land Reform Zone of the government. The TRIAL COURT ordered petitioners to vacate the land , turn over its possession to private respondent and pay attorney's fees. No appeal was taken, decision became final and executory. On March 21, 1993, the trial court issued a writ of execution. Petitioners, represented by new counsel, filed a "Motion for Relief from Judgment" alleging that they had no knowledge of the court's decision because their former counsel transferred his law office and neglected to inform them thereof; that they learned of the decision only on March 30, 1995 after receiving notices to vacate the property. Private respondents moved for the issuance of a special order of demolition. The trial court denied petitioners' "Motion for Relief from Judgment." On December 1, 1995, petitioners filed a notice of appeal from the order denying the motion. Private respondent also filed a "Motion for the Declaration of Defendants as Non-Underprivileged and Homeless Citizens in Connection with Pending Motion for Demolition, with Advance Offer of Testimony and Exhibits, and Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution." The trial court granted private respondent's motion, declared petitioners as professional squatters and exempted private respondent from complying with the eviction procedure in R.A. No. 7279. The court also issued an alias writ of execution and demolition.
Forthwith, petitioners filed a petition for mandamus and certiorari with the CA questioning the January 3, 1996 order and the alleged denial of their appeal from the order denying relief from judgment . [6] The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the subject execution and demolition order. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the trial court.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling on the merits of the case when the action before it was not an appeal but a special civil action for mandamus and certiorari. They contend that the respondent court could not have affirmed the trial court's judgment on the merits because the records of the case were not elevated on appeal. The petition for mandamus was allegedly filed to compel the trial court to allow the appeal from the order denying relief from judgment, and for certiorari to annul the January 3, 1996 order issuing the alias writ of execution and demolition. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in affirming the alias writ of execution. NO HELD: MANDAMUS will lie to compel a judge or other public officer to perform a duty specifically enjoined by law once it is shown that the judge or public officer has unlawfully neglected the performance thereof. A Court neglects the performance of its duties only when after demand has been made upon it, it refuses to perform the same.
Petitioners have not shown that the trial court refused to accept the notice of appeal, much less denied said notice . The ORDER of the trial court dated January 3, 1996 merely granted private respondent's "Motion for the Declaration of Defendants as Non-underprivileged x x x and for the Issuance of an alias Writ of Execution." There is nothing in it that expressly or impliedly denied petitioners' appeal from the Order denying relief from judgment. To be sure, the notice of appeal at bar is not even subject to the approval of the trial court because it was deemed perfected after the fifteenth day, i.e., the last day to appeal by both petitioners and private respondent. Likewise, petitioners have not alleged that the trial court neglected to order the transmittal of the records to the Court of Appeals. We hold that petitioners have failed to prove their cause of action for mandamus. Hence, the petition was correctly dismissed by the Court of Appeals. To abbreviate proceedings, the Court of Appeals treated the petition as the appeal itself from the order denying relief from judgment. It correctly found that the failure of petitioners' former counsel to notify them of the adverse decision to enable them to appeal there from constitutes inexcusable negligence and is not a ground for relief from judgment. This is in accord with our case law that notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform them of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of their right to appeal will not justify setting aside a judgment that is valid and regular on its face. We have also held that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence. Since petitioners' ground for relief is not well-taken, it follows that the trial court's judgment on the merits stands. Contrary to petitioners' allegations, the Court of Appeals did not rule on the merits of the case. The appellate court merely confirmed the existence of the judgment on the merits and, in keeping with the Rules and jurisprudence, made the pronouncement that said judgment had long become final and executory. CA, at first, ruled against the respondent but upon the latters MR, said motion was granted. CA issued the writ for mandamus Hence, this petition. She asserted that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy. ISSUE: WON the remedy of madamus by private respondent is proper HELD: The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ. MANDAMUS is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, DIRECTED TO some inferior COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR BOARD, OR TO SOME CORPORATION OR PERSON requiring the performance of a PARTICULAR DUTY therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the PUBLIC CHARACTER OF THE REMEDY, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The WRIT OF MANDAMUS , however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, MANDAMUS will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully NEGLECTED the performance of an act which the LAW SPECIFICALLY ENJOINS AS A DUTY resulting from office, trust, or station ; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled . On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a CLEAR LEGAL right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required . Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual . Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked.27 In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here the production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law . Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.
The Court of Appeals therefore committed no error in affirming the order granting the issuance of the alias writ of execution. We reject petitioners' contention that the filing of their petition for relief and the subsequent appeal from the order denying relief stayed the execution proceedings before the trial court. Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee FACTS: A petition for mandamus with damages was filed by respondent Nixon Lee against petitioner Uy Kiao Eng (mother of respondent) to COMPEL the PETITIONER to produce the will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be constituted. O Uy Kiao Eng filed her answer with counterclaim asking the court to dismiss the case for failure to state a cause of action and for noncompliance with a condition precedent. O She denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts O After the presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, PETITIONER demurred: She asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue and they did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus. RTC denied the demurrer to evidence but granted petitioners motion for reconsideration.
G.R. No. 79484 December 7, 1987
KANT KWONG and YIM KAM SHING, petitioners, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY RAMON A. DIAZ and COMMISSIONER MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, respondents. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: In this original action for Mandamus, petitioners pray that respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG, for short) be commanded to lift without delay the Hold-Orders issued against them by the said entity for being in violation of their right to travel and for having been issued in grave abuse of authority since they are in no way involved in ill-gotten wealth nor in transactions connected therewith. Petitioners are foreign nationals who are the representatives of the Hongkong-Chinese investors who own 33% of the shares of stock in two domestic garment corporations, namely, De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation and American Inter-Fashion Manufacturing Corporation, which firms were ordered sequestered by the PCGG on 25 March 1986 on the thesis that the Marcoses, through nominees and dummies, appear to control 67 % of the firms' shareholdings. On 13 February 1987 respondent Ramon A. Diaz, then Secretary of the PCGG, wrote the Minister of Public Information advising the latter that petitioners had been included in the Hold-Order list of the PCGG (Annex "L" Petition). On 12 March 1987 petitioners filed before the PCGG an Urgent Motion to Lift Hold-Order with the request that the Motion be set for hearing on 16 March 1987 (Annex "M," Petition). The Motion, however, was not calendared for hearing on said date. On 19 March 1987 the PCGG denied the Motion to Lift in an Order reading as follows: An "Urgent Motion to Lift Hold Order" dated March 12, 1987 was filed by Kant Kwong and Yim Kam Shing. These are the official representatives of the Hongkong investors in these two sequestered corporations. Based on records/evidence in the possession of the Commission, all made known to their principals, such as unexplained withholding of documents covering substantial past shipments, deliberate delay in cashing letters of credit resulting in the lapse thereof, failure to remit payments due for past shipments, their obvious and unmitigated campaign to obstruct the release of funds needed for operations of the two garment firms, and orchestrated acts to discredit the Officer-in-Charge of the garments firms and the Commission and to obstruct the smooth operations of the garment firms, there is need for their presence in this country to resolve the aboveenumerated issues, in order that operations of the corporations are not obstructed, production will not be delayed and corporate funds may be released. The Commission therefore denies the motion for lack of merit. Hence, the present recourse predicated on the following grounds: A. The Hold-Order issued against the petitioners is a gross and unlawful violation of their constitutional right of travel and locomotion. B. The Hold-Order against the petitioners is not authorized or sanctioned by Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, nor by the Rules and Regulations of respondent PCGG. C. The Hold-Order is an act of harrassment, motivated by ill-will and vindictiveness, and violates the elementary rules of due process, fair play and human decency. D. The Hold-Order has caused and is causing damages and sufferings to the petitioners and their families. On 24 September 1987, acting upon an Urgent Motion filed by petitioner Yim Kam Shing, this Court lifted, effective immediately, the Hold-Order issued against him for the purpose of allowing him to leave for Hongkong for urgent medical treatment. ... Petitioners, instead of cooperating with respondent PCGG in its task of investigating and recovering ill-gotten wealth of the former President, his immediate family, close relatives, associates or cronies, frustrated and hampered the investigation or otherwise prevented the Commission from accomplishing its task, by withholding documents covering substantial past shipments, which hold the key to the question earlier posed: Where have all the dollars gone? Have they gone a flying one by one to Switzerland? Petitioners likewise deliberately delayed the cashing of letters of credit resulting in the lapse thereof; failed to remit payments due for past shipments; obstructed the release of funds needed for operations of the two garment firms, orchestrated acts to discredit the officer-in-charge of the garment firms and respondent PCGG; and obstructed the smooth operations of the garment firms. To state that all the above acts of petitioners, in one way or another, frustrated, hampered or otherwise prevented respondent Commission from accomplishing its task under Executive Order No. 1 is to state here a consummate understatement. Hence, the issuance of the hold orders against the petitioners remain unassailable. 1 Executive Order No. 1, dated 28 February 1986, created the PCGG and tasked it principally with: Section 2. ... (a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family relative, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship. Section 3 of the same Executive Order empowers the PCGG: (a) To conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purpose of this order. (b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or disappearance which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task. (d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of acts by any person or entity that may render moot and academic, or frustrate, or otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its task under this order. (h) To promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. On 11 April 1986 the PCGG issued its Rules and Regulations , the pertinent section of which provides: SECTION 2. Writ of sequestration freeze and hold orders . To enable the Commission to accomplish its task of recovering ill-gotten wealth, it may issue writs of sequestration and freeze and/or hold orders. As defined in the same Rules and Regulations, a Hold-Order is: D) ... an order to temporarily prevent a person from leaving the country where his departure will prejudice, hamper or otherwise obstruct the task of the Commission in the enforcement of Executive Orders Nos. I and 2, because such person is known or suspected to be involved in the properties or transactions covered by said Executive Orders ... In this case, the justification for the issuance of the Hold-Orders against petitioners has been summarized by the Solicitor General, thus:
We find merit in the Petition. Petitioners' right to travel has, in fact, been impaired. 1. The validity of the Hold-Orders issued against petitioners on 13 February 1987 has already expired pursuant to the Rules and Regulations of the PCGG, which specifically provide: (D) ... A "hold-order" shall be valid only for a maximum period of six months, unless for good reasons extended by the Commission en banc. " The PCGG has not extended the life-span of the Hold-Orders in question nor has it advanced "good reasons" for doing so. 2. The grounds for the issuance of the Hold-Orders have become stale. (a) The PCGG Order denying petitioners' Motion to Lift the Hold Orders against them states that "there is need for their presence in this country to resolve the issues, in order that operations of the corporations are not obstructed, production will not be delayed and corporate funds may be released" The enumerated issues read: o unexplained withholding of documents covering substantial past shipments, o deliberate delay in cashing letters of credit resulting in the lapse thereof, o failure to remit payments due for past shipments, their obvious and unmitigated campaign to obstruct the release of funds needed for operations of the two garment firms, and o orchestrated acts to discredit the Officer-in-Charge of the garments firms and the Commission and to obstruct the smooth operations of the garment firms. It strikes the Court, however, that although the business malpractices attributed to petitioners may have furnished sufficient basis for the issuance of the Hold-Orders against them, subsequent developments have apparently rendered them no longer controlling. Thus, as a result of the sequestration, the PCGG has already appointed an Officer-in-Charge for the two firms, with full authority to operate and manage the same (Annex "B", Petitioner); it has taken over the "management and operations of the sequestered corporations;" 2 it has "initiated changes in the management and operations of the two corporations aimed at protecting not only the interest of the government but also that of the workers;" 3 and since the take-over it has been able to accomplish the following: a. Halted the losses in the operations of the two corporations as declared by the Hong Kong investors during the last two years, by posting a modest profit thereby enabling the corporations to pay the government some P 697,000.00 in taxes i.e. from American Inter-Fashion alone. b. Discontinued the marketing agreement with Ringo Garments-Hongkong and organized a Manila-based marketing and procurement office. c. Firmed up new orders through the said local marketing office enough to sustain the full production of the two companies up to the end of the year at prices 30-50% higher than the orders previously coursed by the minority Hongkong investors through Ringo Garments, their own conduit company in Hongkong. d. Replaced the highly paid Hongkong-Chinese technicians with qualified, competent and deserving Filipino technicians who were promoted from the ranks. e. Upgraded the wages and benefits of the Filipino workers in the corporations. f. Instituted cost-saving measures to preserve the assets and to make operations more profitable. (b) Another reason given for the issuance of the Hold-Orders is that petitioners had "frustrated and hampered the investigation or otherwise prevented the Commission from accomplishing its task." The Court takes judicial notice of the fact, however, that Civil Case No. 0002 entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et als., has been filed by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan on 16 July 1987. To all appearances, therefore, the PCGG's investigative task relative to the sequestered garment firms and their involvement, if any, in ill-gotten wealth or in any transactions connected therewith, has terminated. Another reason, therefore, for petitioners' continued presence in the country has been virtually eliminated. We likewise find that petitioners have been denied the rudiments of fair play. The Rules and Regulations of the PCGG specifically provide: SECTION 5. Who may contest. The person against whom a writ of sequestration or freeze or hold order is directed may request the lifting thereof in writing, either personally or through counsel within five (5) days from receipt of the writ or order, or in the case of a hold order, from date of knowledge thereof. " SECTION 6. Procedure for review of writ or order. After due hearing or motu propio for good cause shown, the Commission may lift the writ or order unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may deem necessary, taking into consideration the evidence and the circumstances of the case ... And yet, the PCGG has not given petitioners any opportunity to contest the Hold-Orders issued against them . After their issuance, no hearing had been set; a request for the same had been disregarded. Petitioners' Motion to Lift the Hold-Orders was summarily denied. The "issues" spelled out against petitioners have remained unresolved over a period of nine (9) months. The PCGG must thus be faulted for a disregard of the requirements of "fairness and due process" expressly mandated by Executive Order No. 14, reading: WHEREAS, the overriding considerations of national interest and national survival require that the Presidential Commission on Good Government achieve its vital task efficiently and effectively, with due regard to the requirements of fairness and due process (5th Whereas clause), Under the environmental circumstances of the case, the Hold-Orders against petitioners preventing them "from leaving the country cannot be prolonged indefinitely." The right to travel and to freedom of movement is a fundamental right guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution 5 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines is a signatory . 6 That right extends to all residents regardless of nationality. And "everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law. 7 While such right is not absolute but must yield to the State's inherent police power upon which the Hold-Orders were premised, no "good reasons" have been advanced which could justify the continued enforcement of the Hold-Orders. Petitioners are foreign nationals. Their 33% interest in the sequestered firms is recognized by the PCGG itself. There is no showing that those g. Partially collected from Ringo Garments-Hongkong the amount of US$350,000.00 or P7, million representing the unpaid export bills due on past shipments. About $437,126.32 remains unpaid despite the promise of Yim Kang Shing, representing the Hongkong investors to pay same. 4 It would appear, therefore, that with the changes made and the accomplishments achieved, operations of the sequestered firms are no longer obstructed, production no longer delayed and funding is available. Indeed, if petitioners have 11 obstructed the smooth operations" of the sequestered garment firms and "discredited their Officer-in-Charge," might it not be preferable that they be out of the country to ensure the cessation of their acts allegedly inimical to the operations of the sequestered garment firms?
interests appear prima facie to be ill-gotten wealth. No charges have been filed against them before the Sandiganbayan. They face no criminal indictment nor have they been provisionally released on bail that their right to travel might be restricted. Although, as averred by respondents, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other, "yet it is not accurate to say that the writ will never issue to control his discretion. There is an exception to the rule if the case is otherwise proper, as in cases of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. 8 In this case, for reasons already stated, we find that the PCGG acted with gross abuse of discretion in maintaining the Hold-Orders against petitioners for an indefinite length of time. By so doing it has arbitrarily excluded petitioners from the enjoyment of a fundamental right the right to freedom of movement to which they are entitled. 9 mandamus lies. WHEREFORE, in the interest of the early and full restoration of petitioners' right to travel, the Court hereby LIFTS the Hold-Orders issued by respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government against petitioners, effective immediately, upon the condition that they shall hold themselves available if and whenever needed by said Commission in the performance of its task. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 157783 September 23, 2005 NILO PALOMA, Petitioners, vs. DANILO MORA, HILARIO FESTEJO, MAXIMA SALVINO, BRYN BONGBONG and VALENTINO SEVILLA, Respondent. FACTS: Petitioner Nilo Paloma was appointed General Manager of the Palompon, Leyte Water District by its Board of Directors in 1993. His services were subsequently terminated by virtue of Resolution No. 895, which was passed by respondents as Chairman and members of the Board of the Palompon, Leyte Water District. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction with damages before the RTC to contest his dismissal with the prayer to be restored to the position of General Manager. Petition argued that his dismissal was a "capricious and arbitrary act on the part of the Board of Directors, constituting a travesty of justice and a fatal denial of his constitutional right to due process for the grounds relied upon therein to terminate him were never made a subject of a complaint nor was he notified and made to explain the acts he was said to be guilty of." The trial court DISMISSED the petitioner for being a premature cause of action. MR was denied. Petitioner also filed a Complaint with the CSC against respondents for alleged Violation of Civil Service Law and Rules and for Illegal Dismissal, but it was also dismissed. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed orders of the RTC and CSC. MR was denied. Hence, the instant petition. RULING: PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Mandamus may lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty in case of non-observance of due process. SUPREME COURT: No, the petition ought to be denied. Mandamus does not lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District to reinstate petitioner because the Board has the discretionary power to remove him under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended by P.D. No. 768. MANDAMUS: Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a MINISTERIAL DUTY, but NOT to compel the performance of a DISCRETIONARY DUTY. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. P.D. No. 198 (Provincial Water Utilities Act) provides that the general manager shall serve at the pleasure of the board of directors. The law was later amended by P.D. No. 768 and similarly, it provides that said officer shall serve at the pleasure of the board. The appointment of petitioner and his consequent termination are clearly within the wide arena of discretion which the legislature has bestowed the appointing power, which is the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District. The Board of Directors of a Water District may abridge the term of the General Manager thereof the moment the latters services cease to be convivial to the former.
Moreover, Petitioners employment contract will reveal that his employment with CCPAP is qualified by the phrase "unless terminated sooner." Thus, while such employment is co-terminous with the PAPS project, petitioner nevertheless serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority as this is clearly stipulated in his employment contract. The Court agreed with the appellate courts interpretation of the phrase "unless terminated sooner" to mean "that his contractual job as Project Manager IV from March 11, 1996 to January 30, 2000 could end any time before January 30, 2000 if terminated by the other contracting party-employer CCPAP. JURISDICTION OF CSC: As a general rule, no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law as provided in Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. As exception to this, P.D. No. 198, a special enabling charter of Local Water Districts, categorically provides that the General Manager shall serve 'at the pleasure of the board. Water districts are government instrumentalities and their employees belong to the civil service. Thus, the hiring and firing of employees of government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Quasi-judicial bodies like the CSC are better-equipped in handling cases involving the employment status of employees as those in the Civil Service since it is within the field of their expertise. This is consistent with the powers and functions of the CSC, being the central personnel agency of the Government, to carry into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws, including, in this case, P.D. No. 198.
ISSUES: Whether or not
(1)
(2)
Mandamus will lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District to reinstate the General Manager thereof NO CSC has primary jurisdiction over the case for illegal dismissal of petitioner YES
QUO WARRANTO MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, et.al.vs. MENDEZ G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994 HELD: No. Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise." When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit proceeding. It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by the President of the Philippines ..." Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon the relation of another person" with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another." While petitioners concede that enactment of the LGC may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of EO 353. In the meantime the Municipality, of San Andres, continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Granting that the EO 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case offers no choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own that of a de facto municipal corporation. At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the 12 municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code, which considers the present subject as regular municipality, as a Curative law, which in essence is retrospective, and aimed at giving validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded; the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso Quezon, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code. Subsequently, the municipal district gained the status of a municipality, beginning 01 July 1963. On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC Branch 62, of Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of EO 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. The petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner argued, the officials of the Municipality of San Andres had no right to office. In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of affirmative defense, that petitioner municipality should be deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality; that because the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed; and that, considering the petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor General. On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a motion to dismiss alleging that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, citing Section 442(d) of the law, reading thusly: Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. xxx (d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending that the LGC is inapplicable to the present case whose mode of creation had been void ab initio. On December 2, 1991, the lower court dismissed the petition since accordingly, the defect in the creation has already been cured by the enactment of the LGC of 1991. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not a quo warranto proceeding shall prosper in a case assailing the constitutionality of a de facto local government considering the special circumstances surrounding the case
[G.R. No. 111243. May 25, 1994.] JESUS ARMANDO A.R. TARROSA, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL C. SINGSON and HON. SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ III, respondents. SYLLABUS: REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; QUO WARRANTO; PROPER PROCEEDING TO RESOLVE QUESTION OF TITLE TO OFFICE; WHO MAY COMMENCE ACTION; CASE AT BAR. The instant petition is in
the nature of quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another." We have held that a petitioner, who did not aver that he was entitled to the office of the City Engineer of Cabanatuan City, could not bring the action for quo warranto to oust the respondent from said office as a mere usurper. Likewise it had been held that the question of title to an office, which must be resolved in a quo warranto proceeding, may not be determined in a suit to restrain the payment of salary to the person holding such office, brought by someone who does not claim to be the one entitled to occupy the said office. It is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought by petitioner. To uphold the action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machinery. FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a taxpayer, questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the performance of his functions as such official until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments and respondent Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson. The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides: Sec. 6. Composition of the Monetary Board. The powers and functions of the Bangko Sentral shall be exercised by the Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary Board, composed of seven (7) members appointed by the President of the Philippines for a term of six (6) years. The seven (7) members are: (a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the Chairman of the Monetary Board. The Governor of the Bangko Sentral shall be head of a department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Whenever the Governor is unable to attend a meeting of the Board, he shall designate a Deputy Governor to act as his alternate: Provided, That in such event, the Monetary Board shall designate one of its members as acting Chairman . . . In their comment, respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. ISSUES: Did Congress exceed its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral? Its capstone having been removed, the whole case of petitioner collapses. Hence, there is no need to resolve the question of whether the disbursement of public funds to pay the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson can be enjoined. Likewise, the Court refrains from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in deference to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs. LOTA vs CA G.R. No. L-14803 June 30, 1961 1. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; QUO WARRANTO DISTINGUISHED FROM MANDAMUS. Quo warranto is the remedy to try the right to an office or franchise and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus only lies to enforce clear legal duties, not to try disputed titles. Hence, where there is usurpation or intrusion into an office, quo warranto is the proper remedy. But, where the respondent, without claiming any right to an office, excludes the petitioner therefrom, the remedy is mandamus, not quo warranto. 2. ID.; QUO WARRANTO; WHO MAY BE MADE PARTIES. Any person claiming to be entitled to a public office may bring an action of quo warranto without the intervention of the Solicitor General or the Fiscal and only the person who is in unlawful possession of the office, and all who claim to be entitled to that office, may be made parties in order to determine their respective rights thereto in the same action. Ponente: Felipe Natividad FACTS: 1. Moises Sangalang was the cemetery caretaker from 1951 until he was extended a new appointment by the Local Health Officer. 2. Flaviano Lota, then mayor of Taal appointed Jose Sangalang as cemetery caretaker, thus taking Moises place. 3. Moises filed a complaint against Mayor Lota, Jose and the municipal treasurer. 4. The CFI of Batangas rendered in favor of Moises. 5. Mayor Lota appealed. He claimed that the trial court erred in not dismissing complaint on the ground that the real party in interest, which is the municipality of Lipa was not made party-defendant; and the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint on the ground that appellee was not validly appointed to the post of municipal cemetery of Taal. 6. CA rendered a decision declaring Moises to continue in the office as cemetery caretaker. 7. Lota contended that the CA erred in holding that the present action is one of quo warranto; in not dismissing the action for failure of the Moises to join the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, as party defendant; and in declaring that respondent Moises Sangalang is entitled to hold, and continue in the office of caretaker of the municipal cemetery of that municipality. ISSUES: 1. WON the CA erred in holding the action is one of a quo warranto. 2 WON the CA erred in not dismissing the action for failure of the plaintiff to join the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, as party defendant.
HELD:
The petition is dismissed. The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral, a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another. It is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought by petitioner. To uphold the action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machinery.
2.
RULING: 1. No. The claim that the instant action is one of mandamus, not quo warranto, is devoid of basis. While quo warranto and mandamus are often concurrent remedies, however, there exists a clear distinction between the two. The authorities are agreed that quo warranto is the remedy to try the right to an office or franchise and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus only lies to enforce clear legal duties, not to try disputed titles, that where there is usurpation or intrusion into an office, quo warranto is the proper remedy and that where the respondent, without claiming any right to an Office, excludes the petitioner therefrom, his remedy is mandamus, not quo warranto. The instant action is clearly one of quo warranto, although mandamus is also invoked therein as an ancillary remedy. It appears that Moises Sangalang alleges in his complaint that he had the right to the possession and enjoyment of said office to which he had legally been appointed, and asks that Jose Sangalang, who is occupying it unlawfully, be ousted. The present action, therefore, is one whose purpose is to try the right or title to a public office and oust he alleged unlawful holder from its enjoyment. Such proceeding and remedy could only be litigated in a quo warranto action according to the authorities. 2. No There is no merit in the claim that the action should have been dismissed by the respondent Court for failure of the plaintiff to implead the municipality of Taal. According to the jurisprudence, any person claiming to be entitled to a public office may bring an action of quo warranto, without the intervention of the Solicitor-General or the Fiscal and that only the person who is in unlawful possession of the office, and all who claim to be entitled to that office, may be made parties in order to determine their respective rights thereto in the same action. The municipality of Taal does not claim that it wanted and had the right to occupy and enjoy the office of caretaker of its own municipal cemetery its pretension, as voiced by its mayor, is that Jose Sangalang is the party who had the right to occupy said office. It is not necessary for that municipality to appropriate funds for the payment of Moises Sangalang's salary and salary differentials; there already existed funds appropriated for the purpose, and what remained to be done was for the municipal treasurer to disburse them in accordance with law. The municipality of Taal, therefore, is not an essential, nor even a necessary party, to this action. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON (Expropriation) FACTS: The Government and PIATCO entered into an agreement whereby PIATCO was authorized to build NAIA 3, as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period of 25 years. In the case of Agan v. PIATCO promulgated in 2003, the court nullified the "Concession Agreement for the BOT Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III" as well as the amendments and supplements thereto. The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did not possess the requisite financial capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement was contrary to public policy. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. On 21 December 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC. The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. On the same day that the Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to "take or enter upon the possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of City of Manila v. Serrano, the RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession upon the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. The RTC found these requisites present, particularly noting that "the case record shows that the Government has deposited the assessed value of the NAIA 3 facilities in the Land Bank of the Philippines, an authorized depositary. On 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its previous Order and the Writ of Possession. First, it directed the LBPBaclaran, to immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO. Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was directed "to maintain, preserve and safeguard" the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform such as acts or activities in preparation for their direct operation" of the airport terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. However, the Government was prohibited "from performing acts of ownership like awarding concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties. The RTC denied the Governments Urgent Motion for reconsideration and Motion for Inhibition. Hence the present petition. Issue: WON the Government may take possession of the property by mere deposit of the assessed value of the property? Held: No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of writ of possession is issued only after direct payment of just compensation is given to property owner on the basis of fairness. The Petition is GRANTED in PART with respect to the orders dated 4 January 2005 and 10 January 2005 of the lower court. Said orders are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: 1) The implementation of the Writ of Possession dated 21 December 2005 is HELD IN ABEYANCE, pending payment by petitioners to PIATCO of the amount of Three Billion Two Million One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P3,002,125,000.00), representing the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities; 2) Petitioners, upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, are authorized to start the implementation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Pasenger Terminal III project by performing the acts that are essential to the operation of the said International Airport Passenger Terminal project; 3) RTC Branch 117 is hereby directed, within sixty (60) days from finality of this Decision, to determine the just compensation to be paid to PIATCO by the Government. The Order dated 7 January 2005 is AFFIRMED in all respects subject to the qualification that the parties are given ten (10) days from finality of this Decision to file, if they so choose, objections to the appointment of the commissioners decreed therein. The Temporary Restraining Order dated 14 January 2005 is hereby LIFTED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
NPC v. Manubay FACTS: NPC commenced its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. o In order to carry out this project, it is imperative for the transmission lines to cross over certain lands owned by private individuals and entities. o One of these lands is owned by the respondent Manubay. Petitioner filed it complaint for expropriation against the respondent to acquire an easement of right of way over the land of the latter. The court issued an order authorizing the immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the subject land. Subsequently, the court directed the issuance of a writ of condemnation and for the purposes of determining the fair and just compensation, the court appointed three commissioners o Based on the reports of the said commissioners, the RTC approved the recommended amount of P550 per square meter as just compensation o RTC also held that it was not bound by the provision cited by petitioner- Section 3-A of RA 6395. This law prescribed as just compensation for the acquired easement of right of way over an expropriated property an amount not exceeding 10% of market value of the property. CA affirmed the decision of RTC Hence, this petition the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample . In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably undeveloped, raw agricultural land. But a dominant portion thereof has been reclassified by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Naga -- per Zoning Ordinance No. 94076 dated August 10, 1994 -- as residential, per the August 8, 1996 certification of Zoning Administrator Juan O. Villegas Jr. 20 The property is also covered by Naga City Mayor Jesse M. Robredos favorable endorsement of the issuance of a certification for land use conversion by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on the ground that the locality where the property was located had become highly urbanized and would have greater economic value for residential or commercial use. 21 The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner.22 All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.23 In fixing the valuation at P550 per square meter, the trial court had considered the Report of the commissioners and the proofs submitted by the parties. These documents included the following: (1) the established fact that the property of respondent was located along the Naga-Carolina provincial road; (2) the fact that it was about 500 meters from the Kayumanggi Resort and 8 kilometers from the Naga City Central Business District; and a half kilometer from the main entrance of the fully developed Naga City Sports Complex -- used as the site of the Palarong Pambansa -and the San Francisco Village Subdivision, a first class subdivision where lots were priced at P2,500 per square meter; (3) the fair market value of P650 per square meter proffered by respondent, citing its recently concluded sale of a portion of the same property to Metro Naga Water District at a fixed price of P800 per square meter; (4) the BIR zonal valuation of residential lots in Barangay Pacol, Naga City, fixed at a price of P220 per square meter as of 1997; and (5) the fact that the price of P430 per square meter had been determined by the RTC of Naga City (Branch 21)24 as just compensation for the Mercados adjoining property, which had been expropriated by NPC for the same power transmission project. The chairperson of the Board of Commissioners, in adopting the recommendation of Commissioner Bulaos, made a careful study of the property. Factors considered in arriving at a reasonable estimate of just compensation for respondent were the location; the most profitable likely use of the remaining area; and the size, shape, accessibility as well as listings of other properties within the vicinity. Averments pertaining to these factors were supported by documentary evidence. On the other hand, the commissioner for petitioner -- City Assessor Albeus -- recommended a price of P115 per square meter in his Report dated June 30, 1997. No documentary evidence, however, was attached to substantiate the opinions of the banks and the realtors, indicated in the commissioners Report and computation of the market value of the property. The price of P550 per square meter appears to be the closest approximation of the market value of the lots in the adjoining, fully developed San Francisco Village Subdivision. Considering that the parcels of land in question are still undeveloped raw land, it appears to the Court that the just compensation of P550 per square meter is justified.
Petitioner contends that the valuation of the expropriated property -- fixed by the trial court and affirmed by the CA -- was too high a price for the acquisition of an easement of a mere aerial right of way, because respondent would continue to own and use the subject land anyway. Petitioner argues that in a strict sense, there is no "taking" of property, but merely an imposition of an encumbrance or a personal easement/servitude under Article 614 10 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON THE COMPENSATION OF THE SAID PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED IS JUST AND REASONABLE. HELD: We are not persuaded. Petitioner averred in its Complaint in Civil Case No. RTC 96-3675 that it had sought to acquire an easement of a right of way over portions of respondents land -- a total area of 22,961.71 square meters. 11 In its prayer, however, it also sought authority to enter the property and demolish all improvements existing thereon, in order to commence and undertake the construction of its Power Transmission Project. In other words, the expropriation was not to be limited to an easement of a right of way. In its Answer, respondent alleged that it had already authorized petitioner to take possession of the affected portions of the property and to install electric towers thereon. 12 The latter did not controvert this material allegation. True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. 16 Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not
Under Section 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the court may "accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts, or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners, or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; x x x." In other words, the reports of commissioners are merely advisory and recommendatory in character, as far as the courts are concerned.28 Thus, it hardly matters whether the commissioners have unanimously agreed on their recommended valuation of the property. It has been held that the report of only two commissioners may suffice, even if the third commissioner dissents.29 As a court is not bound by commissioners reports it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure for the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of the latters right of condemnation; and for the defendant, just compensation for the property expropriated. For that matter, the court may even substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the evidence on record. In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao . The remaining portion was retained by the PIA. This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the assailed order, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 and declaring it to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription . Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the petition was outrightly denied. It would appear that the denial was based on Section 4, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. At all events, petitioner has a valid point in emphasizing the "public nature" of the expropriated property. The petition being imbued with public interest, the Court has resolved to give it due course and to decide the case on its merits.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the General Manager of the PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY (PIA), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS as herein represented by DR. SABINO SANTOS and PURIFICACION SANTOS IMPERIAL, respondents. TOPIC: Expropriation FACTS: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), took over the premises after the previous lessee, the Voice of America, had ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued an order to pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid. It would appear that the n ational government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May 1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for the implementation thereof. When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed a motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trial court, in its order of 10 July 1984, granted the motion.
ISSUE: Was the taking proper? How much compensation must be made? RULING: The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use, and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property . These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. o In determining public use, two approaches are utilized the first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and thesecond is public advantage or benefit.
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose.
The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No. 7160 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be . The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred. The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and took the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid. [G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005] JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, respondent. FACTS: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located. Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. The municipality decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-SQM property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho which is abutting E. R. Santos Street. The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the municipalitys intent to purchase the property for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer. The municipality filed a complaint against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property. The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same portion. The Cuancos averred that the property has been sold to petitioner as early as February 1993. The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax declaration covering the property. o RTC issued a writ of possession over the property.
The plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the JILCSFI which had purchased the property. o Thereafter, plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters; the road was called Damayan Street. JILCSFIS CONTENTION: It has been denied the use and enjoyment of its property. There was no valid and definite offer made to the owner of the property. RTC issued an Order in favor of the plaintiff. There was substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer requirement of 19 of RA 7160 and that the expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid. JILCSFI elevated the case to the CA. However, the CA affirmed RTCs Order: o The letter of Engr. Reyes, inviting Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to a conference to discuss with him the road project and the price of the lot was a substantial compliance with the valid and definite offer requirement. o There was constructive notice to the defendants of the expropriation proceedings since a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title. JILCSFI filed a MR, alleging that the CA erred in relying on the photocopy of Engr. Reyes letter to Cuanco because the same was not admitted in evidence by the trial court for being a mere photocopy. JILCSFI also averred that no inspection was ever ordered by the trial court to be conducted on the property, and, if there was one, it had the right to be present thereat since an inspection is considered to be part of the trial of the case. The CA denied the MR for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not (1) The respondent complied with the requirement, under 19 of the LGC, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint NO (2) Its property which is already intended to be used for public purposes may still be expropriated by the respondent YES (3) The requisites for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the NCC may be dispensed with YES RULING: The petition is meritorious. At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by the Court in petitions for review on certiorari. Findings of fact of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Where it is shown that the conclusion is a finding grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures or where the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, the Court may reexamine the evidence on record. Eminent Domain: Nature and Scope The RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN is understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. The nature and scope of such power has been comprehensively described as follows: o It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare. The right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government without the necessity for constitutional recognition. Our own Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power. Strict Construction and Burden of Proof The EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN , whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights.
When the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against the agency asserting the power. o The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained. o The condemnor (respondent), has the burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation. The grant of the power of eminent domain to LGUs is grounded on 19 of RA 7160. The REQUISITES FOR THE VALID EXERCISE of the power of eminent domain by a LGU must be complied with: (1) An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. (2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. (3) There is payment of just compensation, as required under 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. (4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. o Valid and Definite Offer Respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter . It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the complaint. An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract. The offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract. The PURPOSE OF THE REQUIREMENT OF A VALID AND DEFINITE OFFER to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action. It is to give the owner the opportunity to sell his land without the expense and inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation, a substantial right which should be protected. It permits the landowner to receive full compensation, and the entity acquiring the property, immediate use and enjoyment of the property. A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire the property for a reasonable price must be made to the owner or his privy. A single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice. In this case, the RESPONDENT FAILED to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road . The only evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance with 19 of the LGC is the photocopy of the letter of Engr. Jose Reyes to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. o The letter only proved its desire or intent to acquire the property for a right-of-way. o The document was not offered to prove that the respondent made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property. o Moreover, the RTC rejected the document because the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof. o The respondent failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter were sent to and received by all the co-owners of the property. Even if the letter was received by the co-owners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties. There is no legal and factual basis to the CAs ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of petitioners TCT No. PT-92579 is a substantial compliance with the requisite offer.
A notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole world of the pendency of an action involving the title to or possession of real property and a warning that those who acquire an interest in the property do so at their own risk and that they gamble on the result of the litigation over it. Moreover, the lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title only on November 26, 1993, long after the complaint had been filed in the RTC against the Ching Cuancos. Neither is the declaration in one of the Whereas clauses of the ordinance that the property owners were already notified by the municipality of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a municipal road, a substantial compliance with the requirement of a valid and definite offer. The Sangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous premise that the letter of Engr. Reyes reached the coowners of the property. In the absence of competent evidence that the respondent made a definite and valid offer to all the co-owners of the property, aside from the letter of Engr. Reyes, the declaration in the ordinance is not a compliance with 19 of R.A. No. 7160. Public Necessity We reject PETITIONERS contention that its property can no longer be expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place for religious worship and a school for its members. As aptly explained by the Court in Manosca v. Court of Appeals, thus: o As society advances, its demands upon the individual increases and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devotedfor whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use. o The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. However, it is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. The constitution in at least two cases determines what is public use: (1) One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. (2) The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. o It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use. Easement of Right of Way The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the NCC. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice. However, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioners property and not elsewhere. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial and even if the trial court conducted an ocular inspection, the petitioner was not notified thereof. Therefore, the petitioner was deprived of its right to due process. It must be stressed that an OCULAR INSPECTION IS PART OF THE TRIAL AS EVIDENCE is thereby
received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. The petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative weight. Therefore, the findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must be rejected. The Appellate Court correctly ruled that the rights and interests of petitioners Limpin and Sarmiento to the property in question are subordinate to those of respondent Ponce, who holds a prior and senior lien. The registration of the lands, first in the name of Limpin and later of Sarmiento, was premature. At most what they were entitled to was the registration of their equity of redemption. Moreover, the superiority of the mortgagee's lien over that of a subsequent judgment creditor is now expressly provided (Rule 39, Section 16) in the Rules of Court, which states with regard to the effect of levy on execution that it shall create a lien in favor of a judgment creditor over the right title and interest of the judgment debtor in such property at the time of the levy, subject to the liens or encumbrances then existing. It is well settled that a recorded mortgage is a right in rem, a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. The registration of the mortgage in this case put the whole world, petitioners included, on constructive notice of its existence and warned everyone who thereafter dealt with the property on which it was constituted that he would have to reckon with that encumbrance. Hence, Limpin's subsequent purchase from Butuan Corporation, as well as the sale of the same to Sarmiento on November 21, 1981, were both subject to said mortgage. On the other hand, Ponce's purchase of the lots mortgaged to him at the foreclosure sale on October 12, 1983, was subject to no prior lien or encumbrance, and could in no way be affected or prejudiced by a subsequent or junior lien, such as that of Limpin. Effects of the foreclosure sale retroact to the date of registration of the mortgage i.e., March 1, 1973 in the present case. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied, with costs against petitioners. *Nota Bene: As correctly held by the CA; the effect of the failure to implead a subordinate lienholder or subsequent purchaser or both is to render the foreclosure ineffective as against them, with the result that there remains in their favor the "unforeclosed equity of redemption." But the foreclosure is valid as between the parties to the suit. This means that the sale to Ponce, as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the two lots in question should have been confirmed, subject to Limpin's equity to redemption (now Sarmiento's as subsequent transferee). EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION, * ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA, * HILARIA A. FIGURACION, FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN FIGURACION and MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ, respondents. FACTS: Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now both deceased) had six children: petitioner and respondents Elena FiguracionAncheta (now deceased), Hilaria Figuracion, Felipa Figuracion-Manuel, Quintin Figuracion and Mary Figuracion-Ginez. When Leandro died, he left behind two parcels of land, a portion of Lot 2299 and 705 in Urdaneta, both of which he inherited from his deceased parents. Another parcel of land, Lot 707, was inherited by Carolina and her half-sister Agripina when their father Eulalio Adviento died. Agripina then executed a quitclaim over the one-half eastern portion of the lot in favor of petitioner, Emilia, who died single and without any issue. Before her half-sisters death, however, Carolina adjudicated unto herself, via affidavit under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court the entire Lot 707 which she later sold to respondents Felipe and Hilaria. The latter two immediately had OCT No. 15867 cancelled, on December 11, 1962. A new title was then issued in the names of Felipa and Hilaria for Lot 707.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof. LIMPIN & Sarmiento vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FACTS: Involved in this conflict resulted from the mortgage and subsequent sale to different persons of the same real property, and the execution sale thereof at a still later date to another party. On February 28, 1973, four lots were mortgaged by the spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino to Guillermo Ponce and his wife Adela (deceased) as security for a loan. The mortgages were registered on March 1, 1973. Two of the lots, were afterwards sold in 1978 by the Aquinos to Butuan Export Corporation, which caused an adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates of title on February 24, 1978. In 1979, Gregorio Y. Limpin, Jr. obtained a money judgement against Butuan. To satisfy the judgment, the lots were levied and sold at public auction to Limpin on October 6, 1980. The covering titles were cancelled and subsequently issued to Limpin. On November 21, 1981, Limpin sold the two lots to Rogelio M. Sarmiento, from which the titles were cancelled on November 4, 1983 and placed in Sarmiento's name. On September 2, 1980 (a day before Limpin's levy on the two lots), Ponce filed suit against the Aquino spouses for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over the Aquinos' four lots in the CFI of Quezon City. On June 8, 1982, judgment was rendered in favor of Ponce. After the judgment became final, the Trial Court, in an order dated September 13, 1983, directed the sale at public auction of the four (4) mortgaged lots to satisfy the judgment. On October 12, 1983, the four lots were sold to Ponce himself as the highest bidder. On the same day, the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered. Ponce then moved for the confirmation of the sale and the issuance of a writ of possession in his favor covering the four lots. But the Trial Court, by order dated October 26, 1983, confirmed only the sale of two of the lots, refusing to confirm the sale or issue a writ of possession in regard to the other two lots, on the ground that those titles had already been cancelled and new ones issued to Limpin, by order of the CFI of Davao in February 16, 1982. Ponce sought corrective relief by filing an action for certiorari and mandamus in the Appellate Court, impleading Limpin and Sarmiento, Limpin's vendee, as private respondents; wherein the Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and ordering said Court to confirm the same and issue a writ of possession to Ponce, subject to Sarmiento's equity of redemption. Petitioners argue that the Appellate Court erred in according superiority to the mortgage rights of Ponce over the levy and sale in favor of petitioner Limpin and the subsequent sale of the property to petitioner Sarmiento. Hence, this petition for review, filed by Limpin and Sarmiento. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the parcels of land by owners to Butuan Corporation and the subsequent transfers of interest involving Limpin and Sarmiento were proper, considering an earlier registered mortgage in favor of respondent Ponce HELD: No. The petition should be denied.
Petitioner and her family went to the United States where they stayed for ten years. When she returned, she built a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707.Sometime later; petitioner sought the extrajudicial partition of all properties held in common by her and respondents. On the other hand, respondents took the position that Leandro's estate should first undergo settlement proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place. And they claimed that an accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was necessary for such settlement. The Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, upon a complaint filed by petitioner, rendered judgment nullifying Carolinas affidavit of selfadjudication and deed of absolute sale of Lot 707. The RTC, however, dismissed the complaint for partition; reconveyance and damages on the ground that reliefs prayed for cannot be granted without any prior settlement proceedings. The CA upheld the dismissal of petitioners action for partition for being premature but reversed the decision with respect to the nullification and the deed of absolute sale. Hence, this present petition. Issue: Whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate (that is, an accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of expenses and liabilities and taxes, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed. Yes HELD: The right to an inheritance is transmitted immediately to the heirs by operation of law, at the moment of death of the decedent. There is no doubt that, as one of the heirs of Leandro Figuracion, petitioner has a legal interest in Lot 2299. But can she compel partition at this stage? There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2 1and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6. Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedents estate. While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real property's income (rentals and profits) in the course of an action for partition, 13 there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property belonging to the decedent's estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion's only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain expenses" including those related to her father's final illness and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father's estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition. In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for which the estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of the estate's obligations. Co v. Militar FACTS: A land was formerly owned by Dalida Dalida mortgaged the property to the petitioner for a loan and upon his default, the petitioner caused the foreclosure of the mortgaged property ISSUE: WON THE PETITIONER HAS BETTER RIGHT THAN THE RESPONDENT OVER THE DISPUTED PROPERTY HELD: We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.12 In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. 13 Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner. As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership. Respondents argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and was guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in his name is a collateral attack on the title of petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. 16 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED o The petitioner acquired it through a foreclosure sale petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 75, against respondents Rizal Militar and Lilia Sones, who were in possession of the land. o In their answer, respondents claimed that they are the owners of 198 square meters each of the disputed land, having bought the same from Burgos L. Pangilinan and Reynaldo Pangilinan who were the owners-developers of a residential subdivision project called "Immaculate Conception Village", and whose ownership was covered by TCT No. 13774. o Respondent Militar further claimed that his occupancy of the property could not be by tolerance of petitioner for the following reasons: one, he constructed his house way back in June 1966, long before petitioner acquired title thereto on October 10, 1983; He also assailed the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, claiming that it had no jurisdiction over the case as the proper action should have been an accion reinvidicatoria filed before the Regional Trial Court. 8
MTC ruled in favor of petitioner RTC reversed MTC decision CA dismissed the petition Hence, the instant petition
UNIDA VS HEIRS OF URBAN TOPIC: Forcible entry and unlawful detainer. ISSUES: FACTS: ALLEGATIONS: o About ten (10) years ago , more or less, without the knowledge or consent of the owners, the defendants[herein petitioners], without any legal right whatsoever, entered the premises of the land which is the subject of this suit and cultivated the same as their own, not giving any share to the owners; Because the location of the land was then infested by the New Peoples Army at the time of the instrusion of the defendants, the owners did nothing but to tolerate their (defendants) stay and cultivation over the land in question; a) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SUBSEQUENT SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY CURES THE DEFECT IN THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE SUCH CONCLUSION WAS GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATION, THE INFERENCE MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, AND THE JUDGMENT WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS. b) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS CRISPINA UNIDA AND HUSBAND ANTONIO MABALOT AND EUGENIO UNIDA MARRIED TO NANCY UNIDA ARE THE OWNERS OF THE LAND IN DISPUTE HAVING POSSESSED THE SAME SINCE PRE-WAR TIME AND INHERITED SAID LAND FROM THEIR FATHER LUIS UNIDA WHO OWNS SEVENTY TWO (72) HECTARES BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR. RULING: From the earlier quoted material paragraphs-allegations of the complaint, petitioners entry into the property was, by respondents own information, unlawful from the very beginning. Respondent, nonetheless, claimed that it merely tolerated petitioners presence in the property. Clearly, an unlawful detainer action does not lie. For to justify an action for unlawful detainer,the permission or tolerance must have been present at the beginning of the possession. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer or forcible entry, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case. It is in this light that this Court finds that the RTC correctly found that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint. Parenthetically, it was error for the RTC to find the complaint dismissible also on the ground that Lucio Cabaddu was not the real party in interest. A final note. Since the RTC found that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case, it should have followed the mandate of Sec. 8, Rule 40. If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice. unlawful, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
In their Answer, the defendants-herein petitioners denied, among other things, having any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief regarding the authority of Lucio Cabaddu to represent the plaintiff and concluded that he has no right and/or personality to represent the alleged [H]eirs-plaintiff. On the merits, petitioners asserted that petitioner Crispina Unida has possessed Lots 298 and 616, and that petitioner Nancy Unida has possessed Lot 299, both in the concept of owner, personally and through their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial, and that the title to the property subject of the complaint, OCT No. P48306, was fraudulently obtained by respondents. MTC, resolving in the affirmative the issues of 1) whether the plaintiff impliedly tolerated the defendants act of cultivating the land, and 2) whether the plaintiff is the lawful owner of the land, accordingly rendered judgment against the defendants-herein petitioners. RTC of Cagayan reversed the MTC decision, it holding that although Lucio Cabaddu was given a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the SPA did not contain a specific authorization for him to institute the complaint. On the substantive issue, the RTC held that since the complaint itself asserted that petitioners entry into the property was unlawful from the very beginning, respondents alleged toleration thereof cannot be considered as toleration in contemplation of law in unlawful detainer cases, hence, the action for unlawful detainer was improper. Neither was forcible entry the proper remedy, added the RTC, as the entry of petitioners was not by means of force, violence, threats, intimidation, stealth or strategy. The RTC suggested though that the remedy of the plaintiff-herein respondent was to file an accion publiciana or reivindicatoria before the proper RTC. Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated that of the MTC. In reversing the RTC decision, the appellate court held that the subsequent execution of an SPA in favor of Lucio Cabaddu cured the defect in the filing of the complaint. o And the appellate court agree[d] with the Municipal Trial Court that [the plaintiff-herein respondent] had established [its] right of possession as owners of the [property]. Furthermore, the appellate court held that an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient for one alleging that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. BABY ARLENE LARANO vs. SPS. ALFREDO CALENDACION FACTS: Petitioner owns a parcel of riceland situated in Barangay Daniw, Municipality of Victoria, Laguna. petitioner and respondents executed a Contract to Sell whereby the latter agreed to buy a 50,000-SQM portion of petitioner's riceland for P5Million, with P500K as down payment and
the balance payable in nine installments of P500K each, until September 2001. Pending full payment of the purchase price, possession of the riceland was transferred to respondents under the CONDITION that they shall account for and deliver the harvest from said riceland to petitioner. However, RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PAY the installments and to account for and deliver the harvest from said riceland. Petitioner sent a demand letter to vacate the riceland within 10 days from receipt thereof, but the demand went unheeded. Consequently, she filed on an unlawful detainer case respondents before the MTC. Respondents allege that: (a) a Contract to Sell was executed but deny that it contains all the agreements of the parties; (b) petitioner has no cause of action because the 3-year period within which to pay the purchase price has not yet lapsed; (c) MTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the complaint failed to allege that a demand to pay and to vacate the riceland was made upon them. MTCS RULING: Vacate the premises and pay the amount of P365K for the use and occupation of the property. RTCS RULING: Upon appeal, RTC affirmed the decision and modified the amount to P400K. CA RULING (PetRev): Set aside RTCs Decision and dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA nullified the proceedings before the MTC for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the main issue extend beyond those commonly involved in unlawful detainer suits, but one incapable of pecuniary estimation, placing it under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, not the MTC. o According to CA, the issues in the case pertain to WON: (a) there was a violation of the Contract to Sell; (b) such violation gives the petitioner the right to terminate the contract and consequently, the right to recover possession and the value of the harvest from the Riceland PETITIONERS CONTENTION: CA should have dismissed outright the petition since it contains no verification as required by the Rules; and that the CA, in finding that the complaint before the MTC was not one for unlawful detainer but for specific performance, did not limit itself to the allegations in the complaint but resorted to unrestrained references, deductions and/or conjectures, unduly influenced by the allegations in the answer. RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Verification is just a formal requirement and petitioner waived her right to question the defect when she failed to submit her comment; that the CA correctly pointed out that the present case involves one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation since the crux of the matter is the rights of the parties based on the Contract to Sell. o SECOND REQUISITE: Refers to the jurisdiction requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued. BOTH DEMANDS to pay installment due or adhere to the terms of the Contract to Sell and to vacate are necessary to make the vendee deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed. It is the vendor's demand for the vendee to vacate the premises and the vendee's refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of the possession. Such refusal violates the vendor's right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer. However, prior to the institution of such action, a demand from the vendor to pay the installment due or comply with the conditions of the Contract and to vacate the premises is required under the rule. Thus, mere failure to pay the installment due or violation of the terms of the Contract to Sell does not automatically render a person's possession unlawful. The giving of such demand MUST be alleged in the complaint; otherwise, the MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Complaint failed to Constitute a Case of Unlawful Detainer Petitioners allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a case of unlawful detainer. Petitioner alleged that respondents had violated the terms of the Contract to Sell. However, the Complaint failed to state that petitioner made demands upon respondents to comply with the conditions of the contract . The 10-day period granted respondents to vacate even fell short of the 15-day period mandated by law. When the complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC does not have jurisdiction to hear the case. An allegation of a violation of a contract or agreement in a detainer suit may be proved by the presentation of competent evidence, upon which an MTC judge might make a finding to that effect, but certainly, that court cannot declare and hold that the contract is rescinded. The rescission of contract is a power vested in the RTC. The rescission of the contract is the basis of and a condition precedent for the illegality of a party's possession of a piece of realty. Without judicial intervention and determination, even a stipulation entitling one party to take possession of the land and building, in case the other party violates the contract, cannot confer upon the former the right to take possession thereof, if that move is objected to. Clearly, the basic issue raised in the complaint of petitioner is not of possession but interpretation, enforcement and/or rescission of the contract, a matter that is beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and determine. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 13, 2003 of the CA is AFFIRMED. RAMON D. MONTENEGROvs.MA. TERESA L. MONTENEGRO FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner Ramon D. Montenegro seeks the reverse the order of the RTC of Bacolod City, holding him guilty of indirect contempt for his repeated failure to appear at the scheduled hearings for his examination as judgment obligor and imposing on him the penalty of three (3) months imprisonment and a fine of twenty thousand pesos. On 14 June 1994, respondent Ma. Teresa V. Lizares-Montenegro, as mother and guardian of her two minor children Antonio and Isabel, filed with the trial court a complaint for support against her husband, Ramon. 4 years after the filing of the complaint, petitioner and respondent Teresa executed a compromise agreement, approved by the court on 13 October 1998 which became final and executory as between the parties. Under the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner was obligated to (1) pay the respondent the amount of P1M representing her share in their conjugal partnership of gains, (2) establish a trust fund worth P3M in favor of his children Antonio and Isabel within 60 days from the approval of the compromise agreement, and (3) obtain an educational or investment plan to cover matriculation fees of his children within 1 year from the approval of the compromise agreement. Petitioner failed to comply despite the lapse of the periods provided therein. Respondent Teresa filed a motion for the execution of the judgment. The
ISSUE: Whether the complaint is one for unlawful detainer NO RULING: The petition is bereft of merit. Jurisdiction in Ejectment Cases Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. It cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant and it cannot be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties. The TEST FOR DETERMINING the sufficiency of those allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff. The facts upon which an action for unlawful detainer can be brought are specially mentioned in 1, Rule 70 (see ROC) In UNLAWFUL DETAINER, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess. Hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive because in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendants right to continue in possession. In present case, petitioner must comply with TWO REQUISITES for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit: (a) there must be failure to pay the installment due or comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell; and (b) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in 2 of Rule 70 (15 days in case of land and 5 days in case of buildings). o FIRST REQUISITE: Refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer
trial court granted the motion and issued a writ of execution on 15 February 1999. Subsequently, a second writ of execution and a notice of garnishment, issued on May 2001 were returned unsatisfied. In several conferences called by the trial court, petitioner admitted his failure to comply but alleged that he was no longer in a position to do so as he was already insolvent. On 14 March 2002, respondent Teresa filed a motion to examine petitioner as judgment obligor under Sections 36 and 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, with urgency as the latter was about migrate to Canada, which the court granted on March 22, 2002. Repeated demands were subsequently made ordering his appearance in court but to no avail. Thus on 8 November 23, 2002, the trial court issued an order citing him in contempt, and imposed the penalty of imprisonment for 3 months and ordered him to pay a fine of P20,000. His motion for reconsideration of the Order having been denied by the trial court in its Order of 3 January 2003, petitioner filed the present petition. ISSUES: a) Whether, based on the facts found by the trial court, the latter erred in holding the petitioner guilty of indirect contempt for willfully disobeying the orders of the trial court requiring him to appear for purposes of examination as a judgment obligor b) Whether or not the penalty of imprisonment is correct under the given circumstances, which are civil in nature HELD: a) Yes b) No The totality of petitioners acts clearly indicated a deliberate, and unjustified refusal to be examined as a judgment obligor at the time the examination was scheduled for hearing by the trial court. His acts tended to degrade the authority and respect for court processes and impaired the judiciarys duty to deliver and administer justice. Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. It is defined as "disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity." The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely, direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates particular acts which constitute indirect contempt, thus: (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, xxx; (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority; (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court also provides that "a party or other person may be compelled, by an order or subpoena, to attend before the court or commissioner to testify as provided in the two preceding sections, and upon failure to obey such order or subpoena or to be sworn, or to answer as a witness or to subscribe his deposition, may be punished for contempt as in other cases." This provision relates specifically to Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Indirect contempt may either be initiated (1) motu proprio by the court by issuing an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or (2) by the filing of a verified petition, complying with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings. In the present case, the trial court initiated the proceedings for indirect contempt by issuing two orders directing the petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished for indirect contempt. Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the nature and effect of the contemptuous act . Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect." On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made . If the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil. In the present case, the contemptuous act was the petitioners refusal to attend a hearing for his examination as judgment obligor, upon motion by the respondent Teresa. It must be pointed out that the purpose of Section 36 of Rule 39 is to provide the judgment obligee a remedy in case where the judgment obligor continues to fail to comply with its obligation under the judgment. Petitioners refusal to be examined, without justifiable reason constituted indirect contempt, which is civil in nature. Under Section 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person found guilty of contempt of court against a Regional Trial Court may be punished with a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. The penalties imposed herein of imprisonment for three months and a fine of twenty thousand pesos are within the allowable penalties the trial court may impose, albeit not for civil contempt. The purpose of incarceration in civil contempt proceeding is to compel a party to comply with the order of the court. This may be resorted to where the attendant circumstances are such that the non-compliance with the court order is an utter disregard of the authority of the court, which has then no other recourse but to use its coercive power. The reason for indefinite incarceration in civil contempt proceeding is that it is remedial, preservative, or coercive in nature. The punishment is imposed for the benefit of a complainant. Its object is to compel performance of the orders or decrees of the court, which the contemptor refuses to obey. In
effect, it is within the power of the person adjudged guilty of contempt to set himself free. In the present case, however, the act which the trial court ordered the petitioner to do has already been performed, albeit belatedly and not without delay for an unreasonable length of time. As such, the penalty of imprisonment may no longer be imposed despite the fact that its nonimplementation was due to petitioners absence in the Philippines. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The order of the RTC of Bacolod City is modified. As the penalty of imprisonment is deleted therefrom, while the penalty of fine of P20,000 is affirmed. "SEC. 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing. After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt: xxx xxx xxx
[G.R. No. L-66371. May 15, 1985.] ARMANDO ANG, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO, Regional Trial Judge, Branch LXXXIV and HON, JUDGE JOSE P. ARRO, Branch CIII, both of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, and ASSISTANT FISCAL NARCISO T. ATIENZA of Quezon City, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner, through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, lodged with this Court an administrative complaint against respondent judge for ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence, incompetence, manifest partiality, grave abuse of discretion, grave misconduct, rendering unjust decision in Civil Case No. Q-35466 and dereliction of duties in not resolving his motion for reconsideration of the adverse decision in said civil case. Upon learning of the administrative case filed against him, respondent judge ordered petitioner to appear before him, and to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court, for malicious, insolent, inexcusable disrespect and contemptuous attitude towards the court and towards him. Respondent judge found petitioner guilty of contempt of court, sentenced him to suffer five (5) days imprisonment and ordered his arrest for his failure, despite notice, to appear on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge against him. Petitioner filed his notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction in the contempt charge but the same was denied by the respondent judge in an Order. Meantime an alias warrant was issued, in view of the fact that said Armando Ang has remained in hiding and has been eluding the officers of the law in serving the original warrant for his arrest. Thereafter, respondent judge instituted before the Office of the City Fiscal of Quezon City a criminal complaint against herein petitioner for using malicious, insolent and contemptuous language against him in his lettercomplaint filed before this Court. HELD: Upon a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, SC found that the alleged malicious imputations were not uttered in the presence of so near respondent Judge Jose P. Castro as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before him; rather, they were contained in the pleadings and/or letterscomplaint filed by petitioner before the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs and before this Court in the aforementioned administrative case filed by petitioner against him. Section 3, particularly paragraphs (b) and (d), Rule 71 of the New Rules of Court, provide:
"(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; xxx xxx xxx
"(d) Any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; Respondent Judge Castro, in his comment, argues that failure of petitioner to appear, despite notice, on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge for the use of derogatory language in his two letters addressed to the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs and to his Court in an administrative complaint against him, constitutes direct contempt as the acts actually impeded, embarrassed and obstructed him in the administration of justice. SC do not agree. The Rules of Court cannot be any clearer. The use of disrespectful of contemptuous language against a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Stated differently, if the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Considering the aforecited provisions, petitioner's conduct if at all, constitutes indirect contempt and if found guilty, he may appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which reads: "SEC. 10. Review of judgment or order by Court of Appeals or Supreme Court; bond for stay. The judgment or order of a Court of First Instance made in a case of contempt punished after written charge and hearing may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, but execution of the judgment or order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person in contempt, in an amount fixed by the Court of First Instance, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or order. The appeal may be taken as in criminal cases." Anent the ancillary action for prohibition, Court find the same meritorious, considering that the basis of the libel case (Criminal Case NO. Q-31587) filed against petitioner before the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, Quezon City was a communication addressed to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court which was coursed through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, complaining against respondent judge's ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence, incompetence, disregard for the Supreme Court administrative order, grave misconduct, rendering an unjust decision and dereliction of duty. It is manifest that as held in the case of Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922, "a communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the party making the communication has an interest or concerning which he has a duty is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest of duty, although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter which without the privilege would be libelous and actionable; . . . that parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise
defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case." Records show that the libel case had already been instituted in court when the restraining order was issued by Us. Nonetheless, considering the privileged character of petitioner's communication to the Chief Justice barring a prosecution for libel, it is proper that the injunction against respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, Quezon City, from proceeding with the hearing of Criminal Case No. Q-31587, be made permanent pursuant to the restraining order and established doctrine against the use of the strong arm of the law as an instrument of arbitrary and oppressive prosecution. ACCORDINGLY, the petition with respect to the action against respondent Judge Jose P. Castro of the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXXIV, Quezon City is granted and said respondent judge is hereby ordered to elevate the records of Civil Case No. Q-35466 to the Intermediate Appellate Court at once for disposition in accordance with the terms hereof. Respondent trial judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the libel case (Criminal Case No. Q-31587). The temporary restraining order issued on February 20, 1984 enjoining respondent Judge Jose O. Castro from enforcing or carrying out the warrant of arrest issued in Civil Case No. Q35466 is made permanent. SO ORDERED. CANDELARIA DAYOT VS SHELL CORPORATION COMPANY FACTS: On April 20, 1982, Panay Railways, Inc. (PRI) executed a real estate mortgage contract over six parcels of land located in Lapuz District, Iloilo City in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) for purposes of securing its loan obligations to TRB . PRI failed to pay its loan. As a consequence, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold at public auction to TRB as the highest bidder. PRI failed to redeem the foreclosed properties. Hence, TRB consolidated its ownership over the subject parcels of land and, thereafter, certificates of title were issued in its name, all of which canceled TCT No. T-58200. Thereafter, TRB filed a Petition for Writ of Possession with the RTC of Iloilo City, docketed as LRC CAD. REC. NO. 1 ILOILO CITY and LRC CAD. REC. NO. 9616ILOILO CITY. In its Order dated October 22, 1990, the trial court granted the petition and ordered the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of TRB. However, the writ was not fully implemented. On November 20, 1990, TRB sold to spouses Edmundo and Candelaria Dayot (Spouses Dayot), by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, five parcels of land which are portions of Lots 3834, 1-A and 6153. Subsequently, on February 5, 1991, Candelaria Dayot (petitioner) filed a Supplemental Pleading before the RTC of Iloilo City, praying that she, being the transferee of all the rights and interests of TRB over the parcels of land subject of the Petition for Writ of Possession filed by the latter, be substituted as the new petitioner in LRC CAD. The trial court granted petitioner's prayer in its Order dated March 12, 1991. On April 1, 1991, the RTC issued an Alias Writ of Possession in favor of herein petitioner. On August 24, 1994, the spouses Dayot filed with the RTC of Iloilo City, a complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Annulment of Documents, Cancellation of Titles, Reconveyance and Damages against TRB, Petron Corporation (Petron) and herein respondent Shell Chemical Company (Phil.), Inc. (Shell), praying that Shell be directed to vacate the portion of Lot No. 6153 which it actually possesses and for both Petron and Shell to surrender ownership and possession of portions of parcels of lands covered separately by TCT Nos. T-47484 and T94116. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 21957. On August 21, 1997, while Civil Case No. 21957 was pending resolution, herein petitioner filed in LRC CAD. REC. NOS. 1 and 9616 an Amended Supplemental Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession, praying that Shell be ejected from the portion of Lot 6153 which it actually possesses. Shell lodged an Opposition to petitioner's Amended Supplemental Motion arguing, among others, that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping as it seeks the same relief being sought in Civil Case No. 21957 and that the parcels of land sold to petitioner do not include the portion of Lot 6153 being possessed by Shell. On May 7, 1999, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 30 issued an Order denying herein petitioner's Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, insofar as Shell is concerned. Despite the issuance of the above-mentioned Order, petitioner filed two successive motions praying for the issuance of an alias writ of possession. Shell opposed these motions. Wherefore, let an Alias Writ of Possession issue on the affected portions of Lots 3834, 1-A and 6153, all situated in the City of Iloilo, with a total land area of 14,940 sq. meters occupied by Shell and 17,000 sq. meters occupied by Petron and to place and install petitioner Candelaria Dayot in possession thereof. On even date, the Sheriff served upon Shell a Notice to Vacate. Thereafter, Shell and Petron moved for the reconsideration of the January 8, 2002 Order of the RTC but the trial court denied it via its Order dated April 12, 2002. Shell then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA praying for the nullification of the January 8, 2002 and April 12, 2002 Orders of RTC Iloilo, Branch 29, as well as the Alias Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate both dated January 10, 2002. The petition also sought to permanently enjoin the RTC from enforcing the assailed orders and processes and from acting and conducting further proceedings in the subject case. CA: Petition is GRANTED and the questioned four (4) rulings of the court a quo are hereby declared NULL and VOID. No costs. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 23, 2002. Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari, anchored on the following grounds:
ISSUES: 1. THAT RESPONDENT IS BARRED FROM FILING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS, ASSAILING THE AMENDED ORDER DATED JANUARY 8, 2002 OF HON. RENE B. HONRADO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 29, AFTER RESPONDENT LOST ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL BECAUSE A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI IS NOT AND CANNOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR A LOST OR EXPIRED APPEAL THUS, THE DECISION PROMULGATED JULY 30, 2002 AND THE RESOLUTION PROMULGATED DECEMBER 23, 2002 OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WERE ISSUED CONTRARY TO PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE AND THAT SAID COURT DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. 2. THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION OF THE ENTIRE LOTS 3834, 1-A, 6153, 6156, 6158 AND 6159 INCLUDING THE AREA OF 14,940 SQ. METERS OCCUPIED BY RESPONDENT WHICH AREAS ARE PORTIONS OF LOTS 6153, 3834 AND 1-A, OCCUPATION THEREOF BY RESPONDENT BEING THAT OF MERE INTRUDER OR TRESSPASSER. RULING: The Court finds the petition bereft of merit. It bears to emphasize at the outset that the present petition for review arose by reason of the special civil action for certiorari filed by respondent Shell with the CA questioning the January 8, 2002 Amended Order, Alias Writ of Possession, Notice to Vacate and the April 12, 2002 Order issued by the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 29. Accordingly, any discussions on the issues raised as well as rulings by this Court in the present petition apply only insofar as the claim of respondent Shell is concerned. As to the first assigned error, it is true that as a rule while certiorari as a remedy may not be used as a substitute for an appeal, especially for a lost appeal, this rule should not be strictly enforced if the petition is genuinely meritorious. It has been held that where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules. The Court has given due course to petitions forcertiorari although appeal is the proper remedy where the equities of the case warranted such action, mindful that dismissals based on technicalities are looked upon with disfavor. In the present case, the Court finds no error on the part of the CA in giving due course to the petition for certiorari filed by respondent as its case is genuinely meritorious for reasons that will be discussed forthwith. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to resjudicata in the other.[24] On the other hand, the elements of res judicata, also known as bar by prior judgment, are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action . Moreover, the aforementioned cases cannot be said to be identical as the basic issue in LRC CAD. REC. NOS. 1 and 9616 is possession while in Civil Case No. 21957 the issue raised is essentially that of ownership of the disputed lots. Nonetheless, the Court finds that under applicable laws and jurisprudence, respondent cannot be ejected from the property by means of an ex-parte writ of possession. o Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
Under the aforequoted provision, one who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The term judicial process could mean no less than an ejectment suit or reivindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated. In the present case, petitioner had already complied with this procedure by filing Civil Case No. 21957 Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property at the time of levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. (emphasis supplied) It bears emphasis that an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act 3135, as amended. It is brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or consent by any person adversely interested. In the case at bar, it is not disputed that herein respondent had been in possession of the subject lots since 1975 and that it has in its premises bulk plant and fuel storage facilities for the purpose of conducting its business. In this respect, the Court agrees with the findings of the CA that petitioner had knowledge of respondent's prior possession of the disputed properties. Yet, instead of pursuing Civil Action No. 21957 where respondent will be given a chance to substantiate its claim of ownership, petitioner still insists on obtaining a writ of possession pursuant to its alleged right as purchaser of the properties which had been extra-judicially foreclosed. The Court cannot sanction this procedural shortcut. To enforce the writ against herein respondent, an unwitting third party possessor who took no part in the foreclosure proceedings, would be tantamount to the taking of real property without the benefit of proper judicial intervention. Hence, it was not a ministerial duty of the trial court under Act No. 3135 to issue a writ of possession for the ouster of respondent from the lot subject of this instant case, particularly in light of the latter's opposition and claim of ownership and rightful possession of the disputed properties. Furthermore, registration of the lots in petitioners name does not automatically entitle the latter to possession thereof . As discussed earlier, petitioner must resort to the appropriate judicial process for recovery of the properties and cannot simply invoke its title in an ex-parte proceeding to justify the ouster of respondent, especially in view of the fact that the latter also has in its possession a Transfer Certificate of Title over the subject properties. The court cannot just ignore the claim of herein respondent, who is in actual possession of the subject properties, that it has been the owner thereof since 1975 and, therefore, has the better right to possess them. Neither can the RTC rely on the Surveyor's Report
It bears to note that the proceedings conducted subsequent to the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession are ex parte and summary in nature. The order for the issuance of the writ is simply an incident in the transfer of title in the name of the petitioner. Hence, such order cannot be said to be a judgment on the merits, i.e., one rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case. Thus, in the present case, any order or decision of the RTC in LRCCAD. REC. NOS. 1 and 9616 cannot be considered as determinative of the merits of Civil Case No. 21957.
dated August 3, 1997 because respondent was not given the opportunity to refute it, the same being submitted in the exparte proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Dayot. Due process dictates that herein respondent cannot simply be ejected on the strength of the subject Surveyor's Report without giving it (respondent) the opportunity to present its own evidence. All of these issues must be ventilated and resolved on the merits after a proper hearing. Finally, it is expressly stipulated in the Additional Stipulations of Real Estate Mortgage executed by PRI in favor of TRB that it excludes those areas already sold to Shell Co., Inc. with total area of 14,920 sq. meters, known as Lot No. 6153-B and portion of Lot No. 5. This is not the proper forum to determine who between the parties is entitled to ownership of the disputed lands, as the issue in the present case is merely limited to the propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession relating to foreclosure of mortgage. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 30, 2002 and December 23, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 70696 are AFFIRMED insofar as respondent Shell Chemical Company (Phils.), Inc. is concerned. G.R. No. 129704 September 30, 2005 ULPIANO BALO, et al. vs. CA FACTS: A complaint for Judicial Partition of Real Properties and Accounting with Damages was filed by private respondent Josefina Garrido against petitioners before the RTC. She alleged in her COMPLAINT that: o Private respondent and petitioners are the co-owners of undivided parcels of land located at Mayorga, Leyte. The described parcels of lands were originally owned by the spouses Eugenio Balo, Sr. and Ma. Pasagui-Balo and they were survived by their 2 children: Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino (deceased); The lands were inherited into two (2) equal shares by their 2 children; Plaintiff is the daughter of the late Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao, who after her fathers death, had inherited her fathers share of the inheritance; Ulpiano Balo, Sr. aside from being the son of Eugenio Balo, Sr., is married to Felicidad Superio, and is the father of all the other defendants in this case; Immediately upon the death of Eugenio Sr., petitioners took possession of the properties without her knowledge and consent. She requested for the properties fair and equal partition, but petitioners refused her proposal. (3) The properties enumerated in the Complaint were proceeded against by way of execution to satisfy a judgment against Eugenio and Maria Balo. Subsequently, defendant Ulpiano repurchased the said properties and has been, together with his children, openly, exclusively and adversely in possession of the real estate properties in question.
The RTC denied the MTD for lack of merit. o No evidence may be alleged or considered to test the sufficiency of the complaint except the very facts pleaded therein. It would be improper to inject into the allegation, facts not alleged and use them as basis for the decision on the motion. The Court is not permitted to go beyond and outside of the allegations in the complaint for data or facts. Therefore, the allegation of illegitimacy and claim of absolute ownership are modifications and unreasonable inferences. If there is doubt to the truth of the facts averred in the complaint, the Court does not dismiss the complaint but requires an answer and proceeds to hear the case on the merit.
COURT OF APPEALS RULING (PetCert): CA accordingly dismissed the same because: o An order denying a MTD is basically interlocutory in character and cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. The proper procedure is to proceed with the trial and if the decision be adverse to the movant, the remedy is to take an appeal from said decision, assigning as one of the errors therefore the denial of the motion to dismiss.
CA denied the MR. Hence this petition for review under Rule 45 of the ROC.
ISSUES: Whether or not (1) (2) The dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari is valid NO The failure to allege the nature and extent of plaintiffs title in a petition for partition is fatal to its cause of action NO, proof of legal acknowledgment is not a prerequisite before an action for partition may be filed. The action for judicial partition and accounting has prescribed, was waived, or was otherwise abandoned NO
(3)
RULING: Dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari is Invalid [COMMENTO: The SC stated in this case that the petitioners have alleged GAD thats why the SC discussed the merits of the petition. However, I did not find that in the facts (PROMISE!!!).] The CA should not have dismissed the petition outright as the same alleges grave abuse of discretion. It should have determined WON the trial court did commit grave abuse of discretion as alleged by the petitioners. The Court of Appeals having failed in this regard, it behooves upon this Court to discuss the merits of the petition to put to rest the issues raised by the petitioners. GENERAL RULE: An order denying a MTD is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the denial of a MTD cannot be questioned in a
In lieu of an Answer, petitioners filed a MTD on the following grounds: (1) Failure to state a COA for failing to allege that she is a legitimate child and to allow her to inherit from the estate in representation of her father would be to permit intestate succession by an illegitimate child. The complaint does not show that the estate of the spouses Eugenio and Maria Balo have been settled and its obligations have been paid.
(2)
special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. EXCEPTION: The denial of the MTD must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion. By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law. o Specific instances whereby recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate: (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case In PARTITION PROCEEDINGS, dismissal prior to answer is premature because in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks: o First, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties and Second, the conveyance of his lawful shares.
The CA correctly held, an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determine portion of the properties involved . o If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit to partition. On the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the partition of the properties in the same action. Issue of Prescription
In a MTD for failure to state a cause of action, the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. Moreover, the inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint. 1, Rule 8 provides that the complaint needs only to allege the ultimate facts upon which private respondent bases her claim. The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. The allegations of Private Respondent in her complaint show SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE with the formal and substantial requirements of a Complaint for Partition as required under 1, Rule 69. o 1: A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
On the matter of prescription cited by the petitioners as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint, it is noteworthy that the MTD filed by the Balos did not ipso facto establish prescription. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a MTD only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed; otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere MTD.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA, affirming the Order of the RTC dated 12 September 1996, is AFFIRMED. This case is ordered remanded to the court of origin which is directed to resolve the case with dispatch. [G.R. No. 148448. August 17, 2004.] RUSTICO A. ARDIENTE and ASUNCION PALOMA-ARDIENTE, petitioners, vs. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON and PENINSULA DEVELOPMENT BANK, respondents. FACTS:
Proof of Legal Acknowledgment is not a Prerequisite BRIZ vs. BRIZ: Proof of legal acknowledgment is not a prerequisite before an action for partition may be filed. There is no necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. A natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition (proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother. o There is no need for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings, the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
The spouses Rustico Ardiente and Asuncion Paloma obtained a loan in the amount of P100,000.00 from the Peninsula Development Bank (the bank), to be amortized in six years, on account of which they executed a Promissory Note in the same amount. To secure the payment of the loan, the Ardientes executed in favor of the bank a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land situated at Mabutag, Cawa, Buenavista, Quezon and three (3) parcels of land situated at Cadlit, Guinayangan, Quezon. Out of the proceeds of the loan, the Ardientes purchased a mini bus costing P81,875.00. After the bus was in operation for several months, it met an accident, as a result of which it sustained heavy damages and rendered the Ardientes unable to meet their obligation to the bank. Demands for the payment of their obligation to notwithstanding, the Ardientes failed to settle the same. the bank
The bank thus extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage and the parcels of land covered thereby were sold at public auction to the bank which was the highest bidder. The bank later notified the Ardientes by letter of February 24, 1984 4 that they had one (1) year from November 11, 1983 or up to November 11, 1984 to redeem the foreclosed mortgage. Subsequently, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court a complaint for annulment of the auction sale based on two grounds: 1) that it was the bank who violated the real estate mortgage; and 2) that they were not notified of the intended extrajudicial foreclosure. The trial court nullified the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties, noting the absence of documentary evidence to show strict compliance with the statutory requirements on publication of notice of the extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision after finding that the lack of required notice and publication of the extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage was not averred in the complaint, hence, cannot be the basis of an adverse judgment. Petitioners then filed the present petition for review before the Supreme Court. who are also among the incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to Respondents. o RTC issued an Order transferring the case to RTCNaga pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the action for quo warranto should be brought in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides and since the respondents in this case are residents of Naga City. o RTC-Naga refused to receive the case stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case. o Hence, RTC-BR. 58 proceeded with the case. RTC-Br. 58 issued an order remanding the case to RTC- Naga o Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings. On the otherhand, the Supreme Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed the transfer from the regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial Courts specially designated to try and decide intra-corporate dispute . Hence, this petition
ISSUE: ISSUE: W/N THE EXTRA JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE WAS VALID? YES HELD: In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held that what the petitioners were questioning in their complaint was the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the basis of lack of notice to them as mortgagor. According to the Court, it is settled that personal notice to the mortgagor in extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary, hence, not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale. The Court also agreed with the appellate court's ruling that the issue of lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure was never raised by petitioners in the trial court; hence, the same could not be raised for the first time on appeal. SYLLABUS: REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE; STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING PUBLICATION OF NOTICE OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE SALES MUST BE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH. It is a well-settled rule that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and the sale at least voidable. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE THEREOF CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. The issue of lack of publication of notice cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Calleja v. Panday HELD: 1ST ISSUE: It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for an intracorporate controversy.9 Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting Justice Jose Y. Ferias view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals 10 that Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated," while "[a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as amended)."11 However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows: 5.2. The Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally WON THE ACTION FOR QUO WARRANTO IS PROPER WON THE RTC-BR. 58 HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE QUO WARRANTO CASE
FACTS: Respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTCBr. 58 of San Jose. Camarines Sur) for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners. o They alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition, they had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners,
incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated. 2ND ISSUE: Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is undisputed that the principal office of the corporation is situated at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial Court designated as Special Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto filed by herein Respondents. Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intracorporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC. Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction ownership over the parcels of land upon expiration of the redemption period. It emphasized that the issue on the failure to return the excess or surplus proceeds of the auction sale had been squarely met by the respondent, and therefore, the case was distinguishable from Sulit v. Court of Appeals. In all, the CA upheld the general rule that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function of the court. ISSUES: 1. Whether the RTC erred in issuing a writ of possession considering respondent's failure to remit the excess or surplus proceeds of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. (NO) 2. Whether respondent may unilaterally apply the excess or surplus proceeds of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale to petitioner's remaining unsecured obligations. 3. Whether the RTC should have granted petitioners' motion to dismiss the petition for writ of possession based on respondent's failure to comply with the RTC's Orders on the filing of a formal offer of evidence. HELD: A writ of possession is an order enforcing a judgment to allow a person's recovery of possession of real or personal property. An instance when a writ of possession may issue is under Act No. 3135, 15 as amended by Act No. 4118, on extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. 16 Sections 6 and 7 provide, to wit: Section 6. Redemption. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power herein before referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at anytime within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. Section 7. Possession during redemption period. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in [the] form of an ex-parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Number Four hundred and ninety-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately. From the foregoing provisions, a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond. Within the redemption period the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession by filing for that purpose an ex-parte motion under oath, in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property covered by a Torrens title. Upon the filing of an ex-parte motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the court is expressly directed to issue the order for a writ of possession.
[G.R. No. 159882. November 23, 2007.] SPOUSES RUBEN and VIOLETA SAGUAN, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS and COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), respondents. FACTS: [Petitioners] spouses Ruben Saguan and Violeta Saguan obtained a loan of P3 Million from [respondent] Philippine Bank of Communications. To secure the obligation, they mortgaged five parcels of land, and improvements therein. Because [petitioners] defaulted in the payment of their mortgage indebtedness, [respondent] extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage. In the auction sale on 05 January 1998, [respondent] was the only and highest bidder for P6,008,026.74. As [petitioners] failed to redeem the properties within the one-year period ending on 18 February 1999, TCT were issued in the name of [respondent] in lieu of the old ones. Thus, [respondent] consolidated ownership of the properties in its favor. Since the parcels of land were in physical possession of [petitioners] and other persons [copetitioners in the petition before the CA], [respondent], after due demand, filed a petition for writ of possession with Branch 31, Regional Trial Court, Tagum City. Petitioners filed an Opposition. In their Opposition and Reply, petitioners argued that a writ of possession should not issue considering respondent's failure to return the excess or surplus proceeds of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale based on theruling in Sulit v. Court of Appeals. In refutation, respondent points to petitioners' remaining unsecured obligations with the former to which the excess or surplus proceeds were applied. RTC issues a writ of possession. The CA affirmed respondent's entitlement to a writ of possession as a matter of right, the latter having consolidated its
On the other hand, after the lapse of the redemption period, a writ of possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale as the mortgagor is now considered to have lost interest over the foreclosed property. Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. 20 In this regard, the bond is no longer needed. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser's right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion. Therefore, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent in this case is proper. We have consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession in such instances is ministerial, and the court may not exercise discretion or judgment. The propriety of the issuance of the writ was heightened in this case where the respondent's right to possession of the properties extended after the expiration of the redemption period, and became absolute upon the petitioners' failure to redeem the mortgaged properties. 1. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the petitioners insist that respondent's failure to return the excess or surplus proceeds of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale converted the issuance of a writ of possession from a ministerial to a discretionary function of the trial court pursuant to our holding in Sulit v. Court of Appeals. The Court is not persuaded. A careful reading of Sulit will readily show that it was decided under a different factual milieu. In Sulit, the plea for a writ of possession was made during the redemption period and title to the property had not, as yet, been consolidated in favor of the purchaser in the foreclosure sale. In stark contrast, the herein petitioners failed to exercise their right of redemption within the one-year reglementary period provided under Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, and ownership over the properties was consolidated in, and corresponding titles issued in favor of, the respondent. We emphasize that the proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex-parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without need of notice to any person claiming an adverse interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted even without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. By its very nature, an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized under Act No. 3135, as amended. Be that as it may, the debtor or mortgagor is not without recourse. Section 8 of Act No. 3135, as amended, provides: Section 8. Setting aside of sale and writ of possession. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal. Thus, a party may file a petition to set aside the foreclosure sale and to cancel the writ of possession in the same proceedings where the writ of possession was requested. However, in this case, petitioners do not challenge the validity of the foreclosure nor do they wish to set aside the foreclosure sale. It appears that the only remaining bone of contention is the disposition of the excess or surplus proceeds of the foreclosure sale. In short, petitioners do not question the consolidation of ownership in favor of the respondent, but simply demand the payment of the sum of money supposedly still owing them from the latter. Article 427, 25 in relation to Article 428, 26 of the Civil Code provides that ownership may be exercised over things or rights, and grants the owner of property a right of action for recovery against the holder and possessor thereof. Thus, even as we rule that the writ of possession was properly issued in favor of respondent as a consequence of its confirmed ownership, we are not unmindful of the fact that the issue of the excess or surplus proceeds of the foreclosure sale remains unsettled. 2. Respondent's stance, as sustained by the CA, is that petitioners have remaining unsecured obligations with respondent and the excess or surplus proceeds of the foreclosure sale were validly, albeit unilaterally, applied thereto. This argument is unacceptable. We have elucidated on the import of surplus proceeds in the case of Sulit, viz.: In case of a surplus in the purchase price, however, there is jurisprudence to the effect that while the mortgagee ordinarily is liable only for such surplus as actually comes into his hands, but he sells on credit instead of for cash, he must still account for the proceeds as if the price were paid in cash, and in an action against the mortgagee to recover the surplus, the latter cannot raise the defense that no actual cash was received. Surplus money, in case of a foreclosure sale, gains much significance where there are junior encumbrancers on the mortgaged property. Jurisprudence has it that when there are several liens upon the premises, the surplus money must be applied to their discharge in the order of their priority. A junior mortgagee may have his rights protected by an appropriate decree as to the application of the surplus, if there be any, after satisfying the prior mortgage. His lien on the land is transferred to the surplus fund. And a senior mortgagee, realizing more than the amount of his debt on a foreclosure sale, is regarded as a trustee for the benefit of junior encumbrancers. Given the foregoing pronouncement in Sulit, we cannot countenance respondent's cavalier attitude towards petitioners' right to the surplus proceeds. To begin with, the foreclosure of petitioners' properties was meant to answer only the obligation secured by the mortgage. Article 2126 of the Civil Code unequivocally states: Art. 2126. The mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. We need not expound on the obvious. Simply put, even if petitioners have remaining obligations with respondent, these obligations, as conceded by respondent itself, were not collateralized by the foreclosed properties. Furthermore, under Section 1 28 of Act No. 3135 as amended, the special power of attorney authorizing the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage must be either (1) inserted or stated in the mortgage deed itself; or (2) the authority is attached thereto. Thus, petitioners' supposed remaining obligations which were not secured by the mortgage cannot be made subject, or even susceptible, to the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.
However, petitioners' remedy lies in a separate civil action for collection of a sum of money. We have previously held that where the mortgagee retains more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but simply give the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus. 30 In the same case, both parties can establish their respective rights and obligations to one another, after a proper liquidation of the expenses of the foreclosure sale, and other interests and claims chargeable to the purchase price of the foreclosed property. The court can then determine the proper application of compensation with respect to respondent's claim on petitioners' remaining unsecured obligations. 31 In this regard, respondent is not precluded from itself filing a case to collect on petitioners' remaining debt. 3. Anent the third issue, we agree with the CA that there was no grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's liberality in giving ample time and opportunity for respondent to complete the presentation of its evidence. It was a liberality that carried no taint of partiality. Despite the ex-parte nature of the proceedings, the RTC also allowed petitioners to file pleadings to oppose the petition for the issuance of the writ of possession. Clearly, petitioners were not denied due process, and the trial judge acted accordingly in admitting respondent's uncontroverted evidence. Finally, we note petitioners' incorrect remedy of certiorari before the CA, which the latter and both parties have apparently overlooked. A special civil action for certiorari may be availed of only if the lower tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Ineluctably, the RTC issued the writ of possession in compliance with the express provisions of Act No. 3135. It cannot, therefore, be charged with grave abuse of discretion as there is no showing that, in the exercise of its judgment, it acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Absent grave abuse of discretion, petitioners should have filed an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for certiorari. The soundness of the order granting the writ of possession is a matter of judgment with respect to which the remedy of the party aggrieved is ordinary appeal. An error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as "grave abuse of discretion." Errors of judgment are correctible by appeal, while those of jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari. Nonetheless, we have allowed this procedural lapse to pass without incident, and have resolved the issues raised. SacTCA WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The writ of possession in favor of respondent Philippine Bank of Communications is hereby AFFIRMED without prejudice to petitioners' separate remedy for recovery of the excess or surplus proceeds of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. SEPULVEDA, substituted by SOCORRO S. LAWASvs.ATTY. PELAEZ FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 from a decision of the CA, affirming the decision of the RTC of Danao City. On December 6, 1972, respondent Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint against his granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., with the CFI of Cebu, for the recovery of possession and ownership of his one-half (1/2) undivided share of parcels of land; his undivided one-third (1/3) share in several other lots; and a share in the proceeds of sale between the defendant and the City of Danao; and for the partition thereof among the co-owners. The lots were among the 25 parcels of land which the private respondents mother, Dulce Sepulveda, inherited from her grandmother, Dionisia Sepulveda under the Project of Partition dated April 16, 1937 submitted by Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. as the administrator of the estate. Under the said deed, it appeared that the respondents mother Dulce is legally entitled to a share of the property, representing her mother Dionisia, as the co-owners along with Pedro and Santiago, of the eleven other parcels of land, each with an undivided one-third (1/3) share thereof. Respondent Atty. Pelaezs mother Dulce died intestate in 1944, survived by her husband Rodolfo Pelaez. Dulces grandfather Vicente Sepulveda died intestate on October 25, 1920 when she was only about four years old. From that time, Atty Pelaezs grandmother Carlota repeatedly demanded the delivery of her mothers share in the eleven (11) parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. who was then a Municipal Mayor of a nearby town refused. Dulce, likewise, later demanded the delivery of her share, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. still refused, claiming that he needed to reap the produce therefrom as payment of the realty taxes on the subject properties. The private respondent alleged that he himself demanded the same but to no avail. His granduncle Pedro executed an affidavit on November 28, 1961, stating that he was the sole heir of Dionisia, thus claiming adverse possession as against the interest of his other co-heirs. Thus, respondent Pelaez filed the present action assailed before the SC. Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. in his affirmative defense admitted having executed a deed of sale in favor of Danao City, but averred that the latter failed to pay the purchase price thereof; further he claims that he never received any demand for the delivery of Dulces share of the subject properties, from the latters mother Carlota, or from the private respondent. During the trial, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. died. His daughter, petitioner Socorro Sepulveda Lawas, substituted him in 1986 after she was appointed administratrix of his estate back in July 1976. On June 7, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondent Pelaez. The trial court ruled that the private respondents action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed; that he was entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale of the property to Danao City; and that the partition of the subject property among the adjudicatees thereof was in order. The petitioner appealed to CA, which affirmed the appealed decision with modification. The petitioner now comes to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC, as affirmed by the CA correctly held giving due course to private respondents complaint in an action for partition. HELD: No. The petition is granted for the sole reason that the respondent failed to implead as parties, all the indispensable parties in his complaint. It appears that when the private respondent filed the complaint, his father, Rodolfo Pelaez, was still alive. Thus, when his mother Dulce Pelaez died intestate on March 2, 1944, she was survived by her husband Rodolfo and the private respondent. Under Article 996 of the New Civil Code, Rodolfo Pelaez, as surviving spouse, is entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children who has not received any betterment. Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the surviving spouse is a forced heir and entitled to a share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse. The spouse may waive it but the waiver must be express. Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants.
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.- A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the other persons interested in the property. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership between him and the respondent does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper. In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon. In the present action, the private respondent, as the plaintiff in the trial court, failed to implead the following indispensable parties: his father, Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz Sepulveda and their children; and the City of Danao which purchased one of the properties involved. Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct, equal to the share of the respondent in the subject properties. There is no showing that Rodolfo Pelaez had waived his right to usufruct. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads: SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties . Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed. Absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of the private respondent. To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. The petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in and of the Regional Trial Court are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. Mendoza vs. Allas (Quo Warranto) FACTS: Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He held various positions, the last of which before the institution of this case was as Director III of the CIIS. In 1993, Mendoza was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector of Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, Allas was appointed as Acting Director III of the CIIS. Despite the new assignment, Mendoza continued to receive the salary of the position of Director III. In 1994, Mendoza received a letter from the Deputy Customs Commissioner informing him of his termination from the BOC in view of Allas appointment by Pres. Aquino as Director III. Mendoza filed quo warranto against Allas. The court ruled in favor of Mendoza and ordered the ouster of Allas. Allas appealed to the CA but it was dismissed for being moot and academic since Allas was promoted by Pres. Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. Decision became final and executory. Mendoza filed Motion for execution of its decision but it was denied since the contested position vacated by Allas was being occupied by Olores, not a party to the quo warranto petition. Mendoza filed mandamus with the CA but was denied by CA. Hence this petition. ISSUE: WON Mendoza may be reinstated in his position as Director III? HELD: NO. Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision. Petitioner has apprised this Court that he reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on November 13, 1997. Reinstatement not being possible, petitioner now prays for the payment of his back salaries and other benefits from the time he was illegally dismissed until finality of the trial court's decision. Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner's back salaries and benefits. He was merely appointed to the subject position by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his constitutional power as Chief Executive. Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the said back salaries and benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition for quo warranto. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. SO ORDERED.
Valdes vs. CA
FACTS: Spouses Valdes filed an unlawful detainer case against Spouses Fabella. The complaint alleges these material facts: 1. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime [i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex "A" and the xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate of Title in her name marked as Annex "B"; 2. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession thereof; 3. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to peacefully surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied; 4. That despite plaintiffs referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still refused to heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot peacefully; 5. That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants to settle the case amicably, the Barangay Captain was forced to issue the necessary Certification to File Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that the necessary cause of action be taken before the proper court, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex "C"; 6. That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender the premises in question, the herein plaintiffs were constrained to engage the professional services of counsel thus incurring expenses amounting to TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing acceptance fee and additional ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent a formal demand was likewise ignored, (sic) copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "D"; 7. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender the said premises in question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious anxiety, sleepless nights, mental torture and moral erosion; The MTC ruled in favor of Spouses Valdes. The RTC affirmed the MTC decision. On appeal by the Spouses Fabella, the CA reversed the RTC decision. Spouses Valdes filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence this petition. ISSUE: WON the complaint makes out a case for unlawful detainer? HELD: No. In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. 27 It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. NOTE: There are three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria. Accion interdictal- comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession. Accion publiciana- is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. 12 It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. Accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.

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G.R. No. 167434

February 19, 2007

G.R. No. 79484 December 7, 1987

ISSUES: Whether or not

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